From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sat Nov 1 04:47:12 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 11:47:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> <1414756414.61185.YahooMailNeo@web173204.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1414842432.38856.YahooMailNeo@web173202.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear Larry Morally I was bound to answer . I wonder if dear folk have more nerves to consume ! I got happy you announced this to be , for the time being , the last exchange ! Thank you and everybody else ! I fear losing the post again . Therefore , deepest apologies for the attachment ! Best Haydi ________________________________ From: ?Larry Purss? ?? To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Friday, 31 October 2014, 23:59:33 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act Haydi, Once again thank you for your thoughtful [and informative] reply. It is an amazingly complex undertaking to explore the relations of word and activity and how the relations between these aspects as a *unity* should forever be engaged. As you mention, Leontiev calls our attention and focus to the centrality of the *objects* [the material] as fundamental to any understanding of human *nature* I seem to be drawn to not forgetting the subjective aspects of the *unity*. Wertsch uses the notion of *mediated action* as his attempt to find a term that bridges dialectical methods and dialogical methods within activity as a unity. Haydi, I have to admit when I read Andy, Martin, and David Kellogg I find myself seeing the *reasonableness* of each position as if there is a unity which embraces their subject matter, and each of these scholars is exploring a different aspect of our human *nature*. I continue to be nourished by the contrasts and I let myself move between their positions and realize they are operating from different *traditions* Vygotsky's book "Thought and Language* seems to be the book that each of them returns to but each enters the SAME book from different backgrounds. This leaves me personally fascinated with the recognition of the transformative power of the activity of *reading*. I am trying to follow each of their understandings and I realize to do this I must enter into the *traditions* that each author brings to Vygotsky. Their arguments are very subtle and nuanced and I am often confused by their differences. I do accept that the particular time and place that the cultural-historical and activity models were being developed was a transformative time and their love for their country illuminated all their work. I also understand that I come to this historically formed work from out of a *humanistic psychology* background [counselling psychology] and this particular tradition makes it difficult to enter a radically alternative worldview that radically puts into question the foundations of humanistic psychology. When confused I do return to Vygotsky's book *thought and language* to get re-grounded on the central thesis of interfunctional relations that are developmentally transformed as speech transforms from a focus on communication to an additional focus on self-mastery. It remain an open question to myself the particular relations between self-mastery and social communication. Mike Cole's description of his thought processes while driving in the car. Haydi, I am also trying to understand the place of the *figural* and perception within activity and language and this complicates things further. I do want to explore the connections between perception, concepts, and activity and you may notice my responses recently tending towards the figural and the notion of *schemas* that are possibly pre-linguistic. When I am looking closely at the *figural* I am inevitably loosing focus [at that moment] on activity or the word as central. However it is the *unity* of all three aspects I am attempting to hold together over time. Haydi, I appreciate your reminding me not to loose focus on activity as I try to follow David Kellogg or Martin. Andy attempting to expand activity as a psychological methodology to the social sciences I also am trying to understand. At some point I also want to understand Marx [the philosopher] and his theory of *labour* AS ONTOLOGICAL [as *being*] Is there a unity within the concept of *labour* that Marx shares with Heidegger and Vygotsky? These are vague, fuzzy questions. Haydi, the central theme of *sign* as *indicating* is where I will leave our conversation. Your being a referee calls be back to the truth of activity, action, and operations. You are *signalling* and I am listening. THIS movement is what I find magical leaving me with more to *figure* out. Larry On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 4:53 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: Dear Larry >Please find my responses in the body of the message : >Apologies ! I lost my responses ; had to use an attachment . > >________________________________ > From: ?Larry Purss? ?? >To: ?Andy Blunden? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? >Sent: Thursday, 30 October 2014, 6:36:53 >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act > > > >Haydi and Andy >Thanks for this rejoinder to the complexity of receiving Vygotsky's work in >the West. >I do wonder if it is possible to maintain the *purity* of the *whole >generation* that was engaged in exploring the *developing relation* between >the function of word and act. >[[Deal all are referees to my talk not addressees . It's not a matter of 'maintaining purity of a generation' . > > > > > >I was left wondering at the meaning of the very last sentence of this 4 >page PDF. > >At *the end* the *functional transformation* of the relation between word >and act and the possibility of future *disintegration* [and return to >earlier forms of functioning] between the word and act. > >Haydi, *in the end* THIS Vygotsky has traveled to the West and is now >transforming western notions > of psychology as [genetically psycho-social >processes. >The question you raise is if in this traveling what is ESSENTIAL is lost or >corrupted? >I am left wondering about the notion of *horizons* of UNDERstanding. >When I read that Anna Stetsenko, [who in the beginning formed her ideas >within the horizon of THIS Vygotsky], indicates that the relation of >*subjectivity* AND *objectivity* continues to BE an *open* question I >wonder if THIS Vygotsky will inevitably remain Para-Doxical and be open to >multiple other interpretations?. > >Haydi, your passion to return to Vygotsky's ACTUAL words [and this 4 page >PDF is an excellent example of this return] does stop us in our tracks and >gives us pause. I myself am left to puzzle the various [multiple] >Vygotsky's [yes multiple versions or genres] OF Vygotsky's works AS >INTERPRETED. > >Reading the rejoinders between Martin, Andy, and the multitude of other >participants on this site I find in ITSELF a dialectical AND dialogical >PROCESS that highlights in FACT the developing subject matter of the >functional relations between word act, AND *image*. > >I do NOT know who is *right* but I trust in THIS process that opens a space >[place] to bring us together. > >IN THE END *is* the beginning. This seems to be a *truth* that puts the >emphasis on a different aspect of this 4 page PDF. > >Larry > > > >On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Attached is a PDF of the article Haydi was talking about, "Word and Act." >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >>> Dear all, >>> The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in regard >>> to the concept of 'activity' . First , because Vygotsky died at an early >>> time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being able >>> to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in which he >>> stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley maneuverings >>> and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original ideas >>> and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the 'rift' >>> has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who invested >>> so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable disciples >>> ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one horrendous >>> criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole Middle >>> East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to >>> justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , > terror , filth and dirt >>> , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . West >>> tried to make people forget the >>> crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to >>> incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the Big >>> Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the >>> scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they don't >>> have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one WHOLE >>> GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; they >>> don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just two >>> or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy > and >>> selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to hear >>> 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' and we >>> laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If >>> Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all >>> politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please don't >>> !! Please don't >>> create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that >>> 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past with >>> attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your digestion >>> for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! >>> Second , Vygotsky > believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him >>> with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his own >>> ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great >>> heritage ! He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' >>> with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign >>> activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , >>> 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. as >>> he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise distinction >>> when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every >>> aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and 'overuses' >>> . Third , > please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and >>> act , and see where he is different from ANL . >>> He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the >>> 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . But is this not >>> just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , 'discourse' , >>> 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his >>> strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and >>> precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of the >>> domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material >>> activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? >>> Yes , I know all about its impact : > organizing , communicating , >>> cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. but >>> let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... as >>> things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be found >>> here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , >>> there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and scientific !! >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> From: ?mike cole? ?? >>> To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? >>> Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really >>> means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>> >>> >>> Lubomir-- >>> >>> A couple of comments that i put in the text in red >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi > Annalisa, >>>> >>>> I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. >>>> >>>> If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: >>>> -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. >>>> -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human >>>> activity. >>>> --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and >>>> therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science >>>> disciplines. There are >>>> >>>> >>> different interpretation of the concept of >>> >>> >>>> consciousness in different social science > disciplines. However, they all >>>> had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical >>>> materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. >>>> But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as >>> professionals about a category called consciousness. >>> >>> I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong >>> time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one >>> encounter >>> of the two ways of thinking. ? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Also: >>>> --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV >>>> resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students >>>> were >>>> reigning and that time. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy declined >>> after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that >>> counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy >>> Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his >>>> students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life >>>> time. >>>> ? An overstatement as above.? >>>> >>>> -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL >>>> circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at >>>> all. >>>> The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the >>>> 1960s (first edition 1940). >>>> -- Rubinstein was the >>>> >>>> >>> first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle >>> >>> >>>> of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim >>>> he >>>> heavily used works of LSV. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe them?? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that >>>> consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of >>>> activity and everyday life environment of the subject. >>>> ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, >>>> the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full >>>> >>>> >>> of holes and >>> >>> >>>> gaps, but recountable.? >>>> >>>> Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. >>>> ?that would be great. ? >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> ?Mike (too)? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Haydi.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 17522 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141101/4298d6fa/attachment.bin From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sat Nov 1 09:54:49 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 12:54:49 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <5454221A.3070407@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221A.3070407@mira.net> Message-ID: <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator of it, though!) -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Peg Griffin wrote: > ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the strings and > symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B From ablunden@mira.net Sat Nov 1 16:11:53 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 02 Nov 2014 10:11:53 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> Message-ID: <545568B9.5080502@mira.net> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they react by saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of solving an existing problem. How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Peg Griffin wrote: > The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There cannot > be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater than Boya's > string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." > > (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my favorite > paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that communication has > broken down." Can't remember who is the originator of it, though!) > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of > Andy Blunden > Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not familiar > with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > and < > relations are being evaluated here. Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > >> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A> to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the strings and >> symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B> >> > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sat Nov 1 18:48:51 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 21:48:51 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <545568B9.5080502@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <545568B9.5080502@mira .net> Message-ID: <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers or tape measures of strings. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they react by saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of solving an existing problem. How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Peg Griffin wrote: > The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There > cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater than > Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." > > (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that > communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator > of it, though!) > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf > Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not > familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > > and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > >> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the strings >> and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Nov 1 19:06:14 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 21:06:14 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <545568B9.5080502@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <545568B9.5080502@mira.net> Message-ID: <9C8016BE-C832-419D-8155-139DD92457B7@umich.edu> Andy and Peg It might be of interest to look at Keith Devlin's column in the MAA, He muses about counting versus comparison (in Davydov's sense). Perhaps of more interest would be the the Measure Up curriculum developed by Barbara Dougherty at the University of Hawaii: http://manoa.hawaii.edu/crdg/news/past-news/russian-math-in-hawai%E2%80%98i/ which is supposed to be a variation of Davydov's. Algebra is a strange course. It is often a mishmash of things and purposes. Ed On Nov 1, 2014, at 6:11 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they react by saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of solving an existing problem. > How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: >> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There cannot >> be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater than Boya's >> string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." >> >> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my favorite >> paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that communication has >> broken down." Can't remember who is the originator of it, though!) >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of >> Andy Blunden >> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not familiar >> with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > and < >> relations are being evaluated here. Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=AB = B>> >>> >> >> >> > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Nov 1 19:12:32 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 21:12:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> Message-ID: <56986AA2-A7D6-46CE-9F33-F436FAF21B71@umich.edu> Larry In the early grades most of the symbols are figural (1 especially although I've seen teachings treat the other recounting numbers in a figural fashion) as are things, for instance, like vertical addition. Perhaps you had something else in mind? Ed On Oct 31, 2014, at 11:55 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Peg, Andy, Ed, and Martin > > This thread is exploring a theme at the edge of my ZPD but I do *sense* the > central key theme being pointed to. In this spirit I want to link up a few > ideas. > Peg, you wrote: > That mathematical model (*A>B=A to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the strings and symbols having > a relation among relations: A>B = B exciting. The mathematics operations + and - grow from these relations > among relations. > > Peg, this indicating *models* do NOT need to have a concrete world to *rise > to* > > I want to link this insight to Martin's notion of *modal simulation* as the > *act* of *seeing AS* > > NOT rising to the concrete and *modal simulations* [modes? models?] and > the notion of *figuring* as *thinking* through *images*. > THIS transformation from Davydov's actual concrete relations of [ = ] to > the level of *figural* simulations that ARE GENERAL and *transcend??* the > concrete actuality. > > Now I will move to *units of analysis* as Vygotsky wrote about this notion > in "Thought and Language". > > This TYPE of analysis [ of units] shifts the issue to a LEVEL OF GREATER > GENERALITY looking NOT at elements but at units. The unit of [verbal > thought] is the unit of analysis to study the interfunctional development > of the RELATIONS of thought and speech. > > The question I am asking is where the *relation* of the *figural* > [diagrammatic] *thinking* links with the unit of *verbal thought* and > moving to higher levels of > generality. The *figure* of the triangle or circle AS examples of THIS > figural level of thinking. > > My question now moves to Kant and his notion of *schemas* as transcendental > images and Peirce's engaging with THIS same level of schemas but NOT > seeing the *figural* as transcendent. > > I may be linking too many thoughts together [chaining] but I am circling > around this question of the relations of the > 1] actual concrete situational experiences > 2] verbal thought as a unit of analysis > 3] schemas as figural > > This movement of becoming more GENERAL and mathematical figuring as an > example of this continuing development of GENERALITY as showing how : > > "The mathematics operations + and - grow from these relations among > relations" > > [as an aside I am purposely using Umberto Eco's term *figural* to indicate > THIS form of *seeing as* [modal simulation??]. > I sense *figural* may be a term that is KEY to this thread on *seeing > relations among relations* > Figural as key to interfunctional movement towards greater generality > [beyond the sensual but not transcendental]. > Peirce returned to Kant's notion of *schemas* in his re-search for a > non-transcendental DIAGRAMATIC TYPE of knowing. [the triangle is an > example of Peirce's exploring this TYPE of logic]. Umberto Eco's notion of > the *figural* engages with exploring Peirce's relation to Kant's schemas. > > Vygotsky's unit of analysis [word meaning] also is moving in this > realm towards greater generality beyond sensual experiencing. THE FIGURAL > and its relation to word meaning seems central to this movement of > generality as modal simulation. > > I apologize if I am zigzagging as I try to connect the dots between the > concrete and the general > Larry > > > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 8:10 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >> A small continuation that might help this along: >> In my understanding of the Davidov mathematics educators, it?s all about >> the objects (literal cloth strings or the clay etc.). They actually use >> Alyosha?s string and Borya?s string in their mathematical recording - they >> just use the letters when the strings get tattered or scarce or too >> troublesome or they are sick of being slowed down by drawing them so do >> what >> grown-ups do and give them names like A and B. >> And their direct perception of the cloth strings is crucial to using the >> initial symbols: = ? > < and the operation symbols + and -. Order doesn? >> t matter for recording symmetric relations among strings (= and ? ). Put >> Alyosha?s string on top of Borya?s or Borya?s on top of Alyosha?s and >> perception remains the same; it is either = or ? no matter the ordering. >> But digging a little deeper into inequality gets to the non-symmetric >> relations recorded with the symbols > and <, perception supporting the >> demand that ordering matters for those symbols. The real cloth strings and >> the children?s perceptions make it that they CANNOT ever ?see? or >> ?feel? that ?Alyosha?s string > Borya?s string = Alyosha?s string < >> Borya?s string.? That mathematical model (*A>B=A> concrete world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B> exciting. The mathematics operations + and - grow from these relations >> among relations and so on. >> So in my understanding, the answer of the Davidov mathematics educators to >> Ed?s question about ?equal? would involve the following: The symmetry of >> equality is known (buttressed by direct percepts of objects in the world) >> only in the whole system with ? and the non-symmetrical relations > and < >> and the complex relations among their combinations. >> The cultural value of mathematics for me is not so much the specific >> answers >> folks can arrive at. I value two characteristics: On one end is the >> certainty of the ?don?t know-no one can know? reached in some situations >> and the certainty of ?NOT possible mathematical model? in some situations. >> At the other end is the persistence of mathematicians when they grasp these >> limits and gleefully set about re-phrasing, re-framing, what -if-ing, and >> re-presenting to push the edges of what could be known, what could be >> possible. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2014 8:32 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Let's not let this thread drop, Ed. >> To my mind, understanding that mathematics is constrained by objective >> relations, and is not just a social convention, and therefore *reveals* >> objective relations, quite distinct from relations discoverable by >> "experimenting" in the world beyond the text, and opens the possibility for >> students to *explore and discover*. Such an experience has a very different >> content from that of acquiring a social convention. So I think it is >> important that the unit of analysis reflect this. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Ed Wall wrote: >>> Andy >>> >>> Nice and important points. Thanks! >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> >>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* >> essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially >> grasping >> something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of >> analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. >>>> >>>> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of >> analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are >> rarely >> exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in >> the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> --- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> From ewall@umich.edu Sat Nov 1 19:37:45 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 21:37:45 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Apologies In-Reply-To: <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> Message-ID: <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> Andy Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective versus the opposite? The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link in a brief intro): https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html Ed On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > :) So many issues. > > Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure was due to contingencies, I don't know. > > And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or they fail. > > The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to my mind. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Carol and Andy >> >> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese tended to be fairly pragmatic). >> >> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a different matter. >> >> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics curriculum may be a little outworn. >> >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> It's up to you, Ed. >>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations quite engaging. >>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>> >>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step further in our discussion on the listserve. >>>> >>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>> >>>> Best >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> Just thinking ... >>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>> >>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating phylogeny. >>>> >>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>> >> >>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>> >>> >> >>>> >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>> happened very early in history. >>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>> been resolved). >>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>> were used. >>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>> symbolic notation. >>>> >>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>> >>>> > Ah Ed >>>> > >>>> > Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>> heart of the matter. >>>> > >>>> > Carol >>>> > >>>> > On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>> >>> >> wrote: >>>> > Carol >>>> > >>>> > If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>> granted. >>>> > >>>> > Ed >>>> > >>>> > On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>> > >>>> > > Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>> > > >>>> > > Best >>>> > > Carol >>>> > > >>>> > > -- >>>> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> > > Developmental psycholinguist >>>> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > -- >>>> > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> > Developmental psycholinguist >>>> > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Nov 1 19:45:18 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2014 21:45:18 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <545568B9.5080502@mira .net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> Message-ID: <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - (although the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a Louis Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. Ed On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics > education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the beginning > mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers or tape > measures of strings. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, > wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they react by > saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children are > reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way to go. I > used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think of a number, > double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" with a classroom of > kids and then introducing x for the number you first thought of. Vygotsky > tells us to provide the symbol as a means of solving an existing problem. > How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: >> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater than >> Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." >> >> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >> of it, though!) >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf >> Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the strings >>> and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>> >>> >> >> >> > From tvmathdude@aol.com Sat Nov 1 22:05:48 2014 From: tvmathdude@aol.com (Tvmathdude) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 01:05:48 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> Message-ID: <8D1C471CCB35B1F-1E0C-3A21E@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> Andy, You have identified the real problem in much of what is taught as mathematics. When I look at curriculum in schools or colleges, nowhere do I see "create an environment where the student asks "what if?" The study of Geometry lends itself to this kind of approach, but schools and colleges are more focused on "right" answers, than deviations from the norm.Yes, there is a very small percentage of the student population who do this on their own, but why can't we look to provide an opportunity for "mindful mathematics" rather than "rote learning" for a majority of the students? Are we locked into "social convention"? All of our assessments of learning are about right and wrong, none are about "what do you think about this"? Dr. DeBono took at look at thought when he described a process called "po-ing" (sp?), which is based on "what if". Look at Project Zero out of Harvard. This is a real effort to encourage student thought. Legislatures seem so hung-up on accountability, but have no vision of what learning can be. I teach College Algebra to student right out of high-school. They are obsessed with "tell me what I need to know for the test". When, after kindergarten, do students get to "explore and discover"? Teaching is my passion. NLP is my tool set. I work very hard to open students minds to question and "play with" ideas, even when they don't realize they are doing it. It is great to expand this discussion, but how do we help the student? Roger -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Sent: Thu, Oct 30, 2014 8:34 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Let's not let this thread drop, Ed. To my mind, understanding that mathematics is constrained by objective relations, and is not just a social convention, and therefore *reveals* objective relations, quite distinct from relations discoverable by "experimenting" in the world beyond the text, and opens the possibility for students to *explore and discover*. Such an experience has a very different content from that of acquiring a social convention. So I think it is important that the unit of analysis reflect this. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Nice and important points. Thanks! > > Ed > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. >> >> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 2 00:17:09 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 02 Nov 2014 18:17:09 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> Some people will be familiar with this: 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b 5. then a+b=b 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b 7. then 2=1 This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there just for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to objective constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a and b represent lengths or baseball scores. Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. Andy (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. > > I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective versus the opposite? > > The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link in a brief intro): > > https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html > > Ed > > On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> :) So many issues. >> >> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure was due to contingencies, I don't know. >> >> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or they fail. >> >> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to my mind. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Carol and Andy >>> >>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese tended to be fairly pragmatic). >>> >>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a different matter. >>> >>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics curriculum may be a little outworn. >>> >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> It's up to you, Ed. >>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations quite engaging. >>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>>> >>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step further in our discussion on the listserve. >>>>> >>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Just thinking ... >>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating phylogeny. >>>>> >>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>>> >> >>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>> >>>> >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>>> happened very early in history. >>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>>> been resolved). >>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>>> were used. >>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>>> symbolic notation. >>>>> >>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > Ah Ed >>>>> > >>>>> > Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>>> heart of the matter. >>>>> > >>>>> > Carol >>>>> > >>>>> > On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>>> > Carol >>>>> > >>>>> > If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>>> granted. >>>>> > >>>>> > Ed >>>>> > >>>>> > On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > > Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>>> > > >>>>> > > Best >>>>> > > Carol >>>>> > > >>>>> > > -- >>>>> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> > > Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > -- >>>>> > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> > Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 2 00:22:29 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 02 Nov 2014 18:22:29 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <8D1C471CCB35B1F-1E0C-3A21E@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <8D1C471CCB35B1F-1E0C-3A21E@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <5455DBB5.6090409@mira.net> I'm a bit stumped, Roger. It seems that the "acquiring a social convention in manipulating text" unit of analysis reflects the current consensus of opinion in maths teaching. That explains why people are so repulsed by mathematics and why so many people have trouble learning it, but I am in no position whatsoever to do anything about that except observe. On the other hand, the Davydov approach has some merits, but if they never get past linear operations with constants, that is, the students never actually get to learn mathematics, we are hardly any better off, are we? And that's leaving aside (what I regard as) Davydov's misconceptions about the relation between everyday concepts and scientific concepts. So that's it. Full stop, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Tvmathdude wrote: > Andy, > > You have identified the real problem in much of what is taught as > mathematics. When I look at curriculum in schools or colleges, nowhere > do I see "create an environment where the student asks "what if?" The > study of Geometry lends itself to this kind of approach, but schools > and colleges are more focused on "right" answers, than deviations from > the norm.Yes, there is a very small percentage of the student > population who do this on their own, but why can't we look to provide > an opportunity for "mindful mathematics" rather than "rote learning" > for a majority of the students? Are we locked into "social convention"? > > All of our assessments of learning are about right and wrong, none are > about "what do you think about this"? > > Dr. DeBono took at look at thought when he described a process called > "po-ing" (sp?), which is based on "what if". > > Look at Project Zero out of Harvard. This is a real effort to > encourage student thought. Legislatures seem so hung-up on > accountability, but have no vision of what learning can be. > > I teach College Algebra to student right out of high-school. They are > obsessed with "tell me what I need to know for the test". > > When, after kindergarten, do students get to "explore and discover"? > > Teaching is my passion. NLP is my tool set. I work very hard to open > students minds to question and "play with" ideas, even when they don't > realize they are doing it. > > It is great to expand this discussion, but how do we help the student? > > Roger > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Sent: Thu, Oct 30, 2014 8:34 pm > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Let's not let this thread drop, Ed. > To my mind, understanding that mathematics is constrained by objective > relations, and is not just a social convention, and therefore *reveals* > objective relations, quite distinct from relations discoverable by > "experimenting" in the world beyond the text, and opens the possibility > for students to *explore and discover*. Such an experience has a very > different content from that of acquiring a social convention. So I think > it is important that the unit of analysis reflect this. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: > > Andy > > > > Nice and important points. Thanks! > > > > Ed > > > > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > >> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* > essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping > something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. > Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. > >> > >> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of > analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely > exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the > unit of analysis. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sun Nov 2 07:42:05 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 10:42:05 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <545568B9.5080502@mira .net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I don't know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with the children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in US elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols overshadow other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than relations in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some of the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing not a mathematics thing. PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - (although the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a Louis Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. Ed On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics > education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers > or tape measures of strings. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, > wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they > react by > saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children > are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way > to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think > of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" > with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you > first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of solving an existing problem. > How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: >> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." >> >> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >> of it, though!) >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>> >>> >> >> >> > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sun Nov 2 09:32:07 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 12:32:07 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <545568B9.5080502@mira .net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> Message-ID: <005701cff6c2$ed7e00e0$c87a02a0$@att.net> Typo alert: after the + should be a - in the parenthetical following operations. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2014 10:42 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I don't know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with the children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in US elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols overshadow other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than relations in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some of the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing not a mathematics thing. PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - (although the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a Louis Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. Ed On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics > education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers > or tape measures of strings. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, > wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they > react by > saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children > are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way > to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think > of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" > with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you > first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means > of solving an existing problem. > How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: >> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." >> >> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >> of it, though!) >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>> >>> >> >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 2 11:04:31 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 11:04:31 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act In-Reply-To: <1414842432.38856.YahooMailNeo@web173202.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> <1414756414.61185.YahooMailNeo@web173204.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <1414842432.38856.YahooMailNeo@web173202.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Haydi and Larry-- I am experiencing a lot of difficulty interpreting this thread. I think one issue is how to interpret and deal with the extent of difference between Vygotksy (LSV) and Leontiev (ANL) and which parts of that difference retain their importance. From participation in current Russian discussions of these issues, I know that they remain alive there to the present day. From the Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology we know that a strong division has been instantiated by the editors who follow the Vygotsky/Luria line and omit that part involving ANL. I gather from Haydi's remarks that he is unhappy about the fact that Americans can criticize Leontiev for his complicity in Stalinist policies, but not ourselves for our complicity in contemporary American foreign policy and the ways in which notions of discourse and semiotics may be mobilized to deflect attention from the changes (distortions?) in LSV's ideas that have been taking place since he became a prominent intellectual figure in the west in the 1980's. There is certainly enough truth in that observation to make everyone stop and think. If it is relevant, I would appreciate a succinct statement of what you believe to be major points that we need to focus on, and if possible, specific texts that can be shared online. Perhaps this is going to be counter- productive. I appeared to have caused problems by focusing on the two articles on perezhivanie. I did this because it was identified in discussions among contemporary Russian psychologists about a critical point where LSV and ANL parted company. From the ensuing discussion, it seems clear that this pair of articles certainly evokes the divisions. However, the very great number of similarities in points of view across the divide that opened up in the 1930's remain and remain important. At the risk of causing further dissension, I wonder if it would be possible to focus on the text that Hayki pointed us to in volume 6 (whose volume 6 in which language) on "word and act." LSV's volume 6 in English is devoted to "Sign and Tool" and "Teaching about the emotions." What text are you referring to Haydi? do you think that join reading of that text would promote understanding of fundamental differences of opinion? Do you have a better suggestion? These are difficult discussions being held at difficult times. I us good luck. mike On Sat, Nov 1, 2014 at 4:47 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear Larry > Morally I was bound to answer . I wonder if dear folk have more nerves to > consume ! I got happy you announced this to be , for the time being , the > last exchange ! Thank you and everybody else ! > I fear losing the post again . Therefore , deepest apologies for the > attachment ! > Best > Haydi > > ________________________________ > From: ?Larry Purss? ?? > To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, > Culture, Activity"? ?? > Sent: Friday, 31 October 2014, 23:59:33 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act > > > > Haydi, > Once again thank you for your thoughtful [and informative] reply. > It is an amazingly complex undertaking to explore the relations of word > and activity and how the relations between these aspects as a *unity* > should forever be engaged. As you mention, Leontiev calls our attention and > focus to the centrality of the *objects* [the material] as fundamental to > any understanding of human *nature* > I seem to be drawn to not forgetting the subjective aspects of the *unity*. > > Wertsch uses the notion of *mediated action* as his attempt to find a term > that bridges dialectical methods and dialogical methods within activity as > a unity. > Haydi, I have to admit when I read Andy, Martin, and David Kellogg I find > myself seeing the *reasonableness* of each position as if there is a unity > which embraces their subject matter, and each of these scholars is > exploring a different aspect of our human *nature*. > > I continue to be nourished by the contrasts and I let myself move between > their positions and realize they are operating from different *traditions* > > Vygotsky's book "Thought and Language* seems to be the book that each of > them returns to but each enters the SAME book from different backgrounds. > This leaves me personally fascinated with the recognition of the > transformative power of the activity of *reading*. > I am trying to follow each of their understandings and I realize to do > this I must enter into the *traditions* that each author brings to Vygotsky. > Their arguments are very subtle and nuanced and I am often confused by > their differences. > I do accept that the particular time and place that the > cultural-historical and activity models were being developed was a > transformative time and their love for their country illuminated all their > work. > I also understand that I come to this historically formed work from out of > a *humanistic psychology* background [counselling psychology] and this > particular tradition makes it difficult to enter a radically alternative > worldview that radically puts into question the foundations of humanistic > psychology. > > When confused I do return to Vygotsky's book *thought and language* to get > re-grounded on the central thesis of interfunctional relations that are > developmentally transformed as speech transforms from a focus on > communication to an additional focus on self-mastery. > It remain an open question to myself the particular relations between > self-mastery and social communication. Mike Cole's description of his > thought processes while driving in the car. > > Haydi, I am also trying to understand the place of the *figural* and > perception within activity and language and this complicates things > further. I do want to explore the connections between perception, > concepts, and activity and you may notice my responses recently tending > towards the figural and the notion of *schemas* that are possibly > pre-linguistic. When I am looking closely at the *figural* I am inevitably > loosing focus [at that moment] on activity or the word as central. However > it is the *unity* of all three aspects I am attempting to hold together > over time. > > Haydi, I appreciate your reminding me not to loose focus on activity as I > try to follow David Kellogg or Martin. Andy attempting to expand activity > as a psychological methodology to the social sciences I also am trying to > understand. > At some point I also want to understand Marx [the philosopher] and his > theory of *labour* AS ONTOLOGICAL [as *being*] Is there a unity within the > concept of *labour* that Marx shares with Heidegger and Vygotsky? These > are vague, fuzzy questions. > Haydi, the central theme of *sign* as *indicating* is where I will leave > our conversation. Your being a referee calls be back to the truth of > activity, action, and operations. You are *signalling* and I am listening. > THIS movement is what I find magical leaving me with more to *figure* out. > Larry > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 4:53 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > Dear Larry > >Please find my responses in the body of the message : > >Apologies ! I lost my responses ; had to use an attachment . > > > >________________________________ > > From: ?Larry Purss? ?? > >To: ?Andy Blunden? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity"? ?? > >Sent: Thursday, 30 October 2014, 6:36:53 > >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act > > > > > > > >Haydi and Andy > >Thanks for this rejoinder to the complexity of receiving Vygotsky's work > in > >the West. > >I do wonder if it is possible to maintain the *purity* of the *whole > >generation* that was engaged in exploring the *developing relation* > between > >the function of word and act. > >[[Deal all are referees to my talk not addressees . It's not a matter of > 'maintaining purity of a generation' . > > > > > > > > > > > >I was left wondering at the meaning of the very last sentence of this 4 > >page PDF. > > > >At *the end* the *functional transformation* of the relation between word > >and act and the possibility of future *disintegration* [and return to > >earlier forms of functioning] between the word and act. > > > >Haydi, *in the end* THIS Vygotsky has traveled to the West and is now > >transforming western notions > > of psychology as [genetically psycho-social > >processes. > >The question you raise is if in this traveling what is ESSENTIAL is lost > or > >corrupted? > >I am left wondering about the notion of *horizons* of UNDERstanding. > >When I read that Anna Stetsenko, [who in the beginning formed her ideas > >within the horizon of THIS Vygotsky], indicates that the relation of > >*subjectivity* AND *objectivity* continues to BE an *open* question I > >wonder if THIS Vygotsky will inevitably remain Para-Doxical and be open to > >multiple other interpretations?. > > > >Haydi, your passion to return to Vygotsky's ACTUAL words [and this 4 page > >PDF is an excellent example of this return] does stop us in our tracks and > >gives us pause. I myself am left to puzzle the various [multiple] > >Vygotsky's [yes multiple versions or genres] OF Vygotsky's works AS > >INTERPRETED. > > > >Reading the rejoinders between Martin, Andy, and the multitude of other > >participants on this site I find in ITSELF a dialectical AND dialogical > >PROCESS that highlights in FACT the developing subject matter of the > >functional relations between word act, AND *image*. > > > >I do NOT know who is *right* but I trust in THIS process that opens a > space > >[place] to bring us together. > > > >IN THE END *is* the beginning. This seems to be a *truth* that puts the > >emphasis on a different aspect of this 4 page PDF. > > > >Larry > > > > > > > >On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Attached is a PDF of the article Haydi was talking about, "Word and > Act." > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> > >>> Dear all, > >>> The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in > regard > >>> to the concept of 'activity' . First , because Vygotsky died at an > early > >>> time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being > able > >>> to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in > which he > >>> stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley > maneuverings > >>> and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original > ideas > >>> and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the > 'rift' > >>> has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who > invested > >>> so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable > disciples > >>> ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one > horrendous > >>> criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole > Middle > >>> East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to > >>> justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , > > terror , filth and dirt > >>> , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . > West > >>> tried to make people forget the > >>> crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to > >>> incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the > Big > >>> Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the > >>> scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they > don't > >>> have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one > WHOLE > >>> GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; > they > >>> don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just > two > >>> or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy > > and > >>> selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to > hear > >>> 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' > and we > >>> laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If > >>> Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all > >>> politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please > don't > >>> !! Please don't > >>> create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that > >>> 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past > with > >>> attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your > digestion > >>> for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! > >>> Second , Vygotsky > > believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him > >>> with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his > own > >>> ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great > >>> heritage ! He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' > >>> with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign > >>> activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , > >>> 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. > as > >>> he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise > distinction > >>> when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every > >>> aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and > 'overuses' > >>> . Third , > > please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and > >>> act , and see where he is different from ANL . > >>> He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the > >>> 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . But is this > not > >>> just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , > 'discourse' , > >>> 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his > >>> strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and > >>> precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of > the > >>> domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material > >>> activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? > >>> Yes , I know all about its impact : > > organizing , communicating , > >>> cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. > but > >>> let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... > as > >>> things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be > found > >>> here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , > >>> there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and > scientific !! > >>> Best > >>> Haydi > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> ________________________________ > >>> From: ?mike cole? ?? > >>> To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > >>> Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really > >>> means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > >>> > >>> > >>> Lubomir-- > >>> > >>> A couple of comments that i put in the text in red > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov > > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Hi > > Annalisa, > >>>> > >>>> I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. > >>>> > >>>> If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > >>>> -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > >>>> -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of > human > >>>> activity. > >>>> --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and > >>>> therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science > >>>> disciplines. There are > >>>> > >>>> > >>> different interpretation of the concept of > >>> > >>> > >>>> consciousness in different social science > > disciplines. However, they all > >>>> had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than > historical > >>>> materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday > life. > >>>> But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as > >>> professionals about a category called consciousness. > >>> > >>> I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a > loooooooooooooong > >>> time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one > >>> encounter > >>> of the two ways of thinking. ? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Also: > >>>> --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV > >>>> resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students > >>>> were > >>>> reigning and that time. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy > declined > >>> after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that > >>> counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy > >>> Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his > >>>> students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their > life > >>>> time. > >>>> ? An overstatement as above.? > >>>> > >>>> -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the > ANL > >>>> circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at > >>>> all. > >>>> The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from > the > >>>> 1960s (first edition 1940). > >>>> -- Rubinstein was the > >>>> > >>>> > >>> first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > >>> > >>> > >>>> of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources > claim > >>>> he > >>>> heavily used works of LSV. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe > them?? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that > >>>> consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of > >>>> activity and everyday life environment of the subject. > >>>> ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, > >>>> the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full > >>>> > >>>> > >>> of holes and > >>> > >>> > >>>> gaps, but recountable.? > >>>> > >>>> Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. > >>>> ?that would be great. ? > >>>> > >>>> Best wishes, > >>>> ?Mike (too)? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ewall@umich.edu Sun Nov 2 12:03:00 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 14:03:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <5454221 A.3070407@mira.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <545568B9.5080502@mira .net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> Message-ID: <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> Peg By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus counting number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US curriculum it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting number versus real number) is better than the other. I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you gave 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the one using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in some 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' in some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. Ed On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the > Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. > > I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I don't > know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics > educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about > formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with the > children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers > until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in US > elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols overshadow > other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the > fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than relations > in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not > understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some of > the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing > not a mathematics thing. > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - (although > the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a Louis > Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. > > Ed > > On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers >> or tape measures of strings. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, >> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >> react by >> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children >> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of > solving an existing problem. >> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >> >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Peg Griffin wrote: >>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." >>> >>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >>> of it, though!) >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>> >>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> - >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Nov 2 13:15:25 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 23:15:25 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment) Message-ID: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/world/europe/putins-friend-profits-in-purge-of-schoolbooks.html?emc=edit_na_20141101&nlid=46189431&_r=0 From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 2 13:33:30 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 13:33:30 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?Fwd=3A_NYTimes=2Ecom=3A_=E2=80=98The_Nazis_Next_Door?= =?utf-8?q?=2C=E2=80=99_by_Eric_Lichtblau?= In-Reply-To: <5456a1c1.c25ee50a.2bfa.0a5eSMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> References: <5456a1c1.c25ee50a.2bfa.0a5eSMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: After posting my note addressed to Haydi and Larry, I came across this book review in the NY Times. It seemed to resonate with need to be careful when casting stones from inside a glass house which can be especially irritating in international discussions. mike ?The Nazis Next Door,? by Eric Lichtblau By DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT How did America become a postwar haven for Nazis? To ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your address book. Advertisement Copyright 2014 | The New York Times Company | NYTimes.com 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 2 13:45:28 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 13:45:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> Message-ID: As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean Schmittau's writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may give those following the discussion some useful info. mike On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Peg > > By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you > refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I > mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely > agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus counting > number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US curriculum > it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting number > versus real number) is better than the other. > > I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you gave > 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the one > using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > > I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I > don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in some > 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' in > some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. > > Ed > > On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the > > Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. > > > > I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I > don't > > know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics > > educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > > In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about > > formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with > the > > children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers > > until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in > US > > elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols > overshadow > > other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the > > fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than > relations > > in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not > > understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some > of > > the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing > > not a mathematics thing. > > PG > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > > > Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - > (although > > the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a > Louis > > Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. > > > > Ed > > > > On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > >> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics > >> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > >> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers > >> or tape measures of strings. > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >> > >> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, > >> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they > >> react by > >> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children > >> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way > >> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think > >> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" > >> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you > >> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of > > solving an existing problem. > >> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >> > >> Andy > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There > >>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater > >>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's > string." > >>> > >>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > >>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that > >>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator > >>> of it, though!) > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > >>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>> > >>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not > >>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > >>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>> > >>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A >>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > >>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Schmittau-Davydov1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 71794 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141102/57c4a125/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SchmittauThe Development.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 143368 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141102/57c4a125/attachment-0001.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 2 14:02:09 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 22:02:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1414965728286.61803@unm.edu> Somehow I actually am happy that books with Disney drawings in math books were banned. I wish they would do that in the US. :) Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 2:15 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/world/europe/putins-friend-profits-in-purge-of-schoolbooks.html?emc=edit_na_20141101&nlid=46189431&_r=0 From nataliag@sfu.ca Sun Nov 2 14:12:16 2014 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 14:12:16 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> Message-ID: <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hi Dear All, I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of Jean Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached another article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "mike cole" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean Schmittau's writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may give those following the discussion some useful info. mike On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Peg > > By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you > refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I > mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely > agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus counting > number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US curriculum > it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting number > versus real number) is better than the other. > > I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you gave > 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the one > using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > > I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I > don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in some > 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' in > some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. > > Ed > > On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the > > Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. > > > > I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I > don't > > know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics > > educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > > In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about > > formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with > the > > children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers > > until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in > US > > elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols > overshadow > > other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the > > fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than > relations > > in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not > > understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some > of > > the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing > > not a mathematics thing. > > PG > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > > > Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - > (although > > the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a > Louis > > Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. > > > > Ed > > > > On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > >> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics > >> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > >> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers > >> or tape measures of strings. > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >> > >> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, > >> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they > >> react by > >> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children > >> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way > >> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think > >> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" > >> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you > >> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of > > solving an existing problem. > >> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >> > >> Andy > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There > >>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater > >>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's > string." > >>> > >>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > >>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that > >>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator > >>> of it, though!) > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > >>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>> > >>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not > >>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > >>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>> > >>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A >>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > >>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: MoxnayforXMCA.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 816185 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141102/8857d6a4/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Schmittau Cultural Historical Theory & MathEdforXMCA.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 148705 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141102/8857d6a4/attachment-0003.pdf From ewall@umich.edu Sun Nov 2 14:20:43 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 16:20:43 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <6102F352-3722-4520-AC7E-EEEDDB7156C1@umich.edu> Many thanks Natalia and Mike. Ed On Nov 2, 2014, at 4:12 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Dear All, > I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it very interesting! > just to add to those two articles that Mike send of Jean Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached another article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. > I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. > Cheers, > Natalia. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mike cole" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean Schmittau's > writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may > give those following the discussion some useful info. > mike > > On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Peg >> >> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you >> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely >> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus counting >> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US curriculum >> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting number >> versus real number) is better than the other. >> >> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you gave >> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the one >> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >> >> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in some >> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' in >> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the >>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >>> >>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >> don't >>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics >>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about >>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with >> the >>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers >>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in >> US >>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >> overshadow >>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the >>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >> relations >>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not >>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some >> of >>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing >>> not a mathematics thing. >>> PG >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>> >>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >> (although >>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a >> Louis >>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers >>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>> >>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, >>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >>>> react by >>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children >>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of >>> solving an existing problem. >>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >> string." >>>>> >>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >>>>> of it, though!) >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>> >>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> - >>>>> -- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 2 16:55:16 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 00:55:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu>, , <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> Hi David, I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when the speech goes quiet? :) Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Hi David, Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. What I want to say quickly is regarding 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Dear Annalisa: What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's how the light gets in. Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing intellect). Vygotsky says: 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? ?????????? ??? ?????. ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that will determine the course of his development. He is simply a perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by the environment; through the external path of the environment he acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around him.) You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the dying). Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned characteristics could then be handed down genetically to offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). He was particularly well read in the very latest in German psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with something that is already intellect, what you have is not an explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is Not Born a Personality". Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David! > > I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. > > Immediate things I have learned from your post: > 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. > > 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? > > 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. > > As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! > > With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. > > Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. > > Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. > > My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. > > I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) > > David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. > > Until then... > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In > particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come > over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find > essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are > historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically > expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of > genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question > of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. > > First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings > on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between > Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which > Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of > consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the > importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the > original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's > much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May > 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students > and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. > 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: > > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 > > I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of > Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar > to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder > of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do > now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our > understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at > least) three: > > a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), > Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the > explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself > accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form > of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This > revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use > activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made > up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of > activity. > > b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as > a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant > rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting > contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the > discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than > a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term > effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the > anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely > mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely > mentions anything without mentioning language). > > c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not > Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development > (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his > book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term > effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" > (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child > Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never > renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write > scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of > modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. > > The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from > point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same > way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use > perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of > mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what > Vygotsky does at all. > > a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of > analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution > of the environment from the contribution of the child in the > understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very > simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the > environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it > is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's > hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on > heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to > the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that > Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of > development. > > b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a > "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last > chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, > personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child > development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is > the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one > is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really > reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion > for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is > retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while > "world outlook" is proleptic. > > c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: > the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the > lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on > perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely > notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word > meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is > eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something > else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us > to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and > nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of > its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken > lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his > death. > > Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the > Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of > Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where > Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John > Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality > is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I > think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that > semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A > narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock > puppet clapping. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> >> Thanks for some additional information. >> >> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >> >> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >> >> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >> >> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >> >> First is historical: >> >> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >> >> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >> >> Second is theoretical: >> >> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >> >> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >> >> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >> >> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Annalisa, >> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >> show through. >> >> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> >>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>> >>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>> not flood the list). >>> >>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>> >>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>> this thinking? >>> >>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>> >>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>> >>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>> >>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>> concept of perezhivanie? >>> >>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>> >>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>> >>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>> the whole is an abstraction. >>> >>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>> >>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>> >>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>> >>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Nov 2 18:38:24 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 23:38:24 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] A Collection Of Clues To America's Educational Past : NPR Ed : NPR Message-ID: <26860FB9-E2AF-4943-9062-F23B1430E206@gmail.com> Of interest for many people here, David http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2014/11/02/355129844/a-collection-of-clues-to-americas-educational-past From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 2 19:47:46 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2014 14:47:46 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5456FAE2.7030602@mira.net> Mike, thank you for the two Schmittau articles on Davydov maths teaching. The first was very brief, but useful. The second was very helpful, in that it did put a lot of meat on the bones of my sketchy understanding of what VVD's maths program meant, but I have some problems with it, which people on the list could probably help me with. (1) The abstract claims that the order of learning (first arithmetic and then algebra) traditionally used is reversed. I found this an astounding idea. But when I read, this seems not to be what actually happens. The children are doing complex arithemetical task like dividing by 3-digit numbers, and still haven't actually got to algebra. Though (2) there is talk of a schematic kids are offered to use to structure problems. It would help to know what this schematic is. (3) There is a fault in the PDF, causing some mathematical symbols to not show, which (I think) is making some of the examples incomprehensible, (4) though I find telling a kid who says 14-4-4=14 is making an error a bit rich as it seems to me an equally valid answer to an ill-posed problem. (5) Finally, Schmittau assumes that by "pre-concept" Vygotsky meant "complex". I thought this at first, until a few years ago David Ke kindly corrected me, and indeed this is not the case. Although merely a question of terminology, a rather crucial one, as it is pre-concepts which are the basis for learning mathematics and "complexes" lead to set theory only. I note that Paula Towsey in her work, also distinguishes "preconcepts" as a particular formation, not simply a name for the whole bunch of concepts arising prior to the formation of theoretical concepts. (Though I did appreciate Schmittau's rare distinction implied in the use of the term "theoretical concept" instead of the more usual "scientific concept.") Can anyone help? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean Schmittau's > writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may > give those following the discussion some useful info. > mike > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Nov 2 22:11:50 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:11:50 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <5456FAE2.7030602@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <5456FAE2.7030602@mira.net> Message-ID: I am teaching a class in Immersion this semester, and every week we do a lesson from the Korean curriculum in English. Last week we had to do a mathematics lesson, and almost everyone chose fractions. I usually start off the homework with an example (sometimes not a very good example, though!) and my lesson was essentially Davydov method: the kids had a big tank of banana milk and they had to measure it with impossibly small cups, but I supplied a bowl that held exactly six cups. From this we derived the idea of the bowl as a fraction of the tank and the cup as a fraction of the whole (and, as I understand it, it is this idea of part-whole relations that Davydov considers the entry point into algebra, because instead of starting off with a "known" like zero or one as you do when you count or when you do an arithmetical equation like 6 x 17 = ? you can start off with an unknown). Nobody likes to copy my lessons, but nobody likes to stray too far from them either. The favorite method was to substitute something for the banana milk, and the favorite subsitute was pizza. But this led to unhealthy lessons such as, you and your friend want to divide a pizza, so you cut it in two and each of you takes half. This led to an obvious absurdity when one grad decided to substitute an entire watermelon (and, absurdity on absurdity, used a picture that showed a watermelon in cross section instead of a whole). But what was really unhealthy about the lesson was the regression in mathematics to fit the low level of English. In class I pointed out that the way people actually do eat pizza is a better fit for the lesson. You cut your pizza into eighths or twelfths or sixteenths, depending on the size of the pizza. Everybody takes one and eats it more or less simultaneously, and then everybody takes one when they are hungry and eats it, and then you try to figure out who is entitled to or wants the last piece, on the basis how many have been eaten. As you can see the difference between the two lessons really is twofold: in the case of starting with the whole pizza and dividing it by the number of eaters, you start with a known and proceed to the unknown, while in the case of the more naturalistic pizza-consumption mode, you start with an unknown and proceed to the known. But more importantly, because my grads are all TESOL teachers, they have a natural tendency to reduce everything to naming: when we have named 1/2 by its proper English name, we have the whole key to fractions. Unfortunately, with everyday words, that is exactly what we do not have--you are much better off working with sixteenths, because that forces the children to work with a system, to think of two numbers and an operation instead of just a lexicalized expression like "half" or "quarter". This week we are doing science lessons, and I can already see that the science lessons come in two definite types: 'What" questions ("What is solar altitude?") and "Why" questions ("Why does it it get cooler instead of hotter when the sun comes down?"). Sure enough, the grads who used half pizzas and quarter pizzas and assumed that once you have learned these opaque and lexicalized everyday words you have mastered the system of concepts behind them all fall into the first category. Of course, the term Vygotsky uses is really something like "academic concept" rather than "scientific concept". This is sufficient ot explain to me, or at least to the linguist in me, why they come in hierarchies, why they are definite and exhaustive, why they are morphologically complex, and why they are born in laboratories but like to hide in classrooms.... David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies . On 3 November 2014 12:47, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike, thank you for the two Schmittau articles on Davydov maths teaching. > The first was very brief, but useful. > The second was very helpful, in that it did put a lot of meat on the bones > of my sketchy understanding of what VVD's maths program meant, but I have > some problems with it, which people on the list could probably help me with. > > (1) The abstract claims that the order of learning (first arithmetic and > then algebra) traditionally used is reversed. I found this an astounding > idea. But when I read, this seems not to be what actually happens. The > children are doing complex arithemetical task like dividing by 3-digit > numbers, and still haven't actually got to algebra. Though > (2) there is talk of a schematic kids are offered to use to structure > problems. It would help to know what this schematic is. > (3) There is a fault in the PDF, causing some mathematical symbols to not > show, which (I think) is making some of the examples incomprehensible, > (4) though I find telling a kid who says 14-4-4=14 is making an error a bit > rich as it seems to me an equally valid answer to an ill-posed problem. > (5) Finally, Schmittau assumes that by "pre-concept" Vygotsky meant > "complex". I thought this at first, until a few years ago David Ke kindly > corrected me, and indeed this is not the case. Although merely a question of > terminology, a rather crucial one, as it is pre-concepts which are the basis > for learning mathematics and "complexes" lead to set theory only. I note > that Paula Towsey in her work, also distinguishes "preconcepts" as a > particular formation, not simply a name for the whole bunch of concepts > arising prior to the formation of theoretical concepts. (Though I did > appreciate Schmittau's rare distinction implied in the use of the term > "theoretical concept" instead of the more usual "scientific concept.") > > Can anyone help? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> >> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >> Schmittau's >> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may >> give those following the discussion some useful info. >> mike >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 2 22:17:14 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2014 17:17:14 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning at a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but I guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by Davydov's method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with algebra later on. It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a "unit of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be extended. Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a CHAT theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and Leontyev. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Dear All, > I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it very interesting! > just to add to those two articles that Mike send of Jean Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached another article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. > I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. > Cheers, > Natalia. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mike cole" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean Schmittau's > writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may > give those following the discussion some useful info. > mike > > On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > >> Peg >> >> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you >> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely >> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus counting >> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US curriculum >> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting number >> versus real number) is better than the other. >> >> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you gave >> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the one >> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >> >> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in some >> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' in >> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> >> >>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the >>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >>> >>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >>> >> don't >> >>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics >>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about >>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with >>> >> the >> >>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers >>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in >>> >> US >> >>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >>> >> overshadow >> >>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the >>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >>> >> relations >> >>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not >>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some >>> >> of >> >>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal thing >>> not a mathematics thing. >>> PG >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>> >>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >>> >> (although >> >>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a >>> >> Louis >> >>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>> >>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers >>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>> >>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, >>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >>>> react by >>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children >>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of >>>> >>> solving an existing problem. >>> >>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> >>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >>>>> >> string." >> >>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >>>>> of it, though!) >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>> >>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>>>> >>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> - >>>>> -- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >> >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Nov 2 23:16:57 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 16:16:57 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> Message-ID: I can always tell when people are getting a little defensive on the list. First of all, charges get responded to long before they are even made (profuse and unsubstantiated professions of being poorly read). Secondly, people get told to go and read things (though I think what Andy recommended was not, in fact, Wittgenstein on the ineffable). Thirdly, I find that I myself begin to begin sentences with "I" rather than with "Do you mean...?". Finally, to take an example from a different thread on the list, there is a certain gratuitous intrusion of "tu quoques" argumentation: Leontiev's revisionism is defended on the grounds that Stalin was the George W. Bush of Soviet science. (I would not thought it actually possible to be unfair to Stalin, still less to provoke me to defend him, but I do have to say that while both men were responsible for literally millions of unnecessary deaths, Stalin successfully defeated Hitler, while Bush merely tried to defeat social security and gay marriage and utterly failed. In any case, the real issue is whether the American academic community ever took Bush's scientific beliefs at all seriously, to which I trust the answer is no.) There is no reason, that I can see, for any defensiveness. I do not, for example, think that Haydi's comments are aimed at me, both because he is always very pleasant to me when he is asking me for articles off list and because he is clearly addressing his remarks to Westerners, and I am only Western by virtue of my choice of parents (believe me, my choice of wife has a lot more to do with what I think and say). I think you, Annalisa, have still less reason to be defensive than I do; you've raised some fascinating questions, and we've had a very lucid and enjoyable discussion. For example... a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering again, and that is not what Martin meant.) c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher psychological functions are par excellance the things that require instruction and that instruction depends very much on material resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is elminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with instruction. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David, > > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. > > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. > > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. > > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. > > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) > > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] > > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. > > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. > > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. > > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. > > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. > > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: > > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. > > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. > > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? > > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when the speech goes quiet? :) > > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Hi David, > > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! > > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. > > What I want to say quickly is regarding > > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! > > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. > > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. > > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! > > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. > > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's > how the light gets in. > > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: > > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing > intellect). Vygotsky says: > > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? > ?????????? ??? ?????. > > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the > theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses > the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by > the environment; through the external path of the environment he > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around > him.) > > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the > dying). > > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. > > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. > > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is > Not Born a Personality". > > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi David! >> >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. >> >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. >> >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? >> >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. >> >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >> >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >> >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >> >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >> >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. >> >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) >> >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >> >> Until then... >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >> >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings >> on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between >> Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which >> Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students >> and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >> >> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 >> >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder >> of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do >> now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our >> understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at >> least) three: >> >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the >> explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form >> of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This >> revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use >> activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made >> up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of >> activity. >> >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as >> a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant >> rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting >> contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the >> discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than >> a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term >> effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the >> anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely >> mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely >> mentions anything without mentioning language). >> >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of >> modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >> >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from >> point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same >> way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >> Vygotsky does at all. >> >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution >> of the environment from the contribution of the child in the >> understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to >> the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >> development. >> >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is >> the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one >> is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really >> reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion >> for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is >> retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while >> "world outlook" is proleptic. >> >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >> death. >> >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the >> Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of >> Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where >> Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John >> Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality >> is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I >> think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that >> semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A >> narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock >> puppet clapping. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Thanks for some additional information. >>> >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >>> >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >>> >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >>> >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >>> >>> First is historical: >>> >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >>> >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >>> >>> Second is theoretical: >>> >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >>> >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >>> >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >>> >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >>> >>> Annalisa, >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >>> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >>> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >>> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >>> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >>> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >>> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >>> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >>> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >>> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >>> show through. >>> >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >>> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >>> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >>> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >>> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >>> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >>> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>>> >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>>> not flood the list). >>>> >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>>> >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>>> this thinking? >>>> >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>>> >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>>> >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>>> >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>>> concept of perezhivanie? >>>> >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>>> >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>>> >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>>> the whole is an abstraction. >>>> >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>>> >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>>> >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 2 23:34:40 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2014 18:34:40 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54573010.4030204@mira.net> Lyric as ever, David. And I used "interdisciplinary", following Davydov as it happens, rightly or wrongly implying "from one discipline to another" rather than "in many disciplines" (multidisciplinary) or "across disciplines" (transdisciplinary), ie. above disciplines. I think disciplines are quite necessary, but they need to be connected. And is that reference to Tolstoy in Thinking and Speech, David? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > I can always tell when people are getting a little defensive on the > list. First of all, charges get responded to long before they are even > made (profuse and unsubstantiated professions of being poorly read). > Secondly, people get told to go and read things (though I think what > Andy recommended was not, in fact, Wittgenstein on the ineffable). > Thirdly, I find that I myself begin to begin sentences with "I" rather > than with "Do you mean...?". Finally, to take an example from a > different thread on the list, there is a certain gratuitous intrusion > of "tu quoques" argumentation: Leontiev's revisionism is defended on > the grounds that Stalin was the George W. Bush of Soviet science. > > (I would not thought it actually possible to be unfair to Stalin, > still less to provoke me to defend him, but I do have to say that > while both men were responsible for literally millions of unnecessary > deaths, Stalin successfully defeated Hitler, while Bush merely tried > to defeat social security and gay marriage and utterly failed. In any > case, the real issue is whether the American academic community ever > took Bush's scientific beliefs at all seriously, to which I trust the > answer is no.) > > There is no reason, that I can see, for any defensiveness. I do not, > for example, think that Haydi's comments are aimed at me, both because > he is always very pleasant to me when he is asking me for articles off > list and because he is clearly addressing his remarks to Westerners, > and I am only Western by virtue of my choice of parents (believe me, > my choice of wife has a lot more to do with what I think and say). I > think you, Annalisa, have still less reason to be defensive than I do; > you've raised some fascinating questions, and we've had a very lucid > and enjoyable discussion. > > For example... > > a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each > historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", > which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label > units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century > mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in > the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become > the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at > least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that > these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that > implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the > discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). > They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's > book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than > "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create > a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I > strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", > for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to > activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). > > b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a > fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular > historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the > source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the > development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. > With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal > actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely > inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" > is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the > material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the > functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's > a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering > again, and that is not what Martin meant.) > > c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a > denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children > learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and > that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single > generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood > perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher > psychological functions are par excellance the things that require > instruction and that instruction depends very much on material > resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile > delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is > elminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he > understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an > organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do > not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these > artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with > instruction. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi David, >> >> I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. >> >> I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. >> >> Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. >> >> I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. >> >> (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) >> >> [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] >> >> (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. >> >> I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. >> >> This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. >> >> Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. >> >> (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. >> >> Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: >> >> (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. >> >> (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. >> >> (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? >> >> In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when the speech goes quiet? :) >> >> Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar >> Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Hi David, >> >> Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! >> >> How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. >> >> What I want to say quickly is regarding >> >> 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! >> >> I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. >> >> 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. >> >> 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! >> >> I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. >> >> More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! >> As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but >> nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. >> And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's >> how the light gets in. >> >> Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: >> >> Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS >> Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first >> lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how >> development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the >> theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development >> must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also >> NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of >> these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that >> intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to >> as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the >> explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing >> intellect). Vygotsky says: >> >> 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, >> ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? >> ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? >> ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. >> ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? >> ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? >> ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? >> ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, >> ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? >> ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? >> ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? >> ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? >> ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, >> ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? >> ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? >> ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? >> ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? >> ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? >> ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? >> ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? >> ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? >> ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? >> ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? >> ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? >> ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? >> ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? >> ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, >> ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? >> ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? >> ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? >> ?????????? ??? ?????. >> >> ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems >> to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not >> due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely >> determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have >> been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet >> pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive >> product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the >> child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires >> and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the >> milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development >> of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around >> him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely >> absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from >> 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a >> way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as >> any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be >> answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which >> considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the >> theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses >> the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably >> heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans >> wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take >> whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product >> which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that >> will determine the course of his development. He is simply a >> perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled >> with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by >> the environment; through the external path of the environment he >> acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around >> him.) >> >> You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these >> "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism >> (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he >> picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the >> dying). >> >> Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism >> (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned >> characteristics could then be handed down genetically to >> offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about >> eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single >> generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in >> winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of >> the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the >> English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting >> Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine >> them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism >> DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. >> >> Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was >> part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to >> create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin >> would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not >> really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the >> Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either >> medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to >> Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to >> him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat >> ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor >> after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was >> quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation >> that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). >> He was particularly well read in the very latest in German >> psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his >> work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including >> Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. >> >> So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a >> kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely >> popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in >> Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the >> child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all >> hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of >> Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of >> "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need >> to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least >> not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with >> something that is already intellect, what you have is not an >> explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same >> criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", >> and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is >> Not Born a Personality". >> >> Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, >> letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; >> it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and >> later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement >> rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Hi David! >>> >>> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. >>> >>> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >>> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. >>> >>> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? >>> >>> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. >>> >>> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >>> >>> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >>> >>> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >>> >>> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >>> >>> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. >>> >>> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) >>> >>> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >>> >>> Until then... >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg >>> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >>> >>> Dear Annalisa: >>> >>> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >>> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >>> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >>> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >>> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >>> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >>> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >>> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >>> >>> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings >>> on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between >>> Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which >>> Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >>> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >>> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >>> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >>> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >>> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students >>> and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >>> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >>> >>> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 >>> >>> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >>> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >>> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder >>> of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do >>> now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our >>> understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at >>> least) three: >>> >>> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >>> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the >>> explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >>> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form >>> of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This >>> revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use >>> activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made >>> up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of >>> activity. >>> >>> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as >>> a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant >>> rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting >>> contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the >>> discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than >>> a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term >>> effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the >>> anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely >>> mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely >>> mentions anything without mentioning language). >>> >>> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >>> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >>> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >>> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >>> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >>> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >>> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >>> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >>> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of >>> modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >>> >>> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from >>> point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same >>> way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >>> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >>> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >>> Vygotsky does at all. >>> >>> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >>> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution >>> of the environment from the contribution of the child in the >>> understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >>> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >>> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >>> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >>> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >>> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to >>> the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >>> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >>> development. >>> >>> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >>> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >>> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >>> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >>> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is >>> the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one >>> is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really >>> reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion >>> for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is >>> retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while >>> "world outlook" is proleptic. >>> >>> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >>> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >>> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >>> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >>> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >>> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >>> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >>> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >>> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >>> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >>> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >>> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >>> death. >>> >>> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the >>> Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of >>> Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where >>> Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John >>> Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality >>> is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I >>> think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that >>> semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A >>> narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock >>> puppet clapping. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> Thanks for some additional information. >>>> >>>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >>>> >>>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >>>> >>>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >>>> >>>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >>>> >>>> First is historical: >>>> >>>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >>>> >>>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >>>> >>>> Second is theoretical: >>>> >>>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >>>> >>>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >>>> >>>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >>>> >>>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >>>> >>>> Annalisa, >>>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >>>> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >>>> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >>>> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >>>> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >>>> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >>>> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >>>> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >>>> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >>>> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >>>> show through. >>>> >>>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >>>> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >>>> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >>>> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >>>> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >>>> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >>>> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>>>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>>>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>>>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>>>> >>>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>>>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>>>> not flood the list). >>>>> >>>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>>>> >>>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>>>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>>>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>>>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>>>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>>>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>>>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>>>> this thinking? >>>>> >>>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>>>> >>>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>>>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>>>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>>>> >>>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>>>> >>>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>>>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>>>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>>>> concept of perezhivanie? >>>>> >>>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>>>> >>>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>>>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>>>> >>>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>>>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>>>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>>>> the whole is an abstraction. >>>>> >>>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>>>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>>>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>>>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>>>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>>>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>>>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>>>> >>>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>>>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>>>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>>>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>>>> >>>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>>>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>>>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>>>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>>>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>>>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>>>> >>>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>>>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > > > From smago@uga.edu Mon Nov 3 02:30:58 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 10:30:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: IAIMTE 2015: LANGUAGES, LITERATURES, AND LITERACIES In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: THIS IS A FORWARDED MESSAGE. PLEASE READ ITS CONTENTS CAREFULLY AND REPLY TO THE ORIGINAL SENDER RATHER THAN TO ME From: Rijlaarsdam, Gert [mailto:G.C.W.Rijlaarsdam@uva.nl] Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 5:23 AM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: IAIMTE 2015: LANGUAGES, LITERATURES, AND LITERACIES IAIMTE 2015: LANGUAGES, LITERATURES, AND LITERACIES Deadlines are coming up for submission of abstracts to IAIMTE 2015. We hope that researchers within all fields of L1 research and from all regions of the world will contribute to making this a great event for the L1 research community. Please distribute this call to colleagues. Deadline for submission of abstracts is December 15th 2014 (NB extended deadline), both for the main conference and for the PhD pre-conference. Four Special Interest Groups (SIGs) have announced special calls on the website. Please, note that some of the SIGs have mid-November deadlines for submission of abstracts. The 10th IAIMTE conference will take place on June 3-5 2015 at the University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark. Please find all relevant information, including information on different presentation formats, on the conference website. The conference aims to exchange theory, research, curricular developments, and 'best practices' in education (at all levels, ranging from early childhood to higher education), teacher education and in service. The exchanges and interactions offer an international platform for researchers - including Ph.D. candidates - to present their research on L1 education in their particular national, educational and school contexts to a truly international audience. The bi-annual IAIMTE conferences are successful because of their relatively small scale, the high level of social interaction, and the diverse range of languages and educational cultures represented. The 2015 conference builds on these strengths to create a context where researchers and teacher educators meet to share their research. We are proud to be able to present keynotes by Professor Deborah Brandt, University of Madison Wisconsin, USA, Profesor Titular/Tenured Lecturer Daniel Cassany, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, and Professor Jon Smidt, S?r Tr?ndelag University College, Trondheim, Norway. The conference team are in a process of applying for funding for the conference. There are no guarantees, but hopefully we shall be able to offer some financial support to colleagues with limited access to funding. If we are successful, we shall announce on the website who will be covered, and how to apply for support. On behalf of the conference team, Ellen Krogh, Conference Chair, Professor, University of Southern Denmark, Linneaus University Sweden Conference e-mail: iaimte2015@sdu.dk International Association for the Improvement of Mother Tongue Education From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 03:50:05 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 11:50:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 Message-ID: Hi David, I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... What am I missing? Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! Martin From smago@uga.edu Mon Nov 3 04:29:50 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 12:29:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 Hi David, I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... What am I missing? Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! Martin From compernolle@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 05:07:43 2014 From: compernolle@gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?=22R=E9mi_A=2E_van_Compernolle=22?=) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 08:07:43 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Jim Lantolf and others of us work in a specific area of applied linguistics, namely instructed second language acquisition, which is about doing education to promote second/foreign language capacities, typically in formal settings like the classroom. It?s just one area of a much broader field. Adam R?mi A. van Compernolle Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies Department of Modern Languages Carnegie Mellon University Baker Hall A60M 412-268-1122 On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: > > 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. > 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. > 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. > > So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM > To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 > > Hi David, > > I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... > > What am I missing? > > Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! > > Martin > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 05:13:53 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 13:13:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <18D4CF17-2015-49D9-A402-04BD5CA51464@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Peter, and thanks - yes, I'm hoping to be educated here. Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: > > 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. > 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. > 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. > > So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM > To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 > > Hi David, > > I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... > > What am I missing? > > Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! > > Martin > > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 05:36:02 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 10:36:02 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Open position in Aging in PUC-Chile References: <3B01110E-987F-4A70-B2BC-9B549ED729BE@gmail.com> Message-ID: El Instituto de Sociolog?a, la Escuela de Psicolog?a, y la Escuela de Medicina de la Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile, en Santiago, hacen un llamado de postulaciones para el puesto de profesor asistente de tiempo completo, especializado en estudios de envejecimiento para empezar en Marzo de 2015, y que pueda contribuir en la consolidaci?n interdisciplinaria del Centro de Geriatr?a y Gerontolog?a UC. Se buscan candidatos con especial inter?s en la comprensi?n integral de la vejez y los procesos de envejecimiento, que incorporen dimensiones epidemiol?gicas, psicol?gicas y sociales. Se otorgar? prioridad a candidatos con experiencia en investigaci?n interdisciplinaria en temas de envejecimiento. Se requiere de dedicaci?n y habilidades para impartir cursos de pre y postgrado y para realizar investigaci?n cient?fica e interdisciplinaria de buen nivel. El candidato debe estar en posesi?n del grado acad?mico de doctor (PhD), o su equivalente (especialidades m?dicas), al momento de contrataci?n, de preferencia en ciencias sociales o ciencias de la salud. Se requiere fluidez en espa?ol e ingl?s. Salario es competitivo. El plazo de postulaci?n vence el 30 de noviembre de 2014 para asegurar total consideraci?n dentro de la n?mina. Se les ruega a los y las postulantes enviar (1) curriculum vitae, (2) carta de intenci?n y declaraci?n de intereses de investigaci?n y de docencia (research statement), (3) muestra de escritura (writing sample), (4) dos cartas de recomendaci?n (enviadas directamente por recomendadores), por correo electr?nico a Sof?a Ugarte (asugarte@uc.cl). The Institute of Sociology, the School of Psychology, and the School of Medicine at the Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile, at Santiago, invite applications for an appointment at the rank of Assistant Professor (full-time) specialized in aging studies, to begin in March 2015, and who can contribute to the interdisciplinary consolidation of the Center for Geriatrics and Gerontology UC. We seek candidates with special interest in the comprehensive understanding of aging processes with consideration of its epidemiological, psychological, and social dimensions. Priority will be given to candidates with experience in interdisciplinary research on aging studies. Dedication and ability to teach undergraduate and graduate courses and to perform interdisciplinary scientific research is required. The successful candidate must hold a PhD, or equivalent (medical specialties), at the time of appointment, preferably in social sciences or health sciences. Fluency in Spanish and English is required. Salary is competitive. To ensure full consideration applications must be received by November 30, 2014. Please send (1) curriculum vitae, (2) research statement, (3) writing sample, (4) teaching perspective, and (5) two letters of reference, via email to Sof?a Ugarte (asugarte@uc.cl). David Preiss, Ph.D. Director Escuela de Psicolog?a Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Av Vicu?a Mackenna - 4860 7820436 Macul Santiago, Chile Fono: (562) 3544635 Fax: (562) 3544844 web: https://sites.google.com/site/daviddpreiss/ From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 05:40:20 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:40:20 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Martin You paint with a broad brush here: ELL is a fast growing field today, because "Biligual Education" has a wide range of situations/niches which other people have said here. (It nearly has encyclapedia status). I do L1 and L2 work here in Southern Africa (Grades 1-7) and one of very few privileged enough to be able to do it. Even in such similar cultures as Namibia and South Africa there are very different perceptions about English as Second Language and ways of talking about it. I think you must look at what you said - who is going to deliver their bright new idea in an abstract? You have to surmise that they do, because their concepts (small c) are in place. (We fail people here who only quote abstracts...). So head to the hardcopy, comrade brother. Having delivered my sermon, I find the SCT of ESL very disappointing. It seems like they are just pinning new labels on things they already knew. But if we have a fellow practitioner among us, please do speak up. I remember when I first started working on CHAT in language education in the late eighties, I felt I was pinning labels. Carol On 3 November 2014 13:50, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course > in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library > webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited > access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. > In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but > then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at > abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is > learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and > (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was > expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to > suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... > > What am I missing? > > Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on > people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or > nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because > they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they > speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! > > Martin > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 05:42:41 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 13:42:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Adam, Yes, I should have more clearly separated my two questions! Can you help me understand the light that a sociocultural perspective throws on instructed L2 acquisition? There are one or two places where LVS suggested that learning a second language transforms ones understanding of the first language, but I haven't yet found that explored in Jim Lantolf's writing. Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:07 AM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > Jim Lantolf and others of us work in a specific area of applied linguistics, namely instructed second language acquisition, which is about doing education to promote second/foreign language capacities, typically in formal settings like the classroom. It?s just one area of a much broader field. > > Adam > > R?mi A. van Compernolle > Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies > Department of Modern Languages > Carnegie Mellon University > Baker Hall A60M > 412-268-1122 > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: >> >> 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. >> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >> 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. >> >> So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM >> To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 >> >> Hi David, >> >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >> >> What am I missing? >> >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! >> >> Martin >> >> >> > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Nov 3 05:51:43 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 13:51:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1415022703.71861.YahooMailNeo@web173204.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a CHAT theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and Leontyev. Andy Andy ! Thanks ! Once , in duration of years , endorsed my entrance though you recognized I was poorly read. Now you make a PDF of what I've been weak and Etiquette-free to provide . And Worst of all !! You never despised me because of my weaknesses . How can I not be ashamed ! David ! Usually I don't make files for people's scripts ! But for you during the years , I've been having a special ONE . Those give me inspiration !! To any community of common or learned people I give my respect and apologies even if I'd not been meaning to have them disrespected . If only conditional sentences were differentiated from some assertions or intentional utterances . I also stress on our old friendliness and mutual understanding and the one-sided borrowings . But aside from all other considerations which parallel and equalize your charge of 'omissions' , 'revisionism' is so 'vital' and a 'blessing tremor' to Late Leontiev's (Vygotsky's close friend , colleague and co-theorizing partner) soul even to the border of resurrection . There have been some ... ones which no community of , might have been able to endorse being delivered . And now I'm able to get rid of my confusion . Perceiving , seeing , touching , implying , imagining , conjecturing , what else ? ... some 'potentiality' of 'materialness' in some 'ideal' before any reification , crystalization , embodiment , is , with your supreme support , PLUMP MATERIALISM . This one I owe you to the remaining of my life . Though for some others I've been owing up to the present time . Now though you have 'right' to the provision of many valuable/invaluable responses , may I wholeheartedly ask you to kindly dispossess yourself of this right providing me with some peace . I've talked to others , too ! Will you ? If you become happy with my admittance of being 'faulty' . Yes ! Best Haydi ________________________________ From: ?David Kellogg? ?? To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Sunday, 2 November 2014, 23:16:57 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] I can always tell when people are getting a little defensive on the list. First of all, charges get responded to long before they are even made (profuse and unsubstantiated professions of being poorly read). Secondly, people get told to go and read things (though I think what Andy recommended was not, in fact, Wittgenstein on the ineffable). Thirdly, I find that I myself begin to begin sentences with "I" rather than with "Do you mean...?". Finally, to take an example from a different thread on the list, there is a certain gratuitous intrusion of "tu quoques" argumentation: Leontiev's revisionism is defended on the grounds that Stalin was the George W. Bush of Soviet science. (I would not thought it actually possible to be unfair to Stalin, still less to provoke me to defend him, but I do have to say that while both men were responsible for literally millions of unnecessary deaths, Stalin successfully defeated Hitler, while Bush merely tried to defeat social security and gay marriage and utterly failed. In any case, the real issue is whether the American academic community ever took Bush's scientific beliefs at all seriously, to which I trust the answer is no.) There is no reason, that I can see, for any defensiveness. I do not, for example, think that Haydi's comments are aimed at me, both because he is always very pleasant to me when he is asking me for articles off list and because he is clearly addressing his remarks to Westerners, and I am only Western by virtue of my choice of parents (believe me, my choice of wife has a lot more to do with what I think and say). I think you, Annalisa, have still less reason to be defensive than I do; you've raised some fascinating questions, and we've had a very lucid and enjoyable discussion. For example... a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering again, and that is not what Martin meant.) c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher psychological functions are par excellance the things that require instruction and that instruction depends very much on material resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is elminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with instruction. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David, > > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. > > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. > > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. > > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. > > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) > > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] > > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. > > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. > > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. > > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. > > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. > > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: > > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. > > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. > > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? > > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when the speech goes quiet? :) > > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Hi David, > > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! > > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. > > What I want to say quickly is regarding > > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! > > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. > > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. > > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! > > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. > > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's > how the light gets in. > > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: > > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing > intellect). Vygotsky says: > > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? > ?????????? ??? ?????. > > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the > theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses > the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by > the environment; through the external path of the environment he > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around > him.) > > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the > dying). > > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. > > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. > > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is > Not Born a Personality". > > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi David! >> >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. >> >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. >> >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? >> >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. >> >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >> >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >> >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >> >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >> >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. >> >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) >> >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >> >> Until then... >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >> >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings >> on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between >> Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which >> Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students >> and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >> >> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 >> >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder >> of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do >> now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our >> understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at >> least) three: >> >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the >> explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form >> of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This >> revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use >> activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made >> up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of >> activity. >> >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as >> a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant >> rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting >> contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the >> discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than >> a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term >> effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the >> anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely >> mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely >> mentions anything without mentioning language). >> >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of >> modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >> >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from >> point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same >> way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >> Vygotsky does at all. >> >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution >> of the environment from the contribution of the child in the >> understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to >> the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >> development. >> >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is >> the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one >> is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really >> reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion >> for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is >> retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while >> "world outlook" is proleptic. >> >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >> death. >> >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the >> Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of >> Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where >> Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John >> Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality >> is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I >> think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that >> semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A >> narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock >> puppet clapping. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Thanks for some additional information. >>> >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >>> >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >>> >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >>> >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >>> >>> First is historical: >>> >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >>> >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >>> >>> Second is theoretical: >>> >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >>> >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >>> >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >>> >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >>> >>> Annalisa, >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >>> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >>> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >>> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >>> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >>> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >>> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >>> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >>> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >>> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >>> show through. >>> >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >>> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >>> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >>> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >>> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >>> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >>> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>>> >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>>> not flood the list). >>>> >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>>> >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>>> this thinking? >>>> >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>>> >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>>> >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>>> >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>>> concept of perezhivanie? >>>> >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>>> >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>>> >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>>> the whole is an abstraction. >>>> >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>>> >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>>> >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 06:20:40 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:20:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: To me, one important question would be what SCT is able to tell us about instruction in L2, over and above instruction in general. Carol, I think I explained that this weekend I have had online access to no more than abstracts, except for two chapters that I already had on hand, and which I was referring to. However, if an article contains a bright new idea it really ought to be in the abstract, no? Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:40 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Martin > > You paint with a broad brush here: ELL is a fast growing field today, > because "Biligual Education" has a wide range of situations/niches which > other people have said here. (It nearly has encyclapedia status). I do L1 > and L2 work here in Southern Africa (Grades 1-7) and one of very few > privileged enough to be able to do it. Even in such similar cultures as > Namibia and South Africa there are very different perceptions about English > as Second Language and ways of talking about it. > > I think you must look at what you said - who is going to deliver their > bright new idea in an abstract? You have to surmise that they do, because > their concepts (small c) are in place. (We fail people here who only quote > abstracts...). So head to the hardcopy, comrade brother. > > Having delivered my sermon, I find the SCT of ESL very disappointing. It > seems like they are just pinning new labels on things they already knew. > But if we have a fellow practitioner among us, please do speak up. I > remember when I first started working on CHAT in language education in the > late eighties, I felt I was pinning labels. > > Carol > > On 3 November 2014 13:50, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Hi David, >> >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course >> in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library >> webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited >> access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. >> In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but >> then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at >> abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is >> learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and >> (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was >> expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to >> suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >> >> What am I missing? >> >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on >> people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or >> nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because >> they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they >> speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! >> >> Martin >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From compernolle@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 06:25:49 2014 From: compernolle@gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?=22R=E9mi_A=2E_van_Compernolle=22?=) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 09:25:49 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6F11ED9D-AEC0-4304-BAA6-FE1589B22F1E@gmail.com> Martin: To me, the interesting issue is how concepts are appropriated from a second languacualture (Agar?s term) as psychological tools that mediate the choice of L2 forms in communication. So some of working in concept-based instruction draw from V?s analysis of everyday/spontaneous concepts as developed in socialization and scientific concepts, as developed in school, and then Galperin?s and Davydov?s work in education. The insight for instructed L2 acquisition is that if we promote internalization of categories of meaning (scientific concepts related to how language creates meanings through grammar, pragmatics, etc.), learners gain a lot freedom to create L2 meanings, sometimes meanings that L1 users wouldn?t be inclined to make. From my perspective, at least, this is a lot more interesting than most L2 research that just looks at how forms are acquired, used, etc. because emphasis is placed on semiotic mediation. Just as case in point, in my work on sociopragmatics, I developed a concept-based approach to teaching self-presentation, social distance, and power hierarchies, with French tu/vous ?you? pronouns as illustrative forms. The point was to have students appropriate these concepts as categories of meaning (e.g., how to be relaxed/casual vs formal, how be close to someone or socially distance) to guide the choice of language forms. So this reverses the traditional form-to-meaning approach to teaching language because we started with meanings and then explored how forms were important. Does this make sense? It might be relatively commonsensical in the XMCA crowd, but in L2 acquisition, it?s a pretty novel idea because of the history of focusing on form. Adam R?mi A. van Compernolle Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies Department of Modern Languages Carnegie Mellon University Baker Hall A60M 412-268-1122 On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Adam, > > Yes, I should have more clearly separated my two questions! > > Can you help me understand the light that a sociocultural perspective throws on instructed L2 acquisition? There are one or two places where LVS suggested that learning a second language transforms ones understanding of the first language, but I haven't yet found that explored in Jim Lantolf's writing. > > Martin > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:07 AM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > >> Jim Lantolf and others of us work in a specific area of applied linguistics, namely instructed second language acquisition, which is about doing education to promote second/foreign language capacities, typically in formal settings like the classroom. It?s just one area of a much broader field. >> >> Adam >> >> R?mi A. van Compernolle >> Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies >> Department of Modern Languages >> Carnegie Mellon University >> Baker Hall A60M >> 412-268-1122 >> >> >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >> >>> I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: >>> >>> 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. >>> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >>> 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. >>> >>> So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM >>> To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 >>> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >>> >>> What am I missing? >>> >>> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 06:32:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:32:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> Does the field of "bilingual education", then, include cases where the instruction is in only one language, one which the students did not grow up speaking? Or would that be called something else? Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 07:09:53 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:09:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: <6F11ED9D-AEC0-4304-BAA6-FE1589B22F1E@gmail.com> References: <6F11ED9D-AEC0-4304-BAA6-FE1589B22F1E@gmail.com> Message-ID: <2AF62565-5701-4EF5-98F2-86443F91EECB@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Adam, So the emphasis is on how the L2 labels, categorizes, and generalizes - how it offers a new way to perceive and then conceptualize the world? And the pedagogy involves making those language categories - those word meanings - explicit? This sounds appealing to me, as someone who struggles with the Spanish tu/usted contrast. Problem is, so far no one has been able to spell out these everyday concepts for me in explicit terms! :) Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 9:25 AM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > Martin: > > To me, the interesting issue is how concepts are appropriated from a second languacualture (Agar?s term) as psychological tools that mediate the choice of L2 forms in communication. So some of working in concept-based instruction draw from V?s analysis of everyday/spontaneous concepts as developed in socialization and scientific concepts, as developed in school, and then Galperin?s and Davydov?s work in education. > > The insight for instructed L2 acquisition is that if we promote internalization of categories of meaning (scientific concepts related to how language creates meanings through grammar, pragmatics, etc.), learners gain a lot freedom to create L2 meanings, sometimes meanings that L1 users wouldn?t be inclined to make. From my perspective, at least, this is a lot more interesting than most L2 research that just looks at how forms are acquired, used, etc. because emphasis is placed on semiotic mediation. > > Just as case in point, in my work on sociopragmatics, I developed a concept-based approach to teaching self-presentation, social distance, and power hierarchies, with French tu/vous ?you? pronouns as illustrative forms. The point was to have students appropriate these concepts as categories of meaning (e.g., how to be relaxed/casual vs formal, how be close to someone or socially distance) to guide the choice of language forms. So this reverses the traditional form-to-meaning approach to teaching language because we started with meanings and then explored how forms were important. > > Does this make sense? It might be relatively commonsensical in the XMCA crowd, but in L2 acquisition, it?s a pretty novel idea because of the history of focusing on form. > > Adam > > R?mi A. van Compernolle > Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies > Department of Modern Languages > Carnegie Mellon University > Baker Hall A60M > 412-268-1122 > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Hi Adam, >> >> Yes, I should have more clearly separated my two questions! >> >> Can you help me understand the light that a sociocultural perspective throws on instructed L2 acquisition? There are one or two places where LVS suggested that learning a second language transforms ones understanding of the first language, but I haven't yet found that explored in Jim Lantolf's writing. >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:07 AM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: >> >>> Jim Lantolf and others of us work in a specific area of applied linguistics, namely instructed second language acquisition, which is about doing education to promote second/foreign language capacities, typically in formal settings like the classroom. It?s just one area of a much broader field. >>> >>> Adam >>> >>> R?mi A. van Compernolle >>> Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies >>> Department of Modern Languages >>> Carnegie Mellon University >>> Baker Hall A60M >>> 412-268-1122 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >>> >>>> I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: >>>> >>>> 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. >>>> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >>>> 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. >>>> >>>> So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>> Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM >>>> To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 >>>> >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >>>> >>>> What am I missing? >>>> >>>> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From alex_rosborough@byu.edu Mon Nov 3 07:21:26 2014 From: alex_rosborough@byu.edu (Alex Rosborough) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:21:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, Perhaps you're interested in dual language immersion (DLI)? I think bilingual ed. and DLI can be somewhat umbrella terms but more specifically, one-way DLI classrooms would be "non-native" language speakers learning an L2 and often it's in a 50/50 model (half the day in the L2 target lg. and the other 1/2 in English). Of course there are variations of the time splits and such. I would still say that DLI (whether one-way or two-way) is bilingual ed. Also, I think Remi is right about the novelty of Vygotskian emphasis in SL/FL. For example, when the rules of some DLI models are too strict, they may try and sever (artificially) the L1 from the L2. The students are still thinking in their L1 but a lot of traditional FL K-12 models don't account for L1 private-speech/inner-speech. Merrill Swain using V. gave a good talk about using the L1 to assist/relate to the L2 at a CARLA Immersion conference in 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsgiJndk688 A good practical piece w. V's theory. Perhaps the L1/L2 relationship plus ZPD/Dynamic teaching might help the K-12 field and university FL courses move beyond the usual plateaus (i.e., where students reach a certain level of oral proficiency but haven't mastered deeper lg. concepts like Remi mentioned). As you may be aware, most of these courses take students through a certain lexico-syntactic level and then turn to an emphasis in L2 literature. From an anecdotal view point, I'm seeing pre-service teachers trying to pass the Oral Proficiency Interviews at Advanced-Mid for DLI requirements in Utah. If they're at advanced-low (which is most FL teachers in Sec. Ed.) they sometimes have a hard time moving up one more level. They don't have courses they can take to improve their level and they try and live in the target-language for a summer only to find out that they didn't necessarily improve (perhaps trying to learn/improve implicitly when they really needed more explicit instruction)??? I think Lantolf's work (including Leo van Lier) and his group (as Remi mentioned) uses V. to help this field understand how to move from/beyond implicit to explicit problem-solving instruction/methods. Hope this helps - Alex On 11/3/14 7:32 AM, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >Does the field of "bilingual education", then, include cases where the >instruction is in only one language, one which the students did not grow >up speaking? Or would that be called something else? > >Martin > >On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in >>which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. > > From alex_rosborough@byu.edu Mon Nov 3 07:25:06 2014 From: alex_rosborough@byu.edu (Alex Rosborough) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:25:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Meant to say Adam. You can see I'm nervous in posting here. Sorry Adam :) alex On 11/3/14 8:21 AM, "Alex Rosborough" wrote: >Martin, > >Perhaps you're interested in dual language immersion (DLI)? I think >bilingual ed. and DLI can be somewhat umbrella terms but more >specifically, one-way DLI classrooms would be "non-native" language >speakers learning an L2 and often it's in a 50/50 model (half the day in >the L2 target lg. and the other 1/2 in English). Of course there are >variations of the time splits and such. I would still say that DLI >(whether one-way or two-way) is bilingual ed. > >Also, I think Remi is right about the novelty of Vygotskian emphasis in >SL/FL. For example, when the rules of some DLI models are too strict, they >may try and sever (artificially) the L1 from the L2. The students are >still thinking in their L1 but a lot of traditional FL K-12 models don't >account for L1 private-speech/inner-speech. Merrill Swain using V. gave a >good talk about using the L1 to assist/relate to the L2 at a CARLA >Immersion conference in 2012: > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsgiJndk688 > >A good practical piece w. V's theory. Perhaps the L1/L2 relationship plus >ZPD/Dynamic teaching might help the K-12 field and university FL courses >move beyond the usual plateaus (i.e., where students reach a certain level >of oral proficiency but haven't mastered deeper lg. concepts like Remi >mentioned). As you may be aware, most of these courses take students >through a certain lexico-syntactic level and then turn to an emphasis in >L2 literature. From an anecdotal view point, I'm seeing pre-service >teachers trying to pass the Oral Proficiency Interviews at Advanced-Mid >for DLI requirements in Utah. If they're at advanced-low (which is most FL >teachers in Sec. Ed.) they sometimes have a hard time moving up one more >level. They don't have courses they can take to improve their level and >they try and live in the target-language for a summer only to find out >that they didn't necessarily improve (perhaps trying to learn/improve >implicitly when they really needed more explicit instruction)??? I think >Lantolf's work (including Leo van Lier) and his group (as Remi mentioned) >uses V. to help this field understand how to move from/beyond implicit to >explicit problem-solving instruction/methods. > >Hope this helps - Alex > >On 11/3/14 7:32 AM, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > >>Does the field of "bilingual education", then, include cases where the >>instruction is in only one language, one which the students did not grow >>up speaking? Or would that be called something else? >> >>Martin >> >>On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >> >>> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in >>>which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >> >> > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 07:31:56 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:31:56 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin Thats the version called "Submersion". Children aptly drown. Carol On 3 November 2014 16:32, Martin John Packer wrote: > Does the field of "bilingual education", then, include cases where the > instruction is in only one language, one which the students did not grow up > speaking? Or would that be called something else? > > Martin > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in > which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 07:36:49 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 07:36:49 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> Message-ID: David, to move your insights [reflections] forward I want to return to the notion of *themes* in relation [in unity?] to *multi*, *trans*, and *inter* disciplinary explorations. You mention moving through the dominant theme of *structure* to two possible themes that are now being played out on stage. On the one hand the theme of *activity* AND on the other hand the theme of *meaning*. *AND* could have multiple ways of being understood [such as dialectical or dialogical]. However these two themes are emerging in some type of relation. David, you are indicating to these ARE two very inclusive themes that are now being considered across disciplines and transforming all disciplinary forms. Both themes embrace the historical but *activity* and *meaning* emphasize different foundations [as basic grounds] from which the disciplines are reflected. Therefore, the concept of THEMES [as you use this term in this context] seems vital to our discussions I hope I am reading your ideas WITH you but if not there will be a rejoinder. Larry On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 11:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I can always tell when people are getting a little defensive on the > list. First of all, charges get responded to long before they are even > made (profuse and unsubstantiated professions of being poorly read). > Secondly, people get told to go and read things (though I think what > Andy recommended was not, in fact, Wittgenstein on the ineffable). > Thirdly, I find that I myself begin to begin sentences with "I" rather > than with "Do you mean...?". Finally, to take an example from a > different thread on the list, there is a certain gratuitous intrusion > of "tu quoques" argumentation: Leontiev's revisionism is defended on > the grounds that Stalin was the George W. Bush of Soviet science. > > (I would not thought it actually possible to be unfair to Stalin, > still less to provoke me to defend him, but I do have to say that > while both men were responsible for literally millions of unnecessary > deaths, Stalin successfully defeated Hitler, while Bush merely tried > to defeat social security and gay marriage and utterly failed. In any > case, the real issue is whether the American academic community ever > took Bush's scientific beliefs at all seriously, to which I trust the > answer is no.) > > There is no reason, that I can see, for any defensiveness. I do not, > for example, think that Haydi's comments are aimed at me, both because > he is always very pleasant to me when he is asking me for articles off > list and because he is clearly addressing his remarks to Westerners, > and I am only Western by virtue of my choice of parents (believe me, > my choice of wife has a lot more to do with what I think and say). I > think you, Annalisa, have still less reason to be defensive than I do; > you've raised some fascinating questions, and we've had a very lucid > and enjoyable discussion. > > For example... > > a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each > historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", > which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label > units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century > mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in > the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become > the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at > least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that > these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that > implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the > discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). > They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's > book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than > "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create > a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I > strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", > for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to > activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). > > b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a > fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular > historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the > source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the > development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. > With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal > actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely > inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" > is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the > material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the > functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's > a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering > again, and that is not what Martin meant.) > > c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a > denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children > learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and > that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single > generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood > perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher > psychological functions are par excellance the things that require > instruction and that instruction depends very much on material > resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile > delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is > elminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he > understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an > organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do > not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these > artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with > instruction. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi David, > > > > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this > thread. > > > > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the > *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that > others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be > banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in > its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. > > > > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a > rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I > have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of > the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, > and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for > interpretation in any way shape or form. > > > > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the > political challenges. > > > > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some > scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot > abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this > juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a > political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret > that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the > emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way > we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd > prefer you didn't. :) > > > > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be > limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences > beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped > away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how > limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call > it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are > adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an > idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me > Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] > > > > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own > intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the > ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was > general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday > concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby > out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand > why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many > false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. > > > > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different > understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say > in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse > between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking > and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and > therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and > research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural > practice of doing the science. > > > > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. > We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. > Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do > it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize > that. > > > > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts > and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access > meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only > be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which > is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. > > > > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers > in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are > required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since > I am not a scientist I could not know this. > > > > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: > > > > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I > shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on > heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be > divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the > recent developments in epigenetics. > > > > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words > "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For > me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I > think I can see why this might be problematic. > > > > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! > "Personality as bootstrap" ? > > > > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we > struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and > done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when > the speech goes quiet? :) > > > > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > > > > Hi David, > > > > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! > > > > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do > the Russian of course. > > > > What I want to say quickly is regarding > > > > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know > and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted > to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this > in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a > refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't > recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the > work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! > > > > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. > > > > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying > "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or > desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of > narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of > intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where > things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything > out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his > contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I > hope I have corrected that line of thinking. > > > > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, > as I get to this reading. Again thanks! > > > > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment > more upon it, with hopes you will too. > > > > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > > > > Dear Annalisa: > > > > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! > > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but > > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. > > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's > > how the light gets in. > > > > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: > > > > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS > > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first > > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how > > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the > > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development > > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also > > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of > > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that > > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to > > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the > > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing > > intellect). Vygotsky says: > > > > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, > > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? > > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? > > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. > > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? > > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? > > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? > > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, > > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? > > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? > > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? > > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? > > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, > > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? > > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? > > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? > > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? > > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? > > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? > > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? > > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? > > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? > > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? > > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? > > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? > > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? > > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, > > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? > > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? > > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? > > ?????????? ??? ?????. > > > > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems > > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not > > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely > > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have > > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet > > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive > > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the > > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires > > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the > > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development > > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around > > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely > > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from > > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a > > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as > > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be > > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which > > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the > > theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses > > the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably > > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans > > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take > > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product > > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that > > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a > > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled > > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by > > the environment; through the external path of the environment he > > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around > > him.) > > > > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these > > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism > > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he > > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the > > dying). > > > > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism > > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned > > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to > > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about > > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single > > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in > > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of > > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the > > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting > > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine > > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism > > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. > > > > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was > > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to > > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin > > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not > > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the > > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either > > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to > > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to > > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat > > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor > > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was > > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation > > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). > > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German > > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his > > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including > > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. > > > > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a > > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely > > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in > > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the > > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all > > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of > > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of > > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need > > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least > > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with > > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an > > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same > > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", > > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is > > Not Born a Personality". > > > > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, > > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; > > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and > > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement > > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi David! > >> > >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so > carefully. > >> > >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: > >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also > Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because > I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems > non-trivial. > >> > >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at > that time. Is that a fair statement? > >> > >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split > occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as > I can. > >> > >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What > I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces > without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! > >> > >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter > out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be > controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. > >> > >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so > peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. > We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but > most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his > experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not > hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly > right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and > everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. > >> > >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the > first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I > don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the > disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology > because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for > international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the > exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house > arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists > of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be > saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. > >> > >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We > suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his > contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even > know it existed. > >> > >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of > freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom > to others. :) > >> > >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another > post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. > >> > >> Until then... > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > >> > >> Dear Annalisa: > >> > >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In > >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come > >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find > >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are > >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically > >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of > >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question > >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. > >> > >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings > >> on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between > >> Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which > >> Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of > >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the > >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the > >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's > >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May > >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students > >> and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. > >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: > >> > >> > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 > >> > >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of > >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar > >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder > >> of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do > >> now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our > >> understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at > >> least) three: > >> > >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), > >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the > >> explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself > >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form > >> of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This > >> revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use > >> activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made > >> up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of > >> activity. > >> > >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as > >> a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant > >> rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting > >> contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the > >> discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than > >> a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term > >> effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the > >> anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely > >> mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely > >> mentions anything without mentioning language). > >> > >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not > >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development > >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his > >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term > >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" > >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child > >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never > >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write > >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of > >> modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. > >> > >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from > >> point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same > >> way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use > >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of > >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what > >> Vygotsky does at all. > >> > >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of > >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution > >> of the environment from the contribution of the child in the > >> understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very > >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the > >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it > >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's > >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on > >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to > >> the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that > >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of > >> development. > >> > >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a > >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last > >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, > >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child > >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is > >> the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one > >> is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really > >> reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion > >> for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is > >> retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while > >> "world outlook" is proleptic. > >> > >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: > >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the > >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on > >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely > >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word > >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is > >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something > >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us > >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and > >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of > >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken > >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his > >> death. > >> > >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the > >> Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of > >> Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where > >> Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John > >> Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality > >> is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I > >> think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that > >> semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A > >> narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock > >> puppet clapping. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> > >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> Hi Andy, > >>> > >>> Thanks for some additional information. > >>> > >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from > the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own > beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes > me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. > >>> > >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE > aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or > divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean > to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. > >>> > >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear > picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces > were retrieved and extended upon. > >>> > >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. > >>> > >>> First is historical: > >>> > >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny > the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. > What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents > that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this > parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper > all that we possess? > >>> > >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE > factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it > explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? > >>> > >>> Second is theoretical: > >>> > >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual > in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, > emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation > (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects > of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the > person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" > factors). > >>> > >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe > is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] > >>> > >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a > "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can > radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That > a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for > example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, > it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the > whole). > >>> > >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the > "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say > "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> > >>> > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > >>> > >>> Annalisa, > >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it > >>> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and > >>> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during > >>> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A > >>> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a > matter > >>> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may > >>> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than > >>> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, > >>> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between > >>> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences > >>> show through. > >>> > >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character > develops > >>> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new > >>> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so > >>> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the > >>> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when > >>> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the > >>> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Hi Andy, > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching > >>>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The > >>>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in > >>>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. > >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, > all!) > >>>> > >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are > >>>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and > >>>> not flood the list). > >>>> > >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation > >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. > >>>> > >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a > >>>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these > >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not > >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I > >>>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy > >>>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed > >>>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of > >>>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these > >>>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in > >>>> this thinking? > >>>> > >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It > >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself > >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. > >>>> > >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky > >>>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we > >>>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the > like. > >>>> > >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie > >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I > mistaken? > >>>> > >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not > >>>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an > >>>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the > >>>> concept of perezhivanie? > >>>> > >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political > >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? > >>>> > >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of > >>>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." > >>>> > >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the > >>>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think > >>>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like > >>>> the whole is an abstraction. > >>>> > >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the > >>>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our > >>>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, > >>>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the > >>>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in > >>>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, > >>>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. > >>>> > >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature > >>>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water > >>>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the > >>>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. > >>>> > >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we > >>>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It > >>>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of > >>>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, > >>>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how > >>>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! > >>>> > >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the > >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke > >>>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards, > >>>> > >>>> Annalisa > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 07:41:44 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:41:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Yes, of course the children drown. What I'm wondering is how much it has been studied. When I search on Google Scholar for 'linguistic submersion' in the title, nothing appears: Your search - allintitle: "linguistic Submersion" - did not match any articles. Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:31 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Martin > > Thats the version called "Submersion". Children aptly drown. > > Carol > > On 3 November 2014 16:32, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Does the field of "bilingual education", then, include cases where the >> instruction is in only one language, one which the students did not grow up >> speaking? Or would that be called something else? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >> >>> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in >> which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 07:42:52 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:42:52 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Martin SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as far as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. It seems to me to swallow the shallowly touted "definitions" that general instructions also uses. I think your students might like a bit of exposition on the development of Inner Speech. I once had to restrained when a literacy student said that Vygotsky invented group work!! These people sometimes quote tertiary sources with abandon. We were/are such purists in Psych in Education that students had to read the primary sources. Martin, I know what you said - I was pulling your chain on claiming familiarity with the field on the basis of abstracts. I know you will have headed for the library once the doors opened. Sorry mate. Carol On 3 November 2014 16:20, Martin John Packer wrote: > To me, one important question would be what SCT is able to tell us about > instruction in L2, over and above instruction in general. > > Carol, I think I explained that this weekend I have had online access to > no more than abstracts, except for two chapters that I already had on hand, > and which I was referring to. However, if an article contains a bright new > idea it really ought to be in the abstract, no? > > Martin > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:40 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > > Martin > > > > You paint with a broad brush here: ELL is a fast growing field today, > > because "Biligual Education" has a wide range of situations/niches which > > other people have said here. (It nearly has encyclapedia status). I do > L1 > > and L2 work here in Southern Africa (Grades 1-7) and one of very few > > privileged enough to be able to do it. Even in such similar cultures as > > Namibia and South Africa there are very different perceptions about > English > > as Second Language and ways of talking about it. > > > > I think you must look at what you said - who is going to deliver their > > bright new idea in an abstract? You have to surmise that they do, because > > their concepts (small c) are in place. (We fail people here who only > quote > > abstracts...). So head to the hardcopy, comrade brother. > > > > Having delivered my sermon, I find the SCT of ESL very disappointing. It > > seems like they are just pinning new labels on things they already knew. > > But if we have a fellow practitioner among us, please do speak up. I > > remember when I first started working on CHAT in language education in > the > > late eighties, I felt I was pinning labels. > > > > Carol > > > > On 3 November 2014 13:50, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >> Hi David, > >> > >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my > course > >> in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university > library > >> webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited > >> access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused > me. > >> In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but > >> then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking > at > >> abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is > >> learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), > and > >> (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was > >> expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or > to > >> suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... > >> > >> What am I missing? > >> > >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on > >> people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not > much, or > >> nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because > >> they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they > >> speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about > this! > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 07:59:26 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:59:26 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: <00C772E9-06B1-4FB6-904E-758481B8253E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin There are two responses to that. The first is the unthinking access to English in the American Melting Pot. Europeans happily sujectected themselves to the task of learning American English (preferably with an Irish accent :) ) It was a given. They had to learn to read and write in English in order to get a job. So they did. *What *they did seems to have been obscure. The people who did that up into the 1930s might well be dead now, or limited in what they can remember. I can remember my very classrooms, the teachers, their names, specific episodes, incidents etc etc. Mo mother, born in 1920 could not even remember in which town she was at school in, etc. and anyways she died seven years ago. The other is where *refugees *who have no choice about losing their language in the modern language melting pot - see one of the posts about 300+ languages in New York. About that I think the episodes are so fast moving to be ephemeral. And we don't have the luxury or having seen their language in writing - there may be no writing system. So - maybe ask the listserv. Carol On 3 November 2014 17:41, Martin John Packer wrote: > Yes, of course the children drown. What I'm wondering is how much it has > been studied. > > When I search on Google Scholar for 'linguistic submersion' in the title, > nothing appears: > > Your search - allintitle: "linguistic Submersion" - did not match any > articles. > > Martin > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:31 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Martin > > > > Thats the version called "Submersion". Children aptly drown. > > > > Carol > > > > On 3 November 2014 16:32, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >> Does the field of "bilingual education", then, include cases where the > >> instruction is in only one language, one which the students did not > grow up > >> speaking? Or would that be called something else? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:29 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> > >>> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in > >> which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 05:30:33 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 10:30:33 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Open position in Aging in PUC-Chile Message-ID: <3B01110E-987F-4A70-B2BC-9B549ED729BE@gmail.com> El Instituto de Sociolog?a, la Escuela de Psicolog?a, y la Escuela de Medicina de la Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile, en Santiago, hacen un llamado de postulaciones para el puesto de profesor asistente de tiempo completo, especializado en estudios de envejecimiento para empezar en Marzo de 2015, y que pueda contribuir en la consolidaci?n interdisciplinaria del Centro de Geriatr?a y Gerontolog?a UC. Se buscan candidatos con especial inter?s en la comprensi?n integral de la vejez y los procesos de envejecimiento, que incorporen dimensiones epidemiol?gicas, psicol?gicas y sociales. Se otorgar? prioridad a candidatos con experiencia en investigaci?n interdisciplinaria en temas de envejecimiento. Se requiere de dedicaci?n y habilidades para impartir cursos de pre y postgrado y para realizar investigaci?n cient?fica e interdisciplinaria de buen nivel. El candidato debe estar en posesi?n del grado acad?mico de doctor (PhD), o su equivalente (especialidades m?dicas), al momento de contrataci?n, de preferencia en ciencias sociales o ciencias de la salud. Se requiere fluidez en espa?ol e ingl?s. Salario es competitivo. El plazo de postulaci?n vence el 30 de noviembre de 2014 para asegurar total consideraci?n dentro de la n?mina. Se les ruega a los y las postulantes enviar (1) curriculum vitae, (2) carta de intenci?n y declaraci?n de intereses de investigaci?n y de docencia (research statement), (3) muestra de escritura (writing sample), (4) dos cartas de recomendaci?n (enviadas directamente por recomendadores), por correo electr?nico a Sof?a Ugarte (asugarte@uc.cl). The Institute of Sociology, the School of Psychology, and the School of Medicine at the Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile, at Santiago, invite applications for an appointment at the rank of Assistant Professor (full-time) specialized in aging studies, to begin in March 2015, and who can contribute to the interdisciplinary consolidation of the Center for Geriatrics and Gerontology UC. We seek candidates with special interest in the comprehensive understanding of aging processes with consideration of its epidemiological, psychological, and social dimensions. Priority will be given to candidates with experience in interdisciplinary research on aging studies. Dedication and ability to teach undergraduate and graduate courses and to perform interdisciplinary scientific research is required. The successful candidate must hold a PhD, or equivalent (medical specialties), at the time of appointment, preferably in social sciences or health sciences. Fluency in Spanish and English is required. Salary is competitive. To ensure full consideration applications must be received by November 30, 2014. Please send (1) curriculum vitae, (2) research statement, (3) writing sample, (4) teaching perspective, and (5) two letters of reference, via email to Sof?a Ugarte (asugarte@uc.cl). David Preiss, Ph.D. Director Escuela de Psicolog?a Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Av Vicu?a Mackenna - 4860 7820436 Macul Santiago, Chile Fono: (562) 3544635 Fax: (562) 3544844 web: https://sites.google.com/site/daviddpreiss/ From smago@uga.edu Mon Nov 3 07:18:17 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:18:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching Message-ID: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 09:00:52 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:00:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as far > as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. On the contrary, I'm finding a variety of treatments... for example: De Guerrero, M. C. M. (2006). Inner speech-L2: Thinking words in a second language. Springer. McCafferty, S. G. (1998). Nonverbal Expression and L2 Private Speech. Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 73-96. As I mentioned in my first message in this thread I find SC studies of L2 inner speech an interesting topic, because it is exploring the way that L2 can enter - and transform? - the higher psychological functions. As a native English speaker living and working in a country in which Spanish is the dominant language, I am very aware that my higher psychological functions are not as adequate when I'm using Spanish as they are when I use English, but also that the balance is changing. It's one thing (though difficult!) to *speak* fluently in a second language, it's another to *think* fluently in that language. So this seems to me where the SC approach to L2 is exploring something new. Martin From jherazo4@hotmail.com Mon Nov 3 09:09:59 2014 From: jherazo4@hotmail.com (jose david herazo) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 12:09:59 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Martin and all, I agree with Remi that the idea of using functional second Language concepts as a form or mediation to guide learners' meaning making is new for the L2 education field. In my dissertation ( http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/20998/ ) i explored this idea using concepts from systemic linguistics. One or the intriguing things I found Was that, once learners appropriated the expl?cit explanations (concepts) about how the L2 Worked in the genres we studied, they started to use those explanations during their talk as they planned and assessed their own L2 use. As I see it, concepts provided transformational fuel for my learners to approach their L2 learning tasks in the clasroom differently. JOse David JOS? DAVID HERAZO, PhD > On 3/11/2014, at 7:31, "Peter Smagorinsky" wrote: > > I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: > > 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. > 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. > 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. > > So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM > To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 > > Hi David, > > I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... > > What am I missing? > > Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! > > Martin > > > From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 09:31:13 2014 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 09:31:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Hi Peter, Denise Pacheco wrote her dissertation on teaching & learning poetry with 5th graders using a socio-cultural lens. Her email address is: Denise Pacheco Best, Shirin On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of > sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform > research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention > to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in > this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. > Thanks,Peter > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Nov 3 09:40:58 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:40:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1415036458355.72877@ucdenver.edu> Perhaps, Martin, these two articles are supportive of your interests. phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 3, 2014 10:00 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as far > as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. On the contrary, I'm finding a variety of treatments... for example: De Guerrero, M. C. M. (2006). Inner speech-L2: Thinking words in a second language. Springer. McCafferty, S. G. (1998). Nonverbal Expression and L2 Private Speech. Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 73-96. As I mentioned in my first message in this thread I find SC studies of L2 inner speech an interesting topic, because it is exploring the way that L2 can enter - and transform? - the higher psychological functions. As a native English speaker living and working in a country in which Spanish is the dominant language, I am very aware that my higher psychological functions are not as adequate when I'm using Spanish as they are when I use English, but also that the balance is changing. It's one thing (though difficult!) to *speak* fluently in a second language, it's another to *think* fluently in that language. So this seems to me where the SC approach to L2 is exploring something new. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SSLA2014.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 226516 bytes Desc: SSLA2014.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141103/bc35c8a6/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: donato.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2425707 bytes Desc: donato.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141103/bc35c8a6/attachment-0003.pdf From compernolle@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 09:52:13 2014 From: compernolle@gmail.com (=?iso-8859-1?Q?=22R=E9mi_A=2E_van_Compernolle=22?=) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 12:52:13 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: So there are two general strands/lines of questioning in L2 work. One is related to how the L2 can change, enhance, modify, etc. higher functions. This is the inner speech question. Martin found some relevant references in an earlier post. I?d also note that people like Gale Stam and Steve McCafferty who explore speech-gesture synchrony address the issue. It seems that even with ?native like? L2 proficiency, gestures reveal that inner speech is mediated by the L1. That?s an oversimplified summary of this research, but it?s an important finding. Relatedly, however, gestures appear to participate in internalization processes as private and/or inner speech. The second strand is less focused on the effect of L2 on psych functions and more concerned with how people gain control over a new semiotic system. In this line of research, we emphasize whatever means are used to mediate this process (concepts, L1, L2, L3, etc., other people, strategies, and so on). I?ve argued in my recent work that in a lot of cases it isn?t the L2 that?s internalized to function intrapsychologically but rather metacognitive strategies subserved by declarative memory systems that are deployed to regulate the deployment of L2 resources. This draws on the neurolinguistic work of Paradis and Ullman. So in this sense L2 development isn?t necessarily about acquiring forms but internalizing other means (aux stimuli in V?s well known triangle) to control L2 use ?from the outside?. I attach a recent paper I published with a student in one of our (i.e instructed L2 people) leading journals, Language Learning, in case it?s of interest to anyone out there. Adam -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 2014 LL van Compernolle & Henery - CBPI classroom.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 661950 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141103/e82e37fb/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- R?mi A. van Compernolle Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies Department of Modern Languages Carnegie Mellon University Baker Hall A60M 412-268-1122 On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:09 PM, jose david herazo wrote: > Hi Martin and all, > I agree with Remi that the idea of using functional second Language concepts as a form or mediation to guide learners' meaning making is new for the L2 education field. In my dissertation ( http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/20998/ ) i explored this idea using concepts from systemic linguistics. One or the intriguing things I found Was that, once learners appropriated the expl?cit explanations (concepts) about how the L2 Worked in the genres we studied, they started to use those explanations during their talk as they planned and assessed their own L2 use. As I see it, concepts provided transformational fuel for my learners to approach their L2 learning tasks in the clasroom differently. > > JOse David > > > JOS? DAVID HERAZO, PhD > >> On 3/11/2014, at 7:31, "Peter Smagorinsky" wrote: >> >> I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: >> >> 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. >> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >> 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. >> >> So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM >> To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 >> >> Hi David, >> >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >> >> What am I missing? >> >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! >> >> Martin >> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 09:53:02 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 10:53:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86C04428-7075-4F06-9F25-23074CE5B30A@gmail.com> Hi Martin, I think Steve McCafferty (whom I have copied and whom I know from when we did doctoral work together) at University of Nevada has used Lantolf a lot re: L2. And I?m pretty sure Steve would be interested in your questions. Steve wrote something fairly recently on gesture in L2, which I assume can be connected to TPR (Total Physical Response). If I am wrong about any of this, I apologize, but since you are teaching the stuff this week, I thought speed was necessary. Henry > On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:50 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Hi David, > > I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... > > What am I missing? > > Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! > > Martin > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 09:57:51 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:57:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already been covered. 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling concretely given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, using the familiar notation A > B etc. 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of Gal'perin. 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the means to transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) which would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. I think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not mere understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful quantification". Best, Huw On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. > Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning at > a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It > seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for > arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but I > guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by Davydov's > method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with algebra > later on. > > It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a "unit > of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be > extended. > > Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a CHAT > theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and Leontyev. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > >> Hi Dear All, >> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it >> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of Jean >> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached another >> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. >> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum >> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, >> Natalia. >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "mike cole" >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >> Schmittau's >> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may >> give those following the discussion some useful info. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >> >> >>> Peg >>> >>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you >>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely >>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus >>> counting >>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US >>> curriculum >>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting >>> number >>> versus real number) is better than the other. >>> >>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you >>> gave >>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the >>> one >>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >>> >>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in >>> some >>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' >>> in >>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the >>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >>>> >>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >>>> >>>> >>> don't >>> >>> >>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics >>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about >>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with >>>> >>>> >>> the >>> >>> >>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers >>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in >>>> >>>> >>> US >>> >>> >>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >>>> >>>> >>> overshadow >>> >>> >>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the >>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >>>> >>>> >>> relations >>> >>> >>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not >>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some >>>> >>>> >>> of >>> >>> >>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal >>>> thing >>>> not a mathematics thing. >>>> PG >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>> >>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >>>> >>>> >>> (although >>> >>> >>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a >>>> >>>> >>> Louis >>> >>> >>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers >>>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>> >>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, >>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >>>>> react by >>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children >>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of >>>>> >>>>> >>>> solving an existing problem. >>>> >>>> >>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> -- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> string." >>> >>> >>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >>>>>> of it, though!) >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>> >>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > From usabilidoido@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 10:00:08 2014 From: usabilidoido@gmail.com (Frederick van Amstel) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 19:00:08 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Hello Peter! Vygotsky himself has a lengthy article about that. I like especially the discussion of the experience of Tostoy in writing a theater piece with children from a poor community. Vygotsky, Lev Semenovich. "Imagination and creativity in childhood." *Journal of Russian and east European psychology* 42.1 (2004): 7-97. Cheers, -- . .{ Frederick van Amstel }. http://fredvanamstel.com PhD Researcher Construction Management & Engineering University of Twente 2014-11-03 18:31 GMT+01:00 Shirin Vossoughi : > Hi Peter, > Denise Pacheco wrote her dissertation on teaching & learning poetry with > 5th graders using a socio-cultural lens. Her email address is: Denise > Pacheco > Best, > Shirin > > On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of > > sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform > > research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special > attention > > to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work > in > > this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. > > Thanks,Peter > > > > > From alex_rosborough@byu.edu Mon Nov 3 10:06:12 2014 From: alex_rosborough@byu.edu (Alex Rosborough) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 18:06:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: <86C04428-7075-4F06-9F25-23074CE5B30A@gmail.com> References: <86C04428-7075-4F06-9F25-23074CE5B30A@gmail.com> Message-ID: Steve and Martin, Perhaps Peltier & McCafferty (2010) may be useful here. This is an article about how Italian learners (given certain circumstances) appropriated Italian gestures ("new" identity/way-of-being) in their L2. Evidence of transformation. It's adults not k-12. alex On 11/3/14 10:53 AM, "HENRY SHONERD" wrote: >Hi Martin, >I think Steve McCafferty (whom I have copied and whom I know from when we >did doctoral work together) at University of Nevada has used Lantolf a >lot re: L2. And I?m pretty sure Steve would be interested in your >questions. Steve wrote something fairly recently on gesture in L2, which >I assume can be connected to TPR (Total Physical Response). If I am wrong >about any of this, I apologize, but since you are teaching the stuff this >week, I thought speed was necessary. >Henry > > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:50 AM, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >> Hi David, >> >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my >>course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My >>university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so >>I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to >>read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable >>summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to >>applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it >>seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what >>isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech >>occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to >>attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 >>mediates in a specific way, or... >> >> What am I missing? >> >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on >>people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, >>or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue >>because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only >>if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong >>about this! >> >> Martin >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 10:07:14 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 18:07:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <40072325-3996-4165-81AA-64F3BF19308A@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Jose, Could you say a bit more about how this works? One thing that's puzzling to me is that I think of the word meanings of everyday language as inherently non-explicit and situational, so I'm wondering who does the work of spelling out the L2 concepts, and how. Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:09 PM, jose david herazo wrote: > Hi Martin and all, > I agree with Remi that the idea of using functional second Language concepts as a form or mediation to guide learners' meaning making is new for the L2 education field. In my dissertation ( http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/20998/ ) i explored this idea using concepts from systemic linguistics. One or the intriguing things I found Was that, once learners appropriated the expl?cit explanations (concepts) about how the L2 Worked in the genres we studied, they started to use those explanations during their talk as they planned and assessed their own L2 use. As I see it, concepts provided transformational fuel for my learners to approach their L2 learning tasks in the clasroom differently. > > JOse David > > > JOS? DAVID HERAZO, PhD > >> On 3/11/2014, at 7:31, "Peter Smagorinsky" wrote: >> >> I'm not an L2 researcher (or speaker, for the most part), but I work with quite a few. A few points: >> >> 1. Foreign Language learning is but one of many L2 matters. There is also bilingual education, ESOL, EFL, etc. >> 2. The whole field of bilingual education characterizes the areas in which you say there is nothing, at least in the US. >> 3. There might be ethical problems, at least for US Institutional Review Boards, in studying populations as vulnerable as they ones you describe, especially in getting them to sign consent forms that others are confident that they understand--and many immigrants are reluctant to sign papers they fear might cause them problems. >> >> So, I think you're wrong on this, and hope that's what you're hoping for. p >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 6:50 AM >> To: David Kellogg; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] L2 >> >> Hi David, >> >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my course in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university library webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused me. In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking at abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), and (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or to suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >> >> What am I missing? >> >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not much, or nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about this! >> >> Martin >> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 3 10:10:04 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 18:10:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0A54B1D0-7D01-4E7E-A5B0-EDE5C2C3A179@uniandes.edu.co> Adam, Are you referring here to the way that until a L2 is automatized it requires deliberate control? I get home tired at the end of the say because when I'm speaking Spanish I do so with deliberate awareness - I have to will the utterances to emerge. I have the L2 resources available in some form, but I need to actively deploy them at all levels, whereas in L1 the lexicogrammar takes care of itself. Martin On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:52 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > I?ve argued in my recent work that in a lot of cases it isn?t the L2 that?s internalized to function intrapsychologically but rather metacognitive strategies subserved by declarative memory systems that are deployed to regulate the deployment of L2 resources. From compernolle@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 10:29:44 2014 From: compernolle@gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?=22R=E9mi_A=2E_van_Compernolle=22?=) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 13:29:44 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: <0A54B1D0-7D01-4E7E-A5B0-EDE5C2C3A179@uniandes.edu.co> References: <0A54B1D0-7D01-4E7E-A5B0-EDE5C2C3A179@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <0A82793F-571D-4B5A-B201-EEAE8B6D47EF@gmail.com> Martin: Yes, basically. The evidence in neurolinguistics shows that it?s really really hard (if at all possible) to proceduralize an L2 (in the sense of it becoming implicit knowledge, subserved by procedural memory, etc.). Paradis?s argument is that highly proficiency L2 users speed up access to declarative processes that end up being functionally equivalent (or close) to the way that implicit, procedural competence works for native speakers. So if you?re tired after working all day in an L2 (I?ve had this experience too, and continue to have it when I teach upper division French culture and sociolinguistics courses in French), it?s because it takes a lot of attentional resources to do these things, which isn?t the case if you?re using your L1, at least that?s the theory. I use this basic argument as a rationale for doing explicit teaching. We don?t know how, if at all, we can impact upon implicit/procedural competencies in L2 development, but we do know that we can intervene to promote conscious control. So if we can give learners really good L2 tools (e.g., concepts, categories of meaning, etc.) that mediate their controlled L2 performance, we get really good performances, provided we include communicative tasks that link the metalinguistic to the communicative performance. And at some point, with lots of practice, says Paradis at least, some implicit/procedural competencies may develop in parallel. Adam R?mi A. van Compernolle Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies Department of Modern Languages Carnegie Mellon University Baker Hall A60M 412-268-1122 On Nov 3, 2014, at 1:10 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Adam, > > Are you referring here to the way that until a L2 is automatized it requires deliberate control? I get home tired at the end of the say because when I'm speaking Spanish I do so with deliberate awareness - I have to will the utterances to emerge. I have the L2 resources available in some form, but I need to actively deploy them at all levels, whereas in L1 the lexicogrammar takes care of itself. > > Martin > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:52 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > >> I?ve argued in my recent work that in a lot of cases it isn?t the L2 that?s internalized to function intrapsychologically but rather metacognitive strategies subserved by declarative memory systems that are deployed to regulate the deployment of L2 resources. > > From jherazo4@hotmail.com Mon Nov 3 11:05:01 2014 From: jherazo4@hotmail.com (jose david herazo) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:05:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: <0A82793F-571D-4B5A-B201-EEAE8B6D47EF@gmail.com> References: <0A54B1D0-7D01-4E7E-A5B0-EDE5C2C3A179@uniandes.edu.co> <0A82793F-571D-4B5A-B201-EEAE8B6D47EF@gmail.com> Message-ID: I side with Remi again on the rationale for expl?cit teaching of toools like concepts. In my case I followed Gal'Perin stage-by-stage model to teach learners concepts of how the L2-English Was used to shop and sell at a farmers market and to explain a recipe. I derived these concepts from systemic lunguistics: the idea that when we comun?cate we follow some predictable Stages to achieve our purpose (concept of genre), that communication takes part in specific situations made up of the relationship of those who communicate, of the topic of communication, and of the mode or communication, oral or written (concept or register) and that our choice of specific L2 forms (e.g., ' cut the onions' vs. 'Let's cut the onions') will depend on the configuration or all those aspects in actual communicative events. As for the pedagogy to teach these concepts, i used Gal'Perin, as I said. This means that I first explained these concepts to learners and we used them, for example, as a framework (a system) to compare how farmers market shopping in the states Was similar/different from shopping in small convience stores in my learners' Neighborhoods in Colombia. Then I introduced a graphic, holistic representation or those concepts (Gal'Perin's SCOBA), that learners used for various tasks. For example, the learners identified the stages of a shopping exchange that they saw in a video, or used the conceptual graph for planning a role play (which, by the way, Was something they were used to doing by writing a script!). And finally this graph Was withdrawn, so that learners relied only on their talk based in these concepts to plan their use of the new Language, assess their own production, analyze samples on Language in use, or monitor what they were saying as they were saying it. All this ocurred alongside Other common activities from the Language classroom such as vocabulary games, songs, pronunciation practice activities, and so on. JOS? DAVID HERAZO, PhD > On 3/11/2014, at 13:36, "R?mi A. van Compernolle" wrote: > > Martin: > > Yes, basically. The evidence in neurolinguistics shows that it?s really really hard (if at all possible) to proceduralize an L2 (in the sense of it becoming implicit knowledge, subserved by procedural memory, etc.). Paradis?s argument is that highly proficiency L2 users speed up access to declarative processes that end up being functionally equivalent (or close) to the way that implicit, procedural competence works for native speakers. So if you?re tired after working all day in an L2 (I?ve had this experience too, and continue to have it when I teach upper division French culture and sociolinguistics courses in French), it?s because it takes a lot of attentional resources to do these things, which isn?t the case if you?re using your L1, at least that?s the theory. > > I use this basic argument as a rationale for doing explicit teaching. We don?t know how, if at all, we can impact upon implicit/procedural competencies in L2 development, but we do know that we can intervene to promote conscious control. So if we can give learners really good L2 tools (e.g., concepts, categories of meaning, etc.) that mediate their controlled L2 performance, we get really good performances, provided we include communicative tasks that link the metalinguistic to the communicative performance. And at some point, with lots of practice, says Paradis at least, some implicit/procedural competencies may develop in parallel. > > Adam > > > > R?mi A. van Compernolle > Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies > Department of Modern Languages > Carnegie Mellon University > Baker Hall A60M > 412-268-1122 > > > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 1:10 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Adam, >> >> Are you referring here to the way that until a L2 is automatized it requires deliberate control? I get home tired at the end of the say because when I'm speaking Spanish I do so with deliberate awareness - I have to will the utterances to emerge. I have the L2 resources available in some form, but I need to actively deploy them at all levels, whereas in L1 the lexicogrammar takes care of itself. >> >> Martin >> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:52 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: >>> >>> I?ve argued in my recent work that in a lot of cases it isn?t the L2 that?s internalized to function intrapsychologically but rather metacognitive strategies subserved by declarative memory systems that are deployed to regulate the deployment of L2 resources. > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 11:54:52 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 13:54:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> Message-ID: <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> Huw How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between mathematics and, for instance, physics? Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Andy, > > I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already been > covered. > > 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling concretely > given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, using the > familiar notation A > B etc. > > 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of Gal'perin. > > 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent > applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual > knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the means to > transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) which > would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. I > think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not mere > understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful > quantification". > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. >> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning at >> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It >> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for >> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but I >> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by Davydov's >> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with algebra >> later on. >> >> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a "unit >> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be >> extended. >> >> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a CHAT >> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and Leontyev. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: >> >>> Hi Dear All, >>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it >>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of Jean >>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached another >>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. >>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum >>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, >>> Natalia. >>> >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "mike cole" >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>> >>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >>> Schmittau's >>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that may >>> give those following the discussion some useful info. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Peg >>>> >>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you >>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely >>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus >>>> counting >>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US >>>> curriculum >>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting >>>> number >>>> versus real number) is better than the other. >>>> >>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you >>>> gave >>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the >>>> one >>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >>>> >>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in >>>> some >>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' >>>> in >>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the >>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >>>>> >>>>> >>>> don't >>>> >>>> >>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov mathematics >>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about >>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with >>>>> >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring numbers >>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often see in >>>>> >>>>> >>>> US >>>> >>>> >>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >>>>> >>>>> >>>> overshadow >>>> >>>> >>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the >>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >>>>> >>>>> >>>> relations >>>> >>>> >>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not >>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in some >>>>> >>>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal >>>>> thing >>>>> not a mathematics thing. >>>>> PG >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>> >>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >>>>> >>>>> >>>> (although >>>> >>>> >>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by a >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Louis >>>> >>>> >>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even rulers >>>>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>> >>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. However, >>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >>>>>> react by >>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children >>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> solving an existing problem. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> string." >>>> >>>> >>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the originator >>>>>>> of it, though!) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Nov 3 12:06:28 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:06:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1415045188134.45172@unm.edu> Hi David, (a) Meaning: Interesting. When I spoke of labels, I meant it in terms of an individual mind. What is there before the label, not after? I don't see the harm in applying this dynamic of naming across groups who wish to determine themes in their activities, just that isn't how I meant it. :) Do you mean to say that there is a new theme manifesting in which we are interacting before the label manifests? I'm not sure I understand, but I am trying. Still, meaning is my choice, if I'm allowed to cast a vote, because meaning is what distinguishes us as human and not machine or animal. Words are tools because they have meaning, they are the glue to what we do and think. I don't know how far we could get doing anything if we didn't have words (we, as a society, and we as, you and I, and we as, me and myself - a stretch of the plural first person, I know, but to account for self-reflection and inner speech). Furthermore, I don't know how far we'd get if words didn't have meaning. So I see meaning as the germ, the seed, and I agree with LSV that word-meaning is how we give meaning a form in our minds ("consciousness" to those who have issue with the word "mind"), if this is what he was saying. Word-meaning is a placeholder, like the oil lamp is the holder of the flame. It can be the unit for neuroscience, for anthropology, for philosophy, for learning, for linguistics, for computation, for many, many kinds of angles to study mind. I don't mean to upset anyone, but to only give an honest account that when I examine activity, I don't see that same kind of reach. Of course I am not willing to abandon activity, for the record. I just view activity differently. I believe we are more than what we do. I accept that people disagree with that, and that is OK. (b) Idealism and intellectualism: This does smack of Descartes' dualism. And now with the phrase of "plump materialism" meming around the list, I'll have to hunt that paper of Martin's down and cast my eyes upon it. :) What is so great about the list is that I can read a paper and then pose a question to the author, and I think that is the point of the list and I am really on with that. I regret that I did not climb aboard a few years ago when Vera first told us about it. (c) Lysenko: Seems to be an odd way to see the world as he did, but that way of thinking seems to have been plump with the times. I very much like the idea of seeing a book or a saw as an artificial organ, but also a library, a town hall, an art museum, a university campus, all as external organs to our abilities. The metaphor may break down as all metaphors do, but "artificial organ" does lend itself to how thought and custom are stored beyond the brain, and that seems correct. Kind regards, Annalisa ============================ a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering again, and that is not what Martin meant.) c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher psychological functions are par excellence the things that require instruction and that instruction depends very much on material resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is eliminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with instruction. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David, > > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. > > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. > > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. > > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. > > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) > > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] > > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. > > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. > > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. > > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. > > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. > > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: > > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. > > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. > > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? > > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when the speech goes quiet? :) > > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Hi David, > > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! > > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. > > What I want to say quickly is regarding > > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! > > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. > > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. > > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! > > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. > > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's > how the light gets in. > > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: > > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing > intellect). Vygotsky says: > > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? > ?????????? ??? ?????. > > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the > theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses > the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by > the environment; through the external path of the environment he > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around > him.) > > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the > dying). > > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. > > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. > > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is > Not Born a Personality". > > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi David! >> >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. >> >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. >> >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? >> >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. >> >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >> >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >> >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >> >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >> >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. >> >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) >> >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >> >> Until then... >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >> >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings >> on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between >> Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which >> Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students >> and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >> >> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 >> >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder >> of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do >> now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our >> understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at >> least) three: >> >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the >> explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form >> of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This >> revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use >> activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made >> up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of >> activity. >> >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as >> a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant >> rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting >> contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the >> discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than >> a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term >> effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the >> anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely >> mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely >> mentions anything without mentioning language). >> >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of >> modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >> >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from >> point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same >> way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >> Vygotsky does at all. >> >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution >> of the environment from the contribution of the child in the >> understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to >> the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >> development. >> >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is >> the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one >> is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really >> reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion >> for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is >> retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while >> "world outlook" is proleptic. >> >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >> death. >> >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the >> Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of >> Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where >> Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John >> Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality >> is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I >> think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that >> semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A >> narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock >> puppet clapping. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Thanks for some additional information. >>> >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >>> >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >>> >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >>> >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >>> >>> First is historical: >>> >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >>> >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >>> >>> Second is theoretical: >>> >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >>> >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >>> >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >>> >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >>> >>> Annalisa, >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >>> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >>> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >>> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >>> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >>> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >>> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >>> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >>> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >>> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >>> show through. >>> >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >>> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >>> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >>> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >>> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >>> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >>> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>>> >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>>> not flood the list). >>>> >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>>> >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>>> this thinking? >>>> >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>>> >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>>> >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>>> >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>>> concept of perezhivanie? >>>> >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>>> >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>>> >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>>> the whole is an abstraction. >>>> >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>>> >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>>> >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Nov 3 12:09:35 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:09:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <1415045375233.4754@unm.edu> Hi Peter, Might I recommend Vera John-Steiner's work? She may know of other work too. Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Monday, November 3, 2014 8:18 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 12:29:35 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:29:35 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> Message-ID: <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> Andy I have often used this for various reasons (smile). There are some problems with this example and the way, perhaps, you are using it. The are certain conceptual tricks at play which cause, I think, some of the problems. Let me illustrate. 1. Let a= b + k where k is zero. 2. a^2 = ab + ak 3. a^2 - b^2 = ab + ak - b^2 3. (a-b)(a+b) = (a-b)b + ak 4. (a+b) = b + ak/(a-b) 5. However, a-b = k, so a+b = b + a. The is a rule in school, and it is not exactly a 'mathematical' rule, that you can't divide by zero. However, is a convention, You can, indeed, divide by zero, but you need to think about it a little. In algebra, one might argue, the slope of a vertical line is roughly of this problematic form, but that is a problem of representation. As plots 1/x near the origin, one sees a discontinuity caused by this problematic, but that is expected. The interesting cases occur, however, in calculus where one considers, in a sense, 0/0. These can be somewhat undecidable without a little more information (as case, perhaps, of we can't know). However, in a sense, x/x at zero is just 1 and x^2/x at zero is just 0 (and, in fact, your example is somewhat of this uncertain nature). So the rule isn't necessarily 'objectively' introduced if I understand you correctly; nonetheless, one needs to be careful and preserve a sort of thoughtful consistency in mathematics (by the way, a certain inconsistency can often observed in the historical records in the development of mathematical topics). Anyway, I think you may be saying is that 'objectivity' is something that needs to be introduced when consistency of the discipline is threatened. Perhaps, in mathematics the difference is that this is done internally rather than externally. If that is the case, here may be an example: 5 x 5 = 25 5 x 4 = 20 5 x 3 = 15 5 x 2 = 10 5 x 1 = 5 5 x 0 = 0 5 x -1 = -5 There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. Ed On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Some people will be familiar with this: > > 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab > 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 > 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b > 5. then a+b=b > 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b > 7. then 2=1 > > This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. > The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. > The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there just for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to objective constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a and b represent lengths or baseball scores. > > Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. > > Andy > (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. >> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective versus the opposite? >> >> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link in a brief intro): >> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> :) So many issues. >>> >>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure was due to contingencies, I don't know. >>> >>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or they fail. >>> >>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to my mind. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Carol and Andy >>>> >>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese tended to be fairly pragmatic). >>>> >>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a different matter. >>>> >>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics curriculum may be a little outworn. >>>> >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> It's up to you, Ed. >>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations quite engaging. >>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>>>> >>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step further in our discussion on the listserve. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Just thinking ... >>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating phylogeny. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>>>> happened very early in history. >>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>>>> been resolved). >>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>>>> were used. >>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>>>> symbolic notation. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Ah Ed >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>>>> heart of the matter. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Carol >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> > Carol >>>>>> > >>>>>> > If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>>>> granted. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Ed >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > Best >>>>>> > > Carol >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > -- >>>>>> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> > > Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > -- >>>>>> > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> > Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 12:38:09 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:38:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed, One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, engaging with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through quantifying. I am also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". Best, Huw On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: > Huw > > How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between > mathematics and, for instance, physics? > > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already > been > > covered. > > > > 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling > concretely > > given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, using > the > > familiar notation A > B etc. > > > > 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of Gal'perin. > > > > 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent > > applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual > > knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the means > to > > transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) which > > would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. I > > think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not mere > > understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful > > quantification". > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. > >> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning > at > >> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It > >> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for > >> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but I > >> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by Davydov's > >> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with > algebra > >> later on. > >> > >> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a > "unit > >> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be > >> extended. > >> > >> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a CHAT > >> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and > Leontyev. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Dear All, > >>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it > >>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of > Jean > >>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached > another > >>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. > >>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum > >>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, > >>> Natalia. > >>> > >>> > >>> ----- Original Message ----- > >>> From: "mike cole" > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>> > >>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean > >>> Schmittau's > >>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that > may > >>> give those following the discussion some useful info. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Peg > >>>> > >>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which > you > >>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I > >>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely > >>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus > >>>> counting > >>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US > >>>> curriculum > >>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting > >>>> number > >>>> versus real number) is better than the other. > >>>> > >>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you > >>>> gave > >>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the > >>>> one > >>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > >>>> > >>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I > >>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in > >>>> some > >>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't > know.' > >>>> in > >>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. > >>>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into > the > >>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. > >>>>> > >>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> don't > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov > mathematics > >>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > >>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all > about > >>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed > with > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring > numbers > >>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often > see in > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> US > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> overshadow > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about > the > >>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> relations > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not > >>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in > some > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> of > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal > >>>>> thing > >>>>> not a mathematics thing. > >>>>> PG > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > >>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>> > >>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> (although > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by > a > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> Louis > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed > >>>>> > >>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics > >>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > >>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even > rulers > >>>>>> or tape measures of strings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. > However, > >>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they > >>>>>> react by > >>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the > children > >>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way > >>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think > >>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought > of?" > >>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you > >>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a > means of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> solving an existing problem. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There > >>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater > >>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> string." > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > >>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that > >>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the > originator > >>>>>>> of it, though!) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > >>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not > >>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how > the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A >>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > >>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 13:16:29 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:16:29 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> Message-ID: <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> Huw I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or 'meaningful activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That is, one aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the conversation on the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean as regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Ed, > > One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. > Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. > > I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, engaging > with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through quantifying. I am > also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Huw >> >> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between >> mathematics and, for instance, physics? >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already >> been >>> covered. >>> >>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling >> concretely >>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, using >> the >>> familiar notation A > B etc. >>> >>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of Gal'perin. >>> >>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent >>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual >>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the means >> to >>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) which >>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. I >>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not mere >>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful >>> quantification". >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. >>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning >> at >>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It >>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for >>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but I >>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by Davydov's >>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with >> algebra >>>> later on. >>>> >>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a >> "unit >>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be >>>> extended. >>>> >>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a CHAT >>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and >> Leontyev. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Dear All, >>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it >>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of >> Jean >>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached >> another >>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. >>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math curriculum >>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, >>>>> Natalia. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>> From: "mike cole" >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>> >>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >>>>> Schmittau's >>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed that >> may >>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Peg >>>>>> >>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which >> you >>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely >>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus >>>>>> counting >>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US >>>>>> curriculum >>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting >>>>>> number >>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you >>>>>> gave >>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the >>>>>> one >>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in >>>>>> some >>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't >> know.' >>>>>> in >>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into >> the >>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> don't >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov >> mathematics >>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all >> about >>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed >> with >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring >> numbers >>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often >> see in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> US >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> overshadow >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about >> the >>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> relations >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not >>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in >> some >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal >>>>>>> thing >>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. >>>>>>> PG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> (although >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s by >> a >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Louis >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even >> rulers >>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. >> However, >>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >>>>>>>> react by >>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the >> children >>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought >> of?" >>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a >> means of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> solving an existing problem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> string." >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the >> originator >>>>>>>>> of it, though!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how >> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 13:26:52 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 21:26:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> Message-ID: > Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is > subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of > relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world > outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to > adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, > irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. > I suspect you're putting the cart before the horse, Andy. A useful notational system with its own "internal" constraints must conform to its use in practical application, although such conforming may be achieved through displacing problems into the discourse. If too many problems are introduced, the mathematical notation would not be suitable. 5cm + 5cm = 10cm 5cm * 5cm = 25cm^2 The 5cm in these two expressions are about different things. The conjunction of the mathematical notation of "*" with the two units of measure changes the meaning of the object that the expression refers to. Huw > > Andy > (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going through > the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: > >> Andy >> >> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of >> mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come >> back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number >> of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the >> curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. >> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about what >> you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective versus >> the opposite? >> >> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, >> reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead >> boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention >> (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her >> daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , >> but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article >> "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link >> in a brief intro): >> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> :) So many issues. >>> >>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in >>> mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would >>> have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book >>> highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the >>> logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the >>> historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to >>> make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure >>> was due to contingencies, I don't know. >>> >>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia >>> Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. >>> Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective >>> relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or >>> they fail. >>> >>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or that >>> group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which is >>> constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those relations, >>> which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, and the >>> infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of discovery which >>> is available to children has the potential to both teach and endear >>> mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead boring and >>> politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to my mind. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Carol and Andy >>>> >>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction >>>> being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with >>>> Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno >>>> clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and >>>> the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was >>>> being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There >>>> are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese >>>> tended to be fairly pragmatic). >>>> >>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes >>>> below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first >>>> and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental >>>> work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I >>>> wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize >>>> such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come >>>> out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). >>>> I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and >>>> social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions >>>> among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is >>>> referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer >>>> with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if >>>> necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has >>>> been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). >>>> Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical >>>> standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, >>>> mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary >>>> and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum >>>> (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a >>>> different matter. >>>> >>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical >>>> contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and >>>> probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an >>>> eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have >>>> also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is >>>> recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took >>>> smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now >>>> tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, >>>> very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics >>>> curriculum may be a little outworn. >>>> >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> It's up to you, Ed. >>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. I >>>>> learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate >>>>> life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations >>>>> quite engaging. >>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get >>>>> interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions >>>>> being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be >>>>> interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at >>>>> the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>>>> >>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you and >>>>>> Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be >>>>>> significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step >>>>>> further in our discussion on the listserve. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Just thinking ... >>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating >>>>>> phylogeny. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>>>> happened very early in history. >>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>>>> been resolved). >>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>>>> were used. >>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>>>> symbolic notation. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Ah Ed >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>>>> heart of the matter. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Carol >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> > Carol >>>>>> > >>>>>> > If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>>>> granted. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Ed >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > > Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > Best >>>>>> > > Carol >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > -- >>>>>> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> > > Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > -- >>>>>> > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> > Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 13:49:55 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 15:49:55 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: off list on mathematics and the social In-Reply-To: <002b01cff76f$55a15260$00e3f720$@att.net> References: <002b01cff76f$55a15260$00e3f720$@att.net> Message-ID: Peg and Andy Let me say that I rather like how Vygotsky thought about development (whatever the discipline) and I like doing some as Davydov recommended, but curricula-wise I am always a bit skeptical. US kids, and I would disagree as to all, do have this problem, but I am not, at all, sure it is because of the mathematical focus on number. I can easily imagine the following conversation Children start with counting numbers Alyosha?s number is greater than Borja?s. Anyone can perceive the difference. The mathematical recording of that is A>B. In the very same situation, one is less than the other, mathematically, B, <, ? and = and the mathematically recordings with + and -. **The key notion here is counting on The whole situation of transformations takes this nice set mathematically recorded as: A?B B?A A>B A-X= B+X A?=B? B?=A? Then of course there?s more fun when Katya?s in on it and transitivity pops in so that even without direct perceptual comparisons mathematics comes to the rescue so you can figure out stuff you wouldn?t know otherwise (do I smell motivation here?): A>B B>K A?K A>K And they work out proudly that you keep the ? (don?t know) answer in the following situation A>B A>K B?K ** I suspect if asked why they (re Davydov) might say something like "Well, A is bigger than B and A is bigger than K., but that doesn't mean B is bigger than K. It doesn't say about B and K." I suspect that US children might say the same. There is, in my opinion, a very strong element of teaching here that makes lessons like this happen. Mathematics teaching has always been much weaker in the US than elsewhere. However, that doesn't mean there aren't substantial exceptions even with a counting number curriculum. There is another issue and that is why I mentioned Benezet. Skipping formal operations with number until later grades seems to have benefits as to later learning and, of course, as you mentioned informal operations with number are happening in the background. I wonder if the informality around number might contribute to a more relaxed view of mathematics (this has been argued to a degree elsewhere). Unfortunately, it is somewhat likely any of this will catch on any time soon because of the social forces in motion, but that doesn't mean one can't agitate (smile). I choose to do so on the side of teaching rather than curriculum. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:06 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > Hi, Ed, > I barely touched on the example-- sorry! It comes up when Katya gets into > the situation. > Essentially, given the following situation, most US fourth graders do quite > well with just a little introduction: > A>B > B>K > A?K > Response A>K > BUT, most US fourth graders do not do well with the following situation: > A>B > A>K > B?K > US kids answer with some symbol or other or say they haven't learned it yet > or they can't do math or they have to go to the bathroom; the Davidov even > younger kids say "don't know, no one could know." > As far as I can tell, the US kids are doing the first one by relying on > knowing the > < among numbers under ten and transfer for each little > porblem; they don't seem to have a firm grasp of situations with greater > than, less than, and transitivity. > I hope you and Andy get back to the issues involving what's social with > mathematics. > I'm glad folks are dealing seriously with mathematics on the list and that > the readings have been posted but I still hope you will get back to that > when you have time. > PG > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2014 3:03 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Peg > > By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which you > refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I mentioned > Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely agree) is that > the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus counting number. While > Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US curriculum it is not > entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting number versus > real number) is better than the other. > > I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you gave > 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was the one > using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > > I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I don't > know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in some 'little > systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't know.' in some > little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. > > Ed > > On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into the >> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >> >> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >> don't know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov >> mathematics educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all about >> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed with >> the children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring >> numbers until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we >> often see in US elementary schools where counting relations among >> number symbols overshadow other aspects of mathematics. The example I >> gave earlier is about the fourth graders in US schools who seem to >> understand > and < than relations in a little system of three >> mathematical statements but they do not understand that "don't know" >> is a mathematically correct answer in some of the little systems -- >> for them don't know is essentially a personal thing not a mathematics > thing. >> PG >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >> (although the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the >> 1920s by a Louis Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas > of Dewey. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even >>> rulers or tape measures of strings. >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>> >>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. >>> However, wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would >>> they react by >>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the children >>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right way >>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing "Think >>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means >>> of >> solving an existing problem. >>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>> >>> Andy >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> - >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string." >>>> >>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the >>>> originator of it, though!) >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>> >>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how >>>> the >>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> - >>>> - >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> >>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From vygotsky@unm.edu Mon Nov 3 13:39:15 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 14:39:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: <1415045375233.4754@unm.edu> References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <1415045375233.4754@unm.edu> Message-ID: <003b01cff7ae$a0273d10$e075b730$@edu> Hi Peter and Annalisa, I really am not familiar with work on teaching poetry from a cultural-historical framework. Sorry, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 1:10 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching Hi Peter, Might I recommend Vera John-Steiner's work? She may know of other work too. Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Monday, November 3, 2014 8:18 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 14:29:16 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 07:29:16 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Martin: I share your disappointment with Lantolf (I was asked to leave the Ph.D programme at Open University when I declined to include him in my literature survey). Merrill Swain once told me that she found the book that he wrote with Steve Thorne, "Sociocultural Theory and the Genesis of Second Language Development (OUP2006) unusuable; I found it unreadable, including the title, and I was particularly offended by the "study" he did of a US Army general who tried to learn Chinese and was supposedly thwarted by the terrible contrast between free, liberty-loving atmosphere she was used to in the army and the regimented, dehumanizing ambiance of a Chinese language classsroom. But in the cool light of morning reflection (it is seven a.m. here, and the leaves remind me that it is not just the sun that cools as it reddens) I must acknowledge at least four areas in which Lantolf has made some very specific contributions. a) He was the first to point out that ZPD does not equal i + 1 (I will explain that cryptic formulation below; let's keep the two questions separate, as you said). b) With Mathew Poehner, he is a strong promoter of "dynamic testing" in a field where testing is often a substitute for real teaching (I think this actually explains a lot about the way his interpretation of the ZPD does not adequately differentiate learning and development and certainly takes no notice of the Central Line of Development or the Neoformation or the Age Periods). c) He has, as you say, applied the concept of inner speech and internalization to second language acquisition (but I think he understands both of them wrongly, because of point b). d) He's done some work that might interest you on McNeill and that Sylvester the Cat and Tweetie Bird video, which contrasts how Spanish and English encode movement (Spanish tends to do it with the verb, but English prefers adverbs and prepositional phrases). And he is ubiquitous and the universally acknowledged rep for CHAT in this field, so in the soft red glare of retrospection I have to admit that some of my disappointment is the work of that green-eyed monster, envy. Other scholars who do Vygotskyan work in L2: Merrill Swain, Sharon Lapkin, Celeste Kinginger (wonderful article on the misuses of the ZPD, "Defining the ZPD in US Foreign Language Education" in Applied Linguistics 23/2, 2002: 240-262). When you say that it is hard to find studies of unwilling language learners, I can tell that you are not reading material from the late seventies and eighties. In fact, the whole field of "second language acquisition", which has tried to conceptualize second language learning as the acquiring of some object quite external to the learner, is the product of an obsession with the very different success rates in first language learning and second language learning at that time. It was widely assumed that formal instruction essentially no difference at all, and that therefore the way to teach a language was to provide conditions that were as 'naturalistic' as possible. Once this was done, it was thought, classroom language learning would be just as successful as first language "acquisition" (again, the idea is that the learner is involved in a process comparable to the accumulation of capital). Hence the idea, still dominant in applied linguistics, that language learning and teaching should be reduced to providing "comprehensible input" at a level slightly above the learner's present competence (i + 1). This idea, still completely undefined and unoperationalizable (because we neither know what the learner's "present competence" is nor can we clearly say in what sense some structure is "above" that competence) was widely assumed to be identical to the ZPD, hence Lantolf's intervention referred to in a) above. Some people, notably John Schumann, pointed out that 'naturalistic' language learning outside the classroom was by no means one hundred percent successful: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acculturation_Model And of course the main studies of motivation (Gardner and Lambert, Kathy Bailey, Zoltan Dornyei) mostly deal with learning in a non-classroom environment. The final point I'd like to make, though, is that there are several assumptions here that could be fruitfully questioned. First of all there is the assumption that classroom learning is voluntary. Since most children are under the legal age of consent, this is far from obvious. Secondly, there is the assumption that L2 is really a pale reflection of L1, and therefore L2 learning outside the classroom is an incompetent recapitulation of the process of learning an L1. This I think Vygotsky would reject most vigorously. Finally, there is the assumption that Halliday first taught us to question: that learning language, learning about language, and learning through language are really three different processes instead of a single unified process of learning. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 4 November 2014 00:42, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Martin > > SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as far > as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. It seems to me to > swallow the shallowly touted "definitions" that general instructions also > uses. I think your students might like a bit of exposition on the > development of Inner Speech. > > I once had to restrained when a literacy student said that Vygotsky > invented group work!! These people sometimes quote tertiary sources with > abandon. We were/are such purists in Psych in Education that students had > to read the primary sources. > > Martin, I know what you said - I was pulling your chain on claiming > familiarity with the field on the basis of abstracts. I know you will have > headed for the library once the doors opened. Sorry mate. > > Carol > > On 3 November 2014 16:20, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> To me, one important question would be what SCT is able to tell us about >> instruction in L2, over and above instruction in general. >> >> Carol, I think I explained that this weekend I have had online access to >> no more than abstracts, except for two chapters that I already had on hand, >> and which I was referring to. However, if an article contains a bright new >> idea it really ought to be in the abstract, no? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:40 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> > Martin >> > >> > You paint with a broad brush here: ELL is a fast growing field today, >> > because "Biligual Education" has a wide range of situations/niches which >> > other people have said here. (It nearly has encyclapedia status). I do >> L1 >> > and L2 work here in Southern Africa (Grades 1-7) and one of very few >> > privileged enough to be able to do it. Even in such similar cultures as >> > Namibia and South Africa there are very different perceptions about >> English >> > as Second Language and ways of talking about it. >> > >> > I think you must look at what you said - who is going to deliver their >> > bright new idea in an abstract? You have to surmise that they do, because >> > their concepts (small c) are in place. (We fail people here who only >> quote >> > abstracts...). So head to the hardcopy, comrade brother. >> > >> > Having delivered my sermon, I find the SCT of ESL very disappointing. It >> > seems like they are just pinning new labels on things they already knew. >> > But if we have a fellow practitioner among us, please do speak up. I >> > remember when I first started working on CHAT in language education in >> the >> > late eighties, I felt I was pinning labels. >> > >> > Carol >> > >> > On 3 November 2014 13:50, Martin John Packer >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Hi David, >> >> >> >> I have to teach a class on second language learning this week in my >> course >> >> in Psychology of Language, so I've turned to Lantolf. My university >> library >> >> webpage has been down for maintenance this weekend so I've had limited >> >> access to his writing, but what I have been able to read has confused >> me. >> >> In a couple of articles I find reasonable summaries of LSV's ideas, but >> >> then Lantolf doesn't get around to applying these ideas to L2! Looking >> at >> >> abstracts in Google Scholar it seems that he's proposing that (1) L2 is >> >> learned in the ZPD (what isn't?), (2) L2 is a mediator (what isn't?), >> and >> >> (3) private speech occurs in L2 (okay, that could be interesting). I was >> >> expecting him to attribute some role to L2 in the higher functions, or >> to >> >> suggest that L2 mediates in a specific way, or... >> >> >> >> What am I missing? >> >> >> >> Plus, I have a growing suspicion that most L2 research is conducted on >> >> people willingly studying a foreign language in the classroom. Not >> much, or >> >> nothing, on people who are forced to abandon their mother tongue because >> >> they live somewhere where school, and/or work, is available only if they >> >> speak a dominant language. I'm hoping you'll tell me I'm wrong about >> this! >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> > Developmental psycholinguist >> > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Nov 3 14:58:20 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 22:58:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <1415045188134.45172@unm.edu> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu>, <1415045188134.45172@unm.edu> Message-ID: <451721466fbb4ea6ad40a23e64572148@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> > meaning is what distinguishes us as human and not machine or animal Except that some of the higher animals can learn words and their meanings. It's syntax they lack. Also, whereas "word-meaning" has some formal properties that may make it suitable as a unit of analysis, it's not clear that all meaning is tied to words, or even to language; cognitive scientists talk of imagistic meaning, etc. Perhaps the branching off to activity theory was in part a rejection of having something as formless as meaning as a unit of analysis. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 2:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Hi David, (a) Meaning: Interesting. When I spoke of labels, I meant it in terms of an individual mind. What is there before the label, not after? I don't see the harm in applying this dynamic of naming across groups who wish to determine themes in their activities, just that isn't how I meant it. :) Do you mean to say that there is a new theme manifesting in which we are interacting before the label manifests? I'm not sure I understand, but I am trying. Still, meaning is my choice, if I'm allowed to cast a vote, because meaning is what distinguishes us as human and not machine or animal. Words are tools because they have meaning, they are the glue to what we do and think. I don't know how far we could get doing anything if we didn't have words (we, as a society, and we as, you and I, and we as, me and myself - a stretch of the plural first person, I know, but to account for self-reflection and inner speech). Furthermore, I don't know how far we'd get if words didn't have meaning. So I see meaning as the germ, the seed, and I agree with LSV that word-meaning is how we give meaning a form in our minds ("consciousness" to those who have issue with the word "mind"), if this is what he was saying. Word-meaning is a placeholder, like the oil lamp is the holder of the flame. It can be the unit for neuroscience, for anthropology, for philosophy, for learning, for linguistics, for computation, for many, many kinds of angles to study mind. I don't mean to upset anyone, but to only give an honest account that when I examine activity, I don't see that same kind of reach. Of course I am not willing to abandon activity, for the record. I just view activity differently. I believe we are more than what we do. I accept that people disagree with that, and that is OK. (b) Idealism and intellectualism: This does smack of Descartes' dualism. And now with the phrase of "plump materialism" meming around the list, I'll have to hunt that paper of Martin's down and cast my eyes upon it. :) What is so great about the list is that I can read a paper and then pose a question to the author, and I think that is the point of the list and I am really on with that. I regret that I did not climb aboard a few years ago when Vera first told us about it. (c) Lysenko: Seems to be an odd way to see the world as he did, but that way of thinking seems to have been plump with the times. I very much like the idea of seeing a book or a saw as an artificial organ, but also a library, a town hall, an art museum, a university campus, all as external organs to our abilities. The metaphor may break down as all metaphors do, but "artificial organ" does lend itself to how thought and custom are stored beyond the brain, and that seems correct. Kind regards, Annalisa ============================ a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering again, and that is not what Martin meant.) c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher psychological functions are par excellence the things that require instruction and that instruction depends very much on material resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is eliminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with instruction. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David, > > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. > > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. > > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. > > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. > > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some > scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot > abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this > juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a > political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people > interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences > and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free > in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to > you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) > > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to > be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have > experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective > experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others > recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in > describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could > call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, > and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm > referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's > quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] > > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. > > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. > > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. > > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. > > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. > > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: > > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. > > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. > > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? > > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we > struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said > and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is > there when the speech goes quiet? :) > > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > > Hi David, > > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! > > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. > > What I want to say quickly is regarding > > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! > > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. > > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. > > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! > > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. > > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's > how the light gets in. > > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: > > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing > intellect). Vygotsky says: > > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? > ?????????? ??? ?????. > > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the > theory of preformism) but instead as a "tabula rasa" (Vygotsky uses > the Latin original here-DK), an expression that you have probably > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by > the environment; through the external path of the environment he > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around > him.) > > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the > dying). > > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. > > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. > > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is > Not Born a Personality". > > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi David! >> >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. >> >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. >> >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? >> >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. >> >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >> >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >> >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >> >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >> >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. >> >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of >> freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving >> freedom to others. :) >> >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >> >> Until then... >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >> cannot determine the personality] >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >> >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's >> writings on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split >> between Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in >> which Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to >> Students and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >> >> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.h >> tml#Sec1 >> >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be >> founder of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we >> can do now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon >> our understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are >> (at >> least) three: >> >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and >> the explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a >> form of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. >> This revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who >> use activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is >> made up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm >> of activity. >> >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning >> as a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has >> meant rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and >> lasting contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is >> the discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather >> than a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a >> long-term effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly >> in the anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which >> scarcely mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which >> scarcely mentions anything without mentioning language). >> >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding >> of modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >> >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on >> from point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the >> same way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >> Vygotsky does at all. >> >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the >> contribution of the environment from the contribution of the child in >> the understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open >> to the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >> development. >> >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What >> is the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that >> one is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not >> really reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single >> criterion for differentiating the two, I would say that >> "perezhivanie" is retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting >> upon it, while "world outlook" is proleptic. >> >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >> death. >> >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to >> the Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's >> "Life of Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which >> is where Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, >> though John Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that >> personality is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my >> taste--I think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, >> but that semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a >> text. A narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one >> sock puppet clapping. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Thanks for some additional information. >>> >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >>> >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >>> >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >>> >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >>> >>> First is historical: >>> >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >>> >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >>> >>> Second is theoretical: >>> >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >>> >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe >>> is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >>> >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >>> >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >>> cannot determine the personality] >>> >>> Annalisa, >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if >>> it was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death >>> and before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely >>> during Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates >>> the issue. A convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was >>> very often a matter of life and death. Which is not to say that the >>> honourable choice may not have been to speak the truth and take the >>> consequences, rather than lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, >>> this document, being dishonest, is not the ideal medium for >>> understanding the real differences between these two former >>> comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences show through. >>> >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character >>> develops through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a >>> new sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, >>> etc., so from that point of view a person's character can be >>> understand as the product or sum of a series of such experiences, as >>> for example, when someone writes their autobiography, especially if >>> they follow in the Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >>> >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was >>>> searching for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is >>>> The Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had >>>> indicated in your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any >>>> confusion, all!) >>>> >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there >>>> are watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more >>>> slowly and not flood the list). >>>> >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a >>>> manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>>> >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had >>>> a large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that >>>> I accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an >>>> easy thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have >>>> missed this if there were other parties available to discuss the >>>> nature of Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have >>>> discussed these concepts without Vygotsky present, among each >>>> other. Am I wrong in this thinking? >>>> >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>>> >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if >>>> Vygotsky and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various >>>> theories, as we are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>>> >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>>> >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev >>>> not understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in >>>> gaining an answer to this question, we might learn something about >>>> *teaching* the concept of perezhivanie? >>>> >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>>> >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>>> >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of >>>> the whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't >>>> think "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an >>>> abstraction like the whole is an abstraction. >>>> >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce >>>> the molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). >>>> In our perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that >>>> molecules exist, just like we know that the ocean exists. But when >>>> we perceive the ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, >>>> but completed in our imagination like the molecule is, and this is >>>> why I feel the unit, seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>>> >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the >>>> nature of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, >>>> the water molecule is the unit we must use to understand the >>>> behavior of the water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can >>>> we say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? >>>> It seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the >>>> nature of its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the >>>> ocean, moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not >>>> sure how one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>>> >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he >>>> spoke of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 15:00:33 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 08:00:33 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu> Message-ID: Larry, Andy, Haydi...oh, and Martin too! When I think of Halliday's distinction between "theme" and "discipline", I think of the difference between Larry and Andy. Larry is a thematic writer; the topic of a thread is not nearly as important to him as the aspect from which you consider it. Andy is more disciplined; as he says, it is content that matters in the long run, and a discipline is defined by its object of study and not by the angle from which you study it. How ironic that Larry should be an educator and Andy a philosopher! But of course "mathematics" does not really have an object of study; or rather, the object of study of mathematics is anything at all, once you measure and quantify it. This meant that math was an ideal "theme" for an age where the various content areas of science and the various functions of technology had not yet been fully differentiated from an amorphous "learned consciousness" (analogous, mutatis mutandis, to the undifferentiated consciousness in infants of which Vygotsky speaks). "History" also does not have a specific object of study; anything at all can be contemplated from the point of view of how it emerges, how it develops, and how it changes. But unlike the theme of mathematics, history became thematic in a specific discipline and even a specific work in the nineteenth century, that is, evolution and the Origin of Species. Also unlike the theme of mathematics, history did not arise from undifferentiated consciousness, but instead arose in an atmosphere already dominated by mathematics (I tend to think in analogies, and the analogy between the way we learn a second language and the way we learn a first one is quite irresistable to me here). So mathematics fought back, in the persona of Saussure. Although Saussure had, like all good nineteenth century scientists, made his career in historical linguistics, he wanted to sever language from history entirely and his foundation of semiotics really looked backwards to mathematics rather than forwards to meaning. The result was a linguistics that was ideally suited to animalistic psychology, viz. behaviorism: language was nothing but the associative learning of structure after structure. Martin: Halliday points out that there really isn't any necessary logical connection between behaviorist historicism and a theory that says languages can be learned passively by stimulus-response; as Andy says about the connection between psychology and activity theory, things just worked out that way. There also isn't any necessary logical connection between nativist structuralism and a theory that says that languages are learned by testing inborn hypotheses against data. What Halliday means (I think) is that you can easily cross-couple here: the nativist theme can and has worked with the methods of stimulus-response that are associated with the discipline of behaviorist psychology (e.g. so called "Total Physical Response" teaching founded by James Asher in 1967). Contrariwise, the behaviorist theme works perfectly well with the hypothesis testing of the discipline of cognitive science (e.g. task based teaching). We can understand the whole sorry history of language teaching in the twentieth century as a kind of confusion between theme on the one hand and discipline on the other: in the USA "communicative teaching" has meant a kind of structuralism without behaviorism (morpheme acquisition through comprehensible input) while in the UK exactly the same term refers to a kind of social behaviorism without structuralism (notional-functionalism). The same content, but very different aspects. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 4 November 2014 00:36, Larry Purss wrote: > David, > to move your insights [reflections] forward I want to return to the notion > of *themes* in relation [in unity?] to *multi*, *trans*, and *inter* > disciplinary explorations. > > You mention moving through the dominant theme of *structure* to two > possible themes that are now being played out on stage. > On the one hand the theme of *activity* AND on the other hand the theme of > *meaning*. > > *AND* could have multiple ways of being understood [such as dialectical or > dialogical]. However these two themes are emerging in some type of relation. > David, you are indicating to these ARE two very inclusive themes that are > now being considered across disciplines and transforming all disciplinary > forms. > Both themes embrace the historical but *activity* and *meaning* emphasize > different foundations [as basic grounds] from which the disciplines are > reflected. > Therefore, the concept of THEMES [as you use this term in this context] > seems vital to our discussions > > I hope I am reading your ideas WITH you but if not there will be a > rejoinder. > Larry > > On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 11:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I can always tell when people are getting a little defensive on the >> list. First of all, charges get responded to long before they are even >> made (profuse and unsubstantiated professions of being poorly read). >> Secondly, people get told to go and read things (though I think what >> Andy recommended was not, in fact, Wittgenstein on the ineffable). >> Thirdly, I find that I myself begin to begin sentences with "I" rather >> than with "Do you mean...?". Finally, to take an example from a >> different thread on the list, there is a certain gratuitous intrusion >> of "tu quoques" argumentation: Leontiev's revisionism is defended on >> the grounds that Stalin was the George W. Bush of Soviet science. >> >> (I would not thought it actually possible to be unfair to Stalin, >> still less to provoke me to defend him, but I do have to say that >> while both men were responsible for literally millions of unnecessary >> deaths, Stalin successfully defeated Hitler, while Bush merely tried >> to defeat social security and gay marriage and utterly failed. In any >> case, the real issue is whether the American academic community ever >> took Bush's scientific beliefs at all seriously, to which I trust the >> answer is no.) >> >> There is no reason, that I can see, for any defensiveness. I do not, >> for example, think that Haydi's comments are aimed at me, both because >> he is always very pleasant to me when he is asking me for articles off >> list and because he is clearly addressing his remarks to Westerners, >> and I am only Western by virtue of my choice of parents (believe me, >> my choice of wife has a lot more to do with what I think and say). I >> think you, Annalisa, have still less reason to be defensive than I do; >> you've raised some fascinating questions, and we've had a very lucid >> and enjoyable discussion. >> >> For example... >> >> a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each >> historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", >> which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label >> units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century >> mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in >> the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become >> the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at >> least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that >> these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that >> implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the >> discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). >> They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's >> book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than >> "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create >> a kind of transdisciplinary theme for the twenty-first century, and I >> strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", >> for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to >> activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). >> >> b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a >> fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular >> historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the >> source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the >> development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. >> With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal >> actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely >> inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" >> is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the >> material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the >> functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's >> a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering >> again, and that is not what Martin meant.) >> >> c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a >> denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children >> learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and >> that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single >> generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood >> perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher >> psychological functions are par excellance the things that require >> instruction and that instruction depends very much on material >> resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile >> delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is >> elminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he >> understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an >> organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do >> not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these >> artificial organs can be handed down to children, albeit with >> instruction. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> > Hi David, >> > >> > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this >> thread. >> > >> > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the >> *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that >> others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be >> banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in >> its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. >> > >> > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a >> rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I >> have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of >> the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, >> and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for >> interpretation in any way shape or form. >> > >> > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the >> political challenges. >> > >> > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some >> scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot >> abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this >> juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a >> political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people interpret >> that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences and the >> emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free in the way >> we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to you. Though I'd >> prefer you didn't. :) >> > >> > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to be >> limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have experiences >> beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective experience, stripped >> away of labels. In my discussions with others recently, I have learned how >> limited the English language is in describing what this is. One could call >> it "the sublime," one could call it aesthetic experience, but these are >> adjectives to experience, and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an >> idea to what I'm referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me >> Wittgenstein's quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] >> > >> > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own >> intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the >> ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was >> general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday >> concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby >> out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand >> why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many >> false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. >> > >> > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different >> understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say >> in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse >> between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking >> and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and >> therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and >> research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural >> practice of doing the science. >> > >> > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. >> We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. >> Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do >> it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize >> that. >> > >> > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts >> and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access >> meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only >> be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which >> is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. >> > >> > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers >> in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are >> required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since >> I am not a scientist I could not know this. >> > >> > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: >> > >> > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I >> shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on >> heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be >> divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the >> recent developments in epigenetics. >> > >> > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words >> "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For >> me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I >> think I can see why this might be problematic. >> > >> > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! >> "Personality as bootstrap" ? >> > >> > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we >> struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said and >> done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is there when >> the speech goes quiet? :) >> > >> > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. >> > >> > Kind regards, >> > >> > Annalisa >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar >> > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >> cannot determine the personality] >> > >> > Hi David, >> > >> > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! >> > >> > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do >> the Russian of course. >> > >> > What I want to say quickly is regarding >> > >> > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know >> and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted >> to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this >> in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a >> refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't >> recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the >> work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! >> > >> > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. >> > >> > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying >> "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or >> desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of >> narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of >> intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where >> things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything >> out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his >> contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I >> hope I have corrected that line of thinking. >> > >> > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, >> as I get to this reading. Again thanks! >> > >> > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment >> more upon it, with hopes you will too. >> > >> > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). >> > >> > Kind regards, >> > >> > Annalisa >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >> cannot determine the personality] >> > >> > Dear Annalisa: >> > >> > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! >> > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but >> > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. >> > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's >> > how the light gets in. >> > >> > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: >> > >> > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS >> > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first >> > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how >> > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the >> > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development >> > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also >> > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of >> > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that >> > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to >> > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the >> > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing >> > intellect). Vygotsky says: >> > >> > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, >> > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? >> > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? >> > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. >> > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? >> > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? >> > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? >> > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, >> > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? >> > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? >> > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? >> > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? >> > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, >> > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? >> > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? >> > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? >> > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? >> > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? >> > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? >> > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? >> > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? >> > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? >> > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? >> > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? >> > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? >> > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? >> > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, >> > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? >> > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? >> > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? >> > ?????????? ??? ?????. >> > >> > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems >> > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not >> > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely >> > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have >> > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet >> > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive >> > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the >> > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires >> > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the >> > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development >> > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around >> > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely >> > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from >> > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a >> > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as >> > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be >> > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which >> > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the >> > theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses >> > the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably >> > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans >> > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take >> > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product >> > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that >> > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a >> > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled >> > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by >> > the environment; through the external path of the environment he >> > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around >> > him.) >> > >> > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these >> > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism >> > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he >> > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the >> > dying). >> > >> > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism >> > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned >> > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to >> > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about >> > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single >> > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in >> > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of >> > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the >> > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting >> > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine >> > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism >> > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. >> > >> > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was >> > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to >> > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin >> > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not >> > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the >> > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either >> > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to >> > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to >> > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat >> > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor >> > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was >> > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation >> > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). >> > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German >> > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his >> > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including >> > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. >> > >> > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a >> > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely >> > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in >> > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the >> > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all >> > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of >> > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of >> > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need >> > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least >> > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with >> > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an >> > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same >> > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", >> > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is >> > Not Born a Personality". >> > >> > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, >> > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; >> > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and >> > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement >> > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > >> > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi David! >> >> >> >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so >> carefully. >> >> >> >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >> >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also >> Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because >> I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems >> non-trivial. >> >> >> >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at >> that time. Is that a fair statement? >> >> >> >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split >> occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as >> I can. >> >> >> >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What >> I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces >> without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >> >> >> >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter >> out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be >> controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >> >> >> >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so >> peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. >> We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but >> most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his >> experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not >> hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly >> right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and >> everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >> >> >> >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the >> first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I >> don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the >> disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology >> because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for >> international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the >> exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house >> arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists >> of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be >> saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >> >> >> >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We >> suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his >> contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even >> know it existed. >> >> >> >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of >> freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom >> to others. :) >> >> >> >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another >> post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >> >> >> >> Until then... >> >> >> >> Kind regards, >> >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >> cannot determine the personality] >> >> >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> >> >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >> >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >> >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >> >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >> >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >> >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >> >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >> >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >> >> >> >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings >> >> on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between >> >> Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which >> >> Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >> >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >> >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >> >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >> >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >> >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students >> >> and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >> >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >> >> >> >> >> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 >> >> >> >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >> >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >> >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder >> >> of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do >> >> now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our >> >> understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at >> >> least) three: >> >> >> >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >> >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the >> >> explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >> >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form >> >> of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This >> >> revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use >> >> activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made >> >> up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of >> >> activity. >> >> >> >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as >> >> a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant >> >> rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting >> >> contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the >> >> discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than >> >> a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term >> >> effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the >> >> anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely >> >> mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely >> >> mentions anything without mentioning language). >> >> >> >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >> >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >> >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >> >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >> >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >> >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >> >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >> >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >> >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of >> >> modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >> >> >> >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from >> >> point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same >> >> way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >> >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >> >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >> >> Vygotsky does at all. >> >> >> >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >> >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution >> >> of the environment from the contribution of the child in the >> >> understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >> >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >> >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >> >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >> >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >> >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to >> >> the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >> >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >> >> development. >> >> >> >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >> >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >> >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >> >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >> >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is >> >> the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one >> >> is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really >> >> reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion >> >> for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is >> >> retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while >> >> "world outlook" is proleptic. >> >> >> >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >> >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >> >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >> >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >> >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >> >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >> >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >> >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >> >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >> >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >> >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >> >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >> >> death. >> >> >> >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the >> >> Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of >> >> Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where >> >> Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John >> >> Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality >> >> is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I >> >> think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that >> >> semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A >> >> narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock >> >> puppet clapping. >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Hi Andy, >> >>> >> >>> Thanks for some additional information. >> >>> >> >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from >> the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own >> beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes >> me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >> >>> >> >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE >> aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or >> divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean >> to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >> >>> >> >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear >> picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces >> were retrieved and extended upon. >> >>> >> >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >> >>> >> >>> First is historical: >> >>> >> >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny >> the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. >> What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents >> that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this >> parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper >> all that we possess? >> >>> >> >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE >> factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it >> explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >> >>> >> >>> Second is theoretical: >> >>> >> >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual >> in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, >> emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation >> (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects >> of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the >> person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" >> factors). >> >>> >> >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe >> is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >> >>> >> >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a >> "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can >> radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That >> a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for >> example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, >> it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the >> whole). >> >>> >> >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the >> "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say >> "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >> >>> >> >>> Kind regards, >> >>> >> >>> Annalisa >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> ________________________________________ >> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >> cannot determine the personality] >> >>> >> >>> Annalisa, >> >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >> >>> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >> >>> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >> >>> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >> >>> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a >> matter >> >>> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >> >>> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >> >>> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >> >>> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >> >>> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >> >>> show through. >> >>> >> >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character >> develops >> >>> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >> >>> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >> >>> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >> >>> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >> >>> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >> >>> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >> >>> >> >>> Andy >> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Hi Andy, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >> >>>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >> >>>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >> >>>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >> >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, >> all!) >> >>>> >> >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >> >>>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >> >>>> not flood the list). >> >>>> >> >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >> >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >> >>>> >> >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >> >>>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >> >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >> >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >> >>>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >> >>>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >> >>>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >> >>>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >> >>>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >> >>>> this thinking? >> >>>> >> >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >> >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >> >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >> >>>> >> >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >> >>>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >> >>>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the >> like. >> >>>> >> >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >> >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I >> mistaken? >> >>>> >> >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >> >>>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >> >>>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >> >>>> concept of perezhivanie? >> >>>> >> >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >> >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >> >>>> >> >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >> >>>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >> >>>> >> >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >> >>>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >> >>>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >> >>>> the whole is an abstraction. >> >>>> >> >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >> >>>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >> >>>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >> >>>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >> >>>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >> >>>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >> >>>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >> >>>> >> >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >> >>>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >> >>>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >> >>>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >> >>>> >> >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >> >>>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >> >>>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >> >>>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >> >>>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >> >>>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >> >>>> >> >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >> >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >> >>>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >> >>>> >> >>>> Kind regards, >> >>>> >> >>>> Annalisa >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 14:53:03 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 22:53:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> Message-ID: On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: > Huw > > I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference > between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or 'meaningful > activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That is, one > aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the conversation on > the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean as > regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? > > I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence in the application of units of measure. That number is derived from measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a meaningful problem. The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which is why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what processes you're studying. If you want to study how students construe a situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study their competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of how they construe and structure that task. Best, Huw > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Hi Ed, > > > > One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. > > Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. > > > > I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, engaging > > with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through quantifying. I > am > > also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Huw > >> > >> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between > >> mathematics and, for instance, physics? > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, > >>> > >>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already > >> been > >>> covered. > >>> > >>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling > >> concretely > >>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, using > >> the > >>> familiar notation A > B etc. > >>> > >>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of Gal'perin. > >>> > >>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent > >>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual > >>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the > means > >> to > >>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) > which > >>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. > I > >>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not mere > >>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful > >>> quantification". > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. > >>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning > >> at > >>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It > >>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for > >>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but > I > >>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by > Davydov's > >>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with > >> algebra > >>>> later on. > >>>> > >>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a > >> "unit > >>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be > >>>> extended. > >>>> > >>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a > CHAT > >>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and > >> Leontyev. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Dear All, > >>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it > >>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of > >> Jean > >>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached > >> another > >>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. > >>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math > curriculum > >>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, > >>>>> Natalia. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- > >>>>> From: "mike cole" > >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>> > >>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean > >>>>> Schmittau's > >>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed > that > >> may > >>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Peg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which > >> you > >>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I > >>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I > entirely > >>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus > >>>>>> counting > >>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US > >>>>>> curriculum > >>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting > >>>>>> number > >>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you > >>>>>> gave > >>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was > the > >>>>>> one > >>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I > >>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer > in > >>>>>> some > >>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't > >> know.' > >>>>>> in > >>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into > >> the > >>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm > afraid. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so > I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> don't > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov > >> mathematics > >>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > >>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all > >> about > >>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed > >> with > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring > >> numbers > >>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often > >> see in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> US > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> overshadow > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about > >> the > >>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> relations > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not > >>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in > >> some > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal > >>>>>>> thing > >>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. > >>>>>>> PG > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > >>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> (although > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s > by > >> a > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> Louis > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in > mathematics > >>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > >>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even > >> rulers > >>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > Blunden > >>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. > >> However, > >>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they > >>>>>>>> react by > >>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the > >> children > >>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right > way > >>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing > "Think > >>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought > >> of?" > >>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you > >>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a > >> means of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> solving an existing problem. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. > There > >>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater > >>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> string." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > >>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops > that > >>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the > >> originator > >>>>>>>>> of it, though!) > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On > >>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am > not > >>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how > >> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A >>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > >>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = > B >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 15:11:35 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:11:35 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: The work of Joan Peskin is a good reference, Peter: http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/aphd/Research/Faculty_Members/Continuing_Appointments/Joan_Peskin/ On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:18 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 15:12:53 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:12:53 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <7D278E34-FAA7-4FE0-9799-AF82D65EB690@gmail.com> More here: http://webspace.oise.utoronto.ca/~peskinj/research%20interests.html On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss wrote: > The work of Joan Peskin is a good reference, Peter: > > http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/aphd/Research/Faculty_Members/Continuing_Appointments/Joan_Peskin/ > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:18 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter >> > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 15:11:35 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:11:35 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: The work of Joan Peskin is a good reference, Peter: http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/aphd/Research/Faculty_Members/Continuing_Appointments/Joan_Peskin/ On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:18 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 15:12:53 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:12:53 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: sociocultural theory and poetry writing, learning, and teaching In-Reply-To: References: <51af11196bce4babaaa5459de7eb6393@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <7D278E34-FAA7-4FE0-9799-AF82D65EB690@gmail.com> More here: http://webspace.oise.utoronto.ca/~peskinj/research%20interests.html On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss wrote: > The work of Joan Peskin is a good reference, Peter: > > http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/aphd/Research/Faculty_Members/Continuing_Appointments/Joan_Peskin/ > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 12:18 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> I've got a doctoral student who is interested in the assumptions of sociocultural theory, with a Vygotskian frame, and how they might inform research on poetry writing, learning, and teaching, with special attention to language, creativity, and playfulness. I'm not familiar with any work in this area. If you've got recommendations, please send them along. Thanks,Peter >> > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 16:17:00 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 18:17:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> Message-ID: <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> Huw You have a very different understanding about the nature of number than I. In a sense, as soon as I draw the diagonal of a 1 by 1 square, that number (to the dismay of the Greeks) is no longer derived from measuring. Perhaps you think I'm talking about some sort of 'Davydov mathematics.' The thread was about Davydov mathematics education. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Huw >> >> I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference >> between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or 'meaningful >> activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That is, one >> aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the conversation on >> the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean as >> regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? >> >> > I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence in > the application of units of measure. That number is derived from > measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a > meaningful problem. > > The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. > > I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which is > why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what > processes you're studying. If you want to study how students construe a > situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study their > competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of how they > construe and structure that task. > > Best, > Huw > > > > >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Hi Ed, >>> >>> One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. >>> Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. >>> >>> I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, engaging >>> with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through quantifying. I >> am >>> also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between >>>> mathematics and, for instance, physics? >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already >>>> been >>>>> covered. >>>>> >>>>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling >>>> concretely >>>>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, using >>>> the >>>>> familiar notation A > B etc. >>>>> >>>>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of Gal'perin. >>>>> >>>>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent >>>>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual >>>>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the >> means >>>> to >>>>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) >> which >>>>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. >> I >>>>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not mere >>>>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful >>>>> quantification". >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. >>>>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and learning >>>> at >>>>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. It >>>>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here for >>>>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, but >> I >>>>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by >> Davydov's >>>>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with >>>> algebra >>>>>> later on. >>>>>> >>>>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a >>>> "unit >>>>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be >>>>>> extended. >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a >> CHAT >>>>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and >>>> Leontyev. >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Dear All, >>>>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find it >>>>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send of >>>> Jean >>>>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached >>>> another >>>>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. >>>>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math >> curriculum >>>>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, >>>>>>> Natalia. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>>> From: "mike cole" >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >>>>>>> Schmittau's >>>>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed >> that >>>> may >>>>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which >>>> you >>>>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >>>>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I >> entirely >>>>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus >>>>>>>> counting >>>>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US >>>>>>>> curriculum >>>>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach (counting >>>>>>>> number >>>>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you >>>>>>>> gave >>>>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was >> the >>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >>>>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer >> in >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't >>>> know.' >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into >>>> the >>>>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm >> afraid. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so >> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> don't >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov >>>> mathematics >>>>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>>>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all >>>> about >>>>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed >>>> with >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring >>>> numbers >>>>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often >>>> see in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> US >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> overshadow >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about >>>> the >>>>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> relations >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do not >>>>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer in >>>> some >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a personal >>>>>>>>> thing >>>>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. >>>>>>>>> PG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (although >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s >> by >>>> a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Louis >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in >> mathematics >>>>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even >>>> rulers >>>>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy >> Blunden >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. >>>> However, >>>>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would they >>>>>>>>>> react by >>>>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the >>>> children >>>>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right >> way >>>>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing >> "Think >>>>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought >>>> of?" >>>>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>>>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a >>>> means of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> solving an existing problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. >> There >>>>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> string." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops >> that >>>>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the >>>> originator >>>>>>>>>>> of it, though!) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am >> not >>>>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = >> B>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Nov 3 16:19:40 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 00:19:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <451721466fbb4ea6ad40a23e64572148@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> <1414976115746.80534@unm.edu>, <1415045188134.45172@unm.edu>, <451721466fbb4ea6ad40a23e64572148@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <1415060379903.77070@unm.edu> Hi David Kirsh, You know, after I posted, I was thinking about this, and whether animals have a way of dealing with meaning, such as dogs hearing their names from their masters and basic commands like "sit!" etc. And then we have gorillas who know signing. So it figures I'd be called out on that! :) Let me eat my hat. I don't believe however that meaning was a unit of analysis, but word-meaning, which is different. I don't think it's possible to use meaning as a unit for the very reason that it is formless and dependent upon other things, such as culture, and affect for example. I suppose what I was thinking about when I posted, at the time of Vygotsky and his observance of the crisis of psychology, was there was not a scientific way to connect biology to the mind, just subjective interpretation (Freud) and behavior (Pavlov). Now, I may have been too abbreviated in my representation of psychology of the time, but this is just a list post! I know there were many other branches of research, such as the Gestalt school, Buhler, Piaget, etc. So I hope I'm not being unfair there. The connection to body and mind was the holy grail at the time, wasn't it? Also, the fact that Vygotsky was very gifted in language, it makes sense that he went the route that he did. I don't mean to say that language was the only avenue to create concepts, meaning, etc during development, but perhaps for him it was a pathway that brought the most yield in terms of connecting body to mind and thus avoiding the Descartes problem? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner Sent: Monday, November 3, 2014 3:58 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > meaning is what distinguishes us as human and not machine or animal Except that some of the higher animals can learn words and their meanings. It's syntax they lack. Also, whereas "word-meaning" has some formal properties that may make it suitable as a unit of analysis, it's not clear that all meaning is tied to words, or even to language; cognitive scientists talk of imagistic meaning, etc. Perhaps the branching off to activity theory was in part a rejection of having something as formless as meaning as a unit of analysis. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 2:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Hi David, (a) Meaning: Interesting. When I spoke of labels, I meant it in terms of an individual mind. What is there before the label, not after? I don't see the harm in applying this dynamic of naming across groups who wish to determine themes in their activities, just that isn't how I meant it. :) Do you mean to say that there is a new theme manifesting in which we are interacting before the label manifests? I'm not sure I understand, but I am trying. Still, meaning is my choice, if I'm allowed to cast a vote, because meaning is what distinguishes us as human and not machine or animal. Words are tools because they have meaning, they are the glue to what we do and think. I don't know how far we could get doing anything if we didn't have words (we, as a society, and we as, you and I, and we as, me and myself - a stretch of the plural first person, I know, but to account for self-reflection and inner speech). Furthermore, I don't know how far we'd get if words didn't have meaning. So I see meaning as the germ, the seed, and I agree with LSV that word-meaning is how we give meaning a form in our minds ("consciousness" to those who have issue with the word "mind"), if this is what he was saying. Word-meaning is a placeholder, like the oil lamp is the holder of the flame. It can be the unit for neuroscience, for anthropology, for philosophy, for learning, for linguistics, for computation, for many, many kinds of angles to study mind. I don't mean to upset anyone, but to only give an honest account that when I examine activity, I don't see that same kind of reach. Of course I am not willing to abandon activity, for the record. I just view activity differently. I believe we are more than what we do. I accept that people disagree with that, and that is OK. (b) Idealism and intellectualism: This does smack of Descartes' dualism. And now with the phrase of "plump materialism" meming around the list, I'll have to hunt that paper of Martin's down and cast my eyes upon it. :) What is so great about the list is that I can read a paper and then pose a question to the author, and I think that is the point of the list and I am really on with that. I regret that I did not climb aboard a few years ago when Vera first told us about it. (c) Lysenko: Seems to be an odd way to see the world as he did, but that way of thinking seems to have been plump with the times. I very much like the idea of seeing a book or a saw as an artificial organ, but also a library, a town hall, an art museum, a university campus, all as external organs to our abilities. The metaphor may break down as all metaphors do, but "artificial organ" does lend itself to how thought and custom are stored beyond the brain, and that seems correct. Kind regards, Annalisa ============================ a) As Tolstoy says, the label is ready when the concept is ready. Each historical epoch does tend to have what Halliday calls a "theme", which certainly influences the kinds of things we are ready to label units. Halliday's example is that prior to the nineteenth century mathematics and quantification was a central "theme" in science, in the nineteenth century, particularly after Darwin, "history" become the main theme, and this was replaced, at least in linguistics and at least post-Saussure, by "structure". Hallidays says, and I agree, that these themes are not "inter-" or "multi-" disciplinary (because that implies that the main locus of intellectual activity is still the discipline, which is not thematic but defined by the object of study). They are trans-disciplinary (which is why I always felt that Andy's book on concepts should be called "transdisciplinary" rather than "multidisciplinary"). I think that "activity" is an attempt to create a kind of transdisciplinary th eme for the twenty-first century, and I strongly feel that the true theme should be something like "meaning", for some of the reasons you say (that is, experience is not limited to activity, nor is meaning limited to the activity of signs). b) I think that "idealism" is something like intellectualism; it's a fairly time specific charge, one that was made in a particular historical context. With intellectualism, the charge is that the source of intellect is intellect itself, in embryo, and that the development of intellect is essentially like inflating a rubber raft. With idealism, the charge is actually similar; it is that the ideal actually exists, in embryo, in material artifacts, and we merely inflate it through activity. Martin's formulation "plump materialism" is delightful, because it really turns this around: it says that the material already exists in ideas: the ideal means, at least from the functional point of view, that something is potentially material It's a view with which I strongly agree (but perhaps I am puppeteering again, and that is not what Martin meant.) c) Lysenko was, in a weird way, a wild-eyed idealist, or at least a denier of materialism. He believed that things that Soviet children learned would be passed on to their children without instruction, and that in this way the Soviet dream would come true in a single generation and in a single country. I think that Vygotsky understood perfectly well that it would not be so easy; he could see that higher psychological functions are par excellence the things that require instruction and that instruction depends very much on material resources (in a very early work he points out that juvenile delinquency cannot be seriously addressed until child homelessness is eliminated). But Vygotsky believed in a kind of plump Darwinism: he understood that laws like the Jennings principle (that is, that an organism's activity is a function of the potential of its organs) do not apply to artificial organs (that is, tools) and that these artificial organs can be handed down to children, albei t with instruction. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 3 November 2014 09:55, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David, > > I am finally returning to complete my answer to your reply from this thread. > > I am swimming in texts and so I am just replying with the *understanding* that I may have missed important points, and I hope that others will forgive my ignorance of texts. I would hope that I wouldn't be banned from contribution because I did not read the LSV Collected Works in its entirety and all commentaries made up to the present day. > > Having said that, I was aware before coming to this list that there is a rift caused by the historical and personal fallout between LSV and ANL. I have shared that my sense that this has had more to do with the politics of the time. If that is not correct, I'm sure I will work that out in time, and my posting my understanding isn't meant to express a prescription for interpretation in any way shape or form. > > I appreciate your synthesizing down what you call three points for the political challenges. > > (a) Activity as unit of analysis: I cannot dispute that in some > scenarios activity can be useful as *a* unit of analysis. But I cannot > abide by activity as *the* unit of analysis for all scenarios. At this > juncture, I'm fairly decided upon that, and if that places me in a > political camp, hook, line, and sinker, I can't help how people > interpret that. We all label the world based upon our own experiences > and the emotional attachments that come with them. And we are all free > in the way we do that labeling. So label away if that is necessary to > you. Though I'd prefer you didn't. :) > > [an aside: Speaking of labeling, I'd like to add that I prefer not to > be limited by a label of activity for my experiences, as I have > experiences beyond activity. I'm actually interested in subjective > experience, stripped away of labels. In my discussions with others > recently, I have learned how limited the English language is in > describing what this is. One could call it "the sublime," one could > call it aesthetic experience, but these are adjectives to experience, > and they come with baggage. So if anyone has an idea to what I'm > referring please hand it over, and please don't hand me Wittgenstein's > quote about the ineffable! :) --end aside] > > (b) In consideration of this notion of ideal, I am curious in my own intellectual journey to better understand this, as we did not discuss the ideal in seminar when discussing word-meaning. But that the word was general, as in the way scientific concepts function in relation to everyday concepts. To my sense, conflating this into idealism is pouring the baby out with the bathwater. That is how it feels to me. But I can understand why this is a difficult Vygotskian concept to grasp, as it took me many false steps to actually "get it," and sometimes I require a refresher. > > I appreciate your observation that Anglophones have a different understanding based upon a preferred first text. But as I attempted to say in an earlier post, this split may have also to do with the time lapse between translations, the translations themselves (in reference to Thinking and Speech), and that the work was kept underwraps for so long and therefore decontextualized from the flow of scientific idea exchanges and research as represented in the literature, alongside the actual cultural practice of doing the science. > > This is not an uncommon event when dealing with decontextualized texts. We cannot help but project our own word-meanings upon our interpretations. Perhaps it is a sin, but I would hope it is a guiltless sin, if we all do it. I see that this is why we have need for one another, to try to minimize that. > > Consider the Egyptian hieroglyphs for example of decontextualized texts and how that ancient culture being absent, the only recourse to access meaning was through the Rosetta stone, and if not for that, they would only be mute, pretty picture writing! We must start from where we stand, which is why sometimes 7+4=10 as a first step in understanding. > > (c) Lamarck/Lysenko: You make a great point that for those researchers in their respective contexts, if writing about child development, they are required to confer with the science of genetics. Thank you for that. Since I am not a scientist I could not know this. > > Now in regard to the theoretical snafus: > > (a) Perezhivanie: I have not yet read the lecture on heredity, though I shall, but I can see if a lecture on environment follows a lecture on heredity, that they cannot be divorced from each other and these cannot be divorced from the body of the lecture series. It makes me also consider the recent developments in epigenetics. > > (b) Personality: I thank you for adding to my vocabulary the words "retroleptic" and "proleptic" and I will need some time to digest this. For me, it is tempting to posit personality as subjective and objective, but I think I can see why this might be problematic. > > (c) Development: development itself develops is a great way to say it! "Personality as bootstrap" ? > > In response to your one sock-puppet clapping, I would add, that we > struggle so much to deal with our inner speech, but when all is said > and done who is it who is listening to the inner speech? And who is > there when the speech goes quiet? :) > > Thanks for a great post. I learned a lot. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 5:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > > Hi David, > > Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! > > How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. > > What I want to say quickly is regarding > > 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! > > I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. > > 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. > > 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! > > I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. > > More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > > Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie > cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! > As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but > nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. > And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's > how the light gets in. > > Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: > > Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS > Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first > lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how > development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the > theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development > must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also > NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of > these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that > intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to > as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the > explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing > intellect). Vygotsky says: > > 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, > ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? > ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? > ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. > ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? > ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? > ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? > ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, > ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? > ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? > ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? > ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, > ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? > ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? > ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? > ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? > ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? > ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? > ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? > ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? > ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? > ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? > ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? > ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? > ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? > ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, > ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? > ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? > ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? > ?????????? ??? ?????. > > ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems > to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not > due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely > determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have > been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet > pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive > product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the > child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires > and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the > milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development > of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around > him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely > absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from > 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a > way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as > any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be > answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which > considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the > theory of preformism) but instead as a "tabula rasa" (Vygotsky uses > the Latin original here-DK), an expression that you have probably > heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans > wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take > whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product > which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that > will determine the course of his development. He is simply a > perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled > with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by > the environment; through the external path of the environment he > acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around > him.) > > You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these > "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism > (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he > picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the > dying). > > Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism > (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned > characteristics could then be handed down genetically to > offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about > eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single > generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in > winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of > the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the > English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting > Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine > them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism > DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. > > Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was > part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to > create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin > would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not > really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the > Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either > medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to > Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to > him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat > ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor > after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was > quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation > that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). > He was particularly well read in the very latest in German > psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his > work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including > Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. > > So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a > kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely > popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in > Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the > child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all > hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of > Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of > "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need > to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least > not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with > something that is already intellect, what you have is not an > explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same > criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", > and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is > Not Born a Personality". > > Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, > letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; > it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and > later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement > rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi David! >> >> I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. >> >> Immediate things I have learned from your post: >> 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. >> >> 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? >> >> 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. >> >> As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! >> >> With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. >> >> Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. >> >> Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. >> >> My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. >> >> I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of >> freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving >> freedom to others. :) >> >> David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. >> >> Until then... >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >> cannot determine the personality] >> >> Dear Annalisa: >> >> Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In >> particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come >> over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find >> essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are >> historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically >> expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of >> genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question >> of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. >> >> First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's >> writings on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split >> between Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in >> which Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of >> consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the >> importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the >> original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's >> much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May >> 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to >> Students and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. >> 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: >> >> http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.h >> tml#Sec1 >> >> I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of >> Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar >> to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be >> founder of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we >> can do now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon >> our understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are >> (at >> least) three: >> >> a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), >> Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and >> the explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself >> accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a >> form of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. >> This revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who >> use activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is >> made up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm >> of activity. >> >> b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning >> as a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has >> meant rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and >> lasting contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is >> the discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather >> than a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a >> long-term effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly >> in the anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which >> scarcely mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which >> scarcely mentions anything without mentioning language). >> >> c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not >> Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development >> (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his >> book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term >> effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" >> (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child >> Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never >> renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write >> scientifically about development without a scientific understanding >> of modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. >> >> The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on >> from point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the >> same way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use >> perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of >> mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what >> Vygotsky does at all. >> >> a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of >> analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the >> contribution of the environment from the contribution of the child in >> the understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very >> simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the >> environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it >> is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's >> hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on >> heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open >> to the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that >> Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of >> development. >> >> b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a >> "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last >> chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, >> personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child >> development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What >> is the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that >> one is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not >> really reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single >> criterion for differentiating the two, I would say that >> "perezhivanie" is retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting >> upon it, while "world outlook" is proleptic. >> >> c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: >> the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the >> lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on >> perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely >> notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word >> meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is >> eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something >> else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us >> to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and >> nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of >> its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken >> lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his >> death. >> >> Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to >> the Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's >> "Life of Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which >> is where Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, >> though John Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that >> personality is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my >> taste--I think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, >> but that semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a >> text. A narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one >> sock puppet clapping. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Thanks for some additional information. >>> >>> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >>> >>> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >>> >>> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >>> >>> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >>> >>> First is historical: >>> >>> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >>> >>> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >>> >>> Second is theoretical: >>> >>> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >>> >>> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe >>> is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >>> >>> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >>> >>> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie >>> cannot determine the personality] >>> >>> Annalisa, >>> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if >>> it was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death >>> and before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely >>> during Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates >>> the issue. A convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was >>> very often a matter of life and death. Which is not to say that the >>> honourable choice may not have been to speak the truth and take the >>> consequences, rather than lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, >>> this document, being dishonest, is not the ideal medium for >>> understanding the real differences between these two former >>> comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences show through. >>> >>> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character >>> develops through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a >>> new sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, >>> etc., so from that point of view a person's character can be >>> understand as the product or sum of a series of such experiences, as >>> for example, when someone writes their autobiography, especially if >>> they follow in the Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >>> >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was >>>> searching for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is >>>> The Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had >>>> indicated in your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any >>>> confusion, all!) >>>> >>>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there >>>> are watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more >>>> slowly and not flood the list). >>>> >>>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a >>>> manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>>> >>>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had >>>> a large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that >>>> I accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an >>>> easy thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have >>>> missed this if there were other parties available to discuss the >>>> nature of Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have >>>> discussed these concepts without Vygotsky present, among each >>>> other. Am I wrong in this thinking? >>>> >>>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>>> >>>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if >>>> Vygotsky and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various >>>> theories, as we are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>>> >>>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>>> >>>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev >>>> not understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in >>>> gaining an answer to this question, we might learn something about >>>> *teaching* the concept of perezhivanie? >>>> >>>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>>> >>>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>>> >>>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of >>>> the whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't >>>> think "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an >>>> abstraction like the whole is an abstraction. >>>> >>>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce >>>> the molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). >>>> In our perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that >>>> molecules exist, just like we know that the ocean exists. But when >>>> we perceive the ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, >>>> but completed in our imagination like the molecule is, and this is >>>> why I feel the unit, seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>>> >>>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the >>>> nature of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, >>>> the water molecule is the unit we must use to understand the >>>> behavior of the water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can >>>> we say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? >>>> It seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the >>>> nature of its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the >>>> ocean, moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not >>>> sure how one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>>> >>>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he >>>> spoke of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 17:05:36 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 01:05:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> Message-ID: Ed, I'm referring to a psychological derivation. The image as manifest in the act of measuring. I suspect your 1x1 square is similar, but I'm happy for you to disagree. Huw On 4 November 2014 00:17, Ed Wall wrote: > Huw > > You have a very different understanding about the nature of number > than I. In a sense, as soon as I draw the diagonal of a 1 by 1 square, that > number (to the dismay of the Greeks) is no longer derived from measuring. > Perhaps you think I'm talking about some sort of 'Davydov mathematics.' The > thread was about Davydov mathematics education. > > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Huw > >> > >> I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference > >> between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or > 'meaningful > >> activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That is, > one > >> aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the conversation > on > >> the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean as > >> regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? > >> > >> > > I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence in > > the application of units of measure. That number is derived from > > measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a > > meaningful problem. > > > > The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. > > > > I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which is > > why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what > > processes you're studying. If you want to study how students construe a > > situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study > their > > competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of how > they > > construe and structure that task. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > >> Ed > >> > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Ed, > >>> > >>> One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. > >>> Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. > >>> > >>> I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, > engaging > >>> with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through quantifying. I > >> am > >>> also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between > >>>> mathematics and, for instance, physics? > >>>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Andy, > >>>>> > >>>>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already > >>>> been > >>>>> covered. > >>>>> > >>>>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling > >>>> concretely > >>>>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, > using > >>>> the > >>>>> familiar notation A > B etc. > >>>>> > >>>>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of > Gal'perin. > >>>>> > >>>>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent > >>>>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual > >>>>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the > >> means > >>>> to > >>>>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) > >> which > >>>>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. > >> I > >>>>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not > mere > >>>>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful > >>>>> quantification". > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. > >>>>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and > learning > >>>> at > >>>>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. > It > >>>>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here > for > >>>>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, > but > >> I > >>>>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by > >> Davydov's > >>>>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with > >>>> algebra > >>>>>> later on. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a > >>>> "unit > >>>>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be > >>>>>> extended. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a > >> CHAT > >>>>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and > >>>> Leontyev. > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Dear All, > >>>>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find > it > >>>>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send > of > >>>> Jean > >>>>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached > >>>> another > >>>>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. > >>>>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math > >> curriculum > >>>>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, > >>>>>>> Natalia. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- > >>>>>>> From: "mike cole" > >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean > >>>>>>> Schmittau's > >>>>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed > >> that > >>>> may > >>>>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Peg > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which > >>>> you > >>>>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I > >>>>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I > >> entirely > >>>>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus > >>>>>>>> counting > >>>>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US > >>>>>>>> curriculum > >>>>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach > (counting > >>>>>>>> number > >>>>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you > >>>>>>>> gave > >>>>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was > >> the > >>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I > >>>>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer > >> in > >>>>>>>> some > >>>>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't > >>>> know.' > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may > misunderstand. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked > into > >>>> the > >>>>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm > >> afraid. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," > so > >> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> don't > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov > >>>> mathematics > >>>>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > >>>>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all > >>>> about > >>>>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed > >>>> with > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring > >>>> numbers > >>>>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often > >>>> see in > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> US > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> overshadow > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is > about > >>>> the > >>>>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> relations > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do > not > >>>>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer > in > >>>> some > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a > personal > >>>>>>>>> thing > >>>>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. > >>>>>>>>> PG > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> (although > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s > >> by > >>>> a > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Louis > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in > >> mathematics > >>>>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > >>>>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even > >>>> rulers > >>>>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > >> Blunden > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >>>>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. > >>>> However, > >>>>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would > they > >>>>>>>>>> react by > >>>>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >>>>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the > >>>> children > >>>>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right > >> way > >>>>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing > >> "Think > >>>>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought > >>>> of?" > >>>>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number > you > >>>>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a > >>>> means of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> solving an existing problem. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. > >> There > >>>>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is > greater > >>>>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> string." > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > >>>>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops > >> that > >>>>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the > >>>> originator > >>>>>>>>>>> of it, though!) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On > >>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am > >> not > >>>>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure > how > >>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A concrete > >>>>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > >>>>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = > >> B >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 17:19:09 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 19:19:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> Message-ID: <36D146DF-A802-4813-A1A1-D7B8A485019D@umich.edu> Huw I referring to, one might say, a mathematical derivation. You might say our conversation is, unfortunately, incommensurable. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Ed, > > I'm referring to a psychological derivation. The image as manifest in the > act of measuring. I suspect your 1x1 square is similar, but I'm happy for > you to disagree. > > Huw > > On 4 November 2014 00:17, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Huw >> >> You have a very different understanding about the nature of number >> than I. In a sense, as soon as I draw the diagonal of a 1 by 1 square, that >> number (to the dismay of the Greeks) is no longer derived from measuring. >> Perhaps you think I'm talking about some sort of 'Davydov mathematics.' The >> thread was about Davydov mathematics education. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference >>>> between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or >> 'meaningful >>>> activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That is, >> one >>>> aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the conversation >> on >>>> the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean as >>>> regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? >>>> >>>> >>> I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence in >>> the application of units of measure. That number is derived from >>> measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a >>> meaningful problem. >>> >>> The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. >>> >>> I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which is >>> why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what >>> processes you're studying. If you want to study how students construe a >>> situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study >> their >>> competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of how >> they >>> construe and structure that task. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Ed, >>>>> >>>>> One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. >>>>> Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. >>>>> >>>>> I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, >> engaging >>>>> with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through quantifying. I >>>> am >>>>> also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between >>>>>> mathematics and, for instance, physics? >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have already >>>>>> been >>>>>>> covered. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling >>>>>> concretely >>>>>>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, >> using >>>>>> the >>>>>>> familiar notation A > B etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of >> Gal'perin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative extent >>>>>>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any conceptual >>>>>>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the >>>> means >>>>>> to >>>>>>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) >>>> which >>>>>>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the concept. >>>> I >>>>>>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not >> mere >>>>>>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful >>>>>>> quantification". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. >>>>>>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and >> learning >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my flagpole. >> It >>>>>>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here >> for >>>>>>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, >> but >>>> I >>>>>>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by >>>> Davydov's >>>>>>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with >>>>>> algebra >>>>>>>> later on. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as a >>>>>> "unit >>>>>>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could be >>>>>>>> extended. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a >>>> CHAT >>>>>>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and >>>>>> Leontyev. >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Dear All, >>>>>>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but find >> it >>>>>>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike send >> of >>>>>> Jean >>>>>>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see attached >>>>>> another >>>>>>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's article. >>>>>>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math >>>> curriculum >>>>>>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, >>>>>>>>> Natalia. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>>>>> From: "mike cole" >>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >>>>>>>>> Schmittau's >>>>>>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed >>>> that >>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Peg >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which >>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I >>>>>>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I >>>> entirely >>>>>>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus >>>>>>>>>> counting >>>>>>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US >>>>>>>>>> curriculum >>>>>>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach >> (counting >>>>>>>>>> number >>>>>>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you >>>>>>>>>> gave >>>>>>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember was >>>> the >>>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I >>>>>>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer >>>> in >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't >>>>>> know.' >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may >> misunderstand. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked >> into >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm >>>> afraid. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," >> so >>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> don't >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov >>>>>> mathematics >>>>>>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>>>>>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all >>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are developed >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring >>>>>> numbers >>>>>>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we often >>>>>> see in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> US >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number symbols >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> overshadow >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is >> about >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < than >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> relations >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do >> not >>>>>>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer >> in >>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a >> personal >>>>>>>>>>> thing >>>>>>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. >>>>>>>>>>> PG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (although >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the 1920s >>>> by >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Louis >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of Dewey. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in >>>> mathematics >>>>>>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even >>>>>> rulers >>>>>>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy >>>> Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>>>>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. >>>>>> However, >>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would >> they >>>>>>>>>>>> react by >>>>>>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>>>>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the >>>>>> children >>>>>>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the right >>>> way >>>>>>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing >>>> "Think >>>>>>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought >>>>>> of?" >>>>>>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number >> you >>>>>>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a >>>>>> means of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> solving an existing problem. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. >>>> There >>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is >> greater >>>>>>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> string." >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops >>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the >>>>>> originator >>>>>>>>>>>>> of it, though!) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> On >>>>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am >>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure >> how >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A> concrete >>>>>>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = >>>> B>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Nov 3 17:49:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 17:49:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> Message-ID: That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. The word problem problem is really interesting too. mike PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? mike**2 :-) On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > I have often used this for various reasons (smile). > > There are some problems with this example and the way, perhaps, > you are using it. The are certain conceptual tricks at play which cause, I > think, some of the problems. Let me illustrate. > > 1. Let a= b + k where k is zero. > 2. a^2 = ab + ak > 3. a^2 - b^2 = ab + ak - b^2 > 3. (a-b)(a+b) = (a-b)b + ak > 4. (a+b) = b + ak/(a-b) > 5. However, a-b = k, so a+b = b + a. > > The is a rule in school, and it is not exactly a 'mathematical' rule, that > you can't divide by zero. However, is a convention, You can, indeed, divide > by zero, but you need to think about it a little. In algebra, one might > argue, the slope of a vertical line is roughly of this problematic form, > but that is a problem of representation. As plots 1/x near the origin, one > sees a discontinuity caused by this problematic, but that is expected. The > interesting cases occur, however, in calculus where one considers, in a > sense, 0/0. These can be somewhat undecidable without a little more > information (as case, perhaps, of we can't know). However, in a sense, x/x > at zero is just 1 and x^2/x at zero is just 0 (and, in fact, your example > is somewhat of this uncertain nature). > So the rule isn't necessarily 'objectively' introduced if I understand > you correctly; nonetheless, one needs to be careful and preserve a sort of > thoughtful consistency in mathematics (by the way, a certain inconsistency > can often observed in the historical records in the development of > mathematical topics). Anyway, I think you may be saying is that > 'objectivity' is something that needs to be introduced when consistency of > the discipline is threatened. Perhaps, in mathematics the difference is > that this is done internally rather than externally. If that is the case, > here may be an example: > > 5 x 5 = 25 > 5 x 4 = 20 > 5 x 3 = 15 > 5 x 2 = 10 > 5 x 1 = 5 > 5 x 0 = 0 > 5 x -1 = -5 > > There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = > -5. > > Ed > > > > On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Some people will be familiar with this: > > > > 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab > > 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 > > 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b > > 5. then a+b=b > > 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b > > 7. then 2=1 > > > > This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are > taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. > > The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling > out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. > > The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there just > for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because > otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire > system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to objective > constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have > nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a and b > represent lengths or baseball scores. > > > > Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is > subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of > relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world > outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to > adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, > irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. > > > > Andy > > (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going > through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Ed Wall wrote: > >> Andy > >> > >> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of > mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come > back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number > of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the > curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. > >> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about > what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective > versus the opposite? > >> > >> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, > reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead > boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention > (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her > daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , > but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article > "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link > in a brief intro): > >> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> > >>> :) So many issues. > >>> > >>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in > mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would > have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book > highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the > logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the > historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to > make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure > was due to contingencies, I don't know. > >>> > >>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia > Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. > Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective > relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or > they fail. > >>> > >>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or > that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which > is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those > relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, > and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of > discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach > and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead > boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to > my mind. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>>> Carol and Andy > >>>> > >>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction > being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with > Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno > clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and > the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was > being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There > are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese > tended to be fairly pragmatic). > >>>> > >>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes > below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first > and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental > work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I > wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize > such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come > out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). > I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and > social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions > among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is > referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer > with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if > necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has > been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). > Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical > standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, > mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary > and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum > (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a > different matter. > >>>> > >>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical > contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and > probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an > eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have > also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is > recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took > smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now > tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, > very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics > curriculum may be a little outworn. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> It's up to you, Ed. > >>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. > I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate > life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations > quite engaging. > >>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get > interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions > being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be > interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at > the time our xcma discussion broke off. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you > and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be > significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step > further in our discussion on the listserve. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best > >>>>>> Carol > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Just thinking ... > >>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity > >>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of > >>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real > >>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative > >>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in > >>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post > >>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating > phylogeny. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 > >>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies > >>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>>> >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would > >>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so > >>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem > >>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting > >>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an > >>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). > >>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' > >>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic > >>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that > >>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors > >>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what > >>>>>> happened very early in history. > >>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are > >>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how > >>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - > >>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort > >>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that > >>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' > >>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show > >>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, > >>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again > >>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about > >>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, > >>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within > >>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it > >>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise > >>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics > >>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no > >>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different > >>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that > >>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and > >>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections > >>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put > >>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems > >>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never > >>>>>> been resolved). > >>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has > >>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from > >>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' > >>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia > >>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of > >>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people > >>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were > >>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording > >>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving > >>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a > >>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a > >>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, > >>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than > >>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were > >>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also > >>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations > >>>>>> were used. > >>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, > >>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the > >>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra > >>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again > >>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize > >>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the > >>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus > >>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation > >>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate > >>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the > >>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') > >>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; > >>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always > >>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do > >>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a > >>>>>> symbolic notation. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all > >>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics > >>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to > >>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the > >>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the > >>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - > >>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the > >>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are > >>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally > >>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to > >>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the > >>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I > >>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Ah Ed > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the > >>>>>> heart of the matter. > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Carol > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>>> > Carol > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is > >>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the > >>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been > >>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for > >>>>>> granted. > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Ed > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other > >>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > Best > >>>>>> > > Carol > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > -- > >>>>>> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>> > > Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>>> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > -- > >>>>>> > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>> > Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>> > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>>> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 18:02:35 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 02:02:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <36D146DF-A802-4813-A1A1-D7B8A485019D@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> <36D146DF-A802-4813-A1A1-D7B8A485019D@umich.edu> Message-ID: On 4 November 2014 01:19, Ed Wall wrote: > Huw > > I referring to, one might say, a mathematical derivation. You might > say our conversation is, unfortunately, incommensurable. > > Hi Ed, That's perfectly consistent if man is abstracted from mathematics. "Nothing human is alien to me". I expect you'll need to find a source for number somewhere, however. Best, Huw > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Ed, > > > > I'm referring to a psychological derivation. The image as manifest in > the > > act of measuring. I suspect your 1x1 square is similar, but I'm happy > for > > you to disagree. > > > > Huw > > > > On 4 November 2014 00:17, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Huw > >> > >> You have a very different understanding about the nature of number > >> than I. In a sense, as soon as I draw the diagonal of a 1 by 1 square, > that > >> number (to the dismay of the Greeks) is no longer derived from > measuring. > >> Perhaps you think I'm talking about some sort of 'Davydov mathematics.' > The > >> thread was about Davydov mathematics education. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >>> On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference > >>>> between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or > >> 'meaningful > >>>> activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That > is, > >> one > >>>> aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the > conversation > >> on > >>>> the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean > as > >>>> regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence > in > >>> the application of units of measure. That number is derived from > >>> measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a > >>> meaningful problem. > >>> > >>> The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. > >>> > >>> I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which > is > >>> why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what > >>> processes you're studying. If you want to study how students construe > a > >>> situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study > >> their > >>> competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of how > >> they > >>> construe and structure that task. > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Ed, > >>>>> > >>>>> One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. > >>>>> Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. > >>>>> > >>>>> I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, > >> engaging > >>>>> with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through > quantifying. I > >>>> am > >>>>> also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between > >>>>>> mathematics and, for instance, physics? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have > already > >>>>>> been > >>>>>>> covered. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling > >>>>>> concretely > >>>>>>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, > >> using > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> familiar notation A > B etc. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of > >> Gal'perin. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative > extent > >>>>>>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any > conceptual > >>>>>>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the > >>>> means > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) > >>>> which > >>>>>>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the > concept. > >>>> I > >>>>>>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not > >> mere > >>>>>>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful > >>>>>>> quantification". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. > >>>>>>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and > >> learning > >>>>>> at > >>>>>>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my > flagpole. > >> It > >>>>>>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here > >> for > >>>>>>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, > >> but > >>>> I > >>>>>>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by > >>>> Davydov's > >>>>>>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with > >>>>>> algebra > >>>>>>>> later on. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as > a > >>>>>> "unit > >>>>>>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could > be > >>>>>>>> extended. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a > >>>> CHAT > >>>>>>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and > >>>>>> Leontyev. > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Hi Dear All, > >>>>>>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but > find > >> it > >>>>>>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike > send > >> of > >>>>>> Jean > >>>>>>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see > attached > >>>>>> another > >>>>>>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's > article. > >>>>>>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math > >>>> curriculum > >>>>>>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, > >>>>>>>>> Natalia. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- > >>>>>>>>> From: "mike cole" > >>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean > >>>>>>>>> Schmittau's > >>>>>>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed > >>>> that > >>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall > wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Peg > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to > which > >>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' > when I > >>>>>>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I > >>>> entirely > >>>>>>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number > versus > >>>>>>>>>> counting > >>>>>>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US > >>>>>>>>>> curriculum > >>>>>>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach > >> (counting > >>>>>>>>>> number > >>>>>>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example > you > >>>>>>>>>> gave > >>>>>>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember > was > >>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why > "I > >>>>>>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' > answer > >>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We > can't > >>>>>> know.' > >>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may > >> misunderstand. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked > >> into > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm > >>>> afraid. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," > >> so > >>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> don't > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov > >>>>>> mathematics > >>>>>>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > >>>>>>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all > >>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are > developed > >>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring > >>>>>> numbers > >>>>>>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we > often > >>>>>> see in > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> US > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number > symbols > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> overshadow > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is > >> about > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < > than > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> relations > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do > >> not > >>>>>>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer > >> in > >>>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a > >> personal > >>>>>>>>>>> thing > >>>>>>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. > >>>>>>>>>>> PG > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th > - > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> (although > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the > 1920s > >>>> by > >>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Louis > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of > Dewey. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in > >>>> mathematics > >>>>>>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the > >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not > even > >>>>>> rulers > >>>>>>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > >>>> Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >>>>>>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. > >>>>>> However, > >>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would > >> they > >>>>>>>>>>>> react by > >>>>>>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >>>>>>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the > >>>>>> children > >>>>>>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the > right > >>>> way > >>>>>>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing > >>>> "Think > >>>>>>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first > thought > >>>>>> of?" > >>>>>>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number > >> you > >>>>>>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a > >>>>>> means of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> solving an existing problem. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. > >>>> There > >>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is > >> greater > >>>>>>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that > Borya's > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> string." > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my > >>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the > troops > >>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the > >>>>>> originator > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of it, though!) > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> On > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I > am > >>>> not > >>>>>>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure > >> how > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A >> concrete > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = > >>>> B >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Mon Nov 3 18:28:04 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 21:28:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: off list on mathematics and the social In-Reply-To: References: <002b01cff76f$55a15260$00e3f720$@att.net> Message-ID: <007f01cff7d6$f6fd9670$e4f8c350$@att.net> Of course there's teaching. It's school. I cannot imagine Davidov's or any curriculum without teaching. -----Original Message----- From: Ed Wall [mailto:ewall@umich.edu] Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 4:50 PM To: Peg Griffin Cc: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: off list on mathematics and the social Peg and Andy Let me say that I rather like how Vygotsky thought about development (whatever the discipline) and I like doing some as Davydov recommended, but curricula-wise I am always a bit skeptical. US kids, and I would disagree as to all, do have this problem, but I am not, at all, sure it is because of the mathematical focus on number. I can easily imagine the following conversation Children start with counting numbers Alyosha?s number is greater than Borja?s. Anyone can perceive the difference. The mathematical recording of that is A>B. In the very same situation, one is less than the other, mathematically, B, <, ? and = and the mathematically recordings with + and -. **The key notion here is counting on The whole situation of transformations takes this nice set mathematically recorded as: A?B B?A A>B A-X= B+X A?=B? B?=A? Then of course there?s more fun when Katya?s in on it and transitivity pops in so that even without direct perceptual comparisons mathematics comes to the rescue so you can figure out stuff you wouldn?t know otherwise (do I smell motivation here?): A>B B>K A?K A>K And they work out proudly that you keep the ? (don?t know) answer in the following situation A>B A>K B?K ** I suspect if asked why they (re Davydov) might say something like "Well, A is bigger than B and A is bigger than K., but that doesn't mean B is bigger than K. It doesn't say about B and K." I suspect that US children might say the same. There is, in my opinion, a very strong element of teaching here that makes lessons like this happen. Mathematics teaching has always been much weaker in the US than elsewhere. However, that doesn't mean there aren't substantial exceptions even with a counting number curriculum. There is another issue and that is why I mentioned Benezet. Skipping formal operations with number until later grades seems to have benefits as to later learning and, of course, as you mentioned informal operations with number are happening in the background. I wonder if the informality around number might contribute to a more relaxed view of mathematics (this has been argued to a degree elsewhere). Unfortunately, it is somewhat likely any of this will catch on any time soon because of the social forces in motion, but that doesn't mean one can't agitate (smile). I choose to do so on the side of teaching rather than curriculum. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:06 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > Hi, Ed, > I barely touched on the example-- sorry! It comes up when Katya gets > into the situation. > Essentially, given the following situation, most US fourth graders do > quite well with just a little introduction: > A>B > B>K > A?K > Response A>K > BUT, most US fourth graders do not do well with the following situation: > A>B > A>K > B?K > US kids answer with some symbol or other or say they haven't learned > it yet or they can't do math or they have to go to the bathroom; the > Davidov even younger kids say "don't know, no one could know." > As far as I can tell, the US kids are doing the first one by relying > on knowing the > < among numbers under ten and transfer for each > little porblem; they don't seem to have a firm grasp of situations > with greater than, less than, and transitivity. > I hope you and Andy get back to the issues involving what's social > with mathematics. > I'm glad folks are dealing seriously with mathematics on the list and > that the readings have been posted but I still hope you will get back > to that when you have time. > PG > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2014 3:03 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Peg > > By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to which > you refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' when I > mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I entirely > agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number versus > counting number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual > US curriculum it is not entirely evident mathematically why one > approach (counting number versus real number) is better than the other. > > I am confused by the statement below concerning an example you > gave 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember > was the one using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. > > I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why "I > don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' answer in > some 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We can't > know.' in some little (and some large) systems; however, I may misunderstand. > > Ed > > On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked into >> the Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm afraid. >> >> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," so I >> don't know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov >> mathematics educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all >> about formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are >> developed with the children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ >> =). Ignoring numbers until later allows teachers to avoid an >> epigenetic byway we often see in US elementary schools where counting >> relations among number symbols overshadow other aspects of >> mathematics. The example I gave earlier is about the fourth graders >> in US schools who seem to understand > and < than relations in a >> little system of three mathematical statements but they do not understand that "don't know" >> is a mathematically correct answer in some of the little systems -- >> for them don't know is essentially a personal thing not a mathematics > thing. >> PG >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >> >> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th - >> (although the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the >> 1920s by a Louis Benezet. My impression is that he was building on >> ideas > of Dewey. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >> >>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in mathematics >>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not even >>> rulers or tape measures of strings. >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>> >>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. >>> However, wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or >>> would they react by >>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the >>> children are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the >>> right way to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by >>> playing "Think of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first thought of?" >>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number you >>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a means >>> of >> solving an existing problem. >>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>> >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> - >>> - >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. There >>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is greater >>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that Borya's string. " >>>> >>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the troops that >>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the >>>> originator of it, though!) >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On >>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>> >>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not >>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how >>>> the >>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> - >>>> - >>>> - >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>> >>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the >>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 18:34:33 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:34:33 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> Message-ID: <89D3E7A7-8790-4A13-BA94-7EFDC45B3225@umich.edu> Mike Yes that is the meaning of invert v (or caret). Long ago, it also took me awhile to figure that out (smile). You want to say, 'a necessity within the integers such that'? I mean it *must* be that 5 x -1 = -5 so as maintain consistency within the integers. The integers are what is termed an extension of the counting numbers (and zero). If 5 x -1 did not equal -5, there is a sense in which arithmetic would fail to operate as before with the counting numbers as now embedded in the integers. That is, the integers are an extension of the counting numbers that maintain for the counting numbers their usual properties. This forces certain mathematical behavior on the non-counting number integers. Foe instance, negative times positive must be negative and negative times negative must be positive. Although it is often the case that teachers teach these later operations as 'social conventions', they aren't, they are consequences of the mathematics. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:49 PM, mike cole wrote: > That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer > here i am assuming > that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > > You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > questions unusually interesting. > > The word problem problem is really interesting too. > > mike > > PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity > within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? > mike**2 > :-) > > > On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Andy >> >> I have often used this for various reasons (smile). >> >> There are some problems with this example and the way, perhaps, >> you are using it. The are certain conceptual tricks at play which cause, I >> think, some of the problems. Let me illustrate. >> >> 1. Let a= b + k where k is zero. >> 2. a^2 = ab + ak >> 3. a^2 - b^2 = ab + ak - b^2 >> 3. (a-b)(a+b) = (a-b)b + ak >> 4. (a+b) = b + ak/(a-b) >> 5. However, a-b = k, so a+b = b + a. >> >> The is a rule in school, and it is not exactly a 'mathematical' rule, that >> you can't divide by zero. However, is a convention, You can, indeed, divide >> by zero, but you need to think about it a little. In algebra, one might >> argue, the slope of a vertical line is roughly of this problematic form, >> but that is a problem of representation. As plots 1/x near the origin, one >> sees a discontinuity caused by this problematic, but that is expected. The >> interesting cases occur, however, in calculus where one considers, in a >> sense, 0/0. These can be somewhat undecidable without a little more >> information (as case, perhaps, of we can't know). However, in a sense, x/x >> at zero is just 1 and x^2/x at zero is just 0 (and, in fact, your example >> is somewhat of this uncertain nature). >> So the rule isn't necessarily 'objectively' introduced if I understand >> you correctly; nonetheless, one needs to be careful and preserve a sort of >> thoughtful consistency in mathematics (by the way, a certain inconsistency >> can often observed in the historical records in the development of >> mathematical topics). Anyway, I think you may be saying is that >> 'objectivity' is something that needs to be introduced when consistency of >> the discipline is threatened. Perhaps, in mathematics the difference is >> that this is done internally rather than externally. If that is the case, >> here may be an example: >> >> 5 x 5 = 25 >> 5 x 4 = 20 >> 5 x 3 = 15 >> 5 x 2 = 10 >> 5 x 1 = 5 >> 5 x 0 = 0 >> 5 x -1 = -5 >> >> There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = >> -5. >> >> Ed >> >> >> >> On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Some people will be familiar with this: >>> >>> 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab >>> 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 >>> 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b >>> 5. then a+b=b >>> 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b >>> 7. then 2=1 >>> >>> This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are >> taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. >>> The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling >> out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. >>> The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there just >> for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because >> otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire >> system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to objective >> constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have >> nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a and b >> represent lengths or baseball scores. >>> >>> Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is >> subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of >> relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world >> outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to >> adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, >> irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. >>> >>> Andy >>> (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going >> through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Ed Wall wrote: >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of >> mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come >> back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number >> of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the >> curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. >>>> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about >> what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective >> versus the opposite? >>>> >>>> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, >> reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead >> boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention >> (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her >> daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , >> but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article >> "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link >> in a brief intro): >>>> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> :) So many issues. >>>>> >>>>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in >> mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would >> have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book >> highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the >> logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the >> historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to >> make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure >> was due to contingencies, I don't know. >>>>> >>>>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia >> Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. >> Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective >> relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or >> they fail. >>>>> >>>>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or >> that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which >> is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those >> relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, >> and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of >> discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach >> and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead >> boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to >> my mind. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol and Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction >> being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with >> Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno >> clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and >> the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was >> being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There >> are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese >> tended to be fairly pragmatic). >>>>>> >>>>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes >> below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first >> and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental >> work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I >> wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize >> such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come >> out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). >> I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and >> social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions >> among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is >> referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer >> with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if >> necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has >> been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). >> Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical >> standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, >> mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary >> and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum >> (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a >> different matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical >> contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and >> probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an >> eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have >> also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is >> recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took >> smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now >> tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, >> very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics >> curriculum may be a little outworn. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> It's up to you, Ed. >>>>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. >> I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate >> life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations >> quite engaging. >>>>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get >> interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions >> being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be >> interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at >> the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you >> and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be >> significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step >> further in our discussion on the listserve. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just thinking ... >>>>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating >> phylogeny. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>>>>>> happened very early in history. >>>>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>>>>>> been resolved). >>>>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>>>>>> were used. >>>>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>>>>>> symbolic notation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ah Ed >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>>>>>> heart of the matter. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>>>>>> granted. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 18:55:14 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:55:14 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> <36D146DF-A802-4813-A1A1-D7B8A485019D@umich.edu> Message-ID: <6958E068-A6EA-43A9-A8A2-013D249C1C8F@umich.edu> Huw Thank you for your answer to my original question. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:02 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 4 November 2014 01:19, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Huw >> >> I referring to, one might say, a mathematical derivation. You might >> say our conversation is, unfortunately, incommensurable. >> >> > Hi Ed, > > That's perfectly consistent if man is abstracted from mathematics. > "Nothing human is alien to me". I expect you'll need to find a source for > number somewhere, however. > > Best, > Huw > > > >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Ed, >>> >>> I'm referring to a psychological derivation. The image as manifest in >> the >>> act of measuring. I suspect your 1x1 square is similar, but I'm happy >> for >>> you to disagree. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On 4 November 2014 00:17, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> You have a very different understanding about the nature of number >>>> than I. In a sense, as soon as I draw the diagonal of a 1 by 1 square, >> that >>>> number (to the dismay of the Greeks) is no longer derived from >> measuring. >>>> Perhaps you think I'm talking about some sort of 'Davydov mathematics.' >> The >>>> thread was about Davydov mathematics education. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference >>>>>> between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or >>>> 'meaningful >>>>>> activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That >> is, >>>> one >>>>>> aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the >> conversation >>>> on >>>>>> the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you mean >> as >>>>>> regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence >> in >>>>> the application of units of measure. That number is derived from >>>>> measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a >>>>> meaningful problem. >>>>> >>>>> The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. >>>>> >>>>> I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which >> is >>>>> why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what >>>>> processes you're studying. If you want to study how students construe >> a >>>>> situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study >>>> their >>>>> competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of how >>>> they >>>>> construe and structure that task. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Ed, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. >>>>>>> Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, >>>> engaging >>>>>>> with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through >> quantifying. I >>>>>> am >>>>>>> also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between >>>>>>>> mathematics and, for instance, physics? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have >> already >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>> covered. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling >>>>>>>> concretely >>>>>>>>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, >>>> using >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> familiar notation A > B etc. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of >>>> Gal'perin. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative >> extent >>>>>>>>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any >> conceptual >>>>>>>>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive the >>>>>> means >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of concepts) >>>>>> which >>>>>>>>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the >> concept. >>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding (not >>>> mere >>>>>>>>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that "meaningful >>>>>>>>> quantification". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. >>>>>>>>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and >>>> learning >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my >> flagpole. >>>> It >>>>>>>>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly here >>>> for >>>>>>>>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be solved, >>>> but >>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by >>>>>> Davydov's >>>>>>>>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble with >>>>>>>> algebra >>>>>>>>>> later on. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method as >> a >>>>>>>> "unit >>>>>>>>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could >> be >>>>>>>>>> extended. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example of a >>>>>> CHAT >>>>>>>>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky and >>>>>>>> Leontyev. >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Dear All, >>>>>>>>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but >> find >>>> it >>>>>>>>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike >> send >>>> of >>>>>>>> Jean >>>>>>>>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see >> attached >>>>>>>> another >>>>>>>>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's >> article. >>>>>>>>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math >>>>>> curriculum >>>>>>>>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, >>>>>>>>>>> Natalia. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>>>>>>> From: "mike cole" >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean >>>>>>>>>>> Schmittau's >>>>>>>>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math ed >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Peg >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to >> which >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' >> when I >>>>>>>>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I >>>>>> entirely >>>>>>>>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number >> versus >>>>>>>>>>>> counting >>>>>>>>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual US >>>>>>>>>>>> curriculum >>>>>>>>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach >>>> (counting >>>>>>>>>>>> number >>>>>>>>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example >> you >>>>>>>>>>>> gave >>>>>>>>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember >> was >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and Borja. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why >> "I >>>>>>>>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' >> answer >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We >> can't >>>>>>>> know.' >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may >>>> misunderstand. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked >>>> into >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm >>>>>> afraid. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal arithmetic," >>>> so >>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> don't >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov >>>>>>>> mathematics >>>>>>>>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially all >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are >> developed >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). Ignoring >>>>>>>> numbers >>>>>>>>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we >> often >>>>>>>> see in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> US >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number >> symbols >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> overshadow >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is >>>> about >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < >> than >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> relations >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they do >>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct answer >>>> in >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a >>>> personal >>>>>>>>>>>>> thing >>>>>>>>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. >>>>>>>>>>>>> PG >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until 7th >> - >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (although >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the >> 1920s >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Louis >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of >> Dewey. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in >>>>>> mathematics >>>>>>>>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not >> even >>>>>>>> rulers >>>>>>>>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy >>>>>> Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM >>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that expression. >>>>>>>> However, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would >>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>> react by >>>>>>>>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the >>>>>>>> children >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the >> right >>>>>> way >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by playing >>>>>> "Think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first >> thought >>>>>>>> of?" >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the number >>>> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol as a >>>>>>>> means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> solving an existing problem. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just paradoxical. >>>>>> There >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is >>>> greater >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that >> Borya's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> string." >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the >> troops >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the >>>>>>>> originator >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of it, though!) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> On >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I >> am >>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure >>>> how >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A>>> concrete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive >> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = >>>>>> B>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 19:34:53 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 03:34:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: <6958E068-A6EA-43A9-A8A2-013D249C1C8F@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> <36D146DF-A802-4813-A1A1-D7B8A485019D@umich.edu> <6958E068-A6EA-43A9-A8A2-013D249C1C8F@umich.edu> Message-ID: You're welcome, Ed. On 4 November 2014 02:55, Ed Wall wrote: > Huw > > Thank you for your answer to my original question. > > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 8:02 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 4 November 2014 01:19, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Huw > >> > >> I referring to, one might say, a mathematical derivation. You might > >> say our conversation is, unfortunately, incommensurable. > >> > >> > > Hi Ed, > > > > That's perfectly consistent if man is abstracted from mathematics. > > "Nothing human is alien to me". I expect you'll need to find a source > for > > number somewhere, however. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > >> Ed > >> > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >>> Ed, > >>> > >>> I'm referring to a psychological derivation. The image as manifest in > >> the > >>> act of measuring. I suspect your 1x1 square is similar, but I'm happy > >> for > >>> you to disagree. > >>> > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> On 4 November 2014 00:17, Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> You have a very different understanding about the nature of number > >>>> than I. In a sense, as soon as I draw the diagonal of a 1 by 1 square, > >> that > >>>> number (to the dismay of the Greeks) is no longer derived from > >> measuring. > >>>> Perhaps you think I'm talking about some sort of 'Davydov > mathematics.' > >> The > >>>> thread was about Davydov mathematics education. > >>>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> On 3 November 2014 21:16, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I am interested infer instance, thinking about the difference > >>>>>> between mathematics and physics. 'Meaningful quantification' or > >>>> 'meaningful > >>>>>> activity' seems to be too large a label to detect differences. That > >> is, > >>>> one > >>>>>> aspect of a 'unit of analysis', as I have gleaned from the > >> conversation > >>>> on > >>>>>> the list, its minimality. Hmm. perhaps I need to ask what do you > mean > >> as > >>>>>> regards 'quantification' re the mathematical? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> I mean that an understanding of number is concomitant with competence > >> in > >>>>> the application of units of measure. That number is derived from > >>>>> measuring. But not just any old measuring, measuring that solves a > >>>>> meaningful problem. > >>>>> > >>>>> The Moxhay paper that Natalia sent covers some of this. > >>>>> > >>>>> I don't think a label is used to detect any differences at all, which > >> is > >>>>> why I called it a label. Your unit of analysis will depend upon what > >>>>> processes you're studying. If you want to study how students > construe > >> a > >>>>> situation in order to undertake a task, then it makes sense to study > >>>> their > >>>>> competence at that task over time via, for example, an analysis of > how > >>>> they > >>>>> construe and structure that task. > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 2:38 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Ed, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> One can characterise physics by its interest in physical processes. > >>>>>>> Physics employs quantification as a means to study these processes. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I merely offer "meaningful quantification" as a label. That is, > >>>> engaging > >>>>>>> with the meanings redolent in problems resolved through > >> quantifying. I > >>>>>> am > >>>>>>> also paraphrasing Gal'perin's "meaningful activity". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 3 November 2014 19:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> How does 'meaningful quantification' distinguish between > >>>>>>>> mathematics and, for instance, physics? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I haven't been following the recent threads, so this may have > >> already > >>>>>>>> been > >>>>>>>>> covered. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 1) Algebra in the sense of variables, is introduced by labelling > >>>>>>>> concretely > >>>>>>>>> given particular lengths. E.g length A is larger that length B, > >>>> using > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> familiar notation A > B etc. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 2) For an elaboration of mediating schemas, see the works of > >>>> Gal'perin. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 3) For units, I think this is going to depend on the creative > >> extent > >>>>>>>>> applied to the notion of concept. One could say that any > >> conceptual > >>>>>>>>> knowledge was incomplete if the subject was not able to derive > the > >>>>>> means > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> transform situations (to have some notion of a concept of > concepts) > >>>>>> which > >>>>>>>>> would be required to construe new situations in terms of the > >> concept. > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> think the origins of that go back to the social understanding > (not > >>>> mere > >>>>>>>>> understanding). For mathematics, one could label that > "meaningful > >>>>>>>>> quantification". > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 3 November 2014 06:17, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The article by Peter Moxhay is wonderful, Natalia! Thank you. > >>>>>>>>>> Despite my reservations (which would be relevant teaching and > >>>> learning > >>>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>>> a higher level), I am willing to pin Davydov's flag to my > >> flagpole. > >>>> It > >>>>>>>>>> seems that the task of extending the idea set out so clearly > here > >>>> for > >>>>>>>>>> arithmetic, to algebra, and beyond, is still a task to be > solved, > >>>> but > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>> guess that any child who had acquired the concept of number by > >>>>>> Davydov's > >>>>>>>>>> method in primary school, is probably not going have trouble > with > >>>>>>>> algebra > >>>>>>>>>> later on. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> It would be an interesting exercise to render Davydov's method > as > >> a > >>>>>>>> "unit > >>>>>>>>>> of analysis", and that would perhaps indicate how the idea could > >> be > >>>>>>>>>> extended. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Also, to Haydi, it is worth noting that Davydov is an example > of a > >>>>>> CHAT > >>>>>>>>>> theorist, i.e., someone who values and builds on both Vygotsky > and > >>>>>>>> Leontyev. > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Dear All, > >>>>>>>>>>> I am a lurker in this discussion thread on math education but > >> find > >>>> it > >>>>>>>>>>> very interesting! just to add to those two articles that Mike > >> send > >>>> of > >>>>>>>> Jean > >>>>>>>>>>> Schmittau on Vygotsky/Davydov math curriculum, please, see > >> attached > >>>>>>>> another > >>>>>>>>>>> article Jean wrote with lots of good examples plus Peter's > >> article. > >>>>>>>>>>> I use both of them in my class when it comes to discuss math > >>>>>> curriculum > >>>>>>>>>>> done differently in my Vygotsky seminar. Cheers, > >>>>>>>>>>> Natalia. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "mike cole" > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 2, 2014 1:45:28 PM > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> As a small contribution to this interesting thread, two of Jean > >>>>>>>>>>> Schmittau's > >>>>>>>>>>> writings. She has done a lot work with Davydov's ideas in math > ed > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>>>> give those following the discussion some useful info. > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Nov 2, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Ed Wall > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Peg > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> By ''formal arithmetic' I mean the usual US curriculum to > >> which > >>>>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>>>>> refer to below; I wasn't talking about 'formal mathematics' > >> when I > >>>>>>>>>>>> mentioned Benezet. The point Devlin makes (and I'm not sure I > >>>>>> entirely > >>>>>>>>>>>> agree) is that the Davydov curriculum is about real number > >> versus > >>>>>>>>>>>> counting > >>>>>>>>>>>> number. While Devlin and I both have problems with the usual > US > >>>>>>>>>>>> curriculum > >>>>>>>>>>>> it is not entirely evident mathematically why one approach > >>>> (counting > >>>>>>>>>>>> number > >>>>>>>>>>>> versus real number) is better than the other. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I am confused by the statement below concerning an example > >> you > >>>>>>>>>>>> gave > >>>>>>>>>>>> 'earlier about US fourth graders.' The only example I remember > >> was > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>>>> using the Davydov approach with participants Alyosha and > Borja. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I would appreciate it if you would say a bit more about why > >> "I > >>>>>>>>>>>> don't know" is a 'mathematically' correct and 'impersonal' > >> answer > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>> 'little systems.' I would tend to think otherwise about "We > >> can't > >>>>>>>> know.' > >>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>> some little (and some large) systems; however, I may > >>>> misunderstand. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 9:42 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for this and the Hawaii information, Ed. I had looked > >>>> into > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hawaii work before but I know nothing at all of Benezet, I'm > >>>>>> afraid. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you (or Benezet) mean by "formal > arithmetic," > >>>> so > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> don't > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> know what to make of the implication that the early Davidov > >>>>>>>> mathematics > >>>>>>>>>>>>> educators were "something like" an approach that lacked it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> In my understanding, the Davidov mathematics is essentially > all > >>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>>>>> formal mathematics --symbols and systems of symbols are > >> developed > >>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> children for relations (=? ><) and operations (+ =). > Ignoring > >>>>>>>> numbers > >>>>>>>>>>>>> until later allows teachers to avoid an epigenetic byway we > >> often > >>>>>>>> see in > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> US > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> elementary schools where counting relations among number > >> symbols > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> overshadow > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other aspects of mathematics. The example I gave earlier is > >>>> about > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> fourth graders in US schools who seem to understand > and < > >> than > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> relations > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in a little system of three mathematical statements but they > do > >>>> not > >>>>>>>>>>>>> understand that "don't know" is a mathematically correct > answer > >>>> in > >>>>>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the little systems -- for them don't know is essentially a > >>>> personal > >>>>>>>>>>>>> thing > >>>>>>>>>>>>> not a mathematics thing. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> PG > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed > Wall > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:45 PM > >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Something like this - i.e. lack of formal arithmetic until > 7th > >> - > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> (although > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the details are a little unclear) was done in the US in the > >> 1920s > >>>>>> by > >>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Louis > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Benezet. My impression is that he was building on ideas of > >> Dewey. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 1, 2014, at 8:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> No move from numbers to x. No numbers to begin with in > >>>>>> mathematics > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> education. Kids count in everyday life but no numbers in > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> beginning mathematics classes. It really is strings! Not > >> even > >>>>>>>> rulers > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> or tape measures of strings. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy > >>>>>> Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:12 PM > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Phew! So I was not the only one mystified by that > expression. > >>>>>>>> However, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't the kids have been confused by it as well? Or would > >>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> react by > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> saying: "Hey, Teacher! That's stupid!"? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But certainly making the move to using letters only when the > >>>>>>>> children > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are reaching out for some more convenient symbol seems the > >> right > >>>>>> way > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to go. I used to teach the first lesson in algebra by > playing > >>>>>> "Think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a number, double it, ..., what's the number he first > >> thought > >>>>>>>> of?" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with a classroom of kids and then introducing x for the > number > >>>> you > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first thought of. Vygotsky tells us to provide the symbol > as a > >>>>>>>> means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> solving an existing problem. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> How did Davydov make the move from numbers to x? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The * was an intrusion! The expression is just > paradoxical. > >>>>>> There > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be a concrete world such that "Alyosha's string is > >>>> greater > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than Boya's string equals Alyosha's string is less that > >> Borya's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> string." > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (By the way, in case you want a smile on this November day, > my > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite paradox is the pragmatic one: " Inform all the > >> troops > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> communication has broken down." Can't remember who is the > >>>>>>>> originator > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of it, though!) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin= > att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> On > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 7:58 PM > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? > I > >> am > >>>>>> not > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not > sure > >>>> how > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peg Griffin wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A >>>> concrete > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings and symbols having a relation among relations: > A>B = > >>>>>> B >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 3 19:54:23 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 14:54:23 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <89D3E7A7-8790-4A13-BA94-7EFDC45B3225@umich.edu> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <89D3E7A7-8790-4A13-BA94-7EFDC45B3225@umich.edu> Message-ID: <54584DEF.9030305@mira.net> Yes, Ed, that is probably a better way to illustrate the objectivity of mathematics. We agree here, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > Yes that is the meaning of invert v (or caret). Long ago, it also took me awhile to figure that out (smile). > > You want to say, 'a necessity within the integers such that'? I mean it *must* be that 5 x -1 = -5 so as maintain consistency within the integers. The integers are what is termed an extension of the counting numbers (and zero). If 5 x -1 did not equal -5, there is a sense in which arithmetic would fail to operate as before with the counting numbers as now embedded in the integers. That is, the integers are an extension of the counting numbers that maintain for the counting numbers their usual properties. This forces certain mathematical behavior on the non-counting number integers. Foe instance, negative times positive must be negative and negative times negative must be positive. Although it is often the case that teachers teach these later operations as 'social conventions', they aren't, they are consequences of the mathematics. > > Ed > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:49 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer >> here i am assuming >> that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >> >> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >> questions unusually interesting. >> >> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >> >> mike >> >> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity >> within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >> mike**2 >> :-) >> >> >> On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >> >>> Andy >>> >>> I have often used this for various reasons (smile). >>> >>> There are some problems with this example and the way, perhaps, >>> you are using it. The are certain conceptual tricks at play which cause, I >>> think, some of the problems. Let me illustrate. >>> >>> 1. Let a= b + k where k is zero. >>> 2. a^2 = ab + ak >>> 3. a^2 - b^2 = ab + ak - b^2 >>> 3. (a-b)(a+b) = (a-b)b + ak >>> 4. (a+b) = b + ak/(a-b) >>> 5. However, a-b = k, so a+b = b + a. >>> >>> The is a rule in school, and it is not exactly a 'mathematical' rule, that >>> you can't divide by zero. However, is a convention, You can, indeed, divide >>> by zero, but you need to think about it a little. In algebra, one might >>> argue, the slope of a vertical line is roughly of this problematic form, >>> but that is a problem of representation. As plots 1/x near the origin, one >>> sees a discontinuity caused by this problematic, but that is expected. The >>> interesting cases occur, however, in calculus where one considers, in a >>> sense, 0/0. These can be somewhat undecidable without a little more >>> information (as case, perhaps, of we can't know). However, in a sense, x/x >>> at zero is just 1 and x^2/x at zero is just 0 (and, in fact, your example >>> is somewhat of this uncertain nature). >>> So the rule isn't necessarily 'objectively' introduced if I understand >>> you correctly; nonetheless, one needs to be careful and preserve a sort of >>> thoughtful consistency in mathematics (by the way, a certain inconsistency >>> can often observed in the historical records in the development of >>> mathematical topics). Anyway, I think you may be saying is that >>> 'objectivity' is something that needs to be introduced when consistency of >>> the discipline is threatened. Perhaps, in mathematics the difference is >>> that this is done internally rather than externally. If that is the case, >>> here may be an example: >>> >>> 5 x 5 = 25 >>> 5 x 4 = 20 >>> 5 x 3 = 15 >>> 5 x 2 = 10 >>> 5 x 1 = 5 >>> 5 x 0 = 0 >>> 5 x -1 = -5 >>> >>> There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = >>> -5. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> >>> >>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Some people will be familiar with this: >>>> >>>> 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab >>>> 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 >>>> 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b >>>> 5. then a+b=b >>>> 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b >>>> 7. then 2=1 >>>> >>>> This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are >>>> >>> taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. >>> >>>> The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling >>>> >>> out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. >>> >>>> The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there just >>>> >>> for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because >>> otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire >>> system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to objective >>> constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have >>> nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a and b >>> represent lengths or baseball scores. >>> >>>> Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is >>>> >>> subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of >>> relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world >>> outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to >>> adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, >>> irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. >>> >>>> Andy >>>> (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going >>>> >>> through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) >>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of >>>>> >>> mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to come >>> back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a number >>> of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what the >>> curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. >>> >>>>> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about >>>>> >>> what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective >>> versus the opposite? >>> >>>>> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, >>>>> >>> reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead >>> boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social convention >>> (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because her >>> daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl like') , >>> but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article >>> "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the link >>> in a brief intro): >>> >>>>> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> :) So many issues. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in >>>>>> >>> mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would >>> have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book >>> highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the >>> logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the >>> historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the 1970s to >>> make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this failure >>> was due to contingencies, I don't know. >>> >>>>>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia >>>>>> >>> Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very profound. >>> Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective >>> relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or >>> they fail. >>> >>>>>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or >>>>>> >>> that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science which >>> is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those >>> relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, >>> and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of >>> discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach >>> and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead >>> boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), to >>> my mind. >>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol and Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction >>>>>>> >>> being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with >>> Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of Zeno >>> clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and >>> the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics was >>> being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). There >>> are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the Chinese >>> tended to be fairly pragmatic). >>> >>>>>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes >>>>>>> >>> below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his first >>> and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the monumental >>> work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I >>> wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' realize >>> such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and come >>> out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the egg'). >>> I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity and >>> social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the interactions >>> among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is >>> referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a reviewer >>> with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if >>> necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has >>> been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and withdrawn). >>> Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their logical >>> standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, >>> mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with necessary >>> and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum >>> (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well be a >>> different matter. >>> >>>>>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical >>>>>>> >>> contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and >>> probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with an >>> eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I have >>> also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is >>> recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took >>> smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, now >>> tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are very, >>> very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics >>> curriculum may be a little outworn. >>> >>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It's up to you, Ed. >>>>>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. >>>>>>>> >>> I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my undergraduate >>> life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your observations >>> quite engaging. >>> >>>>>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get >>>>>>>> >>> interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions >>> being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be >>> interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction at >>> the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you >>>>>>>>> >>> and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be >>> significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step >>> further in our discussion on the listserve. >>> >>>>>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>>>>>>>> Just thinking ... >>>>>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>>>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>>>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>>>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>>>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>>>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>>>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating >>>>>>>>> >>> phylogeny. >>> >>>>>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>>>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>>>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>>>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>>>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>>>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>>>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>>>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>>>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>>>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>>>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>>>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>>>>>>> happened very early in history. >>>>>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>>>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>>>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>>>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>>>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>>>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>>>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>>>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>>>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>>>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>>>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>>>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>>>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>>>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>>>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>>>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>>>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>>>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>>>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>>>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>>>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>>>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>>>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>>>>>>> been resolved). >>>>>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>>>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>>>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>>>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>>>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>>>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>>>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>>>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>>>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>>>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>>>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>>>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>>>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>>>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>>>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>>>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>>>>>>> were used. >>>>>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>>>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>>>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>>>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>>>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>>>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>>>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>>>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>>>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>>>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>>>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>>>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>>>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>>>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>>>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>>>>>>> symbolic notation. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>>>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>>>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>>>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>>>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>>>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>>>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>>>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>>>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>>>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>>>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>>>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>>>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ah Ed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> heart of the matter. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>>>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>>>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>>>>>>> granted. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>>> >>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 3 20:45:56 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 15:45:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> Message-ID: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total > duffer here i am assuming > that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > > You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > questions unusually interesting. > > The word problem problem is really interesting too. > > mike > > PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH > not is? > mike**2 > :-) > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Nov 3 20:50:07 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 20:50:07 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <89D3E7A7-8790-4A13-BA94-7EFDC45B3225@umich.edu> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <89D3E7A7-8790-4A13-BA94-7EFDC45B3225@umich.edu> Message-ID: We had a long discussion of the "minus times a plus" ? issue a few years ago, Ed. Should make amusing reading for you! :-) mike? On Monday, November 3, 2014, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > Yes that is the meaning of invert v (or caret). Long ago, it also took > me awhile to figure that out (smile). > > You want to say, 'a necessity within the integers such that'? I mean > it *must* be that 5 x -1 = -5 so as maintain consistency within the > integers. The integers are what is termed an extension of the counting > numbers (and zero). If 5 x -1 did not equal -5, there is a sense in which > arithmetic would fail to operate as before with the counting numbers as now > embedded in the integers. That is, the integers are an extension of the > counting numbers that maintain for the counting numbers their usual > properties. This forces certain mathematical behavior on the non-counting > number integers. Foe instance, negative times positive must be negative and > negative times negative must be positive. Although it is often the case > that teachers teach these later operations as 'social conventions', they > aren't, they are consequences of the mathematics. > > Ed > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:49 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total > duffer > > here i am assuming > > that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > > > > You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > > questions unusually interesting. > > > > The word problem problem is really interesting too. > > > > mike > > > > PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity > > within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? > > mike**2 > > :-) > > > > > > On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Andy > >> > >> I have often used this for various reasons (smile). > >> > >> There are some problems with this example and the way, perhaps, > >> you are using it. The are certain conceptual tricks at play which > cause, I > >> think, some of the problems. Let me illustrate. > >> > >> 1. Let a= b + k where k is zero. > >> 2. a^2 = ab + ak > >> 3. a^2 - b^2 = ab + ak - b^2 > >> 3. (a-b)(a+b) = (a-b)b + ak > >> 4. (a+b) = b + ak/(a-b) > >> 5. However, a-b = k, so a+b = b + a. > >> > >> The is a rule in school, and it is not exactly a 'mathematical' rule, > that > >> you can't divide by zero. However, is a convention, You can, indeed, > divide > >> by zero, but you need to think about it a little. In algebra, one might > >> argue, the slope of a vertical line is roughly of this problematic form, > >> but that is a problem of representation. As plots 1/x near the origin, > one > >> sees a discontinuity caused by this problematic, but that is expected. > The > >> interesting cases occur, however, in calculus where one considers, in a > >> sense, 0/0. These can be somewhat undecidable without a little more > >> information (as case, perhaps, of we can't know). However, in a sense, > x/x > >> at zero is just 1 and x^2/x at zero is just 0 (and, in fact, your > example > >> is somewhat of this uncertain nature). > >> So the rule isn't necessarily 'objectively' introduced if I > understand > >> you correctly; nonetheless, one needs to be careful and preserve a sort > of > >> thoughtful consistency in mathematics (by the way, a certain > inconsistency > >> can often observed in the historical records in the development of > >> mathematical topics). Anyway, I think you may be saying is that > >> 'objectivity' is something that needs to be introduced when consistency > of > >> the discipline is threatened. Perhaps, in mathematics the difference is > >> that this is done internally rather than externally. If that is the > case, > >> here may be an example: > >> > >> 5 x 5 = 25 > >> 5 x 4 = 20 > >> 5 x 3 = 15 > >> 5 x 2 = 10 > >> 5 x 1 = 5 > >> 5 x 0 = 0 > >> 5 x -1 = -5 > >> > >> There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 > = > >> -5. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> > >> > >> On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >>> Some people will be familiar with this: > >>> > >>> 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab > >>> 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 > >>> 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b > >>> 5. then a+b=b > >>> 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b > >>> 7. then 2=1 > >>> > >>> This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are > >> taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. > >>> The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling > >> out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. > >>> The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there > just > >> for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because > >> otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire > >> system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to > objective > >> constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have > >> nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a > and b > >> represent lengths or baseball scores. > >>> > >>> Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is > >> subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of > >> relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world > >> outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to > >> adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, > >> irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going > >> through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) > >>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Ed Wall wrote: > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of > >> mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to > come > >> back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a > number > >> of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what > the > >> curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. > >>>> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about > >> what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective > >> versus the opposite? > >>>> > >>>> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, > >> reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead > >> boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social > convention > >> (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because > her > >> daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl > like') , > >> but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article > >> "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the > link > >> in a brief intro): > >>>> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html > >>>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> :) So many issues. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in > >> mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would > >> have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book > >> highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the > >> logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the > >> historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the > 1970s to > >> make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this > failure > >> was due to contingencies, I don't know. > >>>>> > >>>>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia > >> Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very > profound. > >> Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective > >> relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or > >> they fail. > >>>>> > >>>>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or > >> that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science > which > >> is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those > >> relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, > >> and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of > >> discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach > >> and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead > >> boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), > to > >> my mind. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Carol and Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction > >> being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with > >> Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of > Zeno > >> clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and > >> the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics > was > >> being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). > There > >> are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the > Chinese > >> tended to be fairly pragmatic). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes > >> below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his > first > >> and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the > monumental > >> work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I > >> wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' > realize > >> such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and > come > >> out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the > egg'). > >> I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity > and > >> social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the > interactions > >> among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is > >> referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a > reviewer > >> with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if > >> necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has > >> been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and > withdrawn). > >> Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their > logical > >> standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, > >> mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with > necessary > >> and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum > >> (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well > be a > >> different matter. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical > >> contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and > >> probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with > an > >> eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I > have > >> also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is > >> recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took > >> smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, > now > >> tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are > very, > >> very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics > >> curriculum may be a little outworn. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> It's up to you, Ed. > >>>>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. > >> I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my > undergraduate > >> life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your > observations > >> quite engaging. > >>>>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get > >> interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions > >> being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be > >> interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction > at > >> the time our xcma discussion broke off. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you > >> and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be > >> significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step > >> further in our discussion on the listserve. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Best > >>>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Just thinking ... > >>>>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity > >>>>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of > >>>>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real > >>>>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative > >>>>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in > >>>>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post > >>>>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating > >> phylogeny. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >>>>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* > >>>>>>>> >> > >>>>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 > >>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies > >>>>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would > >>>>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so > >>>>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem > >>>>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting > >>>>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an > >>>>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). > >>>>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' > >>>>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic > >>>>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that > >>>>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors > >>>>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what > >>>>>>>> happened very early in history. > >>>>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are > >>>>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how > >>>>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - > >>>>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort > >>>>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that > >>>>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' > >>>>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show > >>>>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, > >>>>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again > >>>>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about > >>>>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, > >>>>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within > >>>>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it > >>>>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise > >>>>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics > >>>>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no > >>>>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different > >>>>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that > >>>>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and > >>>>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections > >>>>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put > >>>>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems > >>>>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never > >>>>>>>> been resolved). > >>>>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has > >>>>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from > >>>>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' > >>>>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia > >>>>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of > >>>>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people > >>>>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were > >>>>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording > >>>>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving > >>>>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a > >>>>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a > >>>>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, > >>>>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than > >>>>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were > >>>>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also > >>>>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations > >>>>>>>> were used. > >>>>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, > >>>>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the > >>>>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra > >>>>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again > >>>>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize > >>>>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the > >>>>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus > >>>>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation > >>>>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate > >>>>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the > >>>>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') > >>>>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; > >>>>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always > >>>>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do > >>>>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a > >>>>>>>> symbolic notation. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all > >>>>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics > >>>>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to > >>>>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the > >>>>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the > >>>>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - > >>>>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the > >>>>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are > >>>>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally > >>>>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to > >>>>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the > >>>>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I > >>>>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ah Ed > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the > >>>>>>>> heart of the matter. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is > >>>>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the > >>>>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been > >>>>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for > >>>>>>>> granted. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other > >>>>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Best > >>>>>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 21:06:13 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:06:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <89D3E7A7-8790-4A13-BA94-7EFDC45B3225@umich.edu> Message-ID: <69B3CC0C-0B5F-4D89-92F7-BCDF04D47BC1@umich.edu> Mike I will take a look, thanks.. Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:50 PM, mike cole wrote: > We had a long discussion of the "minus times a plus" > ? issue a few years ago, Ed. Should make amusing reading for you! :-) > mike? > > > On Monday, November 3, 2014, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> Yes that is the meaning of invert v (or caret). Long ago, it also took >> me awhile to figure that out (smile). >> >> You want to say, 'a necessity within the integers such that'? I mean >> it *must* be that 5 x -1 = -5 so as maintain consistency within the >> integers. The integers are what is termed an extension of the counting >> numbers (and zero). If 5 x -1 did not equal -5, there is a sense in which >> arithmetic would fail to operate as before with the counting numbers as now >> embedded in the integers. That is, the integers are an extension of the >> counting numbers that maintain for the counting numbers their usual >> properties. This forces certain mathematical behavior on the non-counting >> number integers. Foe instance, negative times positive must be negative and >> negative times negative must be positive. Although it is often the case >> that teachers teach these later operations as 'social conventions', they >> aren't, they are consequences of the mathematics. >> >> Ed >> >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 7:49 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total >> duffer >>> here i am assuming >>> that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>> >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >>> questions unusually interesting. >>> >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity >>> within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>> mike**2 >>> :-) >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> I have often used this for various reasons (smile). >>>> >>>> There are some problems with this example and the way, perhaps, >>>> you are using it. The are certain conceptual tricks at play which >> cause, I >>>> think, some of the problems. Let me illustrate. >>>> >>>> 1. Let a= b + k where k is zero. >>>> 2. a^2 = ab + ak >>>> 3. a^2 - b^2 = ab + ak - b^2 >>>> 3. (a-b)(a+b) = (a-b)b + ak >>>> 4. (a+b) = b + ak/(a-b) >>>> 5. However, a-b = k, so a+b = b + a. >>>> >>>> The is a rule in school, and it is not exactly a 'mathematical' rule, >> that >>>> you can't divide by zero. However, is a convention, You can, indeed, >> divide >>>> by zero, but you need to think about it a little. In algebra, one might >>>> argue, the slope of a vertical line is roughly of this problematic form, >>>> but that is a problem of representation. As plots 1/x near the origin, >> one >>>> sees a discontinuity caused by this problematic, but that is expected. >> The >>>> interesting cases occur, however, in calculus where one considers, in a >>>> sense, 0/0. These can be somewhat undecidable without a little more >>>> information (as case, perhaps, of we can't know). However, in a sense, >> x/x >>>> at zero is just 1 and x^2/x at zero is just 0 (and, in fact, your >> example >>>> is somewhat of this uncertain nature). >>>> So the rule isn't necessarily 'objectively' introduced if I >> understand >>>> you correctly; nonetheless, one needs to be careful and preserve a sort >> of >>>> thoughtful consistency in mathematics (by the way, a certain >> inconsistency >>>> can often observed in the historical records in the development of >>>> mathematical topics). Anyway, I think you may be saying is that >>>> 'objectivity' is something that needs to be introduced when consistency >> of >>>> the discipline is threatened. Perhaps, in mathematics the difference is >>>> that this is done internally rather than externally. If that is the >> case, >>>> here may be an example: >>>> >>>> 5 x 5 = 25 >>>> 5 x 4 = 20 >>>> 5 x 3 = 15 >>>> 5 x 2 = 10 >>>> 5 x 1 = 5 >>>> 5 x 0 = 0 >>>> 5 x -1 = -5 >>>> >>>> There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 >> = >>>> -5. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Some people will be familiar with this: >>>>> >>>>> 1. If a = b 2. then a^2 = ab >>>>> 3. then a^2 - b^2 = ab -b^2 >>>>> 4. then (a-b)(a+b)=(a-b)b >>>>> 5. then a+b=b >>>>> 6. then, because a=b, 2b=b >>>>> 7. then 2=1 >>>>> >>>>> This proof appears to follow the "social conventions" that kids are >>>> taught in algebra, but arrives at an absurdity. >>>>> The reason is that the deduction from 4 to 5 is an error. "Cancelling >>>> out the (a-b)" doesn't work if (a-b)=0. >>>>> The limitation that the divisor be not zero, is obviously not there >> just >>>> for a social convention. It *objectively,* has to be introduced because >>>> otherwise, the common factor rule has the capacity to destroy the entire >>>> system. The rules governing the above operations must conform to >> objective >>>> constraints which belong entirely to the world of mathematics, and have >>>> nothing to do with the world beyond the text. It doesn't matter if a >> and b >>>> represent lengths or baseball scores. >>>>> >>>>> Despite what the advocates of discourse theory believe mathematics is >>>> subject to a whole range of constraints, and reveals a whole lot of >>>> relationships and symmetries, which have nothing to do with the world >>>> outside of mathematics, of "applications." Social conventions have to >>>> adhere to these objective constraints to make good mathematics, >>>> irrespective of whether they reflect material interactions. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> (PS I don't know the above equations are going to look after going >>>> through the mail server. Let's just hope for the best.) >>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I recall Piaget's claim (Piaget gathered a cadre of >>>> mathematicians around him in his later years). Mathematicians tend to >> come >>>> back and do 'foundations' after they have been playing around for a >> number >>>> of years. Beginning at an end point (which was, in large measure, what >> the >>>> curriculum of the 1980s did) may have been a large part of the problem. >>>>>> I've been thinking and realized that I may not be clear about >>>> what you mean by 'objective relations.' What makes a relation objective >>>> versus the opposite? >>>>>> >>>>>> The journey of discovery that mathematics offers is, I think, >>>> reasonably exciting. However, so many children (and adults) find it dead >>>> boring and intellectually repulsive. Some of that may be social >> convention >>>> (I remember a mother of one of my algebra students complaining because >> her >>>> daughter was 'too' involved in doing mathematics; it wasn't 'girl >> like') , >>>> but some of it may be teaching/curriculum. There is an amusing article >>>> "Lockhart 's Lament" which sort of touches on this (Devlin gives the >> link >>>> in a brief intro): >>>>>> https://www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_03_08.html >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> :) So many issues. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ed, do you recall Piaget's claim of ontogeny repeating history in >>>> mathematics. I read it in "Genetic Epistemology" but I am sure he would >>>> have formulated the idea elsewhere. I found the formulation in that book >>>> highly unconvincing at the time. Interesting in that respect is that the >>>> logical sequence of relations within mathematics is opposite to the >>>> historical sequence, and how (in my experience) the efforts in the >> 1970s to >>>> make ontogeny follow logic proved so unsuccessful. But maybe this >> failure >>>> was due to contingencies, I don't know. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And apart from Hilbert/Godel/Turing's demolition of Principia >>>> Mathematics, Russell's demolition of Frege logicism was also very >> profound. >>>> Both of course proved that mathematics is constrained by objective >>>> relations and social conventions have to conform to that objectivity or >>>> they fail. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The first thing, in my view, is to establish that, whatever this or >>>> that group of people believe to be the case, mathematics is a science >> which >>>> is constrained by objectively existing relations and reveals those >>>> relations, which are nothing to do with the laws of physics, space-time, >>>> and the infinite complexity of reality, etc. I think the journey of >>>> discovery which is available to children has the potential to both teach >>>> and endear mathematics for people. Learning social conventions is dead >>>> boring and politically repulsive (if separated from natural necessity), >> to >>>> my mind. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol and Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the historical record, the first time I see the distinction >>>> being clearly drawn between mathematics and the material world is with >>>> Aristotle. However, he did not write in a vacuum and the paradoxes of >> Zeno >>>> clearly indicated some problems (for instance, the story of Achilles and >>>> the Hare). You can also see in the stories of Socrates that mathematics >> was >>>> being done for the sake of the mathematics (for instance, the Meno). >> There >>>> are some indications of the same fascination early on in India (the >> Chinese >>>> tended to be fairly pragmatic). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was raised, in a sense, to observe the distinction Andy makes >>>> below concerning 'objective.'. Godel muddied the water a bit with his >> first >>>> and second incompleteness theorems, capsizing, so to speak, the >> monumental >>>> work - Principia Mathematica - of Russell and Wittgenstein. Anyway, I >>>> wonder (and I am searching for words here) if children 'naturally' >> realize >>>> such objective validity, but are rather immersed in talk of such and >> come >>>> out brain washed (a little of 'which comes first the chicken or the >> egg'). >>>> I find it hard, I guess, to draw a fine line between objective validity >> and >>>> social convention (and, as to this latter, I have in mind the >> interactions >>>> among 'mathematicians.') For example, when a mathematical paper is >>>> referred, the logic of argument is not 'completely' analyzed by a >> reviewer >>>> with standing in the mathematics community although it is presumed if >>>> necessary it could be (I, unfortunately, know of cases where a paper has >>>> been reviewed approvingly and then later found to be flawed and >> withdrawn). >>>> Further,arguments of proof have themselves been debated as to their >> logical >>>> standing over time (proof by contradiction is one such). Nonetheless, >>>> mathematicians do see, as Andy noted, a world of mathematics with >> necessary >>>> and sufficient relations. Children, in the K-12 mathematics curriculum >>>> (immersed in text created by mathematicians and like-minded) may well >> be a >>>> different matter. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol, I am fine if you post this conversation. My historical >>>> contributions were a little hurried and I glossed over exact dates and >>>> probably too quickly interjected details. I am certain that those with >> an >>>> eye for such things will notice mistakes and I apologize in advance. I >> have >>>> also have noticed the K-8 curriculum seeming as if ontogeny is >>>> recapitulating phylogeny. This raises large questions for me as it took >>>> smart men and women a long time to make the leaps which are, in effect, >> now >>>> tacitly presumed. One conclusion I have come to is that children are >> very, >>>> very intelligent (smile). Another is that the standard mathematics >>>> curriculum may be a little outworn. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It's up to you, Ed. >>>>>>>>> I was fascinated with your maths history that Carol shared with me. >>>> I learnt about the history of mathematics at some point in my >> undergraduate >>>> life, but it is all a long time ago now, and I too found your >> observations >>>> quite engaging. >>>>>>>>> I don't know at what historical point, mathematicians began to get >>>> interested in mathematical relations without regard to any conclusions >>>> being drawn from them about the material world itself. But I would be >>>> interested to know. And I presume you, Ed, understood this distinction >> at >>>> the time our xcma discussion broke off. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy and Ed again >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I really think this is a very important distinction. Between you >>>> and Ed, guys I urge you to copy these messages to XMCA. They seem to be >>>> significant contributions - principles - that we take us a good step >>>> further in our discussion on the listserve. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If you want me to do this for you, please let me know. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 30 October 2014 08:32, Andy Blunden > >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just thinking ... >>>>>>>>>> There is an important distinction between the objective validity >>>>>>>>>> of any application of mathematics, and the objective validity of >>>>>>>>>> mathematical processes themselves. Propositions about the real >>>>>>>>>> world established by mathematics are always, at best, relative >>>>>>>>>> truths. But the world of mathematics is no social convention in >>>>>>>>>> itself, but necessary relations. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Read this Andy - it's totally intriguing. I asked Ed to post >>>>>>>>>> it on the listserv. It seems it it ontogeny reciplating >>>> phylogeny. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>>>>>>> From: *Ed Wall* >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> Date: 29 October 2014 19:53 >>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Apologies >>>>>>>>>> To: Carol Macdonald >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As I started to answer, I realized that my reply would >>>>>>>>>> need to be a little more complicated than I had realized (so >>>>>>>>>> as I am writing I am thinking it through). Part of the problem >>>>>>>>>> is that I have been talking with Andy about converting >>>>>>>>>> 'real-life' into something symbolic on, in a sense, an >>>>>>>>>> 'advanced' level (for instance, physics or engineering). >>>>>>>>>> However, the very use of number is a converting of 'real-life' >>>>>>>>>> into symbols and that happened very early in a pictographic >>>>>>>>>> sense. This means, in a certain sense, the mathematics that >>>>>>>>>> happens now early on in schools and on the playground mirrors >>>>>>>>>> in an operational sense (as versus a social sense) what >>>>>>>>>> happened very early in history. >>>>>>>>>> Something happened around 400 - 300 BC (there are >>>>>>>>>> indications the it had been percolating for awhile) in how >>>>>>>>>> mathematics was viewed. Up until l that time mathematics - >>>>>>>>>> which was most usually for commerce and calendars - was sort >>>>>>>>>> of done by recipes. People noted that if you did this and that >>>>>>>>>> you would get accepted answers, but arguments about 'validity' >>>>>>>>>> usually were of the form, "If you get some other answer, show >>>>>>>>>> me and I might believe you." Answers hinged on, on might say, >>>>>>>>>> the personal authority of the 'scribe' or 'teacher' (again >>>>>>>>>> reminiscent of what goes on in schools today). Anyway, about >>>>>>>>>> 300 BC Euclid published his Elements. This was, one might say, >>>>>>>>>> a geometric algebra, but more importantly, arguments within >>>>>>>>>> this work had a certain absolute nature; that is, if you do it >>>>>>>>>> this way, it is right no matter what anyone says otherwise >>>>>>>>>> (i.e. the best way I can say it is that 'within' mathematics >>>>>>>>>> the social convention became that social conventions had no >>>>>>>>>> force as regards the arguments). This was very, very different >>>>>>>>>> than what had gone before and Aristotle was moved to say that >>>>>>>>>> essentially there was no connection between mathematics and >>>>>>>>>> 'real-life' and physicists who tried to make some connections >>>>>>>>>> were just wrong (there were also a series of paradoxes put >>>>>>>>>> forth by Zeno around 400 BC that indicated there were problems >>>>>>>>>> with making direct connections - they still have really never >>>>>>>>>> been resolved). >>>>>>>>>> Well, Greek thinking of mathematics (some of which has >>>>>>>>>> been called, n part, a rhetorical algebra) slowly faded from >>>>>>>>>> the scene, and people largely went back to 'experimental' >>>>>>>>>> arguments as regards things mathematics. However, in Arabia >>>>>>>>>> some of that thinking was preserved and the was a sort of >>>>>>>>>> rebirth. According to the historical records a group of people >>>>>>>>>> engaged in what was termed al' gebar became active. These were >>>>>>>>>> people who basically were generating and recording >>>>>>>>>> mathematical 'recipes' and who had developed ways of moving >>>>>>>>>> back and forth between recipes doing what is now called a >>>>>>>>>> syncopated algebra). In about 780 AD one such person wrote a >>>>>>>>>> book termed roughly Completion and Balancing. It is unclear, >>>>>>>>>> again what happened, and whatever it was it was different than >>>>>>>>>> the Greek geometric algebra, but again accepted arguments were >>>>>>>>>> socially assumed to not be vested in personal authority. Also >>>>>>>>>> there wasn't really a symbolic notation, but abbreviations >>>>>>>>>> were used. >>>>>>>>>> This seems never to have really caught on. In Europe, >>>>>>>>>> until around the 16th century mathematics had roughly the >>>>>>>>>> status of authoritative recipes although syncopated algebra >>>>>>>>>> was beginning to catch on (the Arabic influence). Again >>>>>>>>>> something happened and certain people began to symbolize >>>>>>>>>> 'real-life' somewhat as it is done in modern times. One of the >>>>>>>>>> principal thinkers was a Vi?te. Drawing on the Greek Pappus >>>>>>>>>> (290 AD), he distinguished three stages (1) Find a equation >>>>>>>>>> between the magnitude sought and those given; (2) Investigate >>>>>>>>>> as to whether the equation is plausible; and (3) produce the >>>>>>>>>> magnitude. This might look for a word problem as follows: (1') >>>>>>>>>> hypothesize a series of operations to generate the answer; >>>>>>>>>> (2') check to see if this is reasonable (students don't always >>>>>>>>>> do this, but physicists, engineers, and mathematics tend to do >>>>>>>>>> this); (3') calculate the answer. Vi?te also created a >>>>>>>>>> symbolic notation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It is argued by some that there are some problems in all >>>>>>>>>> this. That is, it may be the case that the modern mathematics >>>>>>>>>> that underlies the sciences limits, in a sense, access to >>>>>>>>>> 'real-life. I have been wondering - since the >>>>>>>>>> social/historical leaps taken although not obvious in the >>>>>>>>>> curriculum,are tacitly assumed in texts and by teachers - >>>>>>>>>> whether some of this (i.e. the leaps) may be limiting the >>>>>>>>>> access to mathematics instruction. It is as if we are >>>>>>>>>> exposing children to a mathematics which operationally >>>>>>>>>> resembles that practiced long ago, but expecting them to >>>>>>>>>> 'leap' to a view of mathematics that tacitly underlies the >>>>>>>>>> mathematics of today. I apologize for not being clearer, but I >>>>>>>>>> am yet working these ideas through. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 28, 2014, at 3:16 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ah Ed >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Now you do need to explain that to me - that's no doubt the >>>>>>>>>> heart of the matter. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 27 October 2014 20:26, Ed Wall >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If I understand what you mean by the conversion, it is >>>>>>>>>> quite interesting. There is a historical sense in which the >>>>>>>>>> possibility in the pre-modern times seems to have been >>>>>>>>>> realized twice. Now, it is, perhaps unfortunately, taken for >>>>>>>>>> granted. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:43 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ed, I see I repeated what you said - it was in the other >>>>>>>>>> conversation. The conversion is the heart of the matter. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Best >>>>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 21:50:39 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 07:50:39 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Martin Where are you working? Colombia? I am experiencing something of the same in regard to Afrikaans, which I use on a daily basis. I was working in Namibia earlier this year I was speaking from a position of ignorance about Inner Speech. If you have any other references to hand, I would like to have a list. I am preparing to write a paper on teaching L1 and L2 in the early primary grades, where the same teacher teaches both languages. Best Carol On 3 November 2014 19:00, Martin John Packer wrote: > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as far > > as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. > > > On the contrary, I'm finding a variety of treatments... for example: > > De Guerrero, M. C. M. (2006). Inner speech-L2: Thinking words in a second > language. Springer. > > McCafferty, S. G. (1998). Nonverbal Expression and L2 Private Speech. > Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 73-96. > > As I mentioned in my first message in this thread I find SC studies of L2 > inner speech an interesting topic, because it is exploring the way that L2 > can enter - and transform? - the higher psychological functions. As a > native English speaker living and working in a country in which Spanish is > the dominant language, I am very aware that my higher psychological > functions are not as adequate when I'm using Spanish as they are when I use > English, but also that the balance is changing. It's one thing (though > difficult!) to *speak* fluently in a second language, it's another to > *think* fluently in that language. So this seems to me where the SC > approach to L2 is exploring something new. > > Martin > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ewall@umich.edu Mon Nov 3 21:51:50 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:51:50 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. Thanks Ed On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. > So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >> >> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >> >> mike >> >> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >> mike**2 >> :-) >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 3 22:07:33 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 17:07:33 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> Message-ID: <54586D25.1020101@mira.net> On pre-concepts, see p. 16 of https://www.academia.edu/6262583/Vygotsky_on_the_Development_of_Concepts , Ed. The interesting thing with the unit, for me, is how the triangle rotates, so that the material things which were once the substance of the object, become the means of figuring out the symbols, which are no longer means, but object. The symbols are not governed by "natural laws", but by rules, like when a child is playing a rule-governed game, like chess, which has its own rules, different from the rules of war. How is learning elementary mathematics related to playing rule-governed games? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. > > Thanks > > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>> >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>> mike**2 >>> :-) >>> >>> >>> > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 22:42:05 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 22:42:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <54586D25.1020101@mira.net> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <54586D25.1020101@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, the symbols are not governed by *natural laws* but by *rules* I am returning to the themes of activity and meaning. In the beginning is material substance AS object material substance becomes the means of *figuring* [out] the symbols [as figures or as interpretations or meaning or?] *symbols* which ARE no longer means BUT OBJECT. Symbols AS object ARE no longer governed by *natural laws* but are now governed by rules [like] when a child is playing a rule-governed game. QUESTION? Where is *meaning* located? Is meaning inherent in ALL these trans [across?] actions or is meaning an aspect of this unit? larry On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 10:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > On pre-concepts, see p. 16 of https://www.academia.edu/ > 6262583/Vygotsky_on_the_Development_of_Concepts , Ed. > The interesting thing with the unit, for me, is how the triangle rotates, > so that the material things which were once the substance of the object, > become the means of figuring out the symbols, which are no longer means, > but object. The symbols are not governed by "natural laws", but by rules, > like when a child is playing a rule-governed game, like chess, which has > its own rules, different from the rules of war. > How is learning elementary mathematics related to playing rule-governed > games? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: > >> Andy >> >> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things >> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching >> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the >> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those >> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may >> come from thinking about them too much. >> Thanks >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that >>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in >>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in >>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," >>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a >>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole >>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure >>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference >>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of >>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >>> solve the task they are working on. >>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. >>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At >>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the >>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in >>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the >>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: >>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' >>> - the unit of capital. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total >>>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>> >>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >>>> questions unusually interesting. The word problem problem is really >>>> interesting too. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity >>>> within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>> mike**2 >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Nov 3 23:37:10 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:37:10 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] fixed/fluid Message-ID: I have been reflecting on *themes* [activity, meaning, structure, and mathematical systems] I also have kept in mind David's comments recommending turning to *structure of feeling* [chapter 9 of Raymond Williams book "Marxism and Literary"] The theme of the already formed [as sociocultural] which leaves the dynamic *forming and *formative* aspects of lived experience as moved to the *personal* realm. Williams wrote on page 7 "IF the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, we have indeed to find other terms for the undeniable experience of the present: not only the temporal present, the realization of this and this, but the SPECIFICITY of present being, the inalienable PHYSICAL, within which we may discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, but not always as fixed products, DEFINING products. And then IF the social IS the fixed and explicit - the KNOWN relationships, institutions, formations, positions, - ALL that is present and moving, ALL that ESCAPES FROM the fixed and the explicit and the KNOWN, IS GRASPED and DEFINED AS the personal: this, HERE, now, alive, active and SUBJECTIVE" In discussing the *themes* of activity and meaning I find this paragraph indicating the way Raymond Williams figures [out] the way *meaning* develops illuminating. I see this paragraph as informative and figurative. Larry From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Nov 4 00:14:58 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 08:14:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: fixed/fluid In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022430D8@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Larry, please excuse me stepping in with no knowledge of Williams's book beyond the paragraph you cite but I was struck by how his account of the social (fixed?) and the personal (fluid?) relates to my own developing interest in conceptual and contextual frames of meaning. Concepts are social, formed and RELATIVELY fixed (though mutable and shifting on a slower timescale) and contexts are embodied, here, now and RELATIVELY subjective (though also inescapably intersubjective or intrasubjective) but, as Vygotsky pointed out in his account of language development, the uniquely personal meanings which inhere in specific contexts are surrounded by and immersed in the 'final/ideal form' of conceptual meanings. The 'spontaneous concepts' which are discovered in the patterns of 'first hand' engagement with the environment of things and persons are framed and corralled by the already formed, social 'schooled' or 'scientific' concepts which are shared by members of a culture so the moving cannot really escape from the fixed, though it can certainly wriggle in its grasp. And that wriggling, the felt experience of an imperfect fit between the 'fluid' and the 'fixed' is what allows both to be acknowledged and each to be influenced by the other. Fixed forms change as people's ways of interacting change under their grasp and our fluid ways of acting and interacting are 'contained' and framed by our awareness of (relatively) fixed social patterns, expectations and 'rules'. My own particular interest in this is in the transition, in early childhood, from an umwelt of contextual meanings, where the 'fixed' structures of concept systems are 'out there' in the fabric of the environment and the minds of others, to a socialised mind which progressively internalises and appropriates these conceptual 'languages'. But the wriggling does not stop at some point when childhood 'gives way' to adulthood and the passions of the flesh are never quite contained by the 'dress' of social constraints! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 04 November 2014 07:37 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] fixed/fluid I have been reflecting on *themes* [activity, meaning, structure, and mathematical systems] I also have kept in mind David's comments recommending turning to *structure of feeling* [chapter 9 of Raymond Williams book "Marxism and Literary"] The theme of the already formed [as sociocultural] which leaves the dynamic *forming and *formative* aspects of lived experience as moved to the *personal* realm. Williams wrote on page 7 "IF the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, we have indeed to find other terms for the undeniable experience of the present: not only the temporal present, the realization of this and this, but the SPECIFICITY of present being, the inalienable PHYSICAL, within which we may discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, but not always as fixed products, DEFINING products. And then IF the social IS the fixed and explicit - the KNOWN relationships, institutions, formations, positions, - ALL that is present and moving, ALL that ESCAPES FROM the fixed and the explicit and the KNOWN, IS GRASPED and DEFINED AS the personal: this, HERE, now, alive, active and SUBJECTIVE" In discussing the *themes* of activity and meaning I find this paragraph indicating the way Raymond Williams figures [out] the way *meaning* develops illuminating. I see this paragraph as informative and figurative. Larry ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca Tue Nov 4 05:31:14 2014 From: samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Samuel_Paul_Louis_Veissi=E8re=2C_Dr?=) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:31:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] 2 questions on "the self" in culture, neuroscience and education Message-ID: Hi all, I have two questions about how modern euroamerican notions of the bounded, teleological 'selfish' Self may have uncritically found their ways into 1) neuroscience and 2) education. I am familiar with anthropological and philosophical literature on persons and selves, but not in neuroscience and education. 1) Does anyone know of a good critique of Default Mode Network imaging studies? DMN is usually associated (in the brain), with our sense of 'ego' or 'self'. Wondering if there is, e.g., data from non euro-american cultures, or from people who are enculturated/enskilled in different models of personhood? A good critique of eurocentric biases in the neural turn in general would be good too. 2) Any good critiques of current 'learner-centred' dogmas in education? Nothing wrong with decentring knowledge and meaning-making, of course, and I am not looking for conservative teacher-centred backlashes - rather, I am interested in the notion that learner-centred pedagogies may also be self-centred, or ego-centred in the sense that they cater to (and as such shape) not just bounded selves, but selfish, entitled selves, along with a battery of other social pathologies we can expect in anomic contexts. Philosophically, I also feel there may be a problem with the push toward 'self-realization'. Intentionality may be universally teleological in the sense that it is goal-directed and tends toward 'aboutness' more than 'thingness', but I am interested in pedagogical literature that is Being-centred, and not Becoming-oriented. The point here is that if selfhood is characterized as an asymptotic quest toward a never-quite-'there' end-goal, but not a state of being, it follows that one is never satisfied. This easily feeds into more consumeristic models of happiness, etc, etc. Thanks for taking the time to consider my questions! cheers, Samuel Samuel Veissi?re, PhD Visiting Professor | Transcultural Psychiatry, Cognitive Science, & Anthropology Department of Psychiatry | Department of Anthropology | McGill University 1033 Pine Avenue West - Room 103 |Montreal, Quebec | H3A 1Y1 Tel: (514) 506-7094 | Fax: (514) 375-2498 Email: samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca From ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org Tue Nov 4 06:12:31 2014 From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org (ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 08:12:31 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Davydov mathematics In-Reply-To: References: , <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> <008801cff5f4$8d61b590$a82520b0$@att.net> <003301cff63f$27973ff0$76c5bfd0$@att.net> <86D8D1D6-E3A2-4FA2-9F6D-0A55359E31D8@umich.edu> <002801cff6b3$8e5dbb00$ab193100$@att.net> <4FD6099D-A5CB-4A9B-911D-D4B2E192E724@umich.edu> <1216709733.58605697.1414966336813.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54571DEA.2080802@mira.net> <4B9E54C2-F101-459A-9AAB-EF957C736B96@umich.edu> <4CD1C6B6-D222-4040-96EB-BDD244B125D2@umich.edu> <2471450A-10F3-4DF5-BFA4-331ED0BBFDE3@umich.edu> <36D146DF-A802-4813-A1A1-D7B8A485019D@umich.edu> <6958E068-A6EA-43A9-A8A2-013D249C1C8F@umich.edu> Message-ID: From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Tue Nov 4 08:56:30 2014 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 08:56:30 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 2 questions on "the self" in culture, neuroscience and education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Samuel, On the 2nd question, two articles came to mind. One by Matusov on internalization vs. participation models of development, which also addresses some of the historical and cultural context of various approaches to learning. And one by Biesta which critiques what he calls the "learnification" of education as getting away from questions of purpose, values and relationships. Both are attached. I have been thinking about some of these issues in relation to current constructionist/constructivist responses to didactic, teacher centered models, which I think re-center the individual in both generative and problematic ways, and tend to understate the role of pedagogy/mediation. I'd be interested in discussing these issues and articles further. Shirin On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 5:31 AM, Samuel Paul Louis Veissi?re, Dr < samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca> wrote: > > Hi all, > > I have two questions about how modern euroamerican notions of the bounded, > teleological 'selfish' Self may have uncritically found their ways into 1) > neuroscience and 2) education. I am familiar with anthropological and > philosophical literature on persons and selves, but not in neuroscience and > education. > > 1) Does anyone know of a good critique of Default Mode Network imaging > studies? DMN is usually associated (in the brain), with our sense of 'ego' > or 'self'. Wondering if there is, e.g., data from non euro-american > cultures, or from people who are enculturated/enskilled in different models > of personhood? A good critique of eurocentric biases in the neural turn in > general would be good too. > > 2) Any good critiques of current 'learner-centred' dogmas in education? > Nothing wrong with decentring knowledge and meaning-making, of course, and > I am not looking for conservative teacher-centred backlashes - rather, I am > interested in the notion that learner-centred pedagogies may also be > self-centred, or ego-centred in the sense that they cater to (and as such > shape) not just bounded selves, but selfish, entitled selves, along with a > battery of other social pathologies we can expect in anomic contexts. > Philosophically, I also feel there may be a problem with the push toward > 'self-realization'. Intentionality may be universally teleological in the > sense that it is goal-directed and tends toward 'aboutness' more than > 'thingness', but I am interested in pedagogical literature that is > Being-centred, and not Becoming-oriented. The point here is that if > selfhood is characterized as an asymptotic quest toward a > never-quite-'there' end-goal, but not a state of being, it follows that one > is never satisfied. This easily feeds into more consumeristic models of > happiness, etc, etc. > > Thanks for taking the time to consider my questions! > > cheers, > > Samuel > > > Samuel Veissi?re, PhD > Visiting Professor | Transcultural Psychiatry, Cognitive Science, & > Anthropology > Department of Psychiatry | Department of Anthropology | McGill University > 1033 Pine Avenue West - Room 103 |Montreal, Quebec | H3A 1Y1 > Tel: (514) 506-7094 | Fax: (514) 375-2498 > Email: samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Matusov_HD1998.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 476597 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141104/6bfeeb9f/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: BIESTA-GOOD-EDUCATION-met-highlights-11(1).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 243174 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141104/6bfeeb9f/attachment-0003.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Nov 4 10:59:00 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 10:59:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: fixed/fluid In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022430D8@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022430D8@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Rod, I am not sure if my reply reached you. Raymond is talking about this particular separation [as such] IF one locates the socialcultural in the already formed and known THEN implicity was is beyond the already formed must be located somewhere else and Raymond says at THIS particular epoch we happen to divide the world THIS way and [as such] the living,here, now spontaneous BECOMES SUBJECTIVE. HE EXPLICITLY SAYS THIS IS A PARTICULAR WAY of defining [LABELLING] the aspects of a unit of analysis. however, IF WE CHANGE OUR DEFINITIONS then what is known and already formed changes and implicitly what is spontaneous, living here now specific and SUBJECTIVE also changes. I am fascinated by how we have historically proposed to *cut* from the continuum of nature and the recognition that the objective and subjective are neither all fixed or all fluid but the relations can shift over time. Is this shift a shift in meaning? Larry On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 12:14 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Larry, please excuse me stepping in with no knowledge of Williams's book > beyond the paragraph you cite but I was struck by how his account of the > social (fixed?) and the personal (fluid?) relates to my own developing > interest in conceptual and contextual frames of meaning. Concepts are > social, formed and RELATIVELY fixed (though mutable and shifting on a > slower timescale) and contexts are embodied, here, now and RELATIVELY > subjective (though also inescapably intersubjective or intrasubjective) > but, as Vygotsky pointed out in his account of language development, the > uniquely personal meanings which inhere in specific contexts are surrounded > by and immersed in the 'final/ideal form' of conceptual meanings. The > 'spontaneous concepts' which are discovered in the patterns of 'first hand' > engagement with the environment of things and persons are framed and > corralled by the already formed, social 'schooled' or 'scientific' concepts > which are shared by members of a culture so the moving cannot really escape > from the fixed, though it can certainly wriggle in its grasp. And that > wriggling, the felt experience of an imperfect fit between the 'fluid' and > the 'fixed' is what allows both to be acknowledged and each to be > influenced by the other. Fixed forms change as people's ways of interacting > change under their grasp and our fluid ways of acting and interacting are > 'contained' and framed by our awareness of (relatively) fixed social > patterns, expectations and 'rules'. > > My own particular interest in this is in the transition, in early > childhood, from an umwelt of contextual meanings, where the 'fixed' > structures of concept systems are 'out there' in the fabric of the > environment and the minds of others, to a socialised mind which > progressively internalises and appropriates these conceptual 'languages'. > But the wriggling does not stop at some point when childhood 'gives way' to > adulthood and the passions of the flesh are never quite contained by the > 'dress' of social constraints! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: 04 November 2014 07:37 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] fixed/fluid > > I have been reflecting on *themes* [activity, meaning, structure, and > mathematical systems] I also have kept in mind David's comments > recommending turning to *structure of feeling* [chapter 9 of Raymond > Williams book "Marxism and Literary"] The theme of the already formed [as > sociocultural] which leaves the dynamic *forming and *formative* aspects of > lived experience as moved to the > *personal* realm. > > Williams wrote on page 7 > > "IF the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, we > have indeed to find other terms for the undeniable experience of the > present: not only the temporal present, the realization of this and this, > but the SPECIFICITY of present being, the inalienable PHYSICAL, within > which we may discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, > but not always as fixed products, DEFINING products. And then IF the social > IS the fixed and explicit - the KNOWN relationships, institutions, > formations, positions, - ALL that is present and moving, ALL that ESCAPES > FROM the fixed and the explicit and the KNOWN, IS GRASPED and DEFINED AS > the personal: this, HERE, now, alive, active and SUBJECTIVE" > > In discussing the *themes* of activity and meaning I find this paragraph > indicating the way Raymond Williams figures [out] the way *meaning* > develops illuminating. > I see this paragraph as informative and figurative. > > Larry > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Nov 4 11:20:59 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 19:20:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: fixed/fluid In-Reply-To: References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022430D8@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102243795@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Thanks Larry, I suspect that it is more a shift in what meaning means to us (which IS a shift in meaning). Is it not part of the 'fall' - the price we pay for knowing - that once we shift our focus from meaning-in-contexts (particularly a very specific awareness of what things mean TO particular people) to meaning-in-concepts (or, rather, in systems of interrelated concepts), meaning moves from being a process to being a property. But I think the shiftiness of meaning is also spectacularly beneficial - the more tightly some people try to fix meaning the more it squelches out of their grip as others find other ways to mean what they need to mean. I caught a snippet on the radio the other day about how a German translation of Dylan Thomas's 'Under Milk Wood' was enormously popular in East Germany during the cold war, because its play with language reminded people that language could be played with. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 04 November 2014 18:59 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: fixed/fluid Rod, I am not sure if my reply reached you. Raymond is talking about this particular separation [as such] IF one locates the socialcultural in the already formed and known THEN implicity was is beyond the already formed must be located somewhere else and Raymond says at THIS particular epoch we happen to divide the world THIS way and [as such] the living,here, now spontaneous BECOMES SUBJECTIVE. HE EXPLICITLY SAYS THIS IS A PARTICULAR WAY of defining [LABELLING] the aspects of a unit of analysis. however, IF WE CHANGE OUR DEFINITIONS then what is known and already formed changes and implicitly what is spontaneous, living here now specific and SUBJECTIVE also changes. I am fascinated by how we have historically proposed to *cut* from the continuum of nature and the recognition that the objective and subjective are neither all fixed or all fluid but the relations can shift over time. Is this shift a shift in meaning? Larry On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 12:14 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Larry, please excuse me stepping in with no knowledge of Williams's > book beyond the paragraph you cite but I was struck by how his account > of the social (fixed?) and the personal (fluid?) relates to my own > developing interest in conceptual and contextual frames of meaning. > Concepts are social, formed and RELATIVELY fixed (though mutable and > shifting on a slower timescale) and contexts are embodied, here, now > and RELATIVELY subjective (though also inescapably intersubjective or > intrasubjective) but, as Vygotsky pointed out in his account of > language development, the uniquely personal meanings which inhere in > specific contexts are surrounded by and immersed in the 'final/ideal > form' of conceptual meanings. The 'spontaneous concepts' which are discovered in the patterns of 'first hand' > engagement with the environment of things and persons are framed and > corralled by the already formed, social 'schooled' or 'scientific' > concepts which are shared by members of a culture so the moving cannot > really escape from the fixed, though it can certainly wriggle in its > grasp. And that wriggling, the felt experience of an imperfect fit > between the 'fluid' and the 'fixed' is what allows both to be > acknowledged and each to be influenced by the other. Fixed forms > change as people's ways of interacting change under their grasp and > our fluid ways of acting and interacting are 'contained' and framed by > our awareness of (relatively) fixed social patterns, expectations and 'rules'. > > My own particular interest in this is in the transition, in early > childhood, from an umwelt of contextual meanings, where the 'fixed' > structures of concept systems are 'out there' in the fabric of the > environment and the minds of others, to a socialised mind which > progressively internalises and appropriates these conceptual 'languages'. > But the wriggling does not stop at some point when childhood 'gives > way' to adulthood and the passions of the flesh are never quite > contained by the 'dress' of social constraints! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: 04 November 2014 07:37 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] fixed/fluid > > I have been reflecting on *themes* [activity, meaning, structure, and > mathematical systems] I also have kept in mind David's comments > recommending turning to *structure of feeling* [chapter 9 of Raymond > Williams book "Marxism and Literary"] The theme of the already formed > [as sociocultural] which leaves the dynamic *forming and *formative* > aspects of lived experience as moved to the > *personal* realm. > > Williams wrote on page 7 > > "IF the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, > we have indeed to find other terms for the undeniable experience of > the > present: not only the temporal present, the realization of this and > this, but the SPECIFICITY of present being, the inalienable PHYSICAL, > within which we may discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, > positions, but not always as fixed products, DEFINING products. And > then IF the social IS the fixed and explicit - the KNOWN > relationships, institutions, formations, positions, - ALL that is > present and moving, ALL that ESCAPES FROM the fixed and the explicit > and the KNOWN, IS GRASPED and DEFINED AS the personal: this, HERE, now, alive, active and SUBJECTIVE" > > In discussing the *themes* of activity and meaning I find this > paragraph indicating the way Raymond Williams figures [out] the way > *meaning* develops illuminating. > I see this paragraph as informative and figurative. > > Larry > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this > email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services > unless accompanied by an official order form. > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Nov 4 13:29:46 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:29:46 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [liberationtech] Professorships in Critical Technical Practice In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Chris Csikszentmihalyi Date: Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 12:13 PM Subject: [liberationtech] Professorships in Critical Technical Practice To: CHASE Visa Dear Friends and Colleagues, We are hiring three faculty for the new European Research Area Chair in humanist and activist HCI & technology design. We have two assistant and one associate position; these are research professorships with little teaching required, and are funded through the European Commission. We are casting a wide net to achieve a multidisciplinary mix, including from humanities, art and design, social and natural sciences, or engineering, but all candidates should be experimentalists with a demonstrated record of critical technical practice. Details of the positions may be found here: http://erachair.m-iti.org/hires/ M-ITI is a young but rising technology institute, located within the University of Madeira, with a focus on HCI, design, and computer science, and with several PhD tracks and a masters track. It is located on Madeira, a paradisaical island in the Atlantic with short direct flights to London, Berlin, Lisbon, and other European cities. Its faculty are international and business and teaching are conducted in English. Please circulate this call and forward as appropriate. Thank you, and apologies for any cross-postings. Chris. -- Christopher Csikszentmih?lyi European Research Area Chair & Scientific Head Madeira Interactive Technology Institute Director, Rootio Project robotic@gmail.com edgyproduct.tumblr.com -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys@stanford.edu. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Nov 4 14:16:24 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 15:16:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena Message-ID: There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the issue of "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" but alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel to these local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has a fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language ideology that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western language ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems about language instruction that have been discussed on XMCA recently. Here is the link for that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join academia.edu and follow Jan first): https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_with_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa ? In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to these issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear Phenomenon - The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join academia.edu first and follow Jan): https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the_birth_of_cool ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to distract from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in so many different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). Cheers, greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Nov 4 14:33:26 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 17:33:26 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Phenomenological Structuralism Message-ID: <9vp133mjpo5e5ermq0bbfdjb.1415140406701@email.android.com> I am developing a theory of social action, phenomenological structuralism, grounded in structuration theory. ?To do so, I am attempting to synthesize elements of haitian vodou, quantum mechanics, heidegger's analytic of dasein, althusser's structural marxism, and Wittgenstein ' s concept of language game...this article is my initial attempt to apply my theory to understanding the constitution of black consciousnesses in the US and UK. ?I would really like some feedback on this from a psychocultural perspective: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/jrcadkNqTktsEF2EztBp/full Regards, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info? From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Nov 4 17:26:02 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 17:26:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: fixed/fluid In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022430D8@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022430D8@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <54597cce.eb42420a.044e.4baa@mx.google.com> On my phone so short response. Raymond is not endorsing this frame. His word *if* we move the sociocultural to the fixed (as such) then it becomes immplicit that All that is left out of the fixed THEN becomes fluid (such as) the live the here the spontaneous the now the subjective. With that caution that we are in the realm of the (as such) as the (defined as such) THEN this structure of fixed/fluidity emerges. Define differently then different relations of concept/context emerge. I would suggest that both sides of THIS WAY of defining (as such) leafs to the particular way we *measure* and *cut* the fixed/fluidity unit of analysis Rod, your contribution is saying what I want to say . The relation of concepts AND contexts opens up this chat -----Original Message----- From: "Rod Parker-Rees" Sent: ?2014-?11-?04 12:17 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: fixed/fluid Larry, please excuse me stepping in with no knowledge of Williams's book beyond the paragraph you cite but I was struck by how his account of the social (fixed?) and the personal (fluid?) relates to my own developing interest in conceptual and contextual frames of meaning. Concepts are social, formed and RELATIVELY fixed (though mutable and shifting on a slower timescale) and contexts are embodied, here, now and RELATIVELY subjective (though also inescapably intersubjective or intrasubjective) but, as Vygotsky pointed out in his account of language development, the uniquely personal meanings which inhere in specific contexts are surrounded by and immersed in the 'final/ideal form' of conceptual meanings. The 'spontaneous concepts' which are discovered in the patterns of 'first hand' engagement with the environment of things and persons are framed and corralled by the already formed, social 'schooled' or 'scientific' concepts which are shared by members of a culture so the moving cannot really escape from the fixed, though it can certainly wriggle in its grasp. And that wriggling, the felt experience of an imperfect fit between the 'fluid' and the 'fixed' is what allows both to be acknowledged and each to be influenced by the other. Fixed forms change as people's ways of interacting change under their grasp and our fluid ways of acting and interacting are 'contained' and framed by our awareness of (relatively) fixed social patterns, expectations and 'rules'. My own particular interest in this is in the transition, in early childhood, from an umwelt of contextual meanings, where the 'fixed' structures of concept systems are 'out there' in the fabric of the environment and the minds of others, to a socialised mind which progressively internalises and appropriates these conceptual 'languages'. But the wriggling does not stop at some point when childhood 'gives way' to adulthood and the passions of the flesh are never quite contained by the 'dress' of social constraints! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 04 November 2014 07:37 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] fixed/fluid I have been reflecting on *themes* [activity, meaning, structure, and mathematical systems] I also have kept in mind David's comments recommending turning to *structure of feeling* [chapter 9 of Raymond Williams book "Marxism and Literary"] The theme of the already formed [as sociocultural] which leaves the dynamic *forming and *formative* aspects of lived experience as moved to the *personal* realm. Williams wrote on page 7 "IF the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, we have indeed to find other terms for the undeniable experience of the present: not only the temporal present, the realization of this and this, but the SPECIFICITY of present being, the inalienable PHYSICAL, within which we may discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, but not always as fixed products, DEFINING products. And then IF the social IS the fixed and explicit - the KNOWN relationships, institutions, formations, positions, - ALL that is present and moving, ALL that ESCAPES FROM the fixed and the explicit and the KNOWN, IS GRASPED and DEFINED AS the personal: this, HERE, now, alive, active and SUBJECTIVE" In discussing the *themes* of activity and meaning I find this paragraph indicating the way Raymond Williams figures [out] the way *meaning* develops illuminating. I see this paragraph as informative and figurative. Larry ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Nov 4 22:01:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 22:01:45 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Cool. That is, when the temperature during my morning walk drops below 52 degrees? Cutural mediation is a non-linear phenomenon and so far as meaning is a form of cultural mediation...... maybe? mike On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the issue of > "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. > > I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" but > alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel to these > local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. > > One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has a > fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language ideology > that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western language > ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems about language > instruction that have been discussed on XMCA recently. Here is the link for > that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join academia.edu > and follow Jan first): > > https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_with_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa > ? > > In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to these > issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear Phenomenon - > The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join > academia.edu first and follow Jan): > > https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the_birth_of_cool > > ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to distract > from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in so many > different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). > > Cheers, > greg > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Nov 4 22:01:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 22:01:45 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Cool. That is, when the temperature during my morning walk drops below 52 degrees? Cutural mediation is a non-linear phenomenon and so far as meaning is a form of cultural mediation...... maybe? mike On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the issue of > "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. > > I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" but > alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel to these > local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. > > One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has a > fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language ideology > that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western language > ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems about language > instruction that have been discussed on XMCA recently. Here is the link for > that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join academia.edu > and follow Jan first): > > https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_with_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa > ? > > In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to these > issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear Phenomenon - > The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join > academia.edu first and follow Jan): > > https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the_birth_of_cool > > ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to distract > from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in so many > different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). > > Cheers, > greg > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 07:21:24 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 08:21:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Cool Mike, That was real cool... cool, -greg On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 11:01 PM, mike cole wrote: > Cool. That is, when the temperature during my morning walk drops below 52 > degrees? > Cutural mediation is a non-linear phenomenon and so far as meaning is a > form of cultural mediation...... > maybe? > > mike > > On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the issue of > > "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. > > > > I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" but > > alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel to these > > local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. > > > > One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has a > > fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language ideology > > that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western language > > ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems about language > > instruction that have been discussed on XMCA recently. Here is the link > for > > that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join > academia.edu > > and follow Jan first): > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_with_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa > > ? > > > > In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to these > > issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear Phenomenon - > > The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join > > academia.edu first and follow Jan): > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the_birth_of_cool > > > > ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to > distract > > from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in so > many > > different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). > > > > Cheers, > > greg > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 07:21:24 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 08:21:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Cool Mike, That was real cool... cool, -greg On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 11:01 PM, mike cole wrote: > Cool. That is, when the temperature during my morning walk drops below 52 > degrees? > Cutural mediation is a non-linear phenomenon and so far as meaning is a > form of cultural mediation...... > maybe? > > mike > > On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the issue of > > "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. > > > > I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" but > > alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel to these > > local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. > > > > One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has a > > fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language ideology > > that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western language > > ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems about language > > instruction that have been discussed on XMCA recently. Here is the link > for > > that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join > academia.edu > > and follow Jan first): > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_with_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa > > ? > > > > In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to these > > issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear Phenomenon - > > The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join > > academia.edu first and follow Jan): > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the_birth_of_cool > > > > ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to > distract > > from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in so > many > > different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). > > > > Cheers, > > greg > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Wed Nov 5 08:56:43 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 16:56:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] too cool Message-ID: <1415206602367.71377@ucdenver.edu> not to mention fluidity and fixed - http://africasacountry.com/5-questions-for-a-filmmaker-philippa-ndisi-herrmann/ [http://i0.wp.com/africasacountry.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/NaSi2G_s1.jpeg?resize=573%2C566] 5 Questions for a filmmaker... Philippa Ndisi-Herrmann ? AFRICA IS A COUNTRY Read more... phillip From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 17:11:05 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 18:11:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Ed and Andy, Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. Henry > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > Andy > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. > > Thanks > > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>> >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>> mike**2 >>> :-) >>> >>> >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Nov 5 17:21:31 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:21:31 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, is to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new way. mike On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Ed and Andy, > Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for > Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > decided that the most important property of human language that clearly > sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate > is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to > things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or > things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same > problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two > objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I > am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 > and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching > and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research > methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a > comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two > methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a > qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects > mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > Henry > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > Andy > > > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been > doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things > seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching > mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the > things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be > wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the > space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those > 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. > > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that > may come from thinking about them too much. > > > > Thanks > > > > Ed > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that > teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in > a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in > forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," > he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a > method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole > system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure > Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference > between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of > Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to > solve the task they are working on. > >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. > The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At > first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the > symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in > the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the > symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: > the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' > - the unit of capital. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total > duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > >>> > >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > questions unusually interesting. > >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? > >>> mike**2 > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ewall@umich.edu Wed Nov 5 18:26:53 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 20:26:53 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry and Mike That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should be so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. Ed On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > > The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, is > to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new way. > > mike > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Ed and Andy, >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for >> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >> decided that the most important property of human language that clearly >> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate >> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to >> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or >> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same >> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two >> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I >> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 >> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching >> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research >> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a >> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two >> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a >> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have >> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects >> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things >> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching >> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the >> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those >> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that >> may come from thinking about them too much. >>> >>> Thanks >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in >> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in >> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a >> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole >> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure >> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference >> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of >> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >> solve the task they are working on. >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At >> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the >> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in >> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the >> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' >> - the unit of capital. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>> >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >> questions unusually interesting. >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>> mike**2 >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Nov 5 19:15:02 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 19:15:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: Exactly, Ed. "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about number lines and "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, sitting on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that moment, explained why on xmca. All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from time to time..... :-) mike On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Henry and Mike > > That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the > wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should be > so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; > however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. > > Ed > > On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > > > > The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, > is > > to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > > filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new way. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Ed and Andy, > >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > >> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action > for > >> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > >> decided that the most important property of human language that clearly > >> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to > communicate > >> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to > >> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or > >> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same > >> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare > two > >> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. > And I > >> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been > following: L2 > >> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > teaching > >> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative > research > >> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a > >> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two > >> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B > (a > >> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > >> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects > >> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been > >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > things > >> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether > teaching > >> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the > >> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be > >> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > >> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > >> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the > >> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those > >> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying > here. > >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that > >> may come from thinking about them too much. > >>> > >>> Thanks > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > that > >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation > in > >> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in > >> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For > Davydov," > >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ > - a > >> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a > whole > >> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure > >> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > >> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference > >> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments > of > >> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to > >> solve the task they are working on. > >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. > >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At > >> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, > the > >> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in > >> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that > the > >> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: > >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises > M-C-M' > >> - the unit of capital. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total > >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > >>>>> > >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > >> questions unusually interesting. > >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>>>> > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH > not is? > >>>>> mike**2 > >>>>> :-) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 19:41:00 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 03:41:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: The way I like to think about it is how experienced problems structure memory. That is, how the awareness of the problem in getting the right length strip can move to the beginning of subsequent attempts. I think of it as a process of exchange. How memories are moved upstream through the right kinds of action. Those kind of effects are what I'd call "concrete generalisation", rather than, say, "notational generalisation" which would be based upon patterns perceived in the notation. I'm guessing that its this latter sort of thing that is often filling up that seemingly necessary gap. Huw On 6 November 2014 03:15, mike cole wrote: > Exactly, Ed. > > "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about > number lines and > "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, sitting > on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, > "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the > nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that > moment, explained why on xmca. > > All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from time > to time..... :-) > mike > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Henry and Mike > > > > That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the > > wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should > be > > so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; > > however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. > > > > Ed > > > > On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > > > > > > The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, > > is > > > to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > > > filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new > way. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > > > > >> Ed and Andy, > > >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > > >> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated > action > > for > > >> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > > >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > > >> decided that the most important property of human language that > clearly > > >> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to > > communicate > > >> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer > to > > >> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings > or > > >> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same > > >> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare > > two > > >> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. > > And I > > >> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been > > following: L2 > > >> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > > >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > > teaching > > >> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative > > research > > >> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended > with a > > >> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two > > >> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B > > (a > > >> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > > >> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, > objects > > >> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> > > >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've > been > > >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > > things > > >> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether > > teaching > > >> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just > the > > >> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be > > >> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > > >> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > > >> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the > > >> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in > those > > >> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying > > here. > > >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but > that > > >> may come from thinking about them too much. > > >>> > > >>> Thanks > > >>> > > >>> Ed > > >>> > > >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > > that > > >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating > concept-formation > > in > > >> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing > in > > >> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For > > Davydov," > > >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ > > - a > > >> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a > > whole > > >> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally > pure > > >> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > > >> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of > difference > > >> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments > > of > > >> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to > > >> solve the task they are working on. > > >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated > action*. > > >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. > At > > >> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, > > the > > >> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains > in > > >> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, > that > > the > > >> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. > Capital: > > >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises > > M-C-M' > > >> - the unit of capital. > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> mike cole wrote: > > >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a > total > > >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > > >> questions unusually interesting. > > >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > > >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH > > not is? > > >>>>> mike**2 > > >>>>> :-) > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 20:17:01 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 21:17:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: Ugh! > On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > Henry and Mike > > That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should be so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. > > Ed > > On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. >> >> The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, is >> to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and >> filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new way. >> >> mike >> >> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Ed and Andy, >>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >>> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for >>> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >>> decided that the most important property of human language that clearly >>> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate >>> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to >>> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or >>> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same >>> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two >>> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I >>> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 >>> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >>> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching >>> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research >>> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a >>> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two >>> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a >>> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have >>> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects >>> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been >>> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things >>> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching >>> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the >>> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >>> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >>> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >>> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >>> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those >>> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that >>> may come from thinking about them too much. >>>> >>>> Thanks >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that >>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in >>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in >>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," >>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a >>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole >>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure >>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference >>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of >>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >>> solve the task they are working on. >>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. >>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At >>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the >>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in >>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the >>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: >>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' >>> - the unit of capital. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total >>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>>> >>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >>> questions unusually interesting. >>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >>> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>>> mike**2 >>>>>> :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 20:16:32 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 21:16:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: <121DAF81-A54B-488E-B08E-E1267B70AAE9@gmail.com> Mike, I can go with that connection. Imagination. Now we don?t know if other species do that kind of thing, but others of our species DO. You wrote a paper on the connection between imagination and creativity, right? How did that go? Henry > On Nov 5, 2014, at 6:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > > The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, is > to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new way. > > mike > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Ed and Andy, >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for >> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >> decided that the most important property of human language that clearly >> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate >> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to >> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or >> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same >> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two >> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I >> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 >> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching >> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research >> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a >> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two >> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a >> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have >> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects >> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things >> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching >> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the >> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those >> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that >> may come from thinking about them too much. >>> >>> Thanks >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in >> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in >> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a >> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole >> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure >> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference >> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of >> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >> solve the task they are working on. >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At >> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the >> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in >> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the >> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' >> - the unit of capital. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>> >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >> questions unusually interesting. >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>> mike**2 >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 20:50:34 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 21:50:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: <474A47B2-1867-493D-A9DF-0B35245B2D58@gmail.com> Huw, You?re making me think about the connection between imagination and memory. Is it in the intentionality of these two ?acts?? I think sometimes memories come unbidden, sometimes unwanted. But you?re talking about using the imagination with memory? Henry > On Nov 5, 2014, at 8:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > The way I like to think about it is how experienced problems structure > memory. That is, how the awareness of the problem in getting the right > length strip can move to the beginning of subsequent attempts. I think of > it as a process of exchange. How memories are moved upstream through the > right kinds of action. > > Those kind of effects are what I'd call "concrete generalisation", rather > than, say, "notational generalisation" which would be based upon patterns > perceived in the notation. I'm guessing that its this latter sort of thing > that is often filling up that seemingly necessary gap. > > Huw > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 03:15, mike cole wrote: > >> Exactly, Ed. >> >> "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about >> number lines and >> "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, sitting >> on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, >> "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the >> nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that >> moment, explained why on xmca. >> >> All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from time >> to time..... :-) >> mike >> >> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Henry and Mike >>> >>> That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the >>> wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should >> be >>> so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; >>> however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. >>>> >>>> The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, >>> is >>>> to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and >>>> filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new >> way. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ed and Andy, >>>>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >>>>> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated >> action >>> for >>>>> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >>>>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >>>>> decided that the most important property of human language that >> clearly >>>>> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to >>> communicate >>>>> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer >> to >>>>> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings >> or >>>>> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same >>>>> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare >>> two >>>>> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. >>> And I >>>>> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been >>> following: L2 >>>>> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >>>>> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 >>> teaching >>>>> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative >>> research >>>>> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended >> with a >>>>> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two >>>>> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B >>> (a >>>>> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have >>>>> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, >> objects >>>>> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've >> been >>>>> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that >>> things >>>>> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether >>> teaching >>>>> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just >> the >>>>> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >>>>> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >>>>> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >>>>> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >>>>> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in >> those >>>>> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying >>> here. >>>>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but >> that >>>>> may come from thinking about them too much. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me >>> that >>>>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating >> concept-formation >>> in >>>>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing >> in >>>>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For >>> Davydov," >>>>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ >>> - a >>>>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a >>> whole >>>>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally >> pure >>>>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >>>>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of >> difference >>>>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments >>> of >>>>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >>>>> solve the task they are working on. >>>>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated >> action*. >>>>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. >> At >>>>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, >>> the >>>>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains >> in >>>>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, >> that >>> the >>>>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. >> Capital: >>>>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises >>> M-C-M' >>>>> - the unit of capital. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a >> total >>>>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >>>>> questions unusually interesting. >>>>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >>>>> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH >>> not is? >>>>>>>> mike**2 >>>>>>>> :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 21:02:27 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 22:02:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: <6DBF989E-2C18-4BD5-A43A-EAAE3E3F7F72@gmail.com> Mike and Huw, Something else just occurred to me. This gap. I asked Vera about creativity and simulation. She said the difference was in the creative ?leap?, something not present when the mind (the subject?) ?simulates? a real world event. Does the gap involve a leap? Does this have anything to do with Pierce?s abduction? Henry > On Nov 5, 2014, at 8:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > The way I like to think about it is how experienced problems structure > memory. That is, how the awareness of the problem in getting the right > length strip can move to the beginning of subsequent attempts. I think of > it as a process of exchange. How memories are moved upstream through the > right kinds of action. > > Those kind of effects are what I'd call "concrete generalisation", rather > than, say, "notational generalisation" which would be based upon patterns > perceived in the notation. I'm guessing that its this latter sort of thing > that is often filling up that seemingly necessary gap. > > Huw > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 03:15, mike cole wrote: > >> Exactly, Ed. >> >> "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about >> number lines and >> "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, sitting >> on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, >> "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the >> nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that >> moment, explained why on xmca. >> >> All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from time >> to time..... :-) >> mike >> >> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Henry and Mike >>> >>> That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the >>> wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should >> be >>> so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; >>> however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. >>>> >>>> The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, >>> is >>>> to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and >>>> filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new >> way. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ed and Andy, >>>>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >>>>> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated >> action >>> for >>>>> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >>>>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >>>>> decided that the most important property of human language that >> clearly >>>>> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to >>> communicate >>>>> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer >> to >>>>> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings >> or >>>>> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same >>>>> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare >>> two >>>>> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. >>> And I >>>>> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been >>> following: L2 >>>>> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >>>>> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 >>> teaching >>>>> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative >>> research >>>>> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended >> with a >>>>> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two >>>>> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B >>> (a >>>>> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have >>>>> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, >> objects >>>>> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've >> been >>>>> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that >>> things >>>>> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether >>> teaching >>>>> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just >> the >>>>> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >>>>> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >>>>> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >>>>> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >>>>> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in >> those >>>>> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying >>> here. >>>>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but >> that >>>>> may come from thinking about them too much. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me >>> that >>>>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating >> concept-formation >>> in >>>>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing >> in >>>>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For >>> Davydov," >>>>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ >>> - a >>>>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a >>> whole >>>>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally >> pure >>>>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >>>>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of >> difference >>>>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments >>> of >>>>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >>>>> solve the task they are working on. >>>>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated >> action*. >>>>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. >> At >>>>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, >>> the >>>>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains >> in >>>>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, >> that >>> the >>>>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. >> Capital: >>>>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises >>> M-C-M' >>>>> - the unit of capital. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a >> total >>>>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >>>>> questions unusually interesting. >>>>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >>>>> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH >>> not is? >>>>>>>> mike**2 >>>>>>>> :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From nataliag@sfu.ca Wed Nov 5 21:02:43 2014 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 21:02:43 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <474A47B2-1867-493D-A9DF-0B35245B2D58@gmail.com> References: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <474A47B2-1867-493D-A9DF-0B35245B2D58@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1364468810.63707628.1415250163168.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> And connection of imagination to thinking? As per LSV (1931): " From our point of view, imagination is a creative transforming activity which moves from one form of concreteness to another. But the mere movement from a given concrete form to a newly created form of it and the very feasibility of a creative construction, is only possible with the help of abstraction. So abstraction is incorporated into the process of imagination as an indispensable constituent part, but it does not form its centre. The movement from the concrete through the abstract to the construction of a new form of a concrete image, is the path which describes imagination in the adolescent age." ----- Original Message ----- From: "HENRY SHONERD" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2014 8:50:34 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Huw, You?re making me think about the connection between imagination and memory. Is it in the intentionality of these two ?acts?? I think sometimes memories come unbidden, sometimes unwanted. But you?re talking about using the imagination with memory? Henry > On Nov 5, 2014, at 8:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > The way I like to think about it is how experienced problems structure > memory. That is, how the awareness of the problem in getting the right > length strip can move to the beginning of subsequent attempts. I think of > it as a process of exchange. How memories are moved upstream through the > right kinds of action. > > Those kind of effects are what I'd call "concrete generalisation", rather > than, say, "notational generalisation" which would be based upon patterns > perceived in the notation. I'm guessing that its this latter sort of thing > that is often filling up that seemingly necessary gap. > > Huw > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 03:15, mike cole wrote: > >> Exactly, Ed. >> >> "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about >> number lines and >> "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, sitting >> on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, >> "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the >> nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that >> moment, explained why on xmca. >> >> All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from time >> to time..... :-) >> mike >> >> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Henry and Mike >>> >>> That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the >>> wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics should >> be >>> so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; >>> however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. >>>> >>>> The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, >>> is >>>> to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and >>>> filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new >> way. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ed and Andy, >>>>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >>>>> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated >> action >>> for >>>>> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >>>>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >>>>> decided that the most important property of human language that >> clearly >>>>> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to >>> communicate >>>>> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer >> to >>>>> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings >> or >>>>> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same >>>>> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare >>> two >>>>> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. >>> And I >>>>> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been >>> following: L2 >>>>> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >>>>> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 >>> teaching >>>>> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative >>> research >>>>> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended >> with a >>>>> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two >>>>> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B >>> (a >>>>> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have >>>>> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, >> objects >>>>> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've >> been >>>>> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that >>> things >>>>> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether >>> teaching >>>>> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just >> the >>>>> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be >>>>> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those >>>>> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little >>>>> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the >>>>> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in >> those >>>>> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying >>> here. >>>>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but >> that >>>>> may come from thinking about them too much. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me >>> that >>>>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating >> concept-formation >>> in >>>>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing >> in >>>>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For >>> Davydov," >>>>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ >>> - a >>>>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a >>> whole >>>>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally >> pure >>>>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical >>>>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of >> difference >>>>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments >>> of >>>>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to >>>>> solve the task they are working on. >>>>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated >> action*. >>>>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. >> At >>>>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, >>> the >>>>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains >> in >>>>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, >> that >>> the >>>>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. >> Capital: >>>>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises >>> M-C-M' >>>>> - the unit of capital. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a >> total >>>>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >>>>> questions unusually interesting. >>>>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >>>>> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH >>> not is? >>>>>>>> mike**2 >>>>>>>> :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 21:20:09 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 21:20:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <474A47B2-1867-493D-A9DF-0B35245B2D58@gmail.com> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <474A47B2-1867-493D-A9DF-0B35245B2D58@gmail.com> Message-ID: *spontaneously* [bracketed] In the nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it [and THIS PROCESS this *groking* is possibly abductive, rather than deductive or inductive] - LP] and I could have, at that moment, explained why on xmca. Mike, this process [groking] emerging prior to explaining IS *imaginal* and has qualities which are central to composing meaning - *spontaneously* Larry On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 8:50 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Huw, > You?re making me think about the connection between imagination and > memory. Is it in the intentionality of these two ?acts?? I think sometimes > memories come unbidden, sometimes unwanted. But you?re talking about using > the imagination with memory? > Henry > > > On Nov 5, 2014, at 8:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > The way I like to think about it is how experienced problems structure > > memory. That is, how the awareness of the problem in getting the right > > length strip can move to the beginning of subsequent attempts. I think > of > > it as a process of exchange. How memories are moved upstream through the > > right kinds of action. > > > > Those kind of effects are what I'd call "concrete generalisation", rather > > than, say, "notational generalisation" which would be based upon patterns > > perceived in the notation. I'm guessing that its this latter sort of > thing > > that is often filling up that seemingly necessary gap. > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 03:15, mike cole wrote: > > > >> Exactly, Ed. > >> > >> "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about > >> number lines and > >> "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, > sitting > >> on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, > >> "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the > >> nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that > >> moment, explained why on xmca. > >> > >> All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from > time > >> to time..... :-) > >> mike > >> > >> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> > >>> Henry and Mike > >>> > >>> That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the > >>> wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics > should > >> be > >>> so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; > >>> however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > >>>> > >>>> The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about > it, > >>> is > >>>> to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > >>>> filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new > >> way. > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Ed and Andy, > >>>>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, > which > >>>>> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated > >> action > >>> for > >>>>> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > >>>>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > >>>>> decided that the most important property of human language that > >> clearly > >>>>> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to > >>> communicate > >>>>> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer > >> to > >>>>> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings > >> or > >>>>> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the > same > >>>>> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to > compare > >>> two > >>>>> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. > >>> And I > >>>>> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been > >>> following: L2 > >>>>> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > >>>>> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > >>> teaching > >>>>> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative > >>> research > >>>>> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended > >> with a > >>>>> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the > two > >>>>> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom > B > >>> (a > >>>>> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > >>>>> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, > >> objects > >>>>> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've > >> been > >>>>> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > >>> things > >>>>> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether > >>> teaching > >>>>> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just > >> the > >>>>> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could > be > >>>>> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > >>>>> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > >>>>> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about > the > >>>>> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in > >> those > >>>>> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying > >>> here. > >>>>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but > >> that > >>>>> may come from thinking about them too much. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > >>> that > >>>>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating > >> concept-formation > >>> in > >>>>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing > >> in > >>>>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For > >>> Davydov," > >>>>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of > acting/ > >>> - a > >>>>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a > >>> whole > >>>>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally > >> pure > >>>>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > >>>>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of > >> difference > >>>>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation > experiments > >>> of > >>>>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use > to > >>>>> solve the task they are working on. > >>>>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated > >> action*. > >>>>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. > >> At > >>>>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, > >>> the > >>>>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains > >> in > >>>>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, > >> that > >>> the > >>>>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. > >> Capital: > >>>>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises > >>> M-C-M' > >>>>> - the unit of capital. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a > >> total > >>>>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" > ? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > >>>>> questions unusually interesting. > >>>>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > >>>>> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH > >>> not is? > >>>>>>>> mike**2 > >>>>>>>> :-) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 21:34:06 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 21:34:06 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <1364468810.63707628.1415250163168.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <474A47B2-1867-493D-A9DF-0B35245B2D58@gmail.com> <1364468810.63707628.1415250163168.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: Natalia and Henry Vygotsky's understanding the place of abstraction in this quote "So abstraction is incorporated into the process of imagination as an indispensable constituent part, but it does not form its centre. The movement from the concrete through the abstract to the construction of a new form of a concrete image, is the path which describes imagination in the adolescent age." If this is the movement of imagination "in the adolescent age" is that different from Mike's nonlinear [spontaneous] imaginal groking. Henry, yes Peirce was fascinated with this topic and his engaging with abduction as spontaneous has a family resemblance with groking. Larry On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > > And connection of imagination to thinking? > As per LSV (1931): > " From our point of view, imagination is a creative transforming activity > which moves from one form of concreteness to another. But the mere movement > from a given concrete form to a newly created form of it and the very > feasibility of a creative construction, is only possible with the help of > abstraction. So abstraction is incorporated into the process of imagination > as an indispensable constituent part, but it does not form its centre. The > movement from the concrete through the abstract to the construction of a > new form of a concrete image, is the path which describes imagination in > the adolescent age." > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "HENRY SHONERD" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2014 8:50:34 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Huw, > You?re making me think about the connection between imagination and > memory. Is it in the intentionality of these two ?acts?? I think sometimes > memories come unbidden, sometimes unwanted. But you?re talking about using > the imagination with memory? > Henry > > > On Nov 5, 2014, at 8:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > The way I like to think about it is how experienced problems structure > > memory. That is, how the awareness of the problem in getting the right > > length strip can move to the beginning of subsequent attempts. I think > of > > it as a process of exchange. How memories are moved upstream through the > > right kinds of action. > > > > Those kind of effects are what I'd call "concrete generalisation", rather > > than, say, "notational generalisation" which would be based upon patterns > > perceived in the notation. I'm guessing that its this latter sort of > thing > > that is often filling up that seemingly necessary gap. > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 03:15, mike cole wrote: > > > >> Exactly, Ed. > >> > >> "Spontaneously" I was driving along and found myself of thinking about > >> number lines and > >> "a minus times a minus equals a plus. And for maybe the first time, > sitting > >> on a freeway in a car, I actually could arrive easily at the conclusion, > >> "of course" without driving off the road or into another car. In the > >> nonlinear way that meaning develops, I groked it and could have, at that > >> moment, explained why on xmca. > >> > >> All very interesting. Makes one almost wish for traffic to sit in from > time > >> to time..... :-) > >> mike > >> > >> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> > >>> Henry and Mike > >>> > >>> That displacement you mention is part of why I've been doing the > >>> wondering I mention below. I do think the teaching of mathematics > should > >> be > >>> so that the gap, in part, is filled, as Mike put it, by imagination; > >>> however, in many classrooms it is filled by anything but. > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>> On Nov 5, 2014, at 7:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > >>>> > >>>> The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about > it, > >>> is > >>>> to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > >>>> filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new > >> way. > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Ed and Andy, > >>>>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, > which > >>>>> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated > >> action > >>> for > >>>>> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > >>>>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > >>>>> decided that the most important property of human language that > >> clearly > >>>>> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to > >>> communicate > >>>>> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer > >> to > >>>>> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings > >> or > >>>>> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the > same > >>>>> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to > compare > >>> two > >>>>> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. > >>> And I > >>>>> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been > >>> following: L2 > >>>>> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > >>>>> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > >>> teaching > >>>>> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative > >>> research > >>>>> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended > >> with a > >>>>> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the > two > >>>>> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom > B > >>> (a > >>>>> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > >>>>> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, > >> objects > >>>>> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've > >> been > >>>>> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > >>> things > >>>>> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether > >>> teaching > >>>>> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just > >> the > >>>>> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could > be > >>>>> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > >>>>> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > >>>>> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about > the > >>>>> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in > >> those > >>>>> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying > >>> here. > >>>>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but > >> that > >>>>> may come from thinking about them too much. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > >>> that > >>>>> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating > >> concept-formation > >>> in > >>>>> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing > >> in > >>>>> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For > >>> Davydov," > >>>>> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of > acting/ > >>> - a > >>>>> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a > >>> whole > >>>>> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally > >> pure > >>>>> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > >>>>> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of > >> difference > >>>>> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation > experiments > >>> of > >>>>> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use > to > >>>>> solve the task they are working on. > >>>>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated > >> action*. > >>>>> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. > >> At > >>>>> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, > >>> the > >>>>> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains > >> in > >>>>> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, > >> that > >>> the > >>>>> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. > >> Capital: > >>>>> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises > >>> M-C-M' > >>>>> - the unit of capital. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a > >> total > >>>>> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" > ? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > >>>>> questions unusually interesting. > >>>>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > >>>>> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH > >>> not is? > >>>>>>>> mike**2 > >>>>>>>> :-) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > From sfard@netvision.net.il Wed Nov 5 22:10:26 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2014 08:10:26 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> Message-ID: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> Hi, I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Ed and Andy, Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. Henry > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > Andy > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. > > Thanks > > Ed > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >> >> Andy >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>> >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>> mike**2 >>> :-) >>> >>> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Nantes - Sep 13 - final.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 928632 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141106/929862da/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Nov 5 22:21:19 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 22:21:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, I enjoyed the article "Translatability and the Uses of Standardization" using the format of a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van der Aa, and Jan Blommaert. I agree it is exploring the same themes explored by Raymond Williams as the relation of fixidity and fluidity. I will highlight the point being explored on page 2 in Jef's phrase "SO preceding the idea of language AS a cultural construct, there was an idea that one could elicit things directly." Jef's answer came after this exchange from Michael: ".... - certainly not semiotic objects - and they are not obviously just inter-translatable at some kind of metalinguistic level which we can assume that everybody has. SO if you don't have a notion of what we now call the semanticity of language, AS A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM, that's applied to the world as it were ...." To repeat, Jef completes Michael's thought with his response: "SO preceding THAT idea of language AS a cultural construct, there was an idea that one could elicit things explicitly"[elicit things contextually - LP] Jan Blommaert jumps in to the conversation with this observation of the contextual prior to the conceptual when he comments: "SO when you [Michael] say that you had to change the culture of these local people, you changed it by means of another culture, and you already hinted that it's a culture in which we ASSUME from within our tradition that this denotational STRUCTURE is the structure of language. And also this idea of translatability, SO, you, I almost everyone here at this conference has been trained in A SYSTEM in which we had to translate all the time. So, say the stock, the books in our bags, every day at school included a dictionary and a grammar. SO we ASSUME that this is universal. Michael jumps in at this point with the comment: "Instruments of oppression! - they are, you know. Greg, on the one hand is the SYSTEM of language as understanding as performance, [a system of praxis] and on the other hand *understanding* is transformed in the philosophical SYSTEM that Michael, Jef and Jan are talking about [the system of conceptual translatability] So the contrast between "contextual" and "conceptual" SYSTEMS that Rod was describing. Then Michael makes a fascinating comment: The more you look at Hindu theories of use of language, you are see that what you are talking about IS a SYSTEM of praxis, i.e. it's all about performativity" The key seems to be different notions of *understanding* and what is meant by the term [languaging] I do see that this ties in with Raymond Williams notion of *structures of feeling* and John Shotter's dialogical contextual notion of speech performance Larry On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 7:21 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Cool Mike, > That was real cool... > cool, > -greg > > On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 11:01 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Cool. That is, when the temperature during my morning walk drops below 52 > > degrees? > > Cutural mediation is a non-linear phenomenon and so far as meaning is a > > form of cultural mediation...... > > maybe? > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the issue of > > > "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. > > > > > > I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" but > > > alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel to > these > > > local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. > > > > > > One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has a > > > fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language > ideology > > > that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western language > > > ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems about language > > > instruction that have been discussed on XMCA recently. Here is the link > > for > > > that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join > > academia.edu > > > and follow Jan first): > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_with_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa > > > ? > > > > > > In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to > these > > > issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear Phenomenon > - > > > The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join > > > academia.edu first and follow Jan): > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the_birth_of_cool > > > > > > ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to > > distract > > > from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in so > > many > > > different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). > > > > > > Cheers, > > > greg > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Thu Nov 6 00:40:54 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 08:40:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102243F42@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Yes - a fascinating conversation - also interesting because the 'paper' is a 'fixed' version of what was clearly a 'fluid' interaction - a conversation in which the relationships between the speakers sometimes leak through as well as the 'content' of their discourse - what would normally be ALL that would be available to a reader of a published paper. I have always thought that Vygotsky understood 'rules' in a sociocultural way - 'what, as a rule, people do' and I think this is children's way in to language - they pick up patterns in what people do without any CONSCIOUS awareness of the 'rules' they have found. And adults usually USE language with very little conscious awareness of the rules they are applying (and these rules may be quite different even among speakers of the 'same' language so what to me is an error may not be an error at all to someone else). Infants make sense of what people around them do and say by drawing on information from the context but a significant part of that context is the 'languagedness' of the behaviour of the other people all around them. As this paper also shows, adults also, normally, draw heavily on context to make sense of the social import of the things that people say. The case of arguments presented in print is a very special and rather peculiar one - not quite stripped of context because every reader brings to the reading a socialised knowledge of how people, as a rule, use written language in particular contexts but peculiar because readers must make do with such knowledge about the context as THEY can bring into play. They can imagine a form of dialogue but the respondent is animated only by the reader's assumptions, knowledge and patterns of thinking, unlike what happens in a dialogical process (words in their speaking, as Shotter would say) where the context can be constantly co-constructed as an interaction BETWEEN the patterns brought by different participants. Shotter uses the analogy of the (Moire) interference patterns created when sets of concentric circles (ripples) are overlaid and also the 'chiasmic interweaving' of optical information from left field and right field which creates a sense of a 3D space - different from what either eye on its own can produce. Studying the aboriginal peoples of Australia is one way to make the familiar features of language strange but spending time with infants is often easier and cheaper! All thebest, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 06 November 2014 06:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jan Blommaert - Meaning as a non-linear phenomena Greg, I enjoyed the article "Translatability and the Uses of Standardization" using the format of a conversation between Michael Silverstein, Jef Van der Aa, and Jan Blommaert. I agree it is exploring the same themes explored by Raymond Williams as the relation of fixidity and fluidity. I will highlight the point being explored on page 2 in Jef's phrase "SO preceding the idea of language AS a cultural construct, there was an idea that one could elicit things directly." Jef's answer came after this exchange from Michael: ".... - certainly not semiotic objects - and they are not obviously just inter-translatable at some kind of metalinguistic level which we can assume that everybody has. SO if you don't have a notion of what we now call the semanticity of language, AS A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM, that's applied to the world as it were ...." To repeat, Jef completes Michael's thought with his response: "SO preceding THAT idea of language AS a cultural construct, there was an idea that one could elicit things explicitly"[elicit things contextually - LP] Jan Blommaert jumps in to the conversation with this observation of the contextual prior to the conceptual when he comments: "SO when you [Michael] say that you had to change the culture of these local people, you changed it by means of another culture, and you already hinted that it's a culture in which we ASSUME from within our tradition that this denotational STRUCTURE is the structure of language. And also this idea of translatability, SO, you, I almost everyone here at this conference has been trained in A SYSTEM in which we had to translate all the time. So, say the stock, the books in our bags, every day at school included a dictionary and a grammar. SO we ASSUME that this is universal. Michael jumps in at this point with the comment: "Instruments of oppression! - they are, you know. Greg, on the one hand is the SYSTEM of language as understanding as performance, [a system of praxis] and on the other hand *understanding* is transformed in the philosophical SYSTEM that Michael, Jef and Jan are talking about [the system of conceptual translatability] So the contrast between "contextual" and "conceptual" SYSTEMS that Rod was describing. Then Michael makes a fascinating comment: The more you look at Hindu theories of use of language, you are see that what you are talking about IS a SYSTEM of praxis, i.e. it's all about performativity" The key seems to be different notions of *understanding* and what is meant by the term [languaging] I do see that this ties in with Raymond Williams notion of *structures of feeling* and John Shotter's dialogical contextual notion of speech performance Larry On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 7:21 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Cool Mike, > That was real cool... > cool, > -greg > > On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 11:01 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Cool. That is, when the temperature during my morning walk drops > > below 52 degrees? > > Cutural mediation is a non-linear phenomenon and so far as meaning > > is a form of cultural mediation...... > > maybe? > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > There is a flurry of threads that seem to be dealing with the > > > issue of "meaning" and how to conceive of meaning. > > > > > > I just thought I'd mention that there is a cadre (I prefer "gang" > > > but > > > alas...) of folks who are doing work that runs in close parallel > > > to > these > > > local conversations, namely the linguistic anthropologists. > > > > > > One of my favorite is Jan Blommaert (University of Ghent). He has > > > a fascinating conversation with Michael Silverstein about language > ideology > > > that points to the historical and cultural origins of Western > > > language ideologies that, imho, are at the heart of the problems > > > about language instruction that have been discussed on XMCA > > > recently. Here is the link > > for > > > that conversation (to access this paper, you may need to join > > academia.edu > > > and follow Jan first): > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/7654748/Michael_Silverstein_in_conversation_w > ith_Jan_Blommaert_and_Jef_Van_der_Aa > > > ? > > > > > > In addition, he has a lovely paper on academia.edu that speaks to > these > > > issues as well. Th paper is titled "Meaning as a Non-linear > > > Phenomenon > - > > > The Birth of Cool". Accessible here (again, you may need to join > > > academia.edu first and follow Jan): > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/8208677/Meaning_as_a_nonlinear_phenomenon_the > _birth_of_cool > > > > > > ??Happy to chat more if anyone is interested but I didn't want to > > distract > > > from the other fascinating conversations that are on-going (and in > > > so > > many > > > different directions I wouldn't even know where to post this!). > > > > > > Cheers, > > > greg > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Nov 6 07:05:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 15:05:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Carol, Yes, in Colombia. Here is one of the texts of L2 inner speech that I've found; it's available in Google Books: Inner Speech - L2: Thinking Words in a Second Language By Maria C.M. de Guerrero Martin On Nov 4, 2014, at 12:50 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi Martin > > Where are you working? Colombia? I am experiencing something of the same > in regard to Afrikaans, which I use on a daily basis. I was working in > Namibia earlier this year > > I was speaking from a position of ignorance about Inner Speech. If you > have any other references to hand, I would like to have a list. I am > preparing to write a paper on teaching L1 and L2 in the early primary > grades, where the same teacher teaches both languages. > > Best > Carol > > On 3 November 2014 19:00, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as far >>> as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. >> >> >> On the contrary, I'm finding a variety of treatments... for example: >> >> De Guerrero, M. C. M. (2006). Inner speech-L2: Thinking words in a second >> language. Springer. >> >> McCafferty, S. G. (1998). Nonverbal Expression and L2 Private Speech. >> Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 73-96. >> >> As I mentioned in my first message in this thread I find SC studies of L2 >> inner speech an interesting topic, because it is exploring the way that L2 >> can enter - and transform? - the higher psychological functions. As a >> native English speaker living and working in a country in which Spanish is >> the dominant language, I am very aware that my higher psychological >> functions are not as adequate when I'm using Spanish as they are when I use >> English, but also that the balance is changing. It's one thing (though >> difficult!) to *speak* fluently in a second language, it's another to >> *think* fluently in that language. So this seems to me where the SC >> approach to L2 is exploring something new. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Nov 6 07:50:52 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 15:50:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> Message-ID: <314C528F-22D5-421A-8651-BF729CA53962@uniandes.edu.co> I don't want to hijack this thread, but I've been puzzled by the supposed need to decide whether mathematics is 'objective' or whether it is a 'social convention.' One of my pet peeves about the way that people - both lay and academics - talk about 'social construction' is that it is assumed that what has been socially constructed is insubstantial, maleable. 'Oh, gender is just a social construction!' as though this implies that we can change it tomorrow if we want to. Introducing the term 'convention' seems to me to make matters worse, because we all 'know' that a 'convention' is, well, merely conventional. Surely we live in a social world in which there are many things that have been socially constructed - I would prefer to say socially constituted - and that as a consequence are objective, that is to say actual, matters of fact. It is a fact that Obama is US president, but this is equally a social construction. Want to change that fact? A whole lot of work - social work - is needed to do so. The same with mathematics, I would suggest. Math is a social construction. And as a result it is objective. Math has a history: it has been constructed in different ways at different times. At each point is has been a matter of fact. Different cultures have invented different mathematics, each of which has been a matter of fact for that culture. It seems to me that we need to stop opposing what is 'social' to what is 'objective.' Martin On Nov 6, 2014, at 1:10 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Hi, > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Ed and Andy, > Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > Henry > > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >> Andy >> >> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. >> >> Thanks >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> --- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> mike cole wrote: >>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>> >>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>> mike**2 >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Thu Nov 6 08:50:58 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 10:50:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <314C528F-22D5-421A-8651-BF729CA53962@uniandes.edu.co> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <314C528F-22D5-421A-8651-BF729CA53962@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <2DF3DF60-BBC7-476F-B66D-555C1AC75280@umich.edu> Martin Nicely put and I have been wondering about this also. I'm sure I have contributed to the confusion as I have been struggling to find words that capture all this in school classrooms. Anyway, so for you objective means "actual matters of fact?" That seems reasonably like Andy's definition? Ed On Nov 6, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I don't want to hijack this thread, but I've been puzzled by the supposed need to decide whether mathematics is 'objective' or whether it is a 'social convention.' One of my pet peeves about the way that people - both lay and academics - talk about 'social construction' is that it is assumed that what has been socially constructed is insubstantial, maleable. 'Oh, gender is just a social construction!' as though this implies that we can change it tomorrow if we want to. Introducing the term 'convention' seems to me to make matters worse, because we all 'know' that a 'convention' is, well, merely conventional. > > Surely we live in a social world in which there are many things that have been socially constructed - I would prefer to say socially constituted - and that as a consequence are objective, that is to say actual, matters of fact. It is a fact that Obama is US president, but this is equally a social construction. Want to change that fact? A whole lot of work - social work - is needed to do so. > > The same with mathematics, I would suggest. Math is a social construction. And as a result it is objective. Math has a history: it has been constructed in different ways at different times. At each point is has been a matter of fact. Different cultures have invented different mathematics, each of which has been a matter of fact for that culture. > > It seems to me that we need to stop opposing what is 'social' to what is 'objective.' > > Martin > > On Nov 6, 2014, at 1:10 AM, anna sfard wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Ed and Andy, >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. >>> >>> Thanks >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> --- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>> >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>> mike**2 >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Nov 6 10:59:25 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 18:59:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <2DF3DF60-BBC7-476F-B66D-555C1AC75280@umich.edu> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <314C528F-22D5-421A-8651-BF729CA53962@uniandes.edu.co> <2DF3DF60-BBC7-476F-B66D-555C1AC75280@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed, I was simply borrowing a dictionary definition; I'm not sure that I'd define the objectivity of mathematics in precisely those terms. There is (of course!) a literature on this. For instance: Goodman, N. D. (1979). Mathematics as an objective science. American Mathematical Monthly, 540-551. ...and a PBS video: And I've enjoyed Brian Rotman's books: Rotman, B. (1993). Ad infinitum...: The ghost in Turing?s machine; taking god out of mathematics and putting the body back in; an essay in corporeal semiotics. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. and Rotman, B. (1993). Signifying nothing: The semiotics of zero. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Rotman engages in a kind of deconstruction of the *ways*, the practices, whereby mathematicians construct formalisms by means of their informal discourse, and he diagnoses a kind of collective fantasy of disembodied infinitude. And I'm searching unsuccessfully for my copy of: Lachterman, D. R. (1989). The ethics of geometry: A genealogy of modernity. New York: Routledge. Lachterman, as the title suggests, traces the history of mathematics and identifies a rupture in that history with the invention, in which Descartes was an important figure, of the notion that mathematicians "construct proofs." Here, Lachterman concludes, was a change in the ontological status of mathematical entities. I can't pretend to be more than an interested amateur in this area, but ten years ago I wrote a paper, unpublished, with a student, Jenny Hwang, that we titled "Learning mathematics as ontological change," where we tried to build on Rotman and Lachterman. The abstract reads: "If mathematics is a sociocultural activity, learning math involves ?socialization.? We analyze a fifth grade math lesson in fractional equivalents, and show that the lesson is not about constructing knowledge so much as about producing and acting on new species of mathematical object: ?fractions.? As the children learn to recognize and act appropriately on these objects they too, we propose, are ontologically changed. We suggest that classroom academic tasks have an embedded cultural task. While school uses social interaction to achieve academic ends, at the same time academic tasks are used to achieve cultural ends. The children are not just learning math, they are learning to be a particular kind of person." I haven't looked at it in a long time and I've probably changed my mind on various things, but I'll attach in it case the literature review might be of interest. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Packer&Hwang_draft.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 296922 bytes Desc: Packer&Hwang_draft.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141106/66020456/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.txt Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141106/66020456/attachment.txt From ewall@umich.edu Thu Nov 6 11:52:40 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 13:52:40 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <314C528F-22D5-421A-8651-BF729CA53962@uniandes.edu.co> <2DF3DF60-BBC7-476F-B66D-555C1AC75280@umich.edu> Message-ID: <2F18E548-4C5E-485C-86CB-38C2E6405C22@umich.edu> Martin I read Lachterman's a number of years ago (and I know where my copy is - smile) and found it to be quite a lovely book. I'm in the process of reading Hopkins' The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics which nicely takes up Jacob Klein's work. Anyway, as a person who does, teaches, teaches others to teach mathematics, I admit to being a little unsure of the word 'objective' and, to be honest, I'm not always sure what people mean by 'fact.' I do more or less agree with your conclusion about "becoming a particular kind of person" and I have heard children clearly express their awareness of such 'becoming.' My initial reason for bringing up some of this on the list was that I've been wondering how to help teachers notice some aspects of this 'becoming.' Thanks for the paper! Ed On Nov 6, 2014, at 12:59 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Ed, > > I was simply borrowing a dictionary definition; I'm not sure that I'd define the objectivity of mathematics in precisely those terms. > > There is (of course!) a literature on this. For instance: > > Goodman, N. D. (1979). Mathematics as an objective science. American Mathematical Monthly, 540-551. > > ...and a PBS video: > > > > And I've enjoyed Brian Rotman's books: > > Rotman, B. (1993). Ad infinitum...: The ghost in Turing?s machine; taking god out of mathematics and putting the body back in; an essay in corporeal semiotics. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. > > and > > Rotman, B. (1993). Signifying nothing: The semiotics of zero. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. > > Rotman engages in a kind of deconstruction of the *ways*, the practices, whereby mathematicians construct formalisms by means of their informal discourse, and he diagnoses a kind of collective fantasy of disembodied infinitude. > > And I'm searching unsuccessfully for my copy of: > > Lachterman, D. R. (1989). The ethics of geometry: A genealogy of modernity. New York: Routledge. > > Lachterman, as the title suggests, traces the history of mathematics and identifies a rupture in that history with the invention, in which Descartes was an important figure, of the notion that mathematicians "construct proofs." Here, Lachterman concludes, was a change in the ontological status of mathematical entities. > > I can't pretend to be more than an interested amateur in this area, but ten years ago I wrote a paper, unpublished, with a student, Jenny Hwang, that we titled "Learning mathematics as ontological change," where we tried to build on Rotman and Lachterman. The abstract reads: > > "If mathematics is a sociocultural activity, learning math involves ?socialization.? We analyze a fifth grade math lesson in fractional equivalents, and show that the lesson is not about constructing knowledge so much as about producing and acting on new species of mathematical object: ?fractions.? As the children learn to recognize and act appropriately on these objects they too, we propose, are ontologically changed. We suggest that classroom academic tasks have an embedded cultural task. While school uses social interaction to achieve academic ends, at the same time academic tasks are used to achieve cultural ends. The children are not just learning math, they are learning to be a particular kind of person." > > I haven't looked at it in a long time and I've probably changed my mind on various things, but I'll attach in it case the literature review might be of interest. > > > Martin > > > > On Nov 6, 2014, at 11:50 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Martin >> >> Nicely put and I have been wondering about this also. I'm sure I have contributed to the confusion as I have been struggling to find words that capture all this in school classrooms. Anyway, so for you objective means "actual matters of fact?" That seems reasonably like Andy's definition? >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 6, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> I don't want to hijack this thread, but I've been puzzled by the supposed need to decide whether mathematics is 'objective' or whether it is a 'social convention.' One of my pet peeves about the way that people - both lay and academics - talk about 'social construction' is that it is assumed that what has been socially constructed is insubstantial, maleable. 'Oh, gender is just a social construction!' as though this implies that we can change it tomorrow if we want to. Introducing the term 'convention' seems to me to make matters worse, because we all 'know' that a 'convention' is, well, merely conventional. >>> >>> Surely we live in a social world in which there are many things that have been socially constructed - I would prefer to say socially constituted - and that as a consequence are objective, that is to say actual, matters of fact. It is a fact that Obama is US president, but this is equally a social construction. Want to change that fact? A whole lot of work - social work - is needed to do so. >>> >>> The same with mathematics, I would suggest. Math is a social construction. And as a result it is objective. Math has a history: it has been constructed in different ways at different times. At each point is has been a matter of fact. Different cultures have invented different mathematics, each of which has been a matter of fact for that culture. >>> >>> It seems to me that we need to stop opposing what is 'social' to what is 'objective.' >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 6, 2014, at 1:10 AM, anna sfard wrote: >>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). >>>> >>>> anna >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD >>>> Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>> >>>> Ed and Andy, >>>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >>>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> --- >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>>>> mike**2 >>>>>>> :-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Nov 6 14:40:13 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 22:40:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33179031-5CED-4482-91EF-F127C1F9FB31@uniandes.edu.co> I want to thank everyone who offered me a helping hand this semester with my undergraduate course in Psychology of Language. The last class meeting was today, and after a crash course myself this past week on L2 I think I was able to arrange a coherent class. I'm happy that I was able to end with some short YouTube videos about the politics of bilingual education, and of interculturalismo, in Latin America. Before starting the course I looked at several recommendations for a textbook, and in the end decided to assemble readings. I found a number of short pieces in Science that I think were good, but made some bad choices of longer pieces later in the semester: too complex by far. I think that a good text on a sociocultural perspective on language remains to be written - earlier in the semester the idea floated here of writing one collectively! I think the class was reasonable successful. I decided to go broad and shallow, and certainly covered more, and hopefully more interesting, topics than the previous version of the course, taught by a cognitivist colleague. There are many changes that could and should be made - and I recently learned that my punishment is to teach this course again next semester! With 90 students (gulp!)! I'm attaching the syllabus (in Spanish, of course); I'd welcome all recommendations about how to improve it. So thanks again. It was a challenge to prepare and teach this course (and do most of that in L2!), and I greatly appreciate having at hand the collective wisdom of xmca. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Programa PSIC2314 Psicolog?a del Lenguaje.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 110589 bytes Desc: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Programa_PSIC2314_Psicolog=EDa_del_Lenguaje.pdf?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141106/90ddc516/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.txt Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141106/90ddc516/attachment.txt From ablunden@mira.net Thu Nov 6 16:46:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 11:46:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <2DF3DF60-BBC7-476F-B66D-555C1AC75280@umich.edu> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <314C528F-22D5-421A-8651-BF729CA53962@uniandes.edu.co> <2DF3DF60-BBC7-476F-B66D-555C1AC75280@umich.edu> Message-ID: <545C167C.7080202@mira.net> For an individual *every* social convention is objective, of course, whether it is the love of Mary mother of Christ, driving on the right or the roundness of the Earth. I was not talking about objectivity in that sense. Something is objective (for a community) if for that community (social formation), it cannot be transformed into something else. (Need I say, every absolute is also relative and there is an absolute in every relative.) I was not discussing "mathematics" as a psychological formation but as something which exists independently of both child and teacher, and which the child can learn about and even the text book can be wrong about. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Martin > > Nicely put and I have been wondering about this also. I'm sure I have contributed to the confusion as I have been struggling to find words that capture all this in school classrooms. Anyway, so for you objective means "actual matters of fact?" That seems reasonably like Andy's definition? > > Ed > > On Nov 6, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > >> I don't want to hijack this thread, but I've been puzzled by the supposed need to decide whether mathematics is 'objective' or whether it is a 'social convention.' One of my pet peeves about the way that people - both lay and academics - talk about 'social construction' is that it is assumed that what has been socially constructed is insubstantial, maleable. 'Oh, gender is just a social construction!' as though this implies that we can change it tomorrow if we want to. Introducing the term 'convention' seems to me to make matters worse, because we all 'know' that a 'convention' is, well, merely conventional. >> >> Surely we live in a social world in which there are many things that have been socially constructed - I would prefer to say socially constituted - and that as a consequence are objective, that is to say actual, matters of fact. It is a fact that Obama is US president, but this is equally a social construction. Want to change that fact? A whole lot of work - social work - is needed to do so. >> >> The same with mathematics, I would suggest. Math is a social construction. And as a result it is objective. Math has a history: it has been constructed in different ways at different times. At each point is has been a matter of fact. Different cultures have invented different mathematics, each of which has been a matter of fact for that culture. >> >> It seems to me that we need to stop opposing what is 'social' to what is 'objective.' >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 6, 2014, at 1:10 AM, anna sfard wrote: >> >> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical >>> > stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > >>> anna >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD >>> Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> Ed and Andy, >>> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >>> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B th >>> > at certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. >>>> >>>> Thanks >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> --- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>>> >>>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>>> mike**2 >>>>>> :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Nov 6 17:13:09 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 17:13:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <121DAF81-A54B-488E-B08E-E1267B70AAE9@gmail.com> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <121DAF81-A54B-488E-B08E-E1267B70AAE9@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry-- I can send paper on imagination separately. It argues for a cultural role in the gap filling of humans that is, is venture, not present in chimps or crows, smart as they may be. If there is a gap, a missed heart beat, there better be some process that leaps the gap or the story ends abruptly. The heart beat is not a bad metric. The beating of a blob of heart cells is the first movement detectable in human tissue, I believe. And the last. mike On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 8:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Mike, > I can go with that connection. Imagination. Now we don?t know if other > species do that kind of thing, but others of our species DO. You wrote a > paper on the connection between imagination and creativity, right? How did > that go? > Henry > > > On Nov 5, 2014, at 6:21 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Nice observation/connection Henry. I provokes the following thought. > > > > The result of a displacement, in the way I have been thinking about it, > is > > to create a gap in the connectivity/continuity of the experience, and > > filling that gap is a process of imagination, of seeing-as in a new way. > > > > mike > > > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 5:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Ed and Andy, > >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > >> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action > for > >> Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > >> decided that the most important property of human language that clearly > >> sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to > communicate > >> is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to > >> things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or > >> things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same > >> problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare > two > >> objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. > And I > >> am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been > following: L2 > >> and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > teaching > >> and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative > research > >> methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a > >> comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two > >> methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B > (a > >> qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > >> required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects > >> mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been > >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > things > >> seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether > teaching > >> mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the > >> things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be > >> wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > >> pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > >> reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the > >> space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those > >> 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying > here. > >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that > >> may come from thinking about them too much. > >>> > >>> Thanks > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > that > >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation > in > >> a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in > >> forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For > Davydov," > >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ > - a > >> method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a > whole > >> system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure > >> Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > >> concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference > >> between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments > of > >> Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to > >> solve the task they are working on. > >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. > >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At > >> first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, > the > >> symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in > >> the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that > the > >> symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: > >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises > M-C-M' > >> - the unit of capital. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total > >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > >>>>> > >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > >> questions unusually interesting. > >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>>>> > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH > not is? > >>>>> mike**2 > >>>>> :-) > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Nov 6 17:24:29 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 01:24:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> Message-ID: Hi Anna, Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds formed in numerical rituals. Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental searching etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces transformations. I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized discourse, perhaps). I enjoyed your paper. :) Best, Huw On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard wrote: > Hi, > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, > when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing > this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested > enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the > present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he > is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his > request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, > as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical > thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses > appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with > the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent > of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses > coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but > at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the > child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas > numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Ed and Andy, > Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for > Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > decided that the most important property of human language that clearly > sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate > is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to > things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or > things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same > problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two > objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I > am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 > and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching > and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research > methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a > comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two > methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a > qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have > required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects > mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > Henry > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > Andy > > > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been > doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things > seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching > mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the > things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be > wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those > pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little > reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the > space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those > 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. > > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that > may come from thinking about them too much. > > > > Thanks > > > > Ed > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that > teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in > a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in > forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," > he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a > method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole > system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure > Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical > concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference > between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of > Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to > solve the task they are working on. > >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. > The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At > first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the > symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in > the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the > symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: > the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' > - the unit of capital. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total > duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > >>> > >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > questions unusually interesting. > >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? > >>> mike**2 > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Thu Nov 6 21:20:36 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 07:20:36 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: L2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks for that Martin Carol On 6 November 2014 17:05, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Carol, > > Yes, in Colombia. Here is one of the texts of L2 inner speech that I've > found; it's available in Google Books: > > Inner Speech - L2: Thinking Words in a Second Language > By Maria C.M. de Guerrero > > Martin > > On Nov 4, 2014, at 12:50 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Hi Martin > > > > Where are you working? Colombia? I am experiencing something of the > same > > in regard to Afrikaans, which I use on a daily basis. I was working in > > Namibia earlier this year > > > > I was speaking from a position of ignorance about Inner Speech. If you > > have any other references to hand, I would like to have a list. I am > > preparing to write a paper on teaching L1 and L2 in the early primary > > grades, where the same teacher teaches both languages. > > > > Best > > Carol > > > > On 3 November 2014 19:00, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Carol Macdonald > >> wrote: > >> > >>> SCT in Language Learning doesn't even get to the Inner Speech area as > far > >>> as I know. That would be LSV pure and uadulterated. > >> > >> > >> On the contrary, I'm finding a variety of treatments... for example: > >> > >> De Guerrero, M. C. M. (2006). Inner speech-L2: Thinking words in a > second > >> language. Springer. > >> > >> McCafferty, S. G. (1998). Nonverbal Expression and L2 Private Speech. > >> Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 73-96. > >> > >> As I mentioned in my first message in this thread I find SC studies of > L2 > >> inner speech an interesting topic, because it is exploring the way that > L2 > >> can enter - and transform? - the higher psychological functions. As a > >> native English speaker living and working in a country in which Spanish > is > >> the dominant language, I am very aware that my higher psychological > >> functions are not as adequate when I'm using Spanish as they are when I > use > >> English, but also that the balance is changing. It's one thing (though > >> difficult!) to *speak* fluently in a second language, it's another to > >> *think* fluently in that language. So this seems to me where the SC > >> approach to L2 is exploring something new. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From sfard@netvision.net.il Fri Nov 7 02:57:01 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 12:57:01 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> Message-ID: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> Hi Huw, Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and acquisitionism. So why? And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Hi Anna, Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds formed in numerical rituals. Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental searching etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces transformations. I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized discourse, perhaps). I enjoyed your paper. :) Best, Huw On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard wrote: > Hi, > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and > now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I > am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who > are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of > its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov > only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing > for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative > discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the > process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help > it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's > life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative > discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any > connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses > coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; > but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is > meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Ed and Andy, > Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated > action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > decided that the most important property of human language that > clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability > to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use > language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including > imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay > article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring > that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another > in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this > touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the > Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and > quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. > Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that > certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the > dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) > was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > Henry > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > Andy > > > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've > > been > doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering > whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even > Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that > is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor > in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need > to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit > more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, > and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. > > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but > > that > may come from thinking about them too much. > > > > Thanks > > > > Ed > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > >> that > teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating > concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what > the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," > he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ > - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to > a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also > equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a > "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point > of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual > stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol > which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. > >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. > The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. > At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but > later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material > task remains in the background. This is what is special about > mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: > the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' > - the unit of capital. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a > >>> total > duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > >>> > >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > questions unusually interesting. > >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? > >>> mike**2 > >>> :-) > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Nov 7 03:29:00 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 11:29:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> Message-ID: Huw & Anna, I had forgotten, until I read the paper again, that Jenny and I based our analysis of the fractions class on three main figures: Rotman, Lachterman, and Sfard! All three see discourse at the heart of mathematics. Martin On Nov 7, 2014, at 5:57 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and acquisitionism. So why? > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Hi Anna, > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds formed in numerical rituals. > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental searching etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces transformations. > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized discourse, perhaps). > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > Best, > Huw > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and >> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I >> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who >> are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of >> its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov >> only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing >> for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative >> discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the >> process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help >> it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's >> life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative >> discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any >> connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses >> coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; >> but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is >> meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Ed and Andy, >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which >> seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated >> action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >> decided that the most important property of human language that >> clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability >> to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use >> language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including >> imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay >> article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring >> that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another >> in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this >> touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the >> Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 >> teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and >> quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. >> Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that >> certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the >> dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) >> was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've >>> been >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that >> things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering >> whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even >> Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that >> is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor >> in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need >> to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit >> more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, >> and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but >>> that >> may come from thinking about them too much. >>> >>> Thanks >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me >>>> that >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating >> concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what >> the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ >> - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to >> a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also >> equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a >> "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point >> of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual >> stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol >> which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. >> At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but >> later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material >> task remains in the background. This is what is special about >> mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' >> - the unit of capital. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> --- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a >>>>> total >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>> >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >> questions unusually interesting. >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>> mike**2 >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From sfard@netvision.net.il Fri Nov 7 03:50:57 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 13:50:57 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <5-4571-927A-9DD4F91DCF90@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <006901cffa81$183a41b0$48aec510$@net.il> Ahoy Martin, How nice: so Rotman, Lachterman and the writer of these lines are mathematical figures? Positive or negative? :-) And while all the other folks you mention indeed view discourse as the heart of mathematics, I view it as more than that. Indeed, not just the heart - discourse includes all the other parts as well. In mathematical symbols, mathematics = [special kind of] discourse (and this is what Huw regards as reductionism, perhaps because he equates discourse with languaging?). Must reread your paper. It's been awhile... anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 1:29 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Huw & Anna, I had forgotten, until I read the paper again, that Jenny and I based our analysis of the fractions class on three main figures: Rotman, Lachterman, and Sfard! All three see discourse at the heart of mathematics. Martin On Nov 7, 2014, at 5:57 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and acquisitionism. So why? > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Hi Anna, > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds formed in numerical rituals. > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental searching etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces transformations. > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized discourse, perhaps). > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > Best, > Huw > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and >> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I >> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who >> are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance >> of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention >> Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm >> arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the >> quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of >> departure for the process of developing child's mathematical >> thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses >> appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, >> with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical >> one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, >> these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient >> mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, >> quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Ed and Andy, >> Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, >> which seems to have produced an AHA! moment" regarding >> object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: >> Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I >> decided that the most important property of human language that >> clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species' ability >> to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use >> language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including >> imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay >> article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring >> that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one >> another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if >> this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the >> Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in >> measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 >> teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and >> quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. >> Moxhay's article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that >> certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which >> the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would >> think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've >>> been >> doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that >> things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering >> whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even >> Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more >> that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to >> factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. >> So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, >> think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying >> mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >>> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but >>> that >> may come from thinking about them too much. >>> >>> Thanks >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me >>>> that >> teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating >> concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what >> the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," >> he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of >> acting/ >> - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related >> to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and >> also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes >> a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the >> point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual >> stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol >> which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. >> The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. >> At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but >> later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material >> task remains in the background. This is what is special about >> mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: >> the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' >> - the unit of capital. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> --- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a >>>>> total >> duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>>> >>>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical >> questions unusually interesting. >>>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a >> necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>>> mike**2 >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Nov 7 04:31:54 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 12:31:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <006901cffa81$183a41b0$48aec510$@net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <5-4571-927A-9DD4F91DCF90@uniandes.edu.co> <006901cffa81$183a41b0$48aec510$@net.il> Message-ID: <2939B2A3-72DC-43BB-9E3E-E5B23CC9A482@uniandes.edu.co> Hola Anna, Well, here's our summary of your position at the time. Did we get it right? Sfard (1998) also gives an account of mathematics that can be called postmodern. She recounts how the search for the elusive referents of mathematical discourse motivated reconceptualizations of this relationship ? the move from realism to constructivism, and then the abandonment of the classic dichotomy of symbol/referent in favor of interactionist views of symbols and meaning, such as the semiotics of Saussure and Peirce. Sfard builds on ?Foucault?s central claim that the objects ?referred to? by symbols, far from being primary to signs and speech acts, are an added value (or the emergent phenomenon) of the discursive activity. This is particularly true for the evanescent objects of mathematics? (p. 14). The ?central theme? of her paper is ?[t]he process through which the objects ?represented? by the symbols come into being retroactively? (p. 15). She suggests that discourse about mathematical referents is ?Virtual Reality discourse? rather than ?Actual Reality discourse,? a metaphor that ?conveys a message as to the particular rights and obligations the mathematical discourse confers upon the participants.... Those who really wish to communicate, not being able to help themselves with their senses, have to use all their mental faculties in an attempt to reconstruct for themselves the realm within which the moves of their interloctors make sense? (p. 2). The task that faces us when we seek to understand mathematics, as she sees it, ?consists of not ? or no longer ? treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak? (Foucault, 1969/1992, p. 40, emphasis added by Sfard). Martin On Nov 7, 2014, at 6:50 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Ahoy Martin, > > How nice: so Rotman, Lachterman and the writer of these lines are > mathematical figures? Positive or negative? :-) > > And while all the other folks you mention indeed view discourse as the heart > of mathematics, I view it as more than that. Indeed, not just the heart - > discourse includes all the other parts as well. In mathematical symbols, > mathematics = [special kind of] discourse (and this is what Huw regards as > reductionism, perhaps because he equates discourse with languaging?). > > Must reread your paper. It's been awhile... > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 1:29 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Huw & Anna, > > I had forgotten, until I read the paper again, that Jenny and I based our > analysis of the fractions class on three main figures: Rotman, Lachterman, > and Sfard! All three see discourse at the heart of mathematics. > > Martin > > > On Nov 7, 2014, at 5:57 AM, anna sfard wrote: > >> Hi Huw, >> >> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would like > to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about problem > solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing > it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is > where you're going." I do think about these processes in discursive terms > and feel, on the contrary, that this is what guards me against > objectification and acquisitionism. So why? >> >> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". If > you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. Objective, > as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a given form > independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But this adjective > ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" are > subcategory of narratives). So... >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Hi Anna, >> >> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated upon > social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds formed > in numerical rituals. >> >> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, seem to > be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental searching > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory about > mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these processes as > discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it to > wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where > you're going. >> >> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is the > distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than > comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that > fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces > transformations. >> >> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps there's > quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized > discourse, perhaps). >> >> I enjoyed your paper. :) >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> From sfard@netvision.net.il Fri Nov 7 04:47:06 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 14:47:06 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <2939B2A3-72DC-43BB-9E3E-E5B23CC9A482@uniandes.edu.co> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <9DD4F91DCF90@uniandes.edu.co> <006901cffa81$183a41b0$48aec510$@net.il> <2939B2A3-72DC-43BB-9E3E-E5B23CC9A482@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <00b201cffa88$f03a1bb0$d0ae5310$@net.il> Salam/shalom, Martin, You said it better than I did (some 15 years ago). Thanks! Your paper on fractions is very relevant to the study currently being done by one of my young colleagues (a.k.a. students). Don't be surprised if she writes to you one of these days. anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 2:32 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Hola Anna, Well, here's our summary of your position at the time. Did we get it right? Sfard (1998) also gives an account of mathematics that can be called postmodern. She recounts how the search for the elusive referents of mathematical discourse motivated reconceptualizations of this relationship - the move from realism to constructivism, and then the abandonment of the classic dichotomy of symbol/referent in favor of interactionist views of symbols and meaning, such as the semiotics of Saussure and Peirce. Sfard builds on "Foucault's central claim that the objects 'referred to' by symbols, far from being primary to signs and speech acts, are an added value (or the emergent phenomenon) of the discursive activity. This is particularly true for the evanescent objects of mathematics" (p. 14). The "central theme" of her paper is "[t]he process through which the objects 'represented' by the symbols come into being retroactively" (p. 15). She suggests that discourse about mathematical referents is "Virtual Reality discourse" rather than "Actual Reality discourse," a metaphor that "conveys a message as to the particular rights and obligations the mathematical discourse confers upon the participants.... Those who really wish to communicate, not being able to help themselves with their senses, have to use all their mental faculties in an attempt to reconstruct for themselves the realm within which the moves of their interloctors make sense" (p. 2). The task that faces us when we seek to understand mathematics, as she sees it, "consists of not - or no longer - treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1969/1992, p. 40, emphasis added by Sfard). Martin On Nov 7, 2014, at 6:50 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Ahoy Martin, > > How nice: so Rotman, Lachterman and the writer of these lines are > mathematical figures? Positive or negative? :-) > > And while all the other folks you mention indeed view discourse as the > heart of mathematics, I view it as more than that. Indeed, not just > the heart - discourse includes all the other parts as well. In > mathematical symbols, mathematics = [special kind of] discourse (and > this is what Huw regards as reductionism, perhaps because he equates discourse with languaging?). > > Must reread your paper. It's been awhile... > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 1:29 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Huw & Anna, > > I had forgotten, until I read the paper again, that Jenny and I based > our analysis of the fractions class on three main figures: Rotman, > Lachterman, and Sfard! All three see discourse at the heart of mathematics. > > Martin > > > On Nov 7, 2014, at 5:57 AM, anna sfard wrote: > >> Hi Huw, >> >> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would >> like > to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about > problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do > think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the > contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and acquisitionism. So why? >> >> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >> If > you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a > given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But > this adjective > ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" > are subcategory of narratives). So... >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Hi Anna, >> >> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated >> upon > social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds > formed in numerical rituals. >> >> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, >> seem to > be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental > searching > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory > about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these > processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >> >> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is >> the > distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than > comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that > fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces > transformations. >> >> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps >> there's > quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized > discourse, perhaps). >> >> I enjoyed your paper. :) >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Nov 7 07:57:02 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 15:57:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> Message-ID: Hi Anna, Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with the world of objects. Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... Is that any clearer? Best, Huw On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would like > to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about problem > solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing > it to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is > where you're going." I do think about these processes in discursive terms > and feel, on the contrary, that this is what guards me against > objectification and acquisitionism. So why? > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". If > you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a given > form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But this > adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think > ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Hi Anna, > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated upon > social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds formed > in numerical rituals. > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, seem to > be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental searching > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory about > mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these processes as > discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with linguists reducing it > to wording, and various kinds of "acquisitionists" thinking that this is > where you're going. > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is the > distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than > comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that > fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces > transformations. > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps there's > quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized > discourse, perhaps). > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > Best, > Huw > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and > > now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I > > am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who > > are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of > > its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov > > only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing > > for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative > > discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the > > process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help > > it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's > > life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative > > discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any > > connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses > > coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; > > but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is > > meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of > choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > > > > anna > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > Ed and Andy, > > Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which > > seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated > > action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > > Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I > > decided that the most important property of human language that > > clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability > > to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use > > language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including > > imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay > > article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring > > that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another > > in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this > > touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the > > Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in > > measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 > > teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and > > quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. > > Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that > > certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the > > dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) > > was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the > interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I > have bitten off more than I can chew. > > Henry > > > > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've > > > been > > doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that > > things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering > > whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even > > Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that > > is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor > > in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need > > to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit > > more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, > > and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what > you are saying here. > > > I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but > > > that > > may come from thinking about them too much. > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > >> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me > > >> that > > teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating > > concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what > > the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of > artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," > > he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ > > - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to > > a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also > > equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a > > "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point > > of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual > > stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol > > which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. > > >> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. > > The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. > > At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but > > later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material > > task remains in the background. This is what is special about > > mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and > becomes the object. C.f. Capital: > > the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises > M-C-M' > > - the unit of capital. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > >> --- > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> mike cole wrote: > > >>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a > > >>> total > > duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? > > >>> > > >>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical > > questions unusually interesting. > > >>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. > > >>> > > >>> mike > > >>> > > >>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a > > necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not > is? > > >>> mike**2 > > >>> :-) > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From sfard@netvision.net.il Fri Nov 7 09:01:06 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 19:01:06 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> Message-ID: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> Hi Huw, You say: Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with the world of objects. I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed only with the methods used by linguists? You also say: Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to the kid, thus giving her advice. You say: Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about what you meant. But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is helpful too J anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Hi Anna, Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with the world of objects. Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... Is that any clearer? Best, Huw On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would > like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked > about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do > think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the > contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and acquisitionism. So why? > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". > If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a > given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But > this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people > say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Hi Anna, > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated > upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative > bonds formed in numerical rituals. > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, > seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving > (mental searching > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory > about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these > processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is > the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather > than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising > that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, > induces transformations. > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps > there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about > individualized discourse, perhaps). > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > Best, > Huw > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and > > now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I > > am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those > > who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the > > relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I > > mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The > > theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking > > the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of > > departure for the process of developing child's mathematical > > thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two > > discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in > > parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the > > numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain > > point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the > > incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, > > quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it > > supports the activity of > choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > > > > anna From ewall@umich.edu Fri Nov 7 10:00:48 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 12:00:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> Message-ID: <151DAC59-E0B6-449F-8F29-91A36B8A11D7@umich.edu> Anna Thanks for this. I can see why the conversation was of interest. Ed Wall On Nov 6, 2014, at 12:10 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Hi, > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of departure for the process of developing child's mathematical thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it supports the activity of choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with grownups). > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 3:11 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Ed and Andy, > Just a little while ago, while I was finishing the Moxhay paper, which seems to have produced an AHA! moment? regarding object-mediated action for Andy, I had my own AHA! moment, and it is this: > Some years ago, after teaching Intro to Linguistics many times, I decided that the most important property of human language that clearly sets it apart from what we know about other species? ability to communicate is what is called DISPLACEMENT: the ability to use language to refer to things removed from the here and now, including imaginary happenings or things. The Davydov tasks in the Moxhay article give children the same problem of displacement by requiring that they figure a way to compare two objects removed from one another in space, and, effectively, in time. And I am wondering if this touches on the other threads I have been following: L2 and the Blommmaert/Silverstein. Does the need for standardization in measurement of the objects in the world today find its way into L2 teaching and language policy? The blending of qualitative and quantitative research methods come to mind, to my mind at least. Moxhay?s article ended with a comparison of Classroom A and B that certainly was a blend of the two methods, though the ways in which the dialog broke down in Classroom B (a qualitative issue, I would think) was only hinted at. That would have required a narrative. So, the interplay of narrative and dialog, objects mentioned by David K. I know I have bitten off more than I can chew. > Henry > > >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:51 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >> Andy >> >> What you say here fits somewhat with some of the thinking I've been doing, but, in part, it is at the point of symbol manipulation that things seem get complicated for me. Also, I find myself wondering whether teaching mathematics, in effect, as mathematics or even Davydov-style is just the things you list. There seems to be more that is needed (and I could be wrong about this) and I have yet to factor in something like those pre-concepts you mentioned earlier. So I need to do a little reading/rereading on the symbolic question, think a bit more about the space the teacher opens up for studying mathematics, and factor in those 'pre-concepts' before I can reply reasonably to what you are saying here. >> I admit that I tend to complicate things too much (smile), but that may come from thinking about them too much. >> >> Thanks >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Particularly after reading Peter Moxhays' paper, it is clear to me that teaching mathematics, Davydov-style, is orchestrating concept-formation in a particular domain of activity, and that what the children are doing in forming a concept is a system of artefact-mediated actions: "For Davydov," he says, "a theoretical concept is itself a /general method of acting/ - a method for solving an entire class of problems - and is related to a whole system of object-oriented actions." Pure Vygotsky, and also equally pure Activity Theory except that here the object becomes a "theoretical concept," which is characteristically Vygotsky, the point of difference between ANL and LSV! Just as in all those dual stimulation experiments of Vygotsky, the teacher introduces a symbol which the student can use to solve the task they are working on. >>> So the unit of learning mathematics is *an artefact-mediated action*. The artefact is introduced by the teacher who also sets up the task. At first the symbols is a means of solving the material task, but later, the symbol is manipulated for its own sake, and the material task remains in the background. This is what is special about mathematics I think, that the symbolic operation begins as means and becomes the object. C.f. Capital: the unit is initially C-C' becomes C-M-C' and then from this arises M-C-M' - the unit of capital. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> --- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> mike cole wrote: >>>> That is really a great addition to Andy's example, Ed. Being a total duffer here i am assuming that the invert v is a sign for "power of" ? >>>> >>>> You, collectively, are making thinking about "simple" mathematical questions unusually interesting. >>>> The word problem problem is really interesting too. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> PS - I assume that when you type: There is, one might say, a necessity within the integers is that 5 x -1 = -5. you mean a SUCH not is? >>>> mike**2 >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Nov 7 12:27:22 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 20:27:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> Message-ID: Hi Anna, I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited manner). For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the social situations established through discourse may promote such development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that it was all happening discursively. Best, Huw On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: > Hi Huw, > > > > You say: > > > > Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the > fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, > rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're > introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse > into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with > the world of objects. > > > > I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", this > would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. Sometimes, > they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to remember that > discourses are not just talking ? there is also gesturing, drawing etc. But > including those in discourse (communication) does not mean putting there > "phenomena inaccessible to analysis within this terminology". I think your > tacit assumption was that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and > can thus be analyzed only with the methods used by linguists? > > > > You also say: > > > > Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of > independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but > note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal > discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a > considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only > derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things > going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be > a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do > it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. > > > > Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling > things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication with > herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind of inner > discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a discourse > nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not discursive, so > it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not inner discourse > (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of walking or dressing a > bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to the kid, thus giving her > advice. > > > > You say: > > > > Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce > whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective > "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor > communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as > communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because > the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that > there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. > > > > Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about what > you meant. > > > > But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is helpful > too J > > > > anna > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > Hi Anna, > > > > Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the > fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, > rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're > introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse > into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with > the world of objects. > > > > Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of > independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but > note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal > discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a > considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only > derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things > going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be > a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do > it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. > > > > Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce > whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective > "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor > communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as > communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because > the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that > there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. > > As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised > discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... > > > > Is that any clearer? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < > sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > > > Hi Huw, > > > > > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would > > > like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked > > > about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with > > > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > > > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do > > > think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the > > > contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and > acquisitionism. So why? > > > > > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". > > > If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > > > Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a > > > given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But > > > this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people > > > say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > > > > > anna > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > > > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > > > Hi Anna, > > > > > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated > > > upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative > > > bonds formed in numerical rituals. > > > > > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, > > > seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving > > > (mental searching > > > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory > > > about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these > > > processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with > > > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > > > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > > > > > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is > > > the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather > > > than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising > > > that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, > > > induces transformations. > > > > > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps > > > there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about > > > individualized discourse, perhaps). > > > > > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < > sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and > > > > now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I > > > > am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those > > > > who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the > > > > relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I > > > > mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The > > > > theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking > > > > the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of > > > > departure for the process of developing child's mathematical > > > > thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two > > > > discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in > > > > parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the > > > > numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain > > > > point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the > > > > incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, > > > > quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it > > > > supports the activity of > > > choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with > grownups). > > > > > > > > anna > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Nov 7 14:04:54 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 22:04:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <00b201cffa88$f03a1bb0$d0ae5310$@net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <9DD4F91DCF90@uniandes.edu.co> <006901cffa81$183a41b0$48aec510$@net.il> <2939B2A3-72DC-43BB-9E3E-E5B23CC9A482@uniandes.edu.co> <00b201cffa88$f03a1bb0$d0ae5310$@net.il> Message-ID: Of course what would be nice is getting it published! ;) On Nov 7, 2014, at 7:47 AM, anna sfard wrote: > Salam/shalom, Martin, > > You said it better than I did (some 15 years ago). Thanks! > > Your paper on fractions is very relevant to the study currently being done > by one of my young colleagues (a.k.a. students). Don't be surprised if she > writes to you one of these days. > > anna > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 2:32 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Hola Anna, > > Well, here's our summary of your position at the time. Did we get it right? > > Sfard (1998) also gives an account of mathematics that can be > called postmodern. She recounts how the search for the elusive referents of > mathematical discourse motivated reconceptualizations of this relationship - > the move from realism to constructivism, and then the abandonment of the > classic dichotomy of symbol/referent in favor of interactionist views of > symbols and meaning, such as the semiotics of Saussure and Peirce. Sfard > builds on "Foucault's central claim that the objects 'referred to' by > symbols, far from being primary to signs and speech acts, are an added value > (or the emergent phenomenon) of the discursive activity. This is > particularly true for the evanescent objects of mathematics" (p. 14). The > "central theme" of her paper is "[t]he process through which the objects > 'represented' by the symbols come into being retroactively" (p. 15). She > suggests that discourse about mathematical referents is "Virtual Reality > discourse" rather than "Actual Reality discourse," a metaphor that "conveys > a message as to the particular rights and obligations the mathematical > discourse confers upon the participants.... Those who really wish to > communicate, not being able to help themselves with their senses, have to > use all their mental faculties in an attempt to reconstruct for themselves > the realm within which the moves of their interloctors make sense" (p. 2). > The task that faces us when we seek to understand mathematics, as she sees > it, "consists of not - or no longer - treating discourses as groups of signs > (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as > practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" > (Foucault, 1969/1992, p. 40, emphasis added by Sfard). > > Martin > > On Nov 7, 2014, at 6:50 AM, anna sfard wrote: > >> Ahoy Martin, >> >> How nice: so Rotman, Lachterman and the writer of these lines are >> mathematical figures? Positive or negative? :-) >> >> And while all the other folks you mention indeed view discourse as the >> heart of mathematics, I view it as more than that. Indeed, not just >> the heart - discourse includes all the other parts as well. In >> mathematical symbols, mathematics = [special kind of] discourse (and >> this is what Huw regards as reductionism, perhaps because he equates > discourse with languaging?). >> >> Must reread your paper. It's been awhile... >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John >> Packer >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 1:29 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Huw & Anna, >> >> I had forgotten, until I read the paper again, that Jenny and I based >> our analysis of the fractions class on three main figures: Rotman, >> Lachterman, and Sfard! All three see discourse at the heart of > mathematics. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Nov 7, 2014, at 5:57 AM, anna sfard wrote: >> >>> Hi Huw, >>> >>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would >>> like >> to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about >> problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with >> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do >> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the >> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and > acquisitionism. So why? >>> >>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >>> If >> you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. >> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a >> given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But >> this adjective >> ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" >> are subcategory of narratives). So... >>> >>> anna >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> Hi Anna, >>> >>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated >>> upon >> social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds >> formed in numerical rituals. >>> >>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, >>> seem to >> be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental >> searching >> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory >> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these >> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with >> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >>> >>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is >>> the >> distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than >> comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that >> fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces >> transformations. >>> >>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps >>> there's >> quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized >> discourse, perhaps). >>> >>> I enjoyed your paper. :) >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Nov 7 14:17:19 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 14:17:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <9DD4F91DCF90@uniandes.edu.co> <006901cffa81$183a41b0$48aec510$@net.il> <2939B2A3-72DC-43BB-9E3E-E5B23CC9A482@uniandes.edu.co> <00b201cffa88$f03a1bb0$d0ae5310$@net.il> Message-ID: How about sending me the reviews. Who was the editor at the time? mike On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 2:04 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Of course what would be nice is getting it published! ;) > > On Nov 7, 2014, at 7:47 AM, anna sfard wrote: > > > Salam/shalom, Martin, > > > > You said it better than I did (some 15 years ago). Thanks! > > > > Your paper on fractions is very relevant to the study currently being > done > > by one of my young colleagues (a.k.a. students). Don't be surprised if > she > > writes to you one of these days. > > > > anna > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 2:32 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > Hola Anna, > > > > Well, here's our summary of your position at the time. Did we get it > right? > > > > Sfard (1998) also gives an account of mathematics that can be > > called postmodern. She recounts how the search for the elusive referents > of > > mathematical discourse motivated reconceptualizations of this > relationship - > > the move from realism to constructivism, and then the abandonment of the > > classic dichotomy of symbol/referent in favor of interactionist views of > > symbols and meaning, such as the semiotics of Saussure and Peirce. Sfard > > builds on "Foucault's central claim that the objects 'referred to' by > > symbols, far from being primary to signs and speech acts, are an added > value > > (or the emergent phenomenon) of the discursive activity. This is > > particularly true for the evanescent objects of mathematics" (p. 14). The > > "central theme" of her paper is "[t]he process through which the objects > > 'represented' by the symbols come into being retroactively" (p. 15). She > > suggests that discourse about mathematical referents is "Virtual Reality > > discourse" rather than "Actual Reality discourse," a metaphor that > "conveys > > a message as to the particular rights and obligations the mathematical > > discourse confers upon the participants.... Those who really wish to > > communicate, not being able to help themselves with their senses, have to > > use all their mental faculties in an attempt to reconstruct for > themselves > > the realm within which the moves of their interloctors make sense" (p. > 2). > > The task that faces us when we seek to understand mathematics, as she > sees > > it, "consists of not - or no longer - treating discourses as groups of > signs > > (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as > > practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" > > (Foucault, 1969/1992, p. 40, emphasis added by Sfard). > > > > Martin > > > > On Nov 7, 2014, at 6:50 AM, anna sfard wrote: > > > >> Ahoy Martin, > >> > >> How nice: so Rotman, Lachterman and the writer of these lines are > >> mathematical figures? Positive or negative? :-) > >> > >> And while all the other folks you mention indeed view discourse as the > >> heart of mathematics, I view it as more than that. Indeed, not just > >> the heart - discourse includes all the other parts as well. In > >> mathematical symbols, mathematics = [special kind of] discourse (and > >> this is what Huw regards as reductionism, perhaps because he equates > > discourse with languaging?). > >> > >> Must reread your paper. It's been awhile... > >> > >> anna > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > >> Packer > >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 1:29 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > >> > >> Huw & Anna, > >> > >> I had forgotten, until I read the paper again, that Jenny and I based > >> our analysis of the fractions class on three main figures: Rotman, > >> Lachterman, and Sfard! All three see discourse at the heart of > > mathematics. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> On Nov 7, 2014, at 5:57 AM, anna sfard wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Huw, > >>> > >>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would > >>> like > >> to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked about > >> problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with > >> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > >> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do > >> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the > >> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and > > acquisitionism. So why? > >>> > >>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". > >>> If > >> you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > >> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a > >> given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But > >> this adjective > >> ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people say/think ("facts" > >> are subcategory of narratives). So... > >>> > >>> anna > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > >>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > >>> > >>> Hi Anna, > >>> > >>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated > >>> upon > >> social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative bonds > >> formed in numerical rituals. > >>> > >>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, > >>> seem to > >> be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving (mental > >> searching > >> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory > >> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these > >> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with > >> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > >> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > >>> > >>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is > >>> the > >> distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather than > >> comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising that > >> fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, induces > >> transformations. > >>> > >>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps > >>> there's > >> quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about individualized > >> discourse, perhaps). > >>> > >>> I enjoyed your paper. :) > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Fri Nov 7 22:53:55 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2014 17:53:55 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> Message-ID: <545DBE03.9070305@mira.net> Activity Theory and Discourse Theory both have chequered histories, but if fully developed both can arrive at the same place. I think the Japanese martial arts people probably have a saying similar to that. Vygotsky's article circulated earlier, hints at this. I prefer Activity Theory, but only on condition that it is developed to the point where it matches what Discourse Theory can tell us. My only objection is to claims that maths (for example) is *only* a discourse, that is, that there is no "outside" to discourse. The same would go for Activity. Thus the subject line for this thread. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Anna, > > I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse the > point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from > non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are > not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited > manner). > > For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive isn't > a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical competence > upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate that > discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see > discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being > referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that > discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but > that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the > social situations established through discourse may promote such > development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be > reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that it > was all happening discursively. > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: > > >> Hi Huw, >> >> >> >> You say: >> >> >> >> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, >> rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're >> introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse >> into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with >> the world of objects. >> >> >> >> I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", this >> would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. Sometimes, >> they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to remember that >> discourses are not just talking ? there is also gesturing, drawing etc. But >> including those in discourse (communication) does not mean putting there >> "phenomena inaccessible to analysis within this terminology". I think your >> tacit assumption was that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and >> can thus be analyzed only with the methods used by linguists? >> >> >> >> You also say: >> >> >> >> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of >> independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but >> note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal >> discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a >> considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only >> derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things >> going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be >> a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do >> it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. >> >> >> >> Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling >> things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication with >> herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind of inner >> discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a discourse >> nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not discursive, so >> it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not inner discourse >> (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of walking or dressing a >> bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to the kid, thus giving her >> advice. >> >> >> >> You say: >> >> >> >> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor >> communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as >> communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because >> the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that >> there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. >> >> >> >> Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about what >> you meant. >> >> >> >> But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is helpful >> too J >> >> >> >> anna >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> >> >> Hi Anna, >> >> >> >> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are discursive, >> rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. But it means you're >> introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to the analysis of discourse >> into this terminology. Actions communicate, but they also interact with >> the world of objects. >> >> >> >> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions of >> independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, but >> note that in a developed form there may not actually be any internal >> discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about consequences of a >> considered action and what is required. And this memory is not only >> derived from participants but from our interactions with objects -- things >> going on beneath the stratum of communication. The use of discourse can be >> a rather coarse medium. A toddler learning to put a jumper on does not do >> it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. >> >> >> >> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics professor >> communicating some rather negative gestures about mathematics as >> communication. Personally, I thought that was rather interesting, because >> the wide use of one of this professor's books helped me to realise that >> there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. >> >> As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised >> discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... >> >> >> >> Is that any clearer? >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < >> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >> >> >> >> >>> Hi Huw, >>> >>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would >>> >>> like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked >>> >>> about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up with >>> >>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>> >>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do >>> >>> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the >>> >>> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and >>> >> acquisitionism. So why? >> >> >>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >>> >>> If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. >>> >>> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have a >>> >>> given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But >>> >>> this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people >>> >>> say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... >>> >>> anna >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> >>> From: >>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> >> >>> >>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >> >> >>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >>> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> Hi Anna, >>> >>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated >>> >>> upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative >>> >>> bonds formed in numerical rituals. >>> >>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, >>> >>> seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving >>> >>> (mental searching >>> >>> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory >>> >>> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these >>> >>> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with >>> >>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>> >>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >>> >>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is >>> >>> the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, rather >>> >>> than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of exercising >>> >>> that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, >>> >>> induces transformations. >>> >>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps >>> >>> there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about >>> >>> individualized discourse, perhaps). >>> >>> I enjoyed your paper. :) >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < >>> >> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >> >> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, and >>>> >>>> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So I >>>> >>>> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those >>>> >>>> who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the >>>> >>>> relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I >>>> >>>> mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The >>>> >>>> theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking >>>> >>>> the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point of >>>> >>>> departure for the process of developing child's mathematical >>>> >>>> thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two >>>> >>>> discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less in >>>> >>>> parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and the >>>> >>>> numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a certain >>>> >>>> point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the >>>> >>>> incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical stage, >>>> >>>> quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as it >>>> >>>> supports the activity of >>>> >>> choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with >>> >> grownups). >> >> >>>> anna >>>> >> >> >> > > From sfard@netvision.net.il Fri Nov 7 23:16:47 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2014 09:16:47 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> Message-ID: <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> Hi Huw, I really like your metaphor of discourse as a plane with "kinds of mathematical knowledge ... traversing through that plane". It is for such metaphors, if anything, and for the kind of imagery that generates it that one should learn mathematics! This metaphor shows me very clearly, however, that you and I are not at the same page when it comes to the use of the word discourse. I am insisting on this point because, unlike you, I think that "the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive" IS "a big deal". See, for me, discursive is tantamount to communicational. If so, when you say "memories derived from non-discursive actions ... are not discursive", I cannot agree. Having memories, no matter about what, is always a communicational act. The fact that memory is about something non-discursive cannot change this. When you say it does, you "collapse" the talk with what is being talked about (we commit such "ontological collapses" all the time, so you're definitely not alone :-)). And since Andy's post is coming just as I am about to send this email, let me add that while I agree with Andy that activity theory and the discursive framework are doing similar jobs in similar, but mostly parallel ways, I am wondering about why Andy thinks that the equation 'math = discourse' implies that 'there is no "outside" to discourse'. But this, probably, is a different story, and since I do have life beyond [this] discourse, I think I must leave it here :-) anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:27 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Hi Anna, I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited manner). For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the social situations established through discourse may promote such development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that it was all happening discursively. Best, Huw On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: > Hi Huw, > > > > You say: > > > > Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the > fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are > discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. > But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to > the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, > but they also interact with the world of objects. > > > > I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", > this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. > Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to > remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also > gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse > (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to > analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was > that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed only with the methods used by linguists? > > > > You also say: > > > > Particular important points with respect to competence include notions > of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, > but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any > internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about > consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this > memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions > with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. > The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler > learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. > > > > Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling > things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication > with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind > of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a > discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not > discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not > inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of > walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to > the kid, thus giving her advice. > > > > You say: > > > > Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce > whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective > "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics > professor communicating some rather negative gestures about > mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather > interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books > helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. > > > > Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about > what you meant. > > > > But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is > helpful too J > > > > anna > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > Hi Anna, > > > > Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the > fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are > discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. > But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to > the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, > but they also interact with the world of objects. > > > > Particular important points with respect to competence include notions > of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, > but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any > internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about > consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this > memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions > with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. > The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler > learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though talking may help organise it a little. > > > > Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce > whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective > "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics > professor communicating some rather negative gestures about > mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather > interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books > helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the way mathematics is taught. > > As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised > discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... > > > > Is that any clearer? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < > sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > > > Hi Huw, > > > > > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would > > > like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked > > > about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up > > with > > > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > > > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do > > > think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the > > > contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and > acquisitionism. So why? > > > > > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". > > > If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > > > Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have > > a > > > given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But > > > this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people > > > say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > > > > > anna > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > > > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > > > Hi Anna, > > > > > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated > > > upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative > > > bonds formed in numerical rituals. > > > > > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, > > > seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving > > > (mental searching > > > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory > > > about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these > > > processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with > > > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > > > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > > > > > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is > > > the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, > > rather > > > than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of > > exercising > > > that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, > > > induces transformations. > > > > > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps > > > there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about > > > individualized discourse, perhaps). > > > > > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < > > > sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, > > > and > > > > now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So > > > I > > > > am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those > > > > who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the > > > > relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I > > > > mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The > > > > theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking > > > > the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point > > > of > > > > departure for the process of developing child's mathematical > > > > thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two > > > > discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less > > > in > > > > parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and > > > the > > > > numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a > > > certain > > > > point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the > > > > incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical > > > stage, > > > > quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as > > > it > > > > supports the activity of > > > choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with > grownups). > > > > > > > > anna > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Nov 8 04:05:11 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2014 12:05:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> References: <9A0CD8DC-7A92-4561-A550-EF5900B9B1CE@umich.edu> <5883D78B-B4BC-4EB7-987E-06C3C2D22EB1@umich.edu> <5451DB76.7010007@mira.net> <54520634.9080302@mira.net> <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> Message-ID: The simple problem here, Anna, is that actions require memory. To act is to exercise memory. This may be why Andy is saying there's no outside to discourse and is the reason why I proffered a way of construing discourse that included action. Best, Huw On 8 November 2014 07:16, anna sfard wrote: > Hi Huw, > > I really like your metaphor of discourse as a plane with "kinds of > mathematical knowledge ... traversing through that plane". It is for such > metaphors, if anything, and for the kind of imagery that generates it that > one should learn mathematics! > > This metaphor shows me very clearly, however, that you and I are not at > the same page when it comes to the use of the word discourse. I am > insisting on this point because, unlike you, I think that "the distinction > between when something is or isn't discursive" IS "a big deal". See, for > me, discursive is tantamount to communicational. If so, when you say > "memories derived from non-discursive actions ... are not discursive", I > cannot agree. Having memories, no matter about what, is always a > communicational act. The fact that memory is about something non-discursive > cannot change this. When you say it does, you "collapse" the talk with what > is being talked about (we commit such "ontological collapses" all the > time, so you're definitely not alone :-)). > > And since Andy's post is coming just as I am about to send this email, let > me add that while I agree with Andy that activity theory and the discursive > framework are doing similar jobs in similar, but mostly parallel ways, I am > wondering about why Andy thinks that the equation 'math = discourse' > implies that 'there is no "outside" to discourse'. But this, probably, is a > different story, and since I do have life beyond [this] discourse, I think > I must leave it here :-) > > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:27 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > Hi Anna, > > I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse > the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from > non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are > not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited > manner). > > For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive > isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical > competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate > that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see > discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being > referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that > discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but > that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the > social situations established through discourse may promote such > development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be > reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that it > was all happening discursively. > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: > > > Hi Huw, > > > > > > > > You say: > > > > > > > > Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the > > fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are > > discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. > > But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to > > the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, > > but they also interact with the world of objects. > > > > > > > > I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", > > this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. > > Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to > > remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also > > gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse > > (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to > > analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was > > that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed > only with the methods used by linguists? > > > > > > > > You also say: > > > > > > > > Particular important points with respect to competence include notions > > of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, > > but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any > > internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about > > consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this > > memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions > > with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. > > The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler > > learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though > talking may help organise it a little. > > > > > > > > Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling > > things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication > > with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind > > of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a > > discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not > > discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not > > inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of > > walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to > > the kid, thus giving her advice. > > > > > > > > You say: > > > > > > > > Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce > > whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective > > "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics > > professor communicating some rather negative gestures about > > mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather > > interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books > > helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the > way mathematics is taught. > > > > > > > > Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about > > what you meant. > > > > > > > > But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is > > helpful too J > > > > > > > > anna > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > > > > > Hi Anna, > > > > > > > > Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the > > fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are > > discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. > > But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to > > the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, > > but they also interact with the world of objects. > > > > > > > > Particular important points with respect to competence include notions > > of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, > > but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any > > internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about > > consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this > > memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions > > with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. > > The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler > > learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though > talking may help organise it a little. > > > > > > > > Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce > > whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective > > "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics > > professor communicating some rather negative gestures about > > mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather > > interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books > > helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the > way mathematics is taught. > > > > As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised > > discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... > > > > > > > > Is that any clearer? > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < > > sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hi Huw, > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would > > > > > like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked > > > > > about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up > > > with > > > > > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > > > > > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do > > > > > think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the > > > > > contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and > > acquisitionism. So why? > > > > > > > > > > And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". > > > > > If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. > > > > > Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have > > > a > > > > > given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But > > > > > this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people > > > > > say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... > > > > > > > > > > anna > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > > > > > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > > > > > > > > > Hi Anna, > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated > > > > > upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative > > > > > bonds formed in numerical rituals. > > > > > > > > > > Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, > > > > > seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving > > > > > (mental searching > > > > > etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory > > > > > about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these > > > > > processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with > > > > > linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of > > > > > "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. > > > > > > > > > > A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is > > > > > the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, > > > rather > > > > > than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of > > > exercising > > > > > that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, > > > > > induces transformations. > > > > > > > > > > I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps > > > > > there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about > > > > > individualized discourse, perhaps). > > > > > > > > > > I enjoyed your paper. :) > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < > > > > > sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > > > I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, > > > > and > > > > > > now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So > > > > I > > > > > > am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those > > > > > > who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the > > > > > > relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I > > > > > > mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The > > > > > > theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking > > > > > > the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point > > > > of > > > > > > departure for the process of developing child's mathematical > > > > > > thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two > > > > > > discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less > > > > in > > > > > > parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and > > > > the > > > > > > numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a > > > > certain > > > > > > point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the > > > > > > incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical > > > > stage, > > > > > > quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as > > > > it > > > > > > supports the activity of > > > > > choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with > > grownups). > > > > > > > > > > > > anna > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Nov 8 04:21:25 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2014 23:21:25 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> Message-ID: <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> No Huw, I am not saying "there is no outside to discourse." On the contrary. I am saying that a properly developed discourse theory allows that the world has constraints which cannot be altered by discourse. Activity Theory, properly developed, also recognises that there are relations which are objective and cannot be changed by activity. And Vygotsky warned us against pitting act against word. My objections is only to those elaborations of Activity Theory or Discourse Theory which claim that there is nothing outside the Activity/Discourse. So *obviously* children learn mathematics by learning to participate in mathematical discourse according to social conventions applying to that specific discourse. But my point is only that that discourse is constrained by objective relations (and can therefore be rationally reconstructed), and social conventions can turn out to be wrong. Mathematics is not *just* a social convention. Interesting isn't it, that Leibniz and Newton each discovered calculus at the same time, but each gave it a completely different form. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > The simple problem here, Anna, is that actions require memory. To act is > to exercise memory. This may be why Andy is saying there's no outside to > discourse and is the reason why I proffered a way of construing discourse > that included action. > > Best, > Huw > > On 8 November 2014 07:16, anna sfard wrote: > > >> Hi Huw, >> >> I really like your metaphor of discourse as a plane with "kinds of >> mathematical knowledge ... traversing through that plane". It is for such >> metaphors, if anything, and for the kind of imagery that generates it that >> one should learn mathematics! >> >> This metaphor shows me very clearly, however, that you and I are not at >> the same page when it comes to the use of the word discourse. I am >> insisting on this point because, unlike you, I think that "the distinction >> between when something is or isn't discursive" IS "a big deal". See, for >> me, discursive is tantamount to communicational. If so, when you say >> "memories derived from non-discursive actions ... are not discursive", I >> cannot agree. Having memories, no matter about what, is always a >> communicational act. The fact that memory is about something non-discursive >> cannot change this. When you say it does, you "collapse" the talk with what >> is being talked about (we commit such "ontological collapses" all the >> time, so you're definitely not alone :-)). >> >> And since Andy's post is coming just as I am about to send this email, let >> me add that while I agree with Andy that activity theory and the discursive >> framework are doing similar jobs in similar, but mostly parallel ways, I am >> wondering about why Andy thinks that the equation 'math = discourse' >> implies that 'there is no "outside" to discourse'. But this, probably, is a >> different story, and since I do have life beyond [this] discourse, I think >> I must leave it here :-) >> >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:27 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> Hi Anna, >> >> I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse >> the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from >> non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are >> not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited >> manner). >> >> For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive >> isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical >> competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate >> that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see >> discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being >> referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that >> discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but >> that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the >> social situations established through discourse may promote such >> development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be >> reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that it >> was all happening discursively. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Huw, >>> >>> >>> >>> You say: >>> >>> >>> >>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>> >>> >>> >>> I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", >>> this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. >>> Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to >>> remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also >>> gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse >>> (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to >>> analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was >>> that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed >>> >> only with the methods used by linguists? >> >>> >>> You also say: >>> >>> >>> >>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>> >> talking may help organise it a little. >> >>> >>> Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling >>> things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication >>> with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind >>> of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a >>> discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not >>> discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not >>> inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of >>> walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to >>> the kid, thus giving her advice. >>> >>> >>> >>> You say: >>> >>> >>> >>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>> >> way mathematics is taught. >> >>> >>> Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about >>> what you meant. >>> >>> >>> >>> But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is >>> helpful too J >>> >>> >>> >>> anna >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> >>> >>> Hi Anna, >>> >>> >>> >>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>> >>> >>> >>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>> >> talking may help organise it a little. >> >>> >>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>> >> way mathematics is taught. >> >>> As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised >>> discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... >>> >>> >>> >>> Is that any clearer? >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < >>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Huw, >>>> >>>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I would >>>> >>>> like to know more, though, about why you think that if you talked >>>> >>>> about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end up >>>> with >>>> >>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>> >>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I do >>>> >>>> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on the >>>> >>>> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification and >>>> >>> acquisitionism. So why? >>> >>> >>>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >>>> >>>> If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an oxymoron. >>>> >>>> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound have >>>> a >>>> >>>> given form independently of one's tastes, values and judgments. But >>>> >>>> this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what people >>>> >>>> say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... >>>> >>>> anna >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> >>>> From: >>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>> >>> >>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >>>> >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>> >>>> Hi Anna, >>>> >>>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, predicated >>>> >>>> upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those tentative >>>> >>>> bonds formed in numerical rituals. >>>> >>>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a problem, >>>> >>>> seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem solving >>>> >>>> (mental searching >>>> >>>> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a theory >>>> >>>> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these >>>> >>>> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up with >>>> >>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>> >>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >>>> >>>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and cognition is >>>> >>>> the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, >>>> rather >>>> >>>> than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of >>>> exercising >>>> >>>> that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present object, >>>> >>>> induces transformations. >>>> >>>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but perhaps >>>> >>>> there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about >>>> >>>> individualized discourse, perhaps). >>>> >>>> I enjoyed your paper. :) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < >>>> >>>> >>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>> >>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>> >>>>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) thread, >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in properly. So >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. Those >>>>> >>>>> who are interested enough to open the attachment will see the >>>>> >>>>> relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And although I >>>>> >>>>> mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much present. The >>>>> >>>>> theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for taking >>>>> >>>>> the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a point >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>> departure for the process of developing child's mathematical >>>>> >>>>> thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two >>>>> >>>>> discourses appear in the child's life separately and more or less >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers and >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a >>>>> certain >>>>> >>>>> point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise to the >>>>> >>>>> incipient mathematical discourse; but at the pre-mathematical >>>>> stage, >>>>> >>>>> quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its own, as >>>>> it >>>>> >>>>> supports the activity of >>>>> >>>> choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with >>>> >>> grownups). >>> >>> >>>>> anna >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Nov 8 04:40:20 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2014 12:40:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> References: <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> Message-ID: That seems fine to me. Although I don't consider that objectivity to be free-standing. Once you have cars, you're going to need traffic management. Once you have practices of arithmetic, you're going to come across the need for algebra. That external objectivity seems to be the same as stating that there are systemic implications. Huw On 8 November 2014 12:21, Andy Blunden wrote: > No Huw, I am not saying "there is no outside to discourse." On the > contrary. I am saying that a properly developed discourse theory allows > that the world has constraints which cannot be altered by discourse. > Activity Theory, properly developed, also recognises that there are > relations which are objective and cannot be changed by activity. And > Vygotsky warned us against pitting act against word. My objections is only > to those elaborations of Activity Theory or Discourse Theory which claim > that there is nothing outside the Activity/Discourse. > So *obviously* children learn mathematics by learning to participate in > mathematical discourse according to social conventions applying to that > specific discourse. But my point is only that that discourse is constrained > by objective relations (and can therefore be rationally reconstructed), and > social conventions can turn out to be wrong. Mathematics is not *just* a > social convention. > Interesting isn't it, that Leibniz and Newton each discovered calculus at > the same time, but each gave it a completely different form. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> The simple problem here, Anna, is that actions require memory. To act is >> to exercise memory. This may be why Andy is saying there's no outside to >> discourse and is the reason why I proffered a way of construing discourse >> that included action. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 8 November 2014 07:16, anna sfard wrote: >> >> >> >>> Hi Huw, >>> >>> I really like your metaphor of discourse as a plane with "kinds of >>> mathematical knowledge ... traversing through that plane". It is for such >>> metaphors, if anything, and for the kind of imagery that generates it >>> that >>> one should learn mathematics! >>> >>> This metaphor shows me very clearly, however, that you and I are not at >>> the same page when it comes to the use of the word discourse. I am >>> insisting on this point because, unlike you, I think that "the >>> distinction >>> between when something is or isn't discursive" IS "a big deal". See, for >>> me, discursive is tantamount to communicational. If so, when you say >>> "memories derived from non-discursive actions ... are not discursive", I >>> cannot agree. Having memories, no matter about what, is always a >>> communicational act. The fact that memory is about something >>> non-discursive >>> cannot change this. When you say it does, you "collapse" the talk with >>> what >>> is being talked about (we commit such "ontological collapses" all the >>> time, so you're definitely not alone :-)). >>> >>> And since Andy's post is coming just as I am about to send this email, >>> let >>> me add that while I agree with Andy that activity theory and the >>> discursive >>> framework are doing similar jobs in similar, but mostly parallel ways, I >>> am >>> wondering about why Andy thinks that the equation 'math = discourse' >>> implies that 'there is no "outside" to discourse'. But this, probably, >>> is a >>> different story, and since I do have life beyond [this] discourse, I >>> think >>> I must leave it here :-) >>> >>> anna >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:27 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> Hi Anna, >>> >>> I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse >>> the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from >>> non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are >>> not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited >>> manner). >>> >>> For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive >>> isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical >>> competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate >>> that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see >>> discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being >>> referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that >>> discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but >>> that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the >>> social situations established through discourse may promote such >>> development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be >>> reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that >>> it >>> was all happening discursively. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Huw, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You say: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", >>>> this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. >>>> Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to >>>> remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also >>>> gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse >>>> (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to >>>> analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was >>>> that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed >>>> >>>> >>> only with the methods used by linguists? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> You also say: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>>> >>>> >>> talking may help organise it a little. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling >>>> things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication >>>> with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind >>>> of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a >>>> discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not >>>> discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not >>>> inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of >>>> walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to >>>> the kid, thus giving her advice. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You say: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>>> >>>> >>> way mathematics is taught. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about >>>> what you meant. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is >>>> helpful too J >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> anna >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Hi Anna, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>>> >>>> >>> talking may help organise it a little. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>>> >>>> >>> way mathematics is taught. >>> >>> >>>> As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised >>>> discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Is that any clearer? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < >>>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Huw, >>>>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I >>>>> would >>>>> like to know more, though, about why you think that if you >>>>> talked >>>>> about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end >>>>> up >>>>> with >>>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I >>>>> do >>>>> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on >>>>> the >>>>> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> >>>> acquisitionism. So why? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >>>>> If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an >>>>> oxymoron. >>>>> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound >>>>> have >>>>> a >>>>> given form independently of one's tastes, values and >>>>> judgments. But >>>>> this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what >>>>> people >>>>> say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... >>>>> anna >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: >>>>> >>>>> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>>> Hi Anna, >>>>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, >>>>> predicated >>>>> upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those >>>>> tentative >>>>> bonds formed in numerical rituals. >>>>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a >>>>> problem, >>>>> seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem >>>>> solving >>>>> (mental searching >>>>> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a >>>>> theory >>>>> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these >>>>> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up >>>>> with >>>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >>>>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and >>>>> cognition is >>>>> the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, >>>>> rather >>>>> than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of >>>>> exercising >>>>> that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present >>>>> object, >>>>> induces transformations. >>>>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but >>>>> perhaps >>>>> there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about >>>>> individualized discourse, perhaps). >>>>> I enjoyed your paper. :) >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) >>>>>> thread, >>>>>> and >>>>>> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in >>>>>> properly. So >>>>>> I >>>>>> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. >>>>>> Those >>>>>> who are interested enough to open the attachment will see >>>>>> the >>>>>> relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And >>>>>> although I >>>>>> mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much >>>>>> present. The >>>>>> theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for >>>>>> taking >>>>>> the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a >>>>>> point >>>>>> of >>>>>> departure for the process of developing child's >>>>>> mathematical >>>>>> thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two >>>>>> discourses appear in the child's life separately and more >>>>>> or less >>>>>> in >>>>>> parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers >>>>>> and >>>>>> the >>>>>> numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a >>>>>> certain >>>>>> point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise >>>>>> to the >>>>>> incipient mathematical discourse; but at the >>>>>> pre-mathematical >>>>>> stage, >>>>>> quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its >>>>>> own, as >>>>>> it >>>>>> supports the activity of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with >>>>> >>>>> >>>> grownups). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> anna >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Nov 8 13:12:32 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2014 14:12:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> Message-ID: Huw and Andy, I am jumping in now, because I think I might have understood almost entirely what you both have been saying. (Don?t go there!) To the extent that this stage of the dialog is about constraints, could we add an ethical note (no bullying) and an aesthetic note (don?t be ugly) as far as ?constraints? on our discourse and activity. Or, we could just be creative. I am so blissfully sure of my brilliance that I propose we make creative projecting as our unit of analysis. Good for whatever ails you. (Don?t go there!) Henry? > On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:40 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > That seems fine to me. Although I don't consider that objectivity to be > free-standing. Once you have cars, you're going to need traffic > management. Once you have practices of arithmetic, you're going to come > across the need for algebra. That external objectivity seems to be the > same as stating that there are systemic implications. > > Huw > > On 8 November 2014 12:21, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> No Huw, I am not saying "there is no outside to discourse." On the >> contrary. I am saying that a properly developed discourse theory allows >> that the world has constraints which cannot be altered by discourse. >> Activity Theory, properly developed, also recognises that there are >> relations which are objective and cannot be changed by activity. And >> Vygotsky warned us against pitting act against word. My objections is only >> to those elaborations of Activity Theory or Discourse Theory which claim >> that there is nothing outside the Activity/Discourse. >> So *obviously* children learn mathematics by learning to participate in >> mathematical discourse according to social conventions applying to that >> specific discourse. But my point is only that that discourse is constrained >> by objective relations (and can therefore be rationally reconstructed), and >> social conventions can turn out to be wrong. Mathematics is not *just* a >> social convention. >> Interesting isn't it, that Leibniz and Newton each discovered calculus at >> the same time, but each gave it a completely different form. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> The simple problem here, Anna, is that actions require memory. To act is >>> to exercise memory. This may be why Andy is saying there's no outside to >>> discourse and is the reason why I proffered a way of construing discourse >>> that included action. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 8 November 2014 07:16, anna sfard wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Huw, >>>> >>>> I really like your metaphor of discourse as a plane with "kinds of >>>> mathematical knowledge ... traversing through that plane". It is for such >>>> metaphors, if anything, and for the kind of imagery that generates it >>>> that >>>> one should learn mathematics! >>>> >>>> This metaphor shows me very clearly, however, that you and I are not at >>>> the same page when it comes to the use of the word discourse. I am >>>> insisting on this point because, unlike you, I think that "the >>>> distinction >>>> between when something is or isn't discursive" IS "a big deal". See, for >>>> me, discursive is tantamount to communicational. If so, when you say >>>> "memories derived from non-discursive actions ... are not discursive", I >>>> cannot agree. Having memories, no matter about what, is always a >>>> communicational act. The fact that memory is about something >>>> non-discursive >>>> cannot change this. When you say it does, you "collapse" the talk with >>>> what >>>> is being talked about (we commit such "ontological collapses" all the >>>> time, so you're definitely not alone :-)). >>>> >>>> And since Andy's post is coming just as I am about to send this email, >>>> let >>>> me add that while I agree with Andy that activity theory and the >>>> discursive >>>> framework are doing similar jobs in similar, but mostly parallel ways, I >>>> am >>>> wondering about why Andy thinks that the equation 'math = discourse' >>>> implies that 'there is no "outside" to discourse'. But this, probably, >>>> is a >>>> different story, and since I do have life beyond [this] discourse, I >>>> think >>>> I must leave it here :-) >>>> >>>> anna >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:27 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>> >>>> Hi Anna, >>>> >>>> I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse >>>> the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from >>>> non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are >>>> not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited >>>> manner). >>>> >>>> For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive >>>> isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical >>>> competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate >>>> that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see >>>> discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being >>>> referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that >>>> discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but >>>> that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the >>>> social situations established through discourse may promote such >>>> development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be >>>> reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that >>>> it >>>> was all happening discursively. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Huw, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You say: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>>>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>>>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>>>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>>>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>>>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", >>>>> this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. >>>>> Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to >>>>> remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also >>>>> gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse >>>>> (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to >>>>> analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was >>>>> that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed >>>>> >>>>> >>>> only with the methods used by linguists? >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> You also say: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>>>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>>>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>>>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>>>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>>>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>>>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>>>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>>>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>>>> >>>>> >>>> talking may help organise it a little. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling >>>>> things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication >>>>> with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind >>>>> of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a >>>>> discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not >>>>> discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not >>>>> inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of >>>>> walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to >>>>> the kid, thus giving her advice. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You say: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>>>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>>>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>>>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>>>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>>>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>>>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> way mathematics is taught. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about >>>>> what you meant. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is >>>>> helpful too J >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> anna >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Anna, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>>>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>>>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>>>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>>>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>>>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>>>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>>>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>>>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>>>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>>>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>>>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>>>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>>>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>>>> >>>>> >>>> talking may help organise it a little. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>>>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>>>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>>>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>>>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>>>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>>>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> way mathematics is taught. >>>> >>>> >>>>> As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised >>>>> discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is that any clearer? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < >>>>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Huw, >>>>>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I >>>>>> would >>>>>> like to know more, though, about why you think that if you >>>>>> talked >>>>>> about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end >>>>>> up >>>>>> with >>>>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I >>>>>> do >>>>>> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on >>>>>> the >>>>>> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> acquisitionism. So why? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >>>>>> If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an >>>>>> oxymoron. >>>>>> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound >>>>>> have >>>>>> a >>>>>> given form independently of one's tastes, values and >>>>>> judgments. But >>>>>> this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what >>>>>> people >>>>>> say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... >>>>>> anna >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>>>> Hi Anna, >>>>>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, >>>>>> predicated >>>>>> upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those >>>>>> tentative >>>>>> bonds formed in numerical rituals. >>>>>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a >>>>>> problem, >>>>>> seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem >>>>>> solving >>>>>> (mental searching >>>>>> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a >>>>>> theory >>>>>> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these >>>>>> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up >>>>>> with >>>>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >>>>>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and >>>>>> cognition is >>>>>> the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, >>>>>> rather >>>>>> than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of >>>>>> exercising >>>>>> that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present >>>>>> object, >>>>>> induces transformations. >>>>>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but >>>>>> perhaps >>>>>> there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about >>>>>> individualized discourse, perhaps). >>>>>> I enjoyed your paper. :) >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Hi, >>>>>>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) >>>>>>> thread, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in >>>>>>> properly. So >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. >>>>>>> Those >>>>>>> who are interested enough to open the attachment will see >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And >>>>>>> although I >>>>>>> mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much >>>>>>> present. The >>>>>>> theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for >>>>>>> taking >>>>>>> the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a >>>>>>> point >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> departure for the process of developing child's >>>>>>> mathematical >>>>>>> thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two >>>>>>> discourses appear in the child's life separately and more >>>>>>> or less >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a >>>>>>> certain >>>>>>> point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise >>>>>>> to the >>>>>>> incipient mathematical discourse; but at the >>>>>>> pre-mathematical >>>>>>> stage, >>>>>>> quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its >>>>>>> own, as >>>>>>> it >>>>>>> supports the activity of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> grownups). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> anna >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Sat Nov 8 14:55:58 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2014 22:55:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> , Message-ID: Dear all I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure I must have misremembered that!.? My feeble understanding of activity is that it involves transformations of (material and other) objects... In order to meet collective and individual human needs. Ok, Marx says such activity also thereby generates new human needs... Mathemattics is being confrnted, criticised and transformed all the time ? I hope this includes being critically subjected to practice, where it might be confronted by some objective, even material facts and 'firstness' (even the CIA found they could not walk through walls) or thirdnesses ( the naive practices of infants who claim that 7 and4 makes 10 sometimes... And surely they are right). In particular, the Maths involved in early years may be confronted with the objective social practice of measurement ( Davydov)... This provides an objective basis for mathematics, which when symbolised in discursive forms ensures a degree of objectivity (not just social convention) for mathematics discourse itself. Thus, the objectivity of the rules of mathematics (as with logic) rest ultimately on the validity of the social practices that ensure maths a wider validity, beyond the conventions of the clique of mathematicians who run the discipline. Thus the discipline is itself disciplined. Vygotsky cites Lenin re Hegels logic: ".. The practical activity of man had to lead his consciousness to () the significance of axioms... " I hope the relevance to objectivity and Davydov makes sense. Julian On 8 Nov 2014, at 21:22, "HENRY SHONERD" wrote: > Huw and Andy, > I am jumping in now, because I think I might have understood almost entirely what you both have been saying. (Don?t go there!) To the extent that this stage of the dialog is about constraints, could we add an ethical note (no bullying) and an aesthetic note (don?t be ugly) as far as ?constraints? on our discourse and activity. Or, we could just be creative. I am so blissfully sure of my brilliance that I propose we make creative projecting as our unit of analysis. Good for whatever ails you. (Don?t go there!) > Henry? > > >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:40 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> That seems fine to me. Although I don't consider that objectivity to be >> free-standing. Once you have cars, you're going to need traffic >> management. Once you have practices of arithmetic, you're going to come >> across the need for algebra. That external objectivity seems to be the >> same as stating that there are systemic implications. >> >> Huw >> >> On 8 November 2014 12:21, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> No Huw, I am not saying "there is no outside to discourse." On the >>> contrary. I am saying that a properly developed discourse theory allows >>> that the world has constraints which cannot be altered by discourse. >>> Activity Theory, properly developed, also recognises that there are >>> relations which are objective and cannot be changed by activity. And >>> Vygotsky warned us against pitting act against word. My objections is only >>> to those elaborations of Activity Theory or Discourse Theory which claim >>> that there is nothing outside the Activity/Discourse. >>> So *obviously* children learn mathematics by learning to participate in >>> mathematical discourse according to social conventions applying to that >>> specific discourse. But my point is only that that discourse is constrained >>> by objective relations (and can therefore be rationally reconstructed), and >>> social conventions can turn out to be wrong. Mathematics is not *just* a >>> social convention. >>> Interesting isn't it, that Leibniz and Newton each discovered calculus at >>> the same time, but each gave it a completely different form. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> The simple problem here, Anna, is that actions require memory. To act is >>>> to exercise memory. This may be why Andy is saying there's no outside to >>>> discourse and is the reason why I proffered a way of construing discourse >>>> that included action. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 8 November 2014 07:16, anna sfard wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Huw, >>>>> >>>>> I really like your metaphor of discourse as a plane with "kinds of >>>>> mathematical knowledge ... traversing through that plane". It is for such >>>>> metaphors, if anything, and for the kind of imagery that generates it >>>>> that >>>>> one should learn mathematics! >>>>> >>>>> This metaphor shows me very clearly, however, that you and I are not at >>>>> the same page when it comes to the use of the word discourse. I am >>>>> insisting on this point because, unlike you, I think that "the >>>>> distinction >>>>> between when something is or isn't discursive" IS "a big deal". See, for >>>>> me, discursive is tantamount to communicational. If so, when you say >>>>> "memories derived from non-discursive actions ... are not discursive", I >>>>> cannot agree. Having memories, no matter about what, is always a >>>>> communicational act. The fact that memory is about something >>>>> non-discursive >>>>> cannot change this. When you say it does, you "collapse" the talk with >>>>> what >>>>> is being talked about (we commit such "ontological collapses" all the >>>>> time, so you're definitely not alone :-)). >>>>> >>>>> And since Andy's post is coming just as I am about to send this email, >>>>> let >>>>> me add that while I agree with Andy that activity theory and the >>>>> discursive >>>>> framework are doing similar jobs in similar, but mostly parallel ways, I >>>>> am >>>>> wondering about why Andy thinks that the equation 'math = discourse' >>>>> implies that 'there is no "outside" to discourse'. But this, probably, >>>>> is a >>>>> different story, and since I do have life beyond [this] discourse, I >>>>> think >>>>> I must leave it here :-) >>>>> >>>>> anna >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 10:27 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>>> >>>>> Hi Anna, >>>>> >>>>> I think with that clarification about how you're referring to discourse >>>>> the point may be put more simply. That is, that memories derived from >>>>> non-discursive actions contribute towards thinking and these memories are >>>>> not discursive (although they could be made to be discursive in a limited >>>>> manner). >>>>> >>>>> For me, the distinction between when something is or isn't discursive >>>>> isn't a big deal. But if you're presenting a sense of mathematical >>>>> competence upon discourse, then it becomes more important to demonstrate >>>>> that discourse offers a sufficient explanation. Personally, I would see >>>>> discourse as a plane, and the kinds of mathematical knowledge being >>>>> referred to as often traversing through that plane. That would mean that >>>>> discourse contributes to specific links in that genetic development, but >>>>> that discourse was not the source of that genesis, but that, however, the >>>>> social situations established through discourse may promote such >>>>> development and that interesting event that are non-discursive may be >>>>> reported discursively. Those circumstances could give the illusion that >>>>> it >>>>> was all happening discursively. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7 November 2014 17:01, anna sfard wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Huw, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You say: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>>>>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>>>>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>>>>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>>>>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>>>>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I didn't mean to say that "the entirety of actions are discursive", >>>>>> this would be strange. There are non-discursive actions, of course. >>>>>> Sometimes, they may be mediate by discourses. But it is important to >>>>>> remember that discourses are not just talking ? there is also >>>>>> gesturing, drawing etc. But including those in discourse >>>>>> (communication) does not mean putting there "phenomena inaccessible to >>>>>> analysis within this terminology". I think your tacit assumption was >>>>>> that discourse is exclusively a language thing, and can thus be analyzed >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> only with the methods used by linguists? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You also say: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>>>>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>>>>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>>>>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>>>>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>>>>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>>>>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>>>>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>>>>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> talking may help organise it a little. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is there a contradiction between the claims "this person is recalling >>>>>> things" and "this person is involved in a discourse (communication >>>>>> with herself)"? I don?t think so. Recall may be not (always) the kind >>>>>> of inner discourse the teacher would like to see, but it is a >>>>>> discourse nevertheless. Learning to walk or dress, in itself, is not >>>>>> discursive, so it doesn't belong to the debate what is and what is not >>>>>> inner discourse (thinking). By the way, we may do this learning of >>>>>> walking or dressing a bit more "discursive" by talking or gesturing to >>>>>> the kid, thus giving her advice. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You say: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>>>>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>>>>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>>>>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>>>>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>>>>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>>>>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> way mathematics is taught. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hmmm, I don't know what to say. I'm afraid I'm not clear enough about >>>>>> what you meant. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But anyway, this is helpful, so thanks, Huw. Hope my response is >>>>>> helpful too J >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> anna >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 5:57 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Anna, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, I think I pointed to the source of the issue with respect to the >>>>>> fabric of actions. If you say that the entirety of actions are >>>>>> discursive, rather than mediated by discursive means, that's fine. >>>>>> But it means you're introducing phenomena typically inaccessible to >>>>>> the analysis of discourse into this terminology. Actions communicate, >>>>>> but they also interact with the world of objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Particular important points with respect to competence include notions >>>>>> of independently solving tasks. You can call that an inner discourse, >>>>>> but note that in a developed form there may not actually be any >>>>>> internal discourse but rather simply a memory, a knowing about >>>>>> consequences of a considered action and what is required. And this >>>>>> memory is not only derived from participants but from our interactions >>>>>> with objects -- things going on beneath the stratum of communication. >>>>>> The use of discourse can be a rather coarse medium. A toddler >>>>>> learning to put a jumper on does not do it through talking, though >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> talking may help organise it a little. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Re reductionism. I think its often the case that people will reduce >>>>>> whenever there is opportunity to. I don't know whether the adjective >>>>>> "acquisitionist" applies, though I do know of one mathematics >>>>>> professor communicating some rather negative gestures about >>>>>> mathematics as communication. Personally, I thought that was rather >>>>>> interesting, because the wide use of one of this professor's books >>>>>> helped me to realise that there was a problem with generalisation in the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> way mathematics is taught. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> As far as I can tell, if you spell out the details of "internalised >>>>>> discourse" then I expect you won't get the same kind of reaction... >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is that any clearer? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 7 November 2014 10:57, anna sfard < >>>>>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Huw, >>>>>>> Thanks for your thoughts. I agree with much of what you say. I >>>>>>> would >>>>>>> like to know more, though, about why you think that if you >>>>>>> talked >>>>>>> about problem solving in discursive terms, "you'd quickly end >>>>>>> up >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>>>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going." I >>>>>>> do >>>>>>> think about these processes in discursive terms and feel, on >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> contrary, that this is what guards me against objectification >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> acquisitionism. So why? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> And on this occasion, to the other debate, the one about "objective". >>>>>>> If you assume the discursive stance, this word becomes an >>>>>>> oxymoron. >>>>>>> Objective, as I understand it, means "mind independent", bound >>>>>>> have >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> given form independently of one's tastes, values and >>>>>>> judgments. But >>>>>>> this adjective ("objective") refers to narratives, to what >>>>>>> people >>>>>>> say/think ("facts" are subcategory of narratives). So... >>>>>>> anna >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 3:24 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>>>>> Hi Anna, >>>>>>> Perhaps you could also assert that quantitative choices, >>>>>>> predicated >>>>>>> upon social commitments, offer a means to go beyond those >>>>>>> tentative >>>>>>> bonds formed in numerical rituals. >>>>>>> Commitments, such as commitment to a task that makes it a >>>>>>> problem, >>>>>>> seem to be important. Also, it seems to me that problem >>>>>>> solving >>>>>>> (mental searching >>>>>>> etc) is something that should have a first class status in a >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>> about mathematics. The problem I'd have with referring to these >>>>>>> processes as discourse is that I think you'd quickly end up >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> linguists reducing it to wording, and various kinds of >>>>>>> "acquisitionists" thinking that this is where you're going. >>>>>>> A second problem, for me, with fusing communication and >>>>>>> cognition is >>>>>>> the distinct role that communication has in mediating actions, >>>>>>> rather >>>>>>> than comprising the fabric of actions. For me, the act of >>>>>>> exercising >>>>>>> that fabric, whether mentally or in relation to a present >>>>>>> object, >>>>>>> induces transformations. >>>>>>> I don't think these issues conflict with your account, but >>>>>>> perhaps >>>>>>> there's quite a bit that is skimmed over (such as the bit about >>>>>>> individualized discourse, perhaps). >>>>>>> I enjoyed your paper. :) >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> On 6 November 2014 06:10, anna sfard < >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> sfard@netvision.net.il> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi, >>>>>>>> I have not been aware of this super-interesting (for me) >>>>>>>> thread, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> now, when I eventually noticed it, I cannot chime in >>>>>>>> properly. So >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> am doing this improperly, simply by attaching my own paper. >>>>>>>> Those >>>>>>>> who are interested enough to open the attachment will see >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> relevance of its theme to the present conversation. And >>>>>>>> although I >>>>>>>> mention Davydov only in an endnote, he is very much >>>>>>>> present. The >>>>>>>> theses I'm arguing for seem to substantiate his request for >>>>>>>> taking >>>>>>>> the quantitative discourse, rather than the numerical, as a >>>>>>>> point >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> departure for the process of developing child's >>>>>>>> mathematical >>>>>>>> thinking (we cannot help it, but in our society, these two >>>>>>>> discourses appear in the child's life separately and more >>>>>>>> or less >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> parallel, with the quantitative discourse free from numbers >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> numerical one innocent of any connection to quantities; at a >>>>>>>> certain >>>>>>>> point, these two discourses coalescence, thus giving rise >>>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>> incipient mathematical discourse; but at the >>>>>>>> pre-mathematical >>>>>>>> stage, >>>>>>>> quantitative discourse is meaningful to the child on its >>>>>>>> own, as >>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>> supports the activity of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> choosing, whereas numerical discourse is but a way to bond with >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> grownups). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> anna >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Nov 8 15:06:08 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2014 23:06:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <5452C9B0.70505@mira.net> <32EF9A39-CDDA-4258-BBDE-7D7658C85A03@umich.edu> <5455DA75.9040906@mira.net> <8EB7C6A3-BA03-469A-A2A5-94274633BE10@umich.edu> <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> , Message-ID: <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! Martin On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams wrote: > I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure I must have misremembered that!.? From ablunden@mira.net Sat Nov 8 16:18:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 11:18:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> , <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for us only thanks to discourse/activity. Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social convention. Simple, eh? I would have thought so. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! > > Martin > > On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams wrote: > > >> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure I must have misremembered that!.? >> > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Nov 8 17:44:00 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2014 17:44:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: My impression is that, for me at least, the conversation about objectivities and conventions as been helpful in focusing my thoughts on the issue. I have not resolved the apparent, residual uncertainties or contradictions that seem to be at issue. Julian, might I start here, and get help with a next step: *"Thus, the objectivity of the rules of mathematics (as with logic) rest ultimately on the validity of the social practices that ensure maths a wider validity, beyond the conventions of the clique of mathematicians who run the discipline. Thus the discipline is itself disciplined."* It seems to me that a lot is riding on the interpretation of the property you call validity. It seems to me that the process of validation itself, passim science studies, needs to be considered here. At some point, it seems to me that validity means something very much like "useful" and useful as "surplus value." It would come very close to pragmatic experimentalism, as close as the phenomena in question allow such a parsing. So how are we to interpret, validity, in your formulation, which I am very interested in? mike On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 4:18 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. > That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a > social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to > say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact that > the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside discourse > and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for us only > thanks to discourse/activity. > Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 > Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social > convention. > Simple, eh? I would have thought so. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >> Martin >> >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams > ac.uk> wrote: >> >> >> >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden say >>> that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure I must >>> have misremembered that!.? >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Nov 8 18:19:00 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 02:19:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: I suspect there are a range of notions of objectivity at play here. Just to (help?) clear up on a few issues. We can see that statements such as "the earth is round" are a social convention in the sense that: i) It is a social convention to consider that the earth is a discrete object that begins and ends at various relative points. Is the earth the beautiful blue and green thing that reflects light and is seen from space? Does the earth include its magnetic and gravitational fields? Is the earth, in fact, not a ring wobbling around its star? Or perhaps it is part of some n-dimensional rubber-like sheet and actually flat? ii) Mathematically construed shapes such as triangles, circles, ellipsoids are conventions. But these shapes also come with rigorous rules that enable them to be related to each other. iii) For many purposes it is very useful to consider that the earth conforms to the convention called an ellipsoid. If we didn't have this conventional notion of an ellipsoid, we might say it was ball shaped or round. Perhaps folk can offer some examples of mathematical objectivity, e.g. classroom dynamics, pure math, applied. Best, Huw On 9 November 2014 00:18, Andy Blunden wrote: > Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. > That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a > social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to > say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact that > the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside discourse > and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for us only > thanks to discourse/activity. > Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 > Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social > convention. > Simple, eh? I would have thought so. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >> Martin >> >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams > ac.uk> wrote: >> >> >> >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden say >>> that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure I must >>> have misremembered that!.? >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > From leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com Sat Nov 8 23:10:20 2014 From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com (Leif Strandberg) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 08:10:20 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> , <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: <497B2D05-CDCC-4EEA-8305-E998E2053C86@telia.com> Yes, we changed in September 1967 from left to right, then in May 1968 we changed from right to left (politically). Leif, Sweden 9 nov 2014 kl. 01:18 skrev Andy Blunden : > Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. > That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for us only thanks to discourse/activity. > Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social convention. > Simple, eh? I would have thought so. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >> Martin >> >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams wrote: >> >> >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure I must have misremembered that!.? >>> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Nov 8 23:14:04 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 18:14:04 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <497B2D05-CDCC-4EEA-8305-E998E2053C86@telia.com> References: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> , <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <497B2D05-CDCC-4EEA-8305-E998E2053C86@telia.com> Message-ID: <545F143C.7050505@mira.net> Ah! Of course. 1967. I was trying to hitchhike through Sweden that weekend. Gave up and went back to Denmark. :) andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Leif Strandberg wrote: > > Yes, we changed in September 1967 from left to right, then in May 1968 > we changed from right to left (politically). > > Leif, > Sweden > 9 nov 2014 kl. 01:18 skrev Andy Blunden >: > >> Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. >> That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* >> a social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That >> is to say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter >> the fact that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also >> outside discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and >> known for us only thanks to discourse/activity. >> Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 >> Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a >> social convention. >> Simple, eh? I would have thought so. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden >>>> say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm >>>> sure I must have misremembered that!.? >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > From lradford@laurentian.ca Sat Nov 8 17:59:24 2014 From: lradford@laurentian.ca (Luis Radford) Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2014 20:59:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: Here are my two cents to this interesting discussion. The question of objectivity has been a central question in understanding what is meant by mathematics. Sociologists of knowledge, even those inclined to think about the world as culturally formed (e.g., Berger, Luckmann, and even Karl Mannheim), have usually preferred to stay away from a sociological understanding of mathematics. The crux of the problem seems to me to be this: If we do not have a clear sense of what we mean by mathematics, we won?t be able to tackle the question of its objectivity. Mathematics objectivity, I think, cannot be established on the basis that 4x7 = 28, regardless of the culture. What is often missed in examples of this kind is that the examples are already embedded in a particular rationality (numbers are treated as decontextualized quantities and the multiplication operator bears an abstract, specific meaning). It is ?objective? only within a culturally institutionalized way of thinking and doing about quantities. My argument does not amount to saying that in another culture 4x7 may be equal to 20 or something else. What I am trying to say is that the question of objectivity can only be asked and investigated within what Foucault used to call a regime of truth (the Western contemporary regimes of truth include a strong interest in abstraction and in expressing abstractions in a written manner). When the Jesuits brought Euclid to China in the 17th century, they did not simply brought Euclidean theorems; they also brought new ways of thinking about figures where proving things in a syllogistic manner makes sense. They brought an Euclidean regime of truth. In the attached chapter, I refer to a psychological expedition that Wassmann and Dasen carried out several years ago with Yupno subjects (from the Madang Province of Papua New Guinea). The example illustrates, from another angle, the previous idea. Wassmann and Dasen used the following ?Bride price story?: ?You want to marry P?s daughter. The bride price was set at 19 pigs. You have already paid 8 pigs. How many will you have to pay later?? The answer was: ?Friend, I am not rich enough to buy a new wife. Where would I find 8 pigs? Besides, I am an old man and have no more strength.? As the interviewers remark, ?After this he could not be moved to tackle the problem again, it having been rejected as preposterous? (W & D). Although the question seems to make sense because of its ?contextual cultural nature? (pigs, bride price, etc.) the way the question is asked is already asked within a certain rationality that provides us (no the Yupno) with a range of expected responses. The rationality has its own normativity (which is partially explicit, partially implicit) from where a kind of objectivity can be spoken about. The Euclidean and the Yupno examples do not explain, however, what can be understood by ?mathematics.? They do not provide any hint about from where the various forms of mathematics we see in the world may come. Following Ilyenkov, I see mathematics as idealities. Of course, not platonic idealities. I see mathematics rather as idealities or generals, in Hegel?s sense. I have suggested that Mathematics is crystalized human labour. More precisely, Mathematics (taken as an ethno-plural noun here) are (like knowledge in general) an evolving culturally codified synthesis of doing, thinking, and relating to others and the world. Mathematics, in this sense, cannot be equated to social practices. They are syntheses of social practices. Mathematics, as Hegelian generals, are put into motion, actualized and transformed through social practices. Within this context, the Yupno mathematics are syntheses of reflection and action in the form of the Yupno activities. To come back to the question of objectivity and to Martin?s and Andy?s reply to Julian?s post, I am reminded of a beautiful passage from Mikhailov?s ?The Riddle of the Self.? Mikhailov asserts that ?People could see the sun as round only because they rounded clay with their hands. With their hands they shaped stone, sharpened its borders, gave it facets? (Mikhailov, 1980, p. 199). Mikhailov is not saying that we invented ex nihilo the idea of the sun as something round. Nor that the sun was already round having all the Euclidean properties of geometric spheres (symmetries, etc.) before we noticed it for the first time. We qualify the sun as round because we have experienced and objectify roundness through embodied activity and recognize (as far as our culturally evolving perceptual systems allow us to do) a similarity with artifacts we and others before us have shaped to satisfy some needs. Luis On 8/11/2014, 7:18 PM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. >That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a >social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to >say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact >that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside >discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for >us only thanks to discourse/activity. >Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 >Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social >convention. >Simple, eh? I would have thought so. >Andy >------------------------------------------------------------------------ >*Andy Blunden* >http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >Martin John Packer wrote: >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams >> wrote: >> >> >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden >>>say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm >>>sure I must have misremembered that!.? >>> >> >> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 2008 - Handbook Ch 18_CultureCognition.pdf Type: application/octet-stream Size: 819837 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141108/e9468efa/attachment-0001.obj From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 00:52:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 19:52:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> Nice to meet you xmca, Luis. The claim: "the question of objectivity can only be asked and investigated within what Foucault used to call a regime of truth" is what is at issue here. This is not actually something which can be decided by questions of cultural psychology. Of course, Uzbekh peasants and Papuan tribespeople find syllogistic logic and mathematical abstractions senseless. Of course, mathematical concepts develop along with industry. All this is known to xmca-ers. It is not a question of whether mathematics is a cultural construct (or social convention) but whether it is *only* such a convention. Of course it is an historical accident that the decimal system of number is used in arithmetic and Roman letters in algebra, and that so much of mathematics is elaborated through equations, but this is not the point, is it? Is there really *nothing* outside the text? My claim is that it is both a "social convention" (since we have adopted this term here) *and* a natural science. And *in that sense* it is like any other natural science. Mathematics differs from the other natural sciences in many respects, but in the fundamentals it is the same. If natural science is *nothing but* a set of social conventions, then so is mathematics. Do you want to make that claim, Luis? You note that: "Mikhailov is not saying that we invented ex nihilo the idea of the sun as something round." Not *ex nihilo*. So I guess we agree, yes? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Luis Radford wrote: > Here are my two cents to this interesting discussion. > > The question of objectivity has been a central question in understanding > what is meant by mathematics. Sociologists of knowledge, even those > inclined to think about the world as culturally formed (e.g., Berger, > Luckmann, and even Karl Mannheim), have usually preferred to stay away > from a sociological understanding of mathematics. > The crux of the problem seems to me to be this: If we do not have a clear > sense of what we mean by mathematics, we won?t be able to tackle the > question of its objectivity. Mathematics objectivity, I think, cannot be > established on the basis that 4x7 = 28, regardless of the culture. What is > often missed in examples of this kind is that the examples are already > embedded in a particular rationality (numbers are treated as > decontextualized quantities and the multiplication operator bears an > abstract, specific meaning). It is ?objective? only within a culturally > institutionalized way of thinking and doing about quantities. > My argument does not amount to saying that in another culture 4x7 may be > equal to 20 or something else. What I am trying to say is that the > question of objectivity can only be asked and investigated within what > Foucault used to call a regime of truth (the Western contemporary regimes > of truth include a strong interest in abstraction and in expressing > abstractions in a written manner). When the Jesuits brought Euclid to > China in the 17th century, they did not simply brought Euclidean theorems; > they also brought new ways of thinking about figures where proving things > in a syllogistic manner makes sense. They brought an Euclidean regime of > truth. > > In the attached chapter, I refer to a psychological expedition that > Wassmann and Dasen carried out several years ago with Yupno subjects (from > the Madang Province of Papua New Guinea). The example illustrates, from > another angle, the previous idea. Wassmann and Dasen used the following > ?Bride price story?: ?You want to marry P?s daughter. The bride price was > set at 19 pigs. You have already paid 8 pigs. How many will you have to > pay later?? The answer was: ?Friend, I am not rich enough to buy a new > wife. Where would I find 8 pigs? Besides, I am an old man and have no more > strength.? As the interviewers remark, ?After this he could not be moved > to tackle the problem again, it having been rejected as preposterous? (W & > D). Although the question seems to make sense because of its ?contextual > cultural nature? (pigs, bride price, etc.) the way the question is asked > is already asked within a certain rationality that provides us (no the > Yupno) with a range of expected responses. The rationality has its own > normativity (which is partially explicit, partially implicit) from where a > kind of objectivity can be spoken about. > The Euclidean and the Yupno examples do not explain, however, what can be > understood by ?mathematics.? They do not provide any hint about from where > the various forms of mathematics we see in the world may come. > Following Ilyenkov, I see mathematics as idealities. Of course, not > platonic idealities. I see mathematics rather as idealities or generals, > in Hegel?s sense. I have suggested that Mathematics is crystalized human > labour. More precisely, Mathematics (taken as an ethno-plural noun here) > are (like knowledge in general) an evolving culturally codified synthesis > of doing, thinking, and relating to others and the world. > Mathematics, in this sense, cannot be equated to social practices. They > are syntheses of social practices. Mathematics, as Hegelian generals, are > put into motion, actualized and transformed through social practices. > Within this context, the Yupno mathematics are syntheses of reflection and > action in the form of the Yupno activities. > > To come back to the question of objectivity and to Martin?s and Andy?s > reply to Julian?s post, I am reminded of a beautiful passage from > Mikhailov?s ?The Riddle of the Self.? Mikhailov asserts that ?People > could see the sun as round only because they rounded clay with their > hands. With their hands they shaped stone, sharpened its borders, gave it > facets? (Mikhailov, 1980, p. 199). > Mikhailov is not saying that we invented ex nihilo the idea of the sun as > something round. Nor that the sun was already round having all the > Euclidean properties of geometric spheres (symmetries, etc.) before we > noticed it for the first time. We qualify the sun as round because we have > experienced and objectify roundness through embodied activity and > recognize (as far as our culturally evolving perceptual systems allow us > to do) a similarity with artifacts we and others before us have shaped to > satisfy some needs. > > > Luis > > On 8/11/2014, 7:18 PM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > > >> Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. >> That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a >> social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to >> say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact >> that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside >> discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for >> us only thanks to discourse/activity. >> Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 >> Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social >> convention. >> Simple, eh? I would have thought so. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden >>>> say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm >>>> sure I must have misremembered that!.? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Nov 9 02:00:40 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 10:00:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102245AFC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Doesn't the example from Mikhailov touch on Vygotsky's argument about the inseparability of intellect and affect? Yes, the sun was 'that which we call round' before we came along and noticed its roundness but when we did NOTICE its roundness that noticing was informed by our embodied, affective apprehension of what round feels like - because we have rounded clay with our hands but also because we have held rounded objects and turned them in our hands, rolled them and turned them in the light of the sun! Isn't it the disciplined simplicity of mathematics (the deliberate setting aside of 'real world' knowledge) which makes it so difficult for many people - not the propositions and relationships themselves but the difficulty of finding meaning in ideas which have been deliberately stripped of (much, but not all of) their affective connotations? As a rather silly example of this (but one which relates to the Yupno response) I like the story of the question, 'If it takes one man one hour to dig a one cubic metre hole, how long would it take two men to dig a hole measuring one metre by half a metre by one metre deep?' If this is seen as a maths question the answer is simple but to anyone with experience of digging holes it becomes more difficult to strip away knowledge of the real world - of how it would be very difficult for two people to dig efficiently in such a small hole. When 'mathematical thinking' is used to 'scale up' educational practices which have been found to be effective in small, specific contexts there can be similar difficulties, even in catering, what is needed to feed 40 people is not likely to be 10 times as much as is needed to feed 4. Multiplying up 'what works' may 'look good on paper' but without knowledge of all the complexity which has to be stripped out to 'do the math', all sorts of difficulties can get in the way. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Luis Radford Sent: 09 November 2014 01:59 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics Here are my two cents to this interesting discussion. The question of objectivity has been a central question in understanding what is meant by mathematics. Sociologists of knowledge, even those inclined to think about the world as culturally formed (e.g., Berger, Luckmann, and even Karl Mannheim), have usually preferred to stay away from a sociological understanding of mathematics. The crux of the problem seems to me to be this: If we do not have a clear sense of what we mean by mathematics, we won?t be able to tackle the question of its objectivity. Mathematics objectivity, I think, cannot be established on the basis that 4x7 = 28, regardless of the culture. What is often missed in examples of this kind is that the examples are already embedded in a particular rationality (numbers are treated as decontextualized quantities and the multiplication operator bears an abstract, specific meaning). It is ?objective? only within a culturally institutionalized way of thinking and doing about quantities. My argument does not amount to saying that in another culture 4x7 may be equal to 20 or something else. What I am trying to say is that the question of objectivity can only be asked and investigated within what Foucault used to call a regime of truth (the Western contemporary regimes of truth include a strong interest in abstraction and in expressing abstractions in a written manner). When the Jesuits brought Euclid to China in the 17th century, they did not simply brought Euclidean theorems; they also brought new ways of thinking about figures where proving things in a syllogistic manner makes sense. They brought an Euclidean regime of truth. In the attached chapter, I refer to a psychological expedition that Wassmann and Dasen carried out several years ago with Yupno subjects (from the Madang Province of Papua New Guinea). The example illustrates, from another angle, the previous idea. Wassmann and Dasen used the following ?Bride price story?: ?You want to marry P?s daughter. The bride price was set at 19 pigs. You have already paid 8 pigs. How many will you have to pay later?? The answer was: ?Friend, I am not rich enough to buy a new wife. Where would I find 8 pigs? Besides, I am an old man and have no more strength.? As the interviewers remark, ?After this he could not be moved to tackle the problem again, it having been rejected as preposterous? (W & D). Although the question seems to make sense because of its ?contextual cultural nature? (pigs, bride price, etc.) the way the question is asked is already asked within a certain rationality that provides us (no the Yupno) with a range of expected responses. The rationality has its own normativity (which is partially explicit, partially implicit) from where a kind of objectivity can be spoken about. The Euclidean and the Yupno examples do not explain, however, what can be understood by ?mathematics.? They do not provide any hint about from where the various forms of mathematics we see in the world may come. Following Ilyenkov, I see mathematics as idealities. Of course, not platonic idealities. I see mathematics rather as idealities or generals, in Hegel?s sense. I have suggested that Mathematics is crystalized human labour. More precisely, Mathematics (taken as an ethno-plural noun here) are (like knowledge in general) an evolving culturally codified synthesis of doing, thinking, and relating to others and the world. Mathematics, in this sense, cannot be equated to social practices. They are syntheses of social practices. Mathematics, as Hegelian generals, are put into motion, actualized and transformed through social practices. Within this context, the Yupno mathematics are syntheses of reflection and action in the form of the Yupno activities. To come back to the question of objectivity and to Martin?s and Andy?s reply to Julian?s post, I am reminded of a beautiful passage from Mikhailov?s ?The Riddle of the Self.? Mikhailov asserts that ?People could see the sun as round only because they rounded clay with their hands. With their hands they shaped stone, sharpened its borders, gave it facets? (Mikhailov, 1980, p. 199). Mikhailov is not saying that we invented ex nihilo the idea of the sun as something round. Nor that the sun was already round having all the Euclidean properties of geometric spheres (symmetries, etc.) before we noticed it for the first time. We qualify the sun as round because we have experienced and objectify roundness through embodied activity and recognize (as far as our culturally evolving perceptual systems allow us to do) a similarity with artifacts we and others before us have shaped to satisfy some needs. Luis On 8/11/2014, 7:18 PM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. >That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a >social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to >say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact >that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside >discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for >us only thanks to discourse/activity. >Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 >Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a >social convention. >Simple, eh? I would have thought so. >Andy >----------------------------------------------------------------------- >- >*Andy Blunden* >http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >Martin John Packer wrote: >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams >> wrote: >> >> >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden >>>say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm >>>sure I must have misremembered that!.? >>> >> >> >> >> > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 04:35:04 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 12:35:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> References: <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> Message-ID: Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only person for whom it is an issue. Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Is there really *nothing* outside the text? From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 04:41:02 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 23:41:02 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> Message-ID: <545F60DE.9050005@mira.net> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone forms the object." Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone forms the object? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only person for whom it is an issue. > > Martin > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 04:56:19 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 12:56:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F60DE.9050005@mira.net> References: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050005@mira.net> Message-ID: Who has said this, Andy? Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 7:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone forms the object." > Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone forms the object? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only person for whom it is an issue. >> Martin >> >> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>> >> >> >> >> >> > From sfard@netvision.net.il Sun Nov 9 04:54:37 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 14:54:37 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F60DE.9050005@mira.net> References: <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> Message-ID: <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake of communication. True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The realization trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the present conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with "chains of signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for the proficiency of mathematical communication.?" Xmca-ing is addictive! anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone forms the object." Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone forms the object? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only person for whom it is an issue. > > Martin > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 05:02:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 00:02:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> References: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> Message-ID: <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ anna sfard wrote: > No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in advance > for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say things anew in > the middle of work on an all different text: > > "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental order > known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter discourses are > created for the sake of ?communication about physical reality, in > mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake of communication. > True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to mediate > practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or another to the > ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. However, this fact may > easily escape ?one?s attention. The realization trees of mathematical > signifiers [for the sake of the present conversation, you may replace the > "realization trees" with "chains of signification"], although likely to have > ?primary objects or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too > rich and complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete > foundations of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the > condition for the proficiency of mathematical communication.?" > > Xmca-ing is addictive! > > anna > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone forms the > object." > Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone forms > the object? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, >> > not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this > is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only > person for whom it is an issue. > >> Martin >> >> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 05:11:51 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 00:11:51 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050005@mira.net> Message-ID: <545F6817.1030402@mira.net> You, quoting Anna quoting Foucault. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Who has said this, Andy? > > Martin > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 7:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone forms the object." >> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone forms the object? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only person for whom it is an issue. >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 05:17:37 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 13:17:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F6817.1030402@mira.net> References: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050005@mira.net> <545F6817.1030402@mira.net> Message-ID: <6A342E57-DF03-40B4-BAF8-EE7015174292@uniandes.edu.co> Where, Andy? Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > You, quoting Anna quoting Foucault. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Who has said this, Andy? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 9, 2014, at 7:41 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone forms the object." >>> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone forms the object? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not Foucault, not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're the only person for whom it is an issue. Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> > > From sfard@netvision.net.il Sun Nov 9 05:18:07 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 15:18:07 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> References: <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> Message-ID: <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, Andy, the external - one that manifests itself in the fact that mathematics works for us in other things we do; and internal - the one that stems from strict adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). Re the latter, mathematical discourses are like the sorcerer's apprentice's broom: once put in motion, they get life of their own and nothing can stop them. Can somebody stop ME please? :-) anna -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM To: anna sfard Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ anna sfard wrote: > No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in > advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say > things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: > > "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental > order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter > discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical > reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake of communication. > True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to > mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or > another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. > However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The realization > trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the present > conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with "chains of > signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects or processes > on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and complex ?to be > embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations of such trees > temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for the proficiency of mathematical communication.?" > > Xmca-ing is addictive! > > anna > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone > forms the object." > Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone > forms the object? > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >> Foucault, >> > not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. > If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're > the only person for whom it is an issue. > >> Martin >> >> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 05:26:39 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 00:26:39 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> Message-ID: <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> A wonderful metaphor, Anna. But it isn't magic like it is in the fairy tale, is it? When the text gets out of control and unfolds according to "laws of its own," so to speak, that is *Nature*. That is all I am saying when I say mathematics is not *just* a social convention. And the same applies to other natural sciences. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ anna sfard wrote: > There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, Andy, the > external - one that manifests itself in the fact that mathematics works for > us in other things we do; and internal - the one that stems from strict > adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). Re the latter, mathematical > discourses are like the sorcerer's apprentice's broom: once put in motion, > they get life of their own and nothing can stop them. > > Can somebody stop ME please? :-) > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM > To: anna sfard > Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. > It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that the unit > of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. > The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it though, > Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation to things > happening in the material world, and the validity of the mathematics is not > thereby any the less for that. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > anna sfard wrote: > >> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in >> advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say >> things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: >> >> "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental >> order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter >> discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical >> reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake of >> > communication. > >> True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to >> mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or >> another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. >> However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The realization >> trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the present >> conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with "chains of >> signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects or processes >> on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and complex ?to be >> embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations of such trees >> temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for the proficiency of >> > mathematical communication.?" > >> Xmca-ing is addictive! >> >> anna >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone >> forms the object." >> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone >> forms the object? >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >>> Foucault, >>> >>> >> not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. >> If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're >> the only person for whom it is an issue. >> >> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > From sfard@netvision.net.il Sun Nov 9 05:49:31 2014 From: sfard@netvision.net.il (anna sfard) Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 15:49:31 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> Message-ID: <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> I'm happy to agree with you, Andy. As I do with Martin. I think the two of you are on the same page, more or less, but get distracted by subtleties of word use. For instance, none of you said explicitly what is the category of things to which the adjective "objective" can be applied. Words or worlds? Being explicit on this point may help (as it helped me to understand that I have no use for this word, and this does not mean that I deny the existence of the/a "real world") anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:27 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics A wonderful metaphor, Anna. But it isn't magic like it is in the fairy tale, is it? When the text gets out of control and unfolds according to "laws of its own," so to speak, that is *Nature*. That is all I am saying when I say mathematics is not *just* a social convention. And the same applies to other natural sciences. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ anna sfard wrote: > There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, > Andy, the external - one that manifests itself in the fact that > mathematics works for us in other things we do; and internal - the one > that stems from strict adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). > Re the latter, mathematical discourses are like the sorcerer's > apprentice's broom: once put in motion, they get life of their own and nothing can stop them. > > Can somebody stop ME please? :-) > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM > To: anna sfard > Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. > It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that > the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. > The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it > though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation > to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the > mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > anna sfard wrote: > >> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in >> advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say >> things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: >> >> "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental >> order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter >> discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical >> reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake >> of >> > communication. > >> True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to >> mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or >> another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. >> However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The >> realization trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the >> present conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with >> "chains of signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects >> or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and >> complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations >> of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for >> the proficiency of >> > mathematical communication.?" > >> Xmca-ing is addictive! >> >> anna >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone >> forms the object." >> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone >> forms the object? >> Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >>> Foucault, >>> >>> >> not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. >> If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're >> the only person for whom it is an issue. >> >> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 06:10:40 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 14:10:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> Message-ID: <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> Agreed, Anna. Andy, I think, defines objective as what cannot be changed. I follow Julian in finding that confusing. Andy gave the example that human activity cannot change the fact that the world is round. Yet with enough atomic bombs humans could certainly change that fact! Less depressingly, human activity changes our material circumstances all the time, and we often employ mathematics in order to do this. At the risk of repeating myself, I think we need to work hard to escape from false dichotomies such as objective/subjective, social/real, conventional/natural... Brian Rotman has suggested that we need ?to demolish the widely held metaphysical belief that mathematical signs point to, refer to, or invoke some world, some supposedly objective eternal domain, other than that of their own human, that is time bound, changeable, subjective and finite, making? (1987, p. 107). Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 8:49 AM, anna sfard wrote: > I'm happy to agree with you, Andy. As I do with Martin. I think the two of > you are on the same page, more or less, but get distracted by subtleties of > word use. For instance, none of you said explicitly what is the category of > things to which the adjective "objective" can be applied. Words or worlds? > Being explicit on this point may help (as it helped me to understand that I > have no use for this word, and this does not mean that I deny the existence > of the/a "real world") > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:27 PM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > A wonderful metaphor, Anna. But it isn't magic like it is in the fairy tale, > is it? When the text gets out of control and unfolds according to "laws of > its own," so to speak, that is *Nature*. > That is all I am saying when I say mathematics is not *just* a social > convention. And the same applies to other natural sciences. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > anna sfard wrote: >> There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, >> Andy, the external - one that manifests itself in the fact that >> mathematics works for us in other things we do; and internal - the one >> that stems from strict adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). >> Re the latter, mathematical discourses are like the sorcerer's >> apprentice's broom: once put in motion, they get life of their own and > nothing can stop them. >> >> Can somebody stop ME please? :-) >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] >> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM >> To: anna sfard >> Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. >> It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that >> the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. >> The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it >> though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation >> to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the >> mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> anna sfard wrote: >> >>> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in >>> advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say >>> things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: >>> >>> "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental >>> order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter >>> discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical >>> reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake >>> of >>> >> communication. >> >>> True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to >>> mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or >>> another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. >>> However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The >>> realization trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the >>> present conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with >>> "chains of signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects >>> or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and >>> complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations >>> of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for >>> the proficiency of >>> >> mathematical communication.?" >> >>> Xmca-ing is addictive! >>> >>> anna >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone >>> forms the object." >>> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone >>> forms the object? >>> Andy >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> - >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >>>> Foucault, >>>> >>>> >>> not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. >>> If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're >>> the only person for whom it is an issue. >>> >>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 06:14:58 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 01:14:58 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <545F76E2.6040000@mira.net> Never mind dichotomies, Martin; they are your speciality alone. Are you willing to do away with the distinction between subjective and objective, do away with the subject-object relation? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Agreed, Anna. Andy, I think, defines objective as what cannot be changed. I follow Julian in finding that confusing. Andy gave the example that human activity cannot change the fact that the world is round. Yet with enough atomic bombs humans could certainly change that fact! Less depressingly, human activity changes our material circumstances all the time, and we often employ mathematics in order to do this. > > At the risk of repeating myself, I think we need to work hard to escape from false dichotomies such as objective/subjective, social/real, conventional/natural... > > Brian Rotman has suggested that we need ?to demolish the widely held metaphysical belief that mathematical signs point to, refer to, or invoke some world, some supposedly objective eternal domain, other than that of their own human, that is time bound, changeable, subjective and finite, making? (1987, p. 107). > > Martin > > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 8:49 AM, anna sfard wrote: > > >> I'm happy to agree with you, Andy. As I do with Martin. I think the two of >> you are on the same page, more or less, but get distracted by subtleties of >> word use. For instance, none of you said explicitly what is the category of >> things to which the adjective "objective" can be applied. Words or worlds? >> Being explicit on this point may help (as it helped me to understand that I >> have no use for this word, and this does not mean that I deny the existence >> of the/a "real world") >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:27 PM >> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> A wonderful metaphor, Anna. But it isn't magic like it is in the fairy tale, >> is it? When the text gets out of control and unfolds according to "laws of >> its own," so to speak, that is *Nature*. >> That is all I am saying when I say mathematics is not *just* a social >> convention. And the same applies to other natural sciences. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> anna sfard wrote: >> >>> There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, >>> Andy, the external - one that manifests itself in the fact that >>> mathematics works for us in other things we do; and internal - the one >>> that stems from strict adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). >>> Re the latter, mathematical discourses are like the sorcerer's >>> apprentice's broom: once put in motion, they get life of their own and >>> >> nothing can stop them. >> >>> Can somebody stop ME please? :-) >>> anna >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] >>> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM >>> To: anna sfard >>> Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. >>> It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that >>> the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. >>> The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it >>> though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation >>> to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the >>> mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. >>> Andy >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> anna sfard wrote: >>> >>> >>>> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in >>>> advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say >>>> things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: >>>> >>>> "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental >>>> order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter >>>> discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical >>>> reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake >>>> of >>>> >>>> >>> communication. >>> >>> >>>> True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to >>>> mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or >>>> another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. >>>> However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The >>>> realization trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the >>>> present conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with >>>> "chains of signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects >>>> or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and >>>> complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations >>>> of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for >>>> the proficiency of >>>> >>>> >>> mathematical communication.?" >>> >>> >>>> Xmca-ing is addictive! >>>> >>>> anna >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>>> >>>> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone >>>> forms the object." >>>> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone >>>> forms the object? >>>> Andy >>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> - >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >>>>> Foucault, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. >>>> If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're >>>> the only person for whom it is an issue. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 06:41:00 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 14:41:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F76E2.6040000@mira.net> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> <545F76E2.6040000@mira.net> Message-ID: This time, Andy, there was nothing *inside* your text. Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 9:14 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 9 06:46:34 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 01:46:34 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <545F7E4A.2030703@mira.net> Never mind dichotomies, Martin; they are your speciality alone. Are you willing to do away with the distinction between subjective and objective, do away with the subject-object relation? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Agreed, Anna. Andy, I think, defines objective as what cannot be changed. I follow Julian in finding that confusing. Andy gave the example that human activity cannot change the fact that the world is round. Yet with enough atomic bombs humans could certainly change that fact! Less depressingly, human activity changes our material circumstances all the time, and we often employ mathematics in order to do this. > > At the risk of repeating myself, I think we need to work hard to escape from false dichotomies such as objective/subjective, social/real, conventional/natural... > > Brian Rotman has suggested that we need ?to demolish the widely held metaphysical belief that mathematical signs point to, refer to, or invoke some world, some supposedly objective eternal domain, other than that of their own human, that is time bound, changeable, subjective and finite, making? (1987, p. 107). > > Martin > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sun Nov 9 07:04:17 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 15:04:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> Message-ID: The focus of this thread on "objectivity of mathematics" seems to be making a shift from what do we mean by "mathematics" to what do we mean by "objective." But despite the prior focus, I'm not recalling anyone ever explicating what specific construction of mathematics is being discussed. At the risk of stating what already is obvious to the discussants, here is a brief historical sketch of what "mathematics" has meant (according to my meager knowledge of it). A) Prior to the Greeks, mathematics was an empirical domain; the circumference of a circle was about three times the diameter, because that's what measurement showed. B) In the time of Thales, Pythagoras, and Euclid, the methodology changed. Starting from self-evident truths about the world (axioms and postulates), logic replaced empirical verification as the adjudicator of new mathematical knowledge. In this respect, mathematics is unlike natural sciences in which the empirical world adjudicates new knowledge through experimentation. C) The methodology started to change again around 1830 in connection with Lobachevsky and Bolyai revisiting of Euclid's parallel postulate. This began the decoupling of axioms and postulates from the world, their primary virtue being self-consistency; all this leading to the formalist and logicist constructions of mathematics as determined solely by the internal relations of aspects of its discourse. Of course, history does not erase the past. When a young child discovers empirically that starting with one quantity and adding another reliably produces the same result as starting with the second quantity and adding the first, she or he is still doing and learning mathematics. So, I wonder if the dispute in this thread simply reflects different participants focusing in on different aspects of this historically still evolving human practice of mathematics. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of anna sfard Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 7:50 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics I'm happy to agree with you, Andy. As I do with Martin. I think the two of you are on the same page, more or less, but get distracted by subtleties of word use. For instance, none of you said explicitly what is the category of things to which the adjective "objective" can be applied. Words or worlds? Being explicit on this point may help (as it helped me to understand that I have no use for this word, and this does not mean that I deny the existence of the/a "real world") anna -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:27 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics A wonderful metaphor, Anna. But it isn't magic like it is in the fairy tale, is it? When the text gets out of control and unfolds according to "laws of its own," so to speak, that is *Nature*. That is all I am saying when I say mathematics is not *just* a social convention. And the same applies to other natural sciences. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ anna sfard wrote: > There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, > Andy, the external - one that manifests itself in the fact that > mathematics works for us in other things we do; and internal - the one > that stems from strict adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). > Re the latter, mathematical discourses are like the sorcerer's > apprentice's broom: once put in motion, they get life of their own and nothing can stop them. > > Can somebody stop ME please? :-) > anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM > To: anna sfard > Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. > It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that > the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. > The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it > though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation > to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the > mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > anna sfard wrote: > >> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in >> advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say >> things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: >> >> "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental >> order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter >> discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical >> reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake >> of >> > communication. > >> True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to >> mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or >> another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. >> However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The >> realization trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the >> present conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with >> "chains of signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects >> or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and >> complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations >> of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for >> the proficiency of >> > mathematical communication.?" > >> Xmca-ing is addictive! >> >> anna >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone >> forms the object." >> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone >> forms the object? >> Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >>> Foucault, >>> >>> >> not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. >> If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're >> the only person for whom it is an issue. >> >> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 07:05:16 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 15:05:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545F7E4A.2030703@mira.net> References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> <64F2E0F3-B081-468A-9A93-4F798D9EF092@uniandes.edu.co> <545F7E4A.2030703@mira.net> Message-ID: <7D3470D6-84A4-4DDE-97C0-EF6BF814291A@uniandes.edu.co> I want to focus on the relationship. We humans live in the world. A distinction between subjective and objective, between subject and object, arises only when we sit down and reflect. That's fine, but we make the mistake of taking that distinction to be primary when it is derivative, as fundamental when it is founded, as universal when it is historical. It is a waste of time to ask, "Does this belong to the subject or to the object?" "Is this objective, or is it subjective?" "Is this mental, or is it material?" "Is this a convention, or is this natural?" Did you find where I said there is nothing outside the text? Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 9:46 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Never mind dichotomies, Martin; they are your speciality alone. Are you willing to do away with the distinction between subjective and objective, do away with the subject-object relation? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Agreed, Anna. Andy, I think, defines objective as what cannot be changed. I follow Julian in finding that confusing. Andy gave the example that human activity cannot change the fact that the world is round. Yet with enough atomic bombs humans could certainly change that fact! Less depressingly, human activity changes our material circumstances all the time, and we often employ mathematics in order to do this. >> >> At the risk of repeating myself, I think we need to work hard to escape from false dichotomies such as objective/subjective, social/real, conventional/natural... >> >> Brian Rotman has suggested that we need ?to demolish the widely held metaphysical belief that mathematical signs point to, refer to, or invoke some world, some supposedly objective eternal domain, other than that of their own human, that is time bound, changeable, subjective and finite, making? (1987, p. 107). >> >> Martin >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 07:14:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 15:14:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> Message-ID: Hi David, Yes, let's not hijack this thread! In the paper I attached, I also took a shot at a reconstruction of the history of math. And I think it's important to add that has mathematics has differed around the world. Martin On Nov 9, 2014, at 10:04 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > The focus of this thread on "objectivity of mathematics" seems to be making a shift from what do we mean by "mathematics" to what do we mean by "objective." > But despite the prior focus, I'm not recalling anyone ever explicating what specific construction of mathematics is being discussed. > At the risk of stating what already is obvious to the discussants, here is a brief historical sketch of what "mathematics" has meant (according to my meager knowledge of it). > > A) Prior to the Greeks, mathematics was an empirical domain; the circumference of a circle was about three times the diameter, because that's what measurement showed. > > B) In the time of Thales, Pythagoras, and Euclid, the methodology changed. Starting from self-evident truths about the world (axioms and postulates), logic replaced empirical verification as the adjudicator of new mathematical knowledge. In this respect, mathematics is unlike natural sciences in which the empirical world adjudicates new knowledge through experimentation. > > C) The methodology started to change again around 1830 in connection with Lobachevsky and Bolyai revisiting of Euclid's parallel postulate. This began the decoupling of axioms and postulates from the world, their primary virtue being self-consistency; all this leading to the formalist and logicist constructions of mathematics as determined solely by the internal relations of aspects of its discourse. > > Of course, history does not erase the past. When a young child discovers empirically that starting with one quantity and adding another reliably produces the same result as starting with the second quantity and adding the first, she or he is still doing and learning mathematics. So, I wonder if the dispute in this thread simply reflects different participants focusing in on different aspects of this historically still evolving human practice of mathematics. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of anna sfard > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 7:50 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > I'm happy to agree with you, Andy. As I do with Martin. I think the two of you are on the same page, more or less, but get distracted by subtleties of word use. For instance, none of you said explicitly what is the category of things to which the adjective "objective" can be applied. Words or worlds? > Being explicit on this point may help (as it helped me to understand that I have no use for this word, and this does not mean that I deny the existence of the/a "real world") anna > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:27 PM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics > > A wonderful metaphor, Anna. But it isn't magic like it is in the fairy tale, is it? When the text gets out of control and unfolds according to "laws of its own," so to speak, that is *Nature*. > That is all I am saying when I say mathematics is not *just* a social convention. And the same applies to other natural sciences. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > anna sfard wrote: >> There are two types of "validity" I think we can talk about here, >> Andy, the external - one that manifests itself in the fact that >> mathematics works for us in other things we do; and internal - the one >> that stems from strict adherence to the rules of the game (discourse). >> Re the latter, mathematical discourses are like the sorcerer's >> apprentice's broom: once put in motion, they get life of their own and > nothing can stop them. >> >> Can somebody stop ME please? :-) >> anna >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] >> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 3:02 PM >> To: anna sfard >> Cc: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >> >> I think your quote expresses a truth, and an important truth. >> It is more precise, but it is what I meant when I said earlier that >> the unit of analysis "rotates.", with the mediator becoming the object. >> The statement is still kind of agnostic on the question, isn't it >> though, Anna? Mathematical relations are often only an approximation >> to things happening in the material world, and the validity of the >> mathematics is not thereby any the less for that. >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> anna sfard wrote: >> >>> No, Andy, I don?t think this was, or should be, said. I apologize in >>> advance for quoting myself, but it would be too much to try to say >>> things anew in the middle of work on an all different text: >>> >>> "mathematical communication apparently reverses the developmental >>> order known from ?colloquial discourses: whereas these latter >>> discourses are created for the sake of ?communication about physical >>> reality, in mathematical discourse objects are created for ?the sake >>> of >>> >> communication. >> >>> True, also mathematical communication is supposed, ?eventually, to >>> mediate practical activities, and thus to pertain, in one way or >>> another to the ?world of primary objects that predate the discourse. >>> However, this fact may easily escape ?one?s attention. The >>> realization trees of mathematical signifiers [for the sake of the >>> present conversation, you may replace the "realization trees" with >>> "chains of signification"], although likely to have ?primary objects >>> or processes on such objects at their basis, may be too rich and >>> complex ?to be embraced at a glance. Leaving the concrete foundations >>> of such trees temporarily out of sight ?may thus be the condition for >>> the proficiency of >>> >> mathematical communication.?" >> >>> Xmca-ing is addictive! >>> >>> anna >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2014 2:41 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics >>> >>> "Nothing outside the text" is a way of saying that "the text alone >>> forms the object." >>> Would you agree, in the context of mathematics, that the text alone >>> forms the object? >>> Andy >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> - >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Who has said that there is nothing outside the text, Andy? Not >>>> Foucault, >>>> >>>> >>> not Anna, not Huw, not me, not Ed, and not Luis so far as I can see. >>> If this is the question that is at issue for you here, I think you're >>> the only person for whom it is an issue. >>> >>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 9, 2014, at 3:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Is there really *nothing* outside the text? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 9 07:43:02 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 15:43:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> <545F2B64.2050409@mira.net> <545F60DE.9050@[77.126.73.233]> <001201cffc1c$5199c6f0$f4cd54d0$@net.il> <545F65C8.3000409@mira.net> <001601cffc1f$99d7b4b0$cd871e10$@net.il> <545F6B8F.70401@mira.net> <003901cffc23$fe2e8430$fa8b8c90$@net.il> Message-ID: Let me copy it here: On Nov 9, 2014, at 10:14 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > In the paper I attached, I also took a shot at a reconstruction of the history of math. Classical Mathematics The Greeks considered mathematical entities?numbers, shapes, solids?to exist prior to their knowledge of them, in the famous ?Platonic? realm. Math was the way of finding these preexisting, underlying forms. The geometry that Euclid (c. 300 BC) presented in his Elements operated within Plato?s ontology of perfect, immaterial, singular forms (such as Triangle), imperfect, multiple, sensible objects, and ?mathematicals??the mathematician?s inscribed figures, such as ABC and XYZ, which were both immaterial and plural (Lachterman, p. 118). Every constructed square, for example, was considered at the same time a unique individual, different from every other square, and yet also representative of the form of squareness, the perfect Square, and so identical with every other square. In this classical ethos and ontology, student and teacher were not discovering or enacting something new when they constructed a figure, or divided two numbers. They were rediscovering what had been there all along, ?reenacting in time what has already been done all along and thus never for the very first time? (p. 121). Mathematical activity was seen as evoking the perfect geometric and arithmetic forms which were the genuine objects of study (p. 120-121). Modern Mathematics The radical moderns, of whom Descartes (1596-1650) was preeminent, viewed math, and knowledge in general, very differently. The 17th century is commonly seen as a time of revolution in mathematics, with the invention of analytic geometry, differential and integral calculus, decimal fractions, and more. Lachterman sees in this revolution a change in ethos and ontology. ?Construction? became a central concept in modern mathematics, a concept that was at core ontological. Mathematical entities were now seen as having no existence prior to their human construction. Cartesian math was something active and creative, an example of the mind?s essential power of making. Descartes? approach to geometry illustrates this: he introduced in La G?om?trie (1637) a coordinate system ? his famous X & Y coordinates ? whereby geometrical problems could be expressed as equations involving variables, known quantities, and unknowns. The solution of the problem (finding a locus, for example) amounted to solving ? finding the ?roots? of ? a polynomial equation. Problems of a specific degree of complexity (number of lines, dimensionality of figures) corresponded to equations of a particular degree. Hence there was an order, a seriality, to this method. It was very general, and powerfully iterative ? a solution at one degree of complexity provided the basis for a solution at the next degree. In a real sense this approach turned every geometrical problem into the single problem of finding an equation?s roots. The successes of this form of math fed its confident extension widely through accounts of human thinking and learning. This modern, Cartesian math of formulae and constructed proofs differed in both ethos and ontology from the classical Greek math of demonstration and proof of theorems. Whereas the Greeks considered mind the mirror of external things and math a way of finding entities such as numbers that already existed, the Cartesians considered mind active and creative, in its essence a power of making. Math was the outward embodiment of this creative power, made visible in the construction of problems (e.g., positing axes, etc.) and of their solutions (drawing up equations). Modern mathematics dissolved the classical distinction between arithmetic and geometry, and in doing so dissolved the perfect Forms that the Greeks had emphasized. Integers became merely a particular type of rational number; square and cube became merely particular cases of constructions in multi-dimensional space. Infinity and infinitesimals were manipulated with ease. Problems with Modern Mathematics This modern mathematical ethos, though born in the 17th century, is alive today. (Its influence on the constructivism of Piaget will be apparent; cf. Rotman, 1977.) But it is not without its problems, as well as its successes. The conception of mathematical construction straddled an ontological divide ? commonly associated with Descartes ? between the subjective (intentionality, the conceptual) and the objective (the referent, the sensible). The concept of construction came to the fore in large part, Lachterman argues, because it promised to be the mediator between reason and reality, mind and mindless nature. As Lachterman puts it, Descartes ?most conspicuously exploited the power inherent in the view that symbolization frees us to work ingeniously beyond the boundaries apparently fixed by nature as it is sensuously, premethodically given... while at the same time serving to direct those mechanical operations or movements from which outwardly manifest configurations artfully issue? (p. 125). Construction seemed to bridge or dissolve the gap between subjective and objective; it seemed to solve the problem of the relationship of reason to the ?real? world, of the ?true?. The ?secret? of modernity, what it struggled to achieve, in Lachterman?s view, was the ?willed coincidence? of human making with truth or intelligibility. But the promise couldn?t be made good: increasingly this ethos came to deny the reality of the ?external? world. To put this another way, Cartesian mathematics, skeptical of perception as a source of genuine knowledge (e.g., Descartes? criticism of Locke), seemed to offer a powerful illustration of the power of ?reason? (individual mental capacity) to construct truths about the world. But a tension developed. On the one hand, true knowledge could not be based directly on the natural world, for this, in the Cartesian ontology, was a realm of contingencies, while true knowledge was unconditional. On the other hand, reason in general, and mathematics in particular, still strove to be about what is ?real.? The criterion of adequacy to reality seemed unavoidable, yet indeterminate. What had begun as a relatively innocent effort to bring order to the natural world, to ?master and possess? it (p. 23), ended with the denial that reality had any existence outside the human mind, a denial that dissolved into relativism and ?self-divinization.? For example, when non-Euclidean geometries were developed in the nineteenth century, both these and classical geometry were viewed as abstract systems resting on conventional and arbitrary axioms, rather than either logically necessary or natural postulates. The ?reality? of the axioms was deemed irrelevant, and these geometries were considered to offer conjectural models of physical space (e.g., Einstein?s use of Riemannian geometry), not as descriptions of how space really is. Postmodern Mathematics These problems within modern mathematics have motivated several attempts at a new conceptualization of mathematical investigation. Lachterman, for example, can tell his history of ancient and modern math only because he adopts a third position, which one can call postmodern. From this vantage point the problems of modern mathematics become visible. Rotman (1993), too, seeks to deconstruct the view that math is a purely formal enterprise. In his account, the formal procedures of mathematics ? operating on apparently decontextual and abstract entities ? are not self-sufficient, but are sustained by the informal practices of a community of mathematicians. ?Mathematics is neither a self-contained linguistic formalism nor an abstract game played entirely within the orbit of its own self-referring rules, conventions, and symbolic protocols? (1993, p. 24). Rather, there is a relationship between mathematical formalism and everyday language which ?allows an embodied subject ? the corporeal, situated speaker of natural language ? to register a presence in and connection to the world of real time, space, and physical process? (1993, p. 25).1 We will return to the character of this ?presence? later. Rotman is clear on the need ?to demolish the widely held metaphysical belief that mathematical signs point to, refer to, or invoke some world, some supposedly objective eternal domain, other than that of their own human, that is time bound, changeable, subjective and finite, making? (Rotman, 1987, p. 107). Math does refer to a reality, but this is a human reality, itself constructed, neither timeless ideal Forms nor lifeless matter. Mathematical signs circulate within, and help reproduce, a specific sociocultural human context. Rotman sees modern mathematics as motivated by an ?illusion of mastery? that is literally fantastic. For example, the assumption of infinite iterability that one finds in integral calculus and series expansions presumes a counterfactual capacity: such iteration would take infinite time and infinite energy. In its place Rotman proposes a ?non-Euclidean arithmetic? in which the iteration that underlies number and counting is not unbounded and infinite, but closed and finite. Such an arithmetic, which Rotman works out in some detail, is only ?locally Euclidian.? From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Sun Nov 9 10:05:20 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 18:05:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy (if you haven't forgotten this prehistoric post by now, nearly a day later!) I don?t disagree that in some sense the 'social convention' (of mathematics) may be not, per se, 'objective' (in the sense that it can 'easily' be re-written) and also that maths can be conventional as well as 'objective'. But I still think its objectivity 'exists' to be transformed and developed, just as other natural sciences do. I guess the way I use 'subject' and 'object' (and subjectivity/objectivity) implies that the concept of 'object' and 'objectivity' only makes sense in terms of a dialectic of activity. So let's begin with the monist hypothesis that 'nature' (or as some say 'god') includes everything, humanity, matter, discourse, experience, perezhivaniya one and all. But 'we' (OK hang in here I know this we is a problem.. What is 'objective' is then dialectically related to who the 'we' is that is collectively considered to be acting - e.g. Are 'we' humanity as a whole, the clique of professional mathematicians, or ... ) find ourselves to be a part of this whole mess: we 'subjects' , our subjectivity and agency are a part of it, but we experience 'the other' stuff (not 'us') as 'objects' to act on .. Of course here the dialectic of subject-object means the 'object' may be represented in terms of our needs (e.g. 'That rabbit looks yummy?' ). I think Pierce's 'firstness' includes this 'other'- objectivity is constituted by the other's firstness to begin with. When you say the earth is 'round', you allude to the firstness of the world that we come to manage as 'roundness'. Then, it seems some of us are concerned with the 'shift' that takes place when the collective 'we' start to communicate and discourse tends to lose its direct connection with action on the 'other' objects (including firstness). The 'object(s)' now begins to include our concepts developed in communicative discourse including 'round' and 'circle', i.e. mathematics. My argument (last post - here we are at last) argued that the objectivity/validity of this mathematics/discourse rests on (and only on) the degree to which it is in some sense satisfactory 'in practice'. Here Mike Cole's post (if I got it right) picks me up and I think he is right - I have confused 'objectivity' with 'validity'. This is because the 'object' we call mathematics is always hypothesised to be 'valid': that is, when we work on the 'object' mathematics, mathematicians are critiquing and transforming what is taken to be the state of the art in mathematical 'validity' or 'truth'. Julian Ps Skimming forward: Luis cites Foucault's 'regime of truth' for mathematics. Im not sure if you - Luis - will agree with this Luis, but my reading of Foucault is that he uses this term (i.e. Regime of T) as a tool to critique the power structures within the discipline. Observing that validity of mathematics is upheld by such a regime should - if we agree with Foucault - provoke us to smash it to pieces? no? :-) On 09/11/2014 00:18, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. >That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a >social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to >say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact >that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside >discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for >us only thanks to discourse/activity. >Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 >Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social >convention. >Simple, eh? I would have thought so. >Andy >------------------------------------------------------------------------ >*Andy Blunden* >http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >Martin John Packer wrote: >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams >> wrote: >> >> >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden >>>say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm >>>sure I must have misremembered that!.? >>> >> >> >> >> > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Sun Nov 9 10:33:57 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 18:33:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Political economy and Objectivity/obscurantism of mathematics Message-ID: Mike I am aware that I have just committed sin on sin (my post to Andy) by patching the objectivity of mathematics with its 'validity' and even 'truth' when tested in social practice (as you say, in its 'use' value) ? This does indeed open another can of worms. This leads away from the current discussion into exchange value etc. Marx's theory of history can be interpreted in a progressive sense as meaning that the superstructure of ideology (including mathematics?) has a certain dialectical relation to the economic structure .. 'Valid mathematics' one might presume, has some functionality in terms of the efficiency of the mode/forces of production - so use/exchange value of labour (power). However, Im concerned about another aspect of mathematics and that is its class-reproductive 'use' and associated obscurantism/social exclusion. My colleague George Joseph (famed re Chinese and Indian roots of mathematics etc) provides data that suggests that some of the very earliest - literally pre-historic - mathematics includes rules for altar-building that was clearly 'functional' in the most reactionary sense of maintaining the power of the religious elite to exclude the masses (well before capitalism). In this view, the possibility arises that we might re-interpret the current conversation re 'validity', 'truth' and 'use'. So, not long ago I passed an office in a School of mathematics entitled "Financial Mathematics - Derivatives Centre" (more or less - fortunately that project has gone now for want of funds). Probably the philosophers of 'subject-object'-ivity did not consider this political aspect: so what are we left with? I am forced to admit that the validity of mathematics in political-economic practice provides an arena for contradictions and class antagonism. (Anna has also written along these lines in her critique of the use of numbers/numberese in the political economy?) Julian On 09/11/2014 01:44, "mike cole" wrote: >My impression is that, for me at least, the conversation about >objectivities and conventions as been helpful in focusing my thoughts on >the issue. I have not resolved the apparent, residual uncertainties or >contradictions that seem to be at issue. > >Julian, might I start here, and get help with a next step: > > >*"Thus, the objectivity of the rules of mathematics (as with logic) rest >ultimately on the validity of the social practices that ensure maths a >wider validity, beyond the conventions of the clique of mathematicians who >run the discipline. Thus the discipline is itself disciplined."* > >It seems to me that a lot is riding on the interpretation of the property >you call validity. It seems to me that the process of validation itself, >passim science studies, needs to be considered here. At some point, it >seems to me that validity means something very much like "useful" and >useful as "surplus value." It would come very close to pragmatic >experimentalism, as close as the phenomena in question allow such a >parsing. > >So how are we to interpret, validity, in your formulation, which I am very >interested in? >mike > > > >On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 4:18 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. >> That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a >> social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to >> say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact >>that >> the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside discourse >> and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for us only >> thanks to discourse/activity. >> Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 >> Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social >> convention. >> Simple, eh? I would have thought so. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams >>>>> ac.uk> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden >>>>say >>>> that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm sure >>>>I must >>>> have misremembered that!.? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > >-- >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Nov 9 15:26:00 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 16:26:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: grosholz Message-ID: <000001cffc74$88dfd4d0$9a9f7e70$@edu> Hi, I am forwarding an article by a philosopher of mathematics who addresses issues of narrative and logic as well as the role of history in mathematics. Some of the article requires a familiarity with concepts in the field which are above my head, nevertheless it was a valuable piece in the context of the current thread. Vera From: reuben hersh [mailto:rhersh@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 7:44 AM To: Vera John-Steiner Subject: grosholz -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Grosholz_Maths & History.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 110561 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141109/7d02573d/attachment.pdf From ewall@umich.edu Sun Nov 9 16:05:31 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2014 18:05:31 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: grosholz In-Reply-To: <000001cffc74$88dfd4d0$9a9f7e70$@edu> References: <000001cffc74$88dfd4d0$9a9f7e70$@edu> Message-ID: Thanks Yes, Wiles is a nice example of doing mathematics within a historical dimension.One part of the article bothered me when the author averred that Fermat would need to pick up the centuries between. Interestingly that is not what a student of mathematics who was born today would 'need' to do to enter the conversation. I was listening to a presentation, you might say, on the 'true but unprovable' (in the sense of Godel) by John Conway and he kept saying "I don't know if this is true, but ?"; "I don't have a proof, but ?" It was a serious mathematical presentation. Ed Wall On Nov 9, 2014, at 5:26 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Hi, > > I am forwarding an article by a philosopher of mathematics who addresses issues of narrative and logic as well as the role of history > > in mathematics. Some of the article requires a familiarity with concepts in the field which are above my head, nevertheless it was a valuable > > piece in the context of the current thread. > > Vera > > > > From: reuben hersh [mailto:rhersh@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 7:44 AM > To: Vera John-Steiner > Subject: grosholz > > > > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 10 15:23:41 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 23:23:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Objectivity of mathematics In-Reply-To: References: <54585A04.8020708@mira.net> <3B024BCD-D68E-474C-A83A-35864F9C3027@gmail.com> <00ac01cff988$5b8fe860$12afb920$@netvision.net.il> <006101cffa79$8f551b60$adff5220$@net.il> <010f01cffaac$6ba77810$42f66830$@net.il> <007601cffb23$f57ada10$e0708e30$@net.il> <545E0AC5.6000007@mira.net> <86562269-9D51-4B30-AE99-B2F99428B27B@uniandes.edu.co> <545EB2EE.7090206@mira.net> Message-ID: My reading of Luis' "two cents" is that in order to empower students it is necessary to foster an engagement with the objectivity described. That, to me, seems to be all about problem solving, i.e. discerning 'rationally' important details of situations and determining what should be done in relation to them. I am surmising that such problem solving goes hand-in-hand with a wider appreciation of that 'rationality'. Best, Huw On 9 November 2014 18:05, Julian Williams wrote: > Andy (if you haven't forgotten this prehistoric post by now, nearly a day > later!) > > I don?t disagree that in some sense the 'social convention' (of > mathematics) may be not, per se, 'objective' (in the sense that it can > 'easily' be re-written) and also that maths can be conventional as well > as 'objective'. But I still think its objectivity 'exists' to be > transformed and developed, just as other natural sciences do. > > I guess the way I use 'subject' and 'object' (and > subjectivity/objectivity) implies that the concept of 'object' and > 'objectivity' only makes sense in terms of a dialectic of activity. So > let's begin with the monist hypothesis that 'nature' (or as some say > 'god') includes everything, humanity, matter, discourse, experience, > perezhivaniya one and all. > > But 'we' (OK hang in here I know this we is a problem.. What is > 'objective' is then dialectically related to who the 'we' is that is > collectively considered to be acting - e.g. Are 'we' humanity as a whole, > the clique of professional mathematicians, or ... ) find ourselves to be a > part of this whole mess: we 'subjects' , our subjectivity and agency are a > part of it, but we experience 'the other' stuff (not 'us') as 'objects' to > act on .. Of course here the dialectic of subject-object means the > 'object' may be represented in terms of our needs (e.g. 'That rabbit looks > yummy?' ). > > I think Pierce's 'firstness' includes this 'other'- objectivity is > constituted by the other's firstness to begin with. When you say the earth > is 'round', you allude to the firstness of the world that we come to > manage as 'roundness'. > > Then, it seems some of us are concerned with the 'shift' that takes place > when the collective 'we' start to communicate and discourse tends to lose > its direct connection with action on the 'other' objects (including > firstness). The 'object(s)' now begins to include our concepts developed > in communicative discourse including 'round' and 'circle', i.e. > mathematics. > > My argument (last post - here we are at last) argued that the > objectivity/validity of this mathematics/discourse rests on (and only on) > the degree to which it is in some sense satisfactory 'in practice'. > > Here Mike Cole's post (if I got it right) picks me up and I think he is > right - I have confused 'objectivity' with 'validity'. This is because the > 'object' we call mathematics is always hypothesised to be 'valid': that > is, when we work on the 'object' mathematics, mathematicians are > critiquing and transforming what is taken to be the state of the art in > mathematical 'validity' or 'truth'. > > Julian > > Ps Skimming forward: Luis cites Foucault's 'regime of truth' for > mathematics. Im not sure if you - Luis - will agree with this Luis, but > my reading of Foucault is that he uses this term (i.e. Regime of T) as a > tool to critique the power structures within the discipline. Observing > that validity of mathematics is upheld by such a regime should - if we > agree with Foucault - provoke us to smash it to pieces? no? > > :-) > > > > On 09/11/2014 00:18, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > > >Oh dear! some times I despair of the possibility of communication. > >That the Earth is round is a social convention, but it is not *only* a > >social convention; it has a sound basis in material reality. That is to > >say, Julian, no amount of discoursing and activity can alter the fact > >that the world is round. The roundness of the Earth is also outside > >discourse and activity, even though it is made meaningful and known for > >us only thanks to discourse/activity. > >Driving on the right is subject to discourse/activity. In about 1968 > >Sweden changed from left to right. RIght-hand driving is *only* a social > >convention. > >Simple, eh? I would have thought so. > >Andy > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >*Andy Blunden* > >http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >Martin John Packer wrote: > >> And also that the earth is round is a convention! Go figure! > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Nov 8, 2014, at 5:55 PM, Julian Williams > >> wrote: > >> > >> > >>> I'm struggling to keep up here... Surely I didn't hear Andy Blunden > >>>say that 'objectivity' implies stuff that can't be transformed? I'm > >>>sure I must have misremembered that!.? > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Nov 10 18:17:23 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 19:17:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: grosholz In-Reply-To: References: <000001cffc74$88dfd4d0$9a9f7e70$@edu> Message-ID: <58C8C12F-3E03-4057-829A-08E3F9241A07@gmail.com> I just finished the Grosholz article (?Phil of Math & Phil of History?). I was thinking about conjectures regarding things that have not been proven) and discoveries of things that have may not even been imagined. Fermat?s theorem was a conjecture until Wylie proved it. I would contrast Wylie?s proof with the year of ?pure math? I did at U of Texas at Austin in the program set up by E.T. Moore. I tried very hard to prove that such a thing as a Cantor set existed. I was not able to beat another student in the program to the punch, in fact made a fool of myself in front of a class thinking I DID have a proof when I didn?t. But that failure, and the struggle that went into it, made it possible for me to understand the other guy?s proof. So, on that occasion, he was better at math than me. But by the time the two of us worked on the problem it was neither a conjecture, nor a discovery. Somebody else had done it for the first time. Our job was not trivial, to trace the steps to the proof, but it was very different from what Wylie did. Cantor?s story, I think, ups the ante. The set in question may have been only a conjecture to Cantor at the time. His ideas on transfinite numbers were ridiculed and he was hounded much like Vygotsky by the cogniscenti at the time. In fact the It was a discovery of that set that has become the foundations of fractal mathematics (which I think is worth talking about in this thread). In analogous fashion, Vygotsky?s work was epic in analogous fashion and equally tragic. I sort of see us here today, with our crisis, working with LSV?s conjectures, finding the solution to the problems. I think it?s worth adding these kinds of narratives to the history of math and the history of philosophy, as Grosholz has construed it. And maybe it?s sort of what she was getting at on page 16: ??[T]his is the logical texture of everyday life, where the unforeseen constantly puts to the test our intellectual and moral resources, and where our ability to rise to the occasion must always remain in question: the insight of tragedy is that anyone can be destroyed by some unfortunate combination of events and a lapse in fortitude or sympathy. Clearly my little piece of it amounts to very little. Still... Henry > On Nov 9, 2014, at 5:05 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > Thanks > > Yes, Wiles is a nice example of doing mathematics within a historical dimension.One part of the article bothered me when the author averred that Fermat would need to pick up the centuries between. Interestingly that is not what a student of mathematics who was born today would 'need' to do to enter the conversation. > > I was listening to a presentation, you might say, on the 'true but unprovable' (in the sense of Godel) by John Conway and he kept saying "I don't know if this is true, but ?"; "I don't have a proof, but ?" It was a serious mathematical presentation. > > Ed Wall > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 5:26 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I am forwarding an article by a philosopher of mathematics who addresses issues of narrative and logic as well as the role of history >> >> in mathematics. Some of the article requires a familiarity with concepts in the field which are above my head, nevertheless it was a valuable >> >> piece in the context of the current thread. >> >> Vera >> >> >> >> From: reuben hersh [mailto:rhersh@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 7:44 AM >> To: Vera John-Steiner >> Subject: grosholz >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Nov 10 21:43:28 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 21:43:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: grosholz In-Reply-To: <58C8C12F-3E03-4057-829A-08E3F9241A07@gmail.com> References: <000001cffc74$88dfd4d0$9a9f7e70$@edu> <58C8C12F-3E03-4057-829A-08E3F9241A07@gmail.com> Message-ID: Still, your experience allows you to richly interpret what is involved, cognitively, socially, and affectively, Henry. Very interesting. mike On Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 6:17 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I just finished the Grosholz article (?Phil of Math & Phil of History?). > > I was thinking about conjectures regarding things that have not been > proven) and discoveries of things that have may not even been imagined. > Fermat?s theorem was a conjecture until Wylie proved it. I would contrast > Wylie?s proof with the year of ?pure math? I did at U of Texas at Austin in > the program set up by E.T. Moore. I tried very hard to prove that such a > thing as a Cantor set existed. I was not able to beat another student in > the program to the punch, in fact made a fool of myself in front of a class > thinking I DID have a proof when I didn?t. But that failure, and the > struggle that went into it, made it possible for me to understand the other > guy?s proof. So, on that occasion, he was better at math than me. But by > the time the two of us worked on the problem it was neither a conjecture, > nor a discovery. Somebody else had done it for the first time. Our job was > not trivial, to trace the steps to the proof, but it was very different > from what Wylie did. Cantor?s story, I think, ups the ante. The set in > question may have been only a conjecture to Cantor at the time. His ideas > on transfinite numbers were ridiculed and he was hounded much like Vygotsky > by the cogniscenti at the time. In fact the It was a discovery of that set > that has become the foundations of fractal mathematics (which I think is > worth talking about in this thread). In analogous fashion, Vygotsky?s work > was epic in analogous fashion and equally tragic. I sort of see us here > today, with our crisis, working with LSV?s conjectures, finding the > solution to the problems. I think it?s worth adding these kinds of > narratives to the history of math and the history of philosophy, as > Grosholz has construed it. And maybe it?s sort of what she was getting at > on page 16: > ??[T]his is the logical texture of everyday life, where the unforeseen > constantly puts to the test our intellectual and moral resources, and where > our ability to rise to the occasion must always remain in question: the > insight of tragedy is that anyone can be destroyed by some unfortunate > combination of events and a lapse in fortitude or sympathy. > Clearly my little piece of it amounts to very little. Still... > Henry > > > > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 5:05 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > Thanks > > > > Yes, Wiles is a nice example of doing mathematics within a historical > dimension.One part of the article bothered me when the author averred that > Fermat would need to pick up the centuries between. Interestingly that is > not what a student of mathematics who was born today would 'need' to do to > enter the conversation. > > > > I was listening to a presentation, you might say, on the 'true but > unprovable' (in the sense of Godel) by John Conway and he kept saying "I > don't know if this is true, but ?"; "I don't have a proof, but ?" It was a > serious mathematical presentation. > > > > Ed Wall > > > > On Nov 9, 2014, at 5:26 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> > >> I am forwarding an article by a philosopher of mathematics who > addresses issues of narrative and logic as well as the role of history > >> > >> in mathematics. Some of the article requires a familiarity with > concepts in the field which are above my head, nevertheless it was a > valuable > >> > >> piece in the context of the current thread. > >> > >> Vera > >> > >> > >> > >> From: reuben hersh [mailto:rhersh@gmail.com] > >> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 7:44 AM > >> To: Vera John-Steiner > >> Subject: grosholz > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Tue Nov 11 05:18:37 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2014 10:18:37 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] On the temporality of creative insight: a psychological and phenomenological perspective | Perception Science Message-ID: Dear colleagues, I thought that this paper we just made with Diego Cosmelli could be of interest for some colleagues here. It is in the same spirit of that beautiful paper by Pelaprat and Cole about imagination. David http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01184/abstract From goncu@uic.edu Wed Nov 12 20:26:23 2014 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 22:26:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Thanking Bucholz, Shively, Peppler, Wohlwend Message-ID: <8c45ab305a1c68305ac2a2e6ee208e46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Dear Beth, Kate, Kylie, and Karen, Thank you very much for addressing questions stimulated by your article "Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices" on xmca. Your contributions to MCA,to the ongoing discussion on xmca, and to the literature at large are much appreciated. Artin Goncu, Ph.D Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From smago@uga.edu Fri Nov 14 10:40:55 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2014 18:40:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: JoLLE Fall 2014 Preview- Check it out! In-Reply-To: <1415985355777.67057@uga.edu> References: <1415985279134.31315@uga.edu> <1415985355777.67057@uga.edu> Message-ID: <04d9e7e277364adeab76f7be2ab5c51c@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> We are excited to announce a preview of The Journal of Language and Literacy Education's Fall 2014 Issue which can be found at: http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/current-issue/ Included within this preview are titles of the books we are reviewing and a new feature, author podcasts, that will give you behind the scenes insight into their research and pedagogy. Please spread the word and look forward to the complete issue coming in December! [cid:ab93bd0f-986d-4d92-aa49-25260602ab25]? Michelle M. Falter Principal Editor 2014-2015, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga JoLLE@UGA? "Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all." ~ Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Picture1-1024x548.png Type: image/png Size: 76794 bytes Desc: Picture1-1024x548.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141114/dfeca973/attachment.png From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Nov 17 07:55:23 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 07:55:23 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Job Position in Developmental Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jason Low Date: Sun, Nov 16, 2014 at 2:10 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Job Position in Developmental Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Dear Colleagues: I am writing to call your attention to a position in Developmental Psychology that is available at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. The position is described below, as well as in the flyer that is attached. Please share with any potential applicants. Thanks very much. Sincerely yours, Jason Low *Lecturer in Developmental Psychology.* The School of Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington is inviting applications for a permanent (equivalent to tenured) appointment at the level of Lecturer (equivalent to USA Assistant Professor). The successful applicant will possess a PhD in Developmental Psychology with a strong research and publication record in the area of Developmental Psychology. The successful applicant will actively conduct research in Developmental Psychology and participate in productive collaborations that complement our existing developmental expertise (e.g., theory-of-mind development, autobiographical memory development, gender and youth, positive youth development, and developmental psychopathology). Consideration will also be given to applicants whose research in Developmental Psychology complements the School?s strengths in other research areas. The successful applicant will demonstrate a proven ability to engage in teaching in a relevant field at University level. The appointee will be expected to direct and teach an undergraduate course in Lifespan Developmental Psychology, to provide teaching at postgraduate courses in his or her area of expertise, to supervise research students, and demonstrate a willingness to contribute to the administrative functioning of the School and the University. The School of Psychology is home to a dynamic and international staff, and was ranked the top overall school or department of psychology in New Zealand in terms of research quality in the last two national quality assessment rounds. Further details may be found at: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/psyc/. For further information, please contact Dr Jason Low, School of Psychology, at: Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz. Applications close 30 January 2015. Interested persons should apply to Reference Number 366 via the online link at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/about/careers Dr Jason Low School of Psychology Victoria University of Wellington PO Box 600 Wellington New Zealand 6140 E-mail: Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Lecturer in Developmental Psycholgy VUW 366.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 389585 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141117/4d070ca8/attachment.pdf From rsanto@umail.iu.edu Mon Nov 17 08:50:53 2014 From: rsanto@umail.iu.edu (Rafi Santo) Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 11:50:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [Data & Society] Researcher Job Opening: Enabling Connected Learning, Data & Society In-Reply-To: References: <630291A3-3C36-4A1C-A344-DA250A215B17@datasociety.net> Message-ID: Thought folks might find this opportunity of interest. Rafi -- Rafi Santo Project Lead Hive Research Lab hiveresearchlab.org A project of Indiana University and New York University Indiana University - Learning Sciences Begin forwarded message: *From: *danah boyd *Date: *November 16, 2014 at 10:54:12 PM EST *To: *friends *Subject: **[Data & Society] Researcher Job Opening: Enabling Connected Learning, Data & Society* *Reply-To: *danah boyd *Can you forward this to folks in your network? * *JOB OPENING: RESEARCHER, ENABLING CONNECTED LEARNING * The Data & Society Research Institute is looking to hire a researcher who can help design and execute a research agenda to enable connected learning. Full job description available here: http://www.datasociety.net/jobs/2014/11/researcher-enabling-connected-learning/ Data & Society is a New York City-based research institute dedicated to addressing social, technical, ethical, legal, and policy issues that are emerging because of data-centric technological development. D&S brings together researchers, entrepreneurs, activists, policy creators, journalists, geeks, and public intellectuals to gather, debate, and engage one another on the key issues introduced by the increasing availability of data in society. *The Enabling Connected Learning Initiative* Enabling Connected Learning is a new Data & Society initiative, spearheaded by our founder, danah boyd, and supported through a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The goal of the project is to better understand the relationship between U.S. governmental policy, technology development, and innovative learning and education initiatives. This project recognizes the importance and goals of connected learning an educational approach designed to leverage technology and learner-driven interests to enable learning. This project is also seeking to enable the cities of learning movement in order to create bridges between different learning environments, all with the learner at the center. Federal and state policies focused on children, education, and technology shape what learning initiatives are possible. Privacy, safety, and security all shape the trustworthiness of different digital platforms and learning ecosystems, even as data can be used to enable new forms of learning and new opportunities for advancing education. While these issues are publicly debated and politically fraught, research to ground these conversations is limited. The goal of this project is to better understand exactly how existing and proposed policies affect connected learning initiatives. *Job Description* We are seeking either a full-time or part-time researcher to help drive the research components of this project. Start date is negotiable and the appointment is for two years (with renewal possibilities). Applicants should have a PhD in a social science or related field or significant experience doing similar types of research. Applicants may be postdocs or more advanced researchers. This is a fully funded position with benefits and vacation; salary is dependent on experience. The appointment requires residency in New York. Travel may be necessary, both for conducting the research and for disseminating findings. This project will involve qualitative interviewing and may also involve content analysis, policy analysis, and survey work depending on the questions that emerge from the initial research. The researcher would work as a part of a research team, collaborating with danah and with other research assistants and researchers. Core findings from the work will be published through white papers and in public-facing venues but researchers are also encouraged to publish scholarly contributions in peer-reviewed venues. This position is ideal for a qualitative researcher who is seeking to do impact-oriented research at the intersection of education and learning, policy, and technology; to be a part of a research team; and to be situated in a community of researchers all looking to understand the intersection of technology and society. While researchers are also encouraged to pursue their own research agenda during this appointment, executing this project must take priority. *Qualifications* ? PhD in social science or related field, or equivalent research experience ? Exceptional written and oral communication skills ? Demonstrated interest and knowledge in qualitative methodology and some combination of education/learning, technology, and policy ? Curious and collaborative self-starter who can help drive a project forward (usually involves herding cats) ? Knowledge of some combination of: education/technology policy, education technologies, digital media & learning initiatives, and/or education practices is a plus *APPLICATION PROCESS* To apply, please send an email to danah boyd at learning-job@datasociety.net with the subject ?Connected Learning Application? and include the following attachments: ? One-page, single-spaced personal statement, including a description of research experience, interests, and professional goals ? CV or resume ? Writing sample (preferably a journal article or equivalent research document) ? Links to online presence (e.g., blog, homepage, Twitter, journalistic endeavors, etc.) ? The names and email addresses of two recommenders ? A cover letter that includes citizenship/legal residency status, current city of residence, available start date, and any other practical consideration that may be important for us to know We will begin reviewing applications immediately and will continue to do so until we find the right researcher. Please contact us should you have any questions about the position. Questions about the opportunity or process will not reflect negatively on your application. *The work and well-being of the Data & Society Research Institute is strengthened by the diversity of our network and our differences in background, culture, experience, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and much more. We welcome applications from people of color, women, the LGBTQIA community, and persons with disabilities. * ____________________________________________________________ You received this message as a subscriber on the list: friends@lists.datasociety.net To be removed from the list, send any message to: friends-unsubscribe@lists.datasociety.net For all list information and functions, see: http://lists.datasociety.net/lists/info/friends From tvmathdude@aol.com Mon Nov 17 12:16:43 2014 From: tvmathdude@aol.com (Roger Breen) Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 21:16:43 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Please get back to me ASAP!!! Message-ID: <201411172018.sAHKITx7013592@mailman.ucsd.edu> - This mail is in HTML. Some elements may be ommited in plain text. - This message is coming to you with great depression due to my state of discomfort. I came down here to Manila, (Philippines) with my family for a short vacation but unfortunately, we were mugged and robbed at the park of the hotel where we stayed. All cash, credit cards and cell phones were stolen off us but we still have our lives and passports. We've been to the embassy and the police here and they have done the best they can. Our flight leaves in less than 12hrs from now but we are having problems settling the hotel bills and the hotel manager won't let us leave until we settle the bills. I am contacting you to ask for a short loan which I will refund immediately I get my family back home safely. Let me know if you can help. Roger From ablunden@mira.net Tue Nov 18 02:32:10 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 21:32:10 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Higher Mental Functions Message-ID: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> For those of you who rely on marxists.org for their Vygotsky reading, I have scanned a couple more chapters from Volume 4 of the LSVCW today: http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/analysis-higher-mental-functions.htm I was looking for material where Vygotsky discusses the relation between sign-mediation and tool-mediation (and other types of mediation!) and these chapters seemed to be necessary. I could not find the passage where he expresses some antipathy to calling both signs and tools "artefacts". I was sure I read this somewhere. Can anyone recall where that could have been? Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Nov 18 12:36:16 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 05:36:16 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Higher Mental Functions In-Reply-To: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> References: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy: Take a look at the end of Chapter Two, the Research Method Chapter, pp. 60-62 in the English Collected Works. It's not that he objects to the term "artifacts"; he doesn't use the term. It's that he objects to the analogy between them being reduced to an identity, and on this basis does not agree that "language is a tool of thinking" or that language is an 'auxiliary device of memory". He also objects to Dewey's phrase that language is a "tool of tools", and points out that it is a bad paraphrase of Aristotle. He says that the relationship between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, functional and genetic relationship has to be worked out. David Kellogg Hankuk Univeristy of Foreign Studies. On 18 November 2014 19:32, Andy Blunden wrote: > For those of you who rely on marxists.org for their Vygotsky reading, I have > scanned a couple more chapters from Volume 4 of the LSVCW today: > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/analysis-higher-mental-functions.htm > > I was looking for material where Vygotsky discusses the relation between > sign-mediation and tool-mediation (and other types of mediation!) and these > chapters seemed to be necessary. I could not find the passage where he > expresses some antipathy to calling both signs and tools "artefacts". I was > sure I read this somewhere. Can anyone recall where that could have been? > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Nov 18 16:03:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 11:03:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Higher Mental Functions In-Reply-To: References: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> Message-ID: <546BDE54.7040105@mira.net> Thanks David. That sounds like it. I knew I could rely on you. :) 'Twas a popular idea. Hegel said "speech is the tool of reason". https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/se/ch01.htm Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Andy: > > Take a look at the end of Chapter Two, the Research Method Chapter, > pp. 60-62 in the English Collected Works. It's not that he objects to > the term "artifacts"; he doesn't use the term. It's that he objects to > the analogy between them being reduced to an identity, and on this > basis does not agree that "language is a tool of thinking" or that > language is an 'auxiliary device of memory". He also objects to > Dewey's phrase that language is a "tool of tools", and points out that > it is a bad paraphrase of Aristotle. He says that the relationship > between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical > category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, functional > and genetic relationship has to be worked out. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk Univeristy of Foreign Studies. > > On 18 November 2014 19:32, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> For those of you who rely on marxists.org for their Vygotsky reading, I have >> scanned a couple more chapters from Volume 4 of the LSVCW today: >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/analysis-higher-mental-functions.htm >> >> I was looking for material where Vygotsky discusses the relation between >> sign-mediation and tool-mediation (and other types of mediation!) and these >> chapters seemed to be necessary. I could not find the passage where he >> expresses some antipathy to calling both signs and tools "artefacts". I was >> sure I read this somewhere. Can anyone recall where that could have been? >> >> Andy >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Nov 19 13:56:28 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 06:56:28 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance Message-ID: Last weekend, like most of the population of Seoul, I left the city to go down to the countryside. It's the traditional moment when people go to their ancestral home, meet with members of the whole family, and make a whole truckload of cabbage into kimchi for the winter, dividing it up for all the members of the extended family to take home, so I went to visit some old friends and look at new paintings (as well as eat the new kimchi before the fermentation has taken the crispness from the cabbage and the bite from the garlic and red pepper). As we were scrabbling for parking spots outside a popular noodle restaurant, I used the Korean word for "fate" to mean "luck", and everybody laughed, because I had inadvertantly implied that my ancestors had somehow designated that particular parking spot for us. I still maintain it was not my fault--the two terms are quite similar in Korean, and even in English they are rather hard to separate out semantically without referring to concepts like "subjective" and "objective". Many thanks to Andy for the posting Chapter Two of the History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions. It is an incredible roller coaster ride, but I have always believed that it is the most important thing on fate, luck, and chance--and even on language--that Vygotsky ever wrote, even though it hardly mentions language at all. As I noted earlier, Vygotsky doesn't use the term "artifacts". Instead, he uses the term "rudimentary functions" to describe things like drawing oracular lots, tying mnemonic knots, and notching sticks to calculate numbers. Of course, these are, genetically speaking, artifacts: they are artificially made. But I think for Vygotsky what is important is not what is self-identical and constant but rather what changes. That's why he rejects the "logical category" approach to classifying both signs and tools as mediating activities, and that's why he insists that the precise genetic, functional, and structural relationship of tools and signs has to be worked out. So I think for Vygotsky what is important is the change in function. That's why he calls them "rudimentary functions" and not artifacts, and that's also why he insists that they have utterly lost the commanding, "fateful" authority they once had. In LSV's example from Tolstoy, Pierre Bezukhov forgets all about the message of the game of Solitaire he is playing to decide whether to stay in Moscow and kill Napoleon or join the Russian Army and be killed! We use these as games of luck and not as conduits of fate. It seems to me that at least some of the recent kerfuffle over Andy's statement that the "objective" is what is seen as not changeable through discourse by a given discourse community can be seen similarly. Pierre's decision is--quite literally--changed through the trivial discourse of his sister, because he recognizes that the outcome of the game is only luck, not fate. Such a change was not possible for the practitioners of "decimation": When a Roman commander wanted to punish a legion, he counted on this fingers, and if he pointed to you with his second pinky, you were bludgened to death, and you called it fate, not luck. These were people who necessarily took the distinction between subjective and objective more seriously than we do, but to a certain extent their distinction beteween fate and luck is the rudimentary form of our own distinction between the subjective and the objective. How does Pierre, and how do children, see that what they take as fate or magic or even skill is simply chance? Of course, the answer is that some of them never do: I am always a little astonished by my own ability to attribute a successful class to my own semi-divine erudition and conversely to blame an unsuccessful one on a diabolical conspiracy of sultry weather, late subways, and other people's ill temper. But I think that Vygotsky would find the idea that the child on his own simply sees through the idea of fate and luck and replaces them with the notion of chance rather intellectualistic: like the scene in the Wizard of Oz where Toto knocks over the curtain and reveals the Wizard as a wizened old circus balloonist speaking through a megaphone. I prefer to think that language plays a vital role: the child learns to see that things that are made of language can be unmade by language, and in so doing tranforms fate into luck and then into chance. But the process is not a single revelation, and it comes as part of a much broader discovery that includes the ability to internalize almost any social discourse as a kind of mental grammar that is more individual, more autonomous and more "subjective". And so I think that Andy's formulation, although the butt of some ridicule by good people on this list who could not actually quote it correctly (I'm looking at you, Martin) is really correct: "objective" just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of just me and my lonely self. That's why Vygotsky says that the 'internal" is simply the psychological, and the external the social. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 19 15:29:50 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 16:29:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <60767C9A-0AA8-463D-B0E8-E855A6D2FE7B@gmail.com> David and all, I am translating a text from Spanish to English that is consequential in the same way that translating Vygotsky from Russian to English is consequential: certain people are passionately interested in the meanings and care very much if the translation is well done. As I do the translation and follow the chat I ponder interpretation of discourse and translation from one language to another as being on some kind of continuum, rather than different processes. I understand that Vygotsky said that learning a second language was a sort of requisite for understanding one?s mother tongue. Translating from Spanish to English may be child?s play compared to going between languages that are very much different, but I am struck by how often idioms and metaphors that are perfectly clear to me in Spanish stump me in trying to find the apt expressions in English. A lot! That sets me to wondering if translating ?academic? language is so entirely different from translating poetry or literature in that metaphor and idiomaticity abound all around. Henry > On Nov 19, 2014, at 2:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Last weekend, like most of the population of Seoul, I left the city to > go down to the countryside. It's the traditional moment when people go > to their ancestral home, meet with members of the whole family, and > make a whole truckload of cabbage into kimchi for the winter, dividing > it up for all the members of the extended family to take home, so I > went to visit some old friends and look at new paintings (as well as > eat the new kimchi before the fermentation has taken the crispness > from the cabbage and the bite from the garlic and red pepper). > > As we were scrabbling for parking spots outside a popular noodle > restaurant, I used the Korean word for "fate" to mean "luck", and > everybody laughed, because I had inadvertantly implied that my > ancestors had somehow designated that particular parking spot for us. > I still maintain it was not my fault--the two terms are quite similar > in Korean, and even in English they are rather hard to separate out > semantically without referring to concepts like "subjective" and > "objective". > > Many thanks to Andy for the posting Chapter Two of the History of the > Development of the Higher Mental Functions. It is an incredible roller > coaster ride, but I have always believed that it is the most important > thing on fate, luck, and chance--and even on language--that Vygotsky > ever wrote, even though it hardly mentions language at all. > > As I noted earlier, Vygotsky doesn't use the term "artifacts". > Instead, he uses the term "rudimentary functions" to describe things > like drawing oracular lots, tying mnemonic knots, and notching sticks > to calculate numbers. Of course, these are, genetically speaking, > artifacts: they are artificially made. > > But I think for Vygotsky what is important is not what is > self-identical and constant but rather what changes. That's why he > rejects the "logical category" approach to classifying both signs and > tools as mediating activities, and that's why he insists that the > precise genetic, functional, and structural relationship of tools and > signs has to be worked out. > > So I think for Vygotsky what is important is the change in function. > That's why he calls them "rudimentary functions" and not artifacts, > and that's also why he insists that they have utterly lost the > commanding, "fateful" authority they once had. In LSV's example from > Tolstoy, Pierre Bezukhov forgets all about the message of the game of > Solitaire he is playing to decide whether to stay in Moscow and kill > Napoleon or join the Russian Army and be killed! We use these as games > of luck and not as conduits of fate. > > It seems to me that at least some of the recent kerfuffle over Andy's > statement that the "objective" is what is seen as not changeable > through discourse by a given discourse community can be seen > similarly. Pierre's decision is--quite literally--changed through the > trivial discourse of his sister, because he recognizes that the > outcome of the game is only luck, not fate. > > Such a change was not possible for the practitioners of "decimation": > When a Roman commander wanted to punish a legion, he counted on this > fingers, and if he pointed to you with his second pinky, you were > bludgened to death, and you called it fate, not luck. These were > people who necessarily took the distinction between subjective and > objective more seriously than we do, but to a certain extent their > distinction beteween fate and luck is the rudimentary form of our own > distinction between the subjective and the objective. > > How does Pierre, and how do children, see that what they take as fate > or magic or even skill is simply chance? Of course, the answer is that > some of them never do: I am always a little astonished by my own > ability to attribute a successful class to my own semi-divine > erudition and conversely to blame an unsuccessful one on a diabolical > conspiracy of sultry weather, late subways, and other people's ill > temper. But I think that Vygotsky would find the idea that the child > on his own simply sees through the idea of fate and luck and replaces > them with the notion of chance rather intellectualistic: like the > scene in the Wizard of Oz where Toto knocks over the curtain and > reveals the Wizard as a wizened old circus balloonist speaking through > a megaphone. > > I prefer to think that language plays a vital role: the child learns > to see that things that are made of language can be unmade by > language, and in so doing tranforms fate into luck and then into > chance. But the process is not a single revelation, and it comes as > part of a much broader discovery that includes the ability to > internalize almost any social discourse as a kind of mental grammar > that is more individual, more autonomous and more "subjective". > > And so I think that Andy's formulation, although the butt of some > ridicule by good people on this list who could not actually quote it > correctly (I'm looking at you, Martin) is really correct: "objective" > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > just me and my lonely self. That's why Vygotsky says that the > 'internal" is simply the psychological, and the external the social. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 19 16:59:22 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 11:59:22 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <546D3CEA.1090202@mira.net> Thank you for that journey, David. To tell the truth, I had never before reflected on the relation between fate, luck and chance! Looking at two passages, two issues which have come up here recently together: Vygotsky's words on signs and tools (and other mediating elements) in http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm#sign-tool and his words on words and actions which Haydi drew our attention to in http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 In both cases I think he is combating the then-fashionable (in the USSR) labour paradigm in psychology and anthropology, that is, taking the labour process as the archetypical relation. In the light of the later development of Activity Theory, his words were prescient. As you suggest, any attempt to distinguish between sign and tool or between word and act, "logically," that is, according to their various attributes, is hopeless. What is more, such a "logical" approach seems to lead to the conclusion that word is a special *type of tool* (or artefact) and speech a special type of action. He shows how mistaken this is, and the key concept is that the two concepts are related not "logically" (or typologically) but genetically, that is, according to the relation between their distinct but related paths of development. Just as he explains in Thinking and Speech, in relation to thinking and speaking: http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch04.htm#s2a Actions (or tool use) on one hand and word-use on the other hand have separate roots and up to a certain point have separate lines of development, but once they come into "contact" with one another, the development of each is raised to a higher (human) level, and conversely and for each of the pairs of concepts. And then beyond a certain point, both forms of action develop along distinct, even divergent lines, even while they have become quite inextricable from a logical or typological point of view. It was formulations like this, bound to be misunderstood in the years after he died, which laid him open for the utterly false accusation of "idealism", and the failure to grasp the relation between the two related concepts by some of those who came afterwards, led them into error. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Last weekend, like most of the population of Seoul, I left the city to > go down to the countryside. It's the traditional moment when people go > to their ancestral home, meet with members of the whole family, and > make a whole truckload of cabbage into kimchi for the winter, dividing > it up for all the members of the extended family to take home, so I > went to visit some old friends and look at new paintings (as well as > eat the new kimchi before the fermentation has taken the crispness > from the cabbage and the bite from the garlic and red pepper). > > As we were scrabbling for parking spots outside a popular noodle > restaurant, I used the Korean word for "fate" to mean "luck", and > everybody laughed, because I had inadvertantly implied that my > ancestors had somehow designated that particular parking spot for us. > I still maintain it was not my fault--the two terms are quite similar > in Korean, and even in English they are rather hard to separate out > semantically without referring to concepts like "subjective" and > "objective". > > Many thanks to Andy for the posting Chapter Two of the History of the > Development of the Higher Mental Functions. It is an incredible roller > coaster ride, but I have always believed that it is the most important > thing on fate, luck, and chance--and even on language--that Vygotsky > ever wrote, even though it hardly mentions language at all. > > As I noted earlier, Vygotsky doesn't use the term "artifacts". > Instead, he uses the term "rudimentary functions" to describe things > like drawing oracular lots, tying mnemonic knots, and notching sticks > to calculate numbers. Of course, these are, genetically speaking, > artifacts: they are artificially made. > > But I think for Vygotsky what is important is not what is > self-identical and constant but rather what changes. That's why he > rejects the "logical category" approach to classifying both signs and > tools as mediating activities, and that's why he insists that the > precise genetic, functional, and structural relationship of tools and > signs has to be worked out. > > So I think for Vygotsky what is important is the change in function. > That's why he calls them "rudimentary functions" and not artifacts, > and that's also why he insists that they have utterly lost the > commanding, "fateful" authority they once had. In LSV's example from > Tolstoy, Pierre Bezukhov forgets all about the message of the game of > Solitaire he is playing to decide whether to stay in Moscow and kill > Napoleon or join the Russian Army and be killed! We use these as games > of luck and not as conduits of fate. > > It seems to me that at least some of the recent kerfuffle over Andy's > statement that the "objective" is what is seen as not changeable > through discourse by a given discourse community can be seen > similarly. Pierre's decision is--quite literally--changed through the > trivial discourse of his sister, because he recognizes that the > outcome of the game is only luck, not fate. > > Such a change was not possible for the practitioners of "decimation": > When a Roman commander wanted to punish a legion, he counted on this > fingers, and if he pointed to you with his second pinky, you were > bludgened to death, and you called it fate, not luck. These were > people who necessarily took the distinction between subjective and > objective more seriously than we do, but to a certain extent their > distinction beteween fate and luck is the rudimentary form of our own > distinction between the subjective and the objective. > > How does Pierre, and how do children, see that what they take as fate > or magic or even skill is simply chance? Of course, the answer is that > some of them never do: I am always a little astonished by my own > ability to attribute a successful class to my own semi-divine > erudition and conversely to blame an unsuccessful one on a diabolical > conspiracy of sultry weather, late subways, and other people's ill > temper. But I think that Vygotsky would find the idea that the child > on his own simply sees through the idea of fate and luck and replaces > them with the notion of chance rather intellectualistic: like the > scene in the Wizard of Oz where Toto knocks over the curtain and > reveals the Wizard as a wizened old circus balloonist speaking through > a megaphone. > > I prefer to think that language plays a vital role: the child learns > to see that things that are made of language can be unmade by > language, and in so doing tranforms fate into luck and then into > chance. But the process is not a single revelation, and it comes as > part of a much broader discovery that includes the ability to > internalize almost any social discourse as a kind of mental grammar > that is more individual, more autonomous and more "subjective". > > And so I think that Andy's formulation, although the butt of some > ridicule by good people on this list who could not actually quote it > correctly (I'm looking at you, Martin) is really correct: "objective" > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > just me and my lonely self. That's why Vygotsky says that the > 'internal" is simply the psychological, and the external the social. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 19 17:55:20 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 01:55:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > "objective" > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > just me and my lonely self. Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view that something differently, no? There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily external to it. Martin From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Nov 19 19:02:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 19:02:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I really appreciated the opportunity to return to these texts. I am really caught by the discussion of rudimentary functrions and where the discussion leads because it brings me to a long standing concern of mine. Cross-cultural comparisons which conclude that "primitives think like children." This potential in LSV's work has been realized too often to make us certain what is being claimed. My concerns are reflected in the following cut and past from Andy's appropriation. --------------Rudimentary functions in the system of higher cultural forms of behavior and analogous, developed, and active functions of the same kind in more primitive systems make it possible for us to connect lower and higher systems genetically. They supply a point of support for a historical approach to higher mental functions and for connecting the psychology of primitive man with the higher psychology of man. Also, ***they provide a scale for transferring data from ethnic psychology to experimental psychological research** * and a measure of homogeneity and similarity of mental processes elicited in a genetic experiment and of higher mental functions. Appearing as a connecting link, a transitional form between experimentally simplified forms of behavior and the psychology of primitive man, on the one hand, and higher mental functions on the other, rudimentary forms are a kind of knot that joins three areas of study, a kind of focus in which all lines of cultural development meet and intersect, a kind of center of the whole problem. They lie halfway between what we observe in an experiment in child psychology and ethnic psychology and what we call higher mental functions that are the final link of all of cultural development. -------------------- what are these links between "experimentally simplified forms of behavior" and the "psychology of primitive man?" Are current people engaged in such research providing those links? mike On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 5:55 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > "objective" > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > > just me and my lonely self. > > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view > that something differently, no? > > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. > > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily > external to it. > > Martin > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Nov 19 19:25:43 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 20:25:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, $20K question: Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term would you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at least the citation? -greg On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > "objective" > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > > just me and my lonely self. > > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view > that something differently, no? > > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. > > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily > external to it. > > Martin > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Nov 19 19:56:28 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 03:56:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1416455787602.63870@unm.edu> Hello David K, et al, A wonderful kickstart! A question. David, you'd said: "Such a change was not possible for the practitioners of "decimation": When a Roman commander wanted to punish a legion, he counted on this fingers, and if he pointed to you with his second pinky, you were bludgened to death, and you called it fate, not luck." What is the "second pinky"? I'm curious, given the lab discussion I attended today! One of the things I'm responding to most of all in David's email is the notion of fate, luck, and chance and juxtaposing that my own understanding of the Vedic concept of karma, which doesn't really map 1:1 to fate, luck, and chance as we conceive it in the West. The categories are different, or the boundaries overlay differently. A lot of Vedic concepts pertaining to one's placement in the world and events that go on in life are not so cut and dried. I'm not sure there is a concept of "chance," largely because if I'm understanding Western notions of the concept of chance there is no determined cause or the cause is not predictable to the effect. But is this perceptual or something else? I actually like the idea of David's ancestors designating a parking space at that precise time to him as he pulled up. Only because it provides an affect of connection to others who are no longer here. And don't we want to be remembered by those we will leave behind on this little mudball, even if it is that we are remembered for providing a parking space? It may be that is the most we can do! :) But I suppose that isn't very scientific, is it? I suspect I shouldn't comment much more than that, as I haven't read the LSV chapter, and it sounds as if I should. Still if I may, I'd also like to comment on the reference to the Wizard of Oz and Toto. I have made my own private analysis of the Wizard of Oz as a fairy tale about the self which seems a good time to share. I don't know if anyone else has thought of this. Here goes: Dorothy is the conscious self, the witches are the spiritual forms of good and evil in the world (hence the directions Good Witch of the North, Wicked Witch of the West, etc.)or perhaps they are the good and bad consciences that direct us. Scarecrow is the mind (straw body), Tin Man is the "inert" body (no heart), The Lion represents the passions, feelings and emotions (cowardly). Each member of this triumvirate is missing something, which seems to align with our own sense of lack or general displacement, your mileage may vary. Toto is symbolic of the intuition or ethical self, as symbolized by loyalty, fidelity, but in a feeling and intuitive sense (dog's keen sense of smell) rather than as rational or logical. Oz is the tyrannical ego who must be revealed for what he is (a fraud), and at that time Dorothy can go home. I'm not sure what this does to David's reference, but it does seem to displace the notion of chance. Is intuition chance? :) Also (and last), what does it mean to discuss objectivity as "not subject to change"? Is this in reference to the subject observing the object not changing? What does it mean to not be subject to something, even if that something is change? Or is the object cast as subject, to those changes that don't (seem to) occur and therefore provide a reference point that is fixed (at that point in time, for the time being). Just asking for some clarification. I did not keep tabs upon the Objectivity of Math thread, so I apologize for any obvious references I have missed. Kind regards in mid-November, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 2:56 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance Last weekend, like most of the population of Seoul, I left the city to go down to the countryside. It's the traditional moment when people go to their ancestral home, meet with members of the whole family, and make a whole truckload of cabbage into kimchi for the winter, dividing it up for all the members of the extended family to take home, so I went to visit some old friends and look at new paintings (as well as eat the new kimchi before the fermentation has taken the crispness from the cabbage and the bite from the garlic and red pepper). As we were scrabbling for parking spots outside a popular noodle restaurant, I used the Korean word for "fate" to mean "luck", and everybody laughed, because I had inadvertantly implied that my ancestors had somehow designated that particular parking spot for us. I still maintain it was not my fault--the two terms are quite similar in Korean, and even in English they are rather hard to separate out semantically without referring to concepts like "subjective" and "objective". Many thanks to Andy for the posting Chapter Two of the History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions. It is an incredible roller coaster ride, but I have always believed that it is the most important thing on fate, luck, and chance--and even on language--that Vygotsky ever wrote, even though it hardly mentions language at all. As I noted earlier, Vygotsky doesn't use the term "artifacts". Instead, he uses the term "rudimentary functions" to describe things like drawing oracular lots, tying mnemonic knots, and notching sticks to calculate numbers. Of course, these are, genetically speaking, artifacts: they are artificially made. But I think for Vygotsky what is important is not what is self-identical and constant but rather what changes. That's why he rejects the "logical category" approach to classifying both signs and tools as mediating activities, and that's why he insists that the precise genetic, functional, and structural relationship of tools and signs has to be worked out. So I think for Vygotsky what is important is the change in function. That's why he calls them "rudimentary functions" and not artifacts, and that's also why he insists that they have utterly lost the commanding, "fateful" authority they once had. In LSV's example from Tolstoy, Pierre Bezukhov forgets all about the message of the game of Solitaire he is playing to decide whether to stay in Moscow and kill Napoleon or join the Russian Army and be killed! We use these as games of luck and not as conduits of fate. It seems to me that at least some of the recent kerfuffle over Andy's statement that the "objective" is what is seen as not changeable through discourse by a given discourse community can be seen similarly. Pierre's decision is--quite literally--changed through the trivial discourse of his sister, because he recognizes that the outcome of the game is only luck, not fate. Such a change was not possible for the practitioners of "decimation": When a Roman commander wanted to punish a legion, he counted on this fingers, and if he pointed to you with his second pinky, you were bludgened to death, and you called it fate, not luck. These were people who necessarily took the distinction between subjective and objective more seriously than we do, but to a certain extent their distinction beteween fate and luck is the rudimentary form of our own distinction between the subjective and the objective. How does Pierre, and how do children, see that what they take as fate or magic or even skill is simply chance? Of course, the answer is that some of them never do: I am always a little astonished by my own ability to attribute a successful class to my own semi-divine erudition and conversely to blame an unsuccessful one on a diabolical conspiracy of sultry weather, late subways, and other people's ill temper. But I think that Vygotsky would find the idea that the child on his own simply sees through the idea of fate and luck and replaces them with the notion of chance rather intellectualistic: like the scene in the Wizard of Oz where Toto knocks over the curtain and reveals the Wizard as a wizened old circus balloonist speaking through a megaphone. I prefer to think that language plays a vital role: the child learns to see that things that are made of language can be unmade by language, and in so doing tranforms fate into luck and then into chance. But the process is not a single revelation, and it comes as part of a much broader discovery that includes the ability to internalize almost any social discourse as a kind of mental grammar that is more individual, more autonomous and more "subjective". And so I think that Andy's formulation, although the butt of some ridicule by good people on this list who could not actually quote it correctly (I'm looking at you, Martin) is really correct: "objective" just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of just me and my lonely self. That's why Vygotsky says that the 'internal" is simply the psychological, and the external the social. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 19 20:05:25 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 15:05:25 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <546D6885.5060102@mira.net> I think it likely, Mike, that Vygotsky was not fully aware of mire he was walking into with that speculation. I think there is an inherent danger in both Marx and Hegel's approach in respect to cross-cultural social science. I do not say a weakness or a fallacy, because I think all the concepts necessary to clarify these problems are present in Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky. But none of them were fully aware of the pitfalls awaiting them in this area. In my personal view, it was only the alignment of social forces which arose after World War Two and the Post-War Settlement between the USSR and the USA, that the conditions emerged for Marxists to understand this problem. The other point which you have said often troubles you, Mike, is this issue of the presence of the ideal in ontogenesis. It is this which distinguishes ontogenesis from phylogenesis and, with qualifications, cultural-historical genesis. I think your work in "Cultural Psychology. A Once and Future Discipline" where you showed how cultural difference prejudiced the results of experiments in a way which is usually as invisible to the researcher as it is to the subject, provided the key insight here. For example, Luria's observation that Uzbek peasants were "childlike" because they organised groups of items into functional sets, rather than according to contingent attributes (as suggested by formal, bureaucratic logic), is, I think, a completely wrong conclusion to draw from the data. Nonetheless, I do think that ontogenetic development, when studied with the aid of dual stimulation using cultural artefacts, and the study of historical or cross-cultural psychology, have great potential to shed light on one another. But only with full consciousness of the complexity of the exercise. To an orthodox Marxist who has somehow avoided the women's movement and the civil rights movement, talking alone will never explain the problem. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > I really appreciated the opportunity to return to these texts. I am really > caught by the discussion of rudimentary functrions and where the discussion > leads because it brings me to a long standing concern of mine. > Cross-cultural comparisons which conclude that "primitives think like > children." This potential in LSV's work has been realized too often to make > us certain what is being claimed. > > My concerns are reflected in the following cut and past from Andy's > appropriation. > > --------------Rudimentary functions in the system of higher cultural forms > of behavior and analogous, developed, and active functions of the same kind > in more primitive systems make it possible for us to connect lower and > higher systems genetically. They supply a point of support for a historical > approach to higher mental functions and for connecting the psychology of > primitive man with the higher psychology of man. Also, ***they provide a > scale for transferring data from ethnic psychology to experimental > psychological research** * and a measure of homogeneity and similarity of > mental processes elicited in a genetic experiment and of higher mental > functions. Appearing as a connecting link, a transitional form between > experimentally simplified forms of behavior and the psychology of primitive > man, on the one hand, and higher mental functions on the other, rudimentary > forms are a kind of knot that joins three areas of study, a kind of focus > in which all lines of cultural development meet and intersect, a kind of > center of the whole problem. They lie halfway between what we observe in an > experiment in child psychology and ethnic psychology and what we call > higher mental functions that are the final link of all of cultural > development. > -------------------- > what are these links between "experimentally simplified forms of behavior" > and the "psychology of primitive man?" > > Are current people engaged in such research providing those links? > > mike > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 5:55 PM, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> > > >> On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> >>> "objective" >>> just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a >>> discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of >>> just me and my lonely self. >>> >> Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view >> that something differently, no? >> >> There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a >> water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And >> the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction >> between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external >> constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of >> monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and >> the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute >> it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it >> circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its >> objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. >> >> Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as >> 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in >> the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily >> external to it. >> >> Martin >> >> > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Nov 20 07:45:08 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 07:45:08 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Greg, with you I would like to read Martin's paper. The theme of constitution and cause but also the theme of constitution and construction. The rudimentary forms through constitutive means being "higher" Also seems related to the the reflections on "immediate and mediate. Will listen in to the next installment of "our" thought On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > $20K question: > Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term would > you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? > > Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at > least the citation? > -greg > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > "objective" > > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > > > just me and my lonely self. > > > > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view > > that something differently, no? > > > > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a > > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And > > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction > > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external > > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of > > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking > and > > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they > constitute > > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as > it > > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that > its > > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. > > > > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as > > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external > in > > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily > > external to it. > > > > Martin > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Nov 20 15:03:55 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 08:03:55 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin: We have a little game that we play with the sixth graders. It's part of a science lesson on light. You put a five-by-five grid of squares on the whiteboard and you mark the x axis with refracting and reflecting agents (e.g. "mirror", "water", "lens", "window", etc--we elicit them from the kids according to Vico's principle of "verum factum", you only really know what you make). Then you mark the y axis of the grid with light sources (e.g. "sunbeam", "moonbeam", "flashlight beam", "candle", etc. The kids tend to like "lasers" but we don't allow any science fiction stuff). The object of the game for a team to get three squares in a row. You get a square by stating an instance, like "a sunbeam bounces off a mirror". But you can only hold the square if you can survive the challenge "Why?" by the other team. Now, the most common way of surviving the challenge is by generalizing: "because mirrors reflect sunbeams". This way of defending your space we allow, but we don't allow "because sunbeams bounce off mirrors". My dad hits the roof when I tell him this. He points out, quite correctly, that both defenses are perfectly tautological, and neither one should be allowed, and of course from the point of view of an 87-year-old physicist, he's right. But as Piaget points out, the word "because" means at least eleven different things (the kids are always saying things like "I like fresh kimchi because it's delicious"). Vygotsky writes that this is an advantage of Piaget's work over his own; I am not so sure, because I think there is a kind of cline between the function of raising a phenomenon to the general, which is the function we see here, and the function of giving an explanation in terms of lower units, which is what the kids would have to do if we required them to explain reflection in terms of a particle or wave model of light. In the examples you give, money and water, and above all in speech, I agree that the key concept is not causality--at least not causality in this sense, in the sense of what causes reflection and refraction. But I also don't think that the word "constitution" is well chosen, because of course the same problem of polysemy arises as with causality. On the one hand, we say that the USA was (externally) constituted when the constitution was written. And on the other hand we say that the constituents of water are not voters, but the elements of hydrogen and oxygen. I'm rather surprised that you tolerate the distinction between external constitution and internal constitution, both because it obscures the difference between a relation between people and a relation between physical objects and because "external constitution" suggests the outside of a container just as surely as "internal constitution" suggests the inside. They are equally container/vehicle metaphors for meaning (which is itself a metaphorical relation, so I suppose I should call them meta-metaphor-phors). The term Halliday uses (for speech, and for goods and services) is "realization". What he means by that is simply that when we turn meaning into wording (even were this wording is merely inner speech) it moves a step away from the ideal form of the material (that is, meaning potential, meaning that is thought) to the real form of the material (when, as Shakespeare says, our eyes are offices of truth and our words are natural breath). This isn't a form of "causality": meanings don't cause wordings any more than deliciousness causes children to like kimchi. But it's not really a form of constituency either. Mike: Gita Lvovna Vygodskaya once wrote that amongst Vygotsky's papers she found letters between him and V.K. Arseniev, the man to whom Vygotsky actually refers to in Chapter Two of HDHMF. Arseniev was the author of "Dersu the Trapper", out of which Kurosawa's wonderful movie "Dersu Uzala" was made. On the one hand, he treasures their contributions towards communism, which he feels are as much moral as modernity's contributions are material (Arseniev was a Commissar for National Minorities in the Far Eastern Soviet Republic). On the other hand he mourns their destruction by the misfits from the West. When the Far Eastern Republic was absorbed into the Russian Federation, Arseniev refused to return to the city of his birth, and died in Vladivostok. His whole family was immediately arrested and either shot or exiled. I think that Arseniev's book (which I have a copy of) expresses almost perfectly Vygotsky's own attitude towards non-modern peoples of the USSR (which are, as he points out, not at all the same as "primitive man", a category which Vygotrsky says no longer exists anywhere on earth). In other words, I think he has a deep respect for the originality and creativity of their ways of thinking, just as he has deep respect for the creativity and originality of the ways that children think. So I guess I can't see anything derogatory at all in the analogy (which is not, as Vygotsky stresses, a parallel, but only an analogy made for the purpose of genetic analysis). By the way, what do you make of p. 33 of Chapter Two? "Experimentation was introduced into ethnic psychology and general and experimental psychology and ethnic psychology ? each from its own aspect ? were brought by the course of development itself to a certain rapprochement; true, it was insignificant and external, but nevertheless it broke the main methodological boundary between them. However, neither of the two disciplines or branches of psychology has recognized the principal significance of this rapprochement, the whole enormity of the methodological reconstruction that it entails for both sciences. This can be easily seen from the fact that the same experimental methods that were developed in the psychological laboratory for use with an adult cultured person were used with a person growing up in culturally backward conditions." Don't you think this is an explicit criticism of Luria's Uzbekistan adventure? Of course, we know that Vygotsky was interested and enthusiastic when it took place. But we also know that he didn't take part, and it would be just like him to have some strong misgivings about the procedure afterwards! Annaluisa: As you noticed, Andy is good at what used to be called nice distinctions, and I am, like you, something of a masher-together-er. But I have learned a certain healthy respect for nice distinctions too; for one thing, it's only when you make the nice distinctions that you can let the boundaries between areas of knowledge go with a crash. For another, I really do believe that when we unite different areas of disciplinary knowledge (e.g. cultural psychology and The Wizard of Oz) we have to do it thematically and not on the basis of coincidences or Freudian insights (so for example the point I was making had to do with the nature of intellectualism--Dorothy, or rather, Toto, "sees through" adult thinking!) Koreans, like the far eastern peoples that Arseniev studied, are traditionally shamanists, and the indigenous religion is vaguely related to the kind of shamanism that Dersu Uzala believed in (and in fact Koreans play an important role in Arseniev's book). I'm not one of those people who believe in pan-diffusionism, e.g. the pyramids of the New World are somehow directly inspired by those of Egypt. It seems to me much more plausible that both sets of pyramids were inspired by nature (i.e. they are artificial mountains). So I think that a lot of the parallels that we moderns see between shamanistic religions and Hindu scriptures are simply based on our own modern biases, and not on any real agnation or affinity. Halliday separates what he calls "semiohistory" into three distinct periods: the Forest (that would be the Vedas, and also shamanistic traditions), the Farm (proverbs, fables, folktales) and the Factory (modern novels and newspapers), and he does point out that their are distinct forms of knowledge and even of grammar associated with each (the Forest emphasizes commonsense forms of knowing, the Farm emphasizes disciplinary and written knowledge with a strong proverbial and lexically metaphorical component, while the Factory requires what he calls "grammatical metaphor", that is, the ability to turn a process into an "entity). I think that the "unity" of the "Forest" is really an illusion; the closeness of the semiotic understandings that forest peoples have to the environment means that there will be far more variation than meets the modern eye (and also far more variation than we find in Factory modes of meaning). So for example, I don't believe that there was ever a single common language; I imagine that early man spoke literally hundreds of thousands of completely unrelated tongues, and this is certainly what longitudinal observations on the number of languages extant would suggest. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 21 November 2014 00:45, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, with you I would like to read Martin's paper. The theme of > constitution and cause but also the theme of constitution and construction. > The rudimentary forms through constitutive means being "higher" > > Also seems related to the the reflections on "immediate and mediate. Will > listen in to the next installment of "our" thought > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Martin, >> $20K question: >> Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term would >> you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? >> >> Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at >> least the citation? >> -greg >> >> On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> > wrote: >> >> > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > >> > > "objective" >> > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a >> > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of >> > > just me and my lonely self. >> > >> > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view >> > that something differently, no? >> > >> > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a >> > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And >> > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction >> > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external >> > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of >> > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking >> and >> > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they >> constitute >> > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as >> it >> > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that >> its >> > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. >> > >> > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as >> > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external >> in >> > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily >> > external to it. >> > >> > Martin >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Nov 20 17:27:57 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 17:27:57 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: David. Briefly unless more seems useful. Great quote. 1.The methods used by Luria were not just tasks used by European adults, but by European developmental psychologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists. This carries with it special issues. 2. I do not know in what year LSV wrote those remarks so it is hard for me to judge whether it was a critique after the fact or as a dissociation before the fact. But it resonates with me. mike On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 3:03 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Martin: > > We have a little game that we play with the sixth graders. It's part > of a science lesson on light. You put a five-by-five grid of squares > on the whiteboard and you mark the x axis with refracting and > reflecting agents (e.g. "mirror", "water", "lens", "window", etc--we > elicit them from the kids according to Vico's principle of "verum > factum", you only really know what you make). Then you mark the y axis > of the grid with light sources (e.g. "sunbeam", "moonbeam", > "flashlight beam", "candle", etc. The kids tend to like "lasers" but > we don't allow any science fiction stuff). > > The object of the game for a team to get three squares in a row. You > get a square by stating an instance, like "a sunbeam bounces off a > mirror". But you can only hold the square if you can survive the > challenge "Why?" by the other team. Now, the most common way of > surviving the challenge is by generalizing: "because mirrors reflect > sunbeams". This way of defending your space we allow, but we don't > allow "because sunbeams bounce off mirrors". > > My dad hits the roof when I tell him this. He points out, quite > correctly, that both defenses are perfectly tautological, and neither > one should be allowed, and of course from the point of view of an > 87-year-old physicist, he's right. But as Piaget points out, the word > "because" means at least eleven different things (the kids are always > saying things like "I like fresh kimchi because it's delicious"). > Vygotsky writes that this is an advantage of Piaget's work over his > own; I am not so sure, because I think there is a kind of cline > between the function of raising a phenomenon to the general, which is > the function we see here, and the function of giving an explanation in > terms of lower units, which is what the kids would have to do if we > required them to explain reflection in terms of a particle or wave > model of light. > > In the examples you give, money and water, and above all in speech, I > agree that the key concept is not causality--at least not causality in > this sense, in the sense of what causes reflection and refraction. But > I also don't think that the word "constitution" is well chosen, > because of course the same problem of polysemy arises as with > causality. On the one hand, we say that the USA was (externally) > constituted when the constitution was written. And on the other hand > we say that the constituents of water are not voters, but the elements > of hydrogen and oxygen. I'm rather surprised that you tolerate the > distinction between external constitution and internal constitution, > both because it obscures the difference between a relation between > people and a relation between physical objects and because "external > constitution" suggests the outside of a container just as surely as > "internal constitution" suggests the inside. They are equally > container/vehicle metaphors for meaning (which is itself a > metaphorical relation, so I suppose I should call them > meta-metaphor-phors). > > The term Halliday uses (for speech, and for goods and services) is > "realization". What he means by that is simply that when we turn > meaning into wording (even were this wording is merely inner speech) > it moves a step away from the ideal form of the material (that is, > meaning potential, meaning that is thought) to the real form of the > material (when, as Shakespeare says, our eyes are offices of truth and > our words are natural breath). This isn't a form of "causality": > meanings don't cause wordings any more than deliciousness causes > children to like kimchi. But it's not really a form of constituency > either. > > Mike: > > Gita Lvovna Vygodskaya once wrote that amongst Vygotsky's papers she > found letters between him and V.K. Arseniev, the man to whom Vygotsky > actually refers to in Chapter Two of HDHMF. Arseniev was the author of > "Dersu the Trapper", out of which Kurosawa's wonderful movie "Dersu > Uzala" was made. On the one hand, he treasures their contributions > towards communism, which he feels are as much moral as modernity's > contributions are material (Arseniev was a Commissar for National > Minorities in the Far Eastern Soviet Republic). On the other hand he > mourns their destruction by the misfits from the West. When the Far > Eastern Republic was absorbed into the Russian Federation, Arseniev > refused to return to the city of his birth, and died in Vladivostok. > His whole family was immediately arrested and either shot or exiled. > > I think that Arseniev's book (which I have a copy of) expresses almost > perfectly Vygotsky's own attitude towards non-modern peoples of the > USSR (which are, as he points out, not at all the same as "primitive > man", a category which Vygotrsky says no longer exists anywhere on > earth). In other words, I think he has a deep respect for the > originality and creativity of their ways of thinking, just as he has > deep respect for the creativity and originality of the ways that > children think. So I guess I can't see anything derogatory at all in > the analogy (which is not, as Vygotsky stresses, a parallel, but only > an analogy made for the purpose of genetic analysis). > > By the way, what do you make of p. 33 of Chapter Two? > > "Experimentation was introduced into ethnic psychology and general and > experimental psychology and ethnic psychology ? each from its own > aspect ? were brought by the course of development itself to a certain > rapprochement; true, it was insignificant and external, but > nevertheless it broke the main methodological boundary between them. > However, neither of the two disciplines or branches of psychology has > recognized the principal significance of this rapprochement, the whole > enormity of the methodological reconstruction that it entails for both > sciences. This can be easily seen from the fact that the same > experimental methods that were developed in the psychological > laboratory for use with an adult cultured person were used with a > person growing up in culturally backward conditions." > > Don't you think this is an explicit criticism of Luria's Uzbekistan > adventure? Of course, we know that Vygotsky was interested and > enthusiastic when it took place. But we also know that he didn't take > part, and it would be just like him to have some strong misgivings > about the procedure afterwards! > > Annaluisa: > > As you noticed, Andy is good at what used to be called nice > distinctions, and I am, like you, something of a masher-together-er. > But I have learned a certain healthy respect for nice distinctions > too; for one thing, it's only when you make the nice distinctions that > you can let the boundaries between areas of knowledge go with a crash. > For another, I really do believe that when we unite different areas of > disciplinary knowledge (e.g. cultural psychology and The Wizard of Oz) > we have to do it thematically and not on the basis of coincidences or > Freudian insights (so for example the point I was making had to do > with the nature of intellectualism--Dorothy, or rather, Toto, "sees > through" adult thinking!) > > Koreans, like the far eastern peoples that Arseniev studied, are > traditionally shamanists, and the indigenous religion is vaguely > related to the kind of shamanism that Dersu Uzala believed in (and in > fact Koreans play an important role in Arseniev's book). I'm not one > of those people who believe in pan-diffusionism, e.g. the pyramids of > the New World are somehow directly inspired by those of Egypt. It > seems to me much more plausible that both sets of pyramids were > inspired by nature (i.e. they are artificial mountains). So I think > that a lot of the parallels that we moderns see between shamanistic > religions and Hindu scriptures are simply based on our own modern > biases, and not on any real agnation or affinity. > > Halliday separates what he calls "semiohistory" into three distinct > periods: the Forest (that would be the Vedas, and also shamanistic > traditions), the Farm (proverbs, fables, folktales) and the Factory > (modern novels and newspapers), and he does point out that their are > distinct forms of knowledge and even of grammar associated with each > (the Forest emphasizes commonsense forms of knowing, the Farm > emphasizes disciplinary and written knowledge with a strong proverbial > and lexically metaphorical component, while the Factory requires what > he calls "grammatical metaphor", that is, the ability to turn a > process into an "entity). I think that the "unity" of the "Forest" is > really an illusion; the closeness of the semiotic understandings that > forest peoples have to the environment means that there will be far > more variation than meets the modern eye (and also far more variation > than we find in Factory modes of meaning). So for example, I don't > believe that there was ever a single common language; I imagine that > early man spoke literally hundreds of thousands of completely > unrelated tongues, and this is certainly what longitudinal > observations on the number of languages extant would suggest. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 21 November 2014 00:45, Larry Purss wrote: > > Greg, with you I would like to read Martin's paper. The theme of > > constitution and cause but also the theme of constitution and > construction. > > The rudimentary forms through constitutive means being "higher" > > > > Also seems related to the the reflections on "immediate and mediate. Will > > listen in to the next installment of "our" thought > > > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Martin, > >> $20K question: > >> Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term > would > >> you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? > >> > >> Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at > >> least the citation? > >> -greg > >> > >> On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> > wrote: > >> > >> > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> > > >> > > "objective" > >> > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > >> > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > >> > > just me and my lonely self. > >> > > >> > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view > >> > that something differently, no? > >> > > >> > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way > that a > >> > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. > And > >> > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction > >> > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and > 'external > >> > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of > >> > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking > >> and > >> > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they > >> constitute > >> > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it > as > >> it > >> > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see > that > >> its > >> > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. > >> > > >> > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word > as > >> > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as > external > >> in > >> > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily > >> > external to it. > >> > > >> > Martin > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Nov 20 17:36:20 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 17:36:20 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Higher Mental Functions In-Reply-To: <546BDE54.7040105@mira.net> References: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> <546BDE54.7040105@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, this is something that all of us should keep in mind. mike " the relationship between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, functional and genetic relationship has to be worked out. ?" mike? On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Thanks David. That sounds like it. I knew I could rely on you. :) > 'Twas a popular idea. Hegel said "speech is the tool of reason". > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/se/ch01.htm > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> Andy: >> >> Take a look at the end of Chapter Two, the Research Method Chapter, >> pp. 60-62 in the English Collected Works. It's not that he objects to >> the term "artifacts"; he doesn't use the term. It's that he objects to >> the analogy between them being reduced to an identity, and on this >> basis does not agree that "language is a tool of thinking" or that >> language is an 'auxiliary device of memory". He also objects to >> Dewey's phrase that language is a "tool of tools", and points out that >> it is a bad paraphrase of Aristotle. He says that the relationship >> between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical >> category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, functional >> and genetic relationship has to be worked out. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk Univeristy of Foreign Studies. >> >> On 18 November 2014 19:32, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> For those of you who rely on marxists.org for their Vygotsky reading, I >>> have >>> scanned a couple more chapters from Volume 4 of the LSVCW today: >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/ >>> analysis-higher-mental-functions.htm >>> >>> I was looking for material where Vygotsky discusses the relation between >>> sign-mediation and tool-mediation (and other types of mediation!) and >>> these >>> chapters seemed to be necessary. I could not find the passage where he >>> expresses some antipathy to calling both signs and tools "artefacts". I >>> was >>> sure I read this somewhere. Can anyone recall where that could have been? >>> >>> Andy >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Nov 20 22:28:42 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 06:28:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1416551322405.33043@unm.edu> Hello my fated discussants, In company with others who are struggling with the components of things and their relationship to causes (and you know who you are), I decided to look up in the thesaurus what comes up from the word "element," just to stir up the imaginations of those on this thread and see what comes up. This is what I got: aspect bit component detail factor fundamental ingredient item material matter member part piece principle view basic basis constituent drop facet hint particle particular portion root section stem subdivision trace unit It seems a worthy effort to decide on a good word that does pass the test of not being misconstrued or misunderstood when trying to convey a concept, particularly a difficult concept. Philosophy of course spends a lot of time on word-meaning before really moving into the harder work pertaining to dynamics of concepts and I think this to be a thrifty and scrupulous preparation that yields results, if only because the work is built upon the careful considerations of words and what they mean. Vygotsky was in a hurry, and with good reason. So we have in some cases the sloppiness of words, but that's likely because he was chasing ideas, along the lines of inner speech. As someone who has worked with computer technology, which has never existed before in the history of humans until the past 50-60 years or so, there are always going to be necessities for new vocabularies. Believe me I wouldn't not mind the removal of so many acronyms and replace them with real words. Also, there is the idea that in dealing with concepts pertaining to the mind and to social realities, there are going to be discoveries of absences in our language to express these concepts, because they are not things we have "seen" before. This is why metaphors are so powerful to me, anyway, because they can ground a concept, even if it is a feeble construct, it is a "point of lift off" that can be developed more fully through the use of speaking it. I have been a casual student of Sanskrit for some years, and one of the marvels of that ancient language is its exactness to meaning. To witness this is something to experience for oneself. Sanskrit also affords the creation of new words. I tend to think word- or phrase-construction should be done when coming across "new" concepts. I say new-in-quotes, because these dynamics or phenomenon have always happened in some form, but we just never had the need to see them. I believe the cause is because life was "easier" (that is my short explanation for now so that I might move forward on the use of words in terms of exactness for meaning). So to address the notion of "constituent," even if there is a recent trend to adopt that word, it has some problems perhaps, as David has discussed. I'm not saying that I have an answer, but rather than deal with words that have already been used that may not fit the need, I ask why not then make up a word? This is why Gibson likely made up the word, "affordance," because there was not such a word to describe what they are. I'm not sure if it seems contrived to create new words in an academic setting, or if it is considered a cop-out, but I think creating a new word for a specific purpose is not a bad idea if only because it has a specific utility to reference a concept observed in the world not observed distinctly before. As a starting point about thinking about words, based on the list above, if we must retain an already-existing word, I sort of like the idea of using the word "fundamentals." Maybe because it sounds like "elementals," but provides the sense of the basic part of importance, such as when we consider "a unit for analysis." Thus a unit for analysis is a fundamental, but a fundamental is not necessarily a unit for analysis. Or should it be the other way around? Perhaps we could say that a fundamental is made of elementals, in the sense that the water molecule is the fundamental (of oceans) and oxygen and hydrogen are elementals that constitute the fundamental (the molecule). Furthermore, I propose that the primary relationship I am fabricating here be that of elementals to fundamentals to also pertain to functional systems. So there can be elemental systems which constitute fundamental systems. Does this hold water???? Please tell me! :) "Ingredients" is also good, because they are units combined (in different measures) to contribute to the whole, in the sense that once mixed cannot be separated out or removed. "Ingredients" are combined in cooking and they do take on different forms when combined with other ingredients. I suspect though that this seems too much like cooking which is women's work and therefore not legitimate, or not scientific enough, perhaps too folksy. (I am purposely being facetious there, so I know you are all smart enough to fall into that bear-trap, I mean... NOT fall into that bear-trap). Then, to continue thinking out loud: perhaps "ingredient" might be appropriate when dealing with artificial constructs, ones that are human-made. It doesn't really work in consideration of phenomenon that may arise. Phenomena don't possess ingredients. Perhaps "facet" or "aspect" would be useful? I don't like them, but I sort of do. How's that for commitment? I know that this is odd coming from someone who loves to use metaphor, but I can't help to add that using words that pertain to material constructs are not always useful as functional constructs, if only that material elements tend to be used as gears in a machine (smallest parts), rather than systems in an environment (units in motion, perspectives, dynamics). I think that this misuse of words is why there is difficulty in understanding the concepts they are intended to reference. LSV's use of "rudimentary functions" vs "artifacts" seems to reveal our problem of taking a word or words (as references) to describe functions and reducing them into nouns (even though I realize "function" is a noun). I am guessing there are more sophisticated ways to describe this, but I am not a linguist. It seems that when functions reduce to nouns happens, the word loses the concept's "verbness," because an artifact is a word that reminds me of pottery shards or arrowheads uncovered in an archeological dig. So there is the specific object (the string round the finger), and then the movement create meaning with such objects (rudimentary function - tying of string to remember something). In this sense, it seems the rudimentary function *results* in an artifact. Take all of these meanderings as just an invitation to consider a better design of a word that might proffer more exactness to meaning we mean, so as to be effective and hardy. That is, if the meaning has been agreed upon beforehand. Which is probably a different email altogether! If a word *were* to be created anew, and we forfeit employing an already-existent, what might it be? I would engage the poets within you and ask you to share what emerges? What do you think about about "poignance" which I think is made up. There is "poignancy" or "poignant", but not "poignance," I don't think. When I consider poignance, I think of something fluid converging into meaning and importance. I sense movement in the word-meaning as used. It doesn't lose its "verbness." So elementals constitute fundamentals, and fundamentals can create poignances, which are ingredients of meaning. You are welcome to tear that apart and remake if you like. But only tear apart if you can remake. Those are the rules of my game here. :) One reason this word poignance is growing on me is because it can pertain to affect and to intellect equally with no favoring of one or the other. Such is my humble offering to this thinking project. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 6:55 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > "objective" > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > just me and my lonely self. Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view that something differently, no? There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily external to it. Martin From ablunden@mira.net Fri Nov 21 03:50:44 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 22:50:44 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Higher Mental Functions In-Reply-To: References: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> <546BDE54.7040105@mira.net> Message-ID: <546F2714.9040102@mira.net> Great technique, Denise. Adapting the method of dual stimulation Engestrom uses in workplaces, I think? Vygotsky was a bit hard on the idea of "words being Tools" etc. He says: 'True, such common expressions like ?language is a tool of thinking,? ?auxiliary devices of memory? (/aides de memoire),/ ?internal technique,? ?technical auxiliary device? or simply auxiliary devices with respect to any psychological operation /(Geistestechnik ? ?/spiritual technique,? ?intellectual tools,? and many others), are found in abundance among psychologists, are devoid of any specific content, and have scarcely any meaning beyond a simple metaphoric, picturesque expression of the fact that some objects or operations or others play an auxiliary role in the mental activity of man.' He says the analogy works in two respects - both tools and signs are used in mediated activity, and both are artificial, i.e., produced by human beings for the purpose. But he emphasises that their function is opposite: tool-mediated actions are directed outwards at controlling nature, sign-mediated actions are directed inwards, at psychologically controlling behaviour, whether one's own or another's. He emphasises that the function of the sign rests on the natural foundation of "signalisation" in the brain, that is to say, the sign is used for the purpose of creating new connections in the brain. So that's what you're doing with this procedure - you're reprogramming people's brains and giving them images and words they can use to further reprogram their own brains. Andy http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Denise Shelley Newnham wrote: > Dear All > > I will be presenting a paper in KL city December 2014 about bullying > and suicide. I carried out formative resesarch with 35 migrant > adlolescents. There were three phases:1) they answered a questionnaire > adapted from Cozier and Dimmock; 2) two weeks later I gave them a > disposible camera and asked them to take a photo of others that they > found different (ethical proc?dures were followed). We then met and I > filmed whilst they discussed the why of their images. The images did > not portrhay (to my mind) anythink unusual. However, if a person had > replied that he or she suffered from being called dirty and ugly etc > they would describe the person in the image as looking dirty, smelly > and ugly. I played extracts of their discussion back to them at a > later interval and they were given their questionnaires to read. The > result was spectacular and they as a group designed a work group that > would from then on help others that were suffering from the same > problems. > > I am sharing this as I am really interested by the connection between > what forms of bullying they recieved and the way that they had made > sense of this and then projected it onto another. Two of the persons > did not do this, their images were neutral and their comments > positive, however, in their questionnaire they confessed to thinking > at regular intervals that the only way out was suicide > > So I find the discussion above interesting about words being Tools, > signs, knowing their genesis etc in order to work out sense making and > development > > Denise > > 2014-11-21 2:36 GMT+01:00 mike cole >: > > Yes, this is something that all of us should keep in mind. > mike > > " the relationship > between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical > category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, functional > and genetic relationship has to be worked out. > ?" > > mike? > > On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Thanks David. That sounds like it. I knew I could rely on you. :) > > 'Twas a popular idea. Hegel said "speech is the tool of reason". > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/se/ch01.htm > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> Andy: > >> > >> Take a look at the end of Chapter Two, the Research Method Chapter, > >> pp. 60-62 in the English Collected Works. It's not that he > objects to > >> the term "artifacts"; he doesn't use the term. It's that he > objects to > >> the analogy between them being reduced to an identity, and on this > >> basis does not agree that "language is a tool of thinking" or that > >> language is an 'auxiliary device of memory". He also objects to > >> Dewey's phrase that language is a "tool of tools", and points > out that > >> it is a bad paraphrase of Aristotle. He says that the relationship > >> between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical > >> category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, > functional > >> and genetic relationship has to be worked out. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk Univeristy of Foreign Studies. > >> > >> On 18 November 2014 19:32, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> > >> > >>> For those of you who rely on marxists.org > for their Vygotsky reading, I > >>> have > >>> scanned a couple more chapters from Volume 4 of the LSVCW today: > >>> > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm > >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/ > >>> analysis-higher-mental-functions.htm > >>> > >>> I was looking for material where Vygotsky discusses the > relation between > >>> sign-mediation and tool-mediation (and other types of > mediation!) and > >>> these > >>> chapters seemed to be necessary. I could not find the passage > where he > >>> expresses some antipathy to calling both signs and tools > "artefacts". I > >>> was > >>> sure I read this somewhere. Can anyone recall where that could > have been? > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> -- > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Nov 21 06:00:02 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 14:00:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Higher Mental Functions In-Reply-To: <546F2714.9040102@mira.net> References: <546B202A.2050506@mira.net> <546BDE54.7040105@mira.net> , <546F2714.9040102@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F906514E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Denise, This is a really interesting research approach. It reminds me of some of the photo research that is done by participatory action researchers, but seems more successful than most. Were the people the adolescents took photos of also migrant workers - not necessarily adolescents? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Friday, November 21, 2014 6:50 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Higher Mental Functions Great technique, Denise. Adapting the method of dual stimulation Engestrom uses in workplaces, I think? Vygotsky was a bit hard on the idea of "words being Tools" etc. He says: 'True, such common expressions like ?language is a tool of thinking,? ?auxiliary devices of memory? (/aides de memoire),/ ?internal technique,? ?technical auxiliary device? or simply auxiliary devices with respect to any psychological operation /(Geistestechnik ? ?/spiritual technique,? ?intellectual tools,? and many others), are found in abundance among psychologists, are devoid of any specific content, and have scarcely any meaning beyond a simple metaphoric, picturesque expression of the fact that some objects or operations or others play an auxiliary role in the mental activity of man.' He says the analogy works in two respects - both tools and signs are used in mediated activity, and both are artificial, i.e., produced by human beings for the purpose. But he emphasises that their function is opposite: tool-mediated actions are directed outwards at controlling nature, sign-mediated actions are directed inwards, at psychologically controlling behaviour, whether one's own or another's. He emphasises that the function of the sign rests on the natural foundation of "signalisation" in the brain, that is to say, the sign is used for the purpose of creating new connections in the brain. So that's what you're doing with this procedure - you're reprogramming people's brains and giving them images and words they can use to further reprogram their own brains. Andy http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Denise Shelley Newnham wrote: > Dear All > > I will be presenting a paper in KL city December 2014 about bullying > and suicide. I carried out formative resesarch with 35 migrant > adlolescents. There were three phases:1) they answered a questionnaire > adapted from Cozier and Dimmock; 2) two weeks later I gave them a > disposible camera and asked them to take a photo of others that they > found different (ethical proc?dures were followed). We then met and I > filmed whilst they discussed the why of their images. The images did > not portrhay (to my mind) anythink unusual. However, if a person had > replied that he or she suffered from being called dirty and ugly etc > they would describe the person in the image as looking dirty, smelly > and ugly. I played extracts of their discussion back to them at a > later interval and they were given their questionnaires to read. The > result was spectacular and they as a group designed a work group that > would from then on help others that were suffering from the same > problems. > > I am sharing this as I am really interested by the connection between > what forms of bullying they recieved and the way that they had made > sense of this and then projected it onto another. Two of the persons > did not do this, their images were neutral and their comments > positive, however, in their questionnaire they confessed to thinking > at regular intervals that the only way out was suicide > > So I find the discussion above interesting about words being Tools, > signs, knowing their genesis etc in order to work out sense making and > development > > Denise > > 2014-11-21 2:36 GMT+01:00 mike cole >: > > Yes, this is something that all of us should keep in mind. > mike > > " the relationship > between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical > category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, functional > and genetic relationship has to be worked out. > ?" > > mike? > > On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Thanks David. That sounds like it. I knew I could rely on you. :) > > 'Twas a popular idea. Hegel said "speech is the tool of reason". > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/se/ch01.htm > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> Andy: > >> > >> Take a look at the end of Chapter Two, the Research Method Chapter, > >> pp. 60-62 in the English Collected Works. It's not that he > objects to > >> the term "artifacts"; he doesn't use the term. It's that he > objects to > >> the analogy between them being reduced to an identity, and on this > >> basis does not agree that "language is a tool of thinking" or that > >> language is an 'auxiliary device of memory". He also objects to > >> Dewey's phrase that language is a "tool of tools", and points > out that > >> it is a bad paraphrase of Aristotle. He says that the relationship > >> between tools and signs is that they both belong to a logical > >> category, mediating activity, but their precise structural, > functional > >> and genetic relationship has to be worked out. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk Univeristy of Foreign Studies. > >> > >> On 18 November 2014 19:32, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> > >> > >>> For those of you who rely on marxists.org > for their Vygotsky reading, I > >>> have > >>> scanned a couple more chapters from Volume 4 of the LSVCW today: > >>> > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/research-method.htm > >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1931/ > >>> analysis-higher-mental-functions.htm > >>> > >>> I was looking for material where Vygotsky discusses the > relation between > >>> sign-mediation and tool-mediation (and other types of > mediation!) and > >>> these > >>> chapters seemed to be necessary. I could not find the passage > where he > >>> expresses some antipathy to calling both signs and tools > "artefacts". I > >>> was > >>> sure I read this somewhere. Can anyone recall where that could > have been? > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> -- > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Nov 21 08:55:09 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 08:55:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416551322405.33043@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416551322405.33043@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, That is a very interesting quest [question] Brings to mind David's way of construing his mashing up style and how David portrays Andy's style of having clear and distinct terms. I will bring Peirce to this game as he has had much practice in this type of playing with narrations, constructions, constitutions, and realizations. [to mention the terms circulating this week on XMCA] He used the terms "firstness" "secondness" and "thirdness". I am going to reference an article that is exploring the concept of "agency" [will, volition] through a Perciean categorical scheme using the three categories. The article is by Marc Champagne "Just Do It: Schopenhauer and Peirce on the Immediacy of Agency" in SYMPOSIUM Volume 18 No.2 Fall 2014 pages 209-232] Firstness is singularity Secondness indicates "polarity" a relation of resistance and constraint. Peirce observed "where there is no effort there is no resistance but where there is no resistance there is no effort. Thirdness brings in triadic relations of interpretation. This is the realm you are exploring above in the search for "terms" Marc Champagne is articulating the relation of "secondness" and "thirdness" as a relation of "subsumption" His model is attempting to show the relation of subsumption binds "representation" and "action". He writes, "Peircean semiotics insists that representation presupposes a mediating INTERPRETATION that brings into relation two things [secondness] - but not the other way around. Armed with this categorical scheme we can recast Schopenhauser's thesis by saying that represented acts of will are a three-place relationship between a mind, a body, and a world [each broadly construed]. Yet, if we strip away what is responsible for the interpretation, we get an unrepresented event that IS a two-sided altercation between a body and a world. While this altercation entails that the structures of agency and thought are very different, such a difference does not thereby translate into incompatibility. On the contrary, we are in a position to see how these two realms interlock, insofar as every triadic relation logically PRESUPPOSES a dyadic one" Annalisa, if this relation [subsumption] has merit, then both secondness [polarity as constraint, resistance] AND thirdness are critical. To bring to consciousness [realization??] is a triadic act of interpretation, but this relation REQUIRES dyadic secondness. Marc Champagne is playing with the themes of narrators, constructors, realizers, through Peirce's relation of subsumption. The tridadic relation requires the dyadic relation but the dyadic relation does not require the dyadic relation UNLESS this dyadic relation is rising to "consciousness" as interpretation. This model refers to three "levels" mind, body, world. In other words "embodied mind" "psychological mind" and "situated mind" translated into cognitive science. "Elements" as firstness are singularity which cannot be "known" When encountering polarity secondess is constituted, when rising to thirdness realization AS INTERPRETATION COMES INTO BEING, but this categorical relation for Peirce is not reciprocal On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 10:28 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello my fated discussants, > > In company with others who are struggling with the components of things > and their relationship to causes (and you know who you are), I decided to > look up in the thesaurus what comes up from the word "element," just to > stir up the imaginations of those on this thread and see what comes up. > This is what I got: > > aspect > bit > component > detail > factor > fundamental > ingredient > item > material > matter > member > part > piece > principle > view > basic > basis > constituent > drop > facet > hint > particle > particular > portion > root > section > stem > subdivision > trace > unit > > It seems a worthy effort to decide on a good word that does pass the test > of not being misconstrued or misunderstood when trying to convey a concept, > particularly a difficult concept. > > Philosophy of course spends a lot of time on word-meaning before really > moving into the harder work pertaining to dynamics of concepts and I think > this to be a thrifty and scrupulous preparation that yields results, if > only because the work is built upon the careful considerations of words and > what they mean. > > Vygotsky was in a hurry, and with good reason. So we have in some cases > the sloppiness of words, but that's likely because he was chasing ideas, > along the lines of inner speech. > > As someone who has worked with computer technology, which has never > existed before in the history of humans until the past 50-60 years or so, > there are always going to be necessities for new vocabularies. Believe me I > wouldn't not mind the removal of so many acronyms and replace them with > real words. > > Also, there is the idea that in dealing with concepts pertaining to the > mind and to social realities, there are going to be discoveries of absences > in our language to express these concepts, because they are not things we > have "seen" before. This is why metaphors are so powerful to me, anyway, > because they can ground a concept, even if it is a feeble construct, it is > a "point of lift off" that can be developed more fully through the use of > speaking it. > > I have been a casual student of Sanskrit for some years, and one of the > marvels of that ancient language is its exactness to meaning. To witness > this is something to experience for oneself. Sanskrit also affords the > creation of new words. > > I tend to think word- or phrase-construction should be done when coming > across "new" concepts. I say new-in-quotes, because these dynamics or > phenomenon have always happened in some form, but we just never had the > need to see them. I believe the cause is because life was "easier" (that is > my short explanation for now so that I might move forward on the use of > words in terms of exactness for meaning). > > So to address the notion of "constituent," even if there is a recent trend > to adopt that word, it has some problems perhaps, as David has discussed. > I'm not saying that I have an answer, but rather than deal with words that > have already been used that may not fit the need, I ask why not then make > up a word? > > This is why Gibson likely made up the word, "affordance," because there > was not such a word to describe what they are. I'm not sure if it seems > contrived to create new words in an academic setting, or if it is > considered a cop-out, but I think creating a new word for a specific > purpose is not a bad idea if only because it has a specific utility to > reference a concept observed in the world not observed distinctly before. > > As a starting point about thinking about words, based on the list above, > if we must retain an already-existing word, I sort of like the idea of > using the word "fundamentals." Maybe because it sounds like "elementals," > but provides the sense of the basic part of importance, such as when we > consider "a unit for analysis." Thus a unit for analysis is a fundamental, > but a fundamental is not necessarily a unit for analysis. Or should it be > the other way around? > > Perhaps we could say that a fundamental is made of elementals, in the > sense that the water molecule is the fundamental (of oceans) and oxygen and > hydrogen are elementals that constitute the fundamental (the molecule). > Furthermore, I propose that the primary relationship I am fabricating here > be that of elementals to fundamentals to also pertain to functional > systems. So there can be elemental systems which constitute fundamental > systems. Does this hold water???? Please tell me! :) > > "Ingredients" is also good, because they are units combined (in different > measures) to contribute to the whole, in the sense that once mixed cannot > be separated out or removed. "Ingredients" are combined in cooking and they > do take on different forms when combined with other ingredients. I suspect > though that this seems too much like cooking which is women's work and > therefore not legitimate, or not scientific enough, perhaps too folksy. (I > am purposely being facetious there, so I know you are all smart enough to > fall into that bear-trap, I mean... NOT fall into that bear-trap). > > Then, to continue thinking out loud: perhaps "ingredient" might be > appropriate when dealing with artificial constructs, ones that are > human-made. It doesn't really work in consideration of phenomenon that may > arise. Phenomena don't possess ingredients. Perhaps "facet" or "aspect" > would be useful? I don't like them, but I sort of do. How's that for > commitment? > > I know that this is odd coming from someone who loves to use metaphor, but > I can't help to add that using words that pertain to material constructs > are not always useful as functional constructs, if only that material > elements tend to be used as gears in a machine (smallest parts), rather > than systems in an environment (units in motion, perspectives, dynamics). I > think that this misuse of words is why there is difficulty in understanding > the concepts they are intended to reference. > > LSV's use of "rudimentary functions" vs "artifacts" seems to reveal our > problem of taking a word or words (as references) to describe functions and > reducing them into nouns (even though I realize "function" is a noun). I am > guessing there are more sophisticated ways to describe this, but I am not a > linguist. It seems that when functions reduce to nouns happens, the word > loses the concept's "verbness," because an artifact is a word that reminds > me of pottery shards or arrowheads uncovered in an archeological dig. So > there is the specific object (the string round the finger), and then the > movement create meaning with such objects (rudimentary function - tying of > string to remember something). In this sense, it seems the rudimentary > function *results* in an artifact. > > Take all of these meanderings as just an invitation to consider a better > design of a word that might proffer more exactness to meaning we mean, so > as to be effective and hardy. That is, if the meaning has been agreed upon > beforehand. Which is probably a different email altogether! > > If a word *were* to be created anew, and we forfeit employing an > already-existent, what might it be? I would engage the poets within you and > ask you to share what emerges? > > What do you think about about "poignance" which I think is made up. There > is "poignancy" or "poignant", but not "poignance," I don't think. When I > consider poignance, I think of something fluid converging into meaning and > importance. I sense movement in the word-meaning as used. It doesn't lose > its "verbness." > > So elementals constitute fundamentals, and fundamentals can create > poignances, which are ingredients of meaning. You are welcome to tear that > apart and remake if you like. But only tear apart if you can remake. Those > are the rules of my game here. :) > > One reason this word poignance is growing on me is because it can pertain > to affect and to intellect equally with no favoring of one or the other. > > Such is my humble offering to this thinking project. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 6:55 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > "objective" > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > > just me and my lonely self. > > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view > that something differently, no? > > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. > > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily > external to it. > > Martin > > From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Nov 21 09:59:22 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 17:59:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416551322405.33043@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416592761539.20773@unm.edu> Larry, Thanks for joining my word game! I hope others are inspired to play. As we all know the function of play in zopeds. :) I would like to ask for you to make for me your connections to what I proposed more explicitly so there is no room for my misinterpretation. I think I see connections, but rather than implied, I'd like to see them more explicitly. Thanks as well for offering a paper for reference, I will attempt to hunt it down. But yes, agency and subjectivity are themes of interest to me, so these notions you have introduced to this thread certainly fall into that pocket. One surface-thought I have is that Schopenhauer studied the Upanishads, and it would not surprise me if he appropriated concepts from them. It is hard not to do because the texts are ripe with relevance, which I mean abstractly and to no specific experience. It is on my to-do list to read Schopenhauer to understand what he actually lifted and whether it was done correctly. I suspect it was not, given his interpretation of women's minds. There is so much in your email that I'm sure I will have to read it a few times to really wring out the meaning. So if I am firstness and you are secondness, is your post thirdness? :) I'm not quite clear about the notion of "subsumption." Where does the word, as used, come from? Champagne? Peirce? Schopenhauer? or Merriam-Webster? This circle of mind, body, world is interesting too. It reminds me of Heidegger's Hermeneutic circle, which I find reminiscent of Vygotsky's everyday and scientific concepts. You have added to my rising curiosity, if there are connections there. Thank you for adding to my quest[tion]! If I am understanding what you are saying, I think I agree that realization is the moment one recognizes the connectedness of things, there is an appearance of this being an event to the individual (the aha-moment), but that connectedness was always there, just not in the mind, which was in a state of ignorance. This dynamic is explained by how knowledge in the mind reflects knowledge in the world, but this presumes a different definition of knowledge than is considered in academic circles, I believe. Et voil?, now I've taken a big dive into epistemology that may not be welcome here. I guess it just depends on how much meaning, or systems of meaning, means to you! :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Friday, November 21, 2014 9:55 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Annalisa, That is a very interesting quest [question] Brings to mind David's way of construing his mashing up style and how David portrays Andy's style of having clear and distinct terms. I will bring Peirce to this game as he has had much practice in this type of playing with narrations, constructions, constitutions, and realizations. [to mention the terms circulating this week on XMCA] He used the terms "firstness" "secondness" and "thirdness". I am going to reference an article that is exploring the concept of "agency" [will, volition] through a Perciean categorical scheme using the three categories. The article is by Marc Champagne "Just Do It: Schopenhauer and Peirce on the Immediacy of Agency" in SYMPOSIUM Volume 18 No.2 Fall 2014 pages 209-232] Firstness is singularity Secondness indicates "polarity" a relation of resistance and constraint. Peirce observed "where there is no effort there is no resistance but where there is no resistance there is no effort. Thirdness brings in triadic relations of interpretation. This is the realm you are exploring above in the search for "terms" Marc Champagne is articulating the relation of "secondness" and "thirdness" as a relation of "subsumption" His model is attempting to show the relation of subsumption binds "representation" and "action". He writes, "Peircean semiotics insists that representation presupposes a mediating INTERPRETATION that brings into relation two things [secondness] - but not the other way around. Armed with this categorical scheme we can recast Schopenhauser's thesis by saying that represented acts of will are a three-place relationship between a mind, a body, and a world [each broadly construed]. Yet, if we strip away what is responsible for the interpretation, we get an unrepresented event that IS a two-sided altercation between a body and a world. While this altercation entails that the structures of agency and thought are very different, such a difference does not thereby translate into incompatibility. On the contrary, we are in a position to see how these two realms interlock, insofar as every triadic relation logically PRESUPPOSES a dyadic one" Annalisa, if this relation [subsumption] has merit, then both secondness [polarity as constraint, resistance] AND thirdness are critical. To bring to consciousness [realization??] is a triadic act of interpretation, but this relation REQUIRES dyadic secondness. Marc Champagne is playing with the themes of narrators, constructors, realizers, through Peirce's relation of subsumption. The tridadic relation requires the dyadic relation but the dyadic relation does not require the dyadic relation UNLESS this dyadic relation is rising to "consciousness" as interpretation. This model refers to three "levels" mind, body, world. In other words "embodied mind" "psychological mind" and "situated mind" translated into cognitive science. "Elements" as firstness are singularity which cannot be "known" When encountering polarity secondess is constituted, when rising to thirdness realization AS INTERPRETATION COMES INTO BEING, but this categorical relation for Peirce is not reciprocal On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 10:28 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello my fated discussants, > > In company with others who are struggling with the components of things > and their relationship to causes (and you know who you are), I decided to > look up in the thesaurus what comes up from the word "element," just to > stir up the imaginations of those on this thread and see what comes up. > This is what I got: > > aspect > bit > component > detail > factor > fundamental > ingredient > item > material > matter > member > part > piece > principle > view > basic > basis > constituent > drop > facet > hint > particle > particular > portion > root > section > stem > subdivision > trace > unit > > It seems a worthy effort to decide on a good word that does pass the test > of not being misconstrued or misunderstood when trying to convey a concept, > particularly a difficult concept. > > Philosophy of course spends a lot of time on word-meaning before really > moving into the harder work pertaining to dynamics of concepts and I think > this to be a thrifty and scrupulous preparation that yields results, if > only because the work is built upon the careful considerations of words and > what they mean. > > Vygotsky was in a hurry, and with good reason. So we have in some cases > the sloppiness of words, but that's likely because he was chasing ideas, > along the lines of inner speech. > > As someone who has worked with computer technology, which has never > existed before in the history of humans until the past 50-60 years or so, > there are always going to be necessities for new vocabularies. Believe me I > wouldn't not mind the removal of so many acronyms and replace them with > real words. > > Also, there is the idea that in dealing with concepts pertaining to the > mind and to social realities, there are going to be discoveries of absences > in our language to express these concepts, because they are not things we > have "seen" before. This is why metaphors are so powerful to me, anyway, > because they can ground a concept, even if it is a feeble construct, it is > a "point of lift off" that can be developed more fully through the use of > speaking it. > > I have been a casual student of Sanskrit for some years, and one of the > marvels of that ancient language is its exactness to meaning. To witness > this is something to experience for oneself. Sanskrit also affords the > creation of new words. > > I tend to think word- or phrase-construction should be done when coming > across "new" concepts. I say new-in-quotes, because these dynamics or > phenomenon have always happened in some form, but we just never had the > need to see them. I believe the cause is because life was "easier" (that is > my short explanation for now so that I might move forward on the use of > words in terms of exactness for meaning). > > So to address the notion of "constituent," even if there is a recent trend > to adopt that word, it has some problems perhaps, as David has discussed. > I'm not saying that I have an answer, but rather than deal with words that > have already been used that may not fit the need, I ask why not then make > up a word? > > This is why Gibson likely made up the word, "affordance," because there > was not such a word to describe what they are. I'm not sure if it seems > contrived to create new words in an academic setting, or if it is > considered a cop-out, but I think creating a new word for a specific > purpose is not a bad idea if only because it has a specific utility to > reference a concept observed in the world not observed distinctly before. > > As a starting point about thinking about words, based on the list above, > if we must retain an already-existing word, I sort of like the idea of > using the word "fundamentals." Maybe because it sounds like "elementals," > but provides the sense of the basic part of importance, such as when we > consider "a unit for analysis." Thus a unit for analysis is a fundamental, > but a fundamental is not necessarily a unit for analysis. Or should it be > the other way around? > > Perhaps we could say that a fundamental is made of elementals, in the > sense that the water molecule is the fundamental (of oceans) and oxygen and > hydrogen are elementals that constitute the fundamental (the molecule). > Furthermore, I propose that the primary relationship I am fabricating here > be that of elementals to fundamentals to also pertain to functional > systems. So there can be elemental systems which constitute fundamental > systems. Does this hold water???? Please tell me! :) > > "Ingredients" is also good, because they are units combined (in different > measures) to contribute to the whole, in the sense that once mixed cannot > be separated out or removed. "Ingredients" are combined in cooking and they > do take on different forms when combined with other ingredients. I suspect > though that this seems too much like cooking which is women's work and > therefore not legitimate, or not scientific enough, perhaps too folksy. (I > am purposely being facetious there, so I know you are all smart enough to > fall into that bear-trap, I mean... NOT fall into that bear-trap). > > Then, to continue thinking out loud: perhaps "ingredient" might be > appropriate when dealing with artificial constructs, ones that are > human-made. It doesn't really work in consideration of phenomenon that may > arise. Phenomena don't possess ingredients. Perhaps "facet" or "aspect" > would be useful? I don't like them, but I sort of do. How's that for > commitment? > > I know that this is odd coming from someone who loves to use metaphor, but > I can't help to add that using words that pertain to material constructs > are not always useful as functional constructs, if only that material > elements tend to be used as gears in a machine (smallest parts), rather > than systems in an environment (units in motion, perspectives, dynamics). I > think that this misuse of words is why there is difficulty in understanding > the concepts they are intended to reference. > > LSV's use of "rudimentary functions" vs "artifacts" seems to reveal our > problem of taking a word or words (as references) to describe functions and > reducing them into nouns (even though I realize "function" is a noun). I am > guessing there are more sophisticated ways to describe this, but I am not a > linguist. It seems that when functions reduce to nouns happens, the word > loses the concept's "verbness," because an artifact is a word that reminds > me of pottery shards or arrowheads uncovered in an archeological dig. So > there is the specific object (the string round the finger), and then the > movement create meaning with such objects (rudimentary function - tying of > string to remember something). In this sense, it seems the rudimentary > function *results* in an artifact. > > Take all of these meanderings as just an invitation to consider a better > design of a word that might proffer more exactness to meaning we mean, so > as to be effective and hardy. That is, if the meaning has been agreed upon > beforehand. Which is probably a different email altogether! > > If a word *were* to be created anew, and we forfeit employing an > already-existent, what might it be? I would engage the poets within you and > ask you to share what emerges? > > What do you think about about "poignance" which I think is made up. There > is "poignancy" or "poignant", but not "poignance," I don't think. When I > consider poignance, I think of something fluid converging into meaning and > importance. I sense movement in the word-meaning as used. It doesn't lose > its "verbness." > > So elementals constitute fundamentals, and fundamentals can create > poignances, which are ingredients of meaning. You are welcome to tear that > apart and remake if you like. But only tear apart if you can remake. Those > are the rules of my game here. :) > > One reason this word poignance is growing on me is because it can pertain > to affect and to intellect equally with no favoring of one or the other. > > Such is my humble offering to this thinking project. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 6:55 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > "objective" > > just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a > > discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of > > just me and my lonely self. > > Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view > that something differently, no? > > There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a > water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And > the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction > between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external > constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of > monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and > the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute > it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it > circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its > objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. > > Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as > 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in > the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily > external to it. > > Martin > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Nov 21 14:13:52 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 07:13:52 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? Message-ID: Mike: Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which is 1931-1932. http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he often expresses. If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory experiments in the field was okay? b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way aroud. It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and unpublished work. Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings about what Luria was up to. Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here for. For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they even have children back then? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Nov 21 15:21:36 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 15:21:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ?Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. The problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 of Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? ? I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the Mind. Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. mike On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Mike: > > Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been > written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which > is 1931-1932. > > http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf > > If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left > for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was > written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the > kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he > often expresses. > > If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. > > a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the > letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had > absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of > Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn > around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory > experiments in the field was okay? > > b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were > pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book > clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume > Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the > beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). > > c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see > above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way > aroud. > > It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not > the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF > is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because > Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and > unpublished work. > > Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his > CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private > manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. > Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. > That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where > Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages > of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there > are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is > right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings > about what Luria was up to. > > Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no > title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the > first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike > Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky > never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a > text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing > his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here > for. > > For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears > to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other > primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they > even have children back then? > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Nov 21 15:57:26 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 08:57:26 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike: Take a look at p. 25-27 of JREEP 45 (2), the letters to students and colleagues. It's a very interesting letter to Leontiev which LSV wrote from a dacha (perhaps the Izmailovo Zoo, where he sometimes stayed when convalescing). He says he's working on "a history of cultural development" (p. 27) there. But he begins by suggesting the "IP"--apparently instrumental psychology--has wound up "in the category of unprofitable pursuits", which is consistent with his desire to establish the difference between signs and tools structurally, genetically, and above all functionally. Then he calls Luria's chapter of "Ape, Primitive, Child": "written *wholly* according to the Freudianists (and not even according to Freud but according to V.F. Schmidt (her materials, M. Klein and other second magnitude stars; then the impenetrable Piaget is turned into an absolute beyond all measure, instrument and sign are mixed together even more...." (p. 26). He's apparently referring to the Third Chapter in the published version, though here he calls it the first chapter of the second part. Then he says the debacle is not ARL's personal fault but the result of the muddled thinking of the instrumental period in general. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 22 November 2014 08:21, mike cole wrote: > Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with > respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. The > problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. > > I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 of > Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following > all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role > in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls > out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or > planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? > > I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the Mind. > Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. > > mike > > On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Mike: >> >> Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been >> written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which >> is 1931-1932. >> >> http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf >> >> If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left >> for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was >> written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the >> kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he >> often expresses. >> >> If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. >> >> a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the >> letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had >> absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of >> Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn >> around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory >> experiments in the field was okay? >> >> b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were >> pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book >> clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume >> Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the >> beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). >> >> c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see >> above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way >> aroud. >> >> It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not >> the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF >> is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because >> Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and >> unpublished work. >> >> Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his >> CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private >> manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. >> Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. >> That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where >> Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages >> of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there >> are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is >> right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings >> about what Luria was up to. >> >> Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no >> title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the >> first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike >> Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky >> never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a >> text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing >> his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here >> for. >> >> For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears >> to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other >> primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they >> even have children back then? >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Fri Nov 21 16:14:14 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 11:14:14 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <546FD556.4000708@mira.net> David, when he is putting down "Instrumental Psychology" is he referring to the amalgamation of sign and tool as simply two types of mediating elements, rather than tracing the interrelation between sign-mediated activity and tool-mediated activity, and their distinct origins and genesis? Is that what he means, do you think? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Mike: > > Take a look at p. 25-27 of JREEP 45 (2), the letters to students and > colleagues. It's a very interesting letter to Leontiev which LSV wrote > from a dacha (perhaps the Izmailovo Zoo, where he sometimes stayed > when convalescing). He says he's working on "a history of cultural > development" (p. 27) there. But he begins by suggesting the > "IP"--apparently instrumental psychology--has wound up "in the > category of unprofitable pursuits", which is consistent with his > desire to establish the difference between signs and tools > structurally, genetically, and above all functionally. Then he calls > Luria's chapter of "Ape, Primitive, Child": > > "written *wholly* according to the Freudianists (and not even > according to Freud but according to V.F. Schmidt (her materials, M. > Klein and other second magnitude stars; then the impenetrable Piaget > is turned into an absolute beyond all measure, instrument and sign are > mixed together even more...." (p. 26). > > He's apparently referring to the Third Chapter in the published > version, though here he calls it the first chapter of the second part. > Then he says the debacle is not ARL's personal fault but the result of > the muddled thinking of the instrumental period in general. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 22 November 2014 08:21, mike cole wrote: > >> Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with >> respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. The >> problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. >> >> I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 of >> Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following >> all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role >> in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls >> out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or >> planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? >> >> I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the Mind. >> Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> >>> Mike: >>> >>> Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been >>> written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which >>> is 1931-1932. >>> >>> http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf >>> >>> If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left >>> for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was >>> written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the >>> kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he >>> often expresses. >>> >>> If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. >>> >>> a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the >>> letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had >>> absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of >>> Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn >>> around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory >>> experiments in the field was okay? >>> >>> b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were >>> pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book >>> clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume >>> Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the >>> beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). >>> >>> c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see >>> above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way >>> aroud. >>> >>> It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not >>> the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF >>> is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because >>> Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and >>> unpublished work. >>> >>> Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his >>> CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private >>> manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. >>> Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. >>> That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where >>> Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages >>> of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there >>> are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is >>> right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings >>> about what Luria was up to. >>> >>> Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no >>> title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the >>> first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike >>> Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky >>> never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a >>> text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing >>> his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here >>> for. >>> >>> For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears >>> to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other >>> primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they >>> even have children back then? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Nov 21 16:25:23 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 11:25:23 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <546FD7F3.1010002@mira.net> Attached is JREEP 45(2) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Mike: > > Take a look at p. 25-27 of JREEP 45 (2), the letters to students and > colleagues. It's a very interesting letter to Leontiev which LSV wrote > from a dacha (perhaps the Izmailovo Zoo, where he sometimes stayed > when convalescing). He says he's working on "a history of cultural > development" (p. 27) there. But he begins by suggesting the > "IP"--apparently instrumental psychology--has wound up "in the > category of unprofitable pursuits", which is consistent with his > desire to establish the difference between signs and tools > structurally, genetically, and above all functionally. Then he calls > Luria's chapter of "Ape, Primitive, Child": > > "written *wholly* according to the Freudianists (and not even > according to Freud but according to V.F. Schmidt (her materials, M. > Klein and other second magnitude stars; then the impenetrable Piaget > is turned into an absolute beyond all measure, instrument and sign are > mixed together even more...." (p. 26). > > He's apparently referring to the Third Chapter in the published > version, though here he calls it the first chapter of the second part. > Then he says the debacle is not ARL's personal fault but the result of > the muddled thinking of the instrumental period in general. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 22 November 2014 08:21, mike cole wrote: > >> Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with >> respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. The >> problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. >> >> I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 of >> Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following >> all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role >> in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls >> out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or >> planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? >> >> I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the Mind. >> Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> >>> Mike: >>> >>> Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been >>> written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which >>> is 1931-1932. >>> >>> http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf >>> >>> If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left >>> for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was >>> written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the >>> kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he >>> often expresses. >>> >>> If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. >>> >>> a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the >>> letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had >>> absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of >>> Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn >>> around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory >>> experiments in the field was okay? >>> >>> b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were >>> pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book >>> clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume >>> Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the >>> beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). >>> >>> c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see >>> above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way >>> aroud. >>> >>> It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not >>> the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF >>> is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because >>> Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and >>> unpublished work. >>> >>> Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his >>> CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private >>> manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. >>> Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. >>> That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where >>> Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages >>> of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there >>> are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is >>> right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings >>> about what Luria was up to. >>> >>> Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no >>> title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the >>> first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike >>> Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky >>> never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a >>> text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing >>> his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here >>> for. >>> >>> For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears >>> to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other >>> primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they >>> even have children back then? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JREEP45-2-Vygotsky-Letters.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 255178 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141122/52f089bb/attachment.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Nov 21 16:25:48 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 16:25:48 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: LSV's criticisms sound plausible to me, David. In the 1920s and probably to the end of his life ARL was interested in Freud. He was nothing if not an enthuiast! Volshinov thrashes him for his form of marxist/freudian synthesis. There are some interesting overlaps between Freudian and Vygotskian theorizing that consideration of Luria highlight. A long discussion for another occasion. mike On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 3:57 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Mike: > > Take a look at p. 25-27 of JREEP 45 (2), the letters to students and > colleagues. It's a very interesting letter to Leontiev which LSV wrote > from a dacha (perhaps the Izmailovo Zoo, where he sometimes stayed > when convalescing). He says he's working on "a history of cultural > development" (p. 27) there. But he begins by suggesting the > "IP"--apparently instrumental psychology--has wound up "in the > category of unprofitable pursuits", which is consistent with his > desire to establish the difference between signs and tools > structurally, genetically, and above all functionally. Then he calls > Luria's chapter of "Ape, Primitive, Child": > > "written *wholly* according to the Freudianists (and not even > according to Freud but according to V.F. Schmidt (her materials, M. > Klein and other second magnitude stars; then the impenetrable Piaget > is turned into an absolute beyond all measure, instrument and sign are > mixed together even more...." (p. 26). > > He's apparently referring to the Third Chapter in the published > version, though here he calls it the first chapter of the second part. > Then he says the debacle is not ARL's personal fault but the result of > the muddled thinking of the instrumental period in general. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 22 November 2014 08:21, mike cole wrote: > > Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with > > respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. > The > > problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. > > > > I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 > of > > Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following > > all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role > > in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls > > out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or > > planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? > > > > I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the > Mind. > > Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. > > > > mike > > > > On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> Mike: > >> > >> Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been > >> written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which > >> is 1931-1932. > >> > >> http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf > >> > >> If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left > >> for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was > >> written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the > >> kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he > >> often expresses. > >> > >> If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. > >> > >> a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the > >> letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had > >> absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of > >> Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn > >> around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory > >> experiments in the field was okay? > >> > >> b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were > >> pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book > >> clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume > >> Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the > >> beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). > >> > >> c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see > >> above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way > >> aroud. > >> > >> It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not > >> the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF > >> is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because > >> Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and > >> unpublished work. > >> > >> Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his > >> CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private > >> manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. > >> Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. > >> That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where > >> Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages > >> of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there > >> are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is > >> right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings > >> about what Luria was up to. > >> > >> Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no > >> title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the > >> first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike > >> Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky > >> never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a > >> text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing > >> his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here > >> for. > >> > >> For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears > >> to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other > >> primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they > >> even have children back then? > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Nov 21 17:40:41 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 01:40:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> Hi David, I admit I still haven't read the texts in question, as I know I should and I will. But I wanted to respond to your "gameful" (playful) post. I think play is very helpful method in stripping away the labels and providing a pathway to one's own experience. I wonder however if it is the case that just as kids will generalize from the springboard of "because" we do the same activity. Why? "Because I say so." With regard to Martin's discussion of internal and external, Martin et al, I wonder if extrinsic and intrinsic are better words for what we are referencing here. If only because these situate differently. By employing internal/external, there is a sense to me of exclusivity. The element is either internal or external. Extrinsic and intrinsic say to me that a single fundamental (if I may use my own made up word...a test drive) could be both internal and external. I absolutely sanction a meta-metaphor-phor! Talk about extrinsic and intrinsic at once! Gee whiz!! However, one of the aspects in this phenomenon of meaning-making I see missing in David's example in the notion of [deliciousness causing kids to like kimchi], is that kids have bodies with tastebuds that do cause kids to like kimchi, since notions of deliciousness coincide with liking, it is the tasting as an embodied experience that unites the circle. Thusly, just like 7+4 = 10, we start from where we stand. It is my emerging thinking that perhaps "true" or "authentic" education is the co-existence of subjective _with_ objective explanations, not a singling out of one or the other. ---- When I consider primitive cultures as discussed in Vygotsky's texts, I wonder if calling them simple cultures is better because there there are more ecological manifestations of being and acting in the world, in contrast to complex cultures. In a simple culture, the eating of fruit is a direct act with no mediation between me and the tree, but in modern (complex) culture it can be far more confusing, because not only do I have to go to a store, I have to decide from a range of fruit, which I must purchase with something called money, sometimes called plastic (in honor of Mike Nichols, perhaps the future isn't in plastics). And not only fruit! I have other things to choose from as well, like jam, jellies, cookies, sherberts, and many other things we have made from fruit and then packaged. There are even marzipan cookies, which are shaped like fruit, but are not fruit! Given how Vygotsky was such an empathetic person, I really can't imagine him placing primitive cultures in a pejorative light, so I am inclined to agree with you David that he was being appreciative of their problem solving skills. Well, you said creativity and originality, which to me is problem solving, though perhaps that is a limited phrase. It is unfortunate that primitive came to have a pejorative meaning, but I think that comes from colonial sensibilities than anything else; it makes sense that his work would be easily misinterpreted. This says more about moderns than it says about primitives. I would venture that the handling of this word "primitive" is an important word to deconstruct for newcomers to Vygotsky, particularly those who might have sensibilities in alignment with primitive cultures, either because one is a member of such a group, or one desires to abolish elitist thinking from one's mind, or both! I would add that regarding your chosen quote from p.33 that methods removed from the lab and used in the world? is this not exactly what Hutchins argues in understanding distributed cognition? Laboratory science does remove the world, and the problem of understanding the environment, traveling the path to method construction, so I wonder if there is something there about that too. ---- Now about distinctions being nice? They are great when they are nice! What can bother about distinctions is when they don't coincide with personal experience, and in that case they tend not to be very nice. What I like about mashing-up as you call it, is that it is essentially creating a subjectivity for which we invite our fellow discussants to put on the mashup, like a costume, to allow the other a pathway to meaning as we mean it. In artmaking, we call this "construction of a viewer." It is a powerful method and why photography is such a powerful medium. This is why I believe that embodied metaphors (rather than cultural metaphors) are so useful when trying to communicate with others who do not share our culture or our language, because as far as I know, and I could be proved wrong I suppose, every human has a body. Consider for example the use of a mouse as a pointer compared to the use of a finger, your own finger of course! What mice have to do with computers is cultural. A finger is a finger is a finger when you have a body (with fingers). Perhaps this function of recreating experience for "the other" is not only the purpose of metaphors, but the purpose of stories, with children, but also among ourselves. I do want to gently defend my interpretation of the Wizard of Oz because there is no intellectualism in the symbolism which I proposed. My Toto, as intuition, is free of rational thought, and so are all the other characters. I might suggest that rational thought can be quite unethical if it dislocates experience (embodied, personal, etc) and this I believe is the complaint against the Cartesian model of mind. Can we call the Wizard a model for rational thought? Possibly. If one sees rational thought as an expression of an ego gone astray and requiring a throne in the Emerald City, which is also the color of money, then maybe that's OK to think of the Wizard as the unit for analysis of rational thought in the environment of Oz. (I can't believe I just wrote that, but there it is) I prefer a Wizard, who we find supplanting one thing for another and calling it wizardry, to be a mechanical thinker not a rational one. Mechanical thinking has no awareness of self, much less other. It isn't magical exactly, but completes through superimposition, more specifically projection (as the great head of Oz), as egos are prone to do. I'm apprehensive how to discuss your representation of the Vedas, because it depends upon what you mean by Vedas, which is why I use the term Vedic, as a general reference rather than specific, since this depends upon how one might interpret Vedas (and even what part of them you interpret). There are many Vedic schools of thought, for example. Not just one. We can look at them as old and tied to a period, or as relevant to something that is perennial within all of us. I am of the latter group, and I don't think it is a matter of my projecting modern anything upon them because they stand on their own, with or without me looking at them with my cultural baggage. I can say this because that is my experience. I don't expect you to accept that. I don't think it makes sense to unite Vedic traditions with shamanic traditions, but I suppose I can see why that grouping would occur, but this grouping comes from outside not from inside the tradition, so that's a bit like calling primitives with an intended meaning of being "underdeveloped" people. I don't think it reveals the value inherent in these traditions, it actually obfuscates. We should be careful when trying to call anything primitive without understanding what it is. Saying the Vedas are of the forest-meaning in relation to what is civilized and modern shows me that Halliday doesn't understand. But I grant I may not understand what he is attempting to achieve with such categories, and I'm happy to give him the benefit of the doubt. Ignorance does not imply stupidity. Still it is a bit reductionist to say such a thing without having spent time understanding what such traditions have to say in the environments in which they were said, which I suppose could have been a forest, but they could be saying what they say in any environment and are not tied to forests. But this can't be known by telling, but by experiencing for oneself, in the same way I cannot describe with words what is sweet. I can only experience sweetness and then share it with you and say, "This is sweet." With regard to pyramids, I think what is lacking in our consideration of them is that we suffer to misunderstand the meaning of these structures because they have been reduced of meaning. I say this because we have no one alive as descendents from their time of use, to explain to us what they actually meant to the people who built them. Everything we do as moderns is interpretive with our modern baggage projected upon them, largely because we have no choice when contexts are ripped apart. It is like attempting to imagine what a dinosaur was like by its bones, or worse from a fossilized egg. However, one essential ingredient for meaning in the quest for understanding antiquities is to attempt to place oneself into the viewpoint of the people who used these structures, as subjects of experience. Just as we have bodies, the ancients also had bodies. They looked to the heavens, as we do today. Embodied experience is perhaps the only thing which positively assists in our reconstruction of meaning of ancients ?disconnected from us? despite there being no tradition handed down from teacher to student (orally or written) (or generation to generation) to the present day. As such, no one can fully explain to us contemporary meanings of the ruins of Ancient Greeks, Ancient Romans, Ancient Mayans, Ancient Aztecs, Ancient Incans, Ancient Druids, Ancient Egyptians and any other ancient culture who built stone structures and wrote texts (this is not to say that buildings are requirements of ancient cultures, but it's all we've got to go on in terms of traces left behind). I mean "fully explain" loosely of course, because we do have a better idea, for example, of the Greeks and the Romans than we do of the others, and this is largely because not only do some buildings still stand, we possess the texts and the language in which they were written as well. The Vedic tradition is singular, in that it is the only ancient culture that does have an unbroken line, in which the buildings are still used, the texts are intact, the language is actively kept alive and these together (language and texts) are passed on to anyone who wants to know what they have to say. Because of this, it's not necessary to use the buildings, of course. The modern act of projection of our own culture upon others is a position I do not believe Vygotsky would not have adopted had he known about Vedic culture, but this is certainly entertaining speculation on my part. I believe he would feel this way for the same way you say he appreciates the creativity and originality of children and primitives. I suggest he recognized subjective experience, not only objective experience, and this subjective experience is something alive in the person, as a relevant expression of freedom, not a mechanized, prefabricated construct forced upon them from the outside, even if it generates from the outside, from the environment. This is why I'm not sure I can fully follow without some discomfort what you describe by Halliday as forest-people thinking. It doesn't make sense to me. We have never given up common sense forms of thinking, nor metaphorical forms of thinking, nor storytelling. These are as much a part of modern life as the Ancients. I'm not sure I can follow what you mean by grammar metaphors of factory thinking. It seems that the environments themselves are being used as categories that suggest a full and irreversible transformation of the manner in which humans think, and I don't see that to be the case. I do see how this metaphor removes humans from natural settings as an historical development, and I can agree with that. I suppose what I witness in the modern world is how "factory thinking" eliminates a notion of a free self, situated in the world. Beingness in a factory ? beingness in the natural world. "Factory thinking" does stunt experience in the same way a captive lion will likely not survive as well on the African Savannah as the wild lion can. I don't think this disconnect is irreversible, because we do have experience, for example, that elephant babies taken from their families, say because of poaching, can be raised by humans if humans can mimic the learning that would happen in the wild by older elephants, and in society with other baby elephants. They can return to the wild. I'm not so confident of rogue teenager male bull elephants who have no elder males to show them (through experience) not to be bullies. All this says to me that with thoughtful interventions we can plan our escape to return to subjective experience if we can understand how to mimic its simple form, regardless of what setting we are in, though it would be better just to remove unnatural settings from our experience (in terms of those deemed toxic) and create or foster settings that are the best of breed of the natural and modern worlds. We reach for these experiences when we carve out parks in cities, or when we want to live by the sea or mountains. This doesn't mean modern experience, nor modern thought stands apart from, but alongside in unity with natural environments. I don't know anyone who doesn't sense something powerful about nature that also assists deeply in our being in ourselves. That is why I cannot give up on my quest to understand the "problem" of the environment, especially with regard to technology design. I find hope in this approach. Thanks for allowing me an attempt to express something I've been thinking about for a while. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 4:03 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Martin: We have a little game that we play with the sixth graders. It's part of a science lesson on light. You put a five-by-five grid of squares on the whiteboard and you mark the x axis with refracting and reflecting agents (e.g. "mirror", "water", "lens", "window", etc--we elicit them from the kids according to Vico's principle of "verum factum", you only really know what you make). Then you mark the y axis of the grid with light sources (e.g. "sunbeam", "moonbeam", "flashlight beam", "candle", etc. The kids tend to like "lasers" but we don't allow any science fiction stuff). The object of the game for a team to get three squares in a row. You get a square by stating an instance, like "a sunbeam bounces off a mirror". But you can only hold the square if you can survive the challenge "Why?" by the other team. Now, the most common way of surviving the challenge is by generalizing: "because mirrors reflect sunbeams". This way of defending your space we allow, but we don't allow "because sunbeams bounce off mirrors". My dad hits the roof when I tell him this. He points out, quite correctly, that both defenses are perfectly tautological, and neither one should be allowed, and of course from the point of view of an 87-year-old physicist, he's right. But as Piaget points out, the word "because" means at least eleven different things (the kids are always saying things like "I like fresh kimchi because it's delicious"). Vygotsky writes that this is an advantage of Piaget's work over his own; I am not so sure, because I think there is a kind of cline between the function of raising a phenomenon to the general, which is the function we see here, and the function of giving an explanation in terms of lower units, which is what the kids would have to do if we required them to explain reflection in terms of a particle or wave model of light. In the examples you give, money and water, and above all in speech, I agree that the key concept is not causality--at least not causality in this sense, in the sense of what causes reflection and refraction. But I also don't think that the word "constitution" is well chosen, because of course the same problem of polysemy arises as with causality. On the one hand, we say that the USA was (externally) constituted when the constitution was written. And on the other hand we say that the constituents of water are not voters, but the elements of hydrogen and oxygen. I'm rather surprised that you tolerate the distinction between external constitution and internal constitution, both because it obscures the difference between a relation between people and a relation between physical objects and because "external constitution" suggests the outside of a container just as surely as "internal constitution" suggests the inside. They are equally container/vehicle metaphors for meaning (which is itself a metaphorical relation, so I suppose I should call them meta-metaphor-phors). The term Halliday uses (for speech, and for goods and services) is "realization". What he means by that is simply that when we turn meaning into wording (even were this wording is merely inner speech) it moves a step away from the ideal form of the material (that is, meaning potential, meaning that is thought) to the real form of the material (when, as Shakespeare says, our eyes are offices of truth and our words are natural breath). This isn't a form of "causality": meanings don't cause wordings any more than deliciousness causes children to like kimchi. But it's not really a form of constituency either. Mike: Gita Lvovna Vygodskaya once wrote that amongst Vygotsky's papers she found letters between him and V.K. Arseniev, the man to whom Vygotsky actually refers to in Chapter Two of HDHMF. Arseniev was the author of "Dersu the Trapper", out of which Kurosawa's wonderful movie "Dersu Uzala" was made. On the one hand, he treasures their contributions towards communism, which he feels are as much moral as modernity's contributions are material (Arseniev was a Commissar for National Minorities in the Far Eastern Soviet Republic). On the other hand he mourns their destruction by the misfits from the West. When the Far Eastern Republic was absorbed into the Russian Federation, Arseniev refused to return to the city of his birth, and died in Vladivostok. His whole family was immediately arrested and either shot or exiled. I think that Arseniev's book (which I have a copy of) expresses almost perfectly Vygotsky's own attitude towards non-modern peoples of the USSR (which are, as he points out, not at all the same as "primitive man", a category which Vygotrsky says no longer exists anywhere on earth). In other words, I think he has a deep respect for the originality and creativity of their ways of thinking, just as he has deep respect for the creativity and originality of the ways that children think. So I guess I can't see anything derogatory at all in the analogy (which is not, as Vygotsky stresses, a parallel, but only an analogy made for the purpose of genetic analysis). By the way, what do you make of p. 33 of Chapter Two? "Experimentation was introduced into ethnic psychology and general and experimental psychology and ethnic psychology ? each from its own aspect ? were brought by the course of development itself to a certain rapprochement; true, it was insignificant and external, but nevertheless it broke the main methodological boundary between them. However, neither of the two disciplines or branches of psychology has recognized the principal significance of this rapprochement, the whole enormity of the methodological reconstruction that it entails for both sciences. This can be easily seen from the fact that the same experimental methods that were developed in the psychological laboratory for use with an adult cultured person were used with a person growing up in culturally backward conditions." Don't you think this is an explicit criticism of Luria's Uzbekistan adventure? Of course, we know that Vygotsky was interested and enthusiastic when it took place. But we also know that he didn't take part, and it would be just like him to have some strong misgivings about the procedure afterwards! Annaluisa: As you noticed, Andy is good at what used to be called nice distinctions, and I am, like you, something of a masher-together-er. But I have learned a certain healthy respect for nice distinctions too; for one thing, it's only when you make the nice distinctions that you can let the boundaries between areas of knowledge go with a crash. For another, I really do believe that when we unite different areas of disciplinary knowledge (e.g. cultural psychology and The Wizard of Oz) we have to do it thematically and not on the basis of coincidences or Freudian insights (so for example the point I was making had to do with the nature of intellectualism--Dorothy, or rather, Toto, "sees through" adult thinking!) Koreans, like the far eastern peoples that Arseniev studied, are traditionally shamanists, and the indigenous religion is vaguely related to the kind of shamanism that Dersu Uzala believed in (and in fact Koreans play an important role in Arseniev's book). I'm not one of those people who believe in pan-diffusionism, e.g. the pyramids of the New World are somehow directly inspired by those of Egypt. It seems to me much more plausible that both sets of pyramids were inspired by nature (i.e. they are artificial mountains). So I think that a lot of the parallels that we moderns see between shamanistic religions and Hindu scriptures are simply based on our own modern biases, and not on any real agnation or affinity. Halliday separates what he calls "semiohistory" into three distinct periods: the Forest (that would be the Vedas, and also shamanistic traditions), the Farm (proverbs, fables, folktales) and the Factory (modern novels and newspapers), and he does point out that their are distinct forms of knowledge and even of grammar associated with each (the Forest emphasizes commonsense forms of knowing, the Farm emphasizes disciplinary and written knowledge with a strong proverbial and lexically metaphorical component, while the Factory requires what he calls "grammatical metaphor", that is, the ability to turn a process into an "entity). I think that the "unity" of the "Forest" is really an illusion; the closeness of the semiotic understandings that forest peoples have to the environment means that there will be far more variation than meets the modern eye (and also far more variation than we find in Factory modes of meaning). So for example, I don't believe that there was ever a single common language; I imagine that early man spoke literally hundreds of thousands of completely unrelated tongues, and this is certainly what longitudinal observations on the number of languages extant would suggest. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Fri Nov 21 19:19:47 2014 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (valerie A. Wilkinson) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 12:19:47 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> , <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> Message-ID: <001301d00603$2b3fbb90$81bf32b0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Random Jumping In! (Like an asteroid.) In the movie "Three Kings" the people who were all in it chance for various reasons were led by Archie Gates (George Clooney) who was instructing Private Vig (Spike Jonze) how to get what it takes. He said, "That's how it works." Which seems to cue in an improvised kibitzing move in this amazing important conversation on the fly. Vandy (A General Systems Theorist) -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2014 10:41 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Hi David, I admit I still haven't read the texts in question, as I know I should and I will. But I wanted to respond to your "gameful" (playful) post. I think play is very helpful method in stripping away the labels and providing a pathway to one's own experience. I wonder however if it is the case that just as kids will generalize from the springboard of "because" we do the same activity. Why? "Because I say so." With regard to Martin's discussion of internal and external, Martin et al, I wonder if extrinsic and intrinsic are better words for what we are referencing here. If only because these situate differently. By employing internal/external, there is a sense to me of exclusivity. The element is either internal or external. Extrinsic and intrinsic say to me that a single fundamental (if I may use my own made up word...a test drive) could be both internal and external. I absolutely sanction a meta-metaphor-phor! Talk about extrinsic and intrinsic at once! Gee whiz!! However, one of the aspects in this phenomenon of meaning-making I see missing in David's example in the notion of [deliciousness causing kids to like kimchi], is that kids have bodies with tastebuds that do cause kids to like kimchi, since notions of deliciousness coincide with liking, it is the tasting as an embodied experience that unites the circle. Thusly, just like 7+4 = 10, we start from where we stand. It is my emerging thinking that perhaps "true" or "authentic" education is the co-existence of subjective _with_ objective explanations, not a singling out of one or the other. ---- When I consider primitive cultures as discussed in Vygotsky's texts, I wonder if calling them simple cultures is better because there there are more ecological manifestations of being and acting in the world, in contrast to complex cultures. In a simple culture, the eating of fruit is a direct act with no mediation between me and the tree, but in modern (complex) culture it can be far more confusing, because not only do I have to go to a store, I have to decide from a range of fruit, which I must purchase with something called money, sometimes called plastic (in honor of Mike Nichols, perhaps the future isn't in plastics). And not only fruit! I have other things to choose from as well, like jam, jellies, cookies, sherberts, and many other things we have made from fruit and then packaged. There are even marzipan cookies, which are shaped like fruit, but are not fruit! Given how Vygotsky was such an empathetic person, I really can't imagine him placing primitive cultures in a pejorative light, so I am inclined to agree with you David that he was being appreciative of their problem solving skills. Well, you said creativity and originality, which to me is problem solving, though perhaps that is a limited phrase. It is unfortunate that primitive came to have a pejorative meaning, but I think that comes from colonial sensibilities than anything else; it makes sense that his work would be easily misinterpreted. This says more about moderns than it says about primitives. I would venture that the handling of this word "primitive" is an important word to deconstruct for newcomers to Vygotsky, particularly those who might have sensibilities in alignment with primitive cultures, either because one is a member of such a group, or one desires to abolish elitist thinking from one's mind, or both! I would add that regarding your chosen quote from p.33 that methods removed from the lab and used in the world? is this not exactly what Hutchins argues in understanding distributed cognition? Laboratory science does remove the world, and the problem of understanding the environment, traveling the path to method construction, so I wonder if there is something there about that too. ---- Now about distinctions being nice? They are great when they are nice! What can bother about distinctions is when they don't coincide with personal experience, and in that case they tend not to be very nice. What I like about mashing-up as you call it, is that it is essentially creating a subjectivity for which we invite our fellow discussants to put on the mashup, like a costume, to allow the other a pathway to meaning as we mean it. In artmaking, we call this "construction of a viewer." It is a powerful method and why photography is such a powerful medium. This is why I believe that embodied metaphors (rather than cultural metaphors) are so useful when trying to communicate with others who do not share our culture or our language, because as far as I know, and I could be proved wrong I suppose, every human has a body. Consider for example the use of a mouse as a pointer compared to the use of a finger, your own finger of course! What mice have to do with computers is cultural. A finger is a finger is a finger when you have a body (with fingers). Perhaps this function of recreating experience for "the other" is not only the purpose of metaphors, but the purpose of stories, with children, but also among ourselves. I do want to gently defend my interpretation of the Wizard of Oz because there is no intellectualism in the symbolism which I proposed. My Toto, as intuition, is free of rational thought, and so are all the other characters. I might suggest that rational thought can be quite unethical if it dislocates experience (embodied, personal, etc) and this I believe is the complaint against the Cartesian model of mind. Can we call the Wizard a model for rational thought? Possibly. If one sees rational thought as an expression of an ego gone astray and requiring a throne in the Emerald City, which is also the color of money, then maybe that's OK to think of the Wizard as the unit for analysis of rational thought in the environment of Oz. (I can't believe I just wrote that, but there it is) I prefer a Wizard, who we find supplanting one thing for another and calling it wizardry, to be a mechanical thinker not a rational one. Mechanical thinking has no awareness of self, much less other. It isn't magical exactly, but completes through superimposition, more specifically projection (as the great head of Oz), as egos are prone to do. I'm apprehensive how to discuss your representation of the Vedas, because it depends upon what you mean by Vedas, which is why I use the term Vedic, as a general reference rather than specific, since this depends upon how one might interpret Vedas (and even what part of them you interpret). There are many Vedic schools of thought, for example. Not just one. We can look at them as old and tied to a period, or as relevant to something that is perennial within all of us. I am of the latter group, and I don't think it is a matter of my projecting modern anything upon them because they stand on their own, with or without me looking at them with my cultural baggage. I can say this because that is my experience. I don't expect you to accept that. I don't think it makes sense to unite Vedic traditions with shamanic traditions, but I suppose I can see why that grouping would occur, but this grouping comes from outside not from inside the tradition, so that's a bit like calling primitives with an intended meaning of being "underdeveloped" people. I don't think it reveals the value inherent in these traditions, it actually obfuscates. We should be careful when trying to call anything primitive without understanding what it is. Saying the Vedas are of the forest-meaning in relation to what is civilized and modern shows me that Halliday doesn't understand. But I grant I may not understand what he is attempting to achieve with such categories, and I'm happy to give him the benefit of the doubt. Ignorance does not imply stupidity. Still it is a bit reductionist to say such a thing without having spent time understanding what such traditions have to say in the environments in which they were said, which I suppose could have been a forest, but they could be saying what they say in any environment and are not tied to forests. But this can't be known by telling, but by experiencing for oneself, in the same way I cannot describe with words what is sweet. I can only experience sweetness and then share it with you and say, "This is sweet." With regard to pyramids, I think what is lacking in our consideration of them is that we suffer to misunderstand the meaning of these structures because they have been reduced of meaning. I say this because we have no one alive as descendents from their time of use, to explain to us what they actually meant to the people who built them. Everything we do as moderns is interpretive with our modern baggage projected upon them, largely because we have no choice when contexts are ripped apart. It is like attempting to imagine what a dinosaur was like by its bones, or worse from a fossilized egg. However, one essential ingredient for meaning in the quest for understanding antiquities is to attempt to place oneself into the viewpoint of the people who used these structures, as subjects of experience. Just as we have bodies, the ancients also had bodies. They looked to the heavens, as we do today. Embodied experience is perhaps the only thing which positively assists in our reconstruction of meaning of ancients -disconnected from us- despite there being no tradition handed down from teacher to student (orally or written) (or generation to generation) to the present day. As such, no one can fully explain to us contemporary meanings of the ruins of Ancient Greeks, Ancient Romans, Ancient Mayans, Ancient Aztecs, Ancient Incans, Ancient Druids, Ancient Egyptians and any other ancient culture who built stone structures and wrote texts (this is not to say that buildings are requirements of ancient cultures, but it's all we've got to go on in terms of traces left behind). I mean "fully explain" loosely of course, because we do have a better idea, for example, of the Greeks and the Romans than we do of the others, and this is largely because not only do some buildings still stand, we possess the texts and the language in which they were written as well. The Vedic tradition is singular, in that it is the only ancient culture that does have an unbroken line, in which the buildings are still used, the texts are intact, the language is actively kept alive and these together (language and texts) are passed on to anyone who wants to know what they have to say. Because of this, it's not necessary to use the buildings, of course. The modern act of projection of our own culture upon others is a position I do not believe Vygotsky would not have adopted had he known about Vedic culture, but this is certainly entertaining speculation on my part. I believe he would feel this way for the same way you say he appreciates the creativity and originality of children and primitives. I suggest he recognized subjective experience, not only objective experience, and this subjective experience is something alive in the person, as a relevant expression of freedom, not a mechanized, prefabricated construct forced upon them from the outside, even if it generates from the outside, from the environment. This is why I'm not sure I can fully follow without some discomfort what you describe by Halliday as forest-people thinking. It doesn't make sense to me. We have never given up common sense forms of thinking, nor metaphorical forms of thinking, nor storytelling. These are as much a part of modern life as the Ancients. I'm not sure I can follow what you mean by grammar metaphors of factory thinking. It seems that the environments themselves are being used as categories that suggest a full and irreversible transformation of the manner in which humans think, and I don't see that to be the case. I do see how this metaphor removes humans from natural settings as an historical development, and I can agree with that. I suppose what I witness in the modern world is how "factory thinking" eliminates a notion of a free self, situated in the world. Beingness in a factory ? beingness in the natural world. "Factory thinking" does stunt experience in the same way a captive lion will likely not survive as well on the African Savannah as the wild lion can. I don't think this disconnect is irreversible, because we do have experience, for example, that elephant babies taken from their families, say because of poaching, can be raised by humans if humans can mimic the learning that would happen in the wild by older elephants, and in society with other baby elephants. They can return to the wild. I'm not so confident of rogue teenager male bull elephants who have no elder males to show them (through experience) not to be bullies. All this says to me that with thoughtful interventions we can plan our escape to return to subjective experience if we can understand how to mimic its simple form, regardless of what setting we are in, though it would be better just to remove unnatural settings from our experience (in terms of those deemed toxic) and create or foster settings that are the best of breed of the natural and modern worlds. We reach for these experiences when we carve out parks in cities, or when we want to live by the sea or mountains. This doesn't mean modern experience, nor modern thought stands apart from, but alongside in unity with natural environments. I don't know anyone who doesn't sense something powerful about nature that also assists deeply in our being in ourselves. That is why I cannot give up on my quest to understand the "problem" of the environment, especially with regard to technology design. I find hope in this approach. Thanks for allowing me an attempt to express something I've been thinking about for a while. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 4:03 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Martin: We have a little game that we play with the sixth graders. It's part of a science lesson on light. You put a five-by-five grid of squares on the whiteboard and you mark the x axis with refracting and reflecting agents (e. g. "mirror", "water", "lens", "window", etc--we elicit them from the kids according to Vico's principle of "verum factum", you only really know what you make). Then you mark the y axis of the grid with light sources (e.g. "sunbeam", "moonbeam", "flashlight beam", "candle", etc. The kids tend to like "lasers" but we don't allow any science fiction stuff). The object of the game for a team to get three squares in a row. You get a square by stating an instance, like "a sunbeam bounces off a mirror". But you can only hold the square if you can survive the challenge "Why?" by the other team. Now, the most common way of surviving the challenge is by generalizing: "because mirrors reflect sunbeams". This way of defending your space we allow, but we don't allow "because sunbeams bounce off mirrors". My dad hits the roof when I tell him this. He points out, quite correctly, that both defenses are perfectly tautological, and neither one should be allowed, and of course from the point of view of an 87-year-old physicist, he's right. But as Piaget points out, the word "because" means at least eleven different things (the kids are always saying things like "I like fresh kimchi because it's delicious"). Vygotsky writes that this is an advantage of Piaget's work over his own; I am not so sure, because I think there is a kind of cline between the function of raising a phenomenon to the general, which is the function we see here, and the function of giving an explanation in terms of lower units, which is what the kids would have to do if we required them to explain reflection in terms of a particle or wave model of light. In the examples you give, money and water, and above all in speech, I agree that the key concept is not causality--at least not causality in this sense, in the sense of what causes reflection and refraction. But I also don't think that the word "constitution" is well chosen, because of course the same problem of polysemy arises as with causality. On the one hand, we say that the USA was (externally) constituted when the constitution was written. And on the other hand we say that the constituents of water are not voters, but the elements of hydrogen and oxygen. I'm rather surprised that you tolerate the distinction between external constitution and internal constitution, both because it obscures the difference between a relation between people and a relation between physical objects and because "external constitution" suggests the outside of a container just as surely as "internal constitution" suggests the inside. They are equally container/vehicle metaphors for meaning (which is itself a metaphorical relation, so I suppose I should call them meta-metaphor-phors). The term Halliday uses (for speech, and for goods and services) is "realization". What he means by that is simply that when we turn meaning into wording (even were this wording is merely inner speech) it moves a step away from the ideal form of the material (that is, meaning potential, meaning that is thought) to the real form of the material (when, as Shakespeare says, our eyes are offices of truth and our words are natural breath). This isn't a form of "causality": meanings don't cause wordings any more than deliciousness causes children to like kimchi. But it's not really a form of constituency either. Mike: Gita Lvovna Vygodskaya once wrote that amongst Vygotsky's papers she found letters between him and V.K. Arseniev, the man to whom Vygotsky actually refers to in Chapter Two of HDHMF. Arseniev was the author of "Dersu the Trapper", out of which Kurosawa's wonderful movie "Dersu Uzala" was made. On the one hand, he treasures their contributions towards communism, which he feels are as much moral as modernity's contributions are material (Arseniev was a Commissar for National Minorities in the Far Eastern Soviet Republic). On the other hand he mourns their destruction by the misfits from the West. When the Far Eastern Republic was absorbed into the Russian Federation, Arseniev refused to return to the city of his birth, and died in Vladivostok. His whole family was immediately arrested and either shot or exiled. I think that Arseniev's book (which I have a copy of) expresses almost perfectly Vygotsky's own attitude towards non-modern peoples of the USSR (which are, as he points out, not at all the same as "primitive man", a category which Vygotrsky says no longer exists anywhere on earth). In other words, I think he has a deep respect for the originality and creativity of their ways of thinking, just as he has deep respect for the creativity and originality of the ways that children think. So I guess I can't see anything derogatory at all in the analogy (which is not, as Vygotsky stresses, a parallel, but only an analogy made for the purpose of genetic analysis). By the way, what do you make of p. 33 of Chapter Two? "Experimentation was introduced into ethnic psychology and general and experimental psychology and ethnic psychology - each from its own aspect - were brought by the course of development itself to a certain rapprochement; true, it was insignificant and external, but nevertheless it broke the main methodological boundary between them. However, neither of the two disciplines or branches of psychology has recognized the principal significance of this rapprochement, the whole enormity of the methodological reconstruction that it entails for both sciences. This can be easily seen from the fact that the same experimental methods that were developed in the psychological laboratory for use with an adult cultured person were used with a person growing up in culturally backward conditions." Don't you think this is an explicit criticism of Luria's Uzbekistan adventure? Of course, we know that Vygotsky was interested and enthusiastic when it took place. But we also know that he didn't take part, and it would be just like him to have some strong misgivings about the procedure afterwards! Annaluisa: As you noticed, Andy is good at what used to be called nice distinctions, and I am, like you, something of a masher-together-er. But I have learned a certain healthy respect for nice distinctions too; for one thing, it's only when you make the nice distinctions that you can let the boundaries between areas of knowledge go with a crash. For another, I really do believe that when we unite different areas of disciplinary knowledge (e.g. cultural psychology and The Wizard of Oz) we have to do it thematically and not on the basis of coincidences or Freudian insights (so for example the point I was making had to do with the nature of intellectualism--Dorothy, or rather, Toto, "sees through" adult thinking!) Koreans, like the far eastern peoples that Arseniev studied, are traditionally shamanists, and the indigenous religion is vaguely related to the kind of shamanism that Dersu Uzala believed in (and in fact Koreans play an important role in Arseniev's book). I'm not one of those people who believe in pan-diffusionism, e.g. the pyramids of the New World are somehow directly inspired by those of Egypt. It seems to me much more plausible that both sets of pyramids were inspired by nature (i.e. they are artificial mountains). So I think that a lot of the parallels that we moderns see between shamanistic religions and Hindu scriptures are simply based on our own modern biases, and not on any real agnation or affinity. Halliday separates what he calls "semiohistory" into three distinct periods: the Forest (that would be the Vedas, and also shamanistic traditions), the Farm (proverbs, fables, folktales) and the Factory (modern novels and newspapers), and he does point out that their are distinct forms of knowledge and even of grammar associated with each (the Forest emphasizes commonsense forms of knowing, the Farm emphasizes disciplinary and written knowledge with a strong proverbial and lexically metaphorical component, while the Factory requires what he calls "grammatical metaphor", that is, the ability to turn a process into an "entity). I think that the "unity" of the "Forest" is really an illusion; the closeness of the semiotic understandings that forest peoples have to the environment means that there will be far more variation than meets the modern eye (and also far more variation than we find in Factory modes of meaning). So for example, I don't believe that there was ever a single common language; I imagine that early man spoke literally hundreds of thousands of completely unrelated tongues, and this is certainly what longitudinal observations on the number of languages extant would suggest. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Nov 21 21:13:47 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 05:13:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <001301d00603$2b3fbb90$81bf32b0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> , <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu>, <001301d00603$2b3fbb90$81bf32b0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Message-ID: <1416633226818.61862@unm.edu> Sometimes it takes a kibitzing asteroid to get things moving. I believe this to be the most memorable kibitz ever, not that I get kibitzed much. Please. Continue! From ablunden@mira.net Fri Nov 21 23:32:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 18:32:38 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Primitive or Ideal? Message-ID: <54703C16.4070800@mira.net> In the light of recent discussion about the role of the ideal in the development of language, and the notion of "primitive man," this old primitive thought it might be a good idea to read up on the case of Nicaraguan Sign Language. So, I've bought this book off Amazon. Does anyone know of criticisms of this author? Andy ------------------ The Emergence of Deaf Community in Nicaragua: "With Sign Language You Can Learn So Much" by Laura Pollich The sudden discovery of Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) enthralled scholars worldwide who hoped to witness the evolution of a new language. But controversy erupted regarding the validity of NSL as a genuinely spontaneous language created by young children. Laura Polich's fascinating book recounts her nine-year study of the Deaf community in Nicaragua and her findings about its formation and that of NSL in its wake. Polich crafted "The Emergence of the Deaf Community in Nicaragua" from her copious research in Nicaragua's National Archives, field observations of deaf pupils in 20 special education schools, polls of the teachers for deaf children about their education and knowledge of deafness, a survey of 225 deaf individuals about their backgrounds and living conditions, and interviews with the oldest members of the National Nicaraguan Association of the Deaf. Polich found that the use of a "standardized" sign language in Nicaragua did not emerge until there was a community of users meeting on a regular basis, especially beyond childhood. The adoption of NSL did not happen suddenly, but took many years and was fed by multiple influences. She also discovered the process that deaf adolescents used to attain their social agency, which gained them recognition by the larger Nicaraguan hearing society. Her book illustrates tremendous changes during the past 60 years, and the truth in one deaf Nicaraguan's declaration, "With sign language you can learn so much." -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Nov 22 06:06:22 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 07:06:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Primitive or Ideal? In-Reply-To: <54703C16.4070800@mira.net> References: <54703C16.4070800@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, You might also want to check out John Haviland's work. He has been watching a language emerge among a small group of 5 or 6 signers in Chiapas Mexico. Here is his publications page: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~jhaviland/JBHPublications.html The best papers on Z sign are the "Different Strokes" paper and the "emerging grammar of nouns in a first generation sign language: specificity, iconicity and syntax". I hosted John for a talk here last week and he has some data documenting the emergence of Z sign in the community. And I think his data can speak to your question of "ends" in "beginnings". I'll write more if I can find some time sometime soon. Meantime, below is the the abstract for the talk he gave while here. Fantastically interesting stuff. -greg *Jointly inventing language: why, how, and what? *John Haviland, UCSD Anthropology I will introduce a first generation "family" sign language from a Tzotzil (Mayan) speaking village in highland Chiapas, Mexico. The family includes three deaf siblings who have never met other deaf people, never been exposed to another sign language, hardly been to school, and had almost no contact with speakers of any spoken language other than Tzotzil. The deaf individuals, who range from their early twenties to their mid thirties, along with a fourth intermediate hearing sibling and a slightly younger hearing niece, have grown up using and contributing to a shared manual communicative system. Additionally, the oldest deaf woman?s now seven-year-old son has simultaneously acquired his mother and uncles' homesign and spoken Tzotzil. Intensive fieldwork on this tiny emerging language community began in 2008, although I have known all the signers?part of the extended household of a *compadre?*since they were born. This presentation concentrates on the collaborative co-construction of the emerging sign language, dubbed ?Z,? and on two central questions about linguistic signs: where do they come from, and why do they emerge? Previous research on manual gesture in Zinacantec Tzotzil allows direct attention to possible semiotic sources therein for the homesign. Using both natural observation and semi-experimental results, I posit various paths leading from visible communicative action, sometimes through ?iconic? co-speech gesture, to grammaticalized "portable" signs which can be emancipated from the immediate context of speaking, and which instantiate emergent linguistic structure. The second generation signer?s socialization into language demonstrates related processes of meta-iconic regimentation, formal simplification, and syntactic regularization. Finally, Z illustrates how sociolinguistic and ideological divisions can emerge even in a miniature speech community. On Sat, Nov 22, 2014 at 12:32 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > In the light of recent discussion about the role of the ideal in the > development of language, and the notion of "primitive man," this old > primitive thought it might be a good idea to read up on the case of > Nicaraguan Sign Language. So, I've bought this book off Amazon. Does anyone > know of criticisms of this author? > Andy > ------------------ > > > The Emergence of Deaf Community in Nicaragua: "With Sign Language You > Can Learn So Much" by Laura Pollich > Laura+Polich&cm_sp=det-_-bdp-_-author> > > The sudden discovery of Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) enthralled scholars > worldwide who hoped to witness the evolution of a new language. But > controversy erupted regarding the validity of NSL as a genuinely > spontaneous language created by young children. Laura Polich's fascinating > book recounts her nine-year study of the Deaf community in Nicaragua and > her findings about its formation and that of NSL in its wake. Polich > crafted "The Emergence of the Deaf Community in Nicaragua" from her copious > research in Nicaragua's National Archives, field observations of deaf > pupils in 20 special education schools, polls of the teachers for deaf > children about their education and knowledge of deafness, a survey of 225 > deaf individuals about their backgrounds and living conditions, and > interviews with the oldest members of the National Nicaraguan Association > of the Deaf. Polich found that the use of a "standardized" sign language in > Nicaragua did not emerge until there was a community of users meeting on a > regular basis, especially beyond childhood. The adoption of NSL did not > happen suddenly, but took many years and was fed by multiple influences. > She also discovered the process that deaf adolescents used to attain their > social agency, which gained them recognition by the larger Nicaraguan > hearing society. Her book illustrates tremendous changes during the past 60 > years, and the truth in one deaf Nicaraguan's declaration, "With sign > language you can learn so much." > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Nov 22 13:19:49 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 06:19:49 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Annalisa: Thanks for that--or perhaps I should really say thanks for those, for I can see that we are very different kinds of masher-togetherer. One of the reasons why the theme of themes appeals to me is that I like to have all the different points linked in some ways. It doesn't have to always be in the same way--I think that complexive thinking, where the links between bullet points are different and specific to each bullet point, is essentially the principle that animates most good conversation. I certainly don't see conversation as a path to my own experience--why would I need to talk to somebody else about that, and why would they be interested? So I am willing to accept that all the turns of talk in a conversation are going to be linked in different ways, as many different ways as there are talkers. But I need the links (even when I divide up my posts according to who I am addressing I find myself mashing them together)! But let me try to do it your way! _______ I agree with Vygotsky--science describes in order to explain; it explains and does not just describe. That's why it can contest religious explanations (which for the most part explain but do not describe). But I also agree with Piaget; that the content of causality develops as children develop (and as civilizations develop). As you say "Because I say so" is not a very developed form of causality, and yet it seems to me agnate to "because it is delicious". In the same way, "light bounces off the mirror because mirrors reflect light" doesn't seem to me to be as explanatory as a wave or particle theory of light. I don't mean to be functionalist about this. The other day I was listening to a Santa Fe institute lecture on "common sense" and somebody asked Duncan Watts for the difference between explaining and predicting. Watts said there wasn't any: explanations predict and predictions explain, and it's just a matter of whether you are looking back or forth, because in both cases you are trying to generalize. Well, first of all, the paucity of common sense comes precisely from the fact that in a world where there are an infinite number of determinants but only one possible outcome, it tends to work a lot better looking back than looking forth. And secondly--I very often want an explanation but don't want to generalize, e.g. when I read a novel or when I live a life. So I think the search for causality, which is such an important factor in a science lesson, is not simply a functionalist quest for an answer that works. On the one hand, a good causal explanation explains structure in terms of function, and on the other it explains function in terms of history. ___ The other thing about the Santa Fe folks is that they have a really simplistic definition of what they are studying. Complexity, according to them, is when you have a minimally simple definition and you find that it has a lot of words in it. But first of all, that depends entirely on what language you are using. And secondly, how does such a definition of complexity deal with polylingualism? As I said, I don't believe in the myth of Babel; the number of languages has steadily decreased throughout history, ergo, early man probably spoke tens or even hundreds of thousands of different languages instead of the handful of languages spoken today, and I think that most bands of early men were polylingual, as people are in Papua New Guinea today. To me this suggests great complexity in the Vygotskyan sense--in the sense of being multi-partitioned and having many interdependent, linked but distinct, moving-and-developing parts. In contrast, it seems to me that modern life is simple. This explains the monotony of our cuisine, the stupidity of our media, and the totalitarian sameness of the world market. I note, by the way, that while pre-modern peoples are materially impoverished with respect to modern ones, their languages tend to be grammatically much richer. I don't see anything unmediated about gathering fruit. I keep a very large fruit bowl of already washed fruit right here on my desk, and for me eating fruit is a lot simpler than it would be if I was a hunter-gatherer. It's simply a matter of how we frame the activity. ___ One aspect of my respect for the past is that I tend to use words in a rather archaic way. The term "nice distinction" means a fine or delicate distinction--I meant that Andy makes a key distinction between, for example, an action and an activity (something Vygotsky never did). This is why I am always surprised that he is ready to mash together tools and signs as "artifacts", since this is a purely genetic category and has nothing to do with either function or structure. It is true that all explanations are in the final analysis genetic and not functional or structural. But that is only the final analysis: in the end the thing that a genetic analysis has to explain is precisely function and the thing that function has to explain is precisely structure. (Looking back, I see that the little lines I have inserted to try to turn this into a PPT didn't do much good! I'm afraid that my masher-togetherer-tude is quite incurable.) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 22 November 2014 at 10:40, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David, > > I admit I still haven't read the texts in question, as I know I should and I will. But I wanted to respond to your "gameful" (playful) post. I think play is very helpful method in stripping away the labels and providing a pathway to one's own experience. > > I wonder however if it is the case that just as kids will generalize from the springboard of "because" we do the same activity. Why? "Because I say so." > > With regard to Martin's discussion of internal and external, Martin et al, I wonder if extrinsic and intrinsic are better words for what we are referencing here. If only because these situate differently. By employing internal/external, there is a sense to me of exclusivity. The element is either internal or external. Extrinsic and intrinsic say to me that a single fundamental (if I may use my own made up word...a test drive) could be both internal and external. > > I absolutely sanction a meta-metaphor-phor! Talk about extrinsic and intrinsic at once! Gee whiz!! > > However, one of the aspects in this phenomenon of meaning-making I see missing in David's example in the notion of [deliciousness causing kids to like kimchi], is that kids have bodies with tastebuds that do cause kids to like kimchi, since notions of deliciousness coincide with liking, it is the tasting as an embodied experience that unites the circle. Thusly, just like 7+4 = 10, we start from where we stand. > > It is my emerging thinking that perhaps "true" or "authentic" education is the co-existence of subjective _with_ objective explanations, not a singling out of one or the other. > > ---- > > When I consider primitive cultures as discussed in Vygotsky's texts, I wonder if calling them simple cultures is better because there there are more ecological manifestations of being and acting in the world, in contrast to complex cultures. > > In a simple culture, the eating of fruit is a direct act with no mediation between me and the tree, but in modern (complex) culture it can be far more confusing, because not only do I have to go to a store, I have to decide from a range of fruit, which I must purchase with something called money, sometimes called plastic (in honor of Mike Nichols, perhaps the future isn't in plastics). And not only fruit! I have other things to choose from as well, like jam, jellies, cookies, sherberts, and many other things we have made from fruit and then packaged. There are even marzipan cookies, which are shaped like fruit, but are not fruit! > > Given how Vygotsky was such an empathetic person, I really can't imagine him placing primitive cultures in a pejorative light, so I am inclined to agree with you David that he was being appreciative of their problem solving skills. Well, you said creativity and originality, which to me is problem solving, though perhaps that is a limited phrase. > > It is unfortunate that primitive came to have a pejorative meaning, but I think that comes from colonial sensibilities than anything else; it makes sense that his work would be easily misinterpreted. This says more about moderns than it says about primitives. I would venture that the handling of this word "primitive" is an important word to deconstruct for newcomers to Vygotsky, particularly those who might have sensibilities in alignment with primitive cultures, either because one is a member of such a group, or one desires to abolish elitist thinking from one's mind, or both! > > I would add that regarding your chosen quote from p.33 that methods removed from the lab and used in the world? is this not exactly what Hutchins argues in understanding distributed cognition? Laboratory science does remove the world, and the problem of understanding the environment, traveling the path to method construction, so I wonder if there is something there about that too. > > ---- > > Now about distinctions being nice? They are great when they are nice! > > What can bother about distinctions is when they don't coincide with personal experience, and in that case they tend not to be very nice. What I like about mashing-up as you call it, is that it is essentially creating a subjectivity for which we invite our fellow discussants to put on the mashup, like a costume, to allow the other a pathway to meaning as we mean it. In artmaking, we call this "construction of a viewer." It is a powerful method and why photography is such a powerful medium. > > This is why I believe that embodied metaphors (rather than cultural metaphors) are so useful when trying to communicate with others who do not share our culture or our language, because as far as I know, and I could be proved wrong I suppose, every human has a body. > > Consider for example the use of a mouse as a pointer compared to the use of a finger, your own finger of course! What mice have to do with computers is cultural. A finger is a finger is a finger when you have a body (with fingers). > > Perhaps this function of recreating experience for "the other" is not only the purpose of metaphors, but the purpose of stories, with children, but also among ourselves. > > I do want to gently defend my interpretation of the Wizard of Oz because there is no intellectualism in the symbolism which I proposed. My Toto, as intuition, is free of rational thought, and so are all the other characters. I might suggest that rational thought can be quite unethical if it dislocates experience (embodied, personal, etc) and this I believe is the complaint against the Cartesian model of mind. Can we call the Wizard a model for rational thought? Possibly. > > If one sees rational thought as an expression of an ego gone astray and requiring a throne in the Emerald City, which is also the color of money, then maybe that's OK to think of the Wizard as the unit for analysis of rational thought in the environment of Oz. (I can't believe I just wrote that, but there it is) > > I prefer a Wizard, who we find supplanting one thing for another and calling it wizardry, to be a mechanical thinker not a rational one. Mechanical thinking has no awareness of self, much less other. It isn't magical exactly, but completes through superimposition, more specifically projection (as the great head of Oz), as egos are prone to do. > > I'm apprehensive how to discuss your representation of the Vedas, because it depends upon what you mean by Vedas, which is why I use the term Vedic, as a general reference rather than specific, since this depends upon how one might interpret Vedas (and even what part of them you interpret). There are many Vedic schools of thought, for example. Not just one. We can look at them as old and tied to a period, or as relevant to something that is perennial within all of us. I am of the latter group, and I don't think it is a matter of my projecting modern anything upon them because they stand on their own, with or without me looking at them with my cultural baggage. I can say this because that is my experience. I don't expect you to accept that. > > I don't think it makes sense to unite Vedic traditions with shamanic traditions, but I suppose I can see why that grouping would occur, but this grouping comes from outside not from inside the tradition, so that's a bit like calling primitives with an intended meaning of being "underdeveloped" people. I don't think it reveals the value inherent in these traditions, it actually obfuscates. > > We should be careful when trying to call anything primitive without understanding what it is. Saying the Vedas are of the forest-meaning in relation to what is civilized and modern shows me that Halliday doesn't understand. But I grant I may not understand what he is attempting to achieve with such categories, and I'm happy to give him the benefit of the doubt. Ignorance does not imply stupidity. Still it is a bit reductionist to say such a thing without having spent time understanding what such traditions have to say in the environments in which they were said, which I suppose could have been a forest, but they could be saying what they say in any environment and are not tied to forests. But this can't be known by telling, but by experiencing for oneself, in the same way I cannot describe with words what is sweet. I can only experience sweetness and then share it with you and say, "This is sweet." > > With regard to pyramids, I think what is lacking in our consideration of them is that we suffer to misunderstand the meaning of these structures because they have been reduced of meaning. I say this because we have no one alive as descendents from their time of use, to explain to us what they actually meant to the people who built them. Everything we do as moderns is interpretive with our modern baggage projected upon them, largely because we have no choice when contexts are ripped apart. It is like attempting to imagine what a dinosaur was like by its bones, or worse from a fossilized egg. > > However, one essential ingredient for meaning in the quest for understanding antiquities is to attempt to place oneself into the viewpoint of the people who used these structures, as subjects of experience. Just as we have bodies, the ancients also had bodies. They looked to the heavens, as we do today. > > Embodied experience is perhaps the only thing which positively assists in our reconstruction of meaning of ancients ?disconnected from us? despite there being no tradition handed down from teacher to student (orally or written) (or generation to generation) to the present day. As such, no one can fully explain to us contemporary meanings of the ruins of Ancient Greeks, Ancient Romans, Ancient Mayans, Ancient Aztecs, Ancient Incans, Ancient Druids, Ancient Egyptians and any other ancient culture who built stone structures and wrote texts (this is not to say that buildings are requirements of ancient cultures, but it's all we've got to go on in terms of traces left behind). I mean "fully explain" loosely of course, because we do have a better idea, for example, of the Greeks and the Romans than we do of the others, and this is largely because not only do some buildings still stand, we possess the texts and the language in which they were written as well. The Vedic tradition is singular, in that it is the only ancient culture that does have an unbroken line, in which the buildings are still used, the texts are intact, the language is actively kept alive and these together (language and texts) are passed on to anyone who wants to know what they have to say. Because of this, it's not necessary to use the buildings, of course. > > The modern act of projection of our own culture upon others is a position I do not believe Vygotsky would not have adopted had he known about Vedic culture, but this is certainly entertaining speculation on my part. I believe he would feel this way for the same way you say he appreciates the creativity and originality of children and primitives. I suggest he recognized subjective experience, not only objective experience, and this subjective experience is something alive in the person, as a relevant expression of freedom, not a mechanized, prefabricated construct forced upon them from the outside, even if it generates from the outside, from the environment. > > This is why I'm not sure I can fully follow without some discomfort what you describe by Halliday as forest-people thinking. It doesn't make sense to me. We have never given up common sense forms of thinking, nor metaphorical forms of thinking, nor storytelling. These are as much a part of modern life as the Ancients. I'm not sure I can follow what you mean by grammar metaphors of factory thinking. It seems that the environments themselves are being used as categories that suggest a full and irreversible transformation of the manner in which humans think, and I don't see that to be the case. > > I do see how this metaphor removes humans from natural settings as an historical development, and I can agree with that. I suppose what I witness in the modern world is how "factory thinking" eliminates a notion of a free self, situated in the world. Beingness in a factory ? beingness in the natural world. "Factory thinking" does stunt experience in the same way a captive lion will likely not survive as well on the African Savannah as the wild lion can. > > I don't think this disconnect is irreversible, because we do have experience, for example, that elephant babies taken from their families, say because of poaching, can be raised by humans if humans can mimic the learning that would happen in the wild by older elephants, and in society with other baby elephants. They can return to the wild. I'm not so confident of rogue teenager male bull elephants who have no elder males to show them (through experience) not to be bullies. > > All this says to me that with thoughtful interventions we can plan our escape to return to subjective experience if we can understand how to mimic its simple form, regardless of what setting we are in, though it would be better just to remove unnatural settings from our experience (in terms of those deemed toxic) and create or foster settings that are the best of breed of the natural and modern worlds. We reach for these experiences when we carve out parks in cities, or when we want to live by the sea or mountains. This doesn't mean modern experience, nor modern thought stands apart from, but alongside in unity with natural environments. > > I don't know anyone who doesn't sense something powerful about nature that also assists deeply in our being in ourselves. That is why I cannot give up on my quest to understand the "problem" of the environment, especially with regard to technology design. I find hope in this approach. > > Thanks for allowing me an attempt to express something I've been thinking about for a while. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 4:03 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Martin: > > We have a little game that we play with the sixth graders. It's part > of a science lesson on light. You put a five-by-five grid of squares > on the whiteboard and you mark the x axis with refracting and > reflecting agents (e.g. "mirror", "water", "lens", "window", etc--we > elicit them from the kids according to Vico's principle of "verum > factum", you only really know what you make). Then you mark the y axis > of the grid with light sources (e.g. "sunbeam", "moonbeam", > "flashlight beam", "candle", etc. The kids tend to like "lasers" but > we don't allow any science fiction stuff). > > The object of the game for a team to get three squares in a row. You > get a square by stating an instance, like "a sunbeam bounces off a > mirror". But you can only hold the square if you can survive the > challenge "Why?" by the other team. Now, the most common way of > surviving the challenge is by generalizing: "because mirrors reflect > sunbeams". This way of defending your space we allow, but we don't > allow "because sunbeams bounce off mirrors". > > My dad hits the roof when I tell him this. He points out, quite > correctly, that both defenses are perfectly tautological, and neither > one should be allowed, and of course from the point of view of an > 87-year-old physicist, he's right. But as Piaget points out, the word > "because" means at least eleven different things (the kids are always > saying things like "I like fresh kimchi because it's delicious"). > Vygotsky writes that this is an advantage of Piaget's work over his > own; I am not so sure, because I think there is a kind of cline > between the function of raising a phenomenon to the general, which is > the function we see here, and the function of giving an explanation in > terms of lower units, which is what the kids would have to do if we > required them to explain reflection in terms of a particle or wave > model of light. > > In the examples you give, money and water, and above all in speech, I > agree that the key concept is not causality--at least not causality in > this sense, in the sense of what causes reflection and refraction. But > I also don't think that the word "constitution" is well chosen, > because of course the same problem of polysemy arises as with > causality. On the one hand, we say that the USA was (externally) > constituted when the constitution was written. And on the other hand > we say that the constituents of water are not voters, but the elements > of hydrogen and oxygen. I'm rather surprised that you tolerate the > distinction between external constitution and internal constitution, > both because it obscures the difference between a relation between > people and a relation between physical objects and because "external > constitution" suggests the outside of a container just as surely as > "internal constitution" suggests the inside. They are equally > container/vehicle metaphors for meaning (which is itself a > metaphorical relation, so I suppose I should call them > meta-metaphor-phors). > > The term Halliday uses (for speech, and for goods and services) is > "realization". What he means by that is simply that when we turn > meaning into wording (even were this wording is merely inner speech) > it moves a step away from the ideal form of the material (that is, > meaning potential, meaning that is thought) to the real form of the > material (when, as Shakespeare says, our eyes are offices of truth and > our words are natural breath). This isn't a form of "causality": > meanings don't cause wordings any more than deliciousness causes > children to like kimchi. But it's not really a form of constituency > either. > > Mike: > > Gita Lvovna Vygodskaya once wrote that amongst Vygotsky's papers she > found letters between him and V.K. Arseniev, the man to whom Vygotsky > actually refers to in Chapter Two of HDHMF. Arseniev was the author of > "Dersu the Trapper", out of which Kurosawa's wonderful movie "Dersu > Uzala" was made. On the one hand, he treasures their contributions > towards communism, which he feels are as much moral as modernity's > contributions are material (Arseniev was a Commissar for National > Minorities in the Far Eastern Soviet Republic). On the other hand he > mourns their destruction by the misfits from the West. When the Far > Eastern Republic was absorbed into the Russian Federation, Arseniev > refused to return to the city of his birth, and died in Vladivostok. > His whole family was immediately arrested and either shot or exiled. > > I think that Arseniev's book (which I have a copy of) expresses almost > perfectly Vygotsky's own attitude towards non-modern peoples of the > USSR (which are, as he points out, not at all the same as "primitive > man", a category which Vygotrsky says no longer exists anywhere on > earth). In other words, I think he has a deep respect for the > originality and creativity of their ways of thinking, just as he has > deep respect for the creativity and originality of the ways that > children think. So I guess I can't see anything derogatory at all in > the analogy (which is not, as Vygotsky stresses, a parallel, but only > an analogy made for the purpose of genetic analysis). > > By the way, what do you make of p. 33 of Chapter Two? > > "Experimentation was introduced into ethnic psychology and general and > experimental psychology and ethnic psychology ? each from its own > aspect ? were brought by the course of development itself to a certain > rapprochement; true, it was insignificant and external, but > nevertheless it broke the main methodological boundary between them. > However, neither of the two disciplines or branches of psychology has > recognized the principal significance of this rapprochement, the whole > enormity of the methodological reconstruction that it entails for both > sciences. This can be easily seen from the fact that the same > experimental methods that were developed in the psychological > laboratory for use with an adult cultured person were used with a > person growing up in culturally backward conditions." > > Don't you think this is an explicit criticism of Luria's Uzbekistan > adventure? Of course, we know that Vygotsky was interested and > enthusiastic when it took place. But we also know that he didn't take > part, and it would be just like him to have some strong misgivings > about the procedure afterwards! > > Annaluisa: > > As you noticed, Andy is good at what used to be called nice > distinctions, and I am, like you, something of a masher-together-er. > But I have learned a certain healthy respect for nice distinctions > too; for one thing, it's only when you make the nice distinctions that > you can let the boundaries between areas of knowledge go with a crash. > For another, I really do believe that when we unite different areas of > disciplinary knowledge (e.g. cultural psychology and The Wizard of Oz) > we have to do it thematically and not on the basis of coincidences or > Freudian insights (so for example the point I was making had to do > with the nature of intellectualism--Dorothy, or rather, Toto, "sees > through" adult thinking!) > > Koreans, like the far eastern peoples that Arseniev studied, are > traditionally shamanists, and the indigenous religion is vaguely > related to the kind of shamanism that Dersu Uzala believed in (and in > fact Koreans play an important role in Arseniev's book). I'm not one > of those people who believe in pan-diffusionism, e.g. the pyramids of > the New World are somehow directly inspired by those of Egypt. It > seems to me much more plausible that both sets of pyramids were > inspired by nature (i.e. they are artificial mountains). So I think > that a lot of the parallels that we moderns see between shamanistic > religions and Hindu scriptures are simply based on our own modern > biases, and not on any real agnation or affinity. > > Halliday separates what he calls "semiohistory" into three distinct > periods: the Forest (that would be the Vedas, and also shamanistic > traditions), the Farm (proverbs, fables, folktales) and the Factory > (modern novels and newspapers), and he does point out that their are > distinct forms of knowledge and even of grammar associated with each > (the Forest emphasizes commonsense forms of knowing, the Farm > emphasizes disciplinary and written knowledge with a strong proverbial > and lexically metaphorical component, while the Factory requires what > he calls "grammatical metaphor", that is, the ability to turn a > process into an "entity). I think that the "unity" of the "Forest" is > really an illusion; the closeness of the semiotic understandings that > forest peoples have to the environment means that there will be far > more variation than meets the modern eye (and also far more variation > than we find in Factory modes of meaning). So for example, I don't > believe that there was ever a single common language; I imagine that > early man spoke literally hundreds of thousands of completely > unrelated tongues, and this is certainly what longitudinal > observations on the number of languages extant would suggest. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Nov 22 15:57:03 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 23:57:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Because I say so] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416700622525.81138@unm.edu> Hi David! Please know I do regret the form of my past post and I was a bit in anguish about it after it left my email client. I'm sorry for not being tidier in my delivery! Let it suffice to say that I was using your email not only as a point of departure for content but also structure. Unfortunately the reification of email posts on listservs do not always coincide with thinking and typing, which tends to focus on words, grammar, and punctuation, rather than in headings and, in my case, chapters! The way I had divided the email did not maintain in the display on the list, so I can't know how formatting will end up interfering in how you might view it. Much of what you say about simple and complex thinking and how we make our assignments of what they are resonates for me. I admit that perhaps associations that come with these two words (simple & complex) are not so easy to untangle, as you have so aptly pointed out with complexity theory at Santa Fe Institute and your bowl of fruit. Still, I don't think your bowl of fruit generates as a bowl of fruit, that, as a bowl of fruit, it generates far removed from where the fruit generates. I was referring to environment in terms of nature and how we might enjoy and experience nature in unmediated form. I do not mean we have to rid the world of supermarkets, or that you should be forced to forfeit your bowl of fruit by planting fruit trees in your back yard, if you were to even have a backyard. I am pointing to what it is like to want fruit and to pick it off the tree and then eat it. Conversation can be a way to one's own experience. Especially pertaining to what I might be taking for granted in my thinking, which is not always easy to know in solitude while cogitating alone. But if I am connecting to my experience too strongly to make it seem I am speaking for all experiences, that isn't my intention, but rather it is to say "this is what it is like for me" knowing very well it may not be like that for others. But then again, maybe it is "what it is like" for others? And how to know that unless I say this is what it is like for me? To say "this is what it is like" isn't to say "this is what it is." What I find frequently in discourse is a kind of ventriloquism whereby people throw the voice through a sundry or convenient vehicle of authority with the resulting "This is what it is," rather than just, "This is what it's like to me, is it that way for you?" What is happening in our conversation, for which I am truly grateful, is that it is lending support (structure, not necessarily agreement) to my understanding and how to convey a particular idea that I believe is very important. The concept is nascent, is not polished, it barely has a form for me. I am positing this emerging thought into the development tray, and that's how I experience this lovely conversation, a kind of developing chemistry that is enabling the image to emerge from its latency. This the power of language is it not, in our developing minds? There is a strong sense of semi-recognition in this thought and that's why Toto is truly my ally right now, but I hope not my only ally. Of course you may not want to participate. I hope I'm not cornering you. I wouldn't mind others joining in to say what it is like for them too. What I'm attempting to do here is to share how I'm thinking about it, as it is developing, in real time. I hope that that isn't insufferable, and that even if anyone disagrees with me, I know I am among friends, or perhaps just interested lurking parties, and oh yeah, kibitizing asteroids! I said all that just now, because you have not understood what I mean when I say "Because I say so." This is my impression. Perhaps I have not said it very well. What I mean is not that the affirmation is not a form of causality. (I'm not liking the word "form" but I'm only using that word because you did), I am saying the affirmation IS a form of causality. Actually, as I'm considering it the affirmation IS causality. Kimchi is delicious because I say it is. How can you refute that? Are you going to study my tastebuds and compare them to Korean tastebuds and find out the differences in them to learn how it is I can say that because I am culturally different from my Korean counterpart? There is something in human experience for which kimchi can *only* be delicious, unless it is bad kimchi I suppose (I am trying to make this fun and light-hearted, even enjoyable in the way kimchi is delicious). It is this way ("like this") because it is embodied experience, but also because I say it is. In the sense of science and "description in order to explain," one might say that there is a kind of circle between the specific and the general. Lately these circles have been popping up all over the place for me to the point I can't remove them from my vision, well I mean my mind's eye, anyway. Subjective experience is a part of that circle. Embodied experience (as a self being a self) should have a chair at the table of "description in order to explain," but it is frequently an uninvited guest. We forget to take ourselves into account, and while this may be appropriate in the physical sciences (though maybe not... post Einstein and all), it is hard for me to accept why it should be the case in the social sciences. I'm not an expert on methodology, however isn't it the case in critical theory and ethnographic methods that subjective experience is an important part of the description in order "to explain"? Even if that subjectivity is as an observer? Shouldn't it be that researchers and the people whom they study, that they are all counted as subjects having experiences of participating in the experiment? Isn't removal of that subjectivity going to distort the data of experiment? Aren't we just counting fossilized dinosaur eggs? One of the lovely things about science that seems to be overlooked, is that we have records of the scientists who discovered not only the data, but "what it was like" for them to discover what they discovered. What was it like to be Galileo to be under house arrest? What was it like for Spinoza to be labeled an atheist? What was it like for Einstein to travel on the lightbeam and look back? We look so enthusiastically and exclusively to the products of research that we forget to think about who was looking at the data and what it was like for the one looking when the data is unearthed? Recently I had an intriguing experience with a well-established and respected researcher in attempting to explain this nascent concept (for which I have your welcomed company right now while I wrestle with all this), and he seemed to respond by saying something like "Subjects never know what they're talking about. Self-reporting doesn't work." That is not exactly what he said, but that is how I remember it, because that seems to be what he meant (to me). That seems like a true statement and a false statement at the same time. Which might be another thread, methinks. In the case of children, I think what I'm trying to say is because of their stages of development, they must start with themselves and to learn they must orient what they learn to how it is for them. "Is" is the main word there. It is their subjectivity, which apparently in philosophical circles is being called "agency." I'm OK with that word, but it still has an inadvertent result of removal of the sense of self, as in myself. When I am speaking I don't call myself an agent for myself, I just say "Me," "Myself," or "I". That immediacy is completely removed and that immediacy is what I am seeking to disclose in this conversation with you. Am I wrong to say that children don't learn fully if they can't connect to their subjective experience? Otherwise any other kind of learning is the mere learning of rules, and when they learn them, they are rewarded like rats. This kind of rule-learning doesn't have anything to do with being in the world, unless the world is just a very large rat maze, and perhaps that is what it is like for many people in world. I realize I might still not be saying this correctly or clearly, because I'm still trying to grab this tiger by the tail, so I hope you will be patient with me in this exploration. Tell me, does that help? Actually, at any stage of development we must start with ourselves and what it is like for us. I would reply to the rest of your post, but I am embarrassing myself by the length of this one. So I will start a different thread at some point in the near future. Kind regards, Annalisa From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sat Nov 22 16:55:05 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 21:55:05 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Help with an article Message-ID: Dear colleagues, Sorry for asking the list, but I don't have access to this journal paper at my local library: Imagination, Cognition and Personality Issue: Volume 5, Number 3 / 1985-86 Pages: 239 - 247 URL: Linking Options DOI: 10.2190/299T-HP2G-8KQP-FP2X Daydreaming, Self Concept and Academic Performance S. R. Gold A1, J. C. Andrews A1, S. W. Minor A1 Any chance any of you could help me to get it? David From ablunden@mira.net Sat Nov 22 17:52:53 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 12:52:53 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> When I learnt "Marxist Psychology" in the 1970s, many years before a friend kindly gave me a photocopy of "Thought and Language" (as it was called) in about 1997, it went something like this: human beings objectify their powers, e.g., the hand is objectified in the stone axe, etc., and then these human powers are perceived as objectively existing things, reflected in the mind as concepts, etc., etc., and on this basis one builds a kind of anthropology of labour. When I read Thinking and Speech, obviously my mind was thrown into turmoil. Here was a *far* more productive approach to understanding psychology. So I gather that when Vygotsky is making a big deal of the distinction between word and action and between sign and tool (and other mediating elements) he is doing so under conditions where the dominant view was that signs are a subordinate *type* of tool, a derivative of tool. As you have no doubt observed with your keen eye, David, I have lately become much more sensitive to relation between tool and sign and the inherent dangers which flow from using a category like "artefact" in which the two are lumped together. But as you know, in this connection Vygotsky also said: "With full justification, Hegel used the concept of mediation in its most general meaning, seeing in it the most characteristic property of the mind." You also know that I come to Vygotsky from Hegel and Marx and that my specific interest is in an interdisciplinary theory of activity, not psychology or linguistics. So for my specific interest, so long as I understand the relation of word-use to action in the nuanced sense in which Vygotsky it in that section "Word and Action", that is, the complex genetic relation between the development of means of acting on matter and means of acting on mind, as opposed to the simple and erroneous typology which may be implied in the category of "artefact" or in the anthropology of labour, I can work across a wide, interdisciplinary field using Vygotsky's ideas. The interconnection of politics and social class (for example) necessarily entails all kinds of artefact mediation. Now David, you doubtless have a view on why it was wrong to entitle Vygotsky's book "Thought and Language." As I see it words (i.e., uttering stuff when you speak) as what people *do*, that is, are actions, and Thinking and Speech needs to be read in that sense, as opposed to considerations of the contents of a dictionary. (Like everything else, I am making a distinction not a dichotomy here). And also, it is important as I see it to understand that words (those little packets of sound) are material objects and in that specific sense a part of the whole material culture of a people. All I am saying is that while the distinction between word and action, and between sign and tool, is every bit as important as the distinction between action and activity or any other such distinction, the relation between them is also fruitful. But the unit of analysis Vygotsky uses in "Thinking and Speech" is not artefact mediation, it is word-meaning. That has never been at issue. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > ... I am always surprised that he is ready to mash > together tools and signs as "artifacts", since this is a purely > genetic category and has nothing to do with either function or > structure. It is true that all explanations are in the final analysis > genetic and not functional or structural. But that is only the final > analysis: in the end the thing that a genetic analysis has to explain > is precisely function and the thing that function has to explain is > precisely structure. > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 23 10:21:38 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 10:21:38 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Primitive or Ideal? In-Reply-To: References: <54703C16.4070800@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for the links to Haviland's work, Greg. Its as if he is showing up close the "rudimentary forms" that begin to be elaborated in the process of the formation of language, not in terms of years but of weeks and months. mike On Sat, Nov 22, 2014 at 6:06 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > You might also want to check out John Haviland's work. He has been watching > a language emerge among a small group of 5 or 6 signers in Chiapas Mexico. > Here is his publications page: > http://pages.ucsd.edu/~jhaviland/JBHPublications.html > > The best papers on Z sign are the "Different Strokes" paper and the > "emerging grammar of nouns in a first generation sign language: > specificity, iconicity and syntax". > > I hosted John for a talk here last week and he has some data documenting > the emergence of Z sign in the community. And I think his data can speak to > your question of "ends" in "beginnings". > > I'll write more if I can find some time sometime soon. Meantime, below is > the the abstract for the talk he gave while here. Fantastically interesting > stuff. > > -greg > > > *Jointly inventing language: why, how, and what? *John Haviland, UCSD > Anthropology > > I will introduce a first generation "family" sign language from a Tzotzil > (Mayan) speaking village in highland Chiapas, Mexico. The family includes > three deaf siblings who have never met other deaf people, never been > exposed to another sign language, hardly been to school, and had almost no > contact with speakers of any spoken language other than Tzotzil. The deaf > individuals, who range from their early twenties to their mid thirties, > along with a fourth intermediate hearing sibling and a slightly younger > hearing niece, have grown up using and contributing to a shared manual > communicative system. Additionally, the oldest deaf woman?s now > seven-year-old son has simultaneously acquired his mother and uncles' > homesign and spoken Tzotzil. Intensive fieldwork on this tiny emerging > language community began in 2008, although I have known all the > signers?part of the extended household of a *compadre?*since they were > born. > > This presentation concentrates on the collaborative co-construction of the > emerging sign language, dubbed ?Z,? and on two central questions about > linguistic signs: where do they come from, and why do they emerge? Previous > research on manual gesture in Zinacantec Tzotzil allows direct attention to > possible semiotic sources therein for the homesign. Using both natural > observation and semi-experimental results, I posit various paths leading > from visible communicative action, sometimes through ?iconic? co-speech > gesture, to grammaticalized "portable" signs which can be emancipated from > the immediate context of speaking, and which instantiate emergent > linguistic structure. The second generation signer?s socialization into > language demonstrates related processes of meta-iconic regimentation, > formal simplification, and syntactic regularization. Finally, Z > illustrates how sociolinguistic and ideological divisions can emerge even > in a miniature speech community. > > > > > On Sat, Nov 22, 2014 at 12:32 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > In the light of recent discussion about the role of the ideal in the > > development of language, and the notion of "primitive man," this old > > primitive thought it might be a good idea to read up on the case of > > Nicaraguan Sign Language. So, I've bought this book off Amazon. Does > anyone > > know of criticisms of this author? > > Andy > > ------------------ > > > > > > The Emergence of Deaf Community in Nicaragua: "With Sign Language You > > Can Learn So Much" by Laura Pollich > > > Laura+Polich&cm_sp=det-_-bdp-_-author> > > > > The sudden discovery of Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) enthralled > scholars > > worldwide who hoped to witness the evolution of a new language. But > > controversy erupted regarding the validity of NSL as a genuinely > > spontaneous language created by young children. Laura Polich's > fascinating > > book recounts her nine-year study of the Deaf community in Nicaragua and > > her findings about its formation and that of NSL in its wake. Polich > > crafted "The Emergence of the Deaf Community in Nicaragua" from her > copious > > research in Nicaragua's National Archives, field observations of deaf > > pupils in 20 special education schools, polls of the teachers for deaf > > children about their education and knowledge of deafness, a survey of 225 > > deaf individuals about their backgrounds and living conditions, and > > interviews with the oldest members of the National Nicaraguan Association > > of the Deaf. Polich found that the use of a "standardized" sign language > in > > Nicaragua did not emerge until there was a community of users meeting on > a > > regular basis, especially beyond childhood. The adoption of NSL did not > > happen suddenly, but took many years and was fed by multiple influences. > > She also discovered the process that deaf adolescents used to attain > their > > social agency, which gained them recognition by the larger Nicaraguan > > hearing society. Her book illustrates tremendous changes during the past > 60 > > years, and the truth in one deaf Nicaraguan's declaration, "With sign > > language you can learn so much." > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 23 12:02:17 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 12:02:17 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenological Structuralism In-Reply-To: <9vp133mjpo5e5ermq0bbfdjb.1415140406701@email.android.com> References: <9vp133mjpo5e5ermq0bbfdjb.1415140406701@email.android.com> Message-ID: Paul-- Might it be possible for you to post a draft of this paper or something that xmca-ites might access for less than 25$ a pop? A lot of libraries, including UCSD, have cut back drastically on journal subscriptions and the article is not available to here. I suspect the same is true elsewhere. mike On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I am developing a theory of social action, phenomenological structuralism, > grounded in structuration theory. To do so, I am attempting to synthesize > elements of haitian vodou, quantum mechanics, heidegger's analytic of > dasein, althusser's structural marxism, and Wittgenstein ' s concept of > language game...this article is my initial attempt to apply my theory to > understanding the constitution of black consciousnesses in the US and UK. > I would really like some feedback on this from a psychocultural perspective: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/jrcadkNqTktsEF2EztBp/full > > > Regards, > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Nov 23 12:56:24 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 15:56:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenological Structuralism Message-ID: Will do... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:11/23/2014 3:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenological Structuralism
Paul-- Might it be possible for you to post a draft of this paper or something that xmca-ites might access for less than 25$ a pop? A lot of libraries, including UCSD, have cut back drastically on journal subscriptions and the article is not available to here. I suspect the same is true elsewhere. mike On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I am developing a theory of social action, phenomenological structuralism, > grounded in structuration theory. To do so, I am attempting to synthesize > elements of haitian vodou, quantum mechanics, heidegger's analytic of > dasein, althusser's structural marxism, and Wittgenstein ' s concept of > language game...this article is my initial attempt to apply my theory to > understanding the constitution of black consciousnesses in the US and UK. > I would really like some feedback on this from a psychocultural perspective: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/jrcadkNqTktsEF2EztBp/full > > > Regards, > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Nov 23 14:07:33 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 07:07:33 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: <546FD556.4000708@mira.net> References: <546FD556.4000708@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy: Obviously, Vygotsky would not accept formulations like "Psychological Tools" (Kozulin) or "Tools of the Mind" (Bodrova and Leong) as anything other than misleading slogans. But I thiink the main point he's making here has to do with function, not genesis. Yes, a tool is a kind of organ substitute, and a sign is, or can be, an action-substitute, and both of them allow humans to transcend what Vygotsky calls the "Jennings Principle" (that is, the principle that any organism is restricted in its activity to functions of its organs). But tools are functional oriented to objects, and signs are functionally oriented to other subjects. This functional difference makes possible a key genetic difference--one can be oriented to the self, and in so doing can transform the very structure of the self. If it were that easy to perform surgery on yourself, tattoo artists and plastic surgeons would be out of a job, and maybe we'd all have wings. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 22 November 2014 at 09:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, when he is putting down "Instrumental Psychology" is he referring to > the amalgamation of sign and tool as simply two types of mediating elements, > rather than tracing the interrelation between sign-mediated activity and > tool-mediated activity, and their distinct origins and genesis? Is that what > he means, do you think? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Mike: >> >> Take a look at p. 25-27 of JREEP 45 (2), the letters to students and >> colleagues. It's a very interesting letter to Leontiev which LSV wrote >> from a dacha (perhaps the Izmailovo Zoo, where he sometimes stayed >> when convalescing). He says he's working on "a history of cultural >> development" (p. 27) there. But he begins by suggesting the >> "IP"--apparently instrumental psychology--has wound up "in the >> category of unprofitable pursuits", which is consistent with his >> desire to establish the difference between signs and tools >> structurally, genetically, and above all functionally. Then he calls >> Luria's chapter of "Ape, Primitive, Child": >> >> "written *wholly* according to the Freudianists (and not even >> according to Freud but according to V.F. Schmidt (her materials, M. >> Klein and other second magnitude stars; then the impenetrable Piaget >> is turned into an absolute beyond all measure, instrument and sign are >> mixed together even more...." (p. 26). >> >> He's apparently referring to the Third Chapter in the published >> version, though here he calls it the first chapter of the second part. >> Then he says the debacle is not ARL's personal fault but the result of >> the muddled thinking of the instrumental period in general. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 22 November 2014 08:21, mike cole wrote: >> >>> >>> Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with >>> respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. >>> The >>> problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. >>> >>> I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 >>> of >>> Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following >>> all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role >>> in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls >>> out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or >>> planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? >>> >>> I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the >>> Mind. >>> Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Mike: >>>> >>>> Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been >>>> written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which >>>> is 1931-1932. >>>> >>>> http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf >>>> >>>> If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left >>>> for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was >>>> written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the >>>> kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he >>>> often expresses. >>>> >>>> If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. >>>> >>>> a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the >>>> letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had >>>> absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of >>>> Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn >>>> around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory >>>> experiments in the field was okay? >>>> >>>> b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were >>>> pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book >>>> clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume >>>> Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the >>>> beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). >>>> >>>> c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see >>>> above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way >>>> aroud. >>>> >>>> It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not >>>> the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF >>>> is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because >>>> Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and >>>> unpublished work. >>>> >>>> Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his >>>> CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private >>>> manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. >>>> Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. >>>> That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where >>>> Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages >>>> of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there >>>> are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is >>>> right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings >>>> about what Luria was up to. >>>> >>>> Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no >>>> title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the >>>> first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike >>>> Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky >>>> never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a >>>> text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing >>>> his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here >>>> for. >>>> >>>> For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears >>>> to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other >>>> primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they >>>> even have children back then? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 23 15:25:00 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 23:25:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> Message-ID: <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> Andy, Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? Kind regards, Annalisa From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Nov 23 16:03:26 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 16:03:26 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi, Analisa -- It they're not material, what are they? Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Nov 23, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Andy, > > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? > > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 23 16:10:23 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 00:10:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [A matter of perspective] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416787818394.85785@unm.edu> Hi David, I am trying to work through your email in clusters of thinking. That is, my thinking and what has resonated with me from your email, and as is the case there is a lot tolling of bells that comes from reading your emails and makes the reading enjoyable, so thanks! One of the aspects that I'm trying to throw light on is just that, that there are aspects to causality. I'm not sure how this lines up with the Santa Fe Institute's notion of common sense. There may be a connection, but that rendering of common sense didn't make that much sense to me. :( Hindsight doesn't seem to be the means by which we live. Although I suppose it can help in scenarios of practice, but not as a way of explanation since there's always a chance of something happening differently than before, given unperceivable causes. I do not mean to say that _objectively_ it is the case that kids like kimchi because it is delicious, in that case it would be exactly what you say in terms of a tautology. It isn't an objective statement of causality, because you may dislike kimchi which tears the argument of causality apart. ("Agnate" is a word that I do not understand as you have used it, so if you don't mind saying it differently I might see more clearly what you mean.) That means what I'm referring to is in reference to the child from how she sees kimchi, without the ability to see how it is for others. In the child's development, can we say that the causality can only be self-referential, with regard to embodied experience, in so far as the child's body, language, and sense of self are developed? What I think happens in education (in the US anyhow) is that there is such a focus upon objectivity without connection to a child's own subjectivity, that all the child learns are rules, rewards, testing, and punishment, rather than how that objectivity is related to herself and to her own experience. I am intuiting (or maybe I'm opining, I do not know), that this is what makes the difference between good teaching and bad teaching and separates good teachers from bad teachers, but not bad students from good students, because all bad students have experiences of themselves just like good students, it's just no one told them that it matters for anything, i.e., they are not important, their perspectives are not important, they just have to do as they are told because someone else says so. This negation of self and one's experience of self seems a perfect recipe for creating our worst criminals, not happy citizens participating in society meaningfully with others. This came to high relief for me when recently I watched a documentary on solitary confinement in a Maine prison. It was the most awful thing to watch, because no one was valuing anything about the experience of the inmates, at some point punishment is no longer punishment but just unimaginable cruelty. It seems common sense to make these connections, and I know most people can do that, and yet how is it we are able to treat people so "objectively?" Kind regards, Annalisa From samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca Sun Nov 23 16:13:45 2014 From: samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Samuel_Paul_Louis_Veissi=E8re=2C_Dr?=) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 00:13:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, Message-ID: Dan Sperber dismisses the question by saying that "public representations" are sound waves and light patterns, and are as such material phenomena. That's a philosophical copout. Meaning (what we embed sound waves with) is not material, unless one goes full-on neuro-reductionist. If all human cultures are dualistic, or have found ways to talk about or try to solve the problem of dualism, it may be because, as far as humans are concerned, we have a pretty serious ontological problem. No? On Nov 23, 2014 7:06 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: Hi, Analisa -- It they're not material, what are they? Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Nov 23, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Andy, > > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? > > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 23 16:18:05 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 00:18:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416788284950.27616@unm.edu> Hi Helena, The relationship of the word to culture seems to be about form, not material. Otherwise all sounds would be words and this is not the case. There is a relationship to material in that if we take the air away, nothing can be spoken. If I don't have any pen or paper, I can't write a letter. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 23 16:33:02 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 00:33:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, , Message-ID: <1416789181814.74014@unm.edu> Hi Samuel, I'm inclined to agree that that is a copout because it doesn't explain how we interpret (meaning from outside) or how we imagine (meaning from inside). If I'm allowed to use "inside/outside" as a construct in this discussion! :) Meaning is form, in the sense that form arises in time and space with a dependency upon material, but it is also use, if something isn't used in time and space, it loses meaning. And that's why we can have ancient pyramids and not have a clue what they mean. And yes! there is inherent in our experience a necessity to struggle with ontology. I think it goes with the territory. It's turtles all the way down in the end. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 23 16:40:41 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 11:40:41 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Did Vygotsky Ever Finish Anything? In-Reply-To: References: <546FD556.4000708@mira.net> Message-ID: <54727E89.2030707@mira.net> "Psychological tool" is Vygotsky's formulation, David (unless we are victims of translators/editors): https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/instrumental.htm http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1929/defectology/ I think you are correct that the distinction between what Vygotsky calls "psychological tools" and "technical tools" is superficially a functional one (and not according to properties) and fundamentally a genetic one. The distinction between "sign-mediated actions" and "tool-mediated" actions is also superficially functional and fundamentally genetic. But this distinction includes the mutual imbrication of both in each others' genesis. Just as thinking and speaking are inextricably linked in their genesis as described in Thinking and Speech. We would not equate thinking and speaking, and a category which includes both thinking and speaking (? discourse, theorising) would have that danger inherent in it, and ideas like "thinking is speaking to oneself" have a genetic and not a categorical meaning ... I mention all these points only to say that the issue around the sign/tool and word/action distinctions are not unique. It is all about the genetic relation between categories. I think there is hardly a distinction in this body of theory which does not raise these issues. I certainly intend to go on using the terms "mediation" and "artefact" but with sensivitity to the issues contained in these words. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Andy: > > Obviously, Vygotsky would not accept formulations like "Psychological > Tools" (Kozulin) or "Tools of the Mind" (Bodrova and Leong) as > anything other than misleading slogans. But I thiink the main point > he's making here has to do with function, not genesis. Yes, a tool is > a kind of organ substitute, and a sign is, or can be, an > action-substitute, and both of them allow humans to transcend what > Vygotsky calls the "Jennings Principle" (that is, the principle that > any organism is restricted in its activity to functions of its > organs). But tools are functional oriented to objects, and signs are > functionally oriented to other subjects. This functional difference > makes possible a key genetic difference--one can be oriented to the > self, and in so doing can transform the very structure of the self. If > it were that easy to perform surgery on yourself, tattoo artists and > plastic surgeons would be out of a job, and maybe we'd all have wings. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 22 November 2014 at 09:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> David, when he is putting down "Instrumental Psychology" is he referring to >> the amalgamation of sign and tool as simply two types of mediating elements, >> rather than tracing the interrelation between sign-mediated activity and >> tool-mediated activity, and their distinct origins and genesis? Is that what >> he means, do you think? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Mike: >>> >>> Take a look at p. 25-27 of JREEP 45 (2), the letters to students and >>> colleagues. It's a very interesting letter to Leontiev which LSV wrote >>> from a dacha (perhaps the Izmailovo Zoo, where he sometimes stayed >>> when convalescing). He says he's working on "a history of cultural >>> development" (p. 27) there. But he begins by suggesting the >>> "IP"--apparently instrumental psychology--has wound up "in the >>> category of unprofitable pursuits", which is consistent with his >>> desire to establish the difference between signs and tools >>> structurally, genetically, and above all functionally. Then he calls >>> Luria's chapter of "Ape, Primitive, Child": >>> >>> "written *wholly* according to the Freudianists (and not even >>> according to Freud but according to V.F. Schmidt (her materials, M. >>> Klein and other second magnitude stars; then the impenetrable Piaget >>> is turned into an absolute beyond all measure, instrument and sign are >>> mixed together even more...." (p. 26). >>> >>> He's apparently referring to the Third Chapter in the published >>> version, though here he calls it the first chapter of the second part. >>> Then he says the debacle is not ARL's personal fault but the result of >>> the muddled thinking of the instrumental period in general. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 22 November 2014 08:21, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Hi David--- I do not think the priority makes much of a difference with >>>> respect to what we have to learn about the complexities of the issues. >>>> The >>>> problems are the same whenever the criticism arose. >>>> >>>> I can find only two references to Luria in the index of my copy of Vol 4 >>>> of >>>> Hist Psych Functions. Neither is on this topic. I have not been following >>>> all the letter writing you refer to and that plays such an important role >>>> in Anton's historical revolutionizing. Could you point to where he calls >>>> out Luria for writing incorrect ideas in their joint book and doing, or >>>> planning to do, objectionable research in Central Asia? >>>> >>>> I sort of like the idea of this "book" as a kind of Notebooks of the >>>> Mind. >>>> Seems to characterize a lot of the way LSV worked. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 2:13 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Mike: >>>>> >>>>> Anton Yasnitsky argues that Chapter Two of HDHMF must have been >>>>> written "not later than 1930", contrary to the usual chronology, which >>>>> is 1931-1932. >>>>> >>>>> http://www.psyanima.ru/journal/2011/4/2011n4a1/2011n4a1.1.pdf >>>>> >>>>> If Anton is right then the manuscript was written before Luria left >>>>> for Uzbekistan; if the traditional dating is correct then it was >>>>> written more or less during the expedition itself and represents the >>>>> kind of private misgivings about the work of his collaborators that he >>>>> often expresses. >>>>> >>>>> If we accept Anton's chronology then there are a few problems. >>>>> >>>>> a) Vygotsky's enthusiasm for the expedition (expressed in the >>>>> letters) is hard to explain; Vygotsky wasn't an opportunist and he had >>>>> absolutely no compunction about expressing his strong disapproval of >>>>> Luria's contribution to "Ape, Primitive, and Child". Why would he turn >>>>> around and suddenly decide that the method of using laboratory >>>>> experiments in the field was okay? >>>>> >>>>> b) Anton says that the two parts of HDHMF are unrelated--they were >>>>> pasted together by the Soviet editor. But the beginning of the book >>>>> clearly prefigures the ending (see Ch. 1, p. 7 in the English Volume >>>>> Four, second para) and the end of the book also refers to the >>>>> beginning (see Ch. 15, p. 241, first three paras). >>>>> >>>>> c) Vygotsky says that the second half of the book was done first (see >>>>> above paragraphs, and also p. 3, para 5). Anton has it the other way >>>>> aroud. >>>>> >>>>> It seems to me that the biggest problem with Anton's analysis is not >>>>> the chronology, though. It's that Anton does not recognize that HDHMF >>>>> is a major work; he doesn't even recognize it as authorial, because >>>>> Vygotsky doesn't include it in any of the lists of his published and >>>>> unpublished work. >>>>> >>>>> Anton's certainly right that Vygotsky did not include the work in his >>>>> CV. But I think that the explanation is this: it was a private >>>>> manuscript, like the notebooks that Da Vinci and Wittgenstein kept. >>>>> Vygotsky used it to try to work out his own ideas for his own benefit. >>>>> That's why Chapter Four contains all this mind-changing, where >>>>> Vygotsky says that maybe Titchener is right and there are two stages >>>>> of behavior, but maybe Buhler is right, and there are three, but there >>>>> are really four, but the fourth one is sui generis, so maybe Buhler is >>>>> right after all. And that's why the manuscript contains his misgivings >>>>> about what Luria was up to. >>>>> >>>>> Although I think it is a private manuscript (and that's why it has no >>>>> title--the title is one that the Soviet editors made up out of the >>>>> first five words of Chapter One) I also think it was, quite unlike >>>>> Thinking and Speech, an almost finished book. Of course, Vygotsky >>>>> never really finished anything: his mind is a discourse and not a >>>>> text. But that's true of minds quite generally, in a sense finishing >>>>> his books and leaving new books unfinished is what we are all here >>>>> for. >>>>> >>>>> For example--a thought occurs to me. The lifespan of early man appears >>>>> to have been somewhere in the low thirties, rather like other >>>>> primates. At age fifteen, early man would be middle aged. Did they >>>>> even have children back then? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 23 17:51:23 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 01:51:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Greg, Interesting question! I'm inclined to say that consciousness is constituted both internally and externally, befitting its character as both a natural phenomenon and a social phenomenon. Internally, consciousness is constituted by the various functions that LSV was keen to study: perception, memory, emotion, and so on. As he tells us, these form a dynamic system whose internal relationships are constantly changing. Externally, consciousness is constituted by the practices and artifacts with which we sustain ourselves, including the knots and noches that David was reminding us of. Martin On Nov 19, 2014, at 10:25 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > $20K question: > Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term would > you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? > > Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at > least the citation? > -greg > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> On Nov 19, 2014, at 4:56 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> "objective" >>> just means that something is seen as not subject to change by a >>> discourse community, even where that discourse community consists of >>> just me and my lonely self. >> >> Perhaps, David. But with time and effort and study we can come to view >> that something differently, no? >> >> There's a small but growing literature on "constitution" - the way that a >> water molecule is constituted of, not caused by, hydrogen and oxygen. And >> the article I was reading today was making an interesting distinction >> between 'internal constitution,' as in the case of water, and 'external >> constitution,' as in the case of money. What makes a coin a token of >> monetary value is *external* to it: the social institutions of banking and >> the practices of buying and selling. These don't cause it, they constitute >> it. The coin, taken at face value, is objective. But once we study it as it >> circulates through these practice and institutions, we come to see that its >> objectivity does not mean it cannot change. On the contrary. >> >> Although LSV like to talk about the constituents of a meaningful word as >> 'internal' to that word, it seems more accurate to see them as external in >> the same sense as the constituents of a coin or a bill are necessarily >> external to it. >> >> Martin >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 23 17:53:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 01:53:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416788284950.27616@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <1416788284950.27616@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, How is it that form is not material? Would you, like Plato, have us believe that forms exist in some immaterial ideal realm? No, surely the form of a material object is itself material. A word is a sound, or a series of sounds, to which we have in its articulation given a recognizable form. Martin On Nov 23, 2014, at 7:18 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Helena, > > The relationship of the word to culture seems to be about form, not material. Otherwise all sounds would be words and this is not the case. There is a relationship to material in that if we take the air away, nothing can be spoken. If I don't have any pen or paper, I can't write a letter. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 23 17:53:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 17:53:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hello Samuel-- I am not familiar with the term, "philosophical copout." Could you explain what it means and how it applies to the notion that language is not material? Or that part of language, meaning, is not? (Which I take to be your view). Sperber is a person relatively well versed in matters philosphical but also anthropological perhaps even psychological. Does the copout influence how I should think about his idea of the epidemiology of representations (today we might here them referred to as "memes")? So far as I can tell from the sampling of opinions on MCA it is safe to say that we have some serious confusions about matters concerning ontology and epistemology. Is there a currently prominent thinker we can turn to who can provide better guidance through that maze? Superceding the material/ideal dualism is one of the topics of conversation here for the past 30 years. If someone has the agreed-upon, agreeable-upon way to solve the problem, lets for goodness sake hear it! The older I get, the more complicated the whole matter seems to me. As you have seen, from time to time we pick some common text or texts and some group of us all read them, and they discuss along with people who have not read them. Perhaps you could offer a text we could use in that way. Then we could bounce our different interpretations off of that common object. mike On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 4:13 PM, Samuel Paul Louis Veissi?re, Dr < samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca> wrote: > Dan Sperber dismisses the question by saying that "public representations" > are sound waves and light patterns, and are as such material phenomena. > That's a philosophical copout. Meaning (what we embed sound waves with) is > not material, unless one goes full-on neuro-reductionist. If all human > cultures are dualistic, or have found ways to talk about or try to solve > the problem of dualism, it may be because, as far as humans are concerned, > we have a pretty serious ontological problem. No? > > On Nov 23, 2014 7:06 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hi, Analisa -- > > It they're not material, what are they? > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Nov 23, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or > metaphorically? > > > > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order > than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see > how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of > material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if > dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body > different from the dance? > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 23 17:57:53 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 01:57:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, Message-ID: Samuel, There seems to me to be a "not" missing somewhere in your last sentence. Some human cultures are not dualist in their ontological assumptions: it's certainly not the case that dualism is so obvious that it's universal. It is the person who argues that meaning is not material who has a serious ontological problem, because they have to explain how a non-material meaning gets somehow connected to, or associated with, a material sound. All attempts to come up with that explanation (in linguistics, in philosophy, in psychology) have so far failed. Seriously folks, if you don't believe that a word is material, please read Thinking and Speech. If you don't believe that dualism is a problem, please read The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological Investigation. Martin On Nov 23, 2014, at 7:13 PM, Samuel Paul Louis Veissi?re, Dr wrote: > Dan Sperber dismisses the question by saying that "public representations" are sound waves and light patterns, and are as such material phenomena. That's a philosophical copout. Meaning (what we embed sound waves with) is not material, unless one goes full-on neuro-reductionist. If all human cultures are dualistic, or have found ways to talk about or try to solve the problem of dualism, it may be because, as far as humans are concerned, we have a pretty serious ontological problem. No? > > On Nov 23, 2014 7:06 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hi, Analisa -- > > It they're not material, what are they? > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Nov 23, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >> >> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 23 17:59:46 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 12:59:46 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54729112.3050604@mira.net> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Andy, > > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? > > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Nov 23 18:38:49 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 02:38:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <54729112.3050604@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> Message-ID: One of the more interesting passages of Crisis is where LSV applies this philosophical definition of matter to consciousness itself, in order to argue that consciousness too is material. Martin On Nov 23, 2014, at 8:59 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > In any case I meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently of and outside of consciousness. From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 23 19:33:38 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 03:33:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <54729112.3050604@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>,<54729112.3050604@mira.net> Message-ID: <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these conceptual distinctions are important. But that's me. Kind regards Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Andy, > > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? > > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 23 19:43:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 14:43:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> Annalisa, It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Ok Andy, > > I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. > > If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. > > I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. > > I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. > > I think these conceptual distinctions are important. > > But that's me. > > Kind regards > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is > problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body > will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant > "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently > of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally > material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or > inscriptions on stone tablets. > Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get > when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of > inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other > than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk > by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the > perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when > there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and > look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >> >> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Nov 23 20:35:29 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2014 20:35:29 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> Message-ID: <5472b5c2.04a0420a.4321.ffffbe48@mx.google.com> Andy Therefore are space and time finite categories. Both consciousness and products of consciousness. The relation of space and time to *matter* As the *base* is then open to inquiry. Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Andy Blunden" Sent: ?2014-?11-?23 7:45 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Annalisa, It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Ok Andy, > > I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. > > If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. > > I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. > > I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. > > I think these conceptual distinctions are important. > > But that's me. > > Kind regards > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is > problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body > will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant > "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently > of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally > material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or > inscriptions on stone tablets. > Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get > when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of > inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other > than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk > by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the > perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when > there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and > look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >> >> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Nov 23 20:59:28 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 15:59:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5472b5c2.04a0420a.4321.ffffbe48@mx.google.com> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <5472b5c2.04a0420a.4321.ffffbe48@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5472BB30.7050908@mira.net> yes ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Lplarry wrote: > Andy > Therefore are space and time finite categories. > Both consciousness and products of consciousness. > The relation of space and time to *matter* > As the *base* is then open to inquiry. > Larry > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: ?2014-?11-?23 7:45 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Annalisa, > It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish > some shared concepts and word meanings. > "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to > almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical > category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of > consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite > category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both > outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is > the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, > ideas, etc., from what exists. > > You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people > you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion > can follow. We need to be on the same page. > > All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up > reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Nov 24 02:39:06 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 10:39:06 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <139613907.127773.1416825546852.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11155.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Mike et al Reading "Crisis" recently again left me no doubt that Vygotsky , of his own will and for good sake , had accepted the "order" of the Day , that is , Marxism . What he did not like was something else . With the idea of 'ontology' and 'epistemology' again in "Crisis" we have this : Categories of 'subject' and 'object' as they refer to 'being' , that is , ontologically , are not tied to our content of 'knowledge' while categories of 'matter' and 'mind' do need our content of knowledge to be comprehended . "One has only to apply the epistemological?formula ?of ?materialism, ?given ?by ?Lenin ?(a ?similar ?one ?can ?be?found ?in ?Plekhanov) ?for the psychological subject-object,?in order to see what is the matter:the ?only ??property? ?of ?matter ?connected ?with?philosophical ?materialism ?is ?the ?property ?of?being an objective reality, of existing outside of?our ?consciousness ?... ?Epistemologically ?the?concept ?of ?matter ?means ?nothing ?other ?than?objective ?reality, ?existing ?independently ?from?human ?consciousness ?and ?reflected ?by ?it.?[Lenin,Materialism and Empirio-Criticism]" Epistemologically , it is in our 'knowing' ; Ontologically , it is in itself according to some especial laws and with some especial properties , subject-matter of a couple of sciences .? "??We?must not mix up the relation between subject and object with?the ?relation ?between ?mind ?and ?body, ?as H?ffding?[1908] splendidly ?explains. ?The ?distinction ?between ?mind?[Geist] ?and ?matter ?is ?a ?distinction ?in ?the ?content ?of ?our?knowledge. ?But ?the ?distinction ?between ?subject ?and ?object?manifests ?itself ?independently ?from ?the ?content ?of ?our?knowledge." He continues : "Elsewhere ?Lenin ?says ?that ?this ?is, ?essentially, ?the ?principle?of realism, but that he avoids this word, because it has been?captured by inconsistent thinkers.Thus, ?this ?formula contradicts ?our ?viewpoint: ?it?cannot ?be ?true ?that ?consciousness ?exists ?outside ?our?consciousness. ?But, ?as ?Plekhanov ?has ?correctly ?established,?self-consciousness ?is ?the ?consciousness ?of ?consciousness. ?And?consciousness can exist without self-consciousness: we become?convinced ?of ?this ?by ?the ?unconscious ?and ?the ?relatively?unconscious. ?I ?can ?see ?not ?knowing ?that ?I ?see. ?That ?is ?why?Pavlov [1928] is right when he says that we can live according?to subjective states, but that we cannot analyse them.Not ?a ?single ?science ?is ?possible without ?separating?direct ?experience ?from ?knowledge. ?It ?is ?amazing: ?only ?the?psychologist-introspectionist ?thinks ?that ?experience ?and?knowledge ?coincide. ?If ?the ?essence ?of ?things ?and ?the ?form ?of?their ?appearance ?directly ?coincided, ?says ?Marx ?[1890], ?all?science would be superfluous. If in psychology appearance and?being ?were ?the ?same, ?then everybody ?would ?be ?a?scientist-psychologist and ?science ?would ?be ?impossible.?Only ?registration ?would ?be ?possible. ?But, ?obviously, ?it ?is one?thing to live, to experience, and another to analyse ." In this respect , even Spinoza is rejected : " In this respect we are first of all reminded of Spinoza?s attempt?to ?investigate ?human ?vices ?and ?stupidities ?by ?means ?of ?the?geometrical method and to examine human actions and drives?exactly as if they were lines, surfaces, and bodies. This method?is ?suitable ?for ?descriptive ?psychology ?and ?not ?for ?any ?other?approach. For it takes from geometry only its verbal style and?the ?outward ?appearance ?of ?irrefutability ?of ?its ?proofs, ?and ?all?the rest ? its core included ? is based upon a non-scientific way?of thinking." And one more thing again from "Crisis" : A is the table ===> material?a is its reflection in the mirror ====> just nothing , phantom?X is the operation and hitting of the light ====> material? His explanation : two objectives : material ? ? mere relationship between them : subjective ====> non-material? We can ask ourselves if attributes of 'matter' are also 'material' , the more so with 'extension' . ? There are original 'emphases' if referencing is made . Best Haydi ? From: mike cole To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, 23 November 2014, 17:53:50 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Hello Samuel-- I am not familiar with the term, "philosophical copout." Could you explain what it means and how it applies to the notion that language is not material? Or that part of language, meaning, is not? (Which I take to be your view). Sperber is a person relatively well versed in matters philosphical but also anthropological perhaps even psychological. Does the copout influence how I should think about his idea of the epidemiology of representations (today we might here them referred to as "memes")? So far as I can tell from the sampling of opinions on MCA it is safe to say that we have some serious confusions about matters concerning ontology and epistemology. Is there a currently prominent thinker we can turn to who can provide better guidance through that maze? Superceding the material/ideal dualism is one of the topics of conversation here for the past 30 years. If someone has the agreed-upon, agreeable-upon way to solve the problem, lets for goodness sake hear it! The older I get, the more complicated the whole matter seems to me. As you have seen, from time to time we pick some common text or texts and some group of us all read them, and they discuss along with people who have not read them. Perhaps you could offer a text we could use in that way. Then we could bounce our different interpretations off of that common object. mike On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 4:13 PM, Samuel Paul Louis Veissi?re, Dr < samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca> wrote: > Dan Sperber dismisses the question by saying that "public representations" > are sound waves and light patterns, and are as such material phenomena. > That's a philosophical copout. Meaning (what we embed sound waves with) is > not material, unless one goes full-on neuro-reductionist. If all human > cultures are dualistic, or have found ways to talk about or try to solve > the problem of dualism, it may be because, as far as humans are concerned, > we have a pretty serious ontological problem. No? > > On Nov 23, 2014 7:06 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Hi, Analisa -- > > It they're not material, what are they? > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Nov 23, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or > metaphorically? > > > > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order > than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see > how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of > material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if > dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body > different from the dance? > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 05:29:30 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 13:29:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> Message-ID: <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective to anything to which the noun would not also apply. Martin On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Annalisa, > It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. > "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. > > You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. > > All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Ok Andy, >> I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. >> >> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. >> I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >> >> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. >> I think these conceptual distinctions are important. >> >> But that's me. >> >> Kind regards >> >> Annalisa >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body >> will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant >> "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently >> of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally >> material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or >> inscriptions on stone tablets. >> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get >> when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of >> inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other >> than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk >> by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the >> perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when >> there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and >> look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >>> >>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 05:35:18 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 00:35:18 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to translate Vygotsky's Russian. You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. Read Haydi's message. It's all there. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective to anything to which the noun would not also apply. > > Martin > > On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Annalisa, >> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. >> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. >> >> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >> >> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Ok Andy, >>> I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>> >>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. >>> I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >>> >>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. >>> I think these conceptual distinctions are important. >>> >>> But that's me. >>> >>> Kind regards >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body >>> will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant >>> "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently >>> of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally >>> material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or >>> inscriptions on stone tablets. >>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get >>> when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of >>> inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other >>> than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk >>> by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the >>> perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when >>> there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and >>> look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >>>> >>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 06:00:31 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 01:00:31 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> Message-ID: <547339FF.9040003@mira.net> To explain ... you say, Martin, in your earlier message "consciousness is material" which you claim is the result of "Vygotsky applying the definition of matter to consciousness itself." Because "the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness" you conclude that "consciousness is material". Do you mean "consciousness is matter"? Are you "arguing" that thinking is a "material process." If so, what is *not* a material process? Against whom are you arguing in this claim? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to > translate Vygotsky's Russian. > You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the > issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and >> 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? >> Do you have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of >> course, is an adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone >> apply the adjective to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >> Martin >> >> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Annalisa, >>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we >>> establish some shared concepts and word meanings. >>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to >>> almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical >>> category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently >>> of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite >>> category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense >>> both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but >>> "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, >>> fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. >>> >>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the >>> people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, >>> then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >>> >>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up >>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say >>>> word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is >>>> material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound >>>> are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>>> >>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This >>>> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des >>>> Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time >>>> that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost >>>> everything is material. >>>> >>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one >>>> is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As >>>> far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, >>>> it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I >>>> think these conceptual distinctions are important. >>>> >>>> But that's me. >>>> >>>> Kind regards >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your >>>> body >>>> will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant >>>> "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists >>>> independently >>>> of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally >>>> material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or >>>> inscriptions on stone tablets. >>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get >>>> when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of >>>> inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other >>>> than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't >>>> talk >>>> by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the >>>> perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when >>>> there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and >>>> look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally >>>>> or metaphorically? >>>>> >>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different >>>>> order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I >>>>> can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through >>>>> space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like >>>>> saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is >>>>> the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Nov 24 07:40:29 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 07:40:29 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> Message-ID: Annalisa, Haydi, Andy, Martin, If the key concepts "matter" and "consciousness" are all here, I would like to focus on this passage that Haydi offered and hopefully explore what is clear and distinct to others but which I still finf muddled. The passage is: "Mike et al Reading "Crisis" recently again left me no doubt that Vygotsky , of his own will and for good sake , had accepted the "order" of the Day , that is , Marxism . What he did not like was something else . With the idea of 'ontology' and 'epistemology' again in "Crisis" we have this : Categories of 'subject' and 'object' as they refer to 'being' , that is , ontologically , are not tied to our content of 'knowledge' while categories of 'matter' and 'mind' do need our content of knowledge to be comprehended . [comment] therefore *matter* is not the concept of matter because to have a concept of is to be conscious of. ALL concepts include consciousness and since matter excludes consciousness [matter is NOT consciousness] therefore the concept of matter is NOT matter. "One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the psychological subject-object, in order to see what is the matter:the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin,Materialism and Empirio-Criticism]" [comment] To *be* epistemologically known is to *be* in the realm of consciousness AS knowing. We can know without self-knowing [be conscious without self-consciousness] but to know is to *be* in the realm of consciousness NOT in the realm of matter [matter by definition is existence that is INDEPENDENT of consciousness, that exists beyond the relation to consciousness] Epistemologically , it is in our 'knowing' ; Ontologically , it is in itself [independent] according to some especial laws and with some especial properties , subject-matter of a couple of sciences . " We must not mix up the relation between subject and object with the relation between mind and body, as H?ffding [1908] splendidly explains. The distinction between mind [Geist] and matter is a distinction in the content of our knowledge. [comment] the distinction between mind/geist and matter is *a* distinction, but to make *a* distinction is to move beyond *matter* into the realm of consciousness and the realm of making distinctions. Therefore the *content* as distinctions in itself is not *matter* it is consciousness. the distinction between subject and object manifests itself independently from the content of our knowledge." [comment] This seems critical. Subject and object *manifest* [show up] independently of epistemology. Seems to *open a space* for further inquiry. He continues : "Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of realism, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers.Thus, this formula contradicts our viewpoint: it cannot be true that consciousness exists outside our consciousness. But, as Plekhanov has correctly established, self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness. And consciousness can exist without self-consciousness: we become convinced of this by the unconscious and the relatively unconscious. [comment] This seems *key* that consciousness can exist without self-consciousness. However it is also true that matter can exist without consciousness [essentially the *principle* [logic] of realism. I can see not knowing that I see. That is why Pavlov [1928] is right when he says that we can live according to subjective states, but that we cannot analyse them. [comment] We can *live* according to subjective *states* but we cannot analyze them. The question becomes, if not possible to analyze can we still *show* subjective *states* [through indexical means, denoting as gestures?] This *indexing* is not analyzing or reflecting. It requires two persons in face to face contact gesturing at the SAME perceived object placed in front of them. Now to analyze this *movement* of *showing* is to move beyond gesturing to the interpretive stance and triadic relations. However indexical movement may be a transitional stage? IF gestures require consciousness they are not matter, but if one defines gestures as NOT consciousness, THEN they could be defined as *matter*. It all depends [analytically] on where you *draw* the boundary. Not a single science is possible without separating direct experience from knowledge. [comment] To have *science* is to analyze but to do this is NOT *matter* it is consciousness. Direct experience is another *matter* and may be considered matter IF you consider *direct experience as able to *exist* without consciousness. Again a matter for rhetorical discourse among an intersubjective community that is not webbed to being a *scientific community* which is a different KIND of community with different KINDS of *dispositions* acquired through different KINDS of inquiry. This may be Martin's plump materialism. It is amazing: only the psychologist-introspectionist thinks that experience and knowledge coincide. If the essence of things and the form of their appearance directly coincided, says Marx [1890], all science would be superfluous. If in psychology appearance and being were the same, then everybody would be a scientist-psychologist and science would be impossible. Only registration would be possible. But, obviously, it is one thing to live, to experience, and another to analyse ." [comment] agreed In this respect , even Spinoza is rejected : " In this respect we are first of all reminded of Spinoza?s attempt to investigate human vices and stupidities by means of the geometrical method and to examine human actions and drives exactly as if they were lines, surfaces, and bodies. This method is suitable for descriptive psychology and not for any other approach. For it takes from geometry only its verbal style and the outward appearance of irrefutability of its proofs, and all the rest ? its core included ? is based upon a non-scientific way of thinking." [comment] is Spinoza's method [being geometric] taking a particular *genre* of discourse and the scientific *way of thinking* is following another genre, another way of being persuasive or rhetorical. Moving from the abstract TO the concrete is moving TO the rhetorical the realm of moving others. This is the realm of being *effective* and scientific ways of *constituting* effective movements [as matter of direct experience shown in face to face movements] is indexical [and may exist without analysis] And one more thing again from "Crisis" : A is the table ===> material a is its reflection in the mirror ====> just nothing , phantom X is the operation and hitting of the light ====> material His explanation : two objectives : material mere relationship between them : subjective ====> non-material We can ask ourselves if attributes of 'matter' are also 'material' , the more so with 'extension' . There are original 'emphases' if referencing is made . Best [comment] the *key* term [with extentions] may open up a space for further inquiry. I am unsure how this post will be received and answered but it was done in the spirit of XMCA as the 30 year exploration of the ideal and matter. Larry Haydi On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 7:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Annalisa, > It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish > some shared concepts and word meanings. > "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost > anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category > denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of > consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category > (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of > consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base > category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., > from what exists. > > You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people > you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion > can follow. We need to be on the same page. > > All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up > reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome > > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Ok Andy, >> I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not >> material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't >> distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted >> identically. The difference is in form. >> >> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This >> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and >> you like Vivian Westwood. >> I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not >> material because almost everything is material. >> >> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is >> material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as >> space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is >> pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. >> I think these conceptual distinctions are important. >> >> But that's me. >> >> Kind regards >> >> Annalisa >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body >> will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant >> "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently >> of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally >> material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or >> inscriptions on stone tablets. >> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get >> when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of >> inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other >> than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk >> by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the >> perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when >> there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and >> look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or >>> metaphorically? >>> >>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order >>> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see >>> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of >>> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if >>> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body >>> different from the dance? >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 08:07:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 16:07:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help with an article In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8D82D11F-3E82-41D5-ABF4-3C35C1B8E4E7@uniandes.edu.co> Hi David, My library has access to this journal, but only from 1998 onwards. Sorry! Martin On Nov 22, 2014, at 7:55 PM, David Preiss wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > Sorry for asking the list, but I don't have access to this journal paper at my local library: > > Imagination, Cognition and Personality > Issue: Volume 5, Number 3 / 1985-86 > Pages: 239 - 247 > URL: Linking Options > DOI: 10.2190/299T-HP2G-8KQP-FP2X > Daydreaming, Self Concept and Academic Performance > > S. R. Gold A1, J. C. Andrews A1, S. W. Minor A1 > > > Any chance any of you could help me to get it? > > David From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Mon Nov 24 09:01:43 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 17:01:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help with an article In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <40FB92B0-AA66-48C1-96E9-05152DF0A2BB@csus.edu> Hi David, I can order this for you but it will take some time to get it?if you?d like me to do this, I?d be glad to help? lynda On Nov 22, 2014, at 4:55 PM, David Preiss wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > Sorry for asking the list, but I don't have access to this journal paper at my local library: > > Imagination, Cognition and Personality > Issue: Volume 5, Number 3 / 1985-86 > Pages: 239 - 247 > URL: Linking Options > DOI: 10.2190/299T-HP2G-8KQP-FP2X > Daydreaming, Self Concept and Academic Performance > > S. R. Gold A1, J. C. Andrews A1, S. W. Minor A1 > > > Any chance any of you could help me to get it? > > David From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Nov 24 09:44:34 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 09:44:34 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Nicaraguan Case Again Message-ID: I encountered again this summary statement from 2003 by Senghas concerning the state of research on Nicaraguan Sign. It continues to seem relevant to the current conversation on language and thought. mike A comprehension task examining interpretations of spatially modulated verbs reveals that new form-function mappings arise among children who functionally differentiate previously equivalent forms. The new mappings are then acquired by their age peers (who are also children), and by subsequent generations of children who learn the language, but not by adult contemporaries. As a result, language emergence is characterized by a convergence on form within each age cohort, and a mismatch in form from one age cohort to the cohort that follows. In this way, each age cohort, in sequence, transforms the language environment for the next, enabling each new cohort of learners to develop further than its predecessors. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 12:52:32 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 20:52:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." :( To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical activities. Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last message. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to translate Vygotsky's Russian. > You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >> Martin >> >> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Annalisa, >>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. >>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. >>> >>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >>> >>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>>> >>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >>>> >>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these conceptual distinctions are important. >>>> >>>> But that's me. >>>> >>>> Kind regards >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your body >>>> will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I meant >>>> "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists independently >>>> of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in air are equally >>>> material as scratches on paper, characters on your screen or >>>> inscriptions on stone tablets. >>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you get >>>> when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a couple of >>>> inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word exists other >>>> than in one or another of its material instantiations. But we don't talk >>>> by mental telepathy, but only by placing material objects within the >>>> perceptual fields of another person, for them to interpret. It's when >>>> there is some breakdown in communication that you hyave to go back and >>>> look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >>>>> >>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From smago@uga.edu Mon Nov 24 13:02:06 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 21:02:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> Message-ID: <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Andy, I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." :( To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical activities. Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last message. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to translate Vygotsky's Russian. > You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >> Martin >> >> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> >>> Annalisa, >>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. >>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. >>> >>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >>> >>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up >>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>>> >>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >>>> >>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these conceptual distinctions are important. >>>> >>>> But that's me. >>>> >>>> Kind regards >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> > on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> > >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your >>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I >>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists >>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in >>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your >>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. >>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you >>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a >>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word >>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. >>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material >>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to >>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that >>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> ----- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >>>>> >>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.png Type: image/png Size: 28923 bytes Desc: image001.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141124/6595144e/attachment.png From smago@uga.edu Mon Nov 24 13:19:35 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 21:19:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> , <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu>, <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Andy, I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." :( To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical activities. Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last message. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to translate Vygotsky's Russian. > You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >> Martin >> >> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> >>> Annalisa, >>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish some shared concepts and word meanings. >>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., from what exists. >>> >>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >>> >>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up >>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>>> >>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is the basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >>>> >>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these conceptual distinctions are important. >>>> >>>> But that's me. >>>> >>>> Kind regards >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> > on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> > >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your >>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I >>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists >>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in >>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your >>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. >>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you >>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a >>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word >>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. >>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material >>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to >>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that >>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave to your words. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> ----- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or metaphorically? >>>>> >>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body different from the dance? >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Nov 24 13:41:09 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 21:41:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: A small point, perhaps: "Consciousness is materially constituted". Stating that "consciousness is matter (or material)" is rather like saying that a square is matter as opposed to saying that a square is a rectangle, unless of course one intends to assert that consciousness is the entirety of matter. Best, Huw On 24 November 2014 at 21:19, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow > forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p > > Peter Smagorinsky > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > Department of Language and Literacy Education > The University of Georgia > 315 Aderhold Hall > Athens, GA 30602 > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: > > [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] > > > > Peter Smagorinsky > > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > > Department of Language and Literacy Education > > The University of Georgia > > 315 Aderhold Hall > > Athens, GA 30602 > > > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > > > Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > > > Andy, > > > > I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a > position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in > sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any > issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) > dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole > tradition of science." :( > > > > To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness > (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain > kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. > > > > Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists > who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - > processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called > "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world > outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They > believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," > and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical > activities. > > > > Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last > message. > > > > Martin > > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > > > > I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to > translate Vygotsky's Russian. > > > You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the > issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > > > Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > > > > > > Andy > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > >> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and > 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you > have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an > adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective > to anything to which the noun would not also apply. > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> Annalisa, > > >>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish > some shared concepts and word meanings. > > >>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to > almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical > category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of > consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category > (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of > consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base > category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., > from what exists. > > >>> > > >>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the > people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then > confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. > > >>> > > >>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up > > >>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Andy > > >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >>> ---- > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say > word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material > doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the > constituted identically. The difference is in form. > > >>>> > > >>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This > doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and > you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is the > basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. > > >>>> > > >>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one > is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as > space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is > pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these > conceptual distinctions are important. > > >>>> > > >>>> But that's me. > > >>>> > > >>>> Kind regards > > >>>> > > >>>> Annalisa > > >>>> > > >>>> ________________________________________ > > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > > >>>> > > > >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM > > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > >>>> > > >>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is > > >>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your > > >>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I > > >>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists > > >>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in > > >>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your > > >>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. > > >>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you > > >>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a > > >>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word > > >>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. > > >>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material > > >>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to > > >>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that > > >>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave > to your words. > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >>>> ----- > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Andy, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or > metaphorically? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order > than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see > how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of > material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if > dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body > different from the dance? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Kind regards, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Annalisa > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 14:13:31 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 22:13:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 4:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > A small point, perhaps: "Consciousness is materially constituted". > > Stating that "consciousness is matter (or material)" is rather like saying > that a square is matter as opposed to saying that a square is a rectangle, > unless of course one intends to assert that consciousness is the entirety > of matter. > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 24 November 2014 at 21:19, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >> Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow >> forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p >> >> Peter Smagorinsky >> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >> Department of Language and Literacy Education >> The University of Georgia >> 315 Aderhold Hall >> Athens, GA 30602 >> >> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >> >> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >> >> >> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky >> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: >> >> [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] >> >> >> >> Peter Smagorinsky >> >> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >> >> Department of Language and Literacy Education >> >> The University of Georgia >> >> 315 Aderhold Hall >> >> Athens, GA 30602 >> >> >> >> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >> >> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >> >> >> >> >> >> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> >> >> Andy, >> >> >> >> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >> tradition of science." :( >> >> >> >> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >> >> >> >> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >> activities. >> >> >> >> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >> message. >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> >> >>> I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to >> translate Vygotsky's Russian. >> >>> You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the >> issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. >> >>> Read Haydi's message. It's all there. >> >>> >> >>> Andy >> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >>> -- >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>>> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and >> 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do you >> have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is an >> adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the adjective >> to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >> >>>> Martin >> >>>> >> >>>> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Annalisa, >> >>>>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we establish >> some shared concepts and word meanings. >> >>>>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to >> almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical >> category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of >> consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite category >> (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside of >> consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base >> category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, etc., >> from what exists. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the >> people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then >> confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up >> >>>>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Andy >> >>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >>>>> ---- >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say >> word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is material >> doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the >> constituted identically. The difference is in form. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This >> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on and >> you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is the >> basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one >> is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far as >> space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is >> pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these >> conceptual distinctions are important. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> But that's me. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Kind regards >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Annalisa >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> >>>>>> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >> >>>>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your >> >>>>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I >> >>>>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists >> >>>>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in >> >>>>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your >> >>>>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. >> >>>>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you >> >>>>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a >> >>>>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word >> >>>>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. >> >>>>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material >> >>>>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to >> >>>>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that >> >>>>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave >> to your words. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Andy >> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >>>>>> ----- >> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Andy, >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or >> metaphorically? >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order >> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see >> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of >> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if >> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body >> different from the dance? >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Annalisa >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 14:48:59 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 09:48:59 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of consciousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. > > Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... > > Martin > > >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>> tradition of science." :( >>> >>> >>> >>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>> >>> >>> >>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>> activities. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>> message. >>> >>> >>> >>> Martin >>> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 15:10:49 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 23:10:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> Message-ID: Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. > > In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A > Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? > > Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. > > But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. > > But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of consciousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. > > So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. >> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >> >> Martin >> >> >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>> tradition of science." :( >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>> activities. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>> message. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 15:46:55 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 10:46:55 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> Message-ID: <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real and an essential component of human activity. The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > > First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > > Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > > Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > > Martin > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >> >> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >> >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >> >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >> >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of consci >> > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. > >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>> message. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 16:15:54 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 00:15:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> Message-ID: <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. > > But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real and an essential component of human activity. > > The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >> >> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >> >> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>> >>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>> >>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>> >>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>> >>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of consci >>> >> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >> >>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>> activities. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>> message. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From vygotsky@unm.edu Mon Nov 24 16:34:24 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 17:34:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.301080 6@mira.net> Message-ID: <003401d00847$92c0bf30$b8423d90$@edu> Hi, I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. > > In > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a > .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" > although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? > > Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. > > But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. > > But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and > illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material > world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up > the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the > relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter > (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually > an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of > knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that > consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with > matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person > the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is > absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a > material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. > This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. > Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of > consci ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. > > So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. >> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >> >> Martin >> >> >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>> :( >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>> activities. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>> my last message. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 16:35:39 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 11:35:39 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> As Vygotsky puts it this way: "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." and notes that: "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers." which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my consciousness. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). > > I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? > > Martin > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. >> >> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real a >> > nd an essential component of human activity. > >> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of cons >>>> > ci > >>>> >>>> >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>> >>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>>> message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > > From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Mon Nov 24 16:37:51 2014 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (valerie A. Wilkinson) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 09:37:51 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> Message-ID: <003601d00848$0bf0eab0$23d2c010$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Hello, let's not get stuck on a word. We can also call consciousness a hologram presentation projected through the various senses which receive impression which are woven together individually but in alignment perhaps with other who agree about what they are seeing. VW -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+vwilk=inf.shizuoka.ac.jp@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 8:47 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real and an essential component of human activity. The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > > First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > > Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > > Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > > Martin > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >> >> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >> >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >> >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >> >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of consci >> > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. > >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>> message. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 17:05:11 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 01:05:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> Message-ID: <54F8C9C2-432C-4A99-8D0B-B98273B7B6AF@uniandes.edu.co> I'm not too impressed by Lenin's formula that: "[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." (Lenin, 1972, p.311) or: "Thus?the concept of matter?epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." (p.312) Lenin had strengths, but in my view philosophy was not one of them. LSV was perhaps being charitable in applying the formula, and perhaps also in the way in which he cited it: "the only property of matter connected with philosophical materialism, is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness... Epistemologically the concept of matter means *nothing* other than *objective* reality, existing independently from human consciousness and and reflected by it." For one thing, the formulation is pretty vague. Is it saying that objective reality is what exists even when we are not conscious of it (which I think none of us would deny)? Or is it saying that anything that we *are* conscious of - anything 'inside' consciousness - cannot be, or have, objective reality? That would lead to the conclusion that consciousness is nothing but an illusion - nothing more than looking in a mirror. And this conclusion would seem to lead us right back to paradox - for example, how can we possibly know what is 'outside' our consciousness, if all we know is what is given in consciousness? How can we possible know that there *is* anything outside our consciousness. These are classic undergraduate philosophy conundrums, yet Lenin doesn't seem to have considered them. So perhaps LSV was being polite to Lenin when he applied his formula. And what did he conclude, on applying it? This: "Thus, this formula *seemingly* [original emphasis] contradicts our viewpoint: it cannot be true that consciousness exists outside our consciousness. But, as Plekhanov has correctly established, self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness. And consciousness *can* exist without self-consciousness" (Crisis, p. 325). Say what? Consciousness, LSV argues, is first of all an awareness of *objects*. Only later (as Vera just pointed out), does consciousness become reflexive: one can become conscious of being conscious. In other words, humdrum consciousness can and does "exist outside our consciousness." Consciousness, in LSV's analysis, *satisfies* Lenin's formula. That means that consciousness has 'objective reality.' And it means that consciousness satisfies Lenin's formula defining matter. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 7:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > As Vygotsky puts it this way: > > "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in > science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not > the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take > the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance > itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints > of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." > > and notes that: > > "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, > but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by > inconsistent thinkers." > > which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my consciousness. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). >> >> I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. >>> >>> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real a >>> >> nd an essential component of human activity. >> >>> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>> >>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>> >>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>> >>>>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>> >>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>>>> >>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>> >>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of cons >>>>> >> ci >> >>>>> >>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>>> >>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>>>> message. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 17:17:05 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:17:05 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <54F8C9C2-432C-4A99-8D0B-B98273B7B6AF@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> <54F8C9C2-432C-4A99-8D0B-B98273B7B6AF@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5473D891.8090103@mira.net> Valerie and Vera, you are both of course entirely right. These boring questions should have and were wrapped up long ago and we should move on, so I will leave Martin to argue with Lenin and Vygotsky. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > I'm not too impressed by Lenin's formula that: > > "[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." (Lenin, 1972, p.311) > > or: > > "Thus?the concept of matter?epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." (p.312) > > Lenin had strengths, but in my view philosophy was not one of them. LSV was perhaps being charitable in applying the formula, and perhaps also in the way in which he cited it: > > "the only property of matter connected with philosophical materialism, is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness... Epistemologically the concept of matter means *nothing* other than *objective* reality, existing independently from human consciousness and and reflected by it." > > For one thing, the formulation is pretty vague. Is it saying that objective reality is what exists even when we are not conscious of it (which I think none of us would deny)? Or is it saying that anything that we *are* conscious of - anything 'inside' consciousness - cannot be, or have, objective reality? That would lead to the conclusion that consciousness is nothing but an illusion - nothing more than looking in a mirror. And this conclusion would seem to lead us right back to paradox - for example, how can we possibly know what is 'outside' our consciousness, if all we know is what is given in consciousness? How can we possible know that there *is* anything outside our consciousness. These are classic undergraduate philosophy conundrums, yet Lenin doesn't seem to have considered them. > > So perhaps LSV was being polite to Lenin when he applied his formula. And what did he conclude, on applying it? This: > > "Thus, this formula *seemingly* [original emphasis] contradicts our viewpoint: it cannot be true that consciousness exists outside our consciousness. But, as Plekhanov has correctly established, self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness. And consciousness *can* exist without self-consciousness" (Crisis, p. 325). > > Say what? Consciousness, LSV argues, is first of all an awareness of *objects*. Only later (as Vera just pointed out), does consciousness become reflexive: one can become conscious of being conscious. In other words, humdrum consciousness can and does "exist outside our consciousness." Consciousness, in LSV's analysis, *satisfies* Lenin's formula. That means that consciousness has 'objective reality.' And it means that consciousness satisfies Lenin's formula defining matter. > > Martin > > > > > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 7:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> As Vygotsky puts it this way: >> >> "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in >> science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not >> the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take >> the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance >> itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints >> of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but >> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." >> >> and notes that: >> >> "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, >> but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by >> inconsistent thinkers." >> >> which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my consciousness. >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). >>> >>> I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. >>>> >>>> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real >>>> > a > >>>> >>>> >>> nd an essential component of human activity. >>> >>> >>>> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>>> >>>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>>> >>>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the >>>>> > mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>>>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>>> >>>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>>>>> >>>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>>> >>>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of co >>>>>> > ns > >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ci >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>>>>> message. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > > From jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br Mon Nov 24 17:24:08 2014 From: jbmartin@sercomtel.com.br (jbmartin) Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 23:24:08 -0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Message-ID: Andy... please... Reference of LSV Thanks Jo?o Martins Enviado do meu smartphone Samsung Galaxy. -------- Mensagem original -------- De : Andy Blunden Data:24/11/2014 22:35 (GMT-03:00) Para: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance As Vygotsky puts it this way: "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." and notes that: "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers." which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my consciousness. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). > > I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? > > Martin > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. >> >> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real a >> > nd an essential component of human activity. > >> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of con s >>>> > ci > >>>> >>>> >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>> >>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>>> message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 17:26:59 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 01:26:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5473D891.8090103@mira.net> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> <54F8C9C2-432C-4A99-8D0B-B98273B7B6AF@uniandes.edu.co> <5473D891.8090103@mira.net> Message-ID: <85F646E7-CEFF-4CE1-8E3E-43EF420AECA9@uniandes.edu.co> Glad we got that settled, then! ;) Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Valerie and Vera, you are both of course entirely right. These boring questions should have and were wrapped up long ago and we should move on, so I will leave Martin to argue with Lenin and Vygotsky. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> I'm not too impressed by Lenin's formula that: >> >> "[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." (Lenin, 1972, p.311) >> or: >> >> "Thus?the concept of matter?epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." (p.312) >> >> Lenin had strengths, but in my view philosophy was not one of them. LSV was perhaps being charitable in applying the formula, and perhaps also in the way in which he cited it: >> >> "the only property of matter connected with philosophical materialism, is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness... Epistemologically the concept of matter means *nothing* other than *objective* reality, existing independently from human consciousness and and reflected by it." >> >> For one thing, the formulation is pretty vague. Is it saying that objective reality is what exists even when we are not conscious of it (which I think none of us would deny)? Or is it saying that anything that we *are* conscious of - anything 'inside' consciousness - cannot be, or have, objective reality? That would lead to the conclusion that consciousness is nothing but an illusion - nothing more than looking in a mirror. And this conclusion would seem to lead us right back to paradox - for example, how can we possibly know what is 'outside' our consciousness, if all we know is what is given in consciousness? How can we possible know that there *is* anything outside our consciousness. These are classic undergraduate philosophy conundrums, yet Lenin doesn't seem to have considered them. >> >> So perhaps LSV was being polite to Lenin when he applied his formula. And what did he conclude, on applying it? This: >> >> "Thus, this formula *seemingly* [original emphasis] contradicts our viewpoint: it cannot be true that consciousness exists outside our consciousness. But, as Plekhanov has correctly established, self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness. And consciousness *can* exist without self-consciousness" (Crisis, p. 325). >> >> Say what? Consciousness, LSV argues, is first of all an awareness of *objects*. Only later (as Vera just pointed out), does consciousness become reflexive: one can become conscious of being conscious. In other words, humdrum consciousness can and does "exist outside our consciousness." Consciousness, in LSV's analysis, *satisfies* Lenin's formula. That means that consciousness has 'objective reality.' And it means that consciousness satisfies Lenin's formula defining matter. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 7:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> As Vygotsky puts it this way: >>> >>> "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in >>> science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not >>> the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take >>> the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance >>> itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints >>> of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but >>> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." >>> >>> and notes that: >>> >>> "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, >>> but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by >>> inconsistent thinkers." >>> >>> which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my consciousness. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). >>>> >>>> I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. >>>>> >>>>> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real >>>>> >> a >> >>>>> >>>> nd an essential component of human activity. >>>> >>>>> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>>>> >>>>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the >>>>>> >> mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>>>>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of co >>>>>>> >> ns >> >>>>>>> >>>> ci >>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>>>>> >>>>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>>>>>> message. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Nov 24 17:30:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 01:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1AAF0048-23F4-488E-AA0A-E84E1F84D01F@uniandes.edu.co> Jo?o, Page 324 in Volume 3 of the Collected Works (in English) Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:24 PM, jbmartin wrote: > Andy... please... Reference of LSV > > Thanks > > Jo?o Martins > > > Enviado do meu smartphone Samsung Galaxy. > > > -------- Mensagem original -------- > De : Andy Blunden > Data:24/11/2014 22:35 (GMT-03:00) > Para: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Cc: > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > As Vygotsky puts it this way: > > "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in > science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not > the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take > the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance > itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints > of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." > > and notes that: > > "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, > but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by > inconsistent thinkers." > > which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. > But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my > consciousness. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). >> >> I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. >>> >>> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real > a >>> >> nd an essential component of human activity. >> >>> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>> >>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>> >>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>> >>>>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>> >>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>>>> >>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>> >>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of con > s >>>>> >> ci >> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>>> >>>> >>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>>>> message. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 17:38:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:38:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5473DD87.3020800@mira.net> It's all in http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm But Ilyenkov wrote a whole book on this question: http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/index.htm Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ jbmartin wrote: > Andy... please... Reference of LSV > > Thanks > > Jo?o Martins > > > Enviado do meu smartphone Samsung Galaxy. > > > -------- Mensagem original -------- > De : Andy Blunden > Data:24/11/2014 22:35 (GMT-03:00) > Para: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Cc: > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > As Vygotsky puts it this way: > > "But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in > science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not > the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take > the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance > itself is an illusion. This is the difference between the viewpoints > of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes." > > and notes that: > > "Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, > but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by > inconsistent thinkers." > > which is why I put "real" in inverted commas. It is an imprecise term. > But "to exist" means precisely to be outside of and independent of my > consciousness. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in > addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that > consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does > not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* > Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting > LSV). > > > > I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to > suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in > motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was > considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was > 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan > vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that > life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic > molecules are interacting in complex cycles. Or am I being paradoxical? > > > > Martin > > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > >> Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the > fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; > "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a > useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision > mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist > ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that > I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my > car successfully with the use of a mirror. > >> > >> But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. > Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" > which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead > mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day > neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - > that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of > neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not > found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is > a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am > not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks > to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and > Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that > "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not > exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my > consciousness) but it is real > a > >> > > nd an essential component of human activity. > > > >> The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" > is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points > out > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm > the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact > *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making > inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions > are "personal." > >> > >> Andy > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Martin John Packer wrote: > >> > >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there > are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > >>> > >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not > follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the > case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state > with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, > consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. > Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know > the world not only from what I experience directly, in the > first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I > read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in > this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned > in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my > consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as > a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is > bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as > Merleau-Ponty put it. > >>> > >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences > about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few > occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing > salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, > my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can > be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, > LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my > digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself > is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. > Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person > processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in > coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes > of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with > those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same > time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it > remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material > process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and > independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. > >>>> > >>>> In > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A > >>>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" > although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly > introduce the first person pronoun here? > >>>> > >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," > I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, > a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my > consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to > determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through > conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material > process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment > through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because > it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more > effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. > >>>> > >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and > therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, > I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your > behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot > have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through > material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your > name and age. > >>>> > >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms > and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material > world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up > the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the > relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter > (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually > an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of > knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that > consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with > matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person > the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is > absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a > material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. > This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. > Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of con > s > >>>> > > ci > > > >>>> > >>>> > >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal > activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs > on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not > aware of any neuronal activity there. > >>> > >>> > >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material > process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. > And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to > exercise more restraint? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as > having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping > me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is > the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I > assert a > >>>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an > argument, and/or in > >>>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying > to cloud any > >>>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's > own assumed) > >>>>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a > whole > >>>>>>> tradition of science." :( > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that > consciousness > >>>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences > of (certain > >>>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those > psychologists > >>>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - > >>>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious > realm called > >>>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of > the "world > >>>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily > basis. They > >>>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology > is "mind," > >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical > >>>>>>> activities. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed > to in my last > >>>>>>> message. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Nov 24 19:28:58 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 03:28:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <85F646E7-CEFF-4CE1-8E3E-43EF420AECA9@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> <54F8C9C2-432C-4A99-8D0B-B98273B7B6AF@uniandes.edu.co> <5473D891.8090103@mira.net>, <85F646E7-CEFF-4CE1-8E3E-43EF420AECA9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1416886136359.61558@unm.edu> Most esteemed and fated discussants, I have been away from the list (and my computer) much of the day and I was amazed to see the flurry of discussion. There are a few concerns that I have that arise from this thread that have to do with content, but also have to do with form, and also with intent. My intent to be on this list is to make contact with others who value the ideas given to us by Vygtosky. I am aware that there are many controversies and unclear or unconnected aspects to the theories presented and extended from and by his students, and I would like to suggest that we are also his students in a remote sense, but in a family sense too, because we are attempting to learn from him, to see what it is that he saw in his mind's eye, and to learn from one another. I hope, Martin, that it is OK that I use the word "mind's eye" that way. :) It is also my intent to understand how to make sociocultural theory relevant to technology design. Why? Because I don't recognize a viable philosophy of design. The manner in which technology design manifests in the world at the present time is not only in complete disregard to our environment, but also to our minds and bodies. Any benefit we derive seems to be accidental. The force that seems to drive technology design is the market, and not science. I don't mean to generalize, but I find that technology design is very surface-oriented and this presents many issues to me, particularly ethical ones. I don't think the market place should be the "decider" for technology design. Since we have minds, I think computer tools should be "shaped" to meet the needs of our minds. I am aware that our minds can be shaped by tools, however can tools be toxic to our well being? If not, then it means we are totally plastic and we have no need to make ethical decisions, and we are just meat being shaped by fate (to get back to the subject line of this thread). In the time I've been on this list, I've witnessed the voices of a few people here, and I've come to understand something about the river of thought as shared here in this community. One of my hopes is see more people discussing and sharing, and if my own experience is something to go by, I have felt intimidated to post because of being shut down. I think there are more cooperative ways of conversing on this list and so that's something of my motivation to my previous posts about "what is it like for me," because we are all going to have different view points, and diversity should be honored and welcomed here. It should not be that we must agree with everyone, but it also should not be that people with differences are not felt welcome to speak up. There seems to be a culture of debate that has revealed itself here that can become too muscular, too rigorous, and when it manifests it seems hurtful. Not just to the people involved but to readers too. Maybe I am too sensitive, but I think this list should be as much for novices as for experts, and novices are certainly not going to post while watching Popeye and Bluto have it out while Wimpy eats hamburgers. These cartoon references are to show how they look from the outside, but they are not funny. Watching violence as a cartoon is not that funny, and neither is watching it as a muscular, intellectual debate. But that is me, that is what it is like for me. This sort of leads me to form. This list is difficult to traverse because it is like a river coursing by in time. Sometimes all that one can do it hold one's nose and jump in. I have made my share of belly flops, to be sure. But my intent is good-natured and I try to keep my humor. I would hope that we could always maintain a connection to humor in the good-natured form, rather than the kind of humor at someone else's expense. I haven't always been sure of that, and I don't like feeling that kind of doubt. Now with regard to content, I'd like to return to what I'd said about word and form, and time and space and that seems to have stirred up a tempest in this teapot. I apologize for any misunderstandings, however, if you look to my posts, I never denied that word was material. By considering word as a form, this does not make me a Platonist preoccupied with ideal forms. I don't like that I was boxed into that corner, just for using that word "form." When I say form, I'm talking about sounds traveling through space. What I meant when I was considering word as material, is that saying it is material is *not enough.* Because then all sound would be words, and I don't experience that to be the case, which means the word must be a particular form. I can accept this. Is it safe to say that the word is material in motion? I don't know. It seems to be the case because words over time change in meaning and cultural reference. Nothing about a word is static. So when I say form, I mean all the manifestations of a word? this includes its cultural associations. Whatever is a word is perceived in the mind and acted upon accordingly, either as thinking or as speech (as spoken word or written word). I can accept that too. Now what you consider as mind is up for grabs, and I can see that people on this list have a different concept of what mind is, and I'm OK with that. Must we bogged down about that right now? As far as I'm concerned we are blind men with the elephant, each describing from our own perspectives."What it is like for me." I am proposing this approach so that there is a little room for discussion, not because I want to dictate that everyone must accept my worldview. There has to be a way to respect worldviews and not bruise others. I think there is much more to lose if we can't find a way to do that. The interesting point I'd like to make about that, is that you won't even know what you lose because any person who might have engaged will not so there will be no awareness that you lost anything. Incidentally, this is why I am remiss that there isn't a "newcomer's" page for the list. Each new person who comes to this list should be greeted as a welcome guest to a wedding or birthday party, with the idea we want this new arrival to join in on the fun. Is this possible? To create that kind of warmth and generosity? With regard to mind and how that is conceived, I will share that it is my observation that Descartes has more of a grip on science 450 years after him than we may realize. But that's a separate thread. So to return to the discussion on words, I can accept words as material for a culture, in the same way I can accept fashion as fabric, but doing so doesn't take me very far with regard to culture. What I like about word-meaning (a very specific construct of "form", a technical phrase) instead of "material" is that affect is not left behind, material alone insinuates inertness, and I have a problem with inert emotions. These words, "inert emotions," don't ring true to me, it's an oxymoron. Word as material alone does not work to me for that reason. This is why form works better because like fashion houses express their own dress-forms over the course of time at different seasons, we use words to express our own cultures over the course of time. I'm sorry if reaching to fashion as a metaphor is too captialistic, but if you can put that aside and just think of the relationships I'm attempting to reference, with fashion as an expression of culture, I think it works as a way to myself. There is more that I could say about time and space, but I think for this post it's enough. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Nov 24 20:09:05 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 04:09:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <85F646E7-CEFF-4CE1-8E3E-43EF420AECA9@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5473B5DB.3010806@mira.net> <5473C36F.5040909@mira.net> <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> <5473CEDB.9040900@mira.net> <54F8C9C2-432C-4A99-8D0B-B98273B7B6AF@uniandes.edu.co> <5473D891.8090103@mira.net>, <85F646E7-CEFF-4CE1-8E3E-43EF420AECA9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1416888544477.32391@unm.edu> I see that my post got cut off at the last paragraph of my last post: It reads: "I'm sorry if reaching to fashion as a metaphor is too captialistic, but if you can put that aside and just think of the relationships I'm attempting to reference, with fashion as an expression of culture, I think it works as a way to my self." I don't know that is there. What I meant to say is: "I'm sorry if reaching to fashion as a metaphor is too captialistic, but if you can put that aside and just think of the relationships I'm attempting to reference, with fashion as an expression of culture, I think it works as a way to my sense of what is a word and how its form manifests in culture." It's very peculiar that "self" insinuated there, I don't know how that happened, but I guess self has a way of doing just that! Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Nov 24 22:27:55 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:27:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> David, I wanted to address more directly your comments about Babel (which oddly refers to an ancient tower, a building of ancient times) and I'm guessing this has to do with my assertions in a previous post about ancient peoples and the meaning of ancient buildings. Just to be clear: I did not say that Ancient Vedic peoples are the original people. I have no way of asserting that, and I have no intention of doing that. I only mean that Vedic culture is an ancient culture that remains to this day fairly intact. It has undergone changes, and other cultures have influenced it and it has influenced other cultures. Which also means I have no need to discuss this in terms of purity, either. I don't mean to suggest that there aren't other surviving ancient cultures, I would say Jewish culture is an ancient culture but we came into the conversation with regard to ancient buildings and I was thinking more about ancient buildings and the cultures in which they manifested that are absent to us and how we can't know the purpose of those buildings. We could discuss the ancient buildings of Jewish culture I suppose, but that may become controversial, and I don't want to be controversial, especially because I don't know enough about Ancient Jewish culture and its buildings. There may be others I have not mentioned and I did not mean any slight by not mentioning them. My list was ad hoc, not definitive. I also never intend to convey that somehow Vedic culture trumps any other culture. Such an assertion would be silly, and furthmore I can't imagine that I could ever think to get away with such a statement in a company of the very intelligent people who frequent this list and who care about understanding culture. There is no one true culture. I only mean that Vedic culture is unusual and singular of today's existing cultures, that it is very old (I believe 7,000 years old) and that it comes to us fairly intact. That was my only point. I was surprised to see that the wikipage says it is only 4-5000 years old or so, but I understand that this was when texts were written down. There is evidence that the culture existed as an oral culture before it was the Vedas were written to add an additional 2,000 years to that. I'm not sure where the 2,000 number comes from. Regardless, everything about the structure of the Vedas in terms of rhyming structure and how they are chanted show that it was originally oral. It seems reasonable. Even families were named based upon how many Vedas were memorized and that that is how the Vedas were "stored" in the culture. Furthermore, as far as the "myth" of Babel which claims a single language to be the original language, I don't think that I can accept that myth either. If that is in any way a reference to my past comments about Sanskrit, I would like to make clear, there is no way I can make the claim that Sanskrit was the original language. I don't think I can even say that I believe that. I do remember in a linguistics class as an undergrad I was told Sanskrit was the mother of indo-european languages, because of the similarities in sound forms, grammar, and so on. Forgive me if I'm not using the proper linguistic technical terms. It's been a while. What I find interesting, and I don't know if this is unique to Sanskrit, but the name does not tie to a geographical place. Sanskrit means, "that which is well made." English is tied to England, Spanish to Spain, German to Germany, etc. I suppose there is Yiddish; it doesn't tie to geography. Hebrew does not either. I guess Latin doesn't either. I just thought that was interesting how the name of the language doesn't tie to a location. The meaning of the word "Sanskrit" intrigues me also in terms of what has been said on this list about language as a tool and also my recent post about a word as a form. One cannot make anything well-made without it having a form of some kind. A form must be present in order to assign it the quality of being well-made. I am not well-versed in the language itself, but the contact I have had with Sanskrit has impressed me because of its precision to meaning. So I can attest to this notion of being "well-made." I have been told that learning Sanskrit is good for the mind, but I have no way of explaining why that is or what makes someone say that. There is something delightful about it when the language comes alive, but one could say that about learning any new language. Still, if language helps to shape the mind, perhaps what it means is that something good comes from understanding the language, its structure, its use, and this precision to meaning to which I refer. That there is a clarity it offers. That is just a guess. It certainly is not easy to learn. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Nov 24 23:00:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 18:00:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled Message-ID: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Nov 25 00:16:19 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 08:16:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From ablunden@mira.net Tue Nov 25 01:11:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 20:11:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> Yes, Rod, it may just be a case of my ignorance. I had not noticed "dappled" used those other ways. "Perished" though as it is used for perishable rubber is surely a distinct meaning from perished=died? But maybe it is all just cases of words moving from one context to another. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. > > Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled > > I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Nov 25 01:20:34 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 09:20:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254E5D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I think perish has a particular sense - life draining away - which makes it appropriate for the progressive loss of functionality suffered by exposed rubber! Word meanings are dappled. Do you know Gerard Manley Hopkins' poem 'Pied Beauty' (http://www.bartleby.com/122/13.html) which begins 'Glory be to God for dappled things' and goes on to celebrate 'All things counter, original , spare, strange; Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)' Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 25 November 2014 09:12 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled Yes, Rod, it may just be a case of my ignorance. I had not noticed "dappled" used those other ways. "Perished" though as it is used for perishable rubber is surely a distinct meaning from perished=died? But maybe it is all just cases of words moving from one context to another. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. > > Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled > > I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? > > Andy > -- > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] h.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From ablunden@mira.net Tue Nov 25 01:31:53 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 20:31:53 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254E5D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254E5D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <54744C89.1020704@mira.net> he, he! Nice. This guy seems to have the idea, with "stipple" and "freckled". :) andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I think perish has a particular sense - life draining away - which makes it appropriate for the progressive loss of functionality suffered by exposed rubber! Word meanings are dappled. Do you know Gerard Manley Hopkins' poem 'Pied Beauty' (http://www.bartleby.com/122/13.html) which begins 'Glory be to God for dappled things' and goes on to celebrate 'All things counter, original , spare, strange; Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)' > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 25 November 2014 09:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > Yes, Rod, it may just be a case of my ignorance. I had not noticed "dappled" used those other ways. "Perished" though as it is used for perishable rubber is surely a distinct meaning from perished=died? But maybe it is all just cases of words moving from one context to another. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > >> This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. >> >> Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled >> >> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >> >> Andy >> -- >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]> h.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Nov 25 01:53:36 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 09:53:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <54744C89.1020704@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254E5D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <54744C89.1020704@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254EF4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> He was 'celebrating diversity' against a culture which elevated 'purity' above anything 'blemished' by admixture. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 25 November 2014 09:32 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled he, he! Nice. This guy seems to have the idea, with "stipple" and "freckled". :) andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I think perish has a particular sense - life draining away - which makes it appropriate for the progressive loss of functionality suffered by exposed rubber! Word meanings are dappled. Do you know Gerard Manley Hopkins' poem 'Pied Beauty' (http://www.bartleby.com/122/13.html) which begins 'Glory be to God for dappled things' and goes on to celebrate 'All things counter, original , spare, strange; Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)' > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 25 November 2014 09:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > Yes, Rod, it may just be a case of my ignorance. I had not noticed "dappled" used those other ways. "Perished" though as it is used for perishable rubber is surely a distinct meaning from perished=died? But maybe it is all just cases of words moving from one context to another. > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > >> This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. >> >> Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled >> >> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >> >> Andy >> -- >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]> t >> h.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] h.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Nov 25 02:50:41 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 10:50:41 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> References: <11638310-DC36-466E-A9AD-B538DA13AB12@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <153302880.754858.1416912641717.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11130.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Martin, "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). I think this is not enough . It needs elaboration .? Something exists in the mind (one might say objectively in the sense one might not deny it though being in the mind should confer subjectively) ; something exists in the world as 'objective reality' . By 'objective' as with 'subjective' , at times , people (me included) might create confusion . I mean 'objectness' , 'subjectness' notions . I wonder if you'd like to put it this way : "Outside of the head , standing to its own" meaning not just not needing consciousness but also perpetuating its being/ness , corporeal endurance --indestructability of matter--. That is when all consciousnesses cease to be yet all bodies , matter , corporals and corporeals still continue to BE . It's not the case when all bodies cease to be . Where will be the 'consciousness' ? On top of that , matter has to be localized , yes ? How is consciousness spatially justified ? I'm sure you know all about 'The teaching about emotions' : James-Lange Spinoza's theory of visceral , neuronal , physiological discoveries and the invariably abundant use of consciousness in that piece both with the primary organic even instinctive and later needs of a child . There was a good voice that some things are to be known anew and worked out . Consciousness is 'primordial' , 'embryonal' , 'uterine' ; how is this justifiable ? I urgently need to know . Has Andy found lines in Marx to this effect ? I just know being behind consciousness and essences prior to appearances and essentials prior to accidentals . Best Haydi From: Martin John Packer To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:15:54 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance I think, Andy, that you are being unnecessarily paradoxical - in addition to admitting to being odd and ambiguous! - in saying that consciousness is real (in quotation marks no less) but that it does not exist. LSV's point was precisely that consciousness *passes* Lenin's test, the test that defines "what exists objectively" (quoting LSV). I'm curious: would anyone on this list think that it is weird to suggest that life is a material process? That life is matter in motion? A couple of hundred years ago this was unthinkable: it was considered obvious that matter was not sufficient for life; life was 'given' to matter in the form of a soul, or spirits, or an *elan vital*. Yet today we are completely comfortable with the notion that life, in all its complexity, is at its base a process in which organic molecules are interacting in complex cycles.? Or am I being paradoxical? Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, to say "consciousness is an illusion" does not exclude the fact that thanks to life-experience it is a useful illusion; "completely an illusion" is not what anyone said and nor is that a useful expression. For example, when I am driving I use my rear-vision mirror, which presents me with an illusion - the car appears to exist ahead of me in inverted form - but thanks, as you say to the fact that I am "educated" with respect to mirrors, I can nonetheless steer my car successfully with the use of a mirror. > > But of course it is not an illusion *that I have consciousness*. Using this word "illusion" (Vygotsky says "appearance" and "phantom" which are OK as well) is useful, not to argue against long-dead mediaeval French philosopher-scientists, but to deal with present-day neuroscientists who also tell us that "consciousness is an illusion" - that is, that they have looked into the brain and taken images of neuronal activity and sliced up the brains of animals and have not found consciousness. So to say that "consciousness is an illusion" is a very odd and ambiguous thing to say. It *is* an illusion, but I am not deceived in believing that I have consciousness. It is only thanks to this fine distinction used by Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Vygotsky and Ilyenkov that we can make sense of the claim by neuroscientists that "consciousness is an illusion" even though it is "real". It does not exist (since to exist means precisely that it exists outside of my consciousness) but it is real and an essential component of human activity. > > The fact that we learn about consciousness "by making inferences" is not at all something unique to consciousness. As Vygotsky points out http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm the historian, the geologist and the nuclear physicist and in fact *all* the sciences also study the object of their science "by making inferences" - not because history or geology or subatomic reactions are "personal." > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >> >> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion.? If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >> >> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>? >>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>> >>> In https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#A >>> Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? >>> >>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. >>> >>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>> >>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of consci >>>? ? >> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. >>? >>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>? ? >>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>? ? ? >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation.? When I assert a >>>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, and/or in >>>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud any >>>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own assumed) >>>>>> dispels the clouds.? I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>>> tradition of science."? :( >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. They >>>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>> activities. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my last >>>>>> message. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> >> >> >> >>? > > > From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Tue Nov 25 04:21:50 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:21:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: How I wish Googlemail had a 'button' for 'Like' - for both of these posts - Andy for a strange confusion but deep question and Rod for the sheerwit and intelligence of a reply Hey Ho TomRichardson MiddlesbroughUK On 25 November 2014 at 08:16, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a > dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You > could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light > or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' > is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. > > Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, > ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled > > I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and > perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Nov 25 04:54:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 23:54:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <54747BE8.9080407@mira.net> :) will do. I should have checked the dictionary before advertising my ignorance. Dappled dates from c. 1400, before the verb, and was first applied to animals. Perish is old (13th century), but in connection with rubber (which is counted as a distinct meaning) from the 1860s. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Tom Richardson wrote: > How I wish Googlemail had a 'button' for 'Like' - for both of these posts - > Andy for a strange confusion but deep question and Rod for the sheerwit and > intelligence of a reply > Hey Ho > TomRichardson MiddlesbroughUK > > On 25 November 2014 at 08:16, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: > > >> This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a >> dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You >> could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light >> or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' >> is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. >> >> Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, >> ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled >> >> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and >> perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >> >> Andy >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >> >> >> > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Nov 25 04:54:03 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:54:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <003401d00847$92c0bf30$b8423d90$@edu> References: <003401d00847$92c0bf30$b8423d90$@edu> Message-ID: <1316206652.825996.1416920043164.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11135.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Hi Vera, Respectfully ! 1. ?"developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc.? 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings .? 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to? thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ??? 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . ? Best Haydi From: Vera John-Steiner To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Hi, I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to? the beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion.? If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. > > In > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a > .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" > although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? > > Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. > > But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. > > But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and > illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material > world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up > the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the > relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter > (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually > an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of > knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that > consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with > matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person > the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is > absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a > material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. > This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. > Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of > consci ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. > > So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. >> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >> >> Martin >> >>? >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation.? When I >>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds.? I >>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science."? >>>> :( >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>> activities. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>> my last message. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>>? ? ? >> > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Nov 25 04:54:03 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:54:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <003401d00847$92c0bf30$b8423d90$@edu> References: <003401d00847$92c0bf30$b8423d90$@edu> Message-ID: <1316206652.825996.1416920043164.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11135.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Hi Vera, Respectfully ! 1. ?"developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc.? 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings .? 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to? thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ??? 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . ? Best Haydi From: Vera John-Steiner To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Hi, I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to? the beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that consciousness is completely an illusion.? If that were the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. Martin On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. > > In > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a > .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" > although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly introduce the first person pronoun here? > > Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than nervous reflexes. > > But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and age. > > But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and > illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material > world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up > the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the > relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter > (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually > an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of > knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that > consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with > matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person > the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is > absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a > material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. > This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. > Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of > consci ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal activity there. > > So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of matter. >> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >> >> Martin >> >>? >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation.? When I >>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds.? I >>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science."? >>>> :( >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>> activities. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>> my last message. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>>? ? ? >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Nov 25 06:18:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 14:18:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On Nov 19, 2014, at 10:25 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > $20K question: > Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term would > you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? > > Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at > least the citation? -greg Greg, I forgot two things. First, to ask whether you'll be sending the $20k as cash or a check. Second, to provide the references. What I was reading was this (attached): Van der Smagt, T. (2006). Causation and constitution in system dynamics: Modelling a socially constituted world. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 23(4), 513-524. But this is also useful: Wendt, A. (1998). On constitution and causation in international relations. Review of International Studies, 24(5), 101-117. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Van der Smagt 2006 Causation and constitution in s.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 153445 bytes Desc: Van der Smagt 2006 Causation and constitution in s.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141125/67737072/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.txt Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141125/67737072/attachment.txt From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 07:37:16 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 07:37:16 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254E5D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254E5D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: I also am hitting the like button. And for transferring to other contexts and this being "key" to meaning formation [word meaning]: To perish as "life draining away from us" can then travel to perish as "life draining away meaning", or "life as draining away vitality" which opens up the notion of "perishing" and the celebration of "dappled" as being critical to counter perishing and extends "perishing" to a vast expansive arena or stage or field of endeavor. Rod and Andy indicating the power or force or drive of words to move us Larry On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 1:20 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > I think perish has a particular sense - life draining away - which makes > it appropriate for the progressive loss of functionality suffered by > exposed rubber! Word meanings are dappled. Do you know Gerard Manley > Hopkins' poem 'Pied Beauty' (http://www.bartleby.com/122/13.html) which > begins 'Glory be to God for dappled things' and goes on to celebrate 'All > things counter, original , spare, strange; Whatever is fickle, freckled > (who knows how?)' > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 25 November 2014 09:12 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > Yes, Rod, it may just be a case of my ignorance. I had not noticed > "dappled" used those other ways. "Perished" though as it is used for > perishable rubber is surely a distinct meaning from perished=died? But > maybe it is all just cases of words moving from one context to another. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > > This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - > 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You > could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light > or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' > is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. > > > > Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have > perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is > perishing! > > > > Rod > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled > > > > I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > > Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple > and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber > respectively)? > > > > Andy > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > h.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 07:57:01 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 08:57:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I'm dappled by your question and I perish the thought that I couldn't understand a post of yours. So, I'm not sure if I know what these words you speak of "mean". -greg On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and > perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 07:58:30 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 08:58:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> Message-ID: ?Oops, sorry, wrote that before my email updated showing me all the other wordplay... -greg? On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > I'm dappled by your question and I perish the thought that I couldn't > understand a post of yours. > > So, I'm not sure if I know what these words you speak of "mean". > > -greg > > On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and >> perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >> >> Andy >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Tue Nov 25 08:19:55 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 16:19:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1316206652.825996.1416920043164.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11135.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: To chime in: The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere solely in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of practices that bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is 'co-constructed'. In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning there is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in the ebb and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- seeing, becomes? There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I am reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the other precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, ethics as primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or "reason" as the distance and closing between "subject" and "object". Miguel On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >Hi Vera, >Respectfully ! >1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >share of the truth . But... >2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole >thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between >the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do >we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology >, etc. >3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having >said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis >(ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps >and bounds or gradience ? >4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to >the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to >just human beings . >5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I >could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >Best >Haydi > From: Vera John-Steiner > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >Hi, > >I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness >and >that is that what we experience as adults >is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not >aware >of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >Vera > > > >-----Original Message----- >From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >[mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > >First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow >that >consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that >"My >consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and >partial, >but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience >directly, >in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >what >I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in >a >previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. >Unlike >Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > >Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, >I >also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness >is >a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I >come >to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > >Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we >can >know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > >Martin > > >On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently >of >consciousness" as you say, Martin. >> >> In >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >introduce the first person pronoun here? >> >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness >and >reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in >the >world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and >in >any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >nervous reflexes. >> >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>therefore I >must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access >to >it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way >in >that sense that I learnt your name and age. >> >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >> consci > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >which >I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >activity there. >> >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit >it >is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >> >> Andy >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >Obviously >(I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >matter. >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>> :( >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>motion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>> my last message. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>> >> > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 08:26:36 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 08:26:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102254D24@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <547447DA.2000001@mira.net> Message-ID: <34F36942-C352-4D22-A5FC-E7E6F7B74EAC@gmail.com> I think we're in the middle of an exercise in negotiating meaning. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Yes, Rod, it may just be a case of my ignorance. I had not noticed "dappled" used those other ways. "Perished" though as it is used for perishable rubber is surely a distinct meaning from perished=died? But maybe it is all just cases of words moving from one context to another. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Rod Parker-Rees wrote: >> This is news to me. I would have thought that 'dappled' had many uses - 'a dappled horse', 'the cloth was green, dappled with patches of blue'. You could argue that these uses are metaphorical - borrowed from dappled light or dappled shade but you could also argue that the use in 'dappled shade' is a borrowing from the description of a dappled horse. >> >> Perished only applies to rubber! Perish the thought! People have perished, ambitions have perished and here in Devon this morning it is perishing! >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 25 November 2014 07:01 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] dappled >> >> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >> >> Andy >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 08:38:03 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 09:38:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> Message-ID: <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> I am coming late to this, but I think ?collocation? would be of interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Nov 25 08:39:58 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 16:39:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Miguel, I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and 'grasping' in the world in which we live. Martin On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > To chime in: > > The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere solely > in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of practices that > bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is 'co-constructed'. > In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning there > is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in the ebb > and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- seeing, > becomes? > > There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as > consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I am > reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the other > precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, ethics as > primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or "reason" as the > distance and closing between "subject" and "object". > > Miguel > > On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: > >> Hi Vera, >> Respectfully ! >> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >> share of the truth . But... >> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole >> thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between >> the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do >> we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology >> , etc. >> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having >> said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis >> (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps >> and bounds or gradience ? >> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to >> the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to >> just human beings . >> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I >> could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >> Best >> Haydi >> From: Vera John-Steiner >> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Hi, >> >> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness >> and >> that is that what we experience as adults >> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not >> aware >> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >> Vera >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >> >> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow >> that >> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that >> "My >> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and >> partial, >> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience >> directly, >> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >> what >> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in >> a >> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. >> Unlike >> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >> >> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, >> I >> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness >> is >> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I >> come >> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >> >> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we >> can >> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently >> of >> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>> >>> In >>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>> >>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness >> and >> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in >> the >> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and >> in >> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >> nervous reflexes. >>> >>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>> therefore I >> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access >> to >> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way >> in >> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>> >>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>> consci >> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >> which >> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >> activity there. >>> >>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit >> it >> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >> Obviously >> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >> matter. >>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>> :( >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>> motion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>> activities. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>> my last message. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Nov 25 10:00:47 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:00:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I just pressed the 'like' button several times for both Miguel's and Martin's posts! Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Miguel, > > I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and 'grasping' in the world in which we live. > > Martin > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > >> To chime in: >> >> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere solely >> in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of practices that >> bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is 'co-constructed'. >> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning there >> is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in the ebb >> and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- seeing, >> becomes? >> >> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I am >> reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the other >> precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, ethics as >> primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or "reason" as the >> distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >> >> Miguel >> >> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>> share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole >>> thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between >>> the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do >>> we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology >>> , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having >>> said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis >>> (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps >>> and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to >>> the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to >>> just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I >>> could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness >>> and >>> that is that what we experience as adults >>> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >>> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not >>> aware >>> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >>> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >>> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >>> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow >>> that >>> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >>> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that >>> "My >>> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and >>> partial, >>> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >>> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience >>> directly, >>> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>> what >>> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >>> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in >>> a >>> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >>> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. >>> Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >>> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >>> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, >>> I >>> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness >>> is >>> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >>> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >>> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I >>> come >>> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >>> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >>> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >>> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >>> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we >>> can >>> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >>> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently >>> of >>> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >>>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >>> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness >>> and >>> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in >>> the >>> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >>> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >>> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >>> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and >>> in >>> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>> therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >>> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >>> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access >>> to >>> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way >>> in >>> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>> which >>> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >>> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >>> activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit >>> it >>> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>> Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>>> my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 10:06:32 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 11:06:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <1316206652.825996.1416920043164.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11135.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <003401d00847$92c0bf30$b8423d90$@edu> <1316206652.825996.1416920043164.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11135.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> Hi Haydi and Vera, I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this displacement applies both spatially and temporally. Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Hi Vera, > Respectfully ! > 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... > 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. > 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? > 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings . > 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? > 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : > a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . > b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . > c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . > Best > Haydi > From: Vera John-Steiner > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi, > > I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and > that is that what we experience as adults > is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the > consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among > other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware > of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, > all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the > beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. > Vera > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some > points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > > First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that > consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could > one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My > consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, > but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know > itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, > in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what > I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in > this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a > previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, > but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike > Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. > Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > > Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about > another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of > experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I > also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is > a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my > consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just > the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come > to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life > spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, > first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am > helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose > processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > > Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who > say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can > know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, > unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > > Martin > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" > despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of > consciousness" as you say, Martin. >> >> In >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly > introduce the first person pronoun here? >> >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know > through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, > and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and > reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the > world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple > organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my > relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not > 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in > any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than > nervous reflexes. >> >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I > must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the > fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your > physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to > it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in > that sense that I learnt your name and age. >> >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >> consci > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which > I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness > is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal > activity there. >> >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," > but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it > is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >> >> Andy >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having > unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously > (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of > matter. >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>> :( >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper > object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>> my last message. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>> >> > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Nov 25 10:08:42 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 18:08:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90659DC@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> What's odd is that if you went back even ten years and used the phrase "like button" people might think it was from an old Twilight Zone movie. Ominous music, "Go ahead, push the like button, see what happens" says the tall, dark man with a scar. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Ed Wall [ewall@umich.edu] Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:00 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance I just pressed the 'like' button several times for both Miguel's and Martin's posts! Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Miguel, > > I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and 'grasping' in the world in which we live. > > Martin > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > >> To chime in: >> >> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere solely >> in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of practices that >> bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is 'co-constructed'. >> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning there >> is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in the ebb >> and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- seeing, >> becomes? >> >> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I am >> reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the other >> precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, ethics as >> primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or "reason" as the >> distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >> >> Miguel >> >> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>> share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole >>> thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between >>> the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do >>> we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology >>> , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having >>> said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis >>> (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps >>> and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to >>> the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to >>> just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I >>> could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness >>> and >>> that is that what we experience as adults >>> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >>> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not >>> aware >>> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >>> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >>> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >>> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow >>> that >>> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >>> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that >>> "My >>> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and >>> partial, >>> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >>> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience >>> directly, >>> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>> what >>> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >>> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in >>> a >>> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >>> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. >>> Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >>> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >>> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, >>> I >>> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness >>> is >>> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >>> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >>> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I >>> come >>> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >>> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >>> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >>> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >>> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we >>> can >>> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >>> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently >>> of >>> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >>>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >>> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness >>> and >>> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in >>> the >>> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >>> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >>> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >>> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and >>> in >>> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>> therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >>> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >>> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access >>> to >>> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way >>> in >>> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>> which >>> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >>> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >>> activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit >>> it >>> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>> Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>>> my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Nov 25 10:09:36 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 18:09:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0D9066DE-38C8-466C-BDE2-4D44CAC47829@uniandes.edu.co> Just retweet... On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > I just pressed the 'like' button several times for both Miguel's and Martin's posts! > > Ed > On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Hi Miguel, >> >> I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and 'grasping' in the world in which we live. >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel wrote: >> >>> To chime in: >>> >>> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere solely >>> in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of practices that >>> bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is 'co-constructed'. >>> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning there >>> is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in the ebb >>> and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- seeing, >>> becomes? >>> >>> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >>> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I am >>> reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the other >>> precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, ethics as >>> primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or "reason" as the >>> distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >>> >>> Miguel >>> >>> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Vera, >>>> Respectfully ! >>>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>>> share of the truth . But... >>>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole >>>> thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between >>>> the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do >>>> we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology >>>> , etc. >>>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having >>>> said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis >>>> (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps >>>> and bounds or gradience ? >>>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to >>>> the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to >>>> just human beings . >>>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I >>>> could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>>> Best >>>> Haydi >>>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness >>>> and >>>> that is that what we experience as adults >>>> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >>>> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not >>>> aware >>>> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >>>> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >>>> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>>> Vera >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >>>> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>> >>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow >>>> that >>>> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >>>> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that >>>> "My >>>> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and >>>> partial, >>>> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >>>> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience >>>> directly, >>>> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>>> what >>>> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >>>> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in >>>> a >>>> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >>>> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. >>>> Unlike >>>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>> >>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >>>> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >>>> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, >>>> I >>>> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness >>>> is >>>> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >>>> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >>>> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I >>>> come >>>> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >>>> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >>>> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >>>> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>>> >>>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >>>> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we >>>> can >>>> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >>>> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently >>>> of >>>> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>> >>>>> In >>>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >>>>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >>>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>> >>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >>>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >>>> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness >>>> and >>>> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in >>>> the >>>> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >>>> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >>>> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >>>> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and >>>> in >>>> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>>> nervous reflexes. >>>>> >>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>>> therefore I >>>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >>>> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >>>> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access >>>> to >>>> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way >>>> in >>>> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>> >>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>>>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>>>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>>>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>>>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>>>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>>>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>>>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>>> consci >>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>>> which >>>> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >>>> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >>>> activity there. >>>>> >>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit >>>> it >>>> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> -- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>>> Obviously >>>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>>> matter. >>>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>>> :( >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >>>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>>>> my last message. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From vygotsky@unm.edu Tue Nov 25 11:09:49 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:09:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> Martin, I like your description of consciousness, but I am still struggling with how we get there developmentally. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 9:40 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance Hi Miguel, I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and 'grasping' in the world in which we live. Martin On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > To chime in: > > The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere > solely in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of > practices that bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is 'co-constructed'. > In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning > there is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in > the ebb and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- > seeing, becomes? > > There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as > consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I > am reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the > other precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, > ethics as primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or > "reason" as the distance and closing between "subject" and "object". > > Miguel > > On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: > >> Hi Vera, >> Respectfully ! >> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >> share of the truth . But... >> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The >> whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some >> thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> >> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation >> of reflexology , reactology , etc. >> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? >> Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the >> genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter >> of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us >> to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it >> to just human beings . >> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' >> I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >> Best >> Haydi >> From: Vera John-Steiner >> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Hi, >> >> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on >> consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a >> developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it >> is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a >> conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together >> with eye-motion coordination, add up to the beginnings of >> consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >> Vera >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John >> Packer >> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are >> some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >> >> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not >> follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were >> the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you >> state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, >> consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be >> educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And >> since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in >> the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >> what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own >> consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and >> social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also >> given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable >> problems arise as a consequence. >> Unlike >> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >> >> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences >> about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few >> occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing >> salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact >> that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own >> consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this >> is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I >> come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to >> learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like >> consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material >> processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by >> observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >> >> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those >> who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time >> that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it >> remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social >> science. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and >> independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>> >>> In >>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch0 >>> 1a .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my >>> consciousness" >>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he >>> suddenly >> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>> >>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I >>> know >> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a >> phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my >> consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to >> determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through >> conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material >> process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment >> through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, >> because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any >> case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >> nervous reflexes. >>> >>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>> therefore I >> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on >> the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour >> and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have >> unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material >> interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and >> age. >>> >>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes >>> up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is >>> the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is >>> actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and >>> validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim >>> that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak >>> with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any >>> person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>> consci >> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >> which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. >> Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware >> of any neuronal activity there. >>> >>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I >> admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise >> more restraint? >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> -- >>> -- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as >>>> having >> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >> Obviously >> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >> matter. >>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>> :( >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>> motion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in >>>>>> some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by >>>>>> "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with >>>>>> people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that >>>>>> the proper >> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>> activities. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to >>>>>> in my last message. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Nov 25 11:29:15 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 19:29:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> References: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Thanks HENRY ! et al ! First as I was not catching up with the posts , I didn't see the 'stop' signal on discussion . If you count my posts in a year , you will see that I'm the least-heard voice .? Second Vera John-Steiner is not someone not known at least to old participants . Then As I knew her , I very seriously put some questions in the hope she will kindly help . Maybe tweeters and retweeters and button-pressers have seen sarcasm , arrogance ?? in what I humbly wrote in which case they have just been playing memoirs . We have a proverb saying : bowls hotter than soup . Please let your respectable teacher talk whatever and however they wish to . There was misunderstanding of clouding which very swiftly and fortunately switched to 'unclouding' . Why again ? It's a matter of hours !! Sorry !! Best Haydi ? ? ?? From: HENRY SHONERD To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: "vygotsky@unm.edu" Sent: Tuesday, 25 November 2014, 10:06:32 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance Hi Haydi and Vera, I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this displacement applies both spatially and temporally. Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Hi Vera, > Respectfully ! > 1.? "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... > 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. > 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? > 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings . > 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to? thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? > 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : > a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . > b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . > c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with .? > Best > Haydi >? ? ? From: Vera John-Steiner > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi, > > I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and > that is that what we experience as adults > is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the > consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among > other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware > of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, > all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to? the > beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. > Vera > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some > points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > > First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that > consciousness is completely an illusion.? If that were the case, how could > one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My > consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, > but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know > itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, > in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what > I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in > this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a > previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, > but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike > Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. > Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > > Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about > another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of > experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I > also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is > a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my > consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just > the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come > to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life > spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, > first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am > helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose > processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > > Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who > say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can > know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, > unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > > Martin > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" > despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of > consciousness" as you say, Martin. >> >> In >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly > introduce the first person pronoun here? >> >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know > through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, > and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and > reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the > world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple > organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my > relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not > 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in > any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than > nervous reflexes. >> >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I > must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the > fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your > physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to > it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in > that sense that I learnt your name and age. >> >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >> consci > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which > I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness > is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal > activity there. >> >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," > but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it > is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >> >> Andy >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having > unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously > (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of > matter. >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>? >>>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation.? When I >>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds.? I >>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science."? >>>>> :( >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper > object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>> my last message. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>>? ? ? >>> >> > > > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Nov 25 11:41:42 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 13:41:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> References: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> Message-ID: <6E189042-6D61-4EBF-8449-4C9F803E8B52@umich.edu> Martin As am I, but it is not so much your formulation as it is, more generally, 'how does one get there developmentally?' and where and what is "there." For instance, as Haydi put it is " is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradients? and is, for instance, historical consciousness reflected in the microcosm of the individual? Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:09 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Martin, > > I like your description of consciousness, but I am still struggling with how > we get there developmentally. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 9:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi Miguel, > > I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on > visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on > touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that > consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of > how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and > 'grasping' in the world in which we live. > > Martin > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel > wrote: > >> To chime in: >> >> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere >> solely in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of >> practices that bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is > 'co-constructed'. >> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning >> there is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in >> the ebb and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- >> seeing, becomes? >> >> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I >> am reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the >> other precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, >> ethics as primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or >> "reason" as the distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >> >> Miguel >> >> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>> share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The >>> whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some >>> thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> >>> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation >>> of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? >>> Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the >>> genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter >>> of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us >>> to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it >>> to just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' >>> I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on >>> consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a >>> developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it >>> is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a >>> conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together >>> with eye-motion coordination, add up to the beginnings of >>> consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John >>> Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are >>> some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not >>> follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were >>> the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you >>> state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, >>> consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be >>> educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And >>> since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in >>> the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>> what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own >>> consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and >>> social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also >>> given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable >>> problems arise as a consequence. >>> Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences >>> about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few >>> occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing >>> salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact >>> that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own >>> consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this >>> is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I >>> come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to >>> learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like >>> consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material >>> processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by >>> observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot > experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those >>> who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time >>> that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it >>> remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social >>> science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and >>> independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch0 >>>> 1a .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my >>>> consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he >>>> suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I >>>> know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a >>> phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my >>> consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to >>> determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through >>> conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material >>> process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment >>> through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, >>> because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any >>> case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>> therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on >>> the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour >>> and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have >>> unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material >>> interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and >>> age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes >>>> up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is >>>> the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is >>>> actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and >>>> validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim >>>> that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak >>>> with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any >>>> person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>> which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. >>> Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware >>> of any neuronal activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I >>> admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise >>> more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as >>>>> having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>> Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in >>>>>>> some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by >>>>>>> "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with >>>>>>> people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that >>>>>>> the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to >>>>>>> in my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Nov 25 11:41:42 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 13:41:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> References: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> Message-ID: Martin As am I, but it is not so much your formulation as it is, more generally, 'how does one get there developmentally?' and where and what is "there." For instance, as Haydi put it is " is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradients? and is, for instance, historical consciousness reflected in the microcosm of the individual? Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:09 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Martin, > > I like your description of consciousness, but I am still struggling with how > we get there developmentally. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 9:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi Miguel, > > I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on > visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on > touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that > consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of > how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and > 'grasping' in the world in which we live. > > Martin > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel > wrote: > >> To chime in: >> >> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere >> solely in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of >> practices that bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is > 'co-constructed'. >> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning >> there is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in >> the ebb and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- >> seeing, becomes? >> >> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I >> am reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the >> other precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, >> ethics as primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or >> "reason" as the distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >> >> Miguel >> >> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>> share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The >>> whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some >>> thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> >>> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation >>> of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? >>> Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the >>> genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter >>> of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us >>> to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it >>> to just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' >>> I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on >>> consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a >>> developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it >>> is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a >>> conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together >>> with eye-motion coordination, add up to the beginnings of >>> consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John >>> Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are >>> some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not >>> follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were >>> the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you >>> state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, >>> consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be >>> educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And >>> since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in >>> the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>> what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own >>> consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and >>> social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also >>> given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable >>> problems arise as a consequence. >>> Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences >>> about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few >>> occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing >>> salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact >>> that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own >>> consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this >>> is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I >>> come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to >>> learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like >>> consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material >>> processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by >>> observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot > experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those >>> who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time >>> that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it >>> remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social >>> science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and >>> independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch0 >>>> 1a .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my >>>> consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he >>>> suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I >>>> know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a >>> phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my >>> consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to >>> determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through >>> conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material >>> process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment >>> through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, >>> because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any >>> case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>> therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on >>> the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour >>> and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have >>> unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material >>> interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and >>> age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes >>>> up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is >>>> the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is >>>> actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and >>>> validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim >>>> that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak >>>> with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any >>>> person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>> which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. >>> Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware >>> of any neuronal activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I >>> admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise >>> more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as >>>>> having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>> Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in >>>>>>> some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by >>>>>>> "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with >>>>>>> people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that >>>>>>> the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to >>>>>>> in my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Nov 25 11:41:42 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 13:41:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> References: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> Message-ID: <5F5F949A-1186-456C-9268-90978A3D163A@umich.edu> Martin As am I, but it is not so much your formulation as it is, more generally, 'how does one get there developmentally?' and where and what is "there." For instance, as Haydi put it is " is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradients? and is, for instance, historical consciousness reflected in the microcosm of the individual? Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:09 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Martin, > > I like your description of consciousness, but I am still struggling with how > we get there developmentally. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 9:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi Miguel, > > I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on > visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on > touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that > consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of > how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and > 'grasping' in the world in which we live. > > Martin > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel > wrote: > >> To chime in: >> >> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere >> solely in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of >> practices that bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is > 'co-constructed'. >> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning >> there is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in >> the ebb and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- >> seeing, becomes? >> >> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I >> am reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the >> other precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, >> ethics as primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or >> "reason" as the distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >> >> Miguel >> >> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>> share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The >>> whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some >>> thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> >>> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation >>> of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? >>> Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the >>> genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter >>> of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us >>> to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it >>> to just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' >>> I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on >>> consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a >>> developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it >>> is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a >>> conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together >>> with eye-motion coordination, add up to the beginnings of >>> consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John >>> Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are >>> some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not >>> follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were >>> the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you >>> state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, >>> consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be >>> educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And >>> since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in >>> the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>> what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own >>> consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and >>> social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also >>> given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable >>> problems arise as a consequence. >>> Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences >>> about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few >>> occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing >>> salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact >>> that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own >>> consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this >>> is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I >>> come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to >>> learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like >>> consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material >>> processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by >>> observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot > experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those >>> who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time >>> that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it >>> remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social >>> science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and >>> independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch0 >>>> 1a .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my >>>> consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he >>>> suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I >>>> know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a >>> phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my >>> consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to >>> determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through >>> conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material >>> process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment >>> through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, >>> because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any >>> case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>> therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on >>> the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour >>> and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have >>> unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material >>> interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and >>> age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes >>>> up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is >>>> the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is >>>> actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and >>>> validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim >>>> that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak >>>> with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any >>>> person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>> which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. >>> Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware >>> of any neuronal activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I >>> admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise >>> more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as >>>>> having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>> Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in >>>>>>> some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by >>>>>>> "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with >>>>>>> people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that >>>>>>> the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to >>>>>>> in my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Nov 25 11:43:09 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 19:43:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> References: <000401d008e3$64fe4c10$2efae430$@edu> Message-ID: Heavens, Vera! That really is the $20k question. (Greg will pay whichever of us gets there first!) I'm in full agreement with your brief statement about this yesterday: > I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and > that is that what we experience as adults > is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the > consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among > other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware > of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, > all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the > beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. Martin On Nov 25, 2014, at 2:09 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Martin, > > I like your description of consciousness, but I am still struggling with how > we get there developmentally. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 9:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi Miguel, > > I completely agree! When we think about consciousness we tend to focus on > visual perception, but if we close our eyes and allow ourselves to focus on > touch and hearing I think we gain a much clearer sense of the way that > consciousness is an aspect of our way of being in the world, an aspect of > how we live in the world, and how consciousness is a 'reaching out' and > 'grasping' in the world in which we live. > > Martin > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Zavala, Miguel > wrote: > >> To chime in: >> >> The new born is aware, quite aware. Consciousness does not inhere >> solely in the individual child. It is in the deliberate set of >> practices that bring the child into-the-world, a world that already is > 'co-constructed'. >> In Indigenous traditions such as Mayan (Popol Vuh), in the beginning >> there is "sound"--rather than light. Why isn't consciousness also in >> the ebb and flow of sound, what the being-in-the-world already, pre- >> seeing, becomes? >> >> There might be a tendency in much of our work to privilege light as >> consciousness; but what happens when we "see" things differently. I >> am reminded of precepts in Liberation Theology, where care for the >> other precedes politics and art (See Enrique Dussel). In other words, >> ethics as primary activity, yes, even prior to "creativity" or >> "reason" as the distance and closing between "subject" and "object". >> >> Miguel >> >> On 11/25/14 4:54 AM, "Haydi Zulfei" wrote: >> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >>> share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >>> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very >>> 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The >>> whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some >>> thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> >>> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation >>> of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >>> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? >>> Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the >>> genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter >>> of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us >>> to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >>> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it >>> to just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >>> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' >>> I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >>> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on >>> consciousness and that is that what we experience as adults is a >>> developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among other reasons) it >>> is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware of a >>> conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, all of which, together >>> with eye-motion coordination, add up to the beginnings of >>> consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John >>> Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are >>> some points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not >>> follow that consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were >>> the case, how could one come to judge its fallibility? How can you >>> state with certainty that "My consciousness is an illusion"? No, >>> consciousness is incomplete, and partial, but it can also be >>> educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know itself. And >>> since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, in >>> the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >>> what I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own >>> consciousness in this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and >>> social, as I mentioned in a previous message.) I know, these are also >>> given to me in my consciousness, but I don't see that any insuperable >>> problems arise as a consequence. >>> Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences >>> about another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few >>> occasions of experiencing things together with another - like dancing >>> salsa!) However, I also have to infer that, and rely on the fact >>> that, my own consciousness is a material process. My own >>> consciousness can be, and often is, outside my consciousness - this >>> is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just the same way I >>> come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come to >>> learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like >>> consciousness, first-person processes, and nonetheless material >>> processes. Perhaps I am helped in coming to these conclusions by >>> observing other people, whose processes of living and digesting I cannot > experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those >>> who say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time >>> that we can know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it >>> remains the paradox, unresolved, of most of contemporary social >>> science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and >>> independently of consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch0 >>>> 1a .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my >>>> consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he >>>> suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I >>>> know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a >>> phantom, and fundamentally different from that which is outside my >>> consciousness and reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to >>> determine my actions in the world. I do not act exclusively through >>> conditional reflexes like a simple organism as an immediate material >>> process, but on the contrary, mediate my relation to my environment >>> through my consciousness, which I learn, is not 100% reliable, >>> because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in any >>> case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >>>> therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on >>> the fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour >>> and your physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have >>> unmediated access to it, I can learn about it only through material >>> interactions, the same way in that sense that I learnt your name and >>> age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes >>>> up the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is >>>> the relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is >>>> actually an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and >>>> validity of knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim >>>> that consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak >>>> with matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any >>>> person the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >>> which I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. >>> Consciousness is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware >>> of any neuronal activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I >>> admit it is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise >>> more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as >>>>> having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >>> Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >>>>>>> motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in >>>>>>> some mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by >>>>>>> "mental representations" of the "world outside." I deal with >>>>>>> people who make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that >>>>>>> the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to >>>>>>> in my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 11:47:12 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 12:47:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> Haydi, What?s a ?stop? signal?! I lack chat etiquette know how I?ll bet. But let me charge ahead. Respectfully. So, what do you, or anyone, think of the substance of my comment/conjecture? Are humans wired differently with how they use their eyes to point? Of course, this doesn?t explain how blind people acquire language. Still? Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Thanks HENRY ! et al ! > > First as I was not catching up with the posts , I didn't see the 'stop' signal on discussion . If you count my posts in a year , you will see that I'm the least-heard voice . > > Second Vera John-Steiner is not someone not known at least to old participants . Then As I knew her , I very seriously put some questions in the hope she will kindly help . Maybe tweeters and retweeters and button-pressers have seen sarcasm , arrogance ?? in what I humbly wrote in which case they have just been playing memoirs . We have a proverb saying : bowls hotter than soup . Please let your respectable teacher talk whatever and however they wish to . There was misunderstanding of clouding which very swiftly and fortunately switched to 'unclouding' . Why again ? It's a matter of hours !! Sorry !! > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > From: HENRY SHONERD > To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Cc: "vygotsky@unm.edu" > Sent: Tuesday, 25 November 2014, 10:06:32 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance > > Hi Haydi and Vera, > I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this displacement applies both spatially and temporally. > Henry > > > > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > > > Hi Vera, > > Respectfully ! > > 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... > > 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. > > 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? > > 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings . > > 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? > > 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : > > a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . > > b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . > > c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . > > Best > > Haydi > > From: Vera John-Steiner > > > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > > > Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > > > Hi, > > > > I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and > > that is that what we experience as adults > > is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the > > consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among > > other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware > > of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, > > all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the > > beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. > > Vera > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu ] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > > > Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some > > points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > > > > First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that > > consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could > > one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My > > consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, > > but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know > > itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, > > in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what > > I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in > > this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a > > previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, > > but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike > > Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. > > Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > > > > Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about > > another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of > > experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I > > also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is > > a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my > > consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just > > the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come > > to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life > > spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, > > first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am > > helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose > > processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > > > > Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who > > say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can > > know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, > > unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" > > despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of > > consciousness" as you say, Martin. > >> > >> In > >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a > >> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" > >> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly > > introduce the first person pronoun here? > >> > >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know > > through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, > > and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and > > reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the > > world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple > > organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my > > relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not > > 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in > > any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than > > nervous reflexes. > >> > >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I > > must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the > > fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your > > physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to > > it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in > > that sense that I learnt your name and age. > >> > >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and > >> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material > >> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up > >> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the > >> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter > >> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually > >> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of > >> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that > >> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with > >> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person > >> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is > >> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a > >> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. > >> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. > >> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of > >> consci > > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which > > I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness > > is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal > > activity there. > >> > >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," > > but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it > > is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having > > unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously > > (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of > > matter. > >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy, > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I > >>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an > >>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm > >>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that > >>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I > >>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." > >>>>> :( > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that > >>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are > >>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those > >>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are > >>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some > >>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental > >>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who > >>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper > > object of investigation for psychology is "mind," > >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical > >>>>> activities. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in > >>>>> my last message. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Nov 25 12:06:51 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 14:06:51 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> References: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <15053477-F0C2-4B47-B28B-59C935F9FBCC@umich.edu> Henry Reading through your conjecture/comment again, a question might be do, for instance, dogs direct other dogs through "joint regard" toward objects at a distance. I seem to remember reading that cats have problems, at times, figuring out humans because cats tend to 'speak' with their bodies and we are quite limited in that regard. Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:47 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Haydi, > What?s a ?stop? signal?! I lack chat etiquette know how I?ll bet. But let me charge ahead. Respectfully. So, what do you, or anyone, think of the substance of my comment/conjecture? Are humans wired differently with how they use their eyes to point? Of course, this doesn?t explain how blind people acquire language. Still? > Henry > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >> Thanks HENRY ! et al ! >> >> First as I was not catching up with the posts , I didn't see the 'stop' signal on discussion . If you count my posts in a year , you will see that I'm the least-heard voice . >> >> Second Vera John-Steiner is not someone not known at least to old participants . Then As I knew her , I very seriously put some questions in the hope she will kindly help . Maybe tweeters and retweeters and button-pressers have seen sarcasm , arrogance ?? in what I humbly wrote in which case they have just been playing memoirs . We have a proverb saying : bowls hotter than soup . Please let your respectable teacher talk whatever and however they wish to . There was misunderstanding of clouding which very swiftly and fortunately switched to 'unclouding' . Why again ? It's a matter of hours !! Sorry !! >> >> Best >> >> Haydi >> >> >> >> >> >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Cc: "vygotsky@unm.edu" >> Sent: Tuesday, 25 November 2014, 10:06:32 >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance >> >> Hi Haydi and Vera, >> I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this displacement applies both spatially and temporally. >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: >>> >>> Hi Vera, >>> Respectfully ! >>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... >>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings . >>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>> Best >>> Haydi >>> From: Vera John-Steiner > >>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > >>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and >>> that is that what we experience as adults >>> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >>> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware >>> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >>> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >>> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>> Vera >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu ] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >>> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>> >>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that >>> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >>> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My >>> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, >>> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >>> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, >>> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what >>> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >>> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a >>> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >>> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike >>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>> >>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >>> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >>> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I >>> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is >>> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >>> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >>> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come >>> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >>> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >>> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >>> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>> >>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >>> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can >>> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >>> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of >>> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>> >>>> In >>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >>>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>> >>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >>> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and >>> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the >>> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >>> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >>> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >>> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in >>> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>> nervous reflexes. >>>> >>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I >>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >>> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >>> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to >>> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in >>> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>> >>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>> consci >>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which >>> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >>> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >>> activity there. >>>> >>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it >>> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>> :( >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>>> my last message. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 12:50:18 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 13:50:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <15053477-F0C2-4B47-B28B-59C935F9FBCC@umich.edu> References: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> <15053477-F0C2-4B47-B28B-59C935F9FBCC@umich.edu> Message-ID: <4B37AEAD-06A1-42AA-A3F7-7B0972D88D93@gmail.com> Ed, >From my experience of being barked at by dogs as I pass their ?turf? (fenced in), a lead dog will rush me, then other dogs will follow his/her lead, but I have no sense of a signal to rush, just a dog-see-dog-do. Often the lead dog will snarl and snap at the dogs that follow their lead. Wolves in the wild seem to be organized for a kill, but I don?t think they plan. I haven?t seen the latest Planet of the Apes movie, but I gather the sinking feeling comes for humans when they realize that signaling and planning is taking place amongst the apes, not simple swarm behavior. Of course, humans can swarm also, but that?s not smart behavior in the way planning is. Again, I see spatial and temporal displacement in cognition as the key. Discourse, all human activity, does this, I gather. If the thread is still fate, luck and chance, then how does this human ability (displacement) affect THEM? Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:06 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > Henry > > Reading through your conjecture/comment again, a question might be do, for instance, dogs direct other dogs through "joint regard" toward objects at a distance. I seem to remember reading that cats have problems, at times, figuring out humans because cats tend to 'speak' with their bodies and we are quite limited in that regard. > > Ed > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 1:47 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Haydi, >> What?s a ?stop? signal?! I lack chat etiquette know how I?ll bet. But let me charge ahead. Respectfully. So, what do you, or anyone, think of the substance of my comment/conjecture? Are humans wired differently with how they use their eyes to point? Of course, this doesn?t explain how blind people acquire language. Still? >> Henry >> >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: >>> >>> Thanks HENRY ! et al ! >>> >>> First as I was not catching up with the posts , I didn't see the 'stop' signal on discussion . If you count my posts in a year , you will see that I'm the least-heard voice . >>> >>> Second Vera John-Steiner is not someone not known at least to old participants . Then As I knew her , I very seriously put some questions in the hope she will kindly help . Maybe tweeters and retweeters and button-pressers have seen sarcasm , arrogance ?? in what I humbly wrote in which case they have just been playing memoirs . We have a proverb saying : bowls hotter than soup . Please let your respectable teacher talk whatever and however they wish to . There was misunderstanding of clouding which very swiftly and fortunately switched to 'unclouding' . Why again ? It's a matter of hours !! Sorry !! >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: HENRY SHONERD >>> To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Cc: "vygotsky@unm.edu" >>> Sent: Tuesday, 25 November 2014, 10:06:32 >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi Haydi and Vera, >>> I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this displacement applies both spatially and temporally. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Vera, >>>> Respectfully ! >>>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger share of the truth . But... >>>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or gradience ? >>>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to just human beings . >>>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>>> Best >>>> Haydi >>>> From: Vera John-Steiner > >>>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > >>>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on consciousness and >>>> that is that what we experience as adults >>>> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is the >>>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >>>> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not aware >>>> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >>>> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >>>> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>>> Vera >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu ] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are some >>>> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>> >>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow that >>>> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how could >>>> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty that "My >>>> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and partial, >>>> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to know >>>> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience directly, >>>> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from what >>>> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness in >>>> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned in a >>>> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my consciousness, >>>> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. Unlike >>>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>> >>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences about >>>> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions of >>>> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) However, I >>>> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own consciousness is >>>> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside my >>>> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In just >>>> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. I come >>>> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like consciousness, >>>> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I am >>>> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >>>> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>>> >>>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those who >>>> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that we can >>>> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the paradox, >>>> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material process" >>>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and independently of >>>> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>> >>>>> In >>>>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a >>>>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >>>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>> >>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I know >>>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a phantom, >>>> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my consciousness and >>>> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions in the >>>> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a simple >>>> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, mediate my >>>> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is not >>>> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough and in >>>> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, than >>>> nervous reflexes. >>>>> >>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and therefore I >>>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on the >>>> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and your >>>> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated access to >>>> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same way in >>>> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>> >>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>>>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>>>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>>>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>>>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>>>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>>>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>>>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>>> consci >>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, which >>>> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. Consciousness >>>> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >>>> activity there. >>>>> >>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material process," >>>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I admit it >>>> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more restraint? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> -- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously >>>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>>> matter. >>>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>>> :( >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >>>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>>>> my last message. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 13:41:36 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 06:41:36 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> Message-ID: So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden household we mean. This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated singularity: all verbs are common verbs. But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some generalization we make about it? Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or less the same effect. In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than about rubber). And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do have unique referents. We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's opinion, is the origin of consciousness. My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech community) generalize the notion of "luck". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I am coming late to this, but I think ?collocation? would be of interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. > Henry > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >> >> Andy >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 14:06:19 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 07:06:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Annalisa: We all make mistakes (as Andy heroically, in an exemplary fashion, reminds us). More, we all tend to have characterizing, yea, predictable patterns of fallibility. I just noticed, with some horror, the following paragraph in the posting I just wrote on "dappled". "You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we put him in, and (???) the longer period of time we take the more general the generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden household we mean." Obviously, this paragraph reads a lot better if you delete everything between "and" and "But this is not so". I don't know what I was thinking. Or rather, I do know what I was thinking; I was thinking of the next idea that I was going to write before I'd really written out the idea at hand. That's my most characteristic fault, I'm afraid. I don't know what yours is, but if I had to guess I would say it was that you sometimes assume that fairly general, even philosophical, remarks are directed against your own personal position. But my original point was not at all personal--I wasn't directing myself against any supposed claim that you were making (in general, I don't do much of that, which is why I get into less trouble than Andy and Martin on the list). What I was really doing was making a comment on the act of mashing-together-ing, of which we are both quite fond. The problem is that mashing Korean shamanism and Indic vedism together too concretely assumes diffusionism. I prefer a thematic approach; it seems to me that the hypothesis of independent invention (that is, pyramids were independently invented from some natural model) is a much more powerful one, because it tells us so much more about what we really want to know--the way minds work. I had a world history prof back at the University of Chicago whose speciality was diffusionism (his name was William H. McNeill and he specialized in vast tomes with imposing names like "The Rise of the West", the subtext of which was that world history is a single story and you and I are the heroes of it). This strikes me as very unlikely, at least until we discover that early man had some paleolithic equivalent of the computer and the worldwide web. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies We all make On 25 November 2014 at 15:27, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > David, > > I wanted to address more directly your comments about Babel (which oddly refers to an ancient tower, a building of ancient times) and I'm guessing this has to do with my assertions in a previous post about ancient peoples and the meaning of ancient buildings. Just to be clear: I did not say that Ancient Vedic peoples are the original people. I have no way of asserting that, and I have no intention of doing that. I only mean that Vedic culture is an ancient culture that remains to this day fairly intact. It has undergone changes, and other cultures have influenced it and it has influenced other cultures. Which also means I have no need to discuss this in terms of purity, either. > > I don't mean to suggest that there aren't other surviving ancient cultures, I would say Jewish culture is an ancient culture but we came into the conversation with regard to ancient buildings and I was thinking more about ancient buildings and the cultures in which they manifested that are absent to us and how we can't know the purpose of those buildings. We could discuss the ancient buildings of Jewish culture I suppose, but that may become controversial, and I don't want to be controversial, especially because I don't know enough about Ancient Jewish culture and its buildings. There may be others I have not mentioned and I did not mean any slight by not mentioning them. My list was ad hoc, not definitive. > > I also never intend to convey that somehow Vedic culture trumps any other culture. Such an assertion would be silly, and furthmore I can't imagine that I could ever think to get away with such a statement in a company of the very intelligent people who frequent this list and who care about understanding culture. There is no one true culture. I only mean that Vedic culture is unusual and singular of today's existing cultures, that it is very old (I believe 7,000 years old) and that it comes to us fairly intact. That was my only point. > > I was surprised to see that the wikipage says it is only 4-5000 years old or so, but I understand that this was when texts were written down. There is evidence that the culture existed as an oral culture before it was the Vedas were written to add an additional 2,000 years to that. I'm not sure where the 2,000 number comes from. Regardless, everything about the structure of the Vedas in terms of rhyming structure and how they are chanted show that it was originally oral. It seems reasonable. Even families were named based upon how many Vedas were memorized and that that is how the Vedas were "stored" in the culture. > > Furthermore, as far as the "myth" of Babel which claims a single language to be the original language, I don't think that I can accept that myth either. If that is in any way a reference to my past comments about Sanskrit, I would like to make clear, there is no way I can make the claim that Sanskrit was the original language. I don't think I can even say that I believe that. I do remember in a linguistics class as an undergrad I was told Sanskrit was the mother of indo-european languages, because of the similarities in sound forms, grammar, and so on. Forgive me if I'm not using the proper linguistic technical terms. It's been a while. > > What I find interesting, and I don't know if this is unique to Sanskrit, but the name does not tie to a geographical place. Sanskrit means, "that which is well made." English is tied to England, Spanish to Spain, German to Germany, etc. I suppose there is Yiddish; it doesn't tie to geography. Hebrew does not either. I guess Latin doesn't either. I just thought that was interesting how the name of the language doesn't tie to a location. > > The meaning of the word "Sanskrit" intrigues me also in terms of what has been said on this list about language as a tool and also my recent post about a word as a form. One cannot make anything well-made without it having a form of some kind. A form must be present in order to assign it the quality of being well-made. > > I am not well-versed in the language itself, but the contact I have had with Sanskrit has impressed me because of its precision to meaning. So I can attest to this notion of being "well-made." I have been told that learning Sanskrit is good for the mind, but I have no way of explaining why that is or what makes someone say that. There is something delightful about it when the language comes alive, but one could say that about learning any new language. Still, if language helps to shape the mind, perhaps what it means is that something good comes from understanding the language, its structure, its use, and this precision to meaning to which I refer. That there is a clarity it offers. That is just a guess. It certainly is not easy to learn. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Nov 25 15:44:12 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 23:44:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> Dear David, Thank you for your reply. The shape of the discussion on this list is difficult to negotiate because it seems there is denial of any subjects here speaking to one another. It seems we are all just illusions speaking to ourselves. So we swap the word "subject" for "phantom." It still doesn't explain subjectivity. It is infinite regression, i.e., turtles all the way down. I hope I am not saying that I'm the only subject here, but it feels like that. We are all subjects, and how it is like for us, each of us, will give us far more information than abstracting all these forms into ideals. That is why I feel we haven't really moved from Descartes, we've only swapped words around. It doesn't solve "the duality problem." If you want to eliminate duality, then there must be a basis for something appearing as dual. Meaning, what appears as two is really one. I don't see anyway around that. We can argue what is two and we can argue what is one, but the logic can't change. I haven't been satisfied with the discussion on the Fate, Luck and Chance thread, most of all because of the form of it, and the content for me is dubious. I'm sure the intentions are good even if they may be poorly formed. Whether that is true or not, I'm still a subject and I'm not in the mood for receiving blackeyes because I cannot argue with my muscles. I don't think knowledge takes place by beating it into a person. As far as me taking things personally, I'm not sure how to take that except as personally. Which apparently is the wrong way to take it. So please explain how not to do that. Am I supposed to address you with my sock puppet? :) Tell me how should I take things? I am a person and I am a speaker and I'm relating my thoughts and my feelings to the list, they aren't someone else's, they are not yours, and they certainly are not Andy's. :) I don't think I'm superimposing my point of view as those of anyone else's. Am I? To be honest, and perhaps to provide you a little more material to respond, I was truly stumped by your reply and so the only connections I could make were to connect to what I had said before, and since what I'd discussed before were the meaning of pyramids and a mention of Sanskrit, I filled in some gaps. I certainly made a lot of assumptions but what else could I do? I thought maybe you thought I was making strange assertions so I tried to clarify my assertions. Clearly I failed and made things more muddy. Yet, these assumptions would occur similarly if I were talking about cats and then you talked about dogs. The connection I would make is that it must have to do with cats being animals because dogs are animals too. I can only relate to the world from where I stand. I'm not sure why that is seems to be controversial (relating from where I stand). I don't know anyone who doesn't relate to the world from one's own perspective. This ventriloquism of objectivity is quite daunting to me. It seems all together unhealthy and non-relational. The clumping together of Korean shamanism and Vedic culture is done from the outside, by a Westerner. I in no way desire to trash Halliday, so please don't take that as my position. As a person who has spent sometime studying aspects of Vedic culture (not all, and I in no way mean to represent myself as an expert, maybe just a perty novice), this clumping together doesn't make any sense (to me). Clearly it does to you, so explain what that is like to you. I don't understand, because it is not what it is like to me. It's like this: Let's say I have a bookshelf full of books that I've previously placed in alphabetical order. The order of the books has a utility to me so that I not only store my books, but I can access them again after I've forgotten where I put my copy of Mind In Society, placed in my "V" section, of course. If I were to take all my books off my shelf and arrange them by the colors of their covers and position them like a color wheel, it would certainly look pretty, but I've completely destroyed my ability to find my books because it means an extra layer of complexity that is not based upon the content of the books or the authors, but their form. And now I've lost my copy of Mind in Society because I can't remember if my copy is the one with the aqua cover or the purple one! This is what I think happens by classifying cultures in this way. Classifying things by their form has some use, but it is limited and can lead us astray. Just like novices will make associations based on surface features, we Westerners may be doing the same thing with cultures outside our own. (Please don't tell me this is a new idea for you!) There is one thing I know for certain. We Westerners are novices about the East. For me to accept your premise I'd have to discuss with you at length what I understand to be Vedic culture, and I presume you being in Korean you know something about Korean shamanism and you'd need to explain that to me. We'd also have to understand what Halliday's objective was and whether it has a solid premise. In the end we still might be off because our understanding of the cultures might still be inaccurate to the task. Why? because we must still start from where we stand, within our own Western culture. I'm not following what kind of thought sculpture you are inviting me to regard by looking at pyramids as mental mountains. It's clear to me that they had meaning to someone at some point in history, I'm not sure what it can tell me about the minds of Ancient Egyptians, because all I'm dealing with are the forms and very eroded forms at that. I know that I could never be a hero of history because it would mean living quite a long time, and I don't see myself that mythically. I'm just little old me. I apologize if I've made further wrong assumptions in my reply. Maybe we need to build a bridge or something... Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Nov 25 17:02:48 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 18:02:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> Message-ID: Respectfully: i may be stepping into something heated here, because it is personal, whether it is meant to be or not. I would like to suggest that we can get some help from the linguistic relativity hypothesis: it?s strong and weak form. In its strong form, might say that communication between people who speak different languages is well nigh impossible because of differences in the way they construe the world. The weak form is that it is possible, though not easy. Learning a second language is not the monumental leap a first language is, but the greater the ?distance? between two languages, the more impressive it is. I tend to think that, despite the conventionality of language that makes communication possible, all communication is to some extent metalinguistic because everybody?s language represents at least slight differences in perspectives on the world. And we spend much of our time repairing our muck ups to get it right. I agree with David about the importance of, what I think one can call iconicity in language. I think it is pervasive in the way we talk, even down to the perish and dapple of Andy. Our idoms and metaphors are riddled with sound symbolism, not so concrete as onomatopeia, but very much affected by the socially and personally preferred music of our speech, it?s tone and rhythm in the articulation of our syllables. And somehow, I think, this iconicity is related to the question Vera asks about the developmental issues in this thread. However abstract language becomes, it has its roots in the very physical connection between meaning and the phonological means we have of evoking that meaning. So much has been made of l?artbtraire of sign and referent (e.g., ?dog" and ?perro" neither sound like the four legged critter) that it camouflages how physical language expression is. McCluhan?s dictm, the medium is the message, makes much sense to me. And where does ?sense?, as it has been used on this chat, if not at least partly from this physicality? If there has been any problems of miscommunication on this thread, perhaps it?s because sometimes we expect too much of written language? I love language, but I love dance (salsa anyone?), music, cinema, sculpture, architecture because of their iconicity, their immediacy. And because they all shout ?creativity? to me. But then even the mundane, everyday use of language is creative. And the turns and returns of this chat are creative. And who says they have to always be comfortable? But they are not destructive. I am so grateful that we are living in a time unlike Vygotsky?s. His heroism is part of the reason we celebrate and mine his legacy. And now I offer my turn into the silence of the chat of the last hour that has given me a chance to craft what for most of you could have done in much less time. I so very much respect written language and the care you all take in getting it right. Frankly, I?m amazed. Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 4:44 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Dear David, > > Thank you for your reply. > > The shape of the discussion on this list is difficult to negotiate because it seems there is denial of any subjects here speaking to one another. It seems we are all just illusions speaking to ourselves. So we swap the word "subject" for "phantom." It still doesn't explain subjectivity. It is infinite regression, i.e., turtles all the way down. > > I hope I am not saying that I'm the only subject here, but it feels like that. We are all subjects, and how it is like for us, each of us, will give us far more information than abstracting all these forms into ideals. That is why I feel we haven't really moved from Descartes, we've only swapped words around. It doesn't solve "the duality problem." > > If you want to eliminate duality, then there must be a basis for something appearing as dual. Meaning, what appears as two is really one. I don't see anyway around that. We can argue what is two and we can argue what is one, but the logic can't change. > > I haven't been satisfied with the discussion on the Fate, Luck and Chance thread, most of all because of the form of it, and the content for me is dubious. I'm sure the intentions are good even if they may be poorly formed. Whether that is true or not, I'm still a subject and I'm not in the mood for receiving blackeyes because I cannot argue with my muscles. I don't think knowledge takes place by beating it into a person. > > As far as me taking things personally, I'm not sure how to take that except as personally. Which apparently is the wrong way to take it. So please explain how not to do that. Am I supposed to address you with my sock puppet? :) Tell me how should I take things? > > I am a person and I am a speaker and I'm relating my thoughts and my feelings to the list, they aren't someone else's, they are not yours, and they certainly are not Andy's. :) I don't think I'm superimposing my point of view as those of anyone else's. Am I? > > To be honest, and perhaps to provide you a little more material to respond, I was truly stumped by your reply and so the only connections I could make were to connect to what I had said before, and since what I'd discussed before were the meaning of pyramids and a mention of Sanskrit, I filled in some gaps. I certainly made a lot of assumptions but what else could I do? > > I thought maybe you thought I was making strange assertions so I tried to clarify my assertions. Clearly I failed and made things more muddy. > > Yet, these assumptions would occur similarly if I were talking about cats and then you talked about dogs. The connection I would make is that it must have to do with cats being animals because dogs are animals too. I can only relate to the world from where I stand. I'm not sure why that is seems to be controversial (relating from where I stand). I don't know anyone who doesn't relate to the world from one's own perspective. This ventriloquism of objectivity is quite daunting to me. It seems all together unhealthy and non-relational. > > The clumping together of Korean shamanism and Vedic culture is done from the outside, by a Westerner. I in no way desire to trash Halliday, so please don't take that as my position. As a person who has spent sometime studying aspects of Vedic culture (not all, and I in no way mean to represent myself as an expert, maybe just a perty novice), this clumping together doesn't make any sense (to me). Clearly it does to you, so explain what that is like to you. I don't understand, because it is not what it is like to me. > > It's like this: > > Let's say I have a bookshelf full of books that I've previously placed in alphabetical order. The order of the books has a utility to me so that I not only store my books, but I can access them again after I've forgotten where I put my copy of Mind In Society, placed in my "V" section, of course. > > If I were to take all my books off my shelf and arrange them by the colors of their covers and position them like a color wheel, it would certainly look pretty, but I've completely destroyed my ability to find my books because it means an extra layer of complexity that is not based upon the content of the books or the authors, but their form. And now I've lost my copy of Mind in Society because I can't remember if my copy is the one with the aqua cover or the purple one! > > This is what I think happens by classifying cultures in this way. Classifying things by their form has some use, but it is limited and can lead us astray. Just like novices will make associations based on surface features, we Westerners may be doing the same thing with cultures outside our own. (Please don't tell me this is a new idea for you!) There is one thing I know for certain. We Westerners are novices about the East. > > For me to accept your premise I'd have to discuss with you at length what I understand to be Vedic culture, and I presume you being in Korean you know something about Korean shamanism and you'd need to explain that to me. We'd also have to understand what Halliday's objective was and whether it has a solid premise. In the end we still might be off because our understanding of the cultures might still be inaccurate to the task. Why? because we must still start from where we stand, within our own Western culture. > > I'm not following what kind of thought sculpture you are inviting me to regard by looking at pyramids as mental mountains. It's clear to me that they had meaning to someone at some point in history, I'm not sure what it can tell me about the minds of Ancient Egyptians, because all I'm dealing with are the forms and very eroded forms at that. > > I know that I could never be a hero of history because it would mean living quite a long time, and I don't see myself that mythically. I'm just little old me. I apologize if I've made further wrong assumptions in my reply. > > Maybe we need to build a bridge or something... > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Nov 25 18:36:19 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:36:19 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> Message-ID: <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to my enquiry. Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its tiny size reminded me. But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is an old man. That's what I was interested in. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be > de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have > any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) > to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? > > Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine > whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation > where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and > everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the > answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that > you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. > > You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception > that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we > put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the > generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both > externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context > as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and > we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself > alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden > household we mean. > > This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the > other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language > as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to > say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed > referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer > to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is > no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated > singularity: all verbs are common verbs. > > But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether > there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do > word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort > of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some > generalization we make about it? > > Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter > of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like > the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than > lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday > calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a > closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but > those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense > morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you > can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they > are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or > less the same effect. > > In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and > "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not > closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big > changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins > reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they > apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations > (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his > use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" > means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels > (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of > "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than > about rubber). > > And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the > thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to > Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how > consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy > was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities > like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is > picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his > undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He > doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he > would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do > have unique referents. > > We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot > say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). > But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see > fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's > adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in > Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean > also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe > the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky > panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's > opinion, is the origin of consciousness. > > My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to > me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize > unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech > community) generalize the notion of "luck". > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I am coming late to this, but I think ?collocation? would be of interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >>> >>> Andy >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Nov 25 19:40:59 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 21:40:59 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> Message-ID: <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to my enquiry. > Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. > As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its tiny size reminded me. > But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. > Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." > So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. > Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is an old man. That's what I was interested in. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: >> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >> >> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >> >> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >> household we mean. >> >> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >> >> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >> generalization we make about it? >> >> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >> less the same effect. >> >> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >> about rubber). >> >> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >> have unique referents. >> >> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >> >> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I am coming late to this, but I think ?collocation? would be of interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> -- >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Nov 25 21:11:27 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 05:11:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> Dear Henry, Thank you for your reply. I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach than one who doesn't know one doesn't know. Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. Kind regards, Annalisa From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Nov 25 22:44:49 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 06:44:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will 'Know'. Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved wrong on this!). The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think together in our 'own' heads). I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives these vowels a different 'feel' for us. I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. Ed On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to my enquiry. > Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. > As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its tiny size reminded me. > But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. > Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." > So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. > Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is an old man. That's what I was interested in. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: >> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >> >> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >> >> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >> household we mean. >> >> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >> >> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >> generalization we make about it? >> >> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >> less the same effect. >> >> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >> about rubber). >> >> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >> have unique referents. >> >> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >> >> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber respectively)? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> -- >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. 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From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 02:16:19 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:16:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, the use of 'is' in an assertion about categories is to assert that one category is a sub-category of the other. Hence, 'a square is a rectangle' is an assertion that a square is special kind of rectangle in which both sides have the same length. Best, Huw On 24 November 2014 at 22:13, Martin John Packer wrote: > Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having > unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously > (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of > matter. > > Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... > > Martin > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 4:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > A small point, perhaps: "Consciousness is materially constituted". > > > > Stating that "consciousness is matter (or material)" is rather like > saying > > that a square is matter as opposed to saying that a square is a > rectangle, > > unless of course one intends to assert that consciousness is the entirety > > of matter. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 24 November 2014 at 21:19, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > >> Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow > >> forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p > >> > >> Peter Smagorinsky > >> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > >> Department of Language and Literacy Education > >> The University of Georgia > >> 315 Aderhold Hall > >> Athens, GA 30602 > >> > >> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > >> > >> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > >> > >> > >> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > >> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >> > >> Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: > >> > >> [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] > >> > >> > >> > >> Peter Smagorinsky > >> > >> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > >> > >> Department of Language and Literacy Education > >> > >> The University of Georgia > >> > >> 315 Aderhold Hall > >> > >> Athens, GA 30602 > >> > >> > >> > >> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > >> > >> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > >> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >> > >> > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> > >> > >> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a > >> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, > and/or in > >> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud > any > >> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own > assumed) > >> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole > >> tradition of science." :( > >> > >> > >> > >> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness > >> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain > >> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. > >> > >> > >> > >> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists > >> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - > >> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called > >> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world > >> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. > They > >> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is > "mind," > >> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical > >> activities. > >> > >> > >> > >> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my > last > >> message. > >> > >> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to > >> translate Vygotsky's Russian. > >> > >>> You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the > >> issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > >> > >>> Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > >> > >>> > >> > >>> Andy > >> > >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >>> -- > >> > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >> > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >>> > >> > >>> > >> > >>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >> > >>>> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and > >> 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do > you > >> have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is > an > >> adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the > adjective > >> to anything to which the noun would not also apply. > >> > >>>> Martin > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>>> Annalisa, > >> > >>>>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we > establish > >> some shared concepts and word meanings. > >> > >>>>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to > >> almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical > >> category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of > >> consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite > category > >> (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside > of > >> consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base > >> category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, > etc., > >> from what exists. > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the > >> people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then > >> confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up > >> > >>>>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>> Andy > >> > >>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >>>>> ---- > >> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> > >>>>> > >> > >>>>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say > >> word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is > material > >> doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the > >> constituted identically. The difference is in form. > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This > >> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on > and > >> you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is > the > >> basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one > >> is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far > as > >> space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is > >> pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these > >> conceptual distinctions are important. > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> But that's me. > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> Kind regards > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> Annalisa > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >> > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >> > >>>>>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >> > >>>>>> > > >> > >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM > >> > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is > >> > >>>>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your > >> > >>>>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I > >> > >>>>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists > >> > >>>>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in > >> > >>>>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your > >> > >>>>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. > >> > >>>>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you > >> > >>>>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a > >> > >>>>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word > >> > >>>>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. > >> > >>>>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material > >> > >>>>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to > >> > >>>>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that > >> > >>>>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave > >> to your words. > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> Andy > >> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >>>>>> ----- > >> > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> Andy, > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally > or > >> metaphorically? > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different > order > >> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see > >> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of > >> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, > if > >> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the > body > >> different from the dance? > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> Kind regards, > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> Annalisa > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>> > >> > >>>> > >> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 02:54:36 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:54:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> References: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> Message-ID: On 25 November 2014 at 19:47, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Haydi, > What?s a ?stop? signal?! I lack chat etiquette know how I?ll bet. But let > me charge ahead. Respectfully. So, what do you, or anyone, think of the > substance of my comment/conjecture? Are humans wired differently with how > they use their eyes to point? Of course, this doesn?t explain how blind > people acquire language. Still? > Henry > > It was an area of interest for Gregory Bateson who wrote about the communication of perceptual organs, ears being a rather obvious one. I recall teaching a dog to follow my pointing using a kind of throwing gesture. Best, Huw > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > > > Thanks HENRY ! et al ! > > > > First as I was not catching up with the posts , I didn't see the 'stop' > signal on discussion . If you count my posts in a year , you will see that > I'm the least-heard voice . > > > > Second Vera John-Steiner is not someone not known at least to old > participants . Then As I knew her , I very seriously put some questions in > the hope she will kindly help . Maybe tweeters and retweeters and > button-pressers have seen sarcasm , arrogance ?? in what I humbly wrote in > which case they have just been playing memoirs . We have a proverb saying : > bowls hotter than soup . Please let your respectable teacher talk whatever > and however they wish to . There was misunderstanding of clouding which > very swiftly and fortunately switched to 'unclouding' . Why again ? It's a > matter of hours !! Sorry !! > > > > Best > > > > Haydi > > > > > > > > > > > > From: HENRY SHONERD > > To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > > Cc: "vygotsky@unm.edu" > > Sent: Tuesday, 25 November 2014, 10:06:32 > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance > > > > Hi Haydi and Vera, > > I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students > (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of > interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through > ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that > this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I > can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) > to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far > as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says > something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the > development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this > displacement applies both spatially and temporally. > > Henry > > > > > > > > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > > > > > > Hi Vera, > > > Respectfully ! > > > 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger > share of the truth . But... > > > 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is > that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being > aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing > Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two > components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have > to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. > > > 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , > etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having > said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring > its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or > gradience ? > > > 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to > the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called > 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to > just human beings . > > > 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of > consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I > could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . > amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? > > > 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : > > > a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . > > > b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . > > > c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . > > > Best > > > Haydi > > > From: Vera John-Steiner vygotsky@unm.edu>> > > > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > > > > Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on > consciousness and > > > that is that what we experience as adults > > > is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is > the > > > consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among > > > other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not > aware > > > of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, > > > all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the > > > beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. > > > Vera > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > > > > > > Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are > some > > > points of difference that it might be worth exploring. > > > > > > First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow > that > > > consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how > could > > > one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty > that "My > > > consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and > partial, > > > but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to > know > > > itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience > directly, > > > in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from > what > > > I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness > in > > > this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned > in a > > > previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my > consciousness, > > > but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. > Unlike > > > Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. > > > Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. > > > > > > Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences > about > > > another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions > of > > > experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) > However, I > > > also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own > consciousness is > > > a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside > my > > > consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In > just > > > the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. > I come > > > to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life > > > spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like > consciousness, > > > first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I > am > > > helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose > > > processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. > > > > > > Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those > who > > > say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that > we can > > > know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the > paradox, > > > unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > > > > >> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material > process" > > > despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and > independently of > > > consciousness" as you say, Martin. > > >> > > >> In > > >> > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a < > https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a> > > >> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" > > >> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly > > > introduce the first person pronoun here? > > >> > > >> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I > know > > > through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a > phantom, > > > and fundamentally different from that which is outside my > consciousness and > > > reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions > in the > > > world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a > simple > > > organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, > mediate my > > > relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is > not > > > 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough > and in > > > any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, > than > > > nervous reflexes. > > >> > > >> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and > therefore I > > > must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on > the > > > fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and > your > > > physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated > access to > > > it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same > way in > > > that sense that I learnt your name and age. > > >> > > >> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and > > >> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material > > >> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up > > >> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the > > >> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter > > >> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually > > >> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of > > >> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that > > >> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with > > >> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person > > >> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is > > >> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a > > >> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. > > >> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. > > >> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of > > >> consci > > > ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, > which > > > I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. > Consciousness > > > is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal > > > activity there. > > >> > > >> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material > process," > > > but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I > admit it > > > is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more > restraint? > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having > > > unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. > Obviously > > > (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of > > > matter. > > >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... > > >>> > > >>> Martin > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I > > >>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an > > >>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm > > >>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that > > >>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I > > >>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." > > >>>>> :( > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that > > >>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are > > >>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) > motion. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those > > >>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are > > >>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some > > >>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental > > >>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who > > >>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper > > > object of investigation for psychology is "mind," > > >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical > > >>>>> activities. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in > > >>>>> my last message. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Martin > > >>>>> > > >>> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 04:33:09 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 12:33:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Mmm. Thanks Huw. But it wasn't the word "is" that was confusing me. My point has been that consciousness is a material process, not some kind of mysterious 'mental' process that goes on in a mysterious place called 'mind.' And the point of the discussion about Lenin's formula was to emphasize that in Crisis this formula was part of LSV's argument that consciousness is material, that it exists objectively. And this in turn means that consciousness can an object of inquiry for science. For LSV, the new psychology was to be the scientific study of consciousness as an objective existence. Consciousness, how it functions (as a dynamic system), and how it develops. Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 5:16 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Martin, the use of 'is' in an assertion about categories is to assert that > one category is a sub-category of the other. Hence, 'a square is a > rectangle' is an assertion that a square is special kind of rectangle in > which both sides have the same length. > > Best, > Huw > > On 24 November 2014 at 22:13, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously >> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >> matter. >> >> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 4:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> A small point, perhaps: "Consciousness is materially constituted". >>> >>> Stating that "consciousness is matter (or material)" is rather like >> saying >>> that a square is matter as opposed to saying that a square is a >> rectangle, >>> unless of course one intends to assert that consciousness is the entirety >>> of matter. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> On 24 November 2014 at 21:19, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >>> >>>> Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow >>>> forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p >>>> >>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>> The University of Georgia >>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>> >>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>> >>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>> >>>> >>>> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: >>>> >>>> [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>> >>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>> >>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>> >>>> The University of Georgia >>>> >>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>> >>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>> >>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, >> and/or in >>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud >> any >>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own >> assumed) >>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>> tradition of science." :( >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. >> They >>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is >> "mind," >>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>> activities. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my >> last >>>> message. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to >>>> translate Vygotsky's Russian. >>>> >>>>> You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the >>>> issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. >>>> >>>>> Read Haydi's message. It's all there. >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> Andy >>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>>> -- >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and >>>> 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do >> you >>>> have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is >> an >>>> adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the >> adjective >>>> to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa, >>>> >>>>>>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we >> establish >>>> some shared concepts and word meanings. >>>> >>>>>>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to >>>> almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical >>>> category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of >>>> consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite >> category >>>> (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside >> of >>>> consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base >>>> category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, >> etc., >>>> from what exists. >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the >>>> people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then >>>> confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up >>>> >>>>>>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>> >>>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>>>>> ---- >>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say >>>> word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is >> material >>>> doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the >>>> constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This >>>> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on >> and >>>> you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is >> the >>>> basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one >>>> is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far >> as >>>> space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is >>>> pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these >>>> conceptual distinctions are important. >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> But that's me. >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>> >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> >>>>>>>> > >>>> >>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>>> >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>>> >>>>>>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your >>>> >>>>>>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I >>>> >>>>>>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists >>>> >>>>>>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in >>>> >>>>>>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your >>>> >>>>>>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. >>>> >>>>>>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you >>>> >>>>>>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a >>>> >>>>>>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word >>>> >>>>>>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. >>>> >>>>>>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material >>>> >>>>>>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to >>>> >>>>>>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that >>>> >>>>>>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave >>>> to your words. >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>>>>>> ----- >>>> >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally >> or >>>> metaphorically? >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different >> order >>>> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see >>>> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of >>>> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, >> if >>>> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the >> body >>>> different from the dance? >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 04:43:20 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 23:43:20 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5475CAE8.40508@mira.net> Martin, I find it best to simply avoid words like "mysterious". Inserting words like "mysterious" and "magical" into a view which you want to impute to an antagonist is a typical Soviet form of argument in my experience. Just say "consciousness is not a mental process" if that's what you mean. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Mmm. Thanks Huw. But it wasn't the word "is" that was confusing me. > > My point has been that consciousness is a material process, not some kind of mysterious 'mental' process that goes on in a mysterious place called 'mind.' > > And the point of the discussion about Lenin's formula was to emphasize that in Crisis this formula was part of LSV's argument that consciousness is material, that it exists objectively. > > And this in turn means that consciousness can an object of inquiry for science. For LSV, the new psychology was to be the scientific study of consciousness as an objective existence. Consciousness, how it functions (as a dynamic system), and how it develops. > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 5:16 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >> Martin, the use of 'is' in an assertion about categories is to assert that >> one category is a sub-category of the other. Hence, 'a square is a >> rectangle' is an assertion that a square is special kind of rectangle in >> which both sides have the same length. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 24 November 2014 at 22:13, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >> >>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. Obviously >>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>> matter. >>> >>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 4:41 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> >>>> A small point, perhaps: "Consciousness is materially constituted". >>>> >>>> Stating that "consciousness is matter (or material)" is rather like >>>> >>> saying >>> >>>> that a square is matter as opposed to saying that a square is a >>>> >>> rectangle, >>> >>>> unless of course one intends to assert that consciousness is the entirety >>>> of matter. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 24 November 2014 at 21:19, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow >>>>> forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p >>>>> >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> The University of Georgia >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>> >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>>> >>>>> Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: >>>>> >>>>> [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>>> >>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> >>>>> The University of Georgia >>>>> >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>> >>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert a >>>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, >>>>> >>> and/or in >>> >>>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud >>>>> >>> any >>> >>>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own >>>>> >>> assumed) >>> >>>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole >>>>> tradition of science." :( >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness >>>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of (certain >>>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those psychologists >>>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - >>>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm called >>>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world >>>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. >>>>> >>> They >>> >>>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is >>>>> >>> "mind," >>> >>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my >>>>> >>> last >>> >>>>> message. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying to >>>>>> >>>>> translate Vygotsky's Russian. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the >>>>>> >>>>> issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Read Haydi's message. It's all there. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and >>>>>>> >>>>> 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do >>>>> >>> you >>> >>>>> have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, is >>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>> adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the >>>>> >>> adjective >>> >>>>> to anything to which the noun would not also apply. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we >>>>>>>> >>> establish >>> >>>>> some shared concepts and word meanings. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to >>>>>>>> >>>>> almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical >>>>> category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently of >>>>> consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite >>>>> >>> category >>> >>>>> (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both outside >>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>> consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base >>>>> category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, >>>>> >>> etc., >>> >>>>> from what exists. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the >>>>>>>> >>>>> people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then >>>>> confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ---- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say >>>>>>>>> >>>>> word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is >>>>> >>> material >>> >>>>> doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the >>>>> constituted identically. The difference is in form. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This >>>>>>>>> >>>>> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des Gar?on >>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>> you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is >>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>> basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither one >>>>>>>>> >>>>> is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As far >>>>> >>> as >>> >>>>> space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is >>>>> pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think these >>>>> conceptual distinctions are important. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> But that's me. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>>>>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> exists other than in one or another of its material instantiations. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing material >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you gave >>>>>>>>> >>>>> to your words. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ----- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally >>>>>>>>>> >>> or >>> >>>>> metaphorically? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different >>>>>>>>>> >>> order >>> >>>>> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see >>>>> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of >>>>> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, >>>>> >>> if >>> >>>>> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the >>>>> >>> body >>> >>>>> different from the dance? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 05:11:35 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:11:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Sure, Martin. What is confusing? >From what I can see such contentions hinge upon obtaining a conception of autopoiesis or material systemic circuits. But I think we'd still need to be careful with various forms of reductionism, i.e. that consciousness is not merely derived from neuronal circuitry etc, but rather that we're interested in the circuitry of actions and activity that are socially constituted. I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions are materially manifested. As I see it there are plenty of people who have a vested interested in avoiding the notion that consciousness is constituted by material relations. The only problem with that is when those opinions are an impediment to one's work. Best, Huw On 26 November 2014 at 12:33, Martin John Packer wrote: > Mmm. Thanks Huw. But it wasn't the word "is" that was confusing me. > > My point has been that consciousness is a material process, not some kind > of mysterious 'mental' process that goes on in a mysterious place called > 'mind.' > > And the point of the discussion about Lenin's formula was to emphasize > that in Crisis this formula was part of LSV's argument that consciousness > is material, that it exists objectively. > > And this in turn means that consciousness can an object of inquiry for > science. For LSV, the new psychology was to be the scientific study of > consciousness as an objective existence. Consciousness, how it functions > (as a dynamic system), and how it develops. > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 5:16 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Martin, the use of 'is' in an assertion about categories is to assert > that > > one category is a sub-category of the other. Hence, 'a square is a > > rectangle' is an assertion that a square is special kind of rectangle in > > which both sides have the same length. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 24 November 2014 at 22:13, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > >> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having > >> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. > Obviously > >> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of > >> matter. > >> > >> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Nov 24, 2014, at 4:41 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> > >>> A small point, perhaps: "Consciousness is materially constituted". > >>> > >>> Stating that "consciousness is matter (or material)" is rather like > >> saying > >>> that a square is matter as opposed to saying that a square is a > >> rectangle, > >>> unless of course one intends to assert that consciousness is the > entirety > >>> of matter. > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 24 November 2014 at 21:19, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > >>> > >>>> Apologies! That was a response to something else entirely (major snow > >>>> forecast following summer temps in the Philadelphia/NYC area). p > >>>> > >>>> Peter Smagorinsky > >>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > >>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education > >>>> The University of Georgia > >>>> 315 Aderhold Hall > >>>> Athens, GA 30602 > >>>> > >>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > >>>> > >>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:02 PM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >>>> > >>>> Amazing when juxtaposed with today's temps: > >>>> > >>>> [cid:image001.png@01D007FF.FEAF7170] > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Peter Smagorinsky > >>>> > >>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > >>>> > >>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education > >>>> > >>>> The University of Georgia > >>>> > >>>> 315 Aderhold Hall > >>>> > >>>> Athens, GA 30602 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > >>>> > >>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 3:53 PM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Andy, > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I assert > a > >>>> position here in this discussion I try to base it on an argument, > >> and/or in > >>>> sources that we all have access to. I'm certainly not trying to cloud > >> any > >>>> issues, and I don't think that arguing from authority (one's own > >> assumed) > >>>> dispels the clouds. I guess I simply don't have access to "a whole > >>>> tradition of science." :( > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that consciousness > >>>> (and thinking) are material processes. They are consequences of > (certain > >>>> kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) motion. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those > psychologists > >>>> who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are mental processes - > >>>> processes which they believe take place in some mysterious realm > called > >>>> "the mind" that is populated by "mental representations" of the "world > >>>> outside." I deal with people who make this argument on a daily basis. > >> They > >>>> believe that the proper object of investigation for psychology is > >> "mind," > >>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical > >>>> activities. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in my > >> last > >>>> message. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 8:35 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> I am speaking from a whole tradition of science, Martin, not trying > to > >>>> translate Vygotsky's Russian. > >>>> > >>>>> You are an expert yourself in using the word "material" to cloud the > >>>> issue so I hardly think I need give you lessons. > >>>> > >>>>> Read Haydi's message. It's all there. > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> Andy, from where do you obtain this distinction between 'matter' and > >>>> 'material'? Are we dealing here with two distinct words in Russian? Do > >> you > >>>> have any evidence that LSV draws such a distinction? One, of course, > is > >> an > >>>> adjective and the other is a noun. But why would anyone apply the > >> adjective > >>>> to anything to which the noun would not also apply. > >>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 23, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa, > >>>> > >>>>>>> It is impossible to take this conversation forward unless we > >> establish > >>>> some shared concepts and word meanings. > >>>> > >>>>>>> "Material" is a word which can be used very loosely and applied to > >>>> almost anything. But "matter" (in this discourse) is a philosophical > >>>> category denoting all that which exists outside of and independently > of > >>>> consciousness but is knowable through human activity. Any finite > >> category > >>>> (such as word, cosmos, thing, movement, ...) in some sense both > outside > >> of > >>>> consciousness and a product of consciousness, but "matter" is the base > >>>> category which distinguishes illusions, fantasies, phantoms, ideas, > >> etc., > >>>> from what exists. > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> You can mean anything you like by any of these words, but if the > >>>> people you are talking to mean something else by the same words, then > >>>> confusion can follow. We need to be on the same page. > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> All the basic concepts are explained, with references for follow-up > >>>> > >>>>>>> reading here: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT/WebHome > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>>>>> > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>> > >>>>>>> ---- > >>>> > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Ok Andy, I want to give this the time it deserves, but when I say > >>>> word is not material but form, what I mean is that to say word is > >> material > >>>> doesn't distinguish it from sound, because word and sound are the > >>>> constituted identically. The difference is in form. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> If I may say, it's like saying fashion is nothing but fabric. This > >>>> doesn't tell me anything about fashion and why I like Commes des > Gar?on > >> and > >>>> you like Vivian Westwood. I intuit at this point in time that form is > >> the > >>>> basis of culture, not material because almost everything is material. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> I would only make allowance for time and space, because neither > one > >>>> is material. If you tell me time is a clock, I'm going to laugh. As > far > >> as > >>>> space, material is in space, but space is not "in" material, it is > >>>> pervasive, but not "in" it. Space is not made of material. I think > these > >>>> conceptual distinctions are important. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> But that's me. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Kind regards > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 6:59 PM > >>>> > >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa, making a distinction between matter and movement is > >>>> > >>>>>>>> problematic and was not my intention. The atoms which make up your > >>>> > >>>>>>>> body will be dancing somewhere else 7 years from now. In any case > I > >>>> > >>>>>>>> meant "matter" in the philosophical sense, as that which exists > >>>> > >>>>>>>> independently of and outside of consciousness. So pressure waves > in > >>>> > >>>>>>>> air are equally material as scratches on paper, characters on your > >>>> > >>>>>>>> screen or inscriptions on stone tablets. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Because we are inclined to say that the little packet of sound you > >>>> > >>>>>>>> get when you say "ger" is 'the same word' as what is written a > >>>> > >>>>>>>> couple of inches back on this line, we easily forget that no word > >>>> > >>>>>>>> exists other than in one or another of its material > instantiations. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> But we don't talk by mental telepathy, but only by placing > material > >>>> > >>>>>>>> objects within the perceptual fields of another person, for them > to > >>>> > >>>>>>>> interpret. It's when there is some breakdown in communication that > >>>> > >>>>>>>> you hyave to go back and look at the actual, material form you > gave > >>>> to your words. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>> > >>>>>>>> ----- > >>>> > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy, > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally > >> or > >>>> metaphorically? > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different > >> order > >>>> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite > see > >>>> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements > of > >>>> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is > material, > >> if > >>>> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the > >> body > >>>> different from the dance? > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 05:21:26 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 00:21:26 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say > Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions > are materially manifested. > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 05:52:29 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:52:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> References: <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> Message-ID: <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. > > But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >> are materially manifested. >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 05:58:14 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 00:58:14 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> References: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. > > By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. >> >> But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >>> are materially manifested. >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 06:08:36 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 14:08:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> References: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> Message-ID: <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, no! And we are close to agreement here! > LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. >> >> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. >>> >>> But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >>>> are materially manifested. >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 06:13:56 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 01:13:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> References: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to see what is the matter: the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism ] Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. >>> >>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. >>>> >>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >>>>> are materially manifested. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 06:37:26 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 14:37:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> References: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> Message-ID: It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", I understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see what is wrong with it". This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be distinct things, but rather distinct foci). Huw On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden wrote: > In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we perceive > as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again required > to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. Who will > study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? > > But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in > science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause > of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist > independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in > Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, > psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the > viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I > would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of > the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the > appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor > in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical > theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two > processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not always a > subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question > is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide. One has only to > apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar > one can be found in Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in > order to see what is the matter: > > the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is > the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our > consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing > other than objective reality, existing independently from human > consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and > Empirio-Criticism five2.htm#bkV14P260F01>] > > Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of > /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by > inconsistent thinkers. > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study >>> illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two >>> objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can >>> be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light >>> rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise >>> and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I >>> completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study >>>> illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to >>>> *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real >>>> mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the >>>> mirror. >>>> >>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be >>>> suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find >>>> some flaw with LSV's argument? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" >>>>> I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which >>>>> proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, >>>>> my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am >>>>> "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that >>>>> consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - >>>>> because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the >>>>> psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's >>>>> discuss that. >>>>> >>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like >>>>> stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and >>>>> its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the >>>>> neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is >>>>> just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very >>>>> useful illusion." :) >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such >>>>>> illusions >>>>>> are materially manifested. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 06:43:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 14:43:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> References: <54713DF5.3040708@mira.net> <1416785099535.29920@unm.edu> <54729112.3050604@mira.net> <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I don't see anything here that suggests that LSV viewed consciousness as an illusion. If you are drawing our attention to the phrase "It does not exist in reality," this refers to the apparent difference between the lengths of two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion. Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? > > But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to see what is the matter: > > the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism ] > > Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers. > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. >>>> >>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. >>>>> >>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >>>>>> are materially manifested. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 06:47:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 01:47:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> Message-ID: <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> Exactly! There is a difference between the objective processes (which can be studied by science) which produce, or as you say, yield the illusion and the illusion itself. That is the *whole* point. To deny this difference in the name of "embedded consciousness" or rejecting "some kind of mental process" as "mysterious" is to retreat into absurdities. We *do* indeed experience consciousness (i.e. mental processes), i.e., we experience illusions, but these illusions arise from objective, material processes which we can understand and study. But the illusion *in itself*, the product, cannot be studied scientifically. And for the same reason - that is, that the illusions arise from from objective material processes, they are *useful guides to those material processes* for the beings which enjoy those illusions and have to live by them. Vygotsky calls them "phantoms". Do a search on "phantom" in that web page. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english > phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", > I understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see > what is wrong with it". > > This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about > separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying > consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system > yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of > consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be > distinct things, but rather distinct foci). > > Huw > > On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we > perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it > is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from > how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both > times, this /*appearance*/? > > But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, > in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the > /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the > phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance > itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: > Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of > them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of > physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing > processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines > and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I > would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a > result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of > this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of > knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two > processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not > always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and > subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and > being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula > of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in > Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to > see what is the matter: > > the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical > materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of > existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the > concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, > existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by > it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism > ] > > Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of > /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been > captured by inconsistent thinkers. > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > No, no! And we are close to agreement here! > LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science > does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises > from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material > processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be > studied by science (just as light rays and the things > reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study > scientifically how these illusions arise and how they > mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I > completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > > Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, > cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually > exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how > illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and > the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of > a candle appears in the mirror. > > By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you > appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied > scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with > LSV's argument? > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying > "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying > something very positive about it. It is an > illusion which proves more or less adequate for > guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear > vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, > because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is > useful I think to frankly say that consciousness > is an illusion - an illusion with survival value > for humans - because it opens a point of agreement > between the positivists and the psychologists. We > both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, > let's discuss that. > > But consciousness differs from a material process > like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated > relation between an organism and its environment, > between physiology and behaviour. This is what the > neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, > the mediating element is just an illusion, which > is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very > useful illusion." :) > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is > not useful, but I'd say > Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, > because any such illusions > are materially manifested. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 06:49:19 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 01:49:19 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> Message-ID: <5475E86F.4090305@mira.net> Martin, the word "illusion" appears three times, as I recall, in that paragraph. "Appearance" is a synonym for "illusion" and that appears 4 times, so he uses the terms 7 times in all, in that one paragraph. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, I don't see anything here that suggests that LSV viewed consciousness as an illusion. If you are drawing our attention to the phrase "It does not exist in reality," this refers to the apparent difference between the lengths of two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion. > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? >> >> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two processes which are objective in themselve >> > s. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to see what is the matter: > >> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism ] >> >> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers. >> >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. >>>>> >>>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. >>>>>> >>>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >>>>>>> are materially manifested. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 06:56:20 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 14:56:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> References: <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> Message-ID: <16C0DE53-040A-4213-B812-F8CFAFAA5CDC@uniandes.edu.co> Yes, Andy, we're in agreement on the need to distinguish between what is appearance and what is reality. And on the proposal that science studies reality, in order to explain appearances. Where we appear to disagree is that in your interpretation, LSV claims that consciousness is an illusion. In my interpretation, consciousness is an objective process, and so can be studied scientifically. Surely the central argument of Crisis is that psychology should be the scientific study of consciousness, properly understood as a material process? If LSV had argued that consciousness is an illusion, he would not have suggested that we can study it, would he? Only that we could *explain* it by studying objective processes. Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Exactly! There is a difference between the objective processes (which can be studied by science) which produce, or as you say, yield the illusion and the illusion itself. That is the *whole* point. To deny this difference in the name of "embedded consciousness" or rejecting "some kind of mental process" as "mysterious" is to retreat into absurdities. We *do* indeed experience consciousness (i.e. mental processes), i.e., we experience illusions, but these illusions arise from objective, material processes which we can understand and study. But the illusion *in itself*, the product, cannot be studied scientifically. And for the same reason - that is, that the illusions arise from from objective material processes, they are *useful guides to those material processes* for the beings which enjoy those illusions and have to live by them. > > Vygotsky calls them "phantoms". Do a search on "phantom" in that web page. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", I understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see what is wrong with it". >> >> This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be distinct things, but rather distinct foci). >> >> Huw >> >> On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we >> perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it >> is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from >> how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both >> times, this /*appearance*/? >> >> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, >> in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the >> /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the >> phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance >> itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: >> Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of >> them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of >> physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but >> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing >> processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines >> and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I >> would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a >> result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of >> this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of >> knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two >> processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not >> always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and >> subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and >> being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula >> of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in >> Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to >> see what is the matter: >> >> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical >> materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of >> existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the >> concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, >> existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by >> it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism >> ] >> >> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of >> /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been >> captured by inconsistent thinkers. >> >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> >> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science >> does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises >> from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material >> processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be >> studied by science (just as light rays and the things >> reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study >> scientifically how these illusions arise and how they >> mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I >> completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, >> cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually >> exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how >> illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and >> the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of >> a candle appears in the mirror. >> >> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you >> appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied >> scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with >> LSV's argument? >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >> >> >> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying >> "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying >> something very positive about it. It is an >> illusion which proves more or less adequate for >> guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear >> vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, >> because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is >> useful I think to frankly say that consciousness >> is an illusion - an illusion with survival value >> for humans - because it opens a point of agreement >> between the positivists and the psychologists. We >> both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, >> let's discuss that. >> >> But consciousness differs from a material process >> like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated >> relation between an organism and its environment, >> between physiology and behaviour. This is what the >> neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, >> the mediating element is just an illusion, which >> is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very >> useful illusion." :) >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is >> not useful, but I'd say >> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, >> because any such illusions >> are materially manifested. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 07:06:28 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 02:06:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <16C0DE53-040A-4213-B812-F8CFAFAA5CDC@uniandes.edu.co> References: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> <16C0DE53-040A-4213-B812-F8CFAFAA5CDC@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5475EC74.7020803@mira.net> I have to go bed now, Martin, so xmca-ers will be relieved of my nagging voice for 8 hours or so, but ... The point is: *how* do you study consciousness, which is, after all, the subject matter of psychology. History and atomic physics face the same problem. None of these sciences (or any science actually) have unmediated access to their subject matter. You would have heard the epigram that "physics is the science of meter readings". So, like any other science, psychology has to reconstruct the illusions which are its subject matter from knowledge of the objective processes which produce the illusions, unlike physics and history which aim to eliminate the illusions and rec9onstruct the objective processes. Consciousness is an illusion, but I am not deluded in believing that I experience consciousness. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Yes, Andy, we're in agreement on the need to distinguish between what is appearance and what is reality. And on the proposal that science studies reality, in order to explain appearances. Where we appear to disagree is that in your interpretation, LSV claims that consciousness is an illusion. In my interpretation, consciousness is an objective process, and so can be studied scientifically. Surely the central argument of Crisis is that psychology should be the scientific study of consciousness, properly understood as a material process? If LSV had argued that consciousness is an illusion, he would not have suggested that we can study it, would he? Only that we could *explain* it by studying objective processes. > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Exactly! There is a difference between the objective processes (which can be studied by science) which produce, or as you say, yield the illusion and the illusion itself. That is the *whole* point. To deny this difference in the name of "embedded consciousness" or rejecting "some kind of mental process" as "mysterious" is to retreat into absurdities. We *do* indeed experience consciousness (i.e. mental processes), i.e., we experience illusions, but these illusions arise from objective, material processes which we can understand and study. But the illusion *in itself*, the product, cannot be studied scientifically. And for the same reason - that is, that the illusions arise from from objective material processes, they are *useful guides to those material processes* for the beings which enjoy those illusions and have to live by them. >> >> Vygotsky calls them "phantoms". Do a search on "phantom" in that web page. >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", I understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see what is wrong with it". >>> >>> This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be distinct things, but rather distinct foci). >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we >>> perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it >>> is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from >>> how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both >>> times, this /*appearance*/? >>> >>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, >>> in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the >>> /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the >>> phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance >>> itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: >>> Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of >>> them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of >>> physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but >>> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing >>> processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines >>> and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I >>> would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a >>> result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of >>> this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of >>> knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two >>> processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not >>> always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and >>> subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and >>> being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula >>> of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in >>> Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to >>> see what is the matter: >>> >>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical >>> materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of >>> existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the >>> concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, >>> existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by >>> it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism >>> ] >>> >>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of >>> /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been >>> captured by inconsistent thinkers. >>> >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 >>> >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> >>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science >>> does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises >>> from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material >>> processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be >>> studied by science (just as light rays and the things >>> reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study >>> scientifically how these illusions arise and how they >>> mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I >>> completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, >>> cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually >>> exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how >>> illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and >>> the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of >>> a candle appears in the mirror. >>> >>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you >>> appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied >>> scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with >>> LSV's argument? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>> >>> >>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying >>> "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying >>> something very positive about it. It is an >>> illusion which proves more or less adequate for >>> guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear >>> vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, >>> because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is >>> useful I think to frankly say that consciousness >>> is an illusion - an illusion with survival value >>> for humans - because it opens a point of agreement >>> between the positivists and the psychologists. We >>> both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, >>> let's discuss that. >>> >>> But consciousness differs from a material process >>> like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated >>> relation between an organism and its environment, >>> between physiology and behaviour. This is what the >>> neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, >>> the mediating element is just an illusion, which >>> is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very >>> useful illusion." :) >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is >>> not useful, but I'd say >>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, >>> because any such illusions >>> are materially manifested. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 07:10:33 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:10:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475E86F.4090305@mira.net> References: <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E86F.4090305@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, of course he uses those words. But he never applies them to consciousness. Consciousness, for LSV, is a phenomenon, not an appearance. Consciousness is an objective process. This is LSV's argument, and I don't see how one can reasonably disagree with it. Consciousness is an objective process, just as life is an objective process. *In* consciousness various experiences are given, some of them illusory (like Muller-Lyer), others not. On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, the word "illusion" appears three times, as I recall, in that paragraph. "Appearance" is a synonym for "illusion" and that appears 4 times, so he uses the terms 7 times in all, in that one paragraph. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, I don't see anything here that suggests that LSV viewed consciousness as an illusion. If you are drawing our attention to the phrase "It does not exist in reality," this refers to the apparent difference between the lengths of two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion. >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? >>> >>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two processes which are objective in themselve >>> >> s. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to see what is the matter: >> >>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism ] >>> >>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers. >>> >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the mirror. >>>>>> >>>>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with LSV's argument? >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's discuss that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very useful illusion." :) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd say >>>>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such illusions >>>>>>>> are materially manifested. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 07:16:00 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:16:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: <5475EC74.7020803@mira.net> References: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> <16C0DE53-040A-4213-B812-F8CFAFAA5CDC@uniandes.edu.co> <5475EC74.7020803@mira.net> Message-ID: Crisis is a text about methodology, Andy, so yes, LSV's central question is how to study consciousness. (His answer is through Analysis, as you know.) But the issue he addresses is how to study consciousness as an objective process. Not as an illusion. Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise to* illusions. (Psychology is "like any other science" but is "unlike physics">>>??) Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:06 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I have to go bed now, Martin, so xmca-ers will be relieved of my nagging voice for 8 hours or so, but ... > > The point is: *how* do you study consciousness, which is, after all, the subject matter of psychology. History and atomic physics face the same problem. None of these sciences (or any science actually) have unmediated access to their subject matter. You would have heard the epigram that "physics is the science of meter readings". So, like any other science, psychology has to reconstruct the illusions which are its subject matter from knowledge of the objective processes which produce the illusions, unlike physics and history which aim to eliminate the illusions and rec9onstruct the objective processes. > > Consciousness is an illusion, but I am not deluded in believing that I experience consciousness. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Yes, Andy, we're in agreement on the need to distinguish between what is appearance and what is reality. And on the proposal that science studies reality, in order to explain appearances. Where we appear to disagree is that in your interpretation, LSV claims that consciousness is an illusion. In my interpretation, consciousness is an objective process, and so can be studied scientifically. Surely the central argument of Crisis is that psychology should be the scientific study of consciousness, properly understood as a material process? If LSV had argued that consciousness is an illusion, he would not have suggested that we can study it, would he? Only that we could *explain* it by studying objective processes. >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Exactly! There is a difference between the objective processes (which can be studied by science) which produce, or as you say, yield the illusion and the illusion itself. That is the *whole* point. To deny this difference in the name of "embedded consciousness" or rejecting "some kind of mental process" as "mysterious" is to retreat into absurdities. We *do* indeed experience consciousness (i.e. mental processes), i.e., we experience illusions, but these illusions arise from objective, material processes which we can understand and study. But the illusion *in itself*, the product, cannot be studied scientifically. And for the same reason - that is, that the illusions arise from from objective material processes, they are *useful guides to those material processes* for the beings which enjoy those illusions and have to live by them. >>> >>> Vygotsky calls them "phantoms". Do a search on "phantom" in that web page. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", I understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see what is wrong with it". >>>> >>>> This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be distinct things, but rather distinct foci). >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>>> >>>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we >>>> perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it >>>> is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from >>>> how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both >>>> times, this /*appearance*/? >>>> >>>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, >>>> in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the >>>> /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the >>>> phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance >>>> itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: >>>> Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of >>>> them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of >>>> physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but >>>> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing >>>> processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines >>>> and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I >>>> would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a >>>> result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of >>>> this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of >>>> knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two >>>> processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not >>>> always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and >>>> subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and >>>> being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula >>>> of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in >>>> Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to >>>> see what is the matter: >>>> >>>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical >>>> materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of >>>> existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the >>>> concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, >>>> existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by >>>> it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism >>>> ] >>>> >>>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of >>>> /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been >>>> captured by inconsistent thinkers. >>>> >>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science >>>> does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises >>>> from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material >>>> processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be >>>> studied by science (just as light rays and the things >>>> reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study >>>> scientifically how these illusions arise and how they >>>> mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I >>>> completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, >>>> cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually >>>> exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how >>>> illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and >>>> the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of >>>> a candle appears in the mirror. >>>> >>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you >>>> appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied >>>> scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with >>>> LSV's argument? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying >>>> "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying >>>> something very positive about it. It is an >>>> illusion which proves more or less adequate for >>>> guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear >>>> vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, >>>> because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is >>>> useful I think to frankly say that consciousness >>>> is an illusion - an illusion with survival value >>>> for humans - because it opens a point of agreement >>>> between the positivists and the psychologists. We >>>> both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, >>>> let's discuss that. >>>> >>>> But consciousness differs from a material process >>>> like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated >>>> relation between an organism and its environment, >>>> between physiology and behaviour. This is what the >>>> neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, >>>> the mediating element is just an illusion, which >>>> is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very >>>> useful illusion." :) >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is >>>> not useful, but I'd say >>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, >>>> because any such illusions >>>> are materially manifested. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Wed Nov 26 07:23:26 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:23:26 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E86F.4090305@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Everyone, How does Eric Fromm's thinking on the dialectic of subconsciousness/ consciousness set with you? Not a trick question just Lake being consciously curious. RL consciousness Consciousness is the mental activity in our state of being preoccupied with external reality-with acting. The unconscious is the mental experience in a state of existence in which we have shut off communications with the outer world are no longer preoccupied with action but with our self-experience. The unconscious is an experience related to a special mode of life ? that of non-activity; and the characteristics of the unconscious follow from the nature of this mode of existence. The qualities of consciousness, on the other hand, are determined by the nature of action and by the survival function of the waking state of existence. ? (Fromm,1951a: The Forgotten Language. An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Myths, New York (Rinehart and Co.) 1951, p. 29.) Our consciousness is all those human experiences of which our particular society permits us to be aware. Usually, aside from very small individual differences, we are aware only of that which our language, our logic, and the taboos of our societies permit us to be aware. There is, you might say, something like a ?social filter,? and only those experiences that can pass through that social filter are the things we are aware of; they are our consciousness. ? And what is our unconscious? Our unconscious is humanity. Our unconscious is the universal man. Our unconscious is all that is human ? the good and the bad ? all that exists in everybody, minus that small sector which is conscious, which represents the experience, thinking, feeling of the culture that we are thrown into rather accidentally. Our unconscious is the total man. ? (1992m [1962]: A New Humanism as a Condition for the One World, in: E. Fromm, On Being Human, New York (Continuum) 1994, pp. 77f.) On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > Yes, of course he uses those words. But he never applies them to > consciousness. Consciousness, for LSV, is a phenomenon, not an appearance. > Consciousness is an objective process. This is LSV's argument, and I don't > see how one can reasonably disagree with it. Consciousness is an objective > process, just as life is an objective process. *In* consciousness various > experiences are given, some of them illusory (like Muller-Lyer), others not. > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Martin, the word "illusion" appears three times, as I recall, in that > paragraph. "Appearance" is a synonym for "illusion" and that appears 4 > times, so he uses the terms 7 times in all, in that one paragraph. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Andy, I don't see anything here that suggests that LSV viewed > consciousness as an illusion. If you are drawing our attention to the > phrase "It does not exist in reality," this refers to the apparent > difference between the lengths of two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> > >>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we > perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is again > required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to me. > Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? > >>> > >>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in > science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ cause > of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist > independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in > Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, > psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between the > viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I > would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of > the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the > appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective factor > in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical > theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two > processes which are objective in themselve > >>> > >> s. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into > object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and > being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of > materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for > the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to see what is the matter: > >> > >>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical materialism > is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our > consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing > other than objective reality, existing independently from human > consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and > Empirio-Criticism < > http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm#bkV14P260F01 > >] > >>> > >>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of > /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by > inconsistent thinkers. > >>> > >>> > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>> > >>>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! > >>>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not > study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" of > two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which > can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by > light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these illusions > arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I > completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study > illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to > *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the real > mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the > mirror. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be > suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find > some flaw with LSV's argument? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an > illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion > which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for > example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, because > I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that > consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for humans - > because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the > psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's > discuss that. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like > stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and > its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the > neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is > just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very > useful illusion." :) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but I'd > say > >>>>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such > illusions > >>>>>>>> are materially manifested. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 07:36:38 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:36:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <1416800017583.55006@unm.edu> <5472A97A.5060900@mira.net> <9E4BF4D1-CE2F-4BD0-8D76-544F59489B57@uniandes.edu.co> <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E86F.4090305@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Robert, It depends by what you specifically mean by unconscious, however I'd say there is much about activity which is unconscious. Typically, our goals are consciously available whilst our motives are not -- they remain on the periphery. Similarly, orientations are unconscious but the means to react within those orientations are consciously available. Hence I disagree with my scan of Fromm's text. Best, Huw On 26 November 2014 at 15:23, Robert Lake wrote: > Hi Everyone, > How does Eric Fromm's thinking on the dialectic of subconsciousness/ > consciousness set with you? > Not a trick question just Lake being consciously curious. > RL > consciousness > < > http://www.erich-fromm-online.de/index.php/en/glossary/Erich-Fromm-Glossary-2/C/consciousness-140/ > > > > Consciousness is the mental activity in our state of being preoccupied with > external reality-with acting. The unconscious is the mental experience in a > state of existence in which we have shut off communications with the outer > world are no longer preoccupied with action but with our self-experience. > The unconscious is an experience related to a special mode of life ? that > of non-activity; and the characteristics of the unconscious follow from the > nature of this mode of existence. The qualities of consciousness, on the > other hand, are determined by the nature of action and by the survival > function of the waking state of existence. ? (Fromm,1951a: The Forgotten > Language. An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales and > Myths, New York (Rinehart and Co.) 1951, p. 29.) > > Our consciousness is all those human experiences of which our particular > society permits us to be aware. Usually, aside from very small individual > differences, we are aware only of that which our language, our logic, and > the taboos of our societies permit us to be aware. There is, you might say, > something like a ?social filter,? and only those experiences that can pass > through that social filter are the things we are aware of; they are our > consciousness. ? And what is our unconscious? Our unconscious is humanity. > Our unconscious is the universal man. Our unconscious is all that is human > ? the good and the bad ? all that exists in everybody, minus that small > sector which is conscious, which represents the experience, thinking, > feeling of the culture that we are thrown into rather accidentally. Our > unconscious is the total man. ? (1992m [1962]: A New Humanism as a > Condition for the One World, in: E. Fromm, On Being Human, New York > (Continuum) 1994, pp. 77f.) > > On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > Yes, of course he uses those words. But he never applies them to > > consciousness. Consciousness, for LSV, is a phenomenon, not an > appearance. > > Consciousness is an objective process. This is LSV's argument, and I > don't > > see how one can reasonably disagree with it. Consciousness is an > objective > > process, just as life is an objective process. *In* consciousness various > > experiences are given, some of them illusory (like Muller-Lyer), others > not. > > > > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Martin, the word "illusion" appears three times, as I recall, in that > > paragraph. "Appearance" is a synonym for "illusion" and that appears 4 > > times, so he uses the terms 7 times in all, in that one paragraph. > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > >> Andy, I don't see anything here that suggests that LSV viewed > > consciousness as an illusion. If you are drawing our attention to the > > phrase "It does not exist in reality," this refers to the apparent > > difference between the lengths of two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we > > perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it is > again > > required to separate perception as such, as it is, from how it seems to > me. > > Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this /*appearance*/? > > >>> > > >>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in > > science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the /*apparent*/ > cause > > of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist > > independently from me. The appearance itself is an /*illusion*/ (in > > Titchener?s basic example: Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, > > psychologically one of them is longer). This is the difference between > the > > viewpoints of physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, > but > > results from two non-coincidences of two really existing processes. If I > > would know the physical nature of the two lines and the objective laws of > > the eye, as they are in themselves, I would get the explanation of the > > appearance, of the illusion as a result. The study of the subjective > factor > > in the knowledge of this illusion is a subject of logic and the > historical > > theory of knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two > > processes which are objective in themselve > > >>> > > >> s. The mind is not always a subject. In introspection it is split into > > object and subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon > and > > being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula of > > materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for > > the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to see what is the matter: > > >> > > >>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical > materialism > > is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our > > consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing > > other than objective reality, existing independently from human > > consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin, Materialism and > > Empirio-Criticism < > > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm#bkV14P260F01 > > >] > > >>> > > >>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of > > /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured > by > > inconsistent thinkers. > > >>> > > >>> > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 > > >>> > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? > > >>>> > > >>>> Martin > > >>>> > > >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! > > >>>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science does not > > study illusions, but that this illusion arises from the "noncoincidence" > of > > two objective, material processes, physiology and behaviour, both of > which > > can be studied by science (just as light rays and the things reflected by > > light rays can), therefore we can study scientifically how these > illusions > > arise and how they mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I > > completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy > > >>>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science does not, cannot, study > > illusions. Science studies what actually exists, and in doing so seeks to > > *explain* how illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and the > real > > mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of a candle appears in the > > mirror. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you appear to be > > suggesting that it cannot be studied scientifically. Or perhaps you find > > some flaw with LSV's argument? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. By saying "consciousness is an > > illusion" I am saying something very positive about it. It is an illusion > > which proves more or less adequate for guiding my activity, just as for > > example, my rear vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, > because > > I am "educated" about mirrors. It is useful I think to frankly say that > > consciousness is an illusion - an illusion with survival value for > humans - > > because it opens a point of agreement between the positivists and the > > psychologists. We both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, let's > > discuss that. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process like > > stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated relation between an organism and > > its environment, between physiology and behaviour. This is what the > > neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, the mediating element is > > just an illusion, which is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very > > useful illusion." :) > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I would concur with Andy that 'mysterious' is not useful, but > I'd > > say > > >>>>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, because any such > > illusions > > >>>>>>>> are materially manifested. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 07:38:47 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 07:38:47 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> <16C0DE53-040A-4213-B812-F8CFAFAA5CDC@uniandes.edu.co> <5475EC74.7020803@mira.net> Message-ID: Martin, Andy, Huw I have just read your extended thinking process as a drama being "played out" and presented to us *readers*. I wanted to express my appreciation with the care and concern you have explored the notions of "appearance" and "illusion" [I also would include "imaginal" as having a family resemblance. To myself this "exchange" is the best practice that XMCA offers to myself as I participate as a "reader" in this word/play. I am now *reading* that a key difference is the notion of consciousness as "sometimes" an illusion OR "always" an illusion. A question that matters to me is if "consciousness *is* imaginal?" and if "the imaginal *is* real?" As a *reader* participating in our interpretive community, I experienced [imaginatively??] this process AS "unfolding" here and now. I experienced this *dialogical exchange" among passionate persons as real AND imaginal. [Both, not either/or] This exchange may be *read* as dispassionate and distanced [reflective] but I was not *reading* from this disposition. I was inside the conversation. Word/play as rhetorical persuasive dialogue AND scientific exchange. [both not either/or] Thank you for this experience Larry On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 7:16 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Crisis is a text about methodology, Andy, so yes, LSV's central question > is how to study consciousness. (His answer is through Analysis, as you > know.) But the issue he addresses is how to study consciousness as an > objective process. Not as an illusion. Consciousness is an objective > process that *sometimes* can *give rise to* illusions. > > (Psychology is "like any other science" but is "unlike physics">>>??) > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:06 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > I have to go bed now, Martin, so xmca-ers will be relieved of my nagging > voice for 8 hours or so, but ... > > > > The point is: *how* do you study consciousness, which is, after all, the > subject matter of psychology. History and atomic physics face the same > problem. None of these sciences (or any science actually) have unmediated > access to their subject matter. You would have heard the epigram that > "physics is the science of meter readings". So, like any other science, > psychology has to reconstruct the illusions which are its subject matter > from knowledge of the objective processes which produce the illusions, > unlike physics and history which aim to eliminate the illusions and > rec9onstruct the objective processes. > > > > Consciousness is an illusion, but I am not deluded in believing that I > experience consciousness. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Yes, Andy, we're in agreement on the need to distinguish between what > is appearance and what is reality. And on the proposal that science studies > reality, in order to explain appearances. Where we appear to disagree is > that in your interpretation, LSV claims that consciousness is an illusion. > In my interpretation, consciousness is an objective process, and so can be > studied scientifically. Surely the central argument of Crisis is that > psychology should be the scientific study of consciousness, properly > understood as a material process? If LSV had argued that consciousness is > an illusion, he would not have suggested that we can study it, would he? > Only that we could *explain* it by studying objective processes. > >> Martin > >> > >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Exactly! There is a difference between the objective processes (which > can be studied by science) which produce, or as you say, yield the illusion > and the illusion itself. That is the *whole* point. To deny this difference > in the name of "embedded consciousness" or rejecting "some kind of mental > process" as "mysterious" is to retreat into absurdities. We *do* indeed > experience consciousness (i.e. mental processes), i.e., we experience > illusions, but these illusions arise from objective, material processes > which we can understand and study. But the illusion *in itself*, the > product, cannot be studied scientifically. And for the same reason - that > is, that the illusions arise from from objective material processes, they > are *useful guides to those material processes* for the beings which enjoy > those illusions and have to live by them. > >>> > >>> Vygotsky calls them "phantoms". Do a search on "phantom" in that web > page. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>> > >>>> It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english > phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", I > understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see what is > wrong with it". > >>>> > >>>> This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about > separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying > consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system > yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of > consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be distinct > things, but rather distinct foci). > >>>> > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we > >>>> perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it > >>>> is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from > >>>> how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both > >>>> times, this /*appearance*/? > >>>> > >>>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, > >>>> in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the > >>>> /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the > >>>> phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance > >>>> itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: > >>>> Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of > >>>> them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of > >>>> physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but > >>>> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing > >>>> processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines > >>>> and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I > >>>> would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a > >>>> result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of > >>>> this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of > >>>> knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two > >>>> processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not > >>>> always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and > >>>> subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and > >>>> being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula > >>>> of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in > >>>> Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to > >>>> see what is the matter: > >>>> > >>>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical > >>>> materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of > >>>> existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the > >>>> concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, > >>>> existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by > >>>> it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism > >>>> < > http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm#bkV14P260F01 > >] > >>>> > >>>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of > >>>> /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been > >>>> captured by inconsistent thinkers. > >>>> > >>>> > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! > >>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science > >>>> does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises > >>>> from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material > >>>> processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be > >>>> studied by science (just as light rays and the things > >>>> reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study > >>>> scientifically how these illusions arise and how they > >>>> mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I > >>>> completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science > does not, > >>>> cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually > >>>> exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how > >>>> illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and > >>>> the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of > >>>> a candle appears in the mirror. > >>>> > >>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you > >>>> appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied > >>>> scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with > >>>> LSV's argument? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden > >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. > By saying > >>>> "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying > >>>> something very positive about it. It is an > >>>> illusion which proves more or less adequate for > >>>> guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear > >>>> vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, > >>>> because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is > >>>> useful I think to frankly say that consciousness > >>>> is an illusion - an illusion with survival value > >>>> for humans - because it opens a point of agreement > >>>> between the positivists and the psychologists. We > >>>> both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, > >>>> let's discuss that. > >>>> > >>>> But consciousness differs from a material process > >>>> like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated > >>>> relation between an organism and its environment, > >>>> between physiology and behaviour. This is what the > >>>> neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, > >>>> the mediating element is just an illusion, which > >>>> is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very > >>>> useful illusion." :) > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>> I would concur > with Andy that 'mysterious' is > >>>> not useful, but I'd say > >>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, > >>>> because any such illusions > >>>> are materially manifested. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 08:08:13 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 16:08:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <54733416.1000401@mira.net> <5b093f6d276f41b59a13bcf3c3a8f73b@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <766a0cd920af412d94173d00194bf4ed@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <153BD624-880E-447A-9F95-DB0764DEFEF7@uniandes.edu.co> <5475D3D6.4030404@mira.net> <9BAD5C6E-22EB-4336-A9F5-9E567F6D6086@uniandes.edu.co> <5475DC76.4050502@mira.net> <8336F717-1870-4A9E-AF1D-669D6D7CFC2C@uniandes.edu.co> <5475E024.6080103@mira.net> <5475E804.6080201@mira.net> <16C0DE53-040A-4213-B812-F8CFAFAA5CDC@uniandes.edu.co> <5475EC74.7020803@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks, Larry! These back-and-forths do get a bit exhausting! But I think the issues here are of fundamental importance: they are at the heart of LSV's project for a new psychology. If we can't get these figured out, what progress can we make?? Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:38 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Martin, Andy, Huw > > I have just read your extended thinking process as a drama being "played > out" and presented to us *readers*. I wanted to express my appreciation > with the care and concern you have explored the notions of "appearance" and > "illusion" [I also would include "imaginal" as having a family resemblance. > > To myself this "exchange" is the best practice that XMCA offers to myself > as I participate as a "reader" in this word/play. > > I am now *reading* that a key difference is the notion of consciousness as > "sometimes" an illusion OR "always" an illusion. > > A question that matters to me is if "consciousness *is* imaginal?" and if > "the imaginal *is* real?" > > As a *reader* participating in our interpretive community, I > experienced [imaginatively??] this process AS "unfolding" here and now. > I experienced this *dialogical exchange" among passionate persons as real > AND imaginal. [Both, not either/or] > This exchange may be *read* as dispassionate and distanced [reflective] but > I was not *reading* from this disposition. I was inside the conversation. > > Word/play as rhetorical persuasive dialogue AND scientific exchange. [both > not either/or] > > Thank you for this experience > Larry > > On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 7:16 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Crisis is a text about methodology, Andy, so yes, LSV's central question >> is how to study consciousness. (His answer is through Analysis, as you >> know.) But the issue he addresses is how to study consciousness as an >> objective process. Not as an illusion. Consciousness is an objective >> process that *sometimes* can *give rise to* illusions. >> >> (Psychology is "like any other science" but is "unlike physics">>>??) >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:06 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> I have to go bed now, Martin, so xmca-ers will be relieved of my nagging >> voice for 8 hours or so, but ... >>> >>> The point is: *how* do you study consciousness, which is, after all, the >> subject matter of psychology. History and atomic physics face the same >> problem. None of these sciences (or any science actually) have unmediated >> access to their subject matter. You would have heard the epigram that >> "physics is the science of meter readings". So, like any other science, >> psychology has to reconstruct the illusions which are its subject matter >> from knowledge of the objective processes which produce the illusions, >> unlike physics and history which aim to eliminate the illusions and >> rec9onstruct the objective processes. >>> >>> Consciousness is an illusion, but I am not deluded in believing that I >> experience consciousness. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> Yes, Andy, we're in agreement on the need to distinguish between what >> is appearance and what is reality. And on the proposal that science studies >> reality, in order to explain appearances. Where we appear to disagree is >> that in your interpretation, LSV claims that consciousness is an illusion. >> In my interpretation, consciousness is an objective process, and so can be >> studied scientifically. Surely the central argument of Crisis is that >> psychology should be the scientific study of consciousness, properly >> understood as a material process? If LSV had argued that consciousness is >> an illusion, he would not have suggested that we can study it, would he? >> Only that we could *explain* it by studying objective processes. >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Exactly! There is a difference between the objective processes (which >> can be studied by science) which produce, or as you say, yield the illusion >> and the illusion itself. That is the *whole* point. To deny this difference >> in the name of "embedded consciousness" or rejecting "some kind of mental >> process" as "mysterious" is to retreat into absurdities. We *do* indeed >> experience consciousness (i.e. mental processes), i.e., we experience >> illusions, but these illusions arise from objective, material processes >> which we can understand and study. But the illusion *in itself*, the >> product, cannot be studied scientifically. And for the same reason - that >> is, that the illusions arise from from objective material processes, they >> are *useful guides to those material processes* for the beings which enjoy >> those illusions and have to live by them. >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky calls them "phantoms". Do a search on "phantom" in that web >> page. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> It may not be clear to foreign readers. When I read the english >> phrase, "one has only to apply the formula to see what is the matter", I >> understand it as "one has only to apply the formula in order to see what is >> wrong with it". >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems quite consistent with LSV's follow on point about >> separating direct experience from knowledge. In terms of studying >> consciousness a useful distinction could be made between the system >> yielding consciousness at any given time and the experience of >> consciousness itself. (Note that I don't consider these to be distinct >> things, but rather distinct foci). >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 26 November 2014 at 14:13, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> In physics we try to eliminate the subjective factor from what we >>>>>> perceive as an object. In psychology, when we study perception it >>>>>> is again required to separate perception as such, as it is, from >>>>>> how it seems to me. Who will study what has been eliminated both >>>>>> times, this /*appearance*/? >>>>>> >>>>>> But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, >>>>>> in science we want to learn about the /*real*/ and not the >>>>>> /*apparent*/ cause of appearance. This means that we must take the >>>>>> phenomena as they exist independently from me. The appearance >>>>>> itself is an /*illusion*/ (in Titchener?s basic example: >>>>>> Muller-Lyer?s lines are physically equal, psychologically one of >>>>>> them is longer). This is the difference between the viewpoints of >>>>>> physics and psychology. It /*does not exist in reality*/, but >>>>>> results from two non-coincidences of two really existing >>>>>> processes. If I would know the physical nature of the two lines >>>>>> and the objective laws of the eye, as they are in themselves, I >>>>>> would get the explanation of the appearance, of the illusion as a >>>>>> result. The study of the subjective factor in the knowledge of >>>>>> this illusion is a subject of logic and the historical theory of >>>>>> knowledge: just like being, the subjective is the result of two >>>>>> processes which are objective in themselves. The mind is not >>>>>> always a subject. In introspection it is split into object and >>>>>> subject. The question is whether in introspection phenomenon and >>>>>> being coincide. One has only to apply the epistemological formula >>>>>> of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in >>>>>> Plekhanov) for the /*psychological subject-object*/, in order to >>>>>> see what is the matter: >>>>>> >>>>>> the only ?property? of matter connected with philosophical >>>>>> materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of >>>>>> existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the >>>>>> concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, >>>>>> existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by >>>>>> it. [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism >>>>>> < >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm#bkV14P260F01 >>> ] >>>>>> >>>>>> Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of >>>>>> /*realism*/, but that he avoids this word, because it has been >>>>>> captured by inconsistent thinkers. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1371 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Where does LSV say that consciousness is an illusion, Andy? >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:58 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> No, no! And we are close to agreement here! >>>>>> LSV says that consciousness is an illusion, and science >>>>>> does not study illusions, but that this illusion arises >>>>>> from the "noncoincidence" of two objective, material >>>>>> processes, physiology and behaviour, both of which can be >>>>>> studied by science (just as light rays and the things >>>>>> reflected by light rays can), therefore we can study >>>>>> scientifically how these illusions arise and how they >>>>>> mediate human activity! This is called psychology. I >>>>>> completely agree with Vygotsky. Don't you? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> Andy, LSV argues in Crisis that a science >> does not, >>>>>> cannot, study illusions. Science studies what actually >>>>>> exists, and in doing so seeks to *explain* how >>>>>> illusions occur. Science studies the real candle and >>>>>> the real mirror, in order to *explain* how an image of >>>>>> a candle appears in the mirror. >>>>>> >>>>>> By saying that consciousness is an illusion, you >>>>>> appear to be suggesting that it cannot be studied >>>>>> scientifically. Or perhaps you find some flaw with >>>>>> LSV's argument? >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw, don't misunderstand me. >> By saying >>>>>> "consciousness is an illusion" I am saying >>>>>> something very positive about it. It is an >>>>>> illusion which proves more or less adequate for >>>>>> guiding my activity, just as for example, my rear >>>>>> vision mirror is adequate for guiding my driving, >>>>>> because I am "educated" about mirrors. It is >>>>>> useful I think to frankly say that consciousness >>>>>> is an illusion - an illusion with survival value >>>>>> for humans - because it opens a point of agreement >>>>>> between the positivists and the psychologists. We >>>>>> both can say "consciousness is an illusion." OK, >>>>>> let's discuss that. >>>>>> >>>>>> But consciousness differs from a material process >>>>>> like stimuli-response, that is, an unmediated >>>>>> relation between an organism and its environment, >>>>>> between physiology and behaviour. This is what the >>>>>> neuroscientist typically overlooks. We say "yes, >>>>>> the mediating element is just an illusion, which >>>>>> is why you can't find it, but hey! it's a very >>>>>> useful illusion." :) >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> I would concur >> with Andy that 'mysterious' is >>>>>> not useful, but I'd say >>>>>> Andy's use of 'illusion' has this problem too, >>>>>> because any such illusions >>>>>> are materially manifested. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 08:48:14 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 09:48:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <73534B94-5445-4C69-8C1A-915E532D3C9F@gmail.com> <103073722.1078435.1416943755470.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11132.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <364303FA-9BEF-4F3A-82CF-C06BE61CA68C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <60887653-5A4A-4C43-ABF5-8AE682C70366@gmail.com> Huw, Bateson. Got to learn more about that. Pointing is part of joint regard of objects at a distance, right? But not the whole thing. Bees seem to point (to food sources). These connections between properties of human communication (indexicality, iconicity, semioticity) and communication of other critters are interesting, part of the phylogeny/ontogeny stuff. Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 3:54 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > On 25 November 2014 at 19:47, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Haydi, >> What?s a ?stop? signal?! I lack chat etiquette know how I?ll bet. But let >> me charge ahead. Respectfully. So, what do you, or anyone, think of the >> substance of my comment/conjecture? Are humans wired differently with how >> they use their eyes to point? Of course, this doesn?t explain how blind >> people acquire language. Still? >> Henry >> >> > It was an area of interest for Gregory Bateson who wrote about the > communication of perceptual organs, ears being a rather obvious one. I > recall teaching a dog to follow my pointing using a kind of throwing > gesture. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks HENRY ! et al ! >>> >>> First as I was not catching up with the posts , I didn't see the 'stop' >> signal on discussion . If you count my posts in a year , you will see that >> I'm the least-heard voice . >>> >>> Second Vera John-Steiner is not someone not known at least to old >> participants . Then As I knew her , I very seriously put some questions in >> the hope she will kindly help . Maybe tweeters and retweeters and >> button-pressers have seen sarcasm , arrogance ?? in what I humbly wrote in >> which case they have just been playing memoirs . We have a proverb saying : >> bowls hotter than soup . Please let your respectable teacher talk whatever >> and however they wish to . There was misunderstanding of clouding which >> very swiftly and fortunately switched to 'unclouding' . Why again ? It's a >> matter of hours !! Sorry !! >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: HENRY SHONERD >>> To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity" >>> Cc: "vygotsky@unm.edu" >>> Sent: Tuesday, 25 November 2014, 10:06:32 >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Fate, Luck and Chance >>> >>> Hi Haydi and Vera, >>> I don?t want to speak for Vera, but I remember her telling her students >> (when I has one of her students) about the importance developmentally of >> interaction between (human) care givers and very young children through >> ?joint regard? toward objects at a distance. Am I wrong in thinking that >> this is very different for humans, vis-a-vis other critters? For example, I >> can have eye contact with my dog, but I can?t ?use? my eyes (and language) >> to direct his attention to an object at a distance from both of us. As far >> as I know, only humans can do this. Am I wrong? If not, I think it says >> something about the ability of humans to ?displace?, so important to the >> development of language, cognition, imagination. I believe this >> displacement applies both spatially and temporally. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 5:54 AM, Haydi Zulfei > > wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Vera, >>>> Respectfully ! >>>> 1. "developmentally co-constructed process" does contain the bigger >> share of the truth . But... >>>> 2. The other side to "The newborn is not awareof a conscious self" is >> that it is aware of some other things . The problem is with the very 'being >> aware' for a newborn . It does not seem to be logical . The whole thing >> Vygosky and his followers tried to do was to put some thing between the two >> components of the formula Stimulus =====> Response . Else what do we have >> to answer Vygotsky on his refutation of reflexology , reactology , etc. >>>> 3. I think Vygotsky also uses 'feelings' of pain , hunger , comfort , >> etc. Are not these 'reflexes' common to both animals and humans ? Having >> said this , can we put the question "With respect to the genesis (ignoring >> its being innate) of consciousness , is it a matter of leaps and bounds or >> gradience ? >>>> 4. Then , we are left with "Eye-motion coordination" which takes us to >> the idea that with so many things we know about the so-called >> 'intelligence?!' of the animals , birds , etc. , could we specify it to >> just human beings . >>>> 5. I got very pleased with the "add up to thebeginnings of >> consciousness" . This helps a lot . But out of Vygotsky's 'emotions' I >> could not gather exact terms for the points on a continuum if any . >> amorphous what , intellect , irritability ?? >>>> 6. If you are so kind to think of this also : >>>> a. you drive quite skillfully thinking of the xmca or whatever . >>>> b. You drive while the officer is testing you for certificate . >>>> c. You drive focusing on the manner you are driving with . >>>> Best >>>> Haydi >>>> From: Vera John-Steiner > vygotsky@unm.edu>> >>>> To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > > >>>> Sent: Monday, 24 November 2014, 16:34:24 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I just would like to add a postscript to the discussion on >> consciousness and >>>> that is that what we experience as adults >>>> is a developmentally co-constructed process, and that so much of it is >> the >>>> consequence of early exchanges. That is why(among >>>> other reasons) it is so dynamic and open to change. The newborn is not >> aware >>>> of a conscious self,but of pain, hunger, comfort, >>>> all of which, together with eye-motion coordination, add up to the >>>> beginnings of consciousness. Or that is how it appears to me. >>>> Vera >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer >>>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 4:11 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance >>>> >>>> Well I think we are generally in agreement, Andy. However, there are >> some >>>> points of difference that it might be worth exploring. >>>> >>>> First, from the fact that consciousness is fallible it does not follow >> that >>>> consciousness is completely an illusion. If that were the case, how >> could >>>> one come to judge its fallibility? How can you state with certainty >> that "My >>>> consciousness is an illusion"? No, consciousness is incomplete, and >> partial, >>>> but it can also be educated. Importantly, consciousness can come to >> know >>>> itself. And since I know the world not only from what I experience >> directly, >>>> in the first-person manner, but also from what others tell me and from >> what >>>> I read, I can become aware of the limitations of my own consciousness >> in >>>> this manner. (Consciousness is both natural and social, as I mentioned >> in a >>>> previous message.) I know, these are also given to me in my >> consciousness, >>>> but I don't see that any insuperable problems arise as a consequence. >> Unlike >>>> Descartes, I don't believe that an evil demon is bent on deceiving me. >>>> Consciousness is our openness to the world, as Merleau-Ponty put it. >>>> >>>> Second, since consciousness is personal, I have to make inferences >> about >>>> another person's consciousness. (With the exception of a few occasions >> of >>>> experiencing things together with another - like dancing salsa!) >> However, I >>>> also have to infer that, and rely on the fact that, my own >> consciousness is >>>> a material process. My own consciousness can be, and often is, outside >> my >>>> consciousness - this is, in a nutshell, LSV's argument in Crisis. In >> just >>>> the same way I come to learn that my digestion is a material process. >> I come >>>> to learn that my life itself is a material process - there is no 'life >>>> spirit' that animates me. Both life and digestion are, like >> consciousness, >>>> first-person processes, and nonetheless material processes. Perhaps I >> am >>>> helped in coming to these conclusions by observing other people, whose >>>> processes of living and digesting I cannot experience directly. >>>> >>>> Where is the paradox here? It seems to me the paradox lies with those >> who >>>> say that experience is all in the mind, and yet at the same time that >> we can >>>> know the world. That was Descartes' paradox, and it remains the >> paradox, >>>> unresolved, of most of contemporary social science. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 24, 2014, at 5:48 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'll try to explain it my way, why "consciousness is a material >> process" >>>> despite the fact that "matter is what exists outside of and >> independently of >>>> consciousness" as you say, Martin. >>>>> >>>>> In >>>>> >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a < >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a> >>>>> .htm#A Marx said "My relation to my environment is my consciousness" >>>>> although he crossed it out in the manuscript. But why did he suddenly >>>> introduce the first person pronoun here? >>>>> >>>>> Everything I know of the world, in any sense of the word "know," I >> know >>>> through my consciousness, but my consciousness is an illusion, a >> phantom, >>>> and fundamentally different from that which is outside my >> consciousness and >>>> reflected in it. Nonetheless it is what I use to determine my actions >> in the >>>> world. I do not act exclusively through conditional reflexes like a >> simple >>>> organism as an immediate material process, but on the contrary, >> mediate my >>>> relation to my environment through my consciousness, which I learn, is >> not >>>> 100% reliable, because it is just an illusion, but is reliable enough >> and in >>>> any case is more effective thanks to socially constructed mediation, >> than >>>> nervous reflexes. >>>>> >>>>> But *your* consciousness is also outside my consciousness, and >> therefore I >>>> must regard it as material, and if I am to get to know it, I rely on >> the >>>> fact that it is a material process, arising from your behaviour and >> your >>>> physiology, and although *like anything* I cannot have unmediated >> access to >>>> it, I can learn about it only through material interactions, the same >> way in >>>> that sense that I learnt your name and age. >>>>> >>>>> But you are of course in the same position. A world of phantoms and >>>>> illusions is all you have to guide your activity in the material >>>>> world, too. Vygotsky says that the confusion arises "When one mixes up >>>>> the epistemological problem with the ontological one". That is the >>>>> relation between consciousness (an illusion) and matter >>>>> (interconnected with all other processes in the universe) is actually >>>>> an epistemological one, that is, of the sources and validity of >>>>> knowledge, and not an ontological one, that is a claim that >>>>> consciousness is something existing side by side so to speak with >>>>> matter. So it is important that while I recognise that for any person >>>>> the distinction for them between consciousness and matter is >>>>> absolutely fundamental, I must regard their consciousness as a >>>>> material process, explainable from their physiology and behaviour. >>>>> This is not a trivial point. Consciousness is not neuronal activity. >>>>> Neuronal activity is the material basis, alongside behaviour, of >>>>> consci >>>> ousness, but the world is not reflected for me in neuronal activity, >> which >>>> I know about only thanks to watching science programs on TV. >> Consciousness >>>> is given to me immediately, however, and I am not aware of any neuronal >>>> activity there. >>>>> >>>>> So yes, what you said was right, "consciousness is a material >> process," >>>> but I think it unhelpful to leave it as a paradox like that. And I >> admit it >>>> is unhelpful to be rude. Perhaps we both ought to exercise more >> restraint? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> -- >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> Don't get your point, Huw. A rectangle is generally defined as having >>>> unequal sides, in contrast to a square, so that's not helping me. >> Obviously >>>> (I would think) I am not saying that consciousness is the entirely of >>>> matter. >>>>>> Perhaps you can help me in my struggle... >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't see that being rude advances the conversation. When I >>>>>>>> assert a position here in this discussion I try to base it on an >>>>>>>> argument, and/or in sources that we all have access to. I'm >>>>>>>> certainly not trying to cloud any issues, and I don't think that >>>>>>>> arguing from authority (one's own assumed) dispels the clouds. I >>>>>>>> guess I simply don't have access to "a whole tradition of science." >>>>>>>> :( >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To respond to your other message, yes, I am arguing that >>>>>>>> consciousness (and thinking) are material processes. They are >>>>>>>> consequences of (certain kinds of) matter in (certain kinds of) >> motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Against whom am I arguing? I am arguing against all those >>>>>>>> psychologists who argue that consciousness (and thinking) are >>>>>>>> mental processes - processes which they believe take place in some >>>>>>>> mysterious realm called "the mind" that is populated by "mental >>>>>>>> representations" of the "world outside." I deal with people who >>>>>>>> make this argument on a daily basis. They believe that the proper >>>> object of investigation for psychology is "mind," >>>>>>>> and so they have no interest in setting, or culture, or practical >>>>>>>> activities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, Haydi's message is the portion of Crisis that I pointed to in >>>>>>>> my last message. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 09:16:02 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:16:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <, > <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> Message-ID: <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> Sister Analisa, Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we value Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said courage. The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. Henry > On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Dear Henry, > > Thank you for your reply. > > I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? > > To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. > > Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > > You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. > > Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. > > I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > > Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > > "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" > --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > > I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > > I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. > > If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. > > Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. > > Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. > > At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach than one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > > Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 09:26:33 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:26:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Rod! We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - something we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on a, o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others even if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about it). I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly non-intentional in its form and structure. A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and setting by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of her aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility of her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and of calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, when visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " Or a phrase like this: ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? Evocative, no? David? -greg On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about > language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my > own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of > knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers > of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological > remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then > there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the > physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What > particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have > a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will > 'Know'. > > Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the > addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip > -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and > freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but > whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might > be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a > family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, > demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive > examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved > wrong on this!). > > The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but > ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be > shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special > cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of > children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which > converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing > together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is > an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think > together in our 'own' heads). > > I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children > have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no > others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her > brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to > theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives > these vowels a different 'feel' for us. > > I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and > possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. > It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. > > Ed > > On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my > question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want > to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to > my enquiry. > > Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are > several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is > therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul > are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts > of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an > specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about > adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. > > As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" > which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other > examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its > tiny size reminded me. > > But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. > > Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar > material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic > elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, > meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, > rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology > aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was > given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any > rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." > > So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is > never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my > enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, > because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such > words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard > Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but > pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. > > Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives > which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the > adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent > "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is > an old man. That's what I was interested in. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be > >> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have > >> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) > >> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? > >> > >> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine > >> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation > >> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and > >> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the > >> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that > >> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. > >> > >> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception > >> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we > >> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the > >> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both > >> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context > >> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and > >> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself > >> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden > >> household we mean. > >> > >> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the > >> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language > >> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to > >> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed > >> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer > >> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is > >> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated > >> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. > >> > >> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether > >> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do > >> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort > >> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some > >> generalization we make about it? > >> > >> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter > >> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like > >> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than > >> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday > >> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a > >> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but > >> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense > >> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you > >> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they > >> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or > >> less the same effect. > >> > >> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and > >> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not > >> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big > >> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins > >> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they > >> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations > >> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his > >> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" > >> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels > >> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of > >> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than > >> about rubber). > >> > >> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the > >> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to > >> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how > >> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy > >> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities > >> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is > >> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his > >> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He > >> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he > >> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do > >> have unique referents. > >> > >> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot > >> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). > >> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see > >> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's > >> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in > >> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean > >> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe > >> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky > >> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's > >> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. > >> > >> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to > >> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize > >> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech > >> community) generalize the notion of "luck". > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> > >>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of > interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. > >>> Henry > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > >>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple > and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber > respectively)? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> -- > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 10:36:55 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 11:36:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> Rod, A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: Evocative, no? One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet of the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. But you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic activation goes with experienced readers and published writers. Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Rod! > We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's > an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact > same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part > as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - something > we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on a, > o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our > third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went > with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others even > if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about it). > > I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly > non-intentional in its form and structure. > > A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the > structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless > reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. > > It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: > "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian > generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her > luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and setting > by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of her > aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her > potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to > mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid > delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility of > her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and of > calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the > admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, when > visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " > > Or a phrase like this: > ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? > > Evocative, no? > > David? > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > >> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about >> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my >> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of >> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers >> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological >> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then >> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the >> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What >> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have >> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will >> 'Know'. >> >> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the >> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip >> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and >> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but >> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might >> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a >> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, >> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive >> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved >> wrong on this!). >> >> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but >> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be >> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special >> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of >> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which >> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing >> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is >> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think >> together in our 'own' heads). >> >> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children >> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no >> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her >> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to >> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives >> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. >> >> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! >> >> All the best, >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >> >> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and >> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. >> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my >> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want >> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to >> my enquiry. >>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are >> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is >> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul >> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts >> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an >> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about >> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. >>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" >> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other >> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its >> tiny size reminded me. >>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. >>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar >> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic >> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, >> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, >> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology >> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was >> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any >> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." >>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is >> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my >> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, >> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such >> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard >> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but >> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. >>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives >> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the >> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent >> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is >> an old man. That's what I was interested in. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >>>> >>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >>>> >>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >>>> household we mean. >>>> >>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >>>> >>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >>>> generalization we make about it? >>>> >>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >>>> less the same effect. >>>> >>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >>>> about rubber). >>>> >>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >>>> have unique referents. >>>> >>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >>>> >>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of >> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple >> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber >> respectively)? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Wed Nov 26 12:09:29 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 20:09:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about and like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to know someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an online 'conversation'. Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of one's conversation partners. Rod Sent from my Windows Phone ________________________________ From: HENRY SHONERD Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled Rod, A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: Evocative, no? One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet of the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. But you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic activation goes with experienced readers and published writers. Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Rod! > We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's > an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact > same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part > as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - something > we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on a, > o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our > third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went > with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others even > if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about it). > > I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly > non-intentional in its form and structure. > > A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the > structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless > reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. > > It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: > "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian > generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her > luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and setting > by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of her > aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her > potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to > mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid > delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility of > her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and of > calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the > admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, when > visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " > > Or a phrase like this: > ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? > > Evocative, no? > > David? > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > >> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about >> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my >> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of >> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers >> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological >> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then >> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the >> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What >> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have >> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will >> 'Know'. >> >> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the >> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip >> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and >> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but >> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might >> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a >> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, >> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive >> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved >> wrong on this!). >> >> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but >> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be >> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special >> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of >> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which >> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing >> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is >> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think >> together in our 'own' heads). >> >> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children >> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no >> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her >> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to >> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives >> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. >> >> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! >> >> All the best, >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >> >> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and >> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. >> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. >> >> Ed >> >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my >> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want >> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to >> my enquiry. >>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are >> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is >> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul >> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts >> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an >> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about >> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. >>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" >> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other >> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its >> tiny size reminded me. >>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. >>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar >> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic >> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, >> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, >> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology >> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was >> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any >> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." >>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is >> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my >> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, >> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such >> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard >> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but >> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. >>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives >> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the >> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent >> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is >> an old man. That's what I was interested in. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >>>> >>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >>>> >>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >>>> household we mean. >>>> >>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >>>> >>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >>>> generalization we make about it? >>>> >>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >>>> less the same effect. >>>> >>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >>>> about rubber). >>>> >>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >>>> have unique referents. >>>> >>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >>>> >>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of >> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple >> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber >> respectively)? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. 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Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 13:11:07 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 06:11:07 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: I secretly agree with Annalisa (despite the frequency with which she dots her "i"s!) that a lot of the back and forth on xmca is rather blokish struggle for power over particular words--making sure they mean what the speaker means them to mean and not what the hearer meant by them. In particularly, I completely disagree with Andy that definitions are a matter to be settled by dictionaries. Dictionaries are a mid-eighteenth century invention, coming a full century after systematic grammar books, and they were designed to try to "freeze" the lexicon as a way of setting up national languages. (You can see how successful THAT project's been!) The part of the language I'm interested in is not the lexicon but the grammar--so for me the most interesting part of "dappled" and "perished" is actually "~ed". The assertion that consciousness was an illusion was first made by James. But his nagging feeling that consciousness was reducible to an illusion turns out to be an illusion (that is why we say that Henry James was a brilliant psychologist, but his brother Bill just wrote fiction). True, the feeling that our consciousness is something that resides in our heads and peers out through the portholes of our eyes is illusory. But consciousness is material stuff, because practical consciousness exists in layers of moving air that are construed by people, including myself, as voices. In the same way, letters on paper is construed as speech and LEDS on a screen are construed as ink on paper: the means is illusory, but the meaning is certainly real. A play is an illusion, but the actions of the actors are real enough and so are the tears and laughter they produce in the audience. For me the key issue is not is consciousness an illusion but rather more like "Is volition an illusion?" in general--and "Is choice in language an illusion?" in particular. Tonight I have to give a lecture on applications of chaos complexity theory to applied linguistics in the late twentieth century. Believe it or not, this is the "latest thing", at least as far as the leading lights in the profession and the central journals are concerned. But it really does go back to William James: it's a form of ultra-associationism, The chaos complexity folks (Diane Larsen-Freeman, Lynn Cameron, now Paul Seedhouse) all start from the obvious fact that language had to emerge from non-language--that meaningless sounds and voiceless minds had to somehow come together--to argue that language is nothing but happy coincidences which are then reinforced through the power law of practice. Grammatical rules are an illusion; it's not "turtles all the way down" (as Annalisa puts it) but happy coincidences all the way up. And it's that way not only when language emerges but also when we use it. This is, by the way, why we get units of analysis in language--that is, units that preserve in a minimal form the phenomenon we are trying to explain. So for Seedhouse the minimal unit is the interaction IRF: T (initiate): What's this? S (response): Apple. T (corrective feedback): That's right. It's an apple. You could, if you really wanted to, spot this unit in a lesson as a whole (Presentation, Practice, Evaluation), or a syllabus as a whole (Introduction, Development, Final Exam). With a certain amount of abstraction, you can argue that it is present every time we use a clause (which has an "independent" or indispensable proposition or proposal and then dependent elements which initiate and manage the response, just as our exchange does). You can spot the structure every time we use a word like "dappled" or "perished", where the root is independent and the past tense morpheme dependent. Even a syllable has an independent vowel and then bound consonants. So it's turtles all the way down. But as far as I know I am the only one who has argued that language is fractally structured in this precisely this way--and I don't think it's because of chaos complexity principles. I think it is quite intentional at every level, and I also think that the apparent coincidence of vowels in Greg's daughters' names is the result of deliberate choice as well--most girls' names have that combination of vowels in them, and this iin turn is an indirect result of milliions of parents selecting words that end in vowels as sounding more feminine (a latent French influence on our language)! Volition's not an illusion, and my volition doesn't cancel out yours resulting in some volitionless soup of molecules from which language self-assembles. That model doesn't even work in economics. It's just that you sometimes (and perhaps always in the case of naming children) get a lot more than you bargained for. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 November 2014 at 05:09, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. > > I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. > > The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about and like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to know someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an online 'conversation'. > > Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of one's conversation partners. > > Rod > > Sent from my Windows Phone > ________________________________ > From: HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > Rod, > A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: > Evocative, no? > One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet of the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. But you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic activation goes with experienced readers and published writers. > Henry > > > >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Rod! >> We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's >> an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact >> same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part >> as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - something >> we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on a, >> o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our >> third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went >> with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others even >> if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about it). >> >> I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly >> non-intentional in its form and structure. >> >> A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the >> structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless >> reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. >> >> It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: >> "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian >> generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her >> luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and setting >> by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of her >> aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her >> potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to >> mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid >> delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility of >> her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and of >> calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the >> admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, when >> visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " >> >> Or a phrase like this: >> ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? >> >> Evocative, no? >> >> David? >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: >> >>> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about >>> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my >>> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of >>> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers >>> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological >>> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then >>> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the >>> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What >>> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have >>> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will >>> 'Know'. >>> >>> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the >>> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip >>> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and >>> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but >>> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might >>> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a >>> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, >>> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive >>> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved >>> wrong on this!). >>> >>> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but >>> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be >>> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special >>> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of >>> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which >>> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing >>> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is >>> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think >>> together in our 'own' heads). >>> >>> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children >>> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no >>> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her >>> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to >>> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives >>> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. >>> >>> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! >>> >>> All the best, >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 >>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >>> >>> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and >>> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. >>> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my >>> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want >>> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to >>> my enquiry. >>>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are >>> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is >>> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul >>> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts >>> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an >>> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about >>> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. >>>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" >>> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other >>> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its >>> tiny size reminded me. >>>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. >>>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar >>> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic >>> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, >>> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, >>> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology >>> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was >>> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any >>> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." >>>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is >>> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my >>> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, >>> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such >>> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard >>> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but >>> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. >>>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives >>> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the >>> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent >>> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is >>> an old man. That's what I was interested in. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >>>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >>>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >>>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >>>>> >>>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >>>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >>>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >>>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >>>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >>>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >>>>> >>>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >>>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >>>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >>>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >>>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >>>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >>>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >>>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >>>>> household we mean. >>>>> >>>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >>>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >>>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >>>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >>>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >>>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >>>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >>>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >>>>> >>>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >>>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >>>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >>>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >>>>> generalization we make about it? >>>>> >>>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >>>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >>>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >>>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >>>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >>>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >>>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >>>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >>>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >>>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >>>>> less the same effect. >>>>> >>>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >>>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >>>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >>>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >>>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >>>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >>>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >>>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >>>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >>>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >>>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >>>>> about rubber). >>>>> >>>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >>>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >>>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >>>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >>>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >>>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >>>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >>>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >>>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >>>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >>>>> have unique referents. >>>>> >>>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >>>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >>>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >>>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >>>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >>>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >>>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >>>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >>>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >>>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >>>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >>>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >>>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of >>> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple >>> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber >>> respectively)? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>> by an official order form. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 13:17:01 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 21:17:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: My poetic sense of dappled is that it is slightly incongruent with 'dappled light', dappled suggests to me a softening, such as to damp down and it seems to me that its not the light which is dappled but the leaf-strewn path etc. Etymologically it seems to originate from 'to spot' which I understand to be to darken etc. Conversely spangled refers to the brighten with sparkles. Possibly there's some affordance in the softening from the "spa" to the "da"... We've recently adopted a rather classic-looking lurcher with a coat streaked with every shade from coal to an aged snow white. Maybe theres a term for that admist Hardy, Hopkins and Donne. That's not much help for question, other than the action-based aspects to the words. With respect to the singularity of meaning, I usually simply refer to these as technical terms. It'd be nice to be equipped with a more precise (technical) word though. :) In respect of fuzzy threads, If you'd like to know what a zawn or a jackstraw is, check out the landreader project: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-27780066 http://www.thelandreader.com/ Best, Huw On 26 November 2014 at 20:09, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. > > I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say > that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and > sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and > other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. > > The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't > really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to > develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, > David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about and > like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to know > someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to > keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an > online 'conversation'. > > Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with > full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of > one's conversation partners. > > Rod > > Sent from my Windows Phone > ________________________________ > From: HENRY SHONERD > Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > Rod, > A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: > Evocative, no? > One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any > genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet of > the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic > structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the > mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. But > you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was > trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to > construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word > ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it > includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written > communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this > chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic activation > goes with experienced readers and published writers. > Henry > > > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > Rod! > > We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's > > an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact > > same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part > > as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - > something > > we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on > a, > > o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our > > third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went > > with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others > even > > if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about > it). > > > > I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly > > non-intentional in its form and structure. > > > > A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the > > structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless > > reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. > > > > It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: > > "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian > > generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her > > luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and > setting > > by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of > her > > aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her > > potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to > > mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid > > delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility > of > > her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and > of > > calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the > > admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, > when > > visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " > > > > Or a phrase like this: > > ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? > > > > Evocative, no? > > > > David? > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > > >> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about > >> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with > my > >> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of > >> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most > speakers > >> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also > etymological > >> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and > then > >> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the > >> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What > >> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which > have > >> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will > >> 'Know'. > >> > >> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by > the > >> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip > >> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and > >> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but > >> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might > >> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a > >> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, > >> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive > >> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be > proved > >> wrong on this!). > >> > >> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but > >> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may > be > >> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special > >> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of > >> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which > >> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing > >> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking > is > >> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think > >> together in our 'own' heads). > >> > >> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children > >> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) > and no > >> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her > >> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to > >> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless > gives > >> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. > >> > >> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! > >> > >> All the best, > >> > >> Rod > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > >> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 > >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > >> > >> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and > >> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the > OED. > >> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my > >> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I > want > >> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response > to > >> my enquiry. > >>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are > >> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is > >> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or > Seoul > >> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are > acts > >> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an > >> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about > >> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. > >>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" > >> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other > >> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for > its > >> tiny size reminded me. > >>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. > >>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar > >> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic > >> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, > >> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, > >> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So > etymology > >> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" > was > >> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that > any > >> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." > >>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is > >> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my > >> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, > >> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that > such > >> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard > >> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but > >> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. > >>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives > >> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in > the > >> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent > >> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he > is > >> an old man. That's what I was interested in. > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> David Kellogg wrote: > >>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be > >>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have > >>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) > >>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? > >>>> > >>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine > >>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation > >>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and > >>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the > >>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that > >>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. > >>>> > >>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception > >>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we > >>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the > >>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both > >>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context > >>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and > >>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself > >>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden > >>>> household we mean. > >>>> > >>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the > >>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language > >>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to > >>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed > >>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer > >>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is > >>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated > >>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. > >>>> > >>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether > >>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do > >>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort > >>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some > >>>> generalization we make about it? > >>>> > >>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter > >>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like > >>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than > >>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday > >>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a > >>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but > >>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense > >>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you > >>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they > >>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or > >>>> less the same effect. > >>>> > >>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and > >>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not > >>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big > >>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins > >>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they > >>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations > >>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his > >>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" > >>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels > >>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of > >>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than > >>>> about rubber). > >>>> > >>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the > >>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to > >>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how > >>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy > >>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities > >>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is > >>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his > >>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He > >>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he > >>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do > >>>> have unique referents. > >>>> > >>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot > >>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). > >>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see > >>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's > >>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in > >>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean > >>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe > >>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky > >>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's > >>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. > >>>> > >>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to > >>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize > >>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech > >>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of > >> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > >>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or > dapple > >> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber > >> respectively)? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> > >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for > >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts > >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied > >> by an official order form. > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 13:52:45 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 14:52:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Huw, I'm grokking your zawn: http://www.thelandreader.com/glossary/zawn -greg p.s. Someone on this listserve pointed me to "grok". Been grokking ever since. "Grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a part of the observed?to merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group experience. It means almost everything that we mean by religion, philosophy, and science?and it means as little to us (because of our Earthling assumptions) as color means to a blind man." On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > My poetic sense of dappled is that it is slightly incongruent with 'dappled > light', dappled suggests to me a softening, such as to damp down and it > seems to me that its not the light which is dappled but the leaf-strewn > path etc. Etymologically it seems to originate from 'to spot' which I > understand to be to darken etc. Conversely spangled refers to the > brighten with sparkles. Possibly there's some affordance in the softening > from the "spa" to the "da"... > > We've recently adopted a rather classic-looking lurcher with a coat > streaked with every shade from coal to an aged snow white. Maybe theres a > term for that admist Hardy, Hopkins and Donne. > > That's not much help for question, other than the action-based aspects to > the words. With respect to the singularity of meaning, I usually simply > refer to these as technical terms. It'd be nice to be equipped with a more > precise (technical) word though. :) > > In respect of fuzzy threads, If you'd like to know what a zawn or a > jackstraw is, check out the landreader project: > > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-27780066 > http://www.thelandreader.com/ > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 26 November 2014 at 20:09, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > wrote: > > > Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. > > > > I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say > > that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and > > sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and > > other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. > > > > The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't > > really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to > > develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, > > David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about > and > > like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to > know > > someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to > > keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an > > online 'conversation'. > > > > Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with > > full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of > > one's conversation partners. > > > > Rod > > > > Sent from my Windows Phone > > ________________________________ > > From: HENRY SHONERD > > Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > > > Rod, > > A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: > > Evocative, no? > > One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any > > genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet > of > > the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic > > structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the > > mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. > But > > you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was > > trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to > > construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word > > ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it > > includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written > > communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this > > chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic > activation > > goes with experienced readers and published writers. > > Henry > > > > > > > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > > Rod! > > > We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child > (she's > > > an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the > exact > > > same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our > part > > > as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - > > something > > > we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on > > a, > > > o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our > > > third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we > went > > > with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others > > even > > > if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about > > it). > > > > > > I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly > > > non-intentional in its form and structure. > > > > > > A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of > the > > > structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless > > > reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. > > > > > > It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: > > > "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian > > > generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her > > > luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and > > setting > > > by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of > > her > > > aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her > > > potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to > > > mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid > > > delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility > > of > > > her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and > > of > > > calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the > > > admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, > > when > > > visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " > > > > > > Or a phrase like this: > > > ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? > > > > > > Evocative, no? > > > > > > David? > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > > > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > > > > >> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about > > >> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely > with > > my > > >> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties > of > > >> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most > > speakers > > >> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also > > etymological > > >> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and > > then > > >> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the > > >> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What > > >> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which > > have > > >> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few > will > > >> 'Know'. > > >> > > >> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by > > the > > >> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip > > >> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and > > >> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family > but > > >> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig > might > > >> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to > a > > >> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, > > >> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive > > >> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be > > proved > > >> wrong on this!). > > >> > > >> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association > but > > >> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may > > be > > >> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special > > >> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings > of > > >> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge > which > > >> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing > > >> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our > thinking > > is > > >> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think > > >> together in our 'own' heads). > > >> > > >> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children > > >> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) > > and no > > >> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her > > >> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to > > >> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless > > gives > > >> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. > > >> > > >> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! > > >> > > >> All the best, > > >> > > >> Rod > > >> > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > > >> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 > > >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled > > >> > > >> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and > > >> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the > > OED. > > >> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. > > >> > > >> Ed > > >> > > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> > > >>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to > my > > >> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I > > want > > >> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory > response > > to > > >> my enquiry. > > >>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are > > >> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is > > >> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or > > Seoul > > >> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are > > acts > > >> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an > > >> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about > > >> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. > > >>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" > > >> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for > other > > >> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for > > its > > >> tiny size reminded me. > > >>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. > > >>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar > > >> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic > > >> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. > Admittedly, > > >> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: > decayed, > > >> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So > > etymology > > >> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" > > was > > >> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent > that > > any > > >> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." > > >>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is > > >> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that > my > > >> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod > responded, > > >> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that > > such > > >> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard > > >> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, > but > > >> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. > > >>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives > > >> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in > > the > > >> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his > opponent > > >> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he > > is > > >> an old man. That's what I was interested in. > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> David Kellogg wrote: > > >>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be > > >>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists > have > > >>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a > terminology) > > >>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique > referent? > > >>>> > > >>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine > > >>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a > situation > > >>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and > > >>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the > > >>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes > that > > >>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. > > >>>> > > >>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception > > >>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation > we > > >>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general > the > > >>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both > > >>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in > context > > >>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and > > >>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself > > >>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden > > >>>> household we mean. > > >>>> > > >>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the > > >>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English > language > > >>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to > > >>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed > > >>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly > closer > > >>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is > > >>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated > > >>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. > > >>>> > > >>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether > > >>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. > Do > > >>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort > > >>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some > > >>>> generalization we make about it? > > >>>> > > >>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a > matter > > >>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like > > >>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than > > >>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties > Halliday > > >>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a > > >>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but > > >>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense > > >>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are > general--you > > >>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And > they > > >>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or > > >>>> less the same effect. > > >>>> > > >>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and > > >>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not > > >>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big > > >>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins > > >>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; > they > > >>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations > > >>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with > his > > >>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not > proportional--"dapple" > > >>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels > > >>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of > > >>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than > > >>>> about rubber). > > >>>> > > >>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the > > >>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer > to > > >>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how > > >>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when > Andy > > >>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities > > >>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy > is > > >>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in > his > > >>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He > > >>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he > > >>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do > > >>>> have unique referents. > > >>>> > > >>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we > cannot > > >>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of > situation). > > >>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see > > >>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's > > >>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in > > >>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their > sounds--Korean > > >>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe > > >>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky > > >>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's > > >>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. > > >>>> > > >>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to > > >>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize > > >>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech > > >>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". > > >>>> > > >>>> David Kellogg > > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>> > > >>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of > > >> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. > > >>>>> Henry > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. > > >>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or > > dapple > > >> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber > > >> respectively)? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>> -- > > >>>>>> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> ________________________________ > > >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > > >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > >> > > >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > > for > > >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > > >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > > >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely > on > > it. > > >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > > >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > > >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > > accepts > > >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > > emails > > >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > > responsibility > > >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > > >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > > accompanied > > >> by an official order form. > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > > by an official order form. > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 14:18:38 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:18:38 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: David and Huw, Fractals rock! Let me do some mashing up: David is rocked by fractal pragmatics, Huw by fractal semantics. Process and structure, all the way down. Self-replicating and complex at any scale. Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 2:11 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I secretly agree with Annalisa (despite the frequency with which she > dots her "i"s!) that a lot of the back and forth on xmca is rather > blokish struggle for power over particular words--making sure they > mean what the speaker means them to mean and not what the hearer meant > by them. In particularly, I completely disagree with Andy that > definitions are a matter to be settled by dictionaries. Dictionaries > are a mid-eighteenth century invention, coming a full century after > systematic grammar books, and they were designed to try to "freeze" > the lexicon as a way of setting up national languages. (You can see > how successful THAT project's been!) The part of the language I'm > interested in is not the lexicon but the grammar--so for me the most > interesting part of "dappled" and "perished" is actually "~ed". > > The assertion that consciousness was an illusion was first made by > James. But his nagging feeling that consciousness was reducible to an > illusion turns out to be an illusion (that is why we say that Henry > James was a brilliant psychologist, but his brother Bill just wrote > fiction). True, the feeling that our consciousness is something that > resides in our heads and peers out through the portholes of our eyes > is illusory. But consciousness is material stuff, because practical > consciousness exists in layers of moving air that are construed by > people, including myself, as voices. In the same way, letters on paper > is construed as speech and LEDS on a screen are construed as ink on > paper: the means is illusory, but the meaning is certainly real. A > play is an illusion, but the actions of the actors are real enough and > so are the tears and laughter they produce in the audience. > > For me the key issue is not is consciousness an illusion but rather > more like "Is volition an illusion?" in general--and "Is choice in > language an illusion?" in particular. Tonight I have to give a lecture > on applications of chaos complexity theory to applied linguistics in > the late twentieth century. Believe it or not, this is the "latest > thing", at least as far as the leading lights in the profession and > the central journals are concerned. But it really does go back to > William James: it's a form of ultra-associationism, The chaos > complexity folks (Diane Larsen-Freeman, Lynn Cameron, now Paul > Seedhouse) all start from the obvious fact that language had to emerge > from non-language--that meaningless sounds and voiceless minds had to > somehow come together--to argue that language is nothing but happy > coincidences which are then reinforced through the power law of > practice. Grammatical rules are an illusion; it's not "turtles all the > way down" (as Annalisa puts it) but happy coincidences all the way up. > And it's that way not only when language emerges but also when we use > it. > > This is, by the way, why we get units of analysis in language--that > is, units that preserve in a minimal form the phenomenon we are trying > to explain. So for Seedhouse the minimal unit is the interaction IRF: > > T (initiate): What's this? > S (response): Apple. > T (corrective feedback): That's right. It's an apple. > > You could, if you really wanted to, spot this unit in a lesson as a > whole (Presentation, Practice, Evaluation), or a syllabus as a whole > (Introduction, Development, Final Exam). With a certain amount of > abstraction, you can argue that it is present every time we use a > clause (which has an "independent" or indispensable proposition or > proposal and then dependent elements which initiate and manage the > response, just as our exchange does). You can spot the structure every > time we use a word like "dappled" or "perished", where the root is > independent and the past tense morpheme dependent. Even a syllable has > an independent vowel and then bound consonants. So it's turtles all > the way down. > > But as far as I know I am the only one who has argued that language is > fractally structured in this precisely this way--and I don't think > it's because of chaos complexity principles. I think it is quite > intentional at every level, and I also think that the apparent > coincidence of vowels in Greg's daughters' names is the result of > deliberate choice as well--most girls' names have that combination of > vowels in them, and this iin turn is an indirect result of milliions > of parents selecting words that end in vowels as sounding more > feminine (a latent French influence on our language)! Volition's not > an illusion, and my volition doesn't cancel out yours resulting in > some volitionless soup of molecules from which language > self-assembles. That model doesn't even work in economics. It's just > that you sometimes (and perhaps always in the case of naming children) > get a lot more than you bargained for. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 27 November 2014 at 05:09, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: >> Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. >> >> I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. >> >> The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about and like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to know someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an online 'conversation'. >> >> Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of one's conversation partners. >> >> Rod >> >> Sent from my Windows Phone >> ________________________________ >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >> >> Rod, >> A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: >> Evocative, no? >> One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet of the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. But you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic activation goes with experienced readers and published writers. >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Rod! >>> We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's >>> an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact >>> same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part >>> as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - something >>> we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on a, >>> o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our >>> third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went >>> with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others even >>> if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about it). >>> >>> I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly >>> non-intentional in its form and structure. >>> >>> A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the >>> structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless >>> reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. >>> >>> It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: >>> "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian >>> generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her >>> luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and setting >>> by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of her >>> aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her >>> potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to >>> mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid >>> delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility of >>> her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and of >>> calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the >>> admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, when >>> visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " >>> >>> Or a phrase like this: >>> ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? >>> >>> Evocative, no? >>> >>> David? >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < >>> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: >>> >>>> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about >>>> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my >>>> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of >>>> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers >>>> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological >>>> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then >>>> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the >>>> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What >>>> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have >>>> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will >>>> 'Know'. >>>> >>>> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the >>>> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip >>>> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and >>>> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but >>>> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might >>>> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a >>>> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, >>>> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive >>>> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved >>>> wrong on this!). >>>> >>>> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but >>>> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be >>>> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special >>>> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of >>>> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which >>>> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing >>>> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is >>>> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think >>>> together in our 'own' heads). >>>> >>>> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children >>>> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no >>>> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her >>>> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to >>>> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives >>>> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. >>>> >>>> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! >>>> >>>> All the best, >>>> >>>> Rod >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >>>> >>>> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and >>>> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. >>>> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my >>>> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want >>>> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to >>>> my enquiry. >>>>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are >>>> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is >>>> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul >>>> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts >>>> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an >>>> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about >>>> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. >>>>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" >>>> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other >>>> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its >>>> tiny size reminded me. >>>>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. >>>>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar >>>> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic >>>> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, >>>> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, >>>> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology >>>> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was >>>> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any >>>> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." >>>>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is >>>> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my >>>> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, >>>> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such >>>> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard >>>> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but >>>> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. >>>>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives >>>> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the >>>> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent >>>> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is >>>> an old man. That's what I was interested in. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >>>>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >>>>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >>>>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >>>>>> >>>>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >>>>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >>>>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >>>>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >>>>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >>>>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >>>>>> >>>>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >>>>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >>>>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >>>>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >>>>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >>>>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >>>>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >>>>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >>>>>> household we mean. >>>>>> >>>>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >>>>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >>>>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >>>>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >>>>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >>>>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >>>>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >>>>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >>>>>> >>>>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >>>>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >>>>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >>>>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >>>>>> generalization we make about it? >>>>>> >>>>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >>>>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >>>>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >>>>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >>>>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >>>>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >>>>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >>>>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >>>>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >>>>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >>>>>> less the same effect. >>>>>> >>>>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >>>>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >>>>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >>>>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >>>>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >>>>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >>>>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >>>>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >>>>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >>>>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >>>>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >>>>>> about rubber). >>>>>> >>>>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >>>>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >>>>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >>>>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >>>>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >>>>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >>>>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >>>>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >>>>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >>>>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >>>>>> have unique referents. >>>>>> >>>>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >>>>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >>>>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >>>>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >>>>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >>>>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >>>>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >>>>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >>>>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >>>>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >>>>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >>>>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >>>>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of >>>> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple >>>> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber >>>> respectively)? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________ >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>> >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>>> by an official order form. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 14:20:23 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:20:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <799B4189-8300-41FF-A1A0-CCBE916DE356@gmail.com> Greg, You got Bob Lake?s email on Fromm and the collective unconscious. Grokking going on here? Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 2:52 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Huw, > I'm grokking your zawn: > http://www.thelandreader.com/glossary/zawn > -greg > p.s. Someone on this listserve pointed me to "grok". Been grokking ever > since. "Grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a > part of the observed?to merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group > experience. It means almost everything that we mean by religion, > philosophy, and science?and it means as little to us (because of our > Earthling assumptions) as color means to a blind man." > > On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> My poetic sense of dappled is that it is slightly incongruent with 'dappled >> light', dappled suggests to me a softening, such as to damp down and it >> seems to me that its not the light which is dappled but the leaf-strewn >> path etc. Etymologically it seems to originate from 'to spot' which I >> understand to be to darken etc. Conversely spangled refers to the >> brighten with sparkles. Possibly there's some affordance in the softening >> from the "spa" to the "da"... >> >> We've recently adopted a rather classic-looking lurcher with a coat >> streaked with every shade from coal to an aged snow white. Maybe theres a >> term for that admist Hardy, Hopkins and Donne. >> >> That's not much help for question, other than the action-based aspects to >> the words. With respect to the singularity of meaning, I usually simply >> refer to these as technical terms. It'd be nice to be equipped with a more >> precise (technical) word though. :) >> >> In respect of fuzzy threads, If you'd like to know what a zawn or a >> jackstraw is, check out the landreader project: >> >> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-27780066 >> http://www.thelandreader.com/ >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 26 November 2014 at 20:09, Rod Parker-Rees < >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> >> wrote: >> >>> Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. >>> >>> I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say >>> that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and >>> sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and >>> other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. >>> >>> The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't >>> really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to >>> develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, >>> David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about >> and >>> like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to >> know >>> someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to >>> keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an >>> online 'conversation'. >>> >>> Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with >>> full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of >>> one's conversation partners. >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> Sent from my Windows Phone >>> ________________________________ >>> From: HENRY SHONERD >>> Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >>> >>> Rod, >>> A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: >>> Evocative, no? >>> One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any >>> genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet >> of >>> the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic >>> structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the >>> mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. >> But >>> you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was >>> trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to >>> construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word >>> ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it >>> includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written >>> communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this >>> chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic >> activation >>> goes with experienced readers and published writers. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson >> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Rod! >>>> We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child >> (she's >>>> an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the >> exact >>>> same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our >> part >>>> as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - >>> something >>>> we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on >>> a, >>>> o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our >>>> third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we >> went >>>> with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others >>> even >>>> if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about >>> it). >>>> >>>> I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly >>>> non-intentional in its form and structure. >>>> >>>> A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of >> the >>>> structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless >>>> reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. >>>> >>>> It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: >>>> "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian >>>> generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her >>>> luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and >>> setting >>>> by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of >>> her >>>> aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her >>>> potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to >>>> mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid >>>> delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility >>> of >>>> her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and >>> of >>>> calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the >>>> admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, >>> when >>>> visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " >>>> >>>> Or a phrase like this: >>>> ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? >>>> >>>> Evocative, no? >>>> >>>> David? >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < >>>> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: >>>> >>>>> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about >>>>> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely >> with >>> my >>>>> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties >> of >>>>> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most >>> speakers >>>>> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also >>> etymological >>>>> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and >>> then >>>>> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the >>>>> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What >>>>> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which >>> have >>>>> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few >> will >>>>> 'Know'. >>>>> >>>>> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by >>> the >>>>> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip >>>>> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and >>>>> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family >> but >>>>> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig >> might >>>>> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to >> a >>>>> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, >>>>> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive >>>>> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be >>> proved >>>>> wrong on this!). >>>>> >>>>> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association >> but >>>>> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may >>> be >>>>> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special >>>>> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings >> of >>>>> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge >> which >>>>> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing >>>>> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our >> thinking >>> is >>>>> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think >>>>> together in our 'own' heads). >>>>> >>>>> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children >>>>> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) >>> and no >>>>> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her >>>>> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to >>>>> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless >>> gives >>>>> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. >>>>> >>>>> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! >>>>> >>>>> All the best, >>>>> >>>>> Rod >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>>> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 >>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >>>>> >>>>> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and >>>>> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the >>> OED. >>>>> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to >> my >>>>> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I >>> want >>>>> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory >> response >>> to >>>>> my enquiry. >>>>>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are >>>>> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is >>>>> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or >>> Seoul >>>>> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are >>> acts >>>>> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an >>>>> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about >>>>> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. >>>>>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" >>>>> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for >> other >>>>> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for >>> its >>>>> tiny size reminded me. >>>>>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. >>>>>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar >>>>> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic >>>>> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. >> Admittedly, >>>>> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: >> decayed, >>>>> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So >>> etymology >>>>> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" >>> was >>>>> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent >> that >>> any >>>>> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." >>>>>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is >>>>> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that >> my >>>>> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod >> responded, >>>>> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that >>> such >>>>> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard >>>>> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, >> but >>>>> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. >>>>>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives >>>>> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in >>> the >>>>> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his >> opponent >>>>> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he >>> is >>>>> an old man. That's what I was interested in. >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >>>>>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists >> have >>>>>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a >> terminology) >>>>>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique >> referent? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >>>>>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a >> situation >>>>>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >>>>>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >>>>>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes >> that >>>>>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >>>>>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation >> we >>>>>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general >> the >>>>>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >>>>>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in >> context >>>>>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >>>>>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >>>>>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >>>>>>> household we mean. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >>>>>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English >> language >>>>>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >>>>>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >>>>>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly >> closer >>>>>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >>>>>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >>>>>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >>>>>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. >> Do >>>>>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >>>>>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >>>>>>> generalization we make about it? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a >> matter >>>>>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >>>>>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >>>>>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties >> Halliday >>>>>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >>>>>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >>>>>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >>>>>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are >> general--you >>>>>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And >> they >>>>>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >>>>>>> less the same effect. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >>>>>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >>>>>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >>>>>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >>>>>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; >> they >>>>>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >>>>>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with >> his >>>>>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not >> proportional--"dapple" >>>>>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >>>>>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >>>>>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >>>>>>> about rubber). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >>>>>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer >> to >>>>>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >>>>>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when >> Andy >>>>>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >>>>>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy >> is >>>>>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in >> his >>>>>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >>>>>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >>>>>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >>>>>>> have unique referents. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we >> cannot >>>>>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of >> situation). >>>>>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >>>>>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >>>>>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >>>>>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their >> sounds--Korean >>>>>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >>>>>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >>>>>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >>>>>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >>>>>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >>>>>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >>>>>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of >>>>> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>>>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or >>> dapple >>>>> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber >>>>> respectively)? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________ >>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>> >>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>> for >>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on >>> it. >>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>> accepts >>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>> emails >>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>> responsibility >>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>> accompanied >>>>> by an official order form. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >> it. >>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >> emails >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>> by an official order form. >>> >>> >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 14:23:48 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:23:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled In-Reply-To: References: <54742910.5020508@mira.net> <89E0EBB2-9529-4DBE-9821-CAD6C327766B@gmail.com> <54753CA3.4000805@mira.net> <5B6729AF-3B2A-4F31-90C2-5770CE3FF321@umich.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110225556F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <34AC9C48-E249-478B-8569-8944D800A9C0@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102255F5A@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: David, Many of your turns turn to ?mashing up?. Might that have any connection to the term ?blending? of cognitive linguistics (Fauconnier and Turner)? Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 2:11 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I secretly agree with Annalisa (despite the frequency with which she > dots her "i"s!) that a lot of the back and forth on xmca is rather > blokish struggle for power over particular words--making sure they > mean what the speaker means them to mean and not what the hearer meant > by them. In particularly, I completely disagree with Andy that > definitions are a matter to be settled by dictionaries. Dictionaries > are a mid-eighteenth century invention, coming a full century after > systematic grammar books, and they were designed to try to "freeze" > the lexicon as a way of setting up national languages. (You can see > how successful THAT project's been!) The part of the language I'm > interested in is not the lexicon but the grammar--so for me the most > interesting part of "dappled" and "perished" is actually "~ed". > > The assertion that consciousness was an illusion was first made by > James. But his nagging feeling that consciousness was reducible to an > illusion turns out to be an illusion (that is why we say that Henry > James was a brilliant psychologist, but his brother Bill just wrote > fiction). True, the feeling that our consciousness is something that > resides in our heads and peers out through the portholes of our eyes > is illusory. But consciousness is material stuff, because practical > consciousness exists in layers of moving air that are construed by > people, including myself, as voices. In the same way, letters on paper > is construed as speech and LEDS on a screen are construed as ink on > paper: the means is illusory, but the meaning is certainly real. A > play is an illusion, but the actions of the actors are real enough and > so are the tears and laughter they produce in the audience. > > For me the key issue is not is consciousness an illusion but rather > more like "Is volition an illusion?" in general--and "Is choice in > language an illusion?" in particular. Tonight I have to give a lecture > on applications of chaos complexity theory to applied linguistics in > the late twentieth century. Believe it or not, this is the "latest > thing", at least as far as the leading lights in the profession and > the central journals are concerned. But it really does go back to > William James: it's a form of ultra-associationism, The chaos > complexity folks (Diane Larsen-Freeman, Lynn Cameron, now Paul > Seedhouse) all start from the obvious fact that language had to emerge > from non-language--that meaningless sounds and voiceless minds had to > somehow come together--to argue that language is nothing but happy > coincidences which are then reinforced through the power law of > practice. Grammatical rules are an illusion; it's not "turtles all the > way down" (as Annalisa puts it) but happy coincidences all the way up. > And it's that way not only when language emerges but also when we use > it. > > This is, by the way, why we get units of analysis in language--that > is, units that preserve in a minimal form the phenomenon we are trying > to explain. So for Seedhouse the minimal unit is the interaction IRF: > > T (initiate): What's this? > S (response): Apple. > T (corrective feedback): That's right. It's an apple. > > You could, if you really wanted to, spot this unit in a lesson as a > whole (Presentation, Practice, Evaluation), or a syllabus as a whole > (Introduction, Development, Final Exam). With a certain amount of > abstraction, you can argue that it is present every time we use a > clause (which has an "independent" or indispensable proposition or > proposal and then dependent elements which initiate and manage the > response, just as our exchange does). You can spot the structure every > time we use a word like "dappled" or "perished", where the root is > independent and the past tense morpheme dependent. Even a syllable has > an independent vowel and then bound consonants. So it's turtles all > the way down. > > But as far as I know I am the only one who has argued that language is > fractally structured in this precisely this way--and I don't think > it's because of chaos complexity principles. I think it is quite > intentional at every level, and I also think that the apparent > coincidence of vowels in Greg's daughters' names is the result of > deliberate choice as well--most girls' names have that combination of > vowels in them, and this iin turn is an indirect result of milliions > of parents selecting words that end in vowels as sounding more > feminine (a latent French influence on our language)! Volition's not > an illusion, and my volition doesn't cancel out yours resulting in > some volitionless soup of molecules from which language > self-assembles. That model doesn't even work in economics. It's just > that you sometimes (and perhaps always in the case of naming children) > get a lot more than you bargained for. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 27 November 2014 at 05:09, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: >> Greg to me, not me to Greg but yes. >> >> I would agree that sense is multisensory but I am not sure I would say that words evoke this sense. I would argue that it is speaking (and sometimes writing) that evokes this 'thick' sense so it is how words and other signs are 'performed' that is particularly telling. >> >> The difficulty with this medium (or one of them) is that most of us don't really know the person whose words we are reading. I am just beginning to develop a sense of who frequent contributors are - what you, Andy, Mike, David, Larry, Vera, Huw, Martin, Haydi, Annalisa and others care about and like to write about but this is a MUCH slower process than getting to know someone in face to face conversation and this can make it hard going to keep up with the asynchronous and semisynchronous twists and turns of an online 'conversation'. >> >> Evoking in writing, to strangers is MUCH more difficult than evoking with full use of a body (and with the ability to monitor the body responses of one's conversation partners. >> >> Rod >> >> Sent from my Windows Phone >> ________________________________ >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: 26/11/2014 18:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >> >> Rod, >> A small point, but important for me, when you say to Greg: >> Evocative, no? >> One could argue that the physical forms of language, the signs, in any genre, EVOKE meaning, whereby we, as language users, profile some facet of the cognitive, encyclopedic, ?ground" which constitutes our semantic structure. I am guessing any effort to posit an actual structure in the mind will provoke concerns in the chat, arguing for dynamic processes. But you have to get nouny sometimes! Call it a useful illusion? What I was trying to lay out was an alternative to the ?packages? of form/meaning to construe ?word?, certainly not what Vygotsky had in mind. I see word ?sense? as collateral activation of the word profiled. And, of course, it includes all of the sound symbolism inherent in your kids? names. Written communication, it seems to me, when done with such care as I see in this chat, gives me an idea of how deep this language-based semantic activation goes with experienced readers and published writers. >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Rod! >>> We had the exact same realization - before we added a fourth child (she's >>> an outlier), our son pointed out to us that all three kids had the exact >>> same three vowels (a, o, i)! This was totally non-intentional on our part >>> as well. And no, there aren't a ton of a, o, i names out there - something >>> we discovered with our fourth. (with the fourth, we were running low on a, >>> o, i girl names since we had used up a third a, o, i girl name with our >>> third child's middle name; we contemplated "Fiona" but in the end we went >>> with an a, e, i name that has other poetic resonances with the others even >>> if it lacks the exact same vowels - that time we did indeed think about it). >>> >>> I think this points to an important quality of meaning - it is highly >>> non-intentional in its form and structure. >>> >>> A second point follows and speaks to Andy's question - the nature of the >>> structure is not always apparent to speakers but we can nonetheless >>> reproduce it. We were reproducing a, o, i in names without knowing it. >>> >>> It is for this reason that we can understand a passage such as this: >>> "?Her antiquity in preceding and surviving succeeding tellurian >>> generations: her nocturnal predominance: her satellitic dependence: her >>> luminary reflection: her constancy under all her phases, rising and setting >>> by her appointed times, waxing and waning: the forced invariability of her >>> aspect: her indeterminate response to inaffirmative interrogation: her >>> potency over effluent and refluent waters: her power to enamour, to >>> mortify, to invest with beauty, to render insane, to incite to and aid >>> delinquency: the tranquil inscrutability of her visage: the terribility of >>> her isolated dominant resplendent propinquity: her omens of tempest and of >>> calm: the stimulation of her light, her motion and her presence: the >>> admonition of her craters, her arid seas, her silence: her splendour, when >>> visible: her attraction, when invisible.? " >>> >>> Or a phrase like this: >>> ?The sea, the snotgreen sea, the scrotumtightening sea.? >>> >>> Evocative, no? >>> >>> David? >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 11:44 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < >>> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: >>> >>>> This conversation has been playing on my mind - Henry's comments about >>>> language in the other thread (Fate. Luck , Chance) tied in closely with my >>>> own ideas about the ways in which language is dappled with varieties of >>>> knowing. There are meanings which we can be pretty confident most speakers >>>> of a language will know and recognise but then there are also etymological >>>> remains which nuance the meaning of some words and word families and then >>>> there are the 'Bouba' and 'Kiki' effects of connections between the >>>> physical act of speaking and the felt meaning of sounds/words. What >>>> particularly interests me is the middle ground of word families which have >>>> a resemblance which most speakers will recognise but which very few will >>>> 'Know'. >>>> >>>> Dapple belongs to one such family - words which suggest repetition by the >>>> addition of the '-le' suffix (spark - sparkle, crack-crackle, drip >>>> -dribble, dab-dabble) and this family includes words like dapple and >>>> freckle, drizzle and giggle which are clearly members of the family but >>>> whose lineage has faded (who knows what a dap, freck, driz or gig might >>>> be?). I suspect that perished might also belong, at least in part, to a >>>> family of 'dying fall' words which share the 'ished' ending (finished, >>>> demolished, extinguished, famished). I tried to think of more positive >>>> examples but could only come up with 'nourished' (I'm sure I will be proved >>>> wrong on this!). >>>> >>>> The point is that words have many shades of meaning and association but >>>> ALL of these depend on the fact that these shades are shared. Some may be >>>> shared only within a very small group (and than gives them a special >>>> cachet) such as those which a family preserves from the mis-speakings of >>>> children. It is the fact that we know that we share our knowledge which >>>> converts knowing into understanding and I would argue that the knowing >>>> together aspect of con-sciousness is absolutely essential (our thinking is >>>> an internalised form of our social interactions and we learn to think >>>> together in our 'own' heads). >>>> >>>> I was honestly surprised when I realised that all three of my children >>>> have names which include the same two vowels (my daughter is Sophie) and no >>>> others. This was not planned, in fact Sophie's name was chosen by her >>>> brothers (which might explain their preference for a name similar to >>>> theirs) but this has constructed a family resemblance which doubtless gives >>>> these vowels a different 'feel' for us. >>>> >>>> I have to say how much I love the thinkles which dapple this forum! >>>> >>>> All the best, >>>> >>>> Rod >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>> Sent: 26 November 2014 03:41 >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: dappled >>>> >>>> Just a note, the term 'perished silk' is reasonably common term (and >>>> possibly older than 'perished rubber') although not given space in the OED. >>>> It refers, it seems, to a sort of worn and faded look. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, thank you very much for your patient and extended response to my >>>> question. At the very great risk of even further humiliating myself, I want >>>> to say that you have nonetheless failed to give a satisfactory response to >>>> my enquiry. >>>>> Firstly, all the stuff about my name is misplaced. Although there are >>>> several Andy Blundens around, "Andy Blunden" is a proper noun and is >>>> therefore not listed in the dictionary any more than David Kellogg or Seoul >>>> are listed. In the sense in which Vygotsky rightly said "All words are acts >>>> of generalisation" "Andy Blunden" is not a word; its referent is an >>>> specific entity. But in any case, my enquiry was meant to be about >>>> adjectives, not nouns proper or otherwise. >>>>> As to "dappled" I was gloriously wrong there, but it was "perished" >>>> which set my mind going in the first place, and I cast around for other >>>> examples, and our lovely back garden which has far too many trees for its >>>> tiny size reminded me. >>>>> But let me try this single instance, which is after all, all I need. >>>>> Meaning 2b in the OED of "perished" is "*b.* Of rubber or a similar >>>> material, or an article made from it: having lost its characteristic >>>> elasticity and become weak, sticky, etc." dating from 1922. Admittedly, >>>> meaning 2a is "*a.* Of a material object or organic substance: decayed, >>>> rotted; damaged, in a poor physical state" dating from 1587. So etymology >>>> aside, the writers of the dictionary recognise that in 1922 "perished" was >>>> given a new, specific meaning.which generalises only to the extent that any >>>> rubber or rubber-like object may "perish." >>>>> So I fully accept that being a word of the kind I am asking about is >>>> never going to be a cut-and-dry matter, but it still seems to me that my >>>> enquiry was not entirely nonsensical. :) It was great how Rod responded, >>>> because the reflections which led me to ask about it was actually that such >>>> words have great literary, rhetorical and poetic potential. The Gerard >>>> Manley Hopkins poem confirmed this in spades, with not only dappled, but >>>> pied, brindle, fallow, freckled. >>>>> Perhaps I ought to have phrased my question in terms of adjectives >>>> which, when used, evoke a specific kind of referent, only implicit in the >>>> adjective? Remember in West Wing, when the candidate calls his opponent >>>> "sprightly" - cleverly praising his fitness while reminding us that he is >>>> an old man. That's what I was interested in. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> So, as Andy must realize by now, his question has to be >>>>>> de-metalinguist-icized. The original question is, do we linguists have >>>>>> any meta-linguistic term (that is, a term about terms, a terminology) >>>>>> to describe the situation where a word has a single, unique referent? >>>>>> >>>>>> Before we can answer this (and I'll do my best) we have to determine >>>>>> whether any such situation ever exists. That is, is there a situation >>>>>> where a word meaning (which is, Vygotsky tells us, always and >>>>>> everywhere an act of generalization) has a unique referent? Here the >>>>>> answer appears to be no, since generalization always presupposes that >>>>>> you are taking one context of situation and applying it to another. >>>>>> >>>>>> You might say that a proper noun like "Andy Blunden" is an exception >>>>>> that proves the rule--Andy is always Andy, no matter what situation we >>>>>> put him in, and the longer period of time we take the more general the >>>>>> generalization "Andy Blunden" becomes. But this is not so, both >>>>>> externally and internally: externally, speaking of the name in context >>>>>> as a whole, Andy the supposed Referent of the name changes as he and >>>>>> we age. Internally, speaking of the structure of the name itself >>>>>> alone, we notice that "Andy" specifies which Blunden in the Blunden >>>>>> household we mean. >>>>>> >>>>>> This suggests that "Blunden" is more general than "Andy"--and on the >>>>>> other hand if we google the name we find that in the English language >>>>>> as a system, "Andy" is far more general than "Blunden". Needless to >>>>>> say, names and nouns are quite a bit more unique in their supposed >>>>>> referents than verbs--we have proper nouns which are supposedly closer >>>>>> to Andy's ideal of a unique referent than common nouns, but there is >>>>>> no such thing as a proper verb describing a unique and unrepeated >>>>>> singularity: all verbs are common verbs. >>>>>> >>>>>> But we can de-metalinguistic-ize still further. We can ask whether >>>>>> there is a situation where a word meaning has a concrete referent. Do >>>>>> word meanings always indicate, not some thing in the world (the sort >>>>>> of thing that Andy was calling "matter"), but rather some >>>>>> generalization we make about it? >>>>>> >>>>>> Here the answer appears to be yes, but once again it's really a matter >>>>>> of degree. At one end of language we find grammatical morphemes like >>>>>> the "~ed" in "dappled" and "perished" are more grammatical than >>>>>> lexical. That is, they have the three grammatical properties Halliday >>>>>> calls "closure", "generality" and "proportion". They come from a >>>>>> closed set of morphemes--a user of English has a lot of freedom, but >>>>>> those freedoms do not include the freedom to invent a new past tense >>>>>> morpheme and have it adopted into the language. They are general--you >>>>>> can apply them to a wide variety of verbs across the system. And they >>>>>> are proportional, because every time you do this you achieve more or >>>>>> less the same effect. >>>>>> >>>>>> In contrast, you find that the roots of the words "dapple" and >>>>>> "perish" are more lexical than grammatical. That is, they are not >>>>>> closed class words--you are free to invent new words and to make big >>>>>> changes to the pronunciation of old ones, as Gerard Manley Hopkins >>>>>> reminds us with his use of "sprung rhythm". They are not general; they >>>>>> apply to much narrower and more local, more restricted situations >>>>>> (though never unique ones, as Hopkins reminds us insistently with his >>>>>> use of the plural). And of course they are not proportional--"dapple" >>>>>> means one thing applied to ponies and another applied to mackerels >>>>>> (and I find the idea that for Andy the prototypical meaning of >>>>>> "perish" has to do with rubber tells us rather more about Andy than >>>>>> about rubber). >>>>>> >>>>>> And this is where the thread on "dappled" and "perished" meets the >>>>>> thread on "Fate, Luck, and Chance", and begins to form some answer to >>>>>> Vera's and Martin's twenty thousand dollar question on how >>>>>> consciousness develops. If we go back in time to the moment when Andy >>>>>> was an infant, we can imagine that Andy engaged in infant activities >>>>>> like ostension and indication. Because the objects the infant Andy is >>>>>> picking up and holding are completely new, we can imagine that in his >>>>>> undifferentiated consciousness they are in fact singularities. He >>>>>> doesn't use words to indicate them (because in order to do this he >>>>>> would have to generalize), but his act of picking up and holding do >>>>>> have unique referents. >>>>>> >>>>>> We can't call this consciousness as we know it (which is why we cannot >>>>>> say that "Andy Blunden" refers to any singular context of situation). >>>>>> But we can certainly call it consciousness, and we can even see >>>>>> fossils of this primitive undifferentiated consciousness in Andy's >>>>>> adult language (e.g. his use of "he he", which is what we call in >>>>>> Korean "ouiseongeo", that is words that only mean their sounds--Korean >>>>>> also has a category of "ouitaeeo" which are words that only describe >>>>>> the sound of the way actions look, such as "hurly burly" or "hanky >>>>>> panky"). And that, in my humble de-metalinguisticized linguist's >>>>>> opinion, is the origin of consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> My original question on Fate, Luck, and Chance was--it seems to >>>>>> me--related. "Luck" is the way I (as an individual) generalize >>>>>> unrelated chance events. But "fate" is the way we (as a speech >>>>>> community) generalize the notion of "luck". >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 26 November 2014 at 01:38, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I am coming late to this, but I think "collocation" would be of >>>> interest. Wikipedia has some good stuff on that. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 12:00 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have a trivial question for the linguists on this list. >>>>>>>> Do you have a word for words like "dappled" and "perished" (or dapple >>>> and perish) which can describe only one thing (shade and rubber >>>> respectively)? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________ >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>> >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>>> by an official order form. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> > From brucerob1953@googlemail.com Wed Nov 26 14:45:41 2014 From: brucerob1953@googlemail.com (Bruce Robinson) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 22:45:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <, > <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> Henry, Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not Richard Nixon :)] Bruce R PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I find irritating... On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Sister Analisa, > Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va > lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said courage. > > The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. > > Henry > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Dear Henry, >> >> Thank you for your reply. >> >> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? >> >> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. >> >> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> >> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. >> >> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >> >> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >> >> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> >> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" >> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> >> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> >> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. >> >> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >> >> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. >> >> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. >> >> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach than > one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 15:45:29 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 16:45:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <, > <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: <50107BBF-866D-4E71-81F6-B3CD5C74BE5B@gmail.com> Hi Bruce, The movie is at its best when the blok and his mate trade blows each from their contending perspectives. But with honesty, and through their constant dialog they keep their life together going, not just there He satisfied with the status quo but deeply committed to keeping his mate, who periodically gets totally pissed off at sacrifices she has been forced to make to keep things going. He really works hard at assuaging her. He?s no fool and she doesn?t want to be made to be one. It has an edge to it, but it gets gooey too. We cracked up at how cleverly Linklater scripted the back and forth, but it really is like my wife and me, only their lines are cleverer. And this chat, I think of it as a relationship between committed partners. It often feels like it?s going to fall apart, but love wins out. The blok is still a blok, but a decent one, and, really, they both knew they would get nothing better. It was an upper. We?re romantics, but then so was Goethe. I like the beginner?s mind thing. Always beginning. Now about this power thing... Henry > On Nov 26, 2014, at 3:45 PM, Bruce Robinson wrote: > > Henry, > > Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not Richard Nixon :)] > > Bruce R > > PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I find irritating... > > On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Sister Analisa, >> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va >> lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said courage. >> >> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >> >> Henry >> >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Dear Henry, >>> >>> Thank you for your reply. >>> >>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? >>> >>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. >>> >>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>> >>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. >>> >>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >>> >>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>> >>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>> >>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" >>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>> >>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>> >>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>> >>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. >>> >>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >>> >>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. >>> >>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. >>> >>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach than >> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >> > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Nov 26 16:03:03 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 00:03:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Blokish struggles for power Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F906CFA1@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Just a push back on the idea of blokish struggle for power over particular words? (Is there anybody out there having a power struggle over what blokish means?). There is I think another side to this, something that Vygotsky I think refers to which is that words have histories, and perhaps achieve a better understanding when we explore those words and their meanings in the context of their history. This is important I think because really interesting words with rich meanings and histories tend to suffer what might be called a regression to the mean. Somebody offers a simple, more visceral meaning and people pick up on that and then they forget the history. A short anecdote on what I mean by visceral. When I was in college the Talking Heads were at their height. My friends would talk about how good the Talking Heads were and I would argue against them, being a fan of the Asbury Park/Jersey sound (Springsteen, Southside Johnny and the Asbury Jukes etc.). Here was the thing, I never really listened to the Talking Heads except in the background at parties and had never seen them. Why had I argued against them as a good band (late night dorm arguments) - well when I thought of Talking Heads I had this visceral picture of them as a bunch of heads on the stage mouthing New Wave lyrics. It had little to do with who they really were as a band. The ending of this little story is I finally was dragged to see David Byrne and the Talking Heads and to this day it is the greatest concert I've ever been to in my life (this includes multiple Springsteen and Dead concerts). So why this little story. Because I worry that sometimes people hear words almost into the background and sometimes they get redefined based on almost visceral reactions to their texture. People pick up on that and adopt it as part of their vocabulary without ever seeing them or going to see them in concert. Much of the richness of the words are lost. To give an example, I have been doing a lot of exploration of Ted Nelson's concept of hypertext. What a rich, radical concept that is - really challenging to way we understand the world. And yet it seems to me the way many people use the word is sort of as a regression to the mean, without recognizing its history, the ways it developed and the reasons behind its development. If somebody comes and says, "No, that's not what Nelson meant, you should see him in concert!" Does that represent a blokish struggle for power? It's a complex question, because of course there are always overt and covert hierarchies - and the people at the top of the hierarchy rarely recognize that they even exist. But there is also a richness to our words that can be so easily lost. Happy Thanksgiving Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Bruce Robinson [brucerob1953@googlemail.com] Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2014 5:45 PM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] Henry, Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not Richard Nixon :)] Bruce R PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I find irritating... On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Sister Analisa, > Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va > lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said courage. > > The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. > > Henry > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Dear Henry, >> >> Thank you for your reply. >> >> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? >> >> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. >> >> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> >> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. >> >> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >> >> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >> >> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> >> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" >> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> >> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> >> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. >> >> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >> >> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. >> >> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. >> >> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach than > one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 16:08:32 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 16:08:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: "Fate, Luck, Chance" and the "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words" Is this "struggle" more than personal? Are traditions involved? As I read the struggle unfolding I hear voices that are expressing positions which trace long ancestral lineages. This struggle is passionate but seems much bigger than individual struggles. Are the particular words used [word/play] ways of indicating deeper *truths* that are contested as positions and stances are thoughtfully deliberated. I go back to the notion of *dispositions* [acquired through passionate inquiry]. When we bring these words to *arenas* and *perform* these words it seems to be not *merely* words but the passions of a lifetime [and the ancestral traditions also involved] that are being brought to the arena and played out. To guide my personal experience of what is occuring in these heated debates, I have developed a particular *disposition* through trying to aquire Gadamer's hermeneutic perspective on life. He saw [generative] conversation as vital to our human condition. If passionate conversation is sometimes discordant, do we stop the conversation? Fate, luck, chance [Peirce's tychism] and also *faith* in *interpretive communities*. In other words, rhetorical and persuasive performances. Performances not as *merely* rhetorical but as foundationally rhetorical expressions as acts of *faith*. Intersubjective interpretive communities *all the way down* Larry On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Bruce Robinson wrote: > Henry, > > Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent majority, > many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K calls a > "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not Richard > Nixon :)] > > Bruce R > > PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of this > message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I find > irritating... > > > On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Sister Analisa, >> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to >> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered >> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the >> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even >> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has >> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small >> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard >> Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in >> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard >> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The >> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get >> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va >> lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said >> courage. >> >> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the >> Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of >> the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I >> just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who >> was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested >> in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >> >> Henry >> >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Dear Henry, >>> >>> Thank you for your reply. >>> >>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. >>> Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? >>> >>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at >>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are >>> in or from, what-have-you. >>> >>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. >>> So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have >>> offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal >>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my >>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>> >>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all >>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are >>> trying to say to me. >>> >>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different >>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for >>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not >>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that >>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," >>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one >>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>> >>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say >>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself >>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little >>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>> >>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm >>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this >>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To >>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>> >>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell >>> from the star!" >>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>> >>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural >>> theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and >>> how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for >>> you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of >>> color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about >>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time >>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that >>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>> >>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow >>> others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen >>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether >>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or >>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I >>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position >>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without >>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>> >>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic >>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know >>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be >>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. >>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now >>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All >>> it does is shut things down. >>> >>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the >>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, >>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an >>> entire website full of texts. >>> >>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I >>> am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the >>> material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. >>> Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or >>> throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw >>> boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being >>> made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require >>> a helping hand. >>> >>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a >>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may >>> not understand. >>> >>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, >>> but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, >>> on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time >>> is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of >>> ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the >>> world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a >>> lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. >>> Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how >>> much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing >>> but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism >>> from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a >>> very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think >>> all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an >>> easier student to teach than >>> >> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> >>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to >>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies >>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank >>> you for offering them to me. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 16:20:23 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 17:20:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] References: <50107BBF-866D-4E71-81F6-B3CD5C74BE5B@gmail.com> Message-ID: <44C6B6C0-5BA8-44FD-A5FB-DC3C8D16A007@gmail.com> Sorry to micro-manage my turn: I mean privilege, rather than power. Is this about fate, luck and chance? > Begin forwarded message: > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > From: HENRY SHONERD > Date: November 26, 2014 at 4:45:29 PM MST > To: bruce@brucerob.eu, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Hi Bruce, > The movie is at its best when the blok and his mate trade blows each from their contending perspectives. But with honesty, and through their constant dialog they keep their life together going, not just there He satisfied with the status quo but deeply committed to keeping his mate, who periodically gets totally pissed off at sacrifices she has been forced to make to keep things going. He really works hard at assuaging her. He?s no fool and she doesn?t want to be made to be one. It has an edge to it, but it gets gooey too. We cracked up at how cleverly Linklater scripted the back and forth, but it really is like my wife and me, only their lines are cleverer. And this chat, I think of it as a relationship between committed partners. It often feels like it?s going to fall apart, but love wins out. The blok is still a blok, but a decent one, and, really, they both knew they would get nothing better. It was an upper. We?re romantics, but then so was Goethe. I like the beginner?s mind thing. Always beginning. Now about this power thing... > Henry > > >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 3:45 PM, Bruce Robinson wrote: >> >> Henry, >> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not Richard Nixon :)] >> >> Bruce R >> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I find irritating... >> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> Sister Analisa, >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va >>> lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said courage. >>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >>> >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? >>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. >>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. >>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. >>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. >>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. >>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach than >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Nov 26 16:24:44 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 11:24:44 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <, > <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a brief moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), or in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise to* illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly phenomenology." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Bruce Robinson wrote: > Henry, > > Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular > words'? [Not Richard Nixon :)] > > Bruce R > > PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > else I find irritating... > > On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Sister Analisa, >> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to >> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I >> wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written >> communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking >> turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked >> about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with >> the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be >> daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last >> night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally >> committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to >> get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The >> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >> get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > va >> lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said >> courage. >> >> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called >> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >> One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >> popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program >> (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something >> she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir >> hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >> >> Henry >> >>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>> >>> Dear Henry, >>> >>> Thank you for your reply. >>> >>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>> welcome? >>> >>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at >>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >>> we are in or from, what-have-you. >>> >>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" >>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>> you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to >>> my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm >>> not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a >>> sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective >>> reality. >>> >>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are >>> all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there >>> what you are trying to say to me. >>> >>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different >>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>> for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it >>> right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles >>> me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews >>> communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for >>> example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely >>> different POVs. >>> >>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say >>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>> himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning >>> that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests >>> are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if >>> that is OK. >>> >>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, >>> I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >>> on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are >>> you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>> >>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who >>> fell from the star!" >>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>> >>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>> such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their >>> work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is >>> that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in >>> thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not >>> easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social >>> interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv >>> is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>> >>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>> happen because all that persists are conversations about >>> definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! >>> subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed >>> this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. >>> Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret >>> differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a >>> clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>> >>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>> academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >>> because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons >>> why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I >>> think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, >>> when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" >>> fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut >>> things down. >>> >>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in >>> the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>> context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or >>> the link to an entire website full of texts. >>> >>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>> agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand >>> is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. >>> Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, >>> where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, >>> then at least connections are being made for those who might not be >>> very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. >>> >>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like >>> a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >>> someone who may not understand. >>> >>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated >>> as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >>> upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in >>> education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us >>> is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant >>> is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I >>> vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein >>> said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I >>> don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing >>> but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense >>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>> learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >>> knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > n >> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to >>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>> implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I >>> have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without >>> the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Nov 26 16:49:35 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 00:49:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <, > <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <, > <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. Martin On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a brief moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), or in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise to* illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly phenomenology." > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: >> Henry, >> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not Richard Nixon :)] >> >> Bruce R >> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I find irritating... >> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> Sister Analisa, >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >> va >>> lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said courage. >>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >>> >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? >>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are in or from, what-have-you. >>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are trying to say to me. >>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell from the star!" >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All it does is shut things down. >>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require a helping hand. >>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may not understand. >>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >> n >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank you for offering them to me. >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 21:49:32 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 07:49:32 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? Carol On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > > Martin > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a brief > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), or > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise to* > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly phenomenology." > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >> Henry, > >> > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not > Richard Nixon :)] > >> > >> Bruce R > >> > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else I > find irritating... > >> > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>> Sister Analisa, > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I wondered > in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is even > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to face, in > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >> va > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said > courage. > >>> > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and > weak form. > >>> > >>> Henry > >>> > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Dear Henry, > >>>> > >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >>>> > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? > >>>> > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are > in or from, what-have-you. > >>>> > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >>>> > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are > trying to say to me. > >>>> > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one > another, despite our likely different POVs. > >>>> > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >>>> > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >>>> > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who > fell from the star!" > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >>>> > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >>>> > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >>>> > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All > it does is shut things down. > >>>> > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an > entire website full of texts. > >>>> > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may > require a helping hand. > >>>> > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may > not understand. > >>>> > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >> n > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank > you for offering them to me. > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards, > >>>> > >>>> Annalisa > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 22:25:28 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 23:25:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Blokish struggles for power In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F906CFA1@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F906CFA1@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael, Stop making sense. -greg p.s. Where can I go to see Andy Blunden in concert? On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 5:03 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Just a push back on the idea of blokish struggle for power over particular > words? (Is there anybody out there having a power struggle over what > blokish means?). > > There is I think another side to this, something that Vygotsky I think > refers to which is that words have histories, and perhaps achieve a better > understanding when we explore those words and their meanings in the context > of their history. This is important I think because really interesting > words with rich meanings and histories tend to suffer what might be called > a regression to the mean. Somebody offers a simple, more visceral meaning > and people pick up on that and then they forget the history. A short > anecdote on what I mean by visceral. When I was in college the Talking > Heads were at their height. My friends would talk about how good the > Talking Heads were and I would argue against them, being a fan of the > Asbury Park/Jersey sound (Springsteen, Southside Johnny and the Asbury > Jukes etc.). Here was the thing, I never really listened to the Talking > Heads except in the background at parties and had never seen them. Why had > I argued against them as a good band (late night dorm arguments) - well > when I thought of Talking Heads I had this visceral picture of them as a > bunch of heads on the stage mouthing New Wave lyrics. It had little to do > with who they really were as a band. The ending of this little story is I > finally was dragged to see David Byrne and the Talking Heads and to this > day it is the greatest concert I've ever been to in my life (this includes > multiple Springsteen and Dead concerts). > > So why this little story. Because I worry that sometimes people hear > words almost into the background and sometimes they get redefined based on > almost visceral reactions to their texture. People pick up on that and > adopt it as part of their vocabulary without ever seeing them or going to > see them in concert. Much of the richness of the words are lost. To give > an example, I have been doing a lot of exploration of Ted Nelson's concept > of hypertext. What a rich, radical concept that is - really challenging to > way we understand the world. And yet it seems to me the way many people > use the word is sort of as a regression to the mean, without recognizing > its history, the ways it developed and the reasons behind its development. > If somebody comes and says, "No, that's not what Nelson meant, you should > see him in concert!" Does that represent a blokish struggle for power? > > It's a complex question, because of course there are always overt and > covert hierarchies - and the people at the top of the hierarchy rarely > recognize that they even exist. But there is also a richness to our words > that can be so easily lost. > > Happy Thanksgiving > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Bruce Robinson [brucerob1953@googlemail.com] > Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2014 5:45 PM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > > Henry, > > Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David > K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? > [Not Richard Nixon :)] > > Bruce R > > PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else > I find irritating... > > On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Sister Analisa, > > Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I wondered > in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in the > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well?what is even > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard > Linklater movie last night, ?Before Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va > > lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said > courage. > > > > The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again to > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would be > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and > weak form. > > > > Henry > > > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> > >> Dear Henry, > >> > >> Thank you for your reply. > >> > >> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? > >> > >> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we are > in or from, what-have-you. > >> > >> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. > So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you have > offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my personal > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >> > >> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are all > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are > trying to say to me. > >> > >> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm not > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to one > another, despite our likely different POVs. > >> > >> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a little > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >> > >> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, I'm > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >> > >> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who fell > from the star!" > >> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >> > >> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural > theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and > how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for > you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of > color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> > >> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to allow > others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something without > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >> > >> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an academic > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would be > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of "now > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. All > it does is shut things down. > >> > >> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in the > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to an > entire website full of texts. > >> > >> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with which > I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree with > the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a matter of > form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing ropes > or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to throw > boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being > made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may require > a helping hand. > >> > >> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like a > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who may > not understand. > >> > >> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this reception > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the more > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > doesn't know is an easier student to teach than > > one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which implies > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank > you for offering them to me. > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Dana.Walker@unco.edu Wed Nov 26 22:38:16 2014 From: Dana.Walker@unco.edu (Walker, Dana) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 06:38:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to consider Annalisa's question: I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so seldom talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self in relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, gender, and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is why I choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this list are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa above? Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory who deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there are others. Dana On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: >Hi > >There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it >complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > >I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > >Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > >Carol > >On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >wrote: > >> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two >> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >> >> Martin >> >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a brief >> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), or >> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says >> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise >>to* >> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>phenomenology." >> > Andy >> > >>------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > >> > >> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >> >> Henry, >> >> >> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David >>K >> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not >> Richard Nixon :)] >> >> >> >> Bruce R >> >> >> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of >> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>else I >> find irritating... >> >> >> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Sister Analisa, >> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>wondered >> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in >>the >> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is even >> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >>has >> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small >> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard >> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>face, in >> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so >>hard >> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get >> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >> >> va >> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said >> courage. >> >>> >> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>called >> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One >> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again >>to >> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would >>be >> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong >>and >> weak form. >> >>> >> >>> Henry >> >>> >> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> Dear Henry, >> >>>> >> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >> >>>> >> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>welcome? >> >>>> >> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept >>at >> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we >>are >> in or from, what-have-you. >> >>>> >> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" >> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you >> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>personal >> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my >> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> >>>> >> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are >>all >> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >>are >> trying to say to me. >> >>>> >> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different >> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for >> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm >>not >> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>that >> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," >> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to >>one >> another, despite our likely different POVs. >> >>>> >> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >>say >> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself >> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>little >> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >> >>>> >> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, >>I'm >> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this >> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To >> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> >>>> >> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who >> fell from the star!" >> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> >>>> >> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>as >> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>is >> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>and >> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>about >> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>time >> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that >> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >>>> >> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>happen >> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>whether >> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or >> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means >>I >> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>position >> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>without >> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> >>>> >> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>academic >> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>know >> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would >>be >> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>reading. >> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >>"now >> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. >>All >> it does is shut things down. >> >>>> >> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in >>the >> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, >> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to >>an >> entire website full of texts. >> >>>> >> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>agree >> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>matter >> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing >> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need >>to >> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections >>are >> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may >> require a helping hand. >> >>>> >> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>like a >> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who >>may >> not understand. >> >>>> >> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >>how >> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the >> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>most >> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>embarrassment, a >> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>reception >> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the >>more >> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>ignorance >> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense >> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn >> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one >> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >> >> n >> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to >> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>implies >> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank >> you for offering them to me. >> >>>> >> >>>> Kind regards, >> >>>> >> >>>> Annalisa >> >>>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> > > >-- >Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >Developmental psycholinguist >Academic, Researcher, and Editor >Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Wed Nov 26 22:48:18 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 06:48:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Blokish struggles for power In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F906CFA1@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102256173@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Here - http://vimeo.com/search?q=Andy+Blunden Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 27 November 2014 06:25 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Blokish struggles for power Michael, Stop making sense. -greg p.s. Where can I go to see Andy Blunden in concert? On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 5:03 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Just a push back on the idea of blokish struggle for power over particular > words? (Is there anybody out there having a power struggle over what > blokish means?). > > There is I think another side to this, something that Vygotsky I think > refers to which is that words have histories, and perhaps achieve a > better understanding when we explore those words and their meanings in > the context of their history. This is important I think because > really interesting words with rich meanings and histories tend to > suffer what might be called a regression to the mean. Somebody offers > a simple, more visceral meaning and people pick up on that and then > they forget the history. A short anecdote on what I mean by visceral. > When I was in college the Talking Heads were at their height. My > friends would talk about how good the Talking Heads were and I would > argue against them, being a fan of the Asbury Park/Jersey sound > (Springsteen, Southside Johnny and the Asbury Jukes etc.). Here was > the thing, I never really listened to the Talking Heads except in the > background at parties and had never seen them. Why had I argued > against them as a good band (late night dorm arguments) - well when I > thought of Talking Heads I had this visceral picture of them as a > bunch of heads on the stage mouthing New Wave lyrics. It had little > to do with who they really were as a band. The ending of this little > story is I finally was dragged to see David Byrne and the Talking > Heads and to this day it is the greatest concert I've ever been to in my life (this includes multiple Springsteen and Dead concerts). > > So why this little story. Because I worry that sometimes people hear > words almost into the background and sometimes they get redefined > based on almost visceral reactions to their texture. People pick up > on that and adopt it as part of their vocabulary without ever seeing > them or going to see them in concert. Much of the richness of the > words are lost. To give an example, I have been doing a lot of > exploration of Ted Nelson's concept of hypertext. What a rich, > radical concept that is - really challenging to way we understand the > world. And yet it seems to me the way many people use the word is > sort of as a regression to the mean, without recognizing its history, the ways it developed and the reasons behind its development. > If somebody comes and says, "No, that's not what Nelson meant, you > should see him in concert!" Does that represent a blokish struggle for power? > > It's a complex question, because of course there are always overt and > covert hierarchies - and the people at the top of the hierarchy rarely > recognize that they even exist. But there is also a richness to our > words that can be so easily lost. > > Happy Thanksgiving > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Bruce Robinson > [brucerob1953@googlemail.com] > Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2014 5:45 PM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > > Henry, > > Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? > [Not Richard Nixon :)] > > Bruce R > > PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > else I find irritating... > > On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Sister Analisa, > > Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, ?How does anyone get to > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?? I > wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written > communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking > turns, well?what is even possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked > about this, and, I think, has some suggestions on how to deal with the > bottlenecking. But even small scale communication can be daunting. I > watched, with my wife, a Richard Linklater movie last night, ?Before > Midnight?. Two people, face to face, in a totally committed > relationship, smart people, good people, trying so hard to get it > right. Always a work in progress. But it?s worth it. The alternative > is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged > down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we va > > lue Vygotsky?s ?heroism?, but that?s too macho. I should have said > courage. > > > > The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > > called > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks > again to my wife, who was listening when she heard something she > thought I would be interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir > hypothesis in its strong and weak form. > > > > Henry > > > >> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> > >> Dear Henry, > >> > >> Thank you for your reply. > >> > >> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of welcome? > >> > >> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept > >> at > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we > are in or from, what-have-you. > >> > >> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" is. > So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > personal experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not > speaking literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock > puppet with my voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >> > >> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are > >> all > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you > are trying to say to me. > >> > >> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" > for worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it > right. I'm not sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. > I have found that many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking > to one another, despite our likely different POVs. > >> > >> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you > >> say > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > little different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >> > >> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, > >> I'm > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on > this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? > :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >> > >> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who > >> fell > from the star!" > >> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >> > >> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> sociocultural > theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as CHAT, etc > and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is that > like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > about Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ > in real time dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds > together. Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> > >> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > >> allow > others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to happen > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > whether nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates > ensue. Or someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" > Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I > disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then I'm > told to go read something without really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >> > >> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >> academic > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I > know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it > would be a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from reading. > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of > "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between > people. All it does is shut things down. > >> > >> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in > >> the > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a > context, especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or > the link to an entire website full of texts. > >> > >> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > >> which > I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we > throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does > that need to throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at > least connections are being made for those who might not be very clear > about ideas and who may require a helping hand. > >> > >> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like > >> a > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone > who may not understand. > >> > >> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon > how little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and > the dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant > about most things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > embarrassment, a deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently > disagree with this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said > something like, "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't > know." Such an aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but > hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism > from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance > is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > doesn't know is an easier student to teach than > > one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have > made sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the > heat. Thank you for offering them to me. > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Nov 26 22:48:38 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 22:48:38 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Carol Et al It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what it means to have participants with such varied histories with the discourse community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries that I know of can be found at LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that go back to roughly 1983. Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions to the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to bear fruit that can nourish a productive future. All sorts of alternatives are possible. One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role of culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous real experts over decades. The record is there, open to all. Check it out. Then we can assess the future. Good luck to us all Mike On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > Hi > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > > Carol > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > > > > Martin > > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a brief > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), or > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise > to* > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > phenomenology." > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: > > >> Henry, > > >> > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David K > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not > > Richard Nixon :)] > > >> > > >> Bruce R > > >> > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something else > I > > find irritating... > > >> > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >>> Sister Analisa, > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > wondered > > in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in > the > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is even > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to face, > in > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so > hard > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > > >> va > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said > > courage. > > >>> > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often called > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again > to > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would > be > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong > and > > weak form. > > >>> > > >>> Henry > > >>> > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Dear Henry, > > >>>> > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. > > >>>> > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of > welcome? > > >>>> > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept at > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we > are > > in or from, what-have-you. > > >>>> > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > personal > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > > >>>> > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are > all > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you are > > trying to say to me. > > >>>> > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm > not > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found that > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to > one > > another, despite our likely different POVs. > > >>>> > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you say > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > little > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > > >>>> > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, > I'm > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > > >>>> > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who > > fell from the star!" > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > > >>>> > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What > is > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women > and > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > about > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real > time > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > >>>> > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to > happen > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or whether > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means I > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a position > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something > without > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > > >>>> > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > academic > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I know > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would > be > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > reading. > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of > "now > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. > All > > it does is shut things down. > > >>>> > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in > the > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to > an > > entire website full of texts. > > >>>> > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to agree > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > matter > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need to > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections > are > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may > > require a helping hand. > > >>>> > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something like > a > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who > may > > not understand. > > >>>> > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon how > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, > a > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > reception > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the > more > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > ignorance > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > > >> n > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > implies > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank > > you for offering them to me. > > >>>> > > >>>> Kind regards, > > >>>> > > >>>> Annalisa > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Wed Nov 26 23:02:02 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 07:02:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Gracias Annalisa and Dana. Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as to why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we did with migrant students at that time... I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and carry forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or interweave with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By "non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as "Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation to chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still useful. Warmly, Miguel Zavala On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >consider Annalisa's question: > >I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as >CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is >that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >and >people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >about >Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >time >dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that >what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > >For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so seldom >talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self in >relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, gender, >and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out >through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is why I >choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this list >are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa above? >Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory who >deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there are >others. > >Dana > >On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: > >>Hi >> >>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it >>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >> >>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >> >>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >> >>Carol >> >>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >> >>wrote: >> >>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two >>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>brief >>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), >>>or >>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says >>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise >>>to* >>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>phenomenology." >>> > Andy >>> > >>>------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> > *Andy Blunden* >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> > >>> > >>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >>> >> Henry, >>> >> >>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David >>>K >>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not >>> Richard Nixon :)] >>> >> >>> >> Bruce R >>> >> >>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of >>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>else I >>> find irritating... >>> >> >>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>> Sister Analisa, >>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>wondered >>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in >>>the >>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>even >>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >>>has >>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small >>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard >>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>face, in >>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so >>>hard >>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>get >>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>> >> va >>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said >>> courage. >>> >>> >>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>called >>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One >>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again >>>to >>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would >>>be >>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong >>>and >>> weak form. >>> >>> >>> >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Dear Henry, >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>welcome? >>> >>>> >>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept >>>at >>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we >>>are >>> in or from, what-have-you. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>hypothesis" >>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you >>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>personal >>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with >>>my >>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are >>>all >>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >>>are >>> trying to say to me. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different >>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for >>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm >>>not >>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>that >>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," >>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to >>>one >>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >>>say >>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself >>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>little >>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, >>>I'm >>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>this >>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To >>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who >>> fell from the star!" >>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>> >>>> >>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>>as >>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>>is >>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>>and >>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>about >>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>>time >>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>that >>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>> >>>> >>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>happen >>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>whether >>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or >>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means >>>I >>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>position >>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>without >>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>academic >>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>know >>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would >>>be >>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>reading. >>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >>>"now >>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. >>>All >>> it does is shut things down. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in >>>the >>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, >>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to >>>an >>> entire website full of texts. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>agree >>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>matter >>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing >>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need >>>to >>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections >>>are >>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>may >>> require a helping hand. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>like a >>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who >>>may >>> not understand. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >>>how >>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the >>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>most >>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>embarrassment, a >>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>reception >>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the >>>more >>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>ignorance >>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>defense >>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn >>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one >>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>> >> n >>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related >>>to >>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>implies >>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>Thank >>> you for offering them to me. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Kind regards, >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Annalisa >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> > >>> >>> >>> >> >> >>-- >>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>Developmental psycholinguist >>Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Nov 26 23:05:47 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 23:05:47 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Dana I did not see your note before responding to Carol. I personally am happy to engage your questions. Since you have been observing for many years you should have a lot to contribute to those like myself who have failed to answer them. A belated thanks. Mike On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Walker, Dana wrote: > Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to > consider Annalisa's question: > > I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women and > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others about > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > > For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so seldom > talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self in > relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, gender, > and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out > through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is why I > choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this list > are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa above? > Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory who > deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a > Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there are > others. > > Dana > > On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" > wrote: > > >Hi > > > >There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it > >complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > > > >I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > > > >Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > > > >Carol > > > >On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer > > >wrote: > > > >> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two > >> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> > >> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a brief > >> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real > >> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), or > >> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says > >> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise > >>to* > >> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > >>phenomenology." > >> > Andy > >> > > >>------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > *Andy Blunden* > >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > >> > > >> > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >> >> Henry, > >> >> > >> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > >> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David > >>K > >> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not > >> Richard Nixon :)] > >> >> > >> >> Bruce R > >> >> > >> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > >> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > >>else I > >> find irritating... > >> >> > >> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> >>> Sister Analisa, > >> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > >> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > >> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > >>wondered > >> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in > >>the > >> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is even > >> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, > >>has > >> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small > >> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard > >> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to > >>face, in > >> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so > >>hard > >> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > >> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get > >> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > >> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >> >> va > >> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said > >> courage. > >> >>> > >> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > >>called > >> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > >> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > >> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again > >>to > >> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would > >>be > >> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong > >>and > >> weak form. > >> >>> > >> >>> Henry > >> >>> > >> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > >> wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Dear Henry, > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > >> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of > >>welcome? > >> >>>> > >> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept > >>at > >> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we > >>are > >> in or from, what-have-you. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity hypothesis" > >> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you > >> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > >>personal > >> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > >> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with my > >> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are > >>all > >> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you > >>are > >> trying to say to me. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > >> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for > >> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm > >>not > >> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found > >>that > >> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > >> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to > >>one > >> another, despite our likely different POVs. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you > >>say > >> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > >> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > >> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > >>little > >> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, > >>I'm > >> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on this > >> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To > >> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >> >>>> > >> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who > >> fell from the star!" > >> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such > >>as > >> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What > >>is > >> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women > >>and > >> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > >>about > >> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real > >>time > >> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that > >> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > >> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to > >>happen > >> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > >>whether > >> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or > >> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means > >>I > >> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > >>position > >> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something > >>without > >> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >>academic > >> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I > >>know > >> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would > >>be > >> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > >>reading. > >> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of > >>"now > >> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. > >>All > >> it does is shut things down. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in > >>the > >> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, > >> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to > >>an > >> entire website full of texts. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > >> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to > >>agree > >> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > >>matter > >> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing > >> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need > >>to > >> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections > >>are > >> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who may > >> require a helping hand. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something > >>like a > >> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who > >>may > >> not understand. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > >> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > >> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon > >>how > >> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the > >> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about > >>most > >> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > >>embarrassment, a > >> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > >>reception > >> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the > >>more > >> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > >>ignorance > >> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense > >> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > >> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > >> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > >> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >> >> n > >> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related to > >> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > >>implies > >> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > >> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. Thank > >> you for offering them to me. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Kind regards, > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Annalisa > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > > > > >-- > >Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >Developmental psycholinguist > >Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From patrick.jaki@gmail.com Wed Nov 26 23:07:21 2014 From: patrick.jaki@gmail.com (Patrick Jaki) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 09:07:21 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly and at the same time remain civil. Patrick. On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: > Carol Et al > > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the discourse > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. > > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries that > I know of can be found at > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that > go > back to roughly 1983. > > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions to > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to bear > fruit that can nourish a productive future. > > All sorts of alternatives are possible. > > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role of > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous real > experts over decades. > > The record is there, open to all. > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. > > Good luck to us all > > Mike > > > > On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Hi > > > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it > > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > > > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > > > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > > > > Carol > > > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two > > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a > brief > > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real > > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), > or > > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says > > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise > > to* > > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > > phenomenology." > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: > > > >> Henry, > > > >> > > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > David K > > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not > > > Richard Nixon :)] > > > >> > > > >> Bruce R > > > >> > > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > else > > I > > > find irritating... > > > >> > > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >>> Sister Analisa, > > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > > wondered > > > in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in > > the > > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is > even > > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, > has > > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small > > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard > > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to > face, > > in > > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so > > hard > > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to > get > > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > > > >> va > > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said > > > courage. > > > >>> > > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > called > > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again > > to > > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would > > be > > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong > > and > > > weak form. > > > >>> > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Dear Henry, > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of > > welcome? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept > at > > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we > > are > > > in or from, what-have-you. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > hypothesis" > > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you > > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > > personal > > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with > my > > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are > > all > > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you > are > > > trying to say to me. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for > > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm > > not > > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found > that > > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to > > one > > > another, despite our likely different POVs. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you > say > > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > > little > > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, > > I'm > > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on > this > > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To > > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who > > > fell from the star!" > > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such > as > > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What > > is > > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women > > and > > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > > about > > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real > > time > > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > that > > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to > > happen > > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > whether > > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or > > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which > means I > > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > position > > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something > > without > > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > > academic > > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I > know > > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would > > be > > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > > reading. > > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of > > "now > > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. > > All > > > it does is shut things down. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in > > the > > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, > > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to > > an > > > entire website full of texts. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to > agree > > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > > matter > > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing > > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need > to > > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections > > are > > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who > may > > > require a helping hand. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something > like > > a > > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who > > may > > > not understand. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon > how > > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the > > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about > most > > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > embarrassment, > > a > > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > > reception > > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the > > more > > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > > ignorance > > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > defense > > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > > > >> n > > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related > to > > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > > implies > > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. > Thank > > > you for offering them to me. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Kind regards, > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Annalisa > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- *Patrick Jaki* *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 03:46:14 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 11:46:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to me that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few stones to find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source of so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with us today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is to be precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions steady and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form but is concerned with their configuration and placement. On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied phenomena. We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... Best, Huw On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki wrote: > Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly and > at the same time remain civil. > > Patrick. > > On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: > > > Carol Et al > > > > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family > > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what > > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the > discourse > > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. > > > > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and > > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries > that > > I know of can be found at > > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that > > go > > back to roughly 1983. > > > > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with > > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions > to > > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in > > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to > bear > > fruit that can nourish a productive future. > > > > All sorts of alternatives are possible. > > > > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal > > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired > > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role > of > > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous > real > > experts over decades. > > > > The record is there, open to all. > > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. > > > > Good luck to us all > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald > > wrote: > > > > > Hi > > > > > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of > it > > > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > > > > > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > > > > > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > > > > > > Carol > > > > > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or > two > > > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a > > brief > > > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real > > > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), > > or > > > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin > says > > > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give > rise > > > to* > > > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > > > phenomenology." > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: > > > > >> Henry, > > > > >> > > > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > > > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > > David K > > > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? > [Not > > > > Richard Nixon :)] > > > > >> > > > > >> Bruce R > > > > >> > > > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading > of > > > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > > else > > > I > > > > find irritating... > > > > >> > > > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > >>> Sister Analisa, > > > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > > > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > > > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > > > wondered > > > > in my email below if too much was expected of written communication > in > > > the > > > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is > > even > > > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, > > has > > > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even > small > > > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a > Richard > > > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to > > face, > > > in > > > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying > so > > > hard > > > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > > > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to > > get > > > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > > > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > > > > >> va > > > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have > said > > > > courage. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > > called > > > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. > One > > > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > > > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks > again > > > to > > > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I > would > > > be > > > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its > strong > > > and > > > > weak form. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu> > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Dear Henry, > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > > > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of > > > welcome? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am > adept > > at > > > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that > we > > > are > > > > in or from, what-have-you. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > > hypothesis" > > > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea > you > > > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > > > personal > > > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > > > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with > > my > > > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we > are > > > all > > > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you > > are > > > > trying to say to me. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents > different > > > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" > for > > > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. > I'm > > > not > > > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found > > that > > > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking > to," > > > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking > to > > > one > > > > another, despite our likely different POVs. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you > > say > > > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for > himself > > > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > > > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > > > little > > > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over > definitions, > > > I'm > > > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on > > this > > > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) > To > > > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady > who > > > > fell from the star!" > > > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > > > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > such > > as > > > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. > What > > > is > > > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > women > > > and > > > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > > > about > > > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > real > > > time > > > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > > that > > > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > > > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to > > > happen > > > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > > whether > > > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. > Or > > > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which > > means I > > > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > > position > > > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something > > > without > > > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > > > academic > > > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I > > know > > > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it > would > > > be > > > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > > > reading. > > > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of > > > "now > > > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between > people. > > > All > > > > it does is shut things down. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive > in > > > the > > > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a > context, > > > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link > to > > > an > > > > entire website full of texts. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > > > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to > > agree > > > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > > > matter > > > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we > throwing > > > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that > need > > to > > > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least > connections > > > are > > > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who > > may > > > > require a helping hand. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something > > like > > > a > > > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone > who > > > may > > > > not understand. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > > > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > > > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon > > how > > > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and > the > > > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about > > most > > > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > > embarrassment, > > > a > > > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > > > reception > > > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, > the > > > more > > > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > > > ignorance > > > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > > defense > > > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > > > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to > learn > > > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows > one > > > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > > > > >> n > > > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > > > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related > > to > > > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > > > implies > > > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > > > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. > > Thank > > > > you for offering them to me. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Kind regards, > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Annalisa > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > > Developmental psycholinguist > > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > *Patrick Jaki* > > > > > > > > *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Nov 27 04:04:00 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 12:04:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: <2CF32EF8-0E59-410F-AE91-7C65C62D442D@uniandes.edu.co> I think this is right, Huw. There are approaches to consciousness that study its basis in neurobiology and the body, and there are approaches that study its internal organization, as a system in which memory, perception, and so on play a role. Each of us has first-person access to our own consciousness, but to study the consciousness of other people we have to reconstruct it 'from without,' based on the traces that it leaves. Martin On Nov 27, 2014, at 6:46 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction > between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think > we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied phenomena. > We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal > calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without > (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow > the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that > calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal > manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... > > Best, > Huw From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Nov 27 04:04:57 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 12:04:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: p.s. I hope that wasn't too blokey! Martin On Nov 27, 2014, at 6:46 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. > Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions > Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to me > that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few stones to > find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A > second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source of > so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with us > today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. > > Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical > utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of > muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is to be > precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions steady > and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of > articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such > circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form but is > concerned with their configuration and placement. > > On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction > between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think > we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied phenomena. > We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal > calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without > (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow > the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that > calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal > manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > > On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki wrote: > >> Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly and >> at the same time remain civil. >> >> Patrick. >> >> On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Carol Et al >>> >>> It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family >>> and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what >>> it means to have participants with such varied histories with the >> discourse >>> community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. >>> >>> For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and >>> reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries >> that >>> I know of can be found at >>> LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that >>> go >>> back to roughly 1983. >>> >>> Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with >>> prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions >> to >>> the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in >>> collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to >> bear >>> fruit that can nourish a productive future. >>> >>> All sorts of alternatives are possible. >>> >>> One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal >>> responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired >>> professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role >> of >>> culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous >> real >>> experts over decades. >>> >>> The record is there, open to all. >>> Check it out. Then we can assess the future. >>> >>> Good luck to us all >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald >> > wrote: >>> >>>> Hi >>>> >>>> There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >> it >>>> complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>> >>>> I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>> >>>> Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >> two >>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>> brief >>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), >>> or >>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >> says >>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >> rise >>>> to* >>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>> phenomenology." >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>>> Henry, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>> David K >>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >> [Not >>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruce R >>>>>>> >>>>>>> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >> of >>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>> else >>>> I >>>>> find irritating... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>>>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>> wondered >>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >> in >>>> the >>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>> even >>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >>> has >>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >> small >>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >> Richard >>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>> face, >>>> in >>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >> so >>>> hard >>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>> get >>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>>> va >>>>>>>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >> said >>>>> courage. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>> called >>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >> One >>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >> again >>>> to >>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >> would >>>> be >>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >> strong >>>> and >>>>> weak form. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < >> annalisa@unm.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>> welcome? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >> adept >>> at >>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >> we >>>> are >>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>> hypothesis" >>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >> you >>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>> personal >>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with >>> my >>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >> are >>>> all >>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >>> are >>>>> trying to say to me. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >> different >>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >> for >>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >> I'm >>>> not >>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>> that >>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >> to," >>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >> to >>>> one >>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >>> say >>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >> himself >>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>> little >>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >> definitions, >>>> I'm >>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>> this >>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >> To >>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >> who >>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>>>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >> such >>> as >>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >> What >>>> is >>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >> women >>>> and >>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>> about >>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >> real >>>> time >>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>> that >>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>> happen >>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>> whether >>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >> Or >>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>> means I >>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>> position >>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>> without >>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>> academic >>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>> know >>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >> would >>>> be >>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>> reading. >>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >>>> "now >>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >> people. >>>> All >>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >> in >>>> the >>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >> context, >>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >> to >>>> an >>>>> entire website full of texts. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>> agree >>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>> matter >>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >> throwing >>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >> need >>> to >>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >> connections >>>> are >>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>> may >>>>> require a helping hand. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>> like >>>> a >>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >> who >>>> may >>>>> not understand. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >>> how >>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >> the >>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>> most >>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>> embarrassment, >>>> a >>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>> reception >>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >> the >>>> more >>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>> ignorance >>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>> defense >>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >> learn >>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >> one >>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>>> n >>>>>>>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>>>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related >>> to >>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>> implies >>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>> Thank >>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> *Patrick Jaki* >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 06:35:19 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 06:35:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Miguel, I was struck by your comment: In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we did with migrant students at that time..." In particular the phrase "reading and writing the world" Annalisa and Dana have asked how we each came to Vygotsky and this site in order to to get some sense of who we are as an audience for helping each other when reading and writing the world. I will offer my perspective as a "personal" journey to this site. As a teenager I was searching for what to believe and where to call "home". I was drawn to explore "intentional community" and this existential theme of "home" and "intentional community" as a yearning or drive or motivation continues today. I had a hunger that called me to inquiry. The key word I was playing with was "encapsulated" as in the "encapsulated self" I. like many in the 1960's, found "humanistic psychology" as a meaningful "answer" to my yearnings. I then encountered at university a professor "Fred Brown" who was passionate about John Dewey but also wanted to create an "intentional community" to live out Dewey's ideas by reading and writing intentional community. This community continues to exist evoking Fred Brown and John Dewey's spirit of interpretive community. I as a career path chose teaching and struggled to find an identity in this institutional structure. I encountered Vygotsky through Feurestein and "mediated learning. Kozulin's book "psychological tools" and Mike Cole's work on literacy in Africa, and David Olson's work on the world on paper. It was this "strand" of Vygotsky that held my attention. I was not linking Dewey and pragmatism to Vygotsky. They were separate inquiries. A third major influence was when I encountered "relational psychoanalysis" which was resituating the understanding of hope and dread within psychoanalysis, not as drives but as contextualized relational themes. Each of these strands were personally meaningful and each was translated into my work as a specialist "reading teacher" It was much later that I encountered a strand of inquiry that located humanistic psychology, Dewey, Vygotsky, and Relational psychoanalysis in a larger arena with shared roots in continental philosophy. To find an interpretive community that embodied all my separate interests [and my personal existential yearnings] was inspiring and I was excited and motivated to understand the roots of what I had perceived as separate strands that were personal interests but did not relate in some larger thematic. It is THIS larger, more "expansive" vision I experienced as a "realization". Now you can see my journey was through humanistic [3rd wave] psychology such as Jerome Bruner's work that led me through my wanderings exploring the causes of the "encapsulated self" that led me to this site. Also motivated my work as a teacher and then a school counsellor. My root to this specific site was not through an academic course or discipline. It was through the realization that the formation of the encapsulated self had general cultural and historical roots and I was searching for an interpretive community which would expand my horizons. I have a need to continue to explore the multiple strands I have mentioned to answer my big question of why we are so encapsulated in our private worlds. As I have participated in CHAT I have had an overwhelming learning curve encountering the depth of cultural historical theory as I had little background in philosophy or linquistics, and other fields explored on this site. What I have found, is an "interpretive community" that is passionate, compassionate, and generative. I have come to embrace the notion of *reading* as in "reading and writing the world" as central. The genre of "question and answer" is my preferred style and I read the current tensions on the site in this spirit of "question and answer" which Vincent Colapietro writes about. Gadamer is an exponent of this conversational style or disposition. I come to CHAT with this way of orienting. My actual work life had very little opportunity to explore this question and answer style in face to face conversations. My question of the "encapsulated self" was a personal journey, done as a "reader". I am not focused on "technical" or "muscular" approaches but I deeply respect the dedication of people who are. I also have not had a context of university constraints. My reason for being here is existentially personal. The archetypal search for "home" for "belonging" as also "our" search. This is my "answer" to my question. Vygotsky inspires answers in an interpretive community that is reading and writing the world. More dialogical in spirit than dialectical, but recognizing constraint and resistance as a motivating impulse in relation to freedom and creativity. "Liquid" modernity as Zygmunt Bauman says is a time of rootlessness with a zeitgeist of a sense of loss of "home" as we pursue the ideal of "freedom" and experience the reality of being "encapsulated". Annalisa, this is my "answer" to your "question". There is a person here. Larry On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Zavala, Miguel < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > Gracias Annalisa and Dana. > > Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new > member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as to > why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own > way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on > conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical > Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this > space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT > reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized > formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's > ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we > did with migrant students at that time... > > I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and carry > forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or interweave > with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By > "non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular > circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas > and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said > theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as > "Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation to > chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that > looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' > context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still useful. > > Warmly, > > Miguel Zavala > > > > On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > > >Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to > >consider Annalisa's question: > > > >I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as > >CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What is > >that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women > >and > >people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > >about > >Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real > >time > >dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that > >what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > > > > > >For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so seldom > >talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self in > >relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, gender, > >and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out > >through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is why I > >choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this list > >are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa above? > >Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory who > >deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a > >Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there are > >others. > > > >Dana > > > >On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: > > > >>Hi > >> > >>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it > >>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > >> > >>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > >> > >>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > >> > >>Carol > >> > >>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer > >> > >>wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two > >>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a > >>>brief > >>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real > >>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), > >>>or > >>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says > >>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise > >>>to* > >>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > >>>phenomenology." > >>> > Andy > >>> > > >>>------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> > *Andy Blunden* > >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >>> >> Henry, > >>> >> > >>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > >>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what David > >>>K > >>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? [Not > >>> Richard Nixon :)] > >>> >> > >>> >> Bruce R > >>> >> > >>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading of > >>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > >>>else I > >>> find irritating... > >>> >> > >>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>> >>> Sister Analisa, > >>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > >>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > >>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > >>>wondered > >>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in > >>>the > >>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is > >>>even > >>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, > >>>has > >>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small > >>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a Richard > >>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to > >>>face, in > >>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so > >>>hard > >>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > >>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to > >>>get > >>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > >>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >>> >> va > >>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have said > >>> courage. > >>> >>> > >>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > >>>called > >>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One > >>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular > >>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks again > >>>to > >>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I would > >>>be > >>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong > >>>and > >>> weak form. > >>> >>> > >>> >>> Henry > >>> >>> > >>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > >>> wrote: > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Dear Henry, > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being > >>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of > >>>welcome? > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept > >>>at > >>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we > >>>are > >>> in or from, what-have-you. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > >>>hypothesis" > >>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea you > >>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > >>>personal > >>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > >>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with > >>>my > >>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are > >>>all > >>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you > >>>are > >>> trying to say to me. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents different > >>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" for > >>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. I'm > >>>not > >>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found > >>>that > >>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," > >>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking to > >>>one > >>> another, despite our likely different POVs. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you > >>>say > >>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself > >>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > >>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > >>>little > >>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, > >>>I'm > >>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on > >>>this > >>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To > >>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who > >>> fell from the star!" > >>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such > >>>as > >>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What > >>>is > >>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women > >>>and > >>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > >>>about > >>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real > >>>time > >>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > >>>that > >>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to > >>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to > >>>happen > >>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > >>>whether > >>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or > >>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which means > >>>I > >>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > >>>position > >>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something > >>>without > >>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >>>academic > >>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I > >>>know > >>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it would > >>>be > >>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > >>>reading. > >>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of > >>>"now > >>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. > >>>All > >>> it does is shut things down. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in > >>>the > >>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a context, > >>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link to > >>>an > >>> entire website full of texts. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with > >>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to > >>>agree > >>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > >>>matter > >>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing > >>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need > >>>to > >>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections > >>>are > >>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who > >>>may > >>> require a helping hand. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something > >>>like a > >>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone who > >>>may > >>> not understand. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being > >>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as > >>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon > >>>how > >>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the > >>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about > >>>most > >>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > >>>embarrassment, a > >>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > >>>reception > >>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the > >>>more > >>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > >>>ignorance > >>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > >>>defense > >>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > >>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn > >>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one > >>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >>> >> n > >>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related > >>>to > >>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > >>>implies > >>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > >>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. > >>>Thank > >>> you for offering them to me. > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Kind regards, > >>> >>>> > >>> >>>> Annalisa > >>> >>>> > >>> >>> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> > > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >>-- > >>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>Developmental psycholinguist > >>Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > From Dana.Walker@unco.edu Thu Nov 27 08:12:02 2014 From: Dana.Walker@unco.edu (Walker, Dana) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 16:12:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [boundary crossing & power] Message-ID: Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving forward this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours years ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant students at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied selves in boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of power in relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours that you might suggest on this subject? Dana On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" wrote: >Gracias Annalisa and Dana. > >Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as to >why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own >way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on >conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this >space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT >reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's >ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >did with migrant students at that time... > >I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and carry >forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or interweave >with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas >and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said >theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation to >chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that >looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still useful. > >Warmly, > >Miguel Zavala > > > >On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > >>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >>consider Annalisa's question: >> >>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such as >>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>is >>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>and >>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>about >>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>time >>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that >>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >> >>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >>seldom >>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self in >>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, gender, >>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out >>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is why >>I >>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this >>list >>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>above? >>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory who >>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there are >>others. >> >>Dana >> >>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: >> >>>Hi >>> >>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of it >>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>> >>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>> >>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>> >>>Carol >>> >>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>> >>>wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or two >>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>>brief >>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), >>>>or >>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin says >>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give rise >>>>to* >>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>phenomenology." >>>> > Andy >>>> > >>>>----------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>- >>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>> >> Henry, >>>> >> >>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>>>David >>>>K >>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >>>>[Not >>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>> >> >>>> >> Bruce R >>>> >> >>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >>>>of >>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>>else I >>>> find irritating... >>>> >> >>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>> Sister Analisa, >>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>>wondered >>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication in >>>>the >>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>>even >>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >>>>has >>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small >>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>Richard >>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>>face, in >>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying so >>>>hard >>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>>get >>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>> >> va >>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>said >>>> courage. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>>called >>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. One >>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>>>again >>>>to >>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>>>would >>>>be >>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>>>strong >>>>and >>>> weak form. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Henry >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>>welcome? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am adept >>>>at >>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that we >>>>are >>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>hypothesis" >>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>>>you >>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>>personal >>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with >>>>my >>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we are >>>>all >>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >>>>are >>>> trying to say to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>different >>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>for >>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>I'm >>>>not >>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>>that >>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking to," >>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >>>>to >>>>one >>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >>>>say >>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for himself >>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>>little >>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over definitions, >>>>I'm >>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>>this >>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) To >>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady who >>>> fell from the star!" >>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>>>as >>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>>>What >>>>is >>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>>>women >>>>and >>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>>about >>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>>>time >>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>that >>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>>happen >>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>>whether >>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. Or >>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>>>means >>>>I >>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>>position >>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>>without >>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>academic >>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>>know >>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>>>would >>>>be >>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>>reading. >>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >>>>"now >>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between people. >>>>All >>>> it does is shut things down. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive in >>>>the >>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>context, >>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >>>>to >>>>an >>>> entire website full of texts. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>>agree >>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>>matter >>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we throwing >>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that need >>>>to >>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections >>>>are >>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>may >>>> require a helping hand. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>>like a >>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >>>>who >>>>may >>>> not understand. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >>>>how >>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and the >>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>>most >>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>>embarrassment, a >>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>>reception >>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, the >>>>more >>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>>ignorance >>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>>defense >>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>>>learn >>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows one >>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>> >> n >>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related >>>>to >>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>>implies >>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>>Thank >>>> you for offering them to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>-- >>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>Developmental psycholinguist >>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 08:41:55 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 09:41:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] On Physics and Psychology (and an AAA (anthropology) meeting next week) Message-ID: Speaking to the Martin/Andy/Vygotsky question of whether Physics and Psychology might be similar, I wanted to come at it from the other side of what Martin proposed in the fate, luck, chance thread (which at 100 posts, seemed to be getting a little long). Whereas Martin suggests that Psychology turns out to be more like Physics, I'd like to suggest that Physics is, in fact, more like Psychology (than we think). Physics isn't at all what we think it is, and so I want to suggest that, in understanding human social interaction (which, imho, is essential to understanding consciousness) then we can productively turn to Physics for a metaphor. I've pasted a short chunk of a conference talk I'll be giving next WEdnesday at the American Anthropological Association meeting in DC (if anyone is in the neighborhood and would like to join, we have a couple folks on the panel that will be engaging with Vygotsky). I paste the chunk of it below that makes the argument for using the 3-body problem in Physics as a model for dyadic interaction (yes, dyadic interaction is comprised of a bare minimum of three primitives - I'd argue that four is the bare minimum but that's just adding more complexity and the famous problem in PHysics is the "3-body problem"). It isn't perfect, but it is surprising how well it fits human social behavior. (NB: no billiard balls here!). Excerpt is pasted below. I'd love to hear any thoughts that folks might have. -greg p.s. my main complaint about the metaphor is that it doesn't get to "constitution". Any thoughts on a metaphor that could do that? (but thinking about it, one could stretch the interplanetary metaphor a bit if one considers the problem across massive scales of time (eons!) and the way that mutual gravitiational pulls are important to the constitution of the planets in the first place - something that requires a loooooooong view. So perhaps there is a sense of constitution in this metaphor that is missing from the shorter timescales considered by the problem). Anyway, excerpt below. [I have all too often heard social scientists complain of the complexity of social phenomena as compared to the simpler and more predictable physical sciences. This ?Physics envy?, if I may, suggests things are much less complex in Physics and other physical sciences as compared to the social sciences. As a way of disabusing us of this unfortunate state while also shedding some important light on the problem at hand, and] To this end, I borrow from Physics a truly ?*Interstellar*? model-as-metaphor that both demonstrates the degree of complexity with even the simplest physical systems and functions as a productive metaphor for the anthropological theory of motivation-in-interaction that I am developing here. The model-as-metaphor I propose is the physical/mathematical problem known as the 3-body problem. This problem was first introduced addressed by Isaac Newton and was formally named as the 3-body problem by Jean d?Alembert around 1761. In the problem, one is given the initial conditions, mass, velocity, and direction of three interacting bodies and from these initial conditions one must predict the position of the three bodies at some future point. Sounds easy enough right? Well, it turns out that even after 250 years of attempts to work out the problem, and even with all of the computing power that we have today, with the exception of a small number of restricted examples, the generic form of the three-body problem remains unsolved (and possibly unsolvable). One simply cannot predict where the bodies will end up. [And, I should add, that the three body problem is already massively simplified from the kinds of problems that one would find when trying to predict the precise future positions of three actual bodies, planetary or otherwise. Treating the three bodies as point-masses ignores many other facets of planetary bodies, for example the problem of rotational velocities and the drag effects of things like surface or interior liquids OR the problem of the uneven distribution of mass around the center of the planetary body OR any other of a number of contingencies that these three bodies might encounter as they move through space and time. What is remarkable of course is that even this highly simplified problem dealing with three point-mass bodies turns out to be unsolvable.] [Animation of 3 body problem]. As a metaphor, I find the 3 body problem to be compelling because it introduces us to the incredible complexity of even very simple interdependent systems. It is just that kind of system that I am suggesting arises in any human interaction, making it appear to be a rather unpredictable muddle while not being entirely unsystematic. If we consider the four primitives of human interaction that I described above, human interaction appears to be a muddle because, as with the planetary bodies, each of these primitives of social interaction are in motion. Perhaps the most mobile (I.e., of the smallest mass) of these is the particular local interactional context, or framing of the interaction, that emerges across interactional. As R. Keith Sawyer has pointed out, these framings can emerge over timescales as short as a few seconds. Perhaps only slightly less mobile (I.e., of larger mass) are the particular types of persons that we will come to be recognized as in a given interaction. And beyond the interaction, the cultural context (or ontology) is perhaps the least mobile (I.e., most massive) of all of these bodies, exerting a massive influence on everything that happens in the interaction. [Image: sun - culture; body1 - person1; body2 - person2; body3 - interactional context]. Further contributing to the muddle is the fact that, also like the planets, each of these primitives are interdependent with the others. The types of person that a participant will come to be in a given interaction depends in part upon the particular interaction in which one is participating. For example, when one is engaged in the type of interaction called ?gossiping?, one cannot take on the role of ?teacher? without transforming the nature of the interaction itself. Similarly, should an interactional participant dramatically change their way of acting, the particular type of person that they are seen to be will also be changed, as will the nature of the type of interaction in which they are participating. And yet, despite the great complexity, there is systematicity here ? perhaps unpredictable systematicity but systematic nonetheless. So then, how might we understand this systematicity? -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 08:49:17 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 09:49:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, thanks for the reading on constitution. Very interesting how people come at even these very reduced questions (i.e., mathematically operationalized) find incredible complexity. (see my other post - Physics and Psychology - for a similar Physics parallel). With regard to that check - "check's in the mail". -greg On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > On Nov 19, 2014, at 10:25 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Martin, > > $20K question: > > Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term > would > > you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? > > > > Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at > > least the citation? > -greg > > Greg, > > I forgot two things. First, to ask whether you'll be sending the $20k as > cash or a check. Second, to provide the references. What I was reading was > this (attached): > > Van der Smagt, T. (2006). Causation and constitution in system dynamics: > Modelling a socially constituted world. Systems Research and Behavioral > Science, 23(4), 513-524. > > But this is also useful: > > Wendt, A. (1998). On constitution and causation in international > relations. Review of International Studies, 24(5), 101-117. > > Martin > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 08:52:56 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 09:52:56 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: And speaking of constitution, there will be another interesting panel at the American Anthropological Association meetings in DC next week. The panel is on the "other" cultural psychologist, Rick Shweder's work and it addresses the mutual constitution of culture and psyche. Here is a sentence from the panel description: "Richard Shweder has encouraged colleagues and students to examine the ways in which ?culture and psyche?make each other up,? neither being prior to nor independent of the other, and has called such a project Cultural Psychology." Again, if there are any anthropologists on this list that will be at the meetings, drop me a line. -greg On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > On Nov 19, 2014, at 10:25 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Martin, > > $20K question: > > Is consciousness (or whatever term you would prefer - btw, what term > would > > you prefer?) "internally constituted" or "externally constituted"? > > > > Also, would you be willing to share the paper of which you speak? Or at > > least the citation? > -greg > > Greg, > > I forgot two things. First, to ask whether you'll be sending the $20k as > cash or a check. Second, to provide the references. What I was reading was > this (attached): > > Van der Smagt, T. (2006). Causation and constitution in system dynamics: > Modelling a socially constituted world. Systems Research and Behavioral > Science, 23(4), 513-524. > > But this is also useful: > > Wendt, A. (1998). On constitution and causation in international > relations. Review of International Studies, 24(5), 101-117. > > Martin > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Nov 27 12:53:42 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 20:53:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [boundary crossing & power] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417121621795.99866@unm.edu> Dana, Miguel, Larry, David, Henry, and esteemed others, Thank you for your personal reflections upon my posts. Because it is the holiday, I'm going to try taking a break from the list, but I wanted you to know that I am grateful for your POVs as voiced. I want to think about what you have put forward and will reply more directly if and when I can. I regret that Professor Mike had to wade in, as I'm guessing it must be extra work to be our soccer referee. However, I would like to second his observation that it is up to everyone to decide the future of the list. I can only speak for myself; I don't expect everyone to have it my way. I'm certainly not speaking up because I want to be a leader of the list. I'm just a perty novice looking to advance my knowledge in areas of my interests, as others want to do. I've expressed what I'm looking for and what I'd like to find. If I'm in the wrong neck of the woods and there are no munchkins here, I'd prefer know this sooner rather than later (I didn't know I could find so much metaphorical material in the Wizard of Oz, but I'm going with it :) ). As far as my form, I will apologize to those who find it antagonistic in length, but I hope you might see instead that it measures more my desire and enthusiasm to participate than my need to hear myself talk, although how one does that on a list if writing and reading is experienced in silence. Also I'm attempting by "dotting my i's" to reveal something important, as performance. It is not to gain attention because I lack self-esteem, but to gain attention to the esteem of subjectivity, experienced in the present moment, and how thought takes place in that space. The only example of subjectivity that I have laying around is my own, and so... I've made use of myself as material. I wonder if the less one uses one's own subjectivity in discourse the more authority one believes one has? Or is it the other way around? These are only thoughts out loud about power and its expression, not an accusation to anyone here. Also, I'm not adverse to reading; I don't mean to create an aura of myself being unwilling to read, just that I want to know the purpose for it before being laden in reams of text to my nose. I do eat my vegetables, being vegetarian. Last, definitional discourse has a place here and I don't mean to stop that. I'm just looking for more plural realities about those definitions and perhaps displayed in less combative, less exclusive forms. As a newcomer, I have found that difficult to negotiate. I can only describe what it is like for me. I'm here because I want to learn and to share. Have a happy and festive Thanksgiving. Kindest regards, Annalisa P.S. Perhaps give thanks to the turkey who has made the ultimate sacrifice for your nourishment! :) From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 14:00:09 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 07:00:09 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining his argument. On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put it more charitably. But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd wrote: > I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. > Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions > Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to me > that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few stones to > find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A > second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source of > so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with us > today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. > > Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical > utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of > muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is to be > precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions steady > and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of > articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such > circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form but is > concerned with their configuration and placement. > > On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction > between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think > we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied phenomena. > We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal > calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without > (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow > the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that > calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal > manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > > On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki wrote: > >> Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly and >> at the same time remain civil. >> >> Patrick. >> >> On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: >> >> > Carol Et al >> > >> > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family >> > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what >> > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the >> discourse >> > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. >> > >> > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and >> > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries >> that >> > I know of can be found at >> > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that >> > go >> > back to roughly 1983. >> > >> > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with >> > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions >> to >> > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in >> > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to >> bear >> > fruit that can nourish a productive future. >> > >> > All sorts of alternatives are possible. >> > >> > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal >> > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired >> > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role >> of >> > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous >> real >> > experts over decades. >> > >> > The record is there, open to all. >> > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. >> > >> > Good luck to us all >> > >> > Mike >> > >> > >> > >> > On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald > > > wrote: >> > >> > > Hi >> > > >> > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >> it >> > > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >> > > >> > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >> > > >> > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >> > > >> > > Carol >> > > >> > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> > > wrote: >> > > >> > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >> two >> > > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >> > > > >> > > > Martin >> > > > >> > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >> > brief >> > > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >> > > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), >> > or >> > > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >> says >> > > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >> rise >> > > to* >> > > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >> > > phenomenology." >> > > > > Andy >> > > > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > > > *Andy Blunden* >> > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: >> > > > >> Henry, >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >> > > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >> > David K >> > > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >> [Not >> > > > Richard Nixon :)] >> > > > >> >> > > > >> Bruce R >> > > > >> >> > > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >> of >> > > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >> > else >> > > I >> > > > find irritating... >> > > > >> >> > > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> > > > >>> Sister Analisa, >> > > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >> > > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >> > > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >> > > wondered >> > > > in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >> in >> > > the >> > > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >> > even >> > > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >> > has >> > > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >> small >> > > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >> Richard >> > > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >> > face, >> > > in >> > > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >> so >> > > hard >> > > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >> > > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >> > get >> > > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> > > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >> > > > >> va >> > > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >> said >> > > > courage. >> > > > >>> >> > > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >> > called >> > > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >> One >> > > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >> > > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >> again >> > > to >> > > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >> would >> > > be >> > > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >> strong >> > > and >> > > > weak form. >> > > > >>> >> > > > >>> Henry >> > > > >>> >> > > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < >> annalisa@unm.edu> >> > > > wrote: >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Dear Henry, >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >> > > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >> > > welcome? >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >> adept >> > at >> > > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >> we >> > > are >> > > > in or from, what-have-you. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >> > hypothesis" >> > > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >> you >> > > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >> > > personal >> > > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >> > > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with >> > my >> > > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >> are >> > > all >> > > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >> > are >> > > > trying to say to me. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >> different >> > > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >> for >> > > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >> I'm >> > > not >> > > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >> > that >> > > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >> to," >> > > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >> to >> > > one >> > > > another, despite our likely different POVs. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >> > say >> > > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >> himself >> > > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >> > > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >> > > little >> > > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >> definitions, >> > > I'm >> > > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >> > this >> > > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >> To >> > > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >> who >> > > > fell from the star!" >> > > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> > > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >> such >> > as >> > > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >> What >> > > is >> > > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >> women >> > > and >> > > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >> > > about >> > > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >> real >> > > time >> > > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >> > that >> > > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >> > > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >> > > happen >> > > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >> > whether >> > > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >> Or >> > > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >> > means I >> > > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >> > position >> > > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >> > > without >> > > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >> > > academic >> > > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >> > know >> > > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >> would >> > > be >> > > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >> > > reading. >> > > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >> > > "now >> > > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >> people. >> > > All >> > > > it does is shut things down. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >> in >> > > the >> > > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >> context, >> > > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >> to >> > > an >> > > > entire website full of texts. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >> > > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >> > agree >> > > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >> > > matter >> > > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >> throwing >> > > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >> need >> > to >> > > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >> connections >> > > are >> > > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >> > may >> > > > require a helping hand. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >> > like >> > > a >> > > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >> who >> > > may >> > > > not understand. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >> > > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >> > > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >> > how >> > > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >> the >> > > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >> > most >> > > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >> > embarrassment, >> > > a >> > > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >> > > reception >> > > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >> the >> > > more >> > > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >> > > ignorance >> > > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >> > defense >> > > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >> > > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >> learn >> > > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >> one >> > > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >> > > > >> n >> > > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> > > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related >> > to >> > > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >> > > implies >> > > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >> > > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >> > Thank >> > > > you for offering them to me. >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Kind regards, >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>>> Annalisa >> > > > >>>> >> > > > >>> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> > > Developmental psycholinguist >> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> > > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> *Patrick Jaki* >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 14:07:25 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 15:07:25 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [boundary crossing & power] In-Reply-To: <1417121621795.99866@unm.edu> References: <1417121621795.99866@unm.edu> Message-ID: <3DCBDF66-896A-4ED6-97D3-FC75CF7CF95B@gmail.com> My Peeps, I have skipped over a lot of turns to read Annalisa?s (the latest as of this moment) to join Michael Gassman in wishing you all a happy Thanksgiving. I am guessing all cultures honor gratitude in some way or another, but it is our special American day of gratitude, warts and all. Thanksgiving and Yom Kippur?gratitude and forgiveness?are bookends for me. So, thank you for this chat and forgive me when I have mucked it up. Whoops!, David is on and I must finish preps for our feast. Thought we?d have a dozen; it has grown to 20! Yikes! Henry > On Nov 27, 2014, at 1:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Dana, Miguel, Larry, David, Henry, and esteemed others, > > Thank you for your personal reflections upon my posts. Because it is the holiday, I'm going to try taking a break from the list, but I wanted you to know that I am grateful for your POVs as voiced. I want to think about what you have put forward and will reply more directly if and when I can. > > I regret that Professor Mike had to wade in, as I'm guessing it must be extra work to be our soccer referee. However, I would like to second his observation that it is up to everyone to decide the future of the list. I can only speak for myself; I don't expect everyone to have it my way. I'm certainly not speaking up because I want to be a leader of the list. I'm just a perty novice looking to advance my knowledge in areas of my interests, as others want to do. I've expressed what I'm looking for and what I'd like to find. If I'm in the wrong neck of the woods and there are no munchkins here, I'd prefer know this sooner rather than later (I didn't know I could find so much metaphorical material in the Wizard of Oz, but I'm going with it :) ). > > As far as my form, I will apologize to those who find it antagonistic in length, but I hope you might see instead that it measures more my desire and enthusiasm to participate than my need to hear myself talk, although how one does that on a list if writing and reading is experienced in silence. Also I'm attempting by "dotting my i's" to reveal something important, as performance. It is not to gain attention because I lack self-esteem, but to gain attention to the esteem of subjectivity, experienced in the present moment, and how thought takes place in that space. The only example of subjectivity that I have laying around is my own, and so... I've made use of myself as material. > > I wonder if the less one uses one's own subjectivity in discourse the more authority one believes one has? Or is it the other way around? These are only thoughts out loud about power and its expression, not an accusation to anyone here. > > Also, I'm not adverse to reading; I don't mean to create an aura of myself being unwilling to read, just that I want to know the purpose for it before being laden in reams of text to my nose. I do eat my vegetables, being vegetarian. > > Last, definitional discourse has a place here and I don't mean to stop that. I'm just looking for more plural realities about those definitions and perhaps displayed in less combative, less exclusive forms. As a newcomer, I have found that difficult to negotiate. I can only describe what it is like for me. > > I'm here because I want to learn and to share. > > Have a happy and festive Thanksgiving. > > Kindest regards, > > Annalisa > > P.S. Perhaps give thanks to the turkey who has made the ultimate sacrifice for your nourishment! :) > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 14:17:01 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 22:17:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: David, Dave? Dickens is my wife's favourite. I like discussing the things I value in my readings etc with her and it was her opinion that Dickens wasn't wimping out on the grit that I thought Marx brought out in this history lesson. I know there's another Dickens fan on this list, so I'll defer a defence that under sell him. The technical (conceptual) thing is simply something to think about, there is a part of me that remains in disbelief regarding Dewey's maxim on the communication of ideas, but I've yet to disprove it to myself... challenging that maxim is also a great way to avoid hoarding great ideas or 'trade secrets' etc. I'll keep you posted on her favourite female Dickens characters the next time she gets 10 minutes spare... might be a while! Best, Huw On 27 November 2014 at 22:00, David Kellogg wrote: > I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his > compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, > strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way > that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining > his argument. > > On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't > think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the > whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. > "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate > (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views > to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real > utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary > that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in > addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an > intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put > it more charitably. > > But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the > aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly > framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of > knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a > perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than > "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike > can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather > than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, > living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if > strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must > predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the > hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts > can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of > knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in > ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). > > We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion > education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol > Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes > like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is > not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) > Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my > students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students > contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, > so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. > > She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a > newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work > on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into > a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was > reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of > Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual > above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had > constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics > for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. > Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. > > Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions > > Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to me > > that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few stones > to > > find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A > > second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source of > > so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with us > > today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. > > > > Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical > > utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of > > muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is to > be > > precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions > steady > > and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of > > articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such > > circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form but > is > > concerned with their configuration and placement. > > > > On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction > > between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think > > we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied > phenomena. > > We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal > > calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without > > (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow > > the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that > > calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal > > manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki > wrote: > > > >> Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly > and > >> at the same time remain civil. > >> > >> Patrick. > >> > >> On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > Carol Et al > >> > > >> > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting > family > >> > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about > what > >> > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the > >> discourse > >> > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted > territory. > >> > > >> > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and > >> > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries > >> that > >> > I know of can be found at > >> > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there > that > >> > go > >> > back to roughly 1983. > >> > > >> > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with > >> > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek > solutions > >> to > >> > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in > >> > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to > >> bear > >> > fruit that can nourish a productive future. > >> > > >> > All sorts of alternatives are possible. > >> > > >> > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal > >> > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired > >> > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the > role > >> of > >> > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous > >> real > >> > experts over decades. > >> > > >> > The record is there, open to all. > >> > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. > >> > > >> > Good luck to us all > >> > > >> > Mike > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald < > carolmacdon@gmail.com > >> > > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Hi > >> > > > >> > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None > of > >> it > >> > > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > >> > > > >> > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > >> > > > >> > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > >> > > > >> > > Carol > >> > > > >> > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < > >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> > > wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or > >> two > >> > > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > >> > > > > >> > > > Martin > >> > > > > >> > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> > > > > >> > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a > >> > brief > >> > > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's > "real > >> > > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx > uses), > >> > or > >> > > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin > >> says > >> > > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give > >> rise > >> > > to* > >> > > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > >> > > phenomenology." > >> > > > > Andy > >> > > > > > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > > > > *Andy Blunden* > >> > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >> > > > >> Henry, > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the > silent > >> > > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > >> > David K > >> > > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? > >> [Not > >> > > > Richard Nixon :)] > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> Bruce R > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject > heading > >> of > >> > > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. > Something > >> > else > >> > > I > >> > > > find irritating... > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> > > > >>> Sister Analisa, > >> > > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife > (getting > >> > > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > >> > > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > >> > > wondered > >> > > > in my email below if too much was expected of written > communication > >> in > >> > > the > >> > > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what > is > >> > even > >> > > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I > think, > >> > has > >> > > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even > >> small > >> > > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a > >> Richard > >> > > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to > >> > face, > >> > > in > >> > > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, > trying > >> so > >> > > hard > >> > > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > >> > > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems > to > >> > get > >> > > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > >> > > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >> > > > >> va > >> > > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have > >> said > >> > > > courage. > >> > > > >>> > >> > > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > >> > called > >> > > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. > >> One > >> > > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into > popular > >> > > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks > >> again > >> > > to > >> > > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I > >> would > >> > > be > >> > > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its > >> strong > >> > > and > >> > > > weak form. > >> > > > >>> > >> > > > >>> Henry > >> > > > >>> > >> > > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < > >> annalisa@unm.edu> > >> > > > wrote: > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Dear Henry, > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires > being > >> > > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign > of > >> > > welcome? > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am > >> adept > >> > at > >> > > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture > that > >> we > >> > > are > >> > > > in or from, what-have-you. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > >> > hypothesis" > >> > > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic > idea > >> you > >> > > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > >> > > personal > >> > > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not > speaking > >> > > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet > with > >> > my > >> > > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we > >> are > >> > > all > >> > > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what > you > >> > are > >> > > > trying to say to me. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents > >> different > >> > > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of > "perspective" > >> for > >> > > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it > right. > >> I'm > >> > > not > >> > > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have > found > >> > that > >> > > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking > >> to," > >> > > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are > talking > >> to > >> > > one > >> > > > another, despite our likely different POVs. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when > you > >> > say > >> > > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for > >> himself > >> > > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > >> > > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are > a > >> > > little > >> > > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over > >> definitions, > >> > > I'm > >> > > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are > on > >> > this > >> > > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? > :) > >> To > >> > > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady > >> who > >> > > > fell from the star!" > >> > > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> > > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > >> such > >> > as > >> > > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. > >> What > >> > > is > >> > > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > >> women > >> > > and > >> > > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with > others > >> > > about > >> > > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > >> real > >> > > time > >> > > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. > Isn't > >> > that > >> > > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate > manner, to > >> > > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going > to > >> > > happen > >> > > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > >> > whether > >> > > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates > ensue. > >> Or > >> > > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which > >> > means I > >> > > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > >> > position > >> > > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read > something > >> > > without > >> > > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >> > > academic > >> > > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but > because I > >> > know > >> > > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it > >> would > >> > > be > >> > > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > >> > > reading. > >> > > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the > tone of > >> > > "now > >> > > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between > >> people. > >> > > All > >> > > > it does is shut things down. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more > productive > >> in > >> > > the > >> > > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a > >> context, > >> > > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the > link > >> to > >> > > an > >> > > > entire website full of texts. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something > with > >> > > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem > to > >> > agree > >> > > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is > a > >> > > matter > >> > > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we > >> throwing > >> > > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that > >> need > >> > to > >> > > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least > >> connections > >> > > are > >> > > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and > who > >> > may > >> > > > require a helping hand. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, > something > >> > like > >> > > a > >> > > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of > someone > >> who > >> > > may > >> > > > not understand. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not > being > >> > > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently > treated as > >> > > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect > upon > >> > how > >> > > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and > >> the > >> > > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant > about > >> > most > >> > > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > >> > embarrassment, > >> > > a > >> > > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > >> > > reception > >> > > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, > >> the > >> > > more > >> > > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > >> > > ignorance > >> > > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > >> > defense > >> > > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's > own > >> > > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to > >> learn > >> > > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows > >> one > >> > > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >> > > > >> n > >> > > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >> > > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is > related > >> > to > >> > > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, > which > >> > > implies > >> > > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > >> > > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. > >> > Thank > >> > > > you for offering them to me. > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Kind regards, > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>>> Annalisa > >> > > > >>>> > >> > > > >>> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >> > > Developmental psycholinguist > >> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> *Patrick Jaki* > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Nov 27 21:52:20 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 22:52:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Z sign (John Haviland) Message-ID: So I promised a while back to report back about some of John Haviland's findings regarding Z sign. Now that everyone (in the U.S.) is full of turkey and potatoes, I finally have a minute. Z sign refers to a sign language that has been developing among a small family of deaf signers in Chiapas, Mexico ("Z" stands for Zinacantecan, which is the spoken language of the area). John has been doing fieldwork there for almost 50 years and since the oldest Z signer is in her 30's, his fieldwork predates this emerging sign language. All told, there are a total of 6 people who know this sign language - including a bi-lingual nephew and John himself. It might be one less than this since it might be argued that the first and oldest Z signer is not properly using the language as it has emerged with the younger signers. In fact, the younger signers (two brothers) often make fun of their older sister for not being able to produce the "proper" and "correct" signs, sometimes in ways that appears to express rather serious judgment - suggesting that their sister is too stupid to know any better. As John notes, this is the dark side of language - the way that language behavior is often re-valorized as iconic of other aspects of a person's self (think about the U.S. example of African-American English as evaluated by mainstream speakers who will comment that AAE speakers must be "ignorant" or some such). John's data are fascinating through and through. For example, the sign for chicken involves making the gesture of a pulling the chicken's neck to break it. John documents how you can begin to see Z sign becoming grammaticalized with subject-verb-object structure emerging such that Z signers can produce full sentences and engage in quite complex conversations ("homesigners" - i.e., people who do not have a signing community and are born deaf to hearing parents and living in a hearing community - homesigners have great difficulty sustaining longer conversations). Of particular interest to XMCA conversations, John makes the point that these signs are both motivated (qua icons) and symbolic (not sure if I've quite captured his terms here, so don't quote me on that). That is to say, the signs, such as the gesture of breaking a chicken's neck to represent chicken, are both iconic and symbolic. They are the latter because the possibilities of making up gestural icons for chickens are massively varied (and if you look at American Sign Language (ASL), for example, the sign for chicken is to make a beak in front of your mouth with your thumb and forefinger). So what becomes important is that the sign becomes conventionalized (and note that the older sister has a different sign for "chicken" - hers is the gesture of holding the chicken at its shoulders, with both hands cupped - and this is what her brothers make fun of her for). These signs become "portable" - that is, they come to mean the same thing across contexts and with different speakers. And the brothers' sign for chicken is consistent across different instances of chicken. Thus, for example, an image of two cute fluffy little baby chicks will still get the neck-breaking sign plus a sign for little and a sign for two (here is further grammaticalization at work - classifiers and all). What seems to me to be one of the most interesting findings (and one that John finds most troubling) is that these brothers seem to have very much "gotten" the culture of the hearing Zinacantecan speakers with whom they are living. As John describes them, these brothers behave very much like people in the surrounding culture. It is as if they are, culturally speaking, Zinacantecan. Yet, on the other hand (no pun...), the grammatical forms of Z signers do not follow the grammatical forms of the surrounding language, Zinacantecan. This does not fit very well into the linguistic relativity argument (i.e., that the language you speak affects the way that you understand and think about the world). If language affects thought, then one would expect to find that if you have someone speaking a grammatically and formally different language, then that person would think differently from those who speak that language. And yet, here is data suggesting the opposite is the case. It seems to me that CHAT might have something to offer here with the notion of "activity" as a broader concept that goes beyond language. Perhaps something like "semiosic activity" is needed to capture all of the many ways in which we meaningfully interact with one another anticipating behaviors of others based on so much more than just language - on their facial expressions and bodily hexis and non-signed gestural expressions. This would suggest renaming the hypothesis the Semiosic Activity Relativity Hypothesis (SARH). I think that could be a quite useful turn, but it still leaves one wondering why these semiosic activities didn't "bleed into" the formal features of Z sign as it emerged among this group? Lots of other interesting questions to pursue here but I'll leave it at that for now. I wonder if folks are tired/busy from all the chatting (online and elsewhere). I'm happy to answer questions about this sign language to the best of my ability and/or to see if I can get John involved or at least put some questions to him by email and see if I can get a response. Cheers, greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 01:26:22 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 09:26:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: Dickens female characters: "Esther summerson! More than likeable! And ada Clare is ok. And the charity lady's daughter whose name escapes me. Bleak house is where its at for women." And Little Dorrit too. Huw On 27 November 2014 at 22:17, Huw Lloyd wrote: > David, Dave? > > Dickens is my wife's favourite. I like discussing the things I value in > my readings etc with her and it was her opinion that Dickens wasn't wimping > out on the grit that I thought Marx brought out in this history lesson. > > I know there's another Dickens fan on this list, so I'll defer a defence > that under sell him. > > The technical (conceptual) thing is simply something to think about, there > is a part of me that remains in disbelief regarding Dewey's maxim on the > communication of ideas, but I've yet to disprove it to myself... > challenging that maxim is also a great way to avoid hoarding great ideas > or 'trade secrets' etc. > > I'll keep you posted on her favourite female Dickens characters the next > time she gets 10 minutes spare... might be a while! > > Best, > Huw > > On 27 November 2014 at 22:00, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his >> compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, >> strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way >> that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining >> his argument. >> >> On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't >> think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the >> whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. >> "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate >> (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views >> to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real >> utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary >> that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in >> addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an >> intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put >> it more charitably. >> >> But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the >> aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly >> framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of >> knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a >> perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than >> "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike >> can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather >> than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, >> living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if >> strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must >> predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the >> hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts >> can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of >> knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in >> ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). >> >> We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion >> education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol >> Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes >> like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is >> not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) >> Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my >> students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students >> contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, >> so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. >> >> She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a >> newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work >> on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into >> a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was >> reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of >> Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual >> above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had >> constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics >> for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. >> Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> > I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >> > Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >> > Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to >> me >> > that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few >> stones to >> > find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >> > second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source >> of >> > so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with >> us >> > today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >> > >> > Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >> > utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >> > muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is >> to be >> > precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions >> steady >> > and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >> > articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >> > circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form >> but is >> > concerned with their configuration and placement. >> > >> > On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal >> distinction >> > between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I >> think >> > we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied >> phenomena. >> > We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >> > calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from >> without >> > (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >> > the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >> > calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >> > manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >> > >> > Best, >> > Huw >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki >> wrote: >> > >> >> Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly >> and >> >> at the same time remain civil. >> >> >> >> Patrick. >> >> >> >> On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> > Carol Et al >> >> > >> >> > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting >> family >> >> > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about >> what >> >> > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the >> >> discourse >> >> > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted >> territory. >> >> > >> >> > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and >> >> > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries >> >> that >> >> > I know of can be found at >> >> > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there >> that >> >> > go >> >> > back to roughly 1983. >> >> > >> >> > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves >> with >> >> > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek >> solutions >> >> to >> >> > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than >> in >> >> > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely >> to >> >> bear >> >> > fruit that can nourish a productive future. >> >> > >> >> > All sorts of alternatives are possible. >> >> > >> >> > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal >> >> > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired >> >> > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the >> role >> >> of >> >> > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by >> numerous >> >> real >> >> > experts over decades. >> >> > >> >> > The record is there, open to all. >> >> > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. >> >> > >> >> > Good luck to us all >> >> > >> >> > Mike >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald < >> carolmacdon@gmail.com >> >> > > wrote: >> >> > >> >> > > Hi >> >> > > >> >> > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None >> of >> >> it >> >> > > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >> >> > > >> >> > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >> >> > > >> >> > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >> >> > > >> >> > > Carol >> >> > > >> >> > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < >> >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> >> > > wrote: >> >> > > >> >> > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one >> or >> >> two >> >> > > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Martin >> >> > > > >> >> > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> >> > > > >> >> > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for >> a >> >> > brief >> >> > > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >> "real >> >> > > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >> uses), >> >> > or >> >> > > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >> >> says >> >> > > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >> >> rise >> >> > > to* >> >> > > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >> >> > > phenomenology." >> >> > > > > Andy >> >> > > > > >> >> > > >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> > > > > *Andy Blunden* >> >> > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: >> >> > > > >> Henry, >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the >> silent >> >> > > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >> >> > David K >> >> > > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular >> words'? >> >> [Not >> >> > > > Richard Nixon :)] >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> Bruce R >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject >> heading >> >> of >> >> > > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. >> Something >> >> > else >> >> > > I >> >> > > > find irritating... >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> > > > >>> Sister Analisa, >> >> > > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife >> (getting >> >> > > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >> >> > > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >> >> > > wondered >> >> > > > in my email below if too much was expected of written >> communication >> >> in >> >> > > the >> >> > > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what >> is >> >> > even >> >> > > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >> think, >> >> > has >> >> > > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >> >> small >> >> > > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >> >> Richard >> >> > > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face >> to >> >> > face, >> >> > > in >> >> > > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, >> trying >> >> so >> >> > > hard >> >> > > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. >> The >> >> > > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which >> seems to >> >> > get >> >> > > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> >> > > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >> >> > > > >> va >> >> > > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should >> have >> >> said >> >> > > > courage. >> >> > > > >>> >> >> > > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, >> often >> >> > called >> >> > > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you >> think. >> >> One >> >> > > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >> popular >> >> > > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >> >> again >> >> > > to >> >> > > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >> >> would >> >> > > be >> >> > > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >> >> strong >> >> > > and >> >> > > > weak form. >> >> > > > >>> >> >> > > > >>> Henry >> >> > > > >>> >> >> > > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < >> >> annalisa@unm.edu> >> >> > > > wrote: >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Dear Henry, >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >> being >> >> > > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign >> of >> >> > > welcome? >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >> >> adept >> >> > at >> >> > > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture >> that >> >> we >> >> > > are >> >> > > > in or from, what-have-you. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >> >> > hypothesis" >> >> > > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic >> idea >> >> you >> >> > > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >> >> > > personal >> >> > > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not >> speaking >> >> > > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >> with >> >> > my >> >> > > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems >> we >> >> are >> >> > > all >> >> > > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there >> what you >> >> > are >> >> > > > trying to say to me. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >> >> different >> >> > > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of >> "perspective" >> >> for >> >> > > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it >> right. >> >> I'm >> >> > > not >> >> > > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have >> found >> >> > that >> >> > > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >> >> to," >> >> > > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are >> talking >> >> to >> >> > > one >> >> > > > another, despite our likely different POVs. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means >> when you >> >> > say >> >> > > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >> >> himself >> >> > > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >> >> > > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests >> are a >> >> > > little >> >> > > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is >> OK. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >> >> definitions, >> >> > > I'm >> >> > > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >> on >> >> > this >> >> > > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? >> :) >> >> To >> >> > > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young >> lady >> >> who >> >> > > > fell from the star!" >> >> > > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> >> > > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >> >> such >> >> > as >> >> > > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their >> work. >> >> What >> >> > > is >> >> > > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >> >> women >> >> > > and >> >> > > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >> others >> >> > > about >> >> > > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >> >> real >> >> > > time >> >> > > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. >> Isn't >> >> > that >> >> > > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate >> manner, to >> >> > > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never >> going to >> >> > > happen >> >> > > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >> >> > whether >> >> > > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates >> ensue. >> >> Or >> >> > > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >> >> > means I >> >> > > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >> >> > position >> >> > > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read >> something >> >> > > without >> >> > > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >> >> > > academic >> >> > > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >> because I >> >> > know >> >> > > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >> >> would >> >> > > be >> >> > > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >> >> > > reading. >> >> > > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the >> tone of >> >> > > "now >> >> > > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >> >> people. >> >> > > All >> >> > > > it does is shut things down. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more >> productive >> >> in >> >> > > the >> >> > > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >> >> context, >> >> > > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the >> link >> >> to >> >> > > an >> >> > > > entire website full of texts. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >> with >> >> > > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem >> to >> >> > agree >> >> > > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand >> is a >> >> > > matter >> >> > > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >> >> throwing >> >> > > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >> >> need >> >> > to >> >> > > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >> >> connections >> >> > > are >> >> > > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and >> who >> >> > may >> >> > > > require a helping hand. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, >> something >> >> > like >> >> > > a >> >> > > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >> someone >> >> who >> >> > > may >> >> > > > not understand. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >> being >> >> > > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently >> treated as >> >> > > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >> upon >> >> > how >> >> > > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education >> and >> >> the >> >> > > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant >> about >> >> > most >> >> > > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >> >> > embarrassment, >> >> > > a >> >> > > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >> >> > > reception >> >> > > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I >> know, >> >> the >> >> > > more >> >> > > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >> >> > > ignorance >> >> > > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >> >> > defense >> >> > > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's >> own >> >> > > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >> >> learn >> >> > > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >> knows >> >> one >> >> > > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >> >> > > > >> n >> >> > > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> >> > > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >> related >> >> > to >> >> > > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, >> which >> >> > > implies >> >> > > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have >> made >> >> > > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the >> heat. >> >> > Thank >> >> > > > you for offering them to me. >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Kind regards, >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>>> Annalisa >> >> > > > >>>> >> >> > > > >>> >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > -- >> >> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> >> > > Developmental psycholinguist >> >> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> >> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >> >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> *Patrick Jaki* >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 07:40:48 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 07:40:48 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Method as Disposition Message-ID: I wonder how central to "reading and writing the world" is the notion of "disposition". At the risk of falling back into the vortex of intensity or of becoming too "distanced" in my conversational style, I want to share an extended reflection by Chris Hacket on a Hediggerian quote. First the quote: ""implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path towards the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order to order itself always toward that which it itself discloses." How Chris Hacket expands and explores how he reads and interprets this Heideggerian quote is fascinating. Three things stand out for Chris in this quote: 1] Method is a "tendency" - one could even say "disposition", or better a "habit" and "habituating toward" something 2] Method is as a result a "path". A metaphor that "guides" these reflections. 3] Method is "marked" by paradox. Genuine method, though not "equated" with disclosure of objects is a critical mark of the path to the disclosure of objects AND at the same time and precisely because the object is present there, method is most essentially understood to be a tendency, a disposition, perhaps even a habit - to be "ordered" to that which method itself discloses, - to disclosure itself. In other words - method for Heidegger is that which emerges "out of" an ordered disposition toward the disclosure of its object. More RADICALLY [going to its root or its founding], method traces its own emergence in the "event" of intelligable disclosure: just as intelligibility is, "through questioning" TIED to the questioning - where we "found" the disclosure of the presence of method - so also for the "path" of method which is now the TYING itself. The paradox, BOTH "toward" AND "from" [approach to disclosure AND emergence from disclosure]. Method is only "calculated approach" as it is simultaneously wholly "incalculable emergence". This conception of the "nature" of method - as a sort of formal name we give to A MORE FUNDAMENTAL "disposition" that defines material phenomenology - "indicates" [points to] that method does not define phenomenology. Material phenomenology, it seems, is not a method although it surely requires that which method formally "signifies". Thus, for Heidegger at least, the particulars of a method do not make material phenomenology what it is, in the FIRST place. Rather, the "genuine question" that arises from experience defines material phenomenology. Here, method is the thoughtful "approach" [path, tendency. disposition] to phenomena of "the questioning" - itself. In other words the paradox of questioning and answer as a method, a path, a disposition, and a habit BOTH "calculated" and "incalculable emergence" I found Chris Hackett's expansion and elaboration evocative. Others may read it as constipated word/play. The notion of "disposition" tied to questions & answers as a method or path. Larry From wiobyrne@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 11:11:33 2014 From: wiobyrne@gmail.com (Ian O'Byrne) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 19:11:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] risk awareness and aversion in online spaces Message-ID: Dear colleagues, In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about what & how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will think about their digital identity as an educator. I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing down a specific field or construct. Thanks in advance, -Ian From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Nov 28 11:42:11 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 19:42:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90743DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Ian, This is a little general. What type of risk awareness and/or aversion. Is it a general sense of Internet anxiety - there has been some research on this? Or is it an aversion to specific activities on the Internet. For instance some of the research we have been doing suggests that individuals (in this case college students) have different levels of aversion between simply communicating on the Internet, worries about whether they will be overwhelmed with data, or whether they actually put themselves out on the Internet in terms of actually generating new information, or even responding to the posts of others. Our findings suggest much greater confidence (actually self-efficacy) in communication and being able to handle a lot of information, less in actually posting. Or is it a fear on teachers' part that students will know more about using the Internet than they do and fear using it and giving up their place as experts in the educational process. There is some (not much) research on this - and it might be partially urban legend. Anyway, just interested if you are finding something more specific. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: juliebwise@comcast.net Subject: [Xmca-l] risk awareness and aversion in online spaces Dear colleagues, In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about what & how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will think about their digital identity as an educator. I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing down a specific field or construct. Thanks in advance, -Ian From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Nov 28 11:44:01 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 19:44:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <360FB680-22F4-44C8-8F9B-E5B328418151@uniandes.edu.co> Ian, Apparently it's called blokeyness. Google scholar gives 31 references. :) Martin On Nov 28, 2014, at 2:11 PM, Ian O'Byrne wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or > aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in > online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about what & > how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will > think about their digital identity as an educator. > > I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what > citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing down > a specific field or construct. > > Thanks in advance, > -Ian From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Nov 28 11:49:05 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 19:49:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Method as Disposition In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417204144690.10781@unm.edu> Dear Larry, Thank you for that wonderful contribution. My own disposition toward a method, after reading your post was to reach to the dictionary, which shows that definitions are not beyond me and my disposition. Paradoxically, the word I sought was "disposition" and the hallowed tome said to me: 1. the predominant or prevailing tendency of one's spirits; natural mental and emotional outlook or mood; characteristic attitude: "a girl with a pleasant disposition." 2. state of mind regarding something; inclination: "a disposition to gamble." 3. physical inclination or tendency: "the disposition of ice to melt when heated." 4. arrangement or placing, as of troops or buildings. 5. final settlement of a matter. 6. bestowal, as by gift or sale. 7.power to make decisions about or dispose of a thing; control: "funds at one's disposition." So many definitions which reference a word-meaning! Isn't it the case that the meaning emerges based upon the event the meaning is required, which depends upon what is present and what presents itself, but also... who uses it? I also looked to the root: 1325-75; Middle English disposicioun (< Anglo-French) < Latin dispositi?n- (stem of dispositi?), equivalent to disposit (us) (past participle of disp?nere [to distribute]; dispos- (see [dispose] ) + -itus past participle suffix) + -i?n- -ion And what emerges there are the words [to distribute] and [dispose]. In order for there to be a disposition, there must be a point of departure in which to distribute from. Namely a point of origin, which would to me present as a person, a subject. I'd like to offer for what it is worth that discussion from the focal point of an "I" could be considered "intense" but it also may be that speaking has its own _habits_ (derived from contexts), in that speaking from an "I" starts to sound strange and may cause discomfort. Speaking from a focal point of "I" is a method, just as not speaking from a focal point of "I" is a method. Larry, your contribution points me vaguely to an idea or possibility that perhaps it is the habit of a method which habituates to remove the subject from view. Of course a method can conjure a disposition, too, I would gather, and if that were the case, I think I would want to know how that method is influencing me as a subject, especially if it is influencing my freedom as a subject in the world. However, putting that aside for the moment, forgetting to take ourselves into account is a common human phenomenon. It is like searching for my sunglasses that were always perched upon my head, or that I was wearing already during my search thinking I had lost them! This phenomenon occurs for a material reason. In our bodies, all our organs of perception point outwards. One cannot perceive oneself as an object in the world because one is the person behind the organ that perceives. It would be like taking a telescope into the world and looking for myself, when I am standing at the originating viewpoint of the telescope. I will look and look and only find that which is anything but myself. At some point I forget that I'm even there. It is quite easy to forget that one is the originating point of inquiry. Historically and socially, subjectivity is considered ill-mannered because what may be true for you is not for me. Which means we started to fight over rightness and this comes to blows, which resulted in monarchies and oppressions. In response to that uncomfortable emphasis upon subjectivity was to take a survey and search for a consensus, and this creates an illusion of objectivity because enough people see the same thing with their telescopes using the same method. The problem is that in the search for objectivity we have doubly forgotten ourselves as subjects, so that can't be right either because objectivity can dislocate us from ourselves. Not only from our senses but our ethics. Hence The Bomb. Hence Fossil Fuels. Hence Otherness, Etc. Subsequently, a product of this method of [objectivity without a subject] there is a tendency to become ensnared in a kind of ventriloquism, in which we must all look from the same vantage point at the same objects in the same way, which is impossible because each of us has from the beginning a unique point of view despite shared tendencies with others. Understanding shared tendencies and view points and objects observed are of certainly of value, but we cannot forget that understanding variations in tendencies and viewpoints and objects observed are of value as well. My sense that it is the noticing of variations that innovations and discoveries might take place, and the methods that these derive are an essential part of our creativity as humans. This suggests to me that a method to seek is one that equally considers subjects with the objects they interact with. We have the subject, the method or interaction, and the object. These must have equal standing in understanding what there is to understand. If we eliminate one to focus on two, or we eliminate two to focus on one, there will be a collapse, like the three-legged stool. In respect to math, three points define a plane, which perhaps here is the plane of understanding, and perhaps that plane of understanding is meaning itself? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 8:40 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Method as Disposition I wonder how central to "reading and writing the world" is the notion of "disposition". At the risk of falling back into the vortex of intensity or of becoming too "distanced" in my conversational style, I want to share an extended reflection by Chris Hacket on a Hediggerian quote. First the quote: "implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path towards the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order itself always toward that which it itself discloses." How Chris Hacket expands and explores how he reads and interprets this Heideggerian quote is fascinating. Three things stand out for Chris in this quote: 1] Method is a "tendency" - one could even say "disposition", or better a "habit" and "habituating toward" something 2] Method is as a result a "path". A metaphor that "guides" these reflections. 3] Method is "marked" by paradox. Genuine method, though not "equated" with disclosure of objects is a critical mark of the path to the disclosure of objects AND at the same time and precisely because the object is present there, method is most essentially understood to be a tendency, a disposition, perhaps even a habit - to be "ordered" to that which method itself discloses, - to disclosure itself. In other words - method for Heidegger is that which emerges "out of" an ordered disposition toward the disclosure of its object. More RADICALLY [going to its root or its founding], method traces its own emergence in the "event" of intelligable disclosure: just as intelligibility is, "through questioning" TIED to the questioning - where we "found" the disclosure of the presence of method - so also for the "path" of method which is now the TYING itself. The paradox, BOTH "toward" AND "from" [approach to disclosure AND emergence from disclosure]. Method is only "calculated approach" as it is simultaneously wholly "incalculable emergence". This conception of the "nature" of method - as a sort of formal name we give to A MORE FUNDAMENTAL "disposition" that defines material phenomenology - "indicates" [points to] that method does not define phenomenology. Material phenomenology, it seems, is not a method although it surely requires that which method formally "signifies". Thus, for Heidegger at least, the particulars of a method do not make material phenomenology what it is, in the FIRST place. Rather, the "genuine question" that arises from experience defines material phenomenology. Here, method is the thoughtful "approach" [path, tendency. disposition] to phenomena of "the questioning" - itself. In other words the paradox of questioning and answer as a method, a path, a disposition, and a habit BOTH "calculated" and "incalculable emergence" I found Chris Hackett's expansion and elaboration evocative. Others may read it as constipated word/play. The notion of "disposition" tied to questions & answers as a method or path. Larry From wiobyrne@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 11:53:47 2014 From: wiobyrne@gmail.com (Ian O'Byrne) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 19:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces References: <360FB680-22F4-44C8-8F9B-E5B328418151@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Martin, Thanks again. I'm Googling "blokeyness." I think that'll make for a good title. :) -Ian On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 2:46:11 PM Martin John Packer wrote: > Ian, > > Apparently it's called blokeyness. Google scholar gives 31 references. > > :) > > Martin > > On Nov 28, 2014, at 2:11 PM, Ian O'Byrne wrote: > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or > > aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in > > online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about > what & > > how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will > > think about their digital identity as an educator. > > > > I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what > > citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing > down > > a specific field or construct. > > > > Thanks in advance, > > -Ian > > > From wiobyrne@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 11:52:56 2014 From: wiobyrne@gmail.com (Ian O'Byrne) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 19:52:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90743DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi Michael, Thanks for reaching out. Specifically, we had teachers creating and sharing content on Twitter. There tends to be this concern, or awareness with the teachers that the content that they are sharing is impacting their digital identity...and also their identity. Our hypothesis is that the more savvy users are considering this socially constructed identity of an "educator" and that impacts the content they share online...and how much they share. We had participants indicate that the content and identity they portrayed online was either just like their offline identity (or the complete opposite) as they considered what society wanted educators to be online. Some accepted this and cleaned up what they shared...others were aware the potential risk involved...but wanted to be "themselves" and just posted it anyway. It's an intriguing mix of identity, identity construction, cultural theory, hegemony, and the risk piece we're trying to unpack. Thanks again, -Ian On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 2:44:02 PM Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Ian, > > This is a little general. What type of risk awareness and/or aversion. > Is it a general sense of Internet anxiety - there has been some research on > this? Or is it an aversion to specific activities on the Internet. For > instance some of the research we have been doing suggests that individuals > (in this case college students) have different levels of aversion between > simply communicating on the Internet, worries about whether they will be > overwhelmed with data, or whether they actually put themselves out on the > Internet in terms of actually generating new information, or even > responding to the posts of others. Our findings suggest much greater > confidence (actually self-efficacy) in communication and being able to > handle a lot of information, less in actually posting. > > Or is it a fear on teachers' part that students will know more about using > the Internet than they do and fear using it and giving up their place as > experts in the educational process. There is some (not much) research on > this - and it might be partially urban legend. > > Anyway, just interested if you are finding something more specific. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: juliebwise@comcast.net > Subject: [Xmca-l] risk awareness and aversion in online spaces > > Dear colleagues, > > In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or > aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in > online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about what & > how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will > think about their digital identity as an educator. > > I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what > citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing down > a specific field or construct. > > Thanks in advance, > -Ian > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Nov 28 12:03:44 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 20:03:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90743DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074405@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Ian, That is really interesting stuff. The applications are extraordinarily different, but there is some really interesting stuff on identity and the creation of avatars (mostly in Second Life I think). Maybe take a look at Gilly Salmon's stuff. Also if you have a chance take a look at the history of the Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link' - The WELL - communities (Howard Rheingold and others) where this whole idea of negotiating online identity and offline identity is really fascinating. I think we are still waiting for a history of online identity as dangerous - attempts to define the Internet as a dangerous place. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:52 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces Hi Michael, Thanks for reaching out. Specifically, we had teachers creating and sharing content on Twitter. There tends to be this concern, or awareness with the teachers that the content that they are sharing is impacting their digital identity...and also their identity. Our hypothesis is that the more savvy users are considering this socially constructed identity of an "educator" and that impacts the content they share online...and how much they share. We had participants indicate that the content and identity they portrayed online was either just like their offline identity (or the complete opposite) as they considered what society wanted educators to be online. Some accepted this and cleaned up what they shared...others were aware the potential risk involved...but wanted to be "themselves" and just posted it anyway. It's an intriguing mix of identity, identity construction, cultural theory, hegemony, and the risk piece we're trying to unpack. Thanks again, -Ian On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 2:44:02 PM Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Ian, > > This is a little general. What type of risk awareness and/or aversion. > Is it a general sense of Internet anxiety - there has been some research on > this? Or is it an aversion to specific activities on the Internet. For > instance some of the research we have been doing suggests that individuals > (in this case college students) have different levels of aversion between > simply communicating on the Internet, worries about whether they will be > overwhelmed with data, or whether they actually put themselves out on the > Internet in terms of actually generating new information, or even > responding to the posts of others. Our findings suggest much greater > confidence (actually self-efficacy) in communication and being able to > handle a lot of information, less in actually posting. > > Or is it a fear on teachers' part that students will know more about using > the Internet than they do and fear using it and giving up their place as > experts in the educational process. There is some (not much) research on > this - and it might be partially urban legend. > > Anyway, just interested if you are finding something more specific. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: juliebwise@comcast.net > Subject: [Xmca-l] risk awareness and aversion in online spaces > > Dear colleagues, > > In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or > aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in > online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about what & > how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will > think about their digital identity as an educator. > > I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what > citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing down > a specific field or construct. > > Thanks in advance, > -Ian > > From wiobyrne@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 12:30:02 2014 From: wiobyrne@gmail.com (Ian O'Byrne) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 20:30:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90743DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074405@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi Michael, Thank you again. I think it's intriguing for a couple of reasons. One, I think we're still in between two models in terms of online identity..and cultural norms, etc. I think it's too early...but alas this is the current state. Second, I think that the socially constructed identities of "educators" (in this discussion) change over time. When I was teaching ten years ago....you hid your Facebook account or you were fired. Now, it's changed...to some extent. :) I'm intrigued by how individuals construct and modify their digital identities using multimodal and social content. I'm interested in the decisions that they make, and for the most part have been able to focus on what they build, and look and semiotics behind these decisions. Now, we're starting to have the more savvy users indicate a consideration of what they want their digital identity to be...and how that relates to what society thinks. Don't get me wrong...this also provides some of our participants with an opportunity to reject the status quo and create their own identity. This brings in elements of critical literacy, feminist ideologies, queer theory,and post-structural perspectives. We think it's cool stuff...but just trying to unpack it and see if others are seeing the same. I'll check out the Second Life pieces, and the Well...especially Howard and Gilly Salmon's work. Thanks again, -Ian On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 3:05:56 PM Glassman, Michael wrote: > Ian, > > That is really interesting stuff. The applications are extraordinarily > different, but there is some really interesting stuff on identity and the > creation of avatars (mostly in Second Life I think). Maybe take a look at > Gilly Salmon's stuff. Also if you have a chance take a look at the history > of the Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link' - The WELL - communities (Howard > Rheingold and others) where this whole idea of negotiating online identity > and offline identity is really fascinating. > > I think we are still waiting for a history of online identity as dangerous > - attempts to define the Internet as a dangerous place. > > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:52 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces > > Hi Michael, > > Thanks for reaching out. Specifically, we had teachers creating and sharing > content on Twitter. There tends to be this concern, or awareness with the > teachers that the content that they are sharing is impacting their digital > identity...and also their identity. Our hypothesis is that the more savvy > users are considering this socially constructed identity of an "educator" > and that impacts the content they share online...and how much they share. > > We had participants indicate that the content and identity they portrayed > online was either just like their offline identity (or the complete > opposite) as they considered what society wanted educators to be online. > Some accepted this and cleaned up what they shared...others were aware the > potential risk involved...but wanted to be "themselves" and just posted it > anyway. > > It's an intriguing mix of identity, identity construction, cultural theory, > hegemony, and the risk piece we're trying to unpack. > > Thanks again, > -Ian > > On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 2:44:02 PM Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > Hi Ian, > > > > This is a little general. What type of risk awareness and/or aversion. > > Is it a general sense of Internet anxiety - there has been some research > on > > this? Or is it an aversion to specific activities on the Internet. For > > instance some of the research we have been doing suggests that > individuals > > (in this case college students) have different levels of aversion between > > simply communicating on the Internet, worries about whether they will be > > overwhelmed with data, or whether they actually put themselves out on the > > Internet in terms of actually generating new information, or even > > responding to the posts of others. Our findings suggest much greater > > confidence (actually self-efficacy) in communication and being able to > > handle a lot of information, less in actually posting. > > > > Or is it a fear on teachers' part that students will know more about > using > > the Internet than they do and fear using it and giving up their place as > > experts in the educational process. There is some (not much) research on > > this - and it might be partially urban legend. > > > > Anyway, just interested if you are finding something more specific. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] > > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:11 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Cc: juliebwise@comcast.net > > Subject: [Xmca-l] risk awareness and aversion in online spaces > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or > > aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in > > online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about > what & > > how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will > > think about their digital identity as an educator. > > > > I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what > > citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing > down > > a specific field or construct. > > > > Thanks in advance, > > -Ian > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 13:12:01 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 06:12:01 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: The charity lady's daughter is Caddy Jellyby (later Princess Turveydrop). Esther Summerson is neither bearable nor a female character: she's a paragon of hypocritical Victorian "modestly" and sounds suspiciously like Dickens in drag. We are told that Little Dorrit was twenty, but almost everybody thought she was only eleven--yet she marries a man well into her forties. That's what I call blokeyness (as opposed to blokishness, which is an over-competitive, possessive attitude towards word meanings). De gustibus non est disputandum (but do we ever do anything else?). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 28 November 2014 at 18:26, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Dickens female characters: > > "Esther summerson! More than likeable! And ada Clare is ok. And the charity > lady's daughter whose name escapes me. Bleak house is where its at for > women." > > And Little Dorrit too. > > Huw > > On 27 November 2014 at 22:17, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> David, Dave? >> >> Dickens is my wife's favourite. I like discussing the things I value in >> my readings etc with her and it was her opinion that Dickens wasn't wimping >> out on the grit that I thought Marx brought out in this history lesson. >> >> I know there's another Dickens fan on this list, so I'll defer a defence >> that under sell him. >> >> The technical (conceptual) thing is simply something to think about, there >> is a part of me that remains in disbelief regarding Dewey's maxim on the >> communication of ideas, but I've yet to disprove it to myself... >> challenging that maxim is also a great way to avoid hoarding great ideas >> or 'trade secrets' etc. >> >> I'll keep you posted on her favourite female Dickens characters the next >> time she gets 10 minutes spare... might be a while! >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 27 November 2014 at 22:00, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his >>> compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, >>> strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way >>> that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining >>> his argument. >>> >>> On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't >>> think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the >>> whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. >>> "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate >>> (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views >>> to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real >>> utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary >>> that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in >>> addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an >>> intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put >>> it more charitably. >>> >>> But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the >>> aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly >>> framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of >>> knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a >>> perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than >>> "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike >>> can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather >>> than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, >>> living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if >>> strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must >>> predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the >>> hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts >>> can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of >>> knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in >>> ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). >>> >>> We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion >>> education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol >>> Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes >>> like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is >>> not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) >>> Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my >>> students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students >>> contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, >>> so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. >>> >>> She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a >>> newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work >>> on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into >>> a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was >>> reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of >>> Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual >>> above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had >>> constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics >>> for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. >>> Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>> > I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >>> > Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >>> > Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to >>> me >>> > that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few >>> stones to >>> > find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >>> > second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source >>> of >>> > so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with >>> us >>> > today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >>> > >>> > Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >>> > utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >>> > muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is >>> to be >>> > precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions >>> steady >>> > and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >>> > articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >>> > circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form >>> but is >>> > concerned with their configuration and placement. >>> > >>> > On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal >>> distinction >>> > between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I >>> think >>> > we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied >>> phenomena. >>> > We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >>> > calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from >>> without >>> > (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >>> > the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >>> > calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >>> > manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >>> > >>> > Best, >>> > Huw >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki >>> wrote: >>> > >>> >> Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly >>> and >>> >> at the same time remain civil. >>> >> >>> >> Patrick. >>> >> >>> >> On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: >>> >> >>> >> > Carol Et al >>> >> > >>> >> > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting >>> family >>> >> > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about >>> what >>> >> > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the >>> >> discourse >>> >> > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted >>> territory. >>> >> > >>> >> > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and >>> >> > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries >>> >> that >>> >> > I know of can be found at >>> >> > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there >>> that >>> >> > go >>> >> > back to roughly 1983. >>> >> > >>> >> > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves >>> with >>> >> > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek >>> solutions >>> >> to >>> >> > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than >>> in >>> >> > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely >>> to >>> >> bear >>> >> > fruit that can nourish a productive future. >>> >> > >>> >> > All sorts of alternatives are possible. >>> >> > >>> >> > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal >>> >> > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired >>> >> > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the >>> role >>> >> of >>> >> > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by >>> numerous >>> >> real >>> >> > experts over decades. >>> >> > >>> >> > The record is there, open to all. >>> >> > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. >>> >> > >>> >> > Good luck to us all >>> >> > >>> >> > Mike >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald < >>> carolmacdon@gmail.com >>> >> > > wrote: >>> >> > >>> >> > > Hi >>> >> > > >>> >> > > There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None >>> of >>> >> it >>> >> > > complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>> >> > > >>> >> > > I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>> >> > > >>> >> > > Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>> >> > > >>> >> > > Carol >>> >> > > >>> >> > > On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < >>> >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> >> > > wrote: >>> >> > > >>> >> > > > Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one >>> or >>> >> two >>> >> > > > more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > > Martin >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > > On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > > > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for >>> a >>> >> > brief >>> >> > > > moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >>> "real >>> >> > > > illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >>> uses), >>> >> > or >>> >> > > > in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >>> >> says >>> >> > > > "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >>> >> rise >>> >> > > to* >>> >> > > > illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>> >> > > phenomenology." >>> >> > > > > Andy >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > >>> >> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >> > > > > *Andy Blunden* >>> >> > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote: >>> >> > > > >> Henry, >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the >>> silent >>> >> > > > majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>> >> > David K >>> >> > > > calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular >>> words'? >>> >> [Not >>> >> > > > Richard Nixon :)] >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> Bruce R >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject >>> heading >>> >> of >>> >> > > > this message so that it bears no relation to the content. >>> Something >>> >> > else >>> >> > > I >>> >> > > > find irritating... >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >> > > > >>> Sister Analisa, >>> >> > > > >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife >>> (getting >>> >> > > > personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>> >> > > > participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>> >> > > wondered >>> >> > > > in my email below if too much was expected of written >>> communication >>> >> in >>> >> > > the >>> >> > > > XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what >>> is >>> >> > even >>> >> > > > possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >>> think, >>> >> > has >>> >> > > > some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >>> >> small >>> >> > > > scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>> >> Richard >>> >> > > > Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face >>> to >>> >> > face, >>> >> > > in >>> >> > > > a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, >>> trying >>> >> so >>> >> > > hard >>> >> > > > to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. >>> The >>> >> > > > alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which >>> seems to >>> >> > get >>> >> > > > bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>> >> > > > consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>> >> > > > >> va >>> >> > > > >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should >>> have >>> >> said >>> >> > > > courage. >>> >> > > > >>> >>> >> > > > >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, >>> often >>> >> > called >>> >> > > > the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you >>> think. >>> >> One >>> >> > > > gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >>> popular >>> >> > > > discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>> >> again >>> >> > > to >>> >> > > > my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>> >> would >>> >> > > be >>> >> > > > interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>> >> strong >>> >> > > and >>> >> > > > weak form. >>> >> > > > >>> >>> >> > > > >>> Henry >>> >> > > > >>> >>> >> > > > >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < >>> >> annalisa@unm.edu> >>> >> > > > wrote: >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Dear Henry, >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >>> being >>> >> > > > heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign >>> of >>> >> > > welcome? >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>> >> adept >>> >> > at >>> >> > > > doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture >>> that >>> >> we >>> >> > > are >>> >> > > > in or from, what-have-you. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>> >> > hypothesis" >>> >> > > > is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic >>> idea >>> >> you >>> >> > > > have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>> >> > > personal >>> >> > > > experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not >>> speaking >>> >> > > > literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >>> with >>> >> > my >>> >> > > > voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems >>> we >>> >> are >>> >> > > all >>> >> > > > speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there >>> what you >>> >> > are >>> >> > > > trying to say to me. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>> >> different >>> >> > > > worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of >>> "perspective" >>> >> for >>> >> > > > worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it >>> right. >>> >> I'm >>> >> > > not >>> >> > > > sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have >>> found >>> >> > that >>> >> > > > many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >>> >> to," >>> >> > > > rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are >>> talking >>> >> to >>> >> > > one >>> >> > > > another, despite our likely different POVs. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means >>> when you >>> >> > say >>> >> > > > that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>> >> himself >>> >> > > > asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>> >> > > > definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests >>> are a >>> >> > > little >>> >> > > > different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is >>> OK. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>> >> definitions, >>> >> > > I'm >>> >> > > > more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >>> on >>> >> > this >>> >> > > > list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? >>> :) >>> >> To >>> >> > > > reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young >>> lady >>> >> who >>> >> > > > fell from the star!" >>> >> > > > >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>> >> > > > sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>> >> such >>> >> > as >>> >> > > > CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their >>> work. >>> >> What >>> >> > > is >>> >> > > > that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>> >> women >>> >> > > and >>> >> > > > people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >>> others >>> >> > > about >>> >> > > > Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>> >> real >>> >> > > time >>> >> > > > dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. >>> Isn't >>> >> > that >>> >> > > > what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate >>> manner, to >>> >> > > > allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never >>> going to >>> >> > > happen >>> >> > > > because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>> >> > whether >>> >> > > > nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates >>> ensue. >>> >> Or >>> >> > > > someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>> >> > means I >>> >> > > > missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>> >> > position >>> >> > > > because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read >>> something >>> >> > > without >>> >> > > > really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>> >> > > academic >>> >> > > > argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >>> because I >>> >> > know >>> >> > > > how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>> >> would >>> >> > > be >>> >> > > > a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>> >> > > reading. >>> >> > > > I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the >>> tone of >>> >> > > "now >>> >> > > > go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >>> >> people. >>> >> > > All >>> >> > > > it does is shut things down. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more >>> productive >>> >> in >>> >> > > the >>> >> > > > moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>> >> context, >>> >> > > > especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the >>> link >>> >> to >>> >> > > an >>> >> > > > entire website full of texts. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >>> with >>> >> > > > which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem >>> to >>> >> > agree >>> >> > > > with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand >>> is a >>> >> > > matter >>> >> > > > of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >>> >> throwing >>> >> > > > ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >>> >> need >>> >> > to >>> >> > > > throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >>> >> connections >>> >> > > are >>> >> > > > being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and >>> who >>> >> > may >>> >> > > > require a helping hand. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, >>> something >>> >> > like >>> >> > > a >>> >> > > > boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >>> someone >>> >> who >>> >> > > may >>> >> > > > not understand. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >>> being >>> >> > > > stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently >>> treated as >>> >> > > > stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >>> upon >>> >> > how >>> >> > > > little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education >>> and >>> >> the >>> >> > > > dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant >>> about >>> >> > most >>> >> > > > things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>> >> > embarrassment, >>> >> > > a >>> >> > > > deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>> >> > > reception >>> >> > > > to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I >>> know, >>> >> the >>> >> > > more >>> >> > > > I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>> >> > > ignorance >>> >> > > > is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>> >> > defense >>> >> > > > mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's >>> own >>> >> > > > ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>> >> learn >>> >> > > > something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >>> knows >>> >> one >>> >> > > > doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>> >> > > > >> n >>> >> > > > >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>> >> > > > >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >>> related >>> >> > to >>> >> > > > pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, >>> which >>> >> > > implies >>> >> > > > movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have >>> made >>> >> > > > sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the >>> heat. >>> >> > Thank >>> >> > > > you for offering them to me. >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Kind regards, >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>>> Annalisa >>> >> > > > >>>> >>> >> > > > >>> >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > >> >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > -- >>> >> > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> >> > > Developmental psycholinguist >>> >> > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> >> > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >> > > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > -- >>> >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>> >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> -- >>> >> *Patrick Jaki* >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>> >> >>> >> >> From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 14:30:55 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 00:30:55 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya Message-ID: Just a curiosity for the contuinity of past and present across generations: Anyone who heard about Zoya, died on 29th November 1942, against Nazis. For me , she is rather, in the context of this xmca group, an issue on the human development of a Soviet child and young for highest ideals. For instance, as a child, she asks to a writer: "Is there not a big, one common happiness for all?" I think this is a great question across all ages of humanity eternally. She decides that this common happiness is the land of Soviets. I am interested on the life, rather than death of her, as an analysis of a child and youth development issue. Best, Ulvi From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 16:04:43 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 17:04:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <042DCB20-BE9D-448A-9659-EB1E23DA0EBD@uniandes.edu.co> <1416620439993.40256@unm.edu> <1416896874222.89048@unm.edu> <1416959052952.28958@unm.edu> <1416978686386.92307@unm.edu> <48DCA657-4D32-4F9E-87B1-24A6B79D8B1C@gmail.com> <54765815.6070203@brucerob.eu> <54766F4C.1010501@mira.net> Message-ID: <1954228D-1662-4A19-888E-55E0835D6018@gmail.com> Hi David, Sorry I?m way behind. Respectfully: Would it be fair to say that science needs art if both are to be creative? And that time and space are prototypical themes in both art and science? So, a 2-by-2 matrix with prototypical examples of the mash up in each quadrant. Just a thought. Henry > On Nov 27, 2014, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his > compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, > strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way > that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining > his argument. > > On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't > think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the > whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. > "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate > (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views > to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real > utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary > that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in > addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an > intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put > it more charitably. > > But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the > aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly > framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of > knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a > perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than > "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike > can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather > than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, > living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if > strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must > predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the > hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts > can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of > knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in > ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). > > We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion > education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol > Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes > like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is > not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) > Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my > students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students > contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, > so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. > > She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a > newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work > on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into > a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was > reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of > Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual > above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had > constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics > for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. > Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >> Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >> Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to me >> that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few stones to >> find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >> second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source of >> so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with us >> today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >> >> Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >> utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >> muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is to be >> precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions steady >> and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >> articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >> circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form but is >> concerned with their configuration and placement. >> >> On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction >> between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think >> we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied phenomena. >> We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >> calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without >> (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >> the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >> calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >> manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 27 November 2014 at 07:07, Patrick Jaki wrote: >> >>> Am sad about the uncalled for attention. We can still debate robustly and >>> at the same time remain civil. >>> >>> Patrick. >>> >>> On 27 November 2014 at 08:48, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Carol Et al >>>> >>>> It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family >>>> and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what >>>> it means to have participants with such varied histories with the >>> discourse >>>> community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. >>>> >>>> For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and >>>> reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries >>> that >>>> I know of can be found at >>>> LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that >>>> go >>>> back to roughly 1983. >>>> >>>> Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with >>>> prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions >>> to >>>> the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in >>>> collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to >>> bear >>>> fruit that can nourish a productive future. >>>> >>>> All sorts of alternatives are possible. >>>> >>>> One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal >>>> responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired >>>> professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role >>> of >>>> culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous >>> real >>>> experts over decades. >>>> >>>> The record is there, open to all. >>>> Check it out. Then we can assess the future. >>>> >>>> Good luck to us all >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, November 26, 2014, Carol Macdonald >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi >>>>> >>>>> There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >>> it >>>>> complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>>> >>>>> I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>>> >>>>> Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer < >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >>> two >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>> brief >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), >>>> or >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >>> says >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >>> rise >>>>> to* >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>> phenomenology." >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>>>> Henry, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>>> David K >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >>> [Not >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruce R >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >>> of >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>> else >>>>> I >>>>>> find irritating... >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>>>>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>>> wondered >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >>> in >>>>> the >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>> even >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >>>> has >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >>> small >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>> Richard >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>> face, >>>>> in >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >>> so >>>>> hard >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>> get >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>>>> va >>>>>>>>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>> said >>>>>> courage. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>> called >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>> One >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>> again >>>>> to >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>> would >>>>> be >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>> strong >>>>> and >>>>>> weak form. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < >>> annalisa@unm.edu> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>>> welcome? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>> adept >>>> at >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >>> we >>>>> are >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>> hypothesis" >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>> you >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>>> personal >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with >>>> my >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >>> are >>>>> all >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >>>> are >>>>>> trying to say to me. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>> different >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>> for >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>> I'm >>>>> not >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>> that >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >>> to," >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >>> to >>>>> one >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >>>> say >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>> himself >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>>> little >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>> definitions, >>>>> I'm >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>> this >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >>> To >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >>> who >>>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>>>>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>> such >>>> as >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>> What >>>>> is >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>> women >>>>> and >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>>> about >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>> real >>>>> time >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>> that >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>>> happen >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>> whether >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>> Or >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>>> means I >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>> position >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>>> without >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>> academic >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>> know >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>> would >>>>> be >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>>> reading. >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >>>>> "now >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >>> people. >>>>> All >>>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >>> in >>>>> the >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>> context, >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >>> to >>>>> an >>>>>> entire website full of texts. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>> agree >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>>> matter >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >>> throwing >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >>> need >>>> to >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >>> connections >>>>> are >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>> may >>>>>> require a helping hand. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>> like >>>>> a >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >>> who >>>>> may >>>>>> not understand. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >>>> how >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >>> the >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>> most >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>> embarrassment, >>>>> a >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>>> reception >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >>> the >>>>> more >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>>> ignorance >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>> defense >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>> learn >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >>> one >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>>>> n >>>>>>>>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>>>>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related >>>> to >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>>> implies >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>> Thank >>>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Patrick Jaki* >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>> From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Fri Nov 28 16:07:14 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 00:07:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [boundary crossing & power] In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Dana, I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has attempted this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate depiction of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps there is a smaller group that would like to continue with this thread/exploration of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of politics and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like many concepts. I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin with our own political biographies, how we view the world and its transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis (informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being made here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political or mechanistic, but I take that risk. Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was published as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" (? la Dewey). -Miguel On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving forward >this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. > >Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours years >ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant students >at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied selves in >boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., >Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder >if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of power in >relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours that >you might suggest on this subject? > >Dana > > >On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >wrote: > >>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >> >>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as >>to >>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own >>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on >>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this >>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT >>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's >>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >>did with migrant students at that time... >> >>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and carry >>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or interweave >>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas >>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said >>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation >>to >>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that >>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >>useful. >> >>Warmly, >> >>Miguel Zavala >> >> >> >>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >> >>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >>>consider Annalisa's question: >>> >>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>>as >>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>>is >>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>>and >>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>about >>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>>time >>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that >>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>> >>> >>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >>>seldom >>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self in >>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, gender, >>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out >>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is why >>>I >>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this >>>list >>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>>above? >>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory >>>who >>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there are >>>others. >>> >>>Dana >>> >>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: >>> >>>>Hi >>>> >>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >>>>it >>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>> >>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>> >>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>> >>>>Carol >>>> >>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>>> >>>>wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >>>>>two >>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>>>brief >>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's "real >>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx uses), >>>>>or >>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >>>>>says >>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >>>>>rise >>>>>to* >>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>>phenomenology." >>>>> > Andy >>>>> > >>>>>---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>- >>>>>- >>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>> >> Henry, >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>>>>David >>>>>K >>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >>>>>[Not >>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Bruce R >>>>> >> >>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >>>>>of >>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>>>else I >>>>> find irritating... >>>>> >> >>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, >>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>>>wondered >>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >>>>>in >>>>>the >>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>>>even >>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I think, >>>>>has >>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >>>>>small >>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>>Richard >>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>>>face, in >>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >>>>>so >>>>>hard >>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>>>get >>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>> >> va >>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>>said >>>>> courage. >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>>>called >>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>>>>One >>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into popular >>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>>>>again >>>>>to >>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>>>>would >>>>>be >>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>>>>strong >>>>>and >>>>> weak form. >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> Henry >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires being >>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>>>welcome? >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>>>>adept >>>>>at >>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >>>>>we >>>>>are >>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>>hypothesis" >>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>>>>you >>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>>>personal >>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet with >>>>>my >>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >>>>>are >>>>>all >>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what you >>>>>are >>>>> trying to say to me. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>>different >>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>>for >>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>>I'm >>>>>not >>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>>>that >>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >>>>>to," >>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >>>>>to >>>>>one >>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when you >>>>>say >>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>>>>himself >>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>>>little >>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>>>>definitions, >>>>>I'm >>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>>>this >>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >>>>>To >>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >>>>>who >>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>>>>such >>>>>as >>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>>>>What >>>>>is >>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>>>>women >>>>>and >>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>>>about >>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>>>>real >>>>>time >>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>>that >>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, to >>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>>>happen >>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>>>whether >>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>>>>Or >>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>>>>means >>>>>I >>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>>>position >>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>>>without >>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>>academic >>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>>>know >>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>>>>would >>>>>be >>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>>>reading. >>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone of >>>>>"now >>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >>>>>people. >>>>>All >>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >>>>>in >>>>>the >>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>>context, >>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >>>>>to >>>>>an >>>>> entire website full of texts. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something with >>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>>>agree >>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>>>matter >>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >>>>>throwing >>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >>>>>need >>>>>to >>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >>>>>connections >>>>>are >>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>>may >>>>> require a helping hand. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>>>like a >>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >>>>>who >>>>>may >>>>> not understand. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not being >>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated as >>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect upon >>>>>how >>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >>>>>the >>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>>>most >>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>>>embarrassment, a >>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>>>reception >>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >>>>>the >>>>>more >>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>>>ignorance >>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>>>defense >>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>>>>learn >>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >>>>>one >>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>> >> n >>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is related >>>>>to >>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>>>implies >>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>>>Thank >>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>-- >>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>Developmental psycholinguist >>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Zavala (2015)_Chapter16.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 656421 bytes Desc: Zavala (2015)_Chapter16.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141129/348523c1/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Nov 28 16:58:20 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 17:58:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Z sign (John Haviland) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <48B47069-FA25-413B-8EC3-C08764B42F3D@gmail.com> Greg, This is great. Count me in to any kind of a thread that deals with gesture. Henry > On Nov 27, 2014, at 10:52 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > So I promised a while back to report back about some of John Haviland's > findings regarding Z sign. Now that everyone (in the U.S.) is full of > turkey and potatoes, I finally have a minute. > > Z sign refers to a sign language that has been developing among a small > family of deaf signers in Chiapas, Mexico ("Z" stands for Zinacantecan, > which is the spoken language of the area). John has been doing fieldwork > there for almost 50 years and since the oldest Z signer is in her 30's, his > fieldwork predates this emerging sign language. > > All told, there are a total of 6 people who know this sign language - > including a bi-lingual nephew and John himself. It might be one less than > this since it might be argued that the first and oldest Z signer is not > properly using the language as it has emerged with the younger signers. In > fact, the younger signers (two brothers) often make fun of their older > sister for not being able to produce the "proper" and "correct" signs, > sometimes in ways that appears to express rather serious judgment - > suggesting that their sister is too stupid to know any better. As John > notes, this is the dark side of language - the way that language behavior > is often re-valorized as iconic of other aspects of a person's self (think > about the U.S. example of African-American English as evaluated by > mainstream speakers who will comment that AAE speakers must be "ignorant" > or some such). > > John's data are fascinating through and through. For example, the sign for > chicken involves making the gesture of a pulling the chicken's neck to > break it. > > John documents how you can begin to see Z sign becoming grammaticalized > with subject-verb-object structure emerging such that Z signers can produce > full sentences and engage in quite complex conversations ("homesigners" - > i.e., people who do not have a signing community and are born deaf to > hearing parents and living in a hearing community - homesigners have great > difficulty sustaining longer conversations). > > Of particular interest to XMCA conversations, John makes the point that > these signs are both motivated (qua icons) and symbolic (not sure if I've > quite captured his terms here, so don't quote me on that). That is to say, > the signs, such as the gesture of breaking a chicken's neck to represent > chicken, are both iconic and symbolic. They are the latter because the > possibilities of making up gestural icons for chickens are massively varied > (and if you look at American Sign Language (ASL), for example, the sign for > chicken is to make a beak in front of your mouth with your thumb and > forefinger). So what becomes important is that the sign becomes > conventionalized (and note that the older sister has a different sign for > "chicken" - hers is the gesture of holding the chicken at its shoulders, > with both hands cupped - and this is what her brothers make fun of her > for). These signs become "portable" - that is, they come to mean the same > thing across contexts and with different speakers. And the brothers' sign > for chicken is consistent across different instances of chicken. Thus, for > example, an image of two cute fluffy little baby chicks will still get the > neck-breaking sign plus a sign for little and a sign for two (here is > further grammaticalization at work - classifiers and all). > > What seems to me to be one of the most interesting findings (and one that > John finds most troubling) is that these brothers seem to have very much > "gotten" the culture of the hearing Zinacantecan speakers with whom they > are living. As John describes them, these brothers behave very much like > people in the surrounding culture. It is as if they are, culturally > speaking, Zinacantecan. Yet, on the other hand (no pun...), the grammatical > forms of Z signers do not follow the grammatical forms of the surrounding > language, Zinacantecan. This does not fit very well into the linguistic > relativity argument (i.e., that the language you speak affects the way that > you understand and think about the world). If language affects thought, > then one would expect to find that if you have someone speaking a > grammatically and formally different language, then that person would think > differently from those who speak that language. And yet, here is data > suggesting the opposite is the case. > > It seems to me that CHAT might have something to offer here with the notion > of "activity" as a broader concept that goes beyond language. Perhaps > something like "semiosic activity" is needed to capture all of the many > ways in which we meaningfully interact with one another anticipating > behaviors of others based on so much more than just language - on their > facial expressions and bodily hexis and non-signed gestural expressions. > This would suggest renaming the hypothesis the Semiosic Activity Relativity > Hypothesis (SARH). > > I think that could be a quite useful turn, but it still leaves one > wondering why these semiosic activities didn't "bleed into" the formal > features of Z sign as it emerged among this group? > > Lots of other interesting questions to pursue here but I'll leave it at > that for now. I wonder if folks are tired/busy from all the chatting > (online and elsewhere). > > I'm happy to answer questions about this sign language to the best of my > ability and/or to see if I can get John involved or at least put some > questions to him by email and see if I can get a response. > > Cheers, > greg > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Nov 28 21:39:47 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 05:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] Message-ID: <1417239585878.37588@unm.edu> If I may, to all and sundry, I recall in a course called Methodologies of Modernism, as an art student, there was one fantastic lecture by my humanities professor Ray Mondini. He showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were precursors to the work of scientific discovery. There were about eight different examples he gave. Unfortunately I do not remember them all. I recall The Yellow Wallpaper came just before Freud's solidifying work on repression and the unconscious. Cubism came just before Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. The others I don't remember. It made me see that artists are very capable of either catching the zietgeist of thought and reifying it in their art, which might then direct the attention of scientists, or perhaps something more ethereal is going on, not spiritual, but something more subtle on the social plane of historical existence. A similar phenomenon in kind when Darwin and Wallace came up with their versions of the theory of evolution, but in that case it seems it is because they'd both read a book by Malthus on populations, so they shared similar inspiration from the same source. So I'm inclined to stand by David on this trans-disciplinary position. However I don't think it's about weak versus strong frames. I see it differently. For artists, they see the world from the general to the specific. For scientists, they see the world from the specific to the general. Of course these "laws" I have observed in thinking patterns vis a vis scientists and artists are not hard and fast, but that is my lived experience. To be an artist is to be a scientist in terms of form and color, tone and texture. But artists are not attempting to discover new worlds of material, they are searching for new worlds of meaning through testing the material. I haven't worked closely with scientists, however we know from Einstein his position on visualization and imagination. This presents me with a personal hypothesis, if I'm allowed to engender a personal one, that the best artists are ones with a bit of the scientist in them, and the best scientists are ones with a bit of the artist in them. Not sure how to quantify that exactly, except perhaps through play. If anyone wants to know what lays ahead in scientific discovery, one thing to do is bone up on what the art scene is, because they are experimenting on the same thoughts as scientists, just from the top-down. A starting point is by perusing magazines like Art Forum, ARTnews, Art in America, Art Review, and others. I'm sure you can find themes that resonate and run parallel. Just follow your nose. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 5:04 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] Hi David, Sorry I?m way behind. Respectfully: Would it be fair to say that science needs art if both are to be creative? And that time and space are prototypical themes in both art and science? So, a 2-by-2 matrix with prototypical examples of the mash up in each quadrant. Just a thought. Henry > On Nov 27, 2014, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his > compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, > strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way > that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining > his argument. > > On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't > think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the > whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. > "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate > (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views > to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real > utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary > that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in > addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an > intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put > it more charitably. > > But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the > aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly > framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of > knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a > perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than > "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike > can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather > than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, > living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if > strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must > predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the > hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts > can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of > knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in > ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). > > We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion > education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol > Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes > like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is > not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) > Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my > students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students > contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, > so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. > > She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a > newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work > on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into > a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was > reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of > Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual > above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had > constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics > for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. > Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >> Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >> Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to me >> that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few stones to >> find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >> second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source of >> so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with us >> today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >> >> Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >> utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >> muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is to be >> precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions steady >> and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >> articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >> circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form but is >> concerned with their configuration and placement. >> >> On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal distinction >> between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I think >> we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied phenomena. >> We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >> calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from without >> (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >> the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >> calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >> manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >> >> Best, >> Huw From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Nov 29 06:58:24 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 06:58:24 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: <1417239585878.37588@unm.edu> References: <1417239585878.37588@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, I want to follow your thread and link it to my reflection on method and disposition and also "modes": My reading that is exploring the notion of *seeing as* as a path/disposition You wrote: "He showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were precursors to the work of scientific discovery." In other words the aesthetic "mode" is "prior" to the scientific "mode". Another perspective is they share the same images one not prior to the other. I want to return to Chris Hackett who is exploring the theme of methods and modes. He gives a description of the "transcendental mode" as method: "The priority of possibility 'higher than actuality', defines the 'metaphysics' of transcendental modes of thought where possibility and rationality are identified; here, in the domain of metaphysics, abstracted from existence, and seeking to 'replace' the ever-greater EXCESS of existence with its own manageable, pre-conceived intelligibility [according to science as 'tekne'], reason institutes itself as FIRST foundation; nothing can APPEAR but what reason defines as POSSIBLE." [Hackett, page 65 in Method, Metaphysics, Metaphor] Annalisa, this quote is Hackett's attempt to situate a particular mode of reasoning as transcendental and if following this path a transcendental disposition. Now I want to bring in a central concept - "image" or appearance that circulates within this mode of reason. It is Schelling who is exploring the relation of possibility and actuality. Here is quote from Chris Hackett developing Hackett's interpretation of Schelling's reasoning on reason: "Yet, 'reason' as Schelling pleaded, is not possible as totally 'indifferent' to existence, which is sovereignly free from all subjective CONSTITUTION, and which already founds the world. Reason requires existence ... for it is only AS AN IMAGE, imbued with the life of existence, bearing that existence as its primal expression, manifesting the ACT of existence that things are, that reason WORKS. To the degree that existence EXCEEDS reason, and therefore, to the degree that reason NEEDS AN IMAGE as *pre* and *post*-rationally DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility, to that degree reason is rational" Annalisa, Chris Hackett is situating both the aesthetic and the scientific in modes and methods which centrally need IMAGES. [appearances]. These modes and relations are indicating dispositions towards possibility and actuality. A particular mode follows the path of the transcendental and values *possibility* as a metaphysical path. Another approach [path] values existence as EXCESS. What is *excess* exists within acts of existence, as relational acts. To the degree that existence EXCEEDS reason, is the degree that reason NEEDS AN IMAGE [an appearance] as DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility. The path Chris Hackett is walking is leading to the centrality of tying meta-phor & meta-physics & meta-hodos [meta-knowledge] into an interpretive mode situated within questions. [I was wondering if I should have started a new thread? to post this answer to Annalisa. It is touching and overlapping previous turns in the conversation.] On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > If I may, to all and sundry, > > I recall in a course called Methodologies of Modernism, as an art student, > there was one fantastic lecture by my humanities professor Ray Mondini. He > showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were precursors to > the work of scientific discovery. There were about eight different examples > he gave. Unfortunately I do not remember them all. I recall The Yellow > Wallpaper came just before Freud's solidifying work on repression and the > unconscious. Cubism came just before Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. > The others I don't remember. It made me see that artists are very capable > of either catching the zietgeist of thought and reifying it in their art, > which might then direct the attention of scientists, or perhaps something > more ethereal is going on, not spiritual, but something more subtle on the > social plane of historical existence. A similar phenomenon in kind when > Darwin and Wallace came up with their versions of the theory of evolution, > but in that case it seems it is because they'd both read a book by Malthus > on populations, so they shared similar inspiration from the same source. > > So I'm inclined to stand by David on this trans-disciplinary position. > However I don't think it's about weak versus strong frames. I see it > differently. For artists, they see the world from the general to the > specific. For scientists, they see the world from the specific to the > general. Of course these "laws" I have observed in thinking patterns vis a > vis scientists and artists are not hard and fast, but that is my lived > experience. > > To be an artist is to be a scientist in terms of form and color, tone and > texture. But artists are not attempting to discover new worlds of material, > they are searching for new worlds of meaning through testing the material. > I haven't worked closely with scientists, however we know from Einstein his > position on visualization and imagination. This presents me with a personal > hypothesis, if I'm allowed to engender a personal one, that the best > artists are ones with a bit of the scientist in them, and the best > scientists are ones with a bit of the artist in them. Not sure how to > quantify that exactly, except perhaps through play. > > If anyone wants to know what lays ahead in scientific discovery, one thing > to do is bone up on what the art scene is, because they are experimenting > on the same thoughts as scientists, just from the top-down. A starting > point is by perusing magazines like Art Forum, ARTnews, Art in America, Art > Review, and others. I'm sure you can find themes that resonate and run > parallel. > > Just follow your nose. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of HENRY SHONERD > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 5:04 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > > Hi David, > Sorry I?m way behind. Respectfully: > Would it be fair to say that science needs art if both are to be creative? > And that time and space are prototypical themes in both art and science? > So, a 2-by-2 matrix with prototypical examples of the mash up in each > quadrant. Just a thought. > Henry > > > On Nov 27, 2014, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his > > compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, > > strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way > > that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining > > his argument. > > > > On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't > > think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the > > whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. > > "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate > > (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views > > to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real > > utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary > > that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in > > addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an > > intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put > > it more charitably. > > > > But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the > > aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly > > framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of > > knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a > > perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than > > "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike > > can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather > > than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, > > living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if > > strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must > > predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the > > hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts > > can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of > > knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in > > ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). > > > > We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion > > education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol > > Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes > > like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is > > not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) > > Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my > > students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students > > contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, > > so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. > > > > She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a > > newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work > > on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into > > a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was > > reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of > > Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual > > above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had > > constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics > > for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. > > Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. > >> Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions > >> Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to > me > >> that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few > stones to > >> find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A > >> second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source > of > >> so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with > us > >> today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. > >> > >> Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical > >> utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of > >> muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is > to be > >> precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions > steady > >> and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of > >> articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such > >> circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form > but is > >> concerned with their configuration and placement. > >> > >> On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal > distinction > >> between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I > think > >> we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied > phenomena. > >> We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal > >> calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from > without > >> (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow > >> the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that > >> calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal > >> manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Nov 29 07:09:19 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 07:09:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Method as Disposition In-Reply-To: <1417204144690.10781@unm.edu> References: <1417204144690.10781@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, My answer, just sent, also emerged from the refection you posted: "Larry, your contribution points me vaguely to an idea or possibility that perhaps it is the habit of a method which habituates to remove the subject from view. Of course a method can conjure a disposition, too On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Dear Larry, > > Thank you for that wonderful contribution. > > My own disposition toward a method, after reading your post was to reach > to the dictionary, which shows that definitions are not beyond me and my > disposition. Paradoxically, the word I sought was "disposition" and the > hallowed tome said to me: > > 1. the predominant or prevailing tendency of one's spirits; natural mental > and emotional outlook or mood; characteristic attitude: "a girl with a > pleasant disposition." > 2. state of mind regarding something; inclination: "a disposition to > gamble." > 3. physical inclination or tendency: "the disposition of ice to melt when > heated." > 4. arrangement or placing, as of troops or buildings. > 5. final settlement of a matter. > 6. bestowal, as by gift or sale. > 7.power to make decisions about or dispose of a thing; control: "funds at > one's disposition." > > So many definitions which reference a word-meaning! Isn't it the case that > the meaning emerges based upon the event the meaning is required, which > depends upon what is present and what presents itself, but also... who uses > it? > > I also looked to the root: > > 1325-75; Middle English disposicioun (< Anglo-French) < Latin dispositi?n- > (stem of dispositi?), equivalent to disposit (us) (past participle of > disp?nere [to distribute]; dispos- (see [dispose] ) + -itus past participle > suffix) + -i?n- -ion > > And what emerges there are the words [to distribute] and [dispose]. In > order for there to be a disposition, there must be a point of departure in > which to distribute from. Namely a point of origin, which would to me > present as a person, a subject. > > I'd like to offer for what it is worth that discussion from the focal > point of an "I" could be considered "intense" but it also may be that > speaking has its own _habits_ (derived from contexts), in that speaking > from an "I" starts to sound strange and may cause discomfort. Speaking from > a focal point of "I" is a method, just as not speaking from a focal point > of "I" is a method. > > Larry, your contribution points me vaguely to an idea or possibility that > perhaps it is the habit of a method which habituates to remove the subject > from view. Of course a method can conjure a disposition, too, I would > gather, and if that were the case, I think I would want to know how that > method is influencing me as a subject, especially if it is influencing my > freedom as a subject in the world. > > However, putting that aside for the moment, forgetting to take ourselves > into account is a common human phenomenon. It is like searching for my > sunglasses that were always perched upon my head, or that I was wearing > already during my search thinking I had lost them! This phenomenon occurs > for a material reason. In our bodies, all our organs of perception point > outwards. One cannot perceive oneself as an object in the world because one > is the person behind the organ that perceives. It would be like taking a > telescope into the world and looking for myself, when I am standing at the > originating viewpoint of the telescope. I will look and look and only find > that which is anything but myself. At some point I forget that I'm even > there. > > It is quite easy to forget that one is the originating point of inquiry. > Historically and socially, subjectivity is considered ill-mannered because > what may be true for you is not for me. Which means we started to fight > over rightness and this comes to blows, which resulted in monarchies and > oppressions. In response to that uncomfortable emphasis upon subjectivity > was to take a survey and search for a consensus, and this creates an > illusion of objectivity because enough people see the same thing with their > telescopes using the same method. The problem is that in the search for > objectivity we have doubly forgotten ourselves as subjects, so that can't > be right either because objectivity can dislocate us from ourselves. Not > only from our senses but our ethics. Hence The Bomb. Hence Fossil Fuels. > Hence Otherness, Etc. > > Subsequently, a product of this method of [objectivity without a subject] > there is a tendency to become ensnared in a kind of ventriloquism, in which > we must all look from the same vantage point at the same objects in the > same way, which is impossible because each of us has from the beginning a > unique point of view despite shared tendencies with others. Understanding > shared tendencies and view points and objects observed are of certainly of > value, but we cannot forget that understanding variations in tendencies and > viewpoints and objects observed are of value as well. > > My sense that it is the noticing of variations that innovations and > discoveries might take place, and the methods that these derive are an > essential part of our creativity as humans. > > This suggests to me that a method to seek is one that equally considers > subjects with the objects they interact with. We have the subject, the > method or interaction, and the object. These must have equal standing in > understanding what there is to understand. If we eliminate one to focus on > two, or we eliminate two to focus on one, there will be a collapse, like > the three-legged stool. In respect to math, three points define a plane, > which perhaps here is the plane of understanding, and perhaps that plane of > understanding is meaning itself? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 8:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Method as Disposition > > I wonder how central to "reading and writing the world" is the notion of > "disposition". At the risk of falling back into the vortex of intensity or > of becoming too "distanced" in my conversational style, I want to share an > extended reflection by Chris Hacket on a Hediggerian quote. > > First the quote: > > "implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path towards > the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order itself always toward > that which it itself discloses." > > How Chris Hacket expands and explores how he reads and interprets this > Heideggerian quote is fascinating. > > Three things stand out for Chris in this quote: > > 1] Method is a "tendency" - one could even say "disposition", or better a > "habit" and "habituating toward" something > > 2] Method is as a result a "path". A metaphor that "guides" these > reflections. > > 3] Method is "marked" by paradox. Genuine method, though not "equated" > with disclosure of objects is a critical mark of the path to the disclosure > of objects AND at the same time and precisely because the object is present > there, method is most essentially understood to be a tendency, a > disposition, perhaps even a habit - to be "ordered" to that which method > itself discloses, - to disclosure itself. > > In other words - method for Heidegger is that which emerges "out of" an > ordered disposition toward the disclosure of its object. More RADICALLY > [going to its root or its founding], method traces its own emergence in the > "event" of intelligable disclosure: just as intelligibility is, "through > questioning" TIED to the questioning - where we "found" the disclosure of > the presence of method - so also for the "path" of method which is now the > TYING itself. > > The paradox, BOTH "toward" AND "from" [approach to disclosure AND > emergence from disclosure]. Method is only "calculated approach" as it is > simultaneously wholly "incalculable emergence". This conception of the > "nature" of method - as a sort of formal name we give to A MORE FUNDAMENTAL > "disposition" that defines material phenomenology - "indicates" [points > to] that method does not define phenomenology. Material phenomenology, it > seems, is not a method although it surely requires that which method > formally "signifies". > > Thus, for Heidegger at least, the particulars of a method do not make > material phenomenology what it is, in the FIRST place. Rather, the "genuine > question" that arises from experience defines material phenomenology. Here, > method is the thoughtful "approach" [path, tendency. disposition] to > phenomena of "the questioning" - itself. > > In other words the paradox of questioning and answer as a method, a path, > a disposition, and a habit BOTH "calculated" and "incalculable emergence" > > I found Chris Hackett's expansion and elaboration evocative. Others may > read it as constipated word/play. The notion of "disposition" tied to > questions & answers as a method or path. > > Larry > > From wiobyrne@gmail.com Sat Nov 29 08:51:18 2014 From: wiobyrne@gmail.com (Ian O'Byrne) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 16:51:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90743DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074405@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi all, I think I stumbled on what I was looking for. Cultural theory of risk seems to account for most of what I was looking for. What I still have to think through is the individual cognitive and decision making involved in this societal and culture "debate" taking place in this typology . Thanks again. -Ian On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 3:29:10 PM Ian O'Byrne wrote: > Hi Michael, > > Thank you again. > > I think it's intriguing for a couple of reasons. One, I think we're still > in between two models in terms of online identity..and cultural norms, etc. > I think it's too early...but alas this is the current state. Second, I > think that the socially constructed identities of "educators" (in this > discussion) change over time. When I was teaching ten years ago....you hid > your Facebook account or you were fired. Now, it's changed...to some > extent. :) > > I'm intrigued by how individuals construct and modify their digital > identities using multimodal and social content. I'm interested in the > decisions that they make, and for the most part have been able to focus on > what they build, and look and semiotics behind these decisions. Now, we're > starting to have the more savvy users indicate a consideration of what they > want their digital identity to be...and how that relates to what society > thinks. > > Don't get me wrong...this also provides some of our participants with an > opportunity to reject the status quo and create their own identity. This > brings in elements of critical literacy, feminist ideologies, queer > theory,and post-structural perspectives. > > We think it's cool stuff...but just trying to unpack it and see if others > are seeing the same. I'll check out the Second Life pieces, and the > Well...especially Howard and Gilly Salmon's work. > > Thanks again, > -Ian > > On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 3:05:56 PM Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> Ian, >> >> That is really interesting stuff. The applications are extraordinarily >> different, but there is some really interesting stuff on identity and the >> creation of avatars (mostly in Second Life I think). Maybe take a look at >> Gilly Salmon's stuff. Also if you have a chance take a look at the history >> of the Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link' - The WELL - communities (Howard >> Rheingold and others) where this whole idea of negotiating online identity >> and offline identity is really fascinating. >> >> I think we are still waiting for a history of online identity as >> dangerous - attempts to define the Internet as a dangerous place. >> >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:52 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: risk awareness and aversion in online spaces >> >> Hi Michael, >> >> Thanks for reaching out. Specifically, we had teachers creating and >> sharing >> content on Twitter. There tends to be this concern, or awareness with the >> teachers that the content that they are sharing is impacting their digital >> identity...and also their identity. Our hypothesis is that the more savvy >> users are considering this socially constructed identity of an "educator" >> and that impacts the content they share online...and how much they share. >> >> We had participants indicate that the content and identity they portrayed >> online was either just like their offline identity (or the complete >> opposite) as they considered what society wanted educators to be online. >> Some accepted this and cleaned up what they shared...others were aware the >> potential risk involved...but wanted to be "themselves" and just posted it >> anyway. >> >> It's an intriguing mix of identity, identity construction, cultural >> theory, >> hegemony, and the risk piece we're trying to unpack. >> >> Thanks again, >> -Ian >> >> On Fri Nov 28 2014 at 2:44:02 PM Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >> > Hi Ian, >> > >> > This is a little general. What type of risk awareness and/or aversion. >> > Is it a general sense of Internet anxiety - there has been some >> research on >> > this? Or is it an aversion to specific activities on the Internet. For >> > instance some of the research we have been doing suggests that >> individuals >> > (in this case college students) have different levels of aversion >> between >> > simply communicating on the Internet, worries about whether they will be >> > overwhelmed with data, or whether they actually put themselves out on >> the >> > Internet in terms of actually generating new information, or even >> > responding to the posts of others. Our findings suggest much greater >> > confidence (actually self-efficacy) in communication and being able to >> > handle a lot of information, less in actually posting. >> > >> > Or is it a fear on teachers' part that students will know more about >> using >> > the Internet than they do and fear using it and giving up their place as >> > experts in the educational process. There is some (not much) research >> on >> > this - and it might be partially urban legend. >> > >> > Anyway, just interested if you are finding something more specific. >> > >> > Michael >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> > on behalf of Ian O'Byrne [wiobyrne@gmail.com] >> > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:11 PM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Cc: juliebwise@comcast.net >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] risk awareness and aversion in online spaces >> > >> > Dear colleagues, >> > >> > In our research we're seeing signs of this form of risk awareness and/or >> > aversion as it relates to digital identity construction and sharing in >> > online spaces. Specifically, participants are making decisions about >> what & >> > how to share content in online spaces while considering what others will >> > think about their digital identity as an educator. >> > >> > I'm wondering if anyone else is seeing this in their work...and what >> > citations or literature do you reference. We're having trouble nailing >> down >> > a specific field or construct. >> > >> > Thanks in advance, >> > -Ian >> > >> > >> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: cultural theory and risk.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1648776 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141129/f0fe5a25/attachment-0001.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Nov 29 11:37:34 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 12:37:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past Message-ID: Folks, Mike asked me to forward this link to the list: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography This is the link to the wiki-history of LCHC, the forerunner of the XMCA discourse community. Mike has proposed (see forwarded message below) that we all familiarize ourselves with this history (particularly those that are new to XMCA). To that end, I thought I'd pose a couple questions: What do you find interesting/surprising about the history of LCHC? What current threads (!) are being pulled through to the present day XMCA conversations? Here and elsewhere? How might we make sense of this history? I'm not sure if this is what Mike is pointing to, but it seems that there are some substantial discontinuities between the XMCA conversations of the past few years and what LCHC has been doing throughout most of its history. This isn't to say that is a bad thing, simply to point it out and to ask: why the differences? Finally, you'll notice that the chapters are chronological leading up to the last chapter titled The Future. That one remains unwritten but will soon be history. -greg ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: mike cole Date: Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:48 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Carol Et al It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what it means to have participants with such varied histories with the discourse community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries that I know of can be found at LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that go back to roughly 1983. Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions to the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to bear fruit that can nourish a productive future. All sorts of alternatives are possible. One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role of culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous real experts over decades. The record is there, open to all. Check it out. Then we can assess the future. Good luck to us all Mike From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Nov 29 13:58:04 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 06:58:04 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <1417239585878.37588@unm.edu> Message-ID: Yes, Annalisa's right. Artists are groundhogs, that is, harbingers of the spring thaw, and her example of "The Yellow Wall Paper" prefiguring the idea of repression as a source of mental illness is particularly apposite (Freud's very blokish transformation of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's theme of professional frustration into sexual frustration had more bad art in it than bad science, but Leontiev's idea that the child plays only because we frustrate his desire to work is very similar). Even more often, though, artists are dragonflies; early indicators of the brief Russian autumn that usher in the long winter months. So for example I think that cubism really has little to do with Heisenberg and uncertainty, but it does have a lot to do with the the long and intellectually sterile domination of abstract objectivism (formalism, structuralism) in linguistics. Why should that be? Compare THIS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Braque#mediaviewer/File:Violin_and_Candlestick.jpg And THIS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nude_Descending_a_Staircase,_No._2#mediaviewer/File:Duchamp_-_Nude_Descending_a_Staircase.jpg You can see that both have the cubist idea (not the inability to fix both position and speed simultaneously, but the attempt to super-impose many different points of view on top of each other, like a kind of Galton photograph. Braque, however, applies the cubist idea to space, while Duchamp has the brilliant idea of applying it to time, and produces for us something very much like one of Muybridge's movies. In fact, almost identical! http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Female_nude_motion_study_by_Eadweard_Muybridge_(2).jpg Muybridge was exactly the kind of artist that Annalisa is talking about: a little bit of a scientist, or rather a technician. And it was actually Muybridge who demonstrated that for centuries artists hadn't seen what they were looking at but instead found what they were looking for. Today, with the first really good transcriptions and spectrographs of human voices talking, we can show that for centuries linguists haven't really heard what they were trying to listen to but instead found what they were listening for. Like most people on this list, I cannot match Larry's stunning erudition; I know Hackett only through Larry, and the height of the stack of books on my night-table which demand to be read when I have cleared away the reading I must do for my daily lectures forbids me any closer approach. I have, however, read a lot in the lchc archives, and I think that, rich as they are, there are themes left almost wholly unexplored, and this is one of them. Trotsky remarks in "Literature and Revolution" (a book that we now know had a big influence on Vygotsky) that art is man's expression of longing for all the things of which class society deprives us: a sense of harmony, a pride in creativity, a sensitivity to nuance, a feeling of empathy, and above all a sound foundation for hope in an apparently hopeless historical situation. The problem is that in this apparently hopeless historical situation when we express these things, their expression becomes a substitute for them, a purely abstract realization of them confined to precisely those of us who need them least, namely artists and scientists. Vygotsky's psychological theory, at least as I understand it, depends crucially on understanding the inadequacy of both heredity and the environment in solving the tasks of social development. Most of the twentieth century was wasted on the intuitively appealing but terribly wrong idea that since heredity is necessary but not sufficient to explain development and the environment is necessary but not sufficient to explain development if we somehow put them together we will get something that is both necessary and sufficient. That's exactly the kind of hope that is hard to resist, but retrospectively a complete non sequitur. Of course, as the material in the lchc archives (I am thinking of the wonderful work by people like Saxe and Hutchins) attests, culture gives the child legions of allies and a rich patrimony to solve the otherwise insuperable problem left by his biological and environmental endowment. But they also bring a whole new set of social and cultural conflicts, not all of which art has the power to resolve. For art to be more than a lightening rod, or a quack love elixir, for art to be able to do more than a poor (or rather a rich) substitute for the good life, artists will have to understand the inadequacy of art and even the inadequacy of individual emotion generally in the face of these new problems, these problems that inhere in the nature of society and culture itself. As Vygotsky says, art has to see itself as the socially derived technique of emotion rather than as a kind of individually derived social contagion. That's why, although I very much enjoyed hearing from Annalisa about her old professor and his lectures on models and modernisms (and I could add a few examples to his list), I think Annalisa's truest word of all is when she says that the best artist has to have a bit of a scientist in her, just as the best scientist has to be a bit of an artist. As Annalisa says, it's not so much a matter of being able to break down walls and build bridges between domains of knowledge, although replacing disciplinary walls with bridges is crucially important. It's a matter of being able to see and realize the very general in the individual (rather than vice-versa, which is the scientists' job). As Virginia Woolf said in her first movie reviews, if you want to see how little the eye can do without the brain (and how little the image accomplishes without the word), just go see the movie adaptation of your favorite novel, David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: I think Andy has been pretty roundly misunderstood--we should all remember the great patience with which he waded through that awful article by Leontiev-- but perhaps sometimes Andy does underestimates the difference between an inter-disciplinary and a trans-disciplinary approach. When Andy calls activity theory an inter-disciplinary approach, he is pointing quite precisely to its greatest weakness: compare the way in which Vygotsky began to construct a transdisciplinary, THEMATIC approach to development by first EVISCERATING the word "pedology" of its content, the study of the eternal child. I think that an interdisciplinary approach is largely a call for more bridges, and the very bridges it constructs sometimes turn into walls. dk On 29 November 2014 at 23:58, Larry Purss wrote: > Annalisa, > I want to follow your thread and link it to my reflection on method and > disposition and also "modes": > > My reading that is exploring the notion of *seeing as* as a path/disposition > You wrote: > > "He showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were > precursors to the work of scientific discovery." > > In other words the aesthetic "mode" is "prior" to the scientific "mode". > Another perspective is they share the same images one not prior to the > other. > > I want to return to Chris Hackett who is exploring the theme of methods and > modes. > > He gives a description of the "transcendental mode" as method: > "The priority of possibility 'higher than actuality', defines the > 'metaphysics' of transcendental modes of thought where possibility and > rationality are identified; here, in the domain of metaphysics, abstracted > from existence, and seeking to 'replace' the ever-greater EXCESS of > existence with its own manageable, pre-conceived intelligibility [according > to science as 'tekne'], reason institutes itself as FIRST foundation; > nothing can APPEAR but what reason defines as POSSIBLE." [Hackett, page 65 > in Method, Metaphysics, Metaphor] > > Annalisa, this quote is Hackett's attempt to situate a particular mode of > reasoning as transcendental and if following this path a transcendental > disposition. > > Now I want to bring in a central concept - "image" or appearance that > circulates within this mode of reason. It is Schelling who is exploring the > relation of possibility and actuality. > > Here is quote from Chris Hackett developing Hackett's interpretation > of Schelling's reasoning on reason: > > "Yet, 'reason' as Schelling pleaded, is not possible as totally > 'indifferent' to existence, which is sovereignly free from all subjective > CONSTITUTION, and which already founds the world. Reason requires existence > ... for it is only AS AN IMAGE, imbued with the life of existence, bearing > that existence as its primal expression, manifesting the ACT of existence > that things are, that reason WORKS. To the degree that existence EXCEEDS > reason, and therefore, to the degree that reason NEEDS AN IMAGE as *pre* > and *post*-rationally DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility, to that degree > reason is rational" > > Annalisa, Chris Hackett is situating both the aesthetic and the scientific > in modes and methods which centrally need IMAGES. [appearances]. These > modes and relations are indicating dispositions towards possibility and > actuality. A particular mode follows the path of the transcendental and > values *possibility* as a metaphysical path. > Another approach [path] values existence as EXCESS. What is *excess* > exists within acts of existence, as relational acts. > To the degree that existence EXCEEDS reason, is the degree that reason > NEEDS AN IMAGE [an appearance] as DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility. > > The path Chris Hackett is walking is leading to the centrality of tying > meta-phor & meta-physics & meta-hodos [meta-knowledge] into an interpretive > mode situated within questions. > > [I was wondering if I should have started a new thread? to post this answer > to Annalisa. It is touching and overlapping previous turns in the > conversation.] > > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> >> If I may, to all and sundry, >> >> I recall in a course called Methodologies of Modernism, as an art student, >> there was one fantastic lecture by my humanities professor Ray Mondini. He >> showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were precursors to >> the work of scientific discovery. There were about eight different examples >> he gave. Unfortunately I do not remember them all. I recall The Yellow >> Wallpaper came just before Freud's solidifying work on repression and the >> unconscious. Cubism came just before Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. >> The others I don't remember. It made me see that artists are very capable >> of either catching the zietgeist of thought and reifying it in their art, >> which might then direct the attention of scientists, or perhaps something >> more ethereal is going on, not spiritual, but something more subtle on the >> social plane of historical existence. A similar phenomenon in kind when >> Darwin and Wallace came up with their versions of the theory of evolution, >> but in that case it seems it is because they'd both read a book by Malthus >> on populations, so they shared similar inspiration from the same source. >> >> So I'm inclined to stand by David on this trans-disciplinary position. >> However I don't think it's about weak versus strong frames. I see it >> differently. For artists, they see the world from the general to the >> specific. For scientists, they see the world from the specific to the >> general. Of course these "laws" I have observed in thinking patterns vis a >> vis scientists and artists are not hard and fast, but that is my lived >> experience. >> >> To be an artist is to be a scientist in terms of form and color, tone and >> texture. But artists are not attempting to discover new worlds of material, >> they are searching for new worlds of meaning through testing the material. >> I haven't worked closely with scientists, however we know from Einstein his >> position on visualization and imagination. This presents me with a personal >> hypothesis, if I'm allowed to engender a personal one, that the best >> artists are ones with a bit of the scientist in them, and the best >> scientists are ones with a bit of the artist in them. Not sure how to >> quantify that exactly, except perhaps through play. >> >> If anyone wants to know what lays ahead in scientific discovery, one thing >> to do is bone up on what the art scene is, because they are experimenting >> on the same thoughts as scientists, just from the top-down. A starting >> point is by perusing magazines like Art Forum, ARTnews, Art in America, Art >> Review, and others. I'm sure you can find themes that resonate and run >> parallel. >> >> Just follow your nose. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 5:04 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] >> >> Hi David, >> Sorry I?m way behind. Respectfully: >> Would it be fair to say that science needs art if both are to be creative? >> And that time and space are prototypical themes in both art and science? >> So, a 2-by-2 matrix with prototypical examples of the mash up in each >> quadrant. Just a thought. >> Henry >> >> > On Nov 27, 2014, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > >> > I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his >> > compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, >> > strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way >> > that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining >> > his argument. >> > >> > On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't >> > think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the >> > whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. >> > "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate >> > (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views >> > to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real >> > utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary >> > that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in >> > addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an >> > intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put >> > it more charitably. >> > >> > But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the >> > aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly >> > framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of >> > knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a >> > perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than >> > "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike >> > can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather >> > than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, >> > living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if >> > strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must >> > predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the >> > hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts >> > can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of >> > knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in >> > ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). >> > >> > We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion >> > education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol >> > Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes >> > like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is >> > not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) >> > Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my >> > students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students >> > contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, >> > so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. >> > >> > She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a >> > newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work >> > on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into >> > a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was >> > reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of >> > Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual >> > above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had >> > constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics >> > for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. >> > Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > >> > On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >> I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >> >> Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >> >> Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to >> me >> >> that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few >> stones to >> >> find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >> >> second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source >> of >> >> so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with >> us >> >> today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >> >> >> >> Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >> >> utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >> >> muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is >> to be >> >> precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions >> steady >> >> and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >> >> articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >> >> circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form >> but is >> >> concerned with their configuration and placement. >> >> >> >> On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal >> distinction >> >> between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I >> think >> >> we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied >> phenomena. >> >> We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >> >> calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from >> without >> >> (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >> >> the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >> >> calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >> >> manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Nov 29 17:35:52 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 17:35:52 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi folks Actually I asked Greg to send the irk for the two documents about the history of xmca. It can be found at lchc.ucsd.edu but I hace only iPhone access and could not cut and paste the url. The two docs are on the history page under archives. People are considering how the discussion might improve and I figured it might be useful to see some prior attempts at improvement dating bac to the early days of the Internet, The wiki is a separate topic and Greg's questions are entirely the product of his pedagogical imagination. Next week when I get back to San Diego I look forward to starting an upgrade of xmca, a discussion list connected to Mind Culture and Activity. Some interesting suggestions have been made that richly deserve attention. Thanks to Greg for his good intentions, but I would appreciate some help with figuring out xmca. Now I am going to escape from this bloody device and hit send. Another long drive tomorrow. Mike On Saturday, November 29, 2014, Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > Mike asked me to forward this link to the list: > > > http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography > > This is the link to the wiki-history of LCHC, the forerunner of the XMCA > discourse community. > > Mike has proposed (see forwarded message below) that we all familiarize > ourselves with this history (particularly those that are new to XMCA). > > To that end, I thought I'd pose a couple questions: > What do you find interesting/surprising about the history of LCHC? > What current threads (!) are being pulled through to the present day XMCA > conversations? Here and elsewhere? > How might we make sense of this history? > > I'm not sure if this is what Mike is pointing to, but it seems that there > are some substantial discontinuities between the XMCA conversations of the > past few years and what LCHC has been doing throughout most of its history. > This isn't to say that is a bad thing, simply to point it out and to ask: > why the differences? > > Finally, you'll notice that the chapters are chronological leading up to > the last chapter titled The Future. > That one remains unwritten but will soon be history. > > -greg > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: mike cole > > Date: Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:48 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > Carol Et al > > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the discourse > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. > > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries that > I know of can be found at > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that > go > back to roughly 1983. > > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions to > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to bear > fruit that can nourish a productive future. > > All sorts of alternatives are possible. > > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role of > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous real > experts over decades. > > The record is there, open to all. > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. > > Good luck to us all > > Mike > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Nov 29 17:42:00 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 17:42:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Oops. url not irk, although iPhone techno local help can certainly be irksome! ? Mike On Saturday, November 29, 2014, mike cole wrote: > Hi folks > Actually I asked Greg to send the irk for the two documents about the > history of xmca. > > It can be found at lchc.ucsd.edu but I hace only iPhone access and could > not cut and paste the url. The two docs are on the history page under > archives. > > People are considering how the discussion might improve and I figured it > might be useful to see some prior attempts at improvement dating bac to the > early days of the Internet, > > The wiki is a separate topic and Greg's questions are entirely the product > of his pedagogical imagination. > > Next week when I get back to San Diego I look forward to starting an > upgrade of xmca, a discussion list connected to Mind Culture and Activity. > Some interesting suggestions have been made that richly deserve attention. > > Thanks to Greg for his good intentions, but I would appreciate some help > with figuring out xmca. > > Now I am going to escape from this bloody device and hit send. Another > long drive tomorrow. > > Mike > > On Saturday, November 29, 2014, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Folks, >> Mike asked me to forward this link to the list: >> >> >> http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography >> >> This is the link to the wiki-history of LCHC, the forerunner of the XMCA >> discourse community. >> >> Mike has proposed (see forwarded message below) that we all familiarize >> ourselves with this history (particularly those that are new to XMCA). >> >> To that end, I thought I'd pose a couple questions: >> What do you find interesting/surprising about the history of LCHC? >> What current threads (!) are being pulled through to the present day XMCA >> conversations? Here and elsewhere? >> How might we make sense of this history? >> >> I'm not sure if this is what Mike is pointing to, but it seems that there >> are some substantial discontinuities between the XMCA conversations of the >> past few years and what LCHC has been doing throughout most of its >> history. >> This isn't to say that is a bad thing, simply to point it out and to ask: >> why the differences? >> >> Finally, you'll notice that the chapters are chronological leading up to >> the last chapter titled The Future. >> That one remains unwritten but will soon be history. >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: mike cole >> Date: Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:48 PM >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> >> Carol Et al >> >> It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family >> and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what >> it means to have participants with such varied histories with the >> discourse >> community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. >> >> For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and >> reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries that >> I know of can be found at >> LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that >> go >> back to roughly 1983. >> >> Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with >> prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions >> to >> the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in >> collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to >> bear >> fruit that can nourish a productive future. >> >> All sorts of alternatives are possible. >> >> One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal >> responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired >> professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role >> of >> culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous >> real >> experts over decades. >> >> The record is there, open to all. >> Check it out. Then we can assess the future. >> >> Good luck to us all >> >> Mike >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Nov 29 20:17:32 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2014 21:17:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ?Okay folks, looks like I royally screwed up that last email. I entirely misunderstood Mike's email request to me and I hope you'll let me clarify. Mike was unable to forward the link from his iPad and so he asked me to forward the link along. But the only link I could find to a "history" under the History tab was the history of LCHC. I did my best to make connections, but of course this wasn't what Mike was talking about at all! Turns out that there are another set of papers that were hiding under the archives sub-menu of the History tab that are in fact much more germane to the recent XMCA conversation. Both of these papers directly engage with questions that pertain to what we now call the "listserve" medium of communication. Both very explicitly address many of the issues that have been raised in the past few weeks with regard to this very listserve right here. Below are the proper links to these papers with a brief description of each and of their relevance. The first piece is a 1992 essay titled "The Seeds of XLCHC" and was written by by Vanessa Gack and Noah Finkelstein (XLCHC was the forerunner of XMCA). This piece can be found here: http://tclearninglounge.org:8888/xlchc%20website/Gack%20and%20Finkelsteinseeds_of_xlchc.pdf This piece traces the early years of XLCHC as it was the first LCHC/CHAT related electronically mediated form of communication. This paper starts in the mid- 80's (tracing roots prior to that) and traces through the beginning of the 90's. There is even an interesting discussion about subject lines as well as the role of the identities of participants. The second piece is from a 1998 ISCAR talk by Eva Ekeblad titled "Contact, Community and Multilogue: Electronic Communication in the Practice of Scholarship.". It can be found here: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ekeblad/cocomu.html Here is one paragraph from the abstract: "It is suggested here that a nested model of three interrelated activity systems constitutes a productive tool for research into computer mediated scholarly communication. Due to the character of the e-mail medium the archived text is a patchwork or web produced through the activity of all the nested systems. The model of three nested activity systems serves as a powerful aid for discerning salient units of analysis, for describing the development of prevalent practices within the community, and for locating important contradictions. This piece also has an interesting consideration of the problem of "cumulativity" - which seems to me to be something that has recently been popping up (and an issue that I struggle with often - how to know all that has come before on the list?"). Anyway, please accept my apologies for my faux-pas here. I missed the Archives submenu on the lchc page and read entirely the wrong history (important to get one's history right!). I'm hopeful that my blunder won't kill this very important conversation. I think you'll find these papers quite a bit more to the point. Very best, greg ? On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 12:37 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Folks, > Mike asked me to forward this link to the list: > > > http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography > > This is the link to the wiki-history of LCHC, the forerunner of the XMCA > discourse community. > > Mike has proposed (see forwarded message below) that we all familiarize > ourselves with this history (particularly those that are new to XMCA). > > To that end, I thought I'd pose a couple questions: > What do you find interesting/surprising about the history of LCHC? > What current threads (!) are being pulled through to the present day XMCA > conversations? Here and elsewhere? > How might we make sense of this history? > > I'm not sure if this is what Mike is pointing to, but it seems that there > are some substantial discontinuities between the XMCA conversations of the > past few years and what LCHC has been doing throughout most of its history. > This isn't to say that is a bad thing, simply to point it out and to ask: > why the differences? > > Finally, you'll notice that the chapters are chronological leading up to > the last chapter titled The Future. > That one remains unwritten but will soon be history. > > -greg > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: mike cole > Date: Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:48 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Carol Et al > > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the discourse > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. > > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries that > I know of can be found at > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that > go > back to roughly 1983. > > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions to > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to bear > fruit that can nourish a productive future. > > All sorts of alternatives are possible. > > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role of > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous real > experts over decades. > > The record is there, open to all. > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. > > Good luck to us all > > Mike > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Nov 29 22:12:28 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 06:12:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> Dear Ulvi, Thank you for your post, which for me is like a single bird singing on a branch of its own (on this list). I do not know about Zoya, but I am curious to learn more. I fear that there has been silence to your post because it is a holiday weekend here in the US and most are with their families eating and eating and eating. Did I mention they are eating? So I am crafting a quick reply so you know at least your post was noticed! I believe myself that there _is_ one big happiness for all, so this resonated for me very, very much. What are your pressing questions in this regard? That is: in regard of Zoya's life? in regard to analysis of child development? Would you describe for me more fully the scope of your interest and inquiry? Kindest regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya Just a curiosity for the contuinity of past and present across generations: Anyone who heard about Zoya, died on 29th November 1942, against Nazis. For me , she is rather, in the context of this xmca group, an issue on the human development of a Soviet child and young for highest ideals. For instance, as a child, she asks to a writer: "Is there not a big, one common happiness for all?" I think this is a great question across all ages of humanity eternally. She decides that this common happiness is the land of Soviets. I am interested on the life, rather than death of her, as an analysis of a child and youth development issue. Best, Ulvi From bella.kotik@gmail.com Sun Nov 30 03:12:05 2014 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 13:12:05 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> Message-ID: Russian Wikipedia has a lot of information about Zoya and her family. It is too long to start translation. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:12 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Dear Ulvi, > > Thank you for your post, which for me is like a single bird singing on a > branch of its own (on this list). I do not know about Zoya, but I am > curious to learn more. > > I fear that there has been silence to your post because it is a holiday > weekend here in the US and most are with their families eating and eating > and eating. Did I mention they are eating? > > So I am crafting a quick reply so you know at least your post was noticed! > > I believe myself that there _is_ one big happiness for all, so this > resonated for me very, very much. > > What are your pressing questions in this regard? That is: in regard of > Zoya's life? in regard to analysis of child development? > > Would you describe for me more fully the scope of your interest and > inquiry? > > Kindest regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya > > Just a curiosity for the contuinity of past and present across generations: > > Anyone who heard about Zoya, died on 29th November 1942, against Nazis. > > For me , she is rather, in the context of this xmca group, an issue on the > human development of a Soviet child and young for highest ideals. > > For instance, as a child, she asks to a writer: > "Is there not a big, one common happiness for all?" > > I think this is a great question across all ages of humanity eternally. > > She decides that this common happiness is the land of Soviets. > > I am interested on the life, rather than death of her, as an analysis of a > child and youth development issue. > > Best, > Ulvi > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 30 09:40:02 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 17:40:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> Hello, I did read a little about Zoya. I am still curious what the actual questions are. Happiness is a universal pursuit of all humans. The complexity arrives in the ways in which each person, each social group, each culture, even each language, defines that happiness. For Zoya that happiness appears partially to be patriotism at a time when patriots were necessary. I know that is not her only identity, and Ulvi does say she is more interested in Zoya's life than her demise. It seems the wiki page's focus upon her is as a subject of controversy, and so, obviously, I would like to sidestep that. Besides, I don't think that is what Ulvi is considering here anyway, but something else. This makes me consider Vygotsky's discussion of "final form" in his "Problem of the Environment" lecture. Such is my addition to this conversation! :) Sincerely, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Bella Kotik-Friedgut Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 4:12 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya Russian Wikipedia has a lot of information about Zoya and her family. It is too long to start translation. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:12 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Dear Ulvi, > > Thank you for your post, which for me is like a single bird singing on a > branch of its own (on this list). I do not know about Zoya, but I am > curious to learn more. > > I fear that there has been silence to your post because it is a holiday > weekend here in the US and most are with their families eating and eating > and eating. Did I mention they are eating? > > So I am crafting a quick reply so you know at least your post was noticed! > > I believe myself that there _is_ one big happiness for all, so this > resonated for me very, very much. > > What are your pressing questions in this regard? That is: in regard of > Zoya's life? in regard to analysis of child development? > > Would you describe for me more fully the scope of your interest and > inquiry? > > Kindest regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya > > Just a curiosity for the contuinity of past and present across generations: > > Anyone who heard about Zoya, died on 29th November 1942, against Nazis. > > For me , she is rather, in the context of this xmca group, an issue on the > human development of a Soviet child and young for highest ideals. > > For instance, as a child, she asks to a writer: > "Is there not a big, one common happiness for all?" > > I think this is a great question across all ages of humanity eternally. > > She decides that this common happiness is the land of Soviets. > > I am interested on the life, rather than death of her, as an analysis of a > child and youth development issue. > > Best, > Ulvi > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Nov 30 11:10:41 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 11:10:41 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mea culpa if the design of the history page was misleading. Thanks to Greg for taking the extra time to track down right links and pointing out the ambiguities of the webpage. Seems like it's approprite to wait a couple of days to allow those interested in the topic of the infrastructure for supporting useful Discussion on XMCA to check it out. More to come. 1000+ miles of driving in a few days time does nothing increase clarity of finger tapping never mind productive ideas about organizing discussion more effectively. Mike On Saturday, November 29, 2014, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Okay folks, looks like I royally screwed up that last email. I entirely > misunderstood Mike's email request to me and I hope you'll let me clarify. > > Mike was unable to forward the link from his iPad and so he asked me to > forward the link along. But the only link I could find to a "history" under > the History tab was the history of LCHC. I did my best to make connections, > but of course this wasn't what Mike was talking about at all! > > Turns out that there are another set of papers that were hiding under the > archives sub-menu of the History tab that are in fact much more germane to > the recent XMCA conversation. Both of these papers directly engage with > questions that pertain to what we now call the "listserve" medium of > communication. Both very explicitly address many of the issues that have > been raised in the past few weeks with regard to this very listserve right > here. Below are the proper links to these papers with a brief description > of each and of their relevance. > > The first piece is a 1992 essay titled "The Seeds of XLCHC" and was written > by by Vanessa Gack and Noah Finkelstein (XLCHC was the forerunner of XMCA). > This piece can be found here: > > > http://tclearninglounge.org:8888/xlchc%20website/Gack%20and%20Finkelsteinseeds_of_xlchc.pdf > > This piece traces the early years of XLCHC as it was the first LCHC/CHAT > related electronically mediated form of communication. This paper starts in > the mid- 80's (tracing roots prior to that) and traces through the > beginning of the 90's. There is even an interesting discussion about > subject lines as well as the role of the identities of participants. > > The second piece is from a 1998 ISCAR talk by Eva Ekeblad titled "Contact, > Community and Multilogue: Electronic Communication in the Practice of > Scholarship.". It can be found here: > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ekeblad/cocomu.html > > Here is one paragraph from the abstract: > "It is suggested here that a nested model of three interrelated activity > systems constitutes a productive tool for research into computer mediated > scholarly communication. Due to the character of the e-mail medium the > archived text is a patchwork or web produced through the activity of all > the nested systems. The model of three nested activity systems serves as a > powerful aid for discerning salient units of analysis, for describing the > development of prevalent practices within the community, and for locating > important contradictions. > This piece also has an interesting consideration of the problem of > "cumulativity" - which seems to me to be something that has recently been > popping up (and an issue that I struggle with often - how to know all that > has come before on the list?"). > > Anyway, please accept my apologies for my faux-pas here. I missed the > Archives submenu on the lchc page and read entirely the wrong history > (important to get one's history right!). I'm hopeful that my blunder won't > kill this very important conversation. > > I think you'll find these papers quite a bit more to the point. > > Very best, > greg > > ? > > On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 12:37 PM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > Folks, > > Mike asked me to forward this link to the list: > > > > > > > http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/The+Story+of+LCHC+-+An+Unfinished+Polyphonic+Autobiography > > > > This is the link to the wiki-history of LCHC, the forerunner of the XMCA > > discourse community. > > > > Mike has proposed (see forwarded message below) that we all familiarize > > ourselves with this history (particularly those that are new to XMCA). > > > > To that end, I thought I'd pose a couple questions: > > What do you find interesting/surprising about the history of LCHC? > > What current threads (!) are being pulled through to the present day XMCA > > conversations? Here and elsewhere? > > How might we make sense of this history? > > > > I'm not sure if this is what Mike is pointing to, but it seems that there > > are some substantial discontinuities between the XMCA conversations of > the > > past few years and what LCHC has been doing throughout most of its > history. > > This isn't to say that is a bad thing, simply to point it out and to ask: > > why the differences? > > > > Finally, you'll notice that the chapters are chronological leading up to > > the last chapter titled The Future. > > That one remains unwritten but will soon be history. > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > From: mike cole > > > Date: Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 11:48 PM > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > > > > Carol Et al > > > > It is a short holiday week in the US and I am on the road visiting family > > and friends. I have only limited access and am trying to think about what > > it means to have participants with such varied histories with the > discourse > > community and its topic and such varied backgrounds. Uncharted territory. > > > > For those who care to see XMCA continue, I suggest that you read and > > reflect on the 30+ history of this discourse community. The summaries > that > > I know of can be found at > > LCHC.ucsd.edu under history archives. There are two summaries there that > > go > > back to roughly 1983. > > > > Further comment without people stopping to familiarize themselves with > > prior history and without having participants ceasing to seek solutions > to > > the current confusions in the iniatives taken by others rather than in > > collective action in which they share responsibility seems unlikely to > bear > > fruit that can nourish a productive future. > > > > All sorts of alternatives are possible. > > > > One alternative is not possible, and that is to eschew personal > > responsibility and lay it on the shoulders of a 76 year old "retired > > professor" whose inadequate understanding of the core issues of the role > of > > culture in the development have been thoroughly documented by numerous > real > > experts over decades. > > > > The record is there, open to all. > > Check it out. Then we can assess the future. > > > > Good luck to us all > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Nov 30 10:33:38 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 10:33:38 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? Message-ID: David K I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic question. Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images upon which thinking rests" The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and illusions was also exploring this theme. Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process *metaphoricity*. Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the *spontaneous event* of meaning. He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - finds itself implicated in this guiding image. AND it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the meaning of its very self. Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in *objectivity* This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the mode [path] of the concept occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been established. In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the image-character of the guiding image. I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may become [again] However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I personally am following this path for now. Larry From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Nov 30 11:50:24 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 21:50:24 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Annalisa, and Bella, and dear all, Thank you very much for your responses and sorry for being late for a response. Here is a very valuable site established by Mike, a friend of Andy, I had the great pleasure of being acquainted with Mike thanks to Andy. I think Mike's effort is a very valuable one as regards making known Zoya's life more. http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/ I really firmly believe that, questions as well as answers are really very simple and modest. And I emphasize that I am not after any political, militant verification or justification of Zoya, but rather of the analysis of her 's objective life development because, I observe that she is not a selfish girl, that when her father is fatally ill, she goes to a doctor upon a total lack of any adult to do so etc, so she is, as a sensible child as his father says. I compare her with children of our age who are reluctant to take one piece of thing from here to there as a selfish child of current generation. Beyond any political dimension, it seems to me that Zoya has a high sense of responsibility, she prepares the meal for herself and for her brother because her mum and papa are coming late to home from wor.k Further, she loses her father at age of 10 upon a sudden illness. A difficult life indeed when compared today's middle classes children, most of which do not sense such a responsibility. At this point, I prefer rather to put the following simple question and I look for it as Zoya does: If we are after one big, common happiness for a whole humanity; and if this humanity is divided into social classes; and if these social classes are antagonistic classes; THEN Happiness should be a state of humanity in which dividedness into antagonistic social classes must have been ceased, abolished, or at least abolition of social classes must bue CATEGORICALLY a precondition for a happiness for humanity. So, we come to ONE BIG, COMMON HAPPINESS FOR HUMANITY which is not divided into social classes. Which brings us to communism. Isn't it? I think it does absolutely. Best, Ulvi 2014-11-30 19:40 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > Hello, > > I did read a little about Zoya. I am still curious what the actual > questions are. > > Happiness is a universal pursuit of all humans. The complexity arrives in > the ways in which each person, each social group, each culture, even each > language, defines that happiness. > > For Zoya that happiness appears partially to be patriotism at a time when > patriots were necessary. I know that is not her only identity, and Ulvi > does say she is more interested in Zoya's life than her demise. > > It seems the wiki page's focus upon her is as a subject of controversy, > and so, obviously, I would like to sidestep that. Besides, I don't think > that is what Ulvi is considering here anyway, but something else. > > This makes me consider Vygotsky's discussion of "final form" in his > "Problem of the Environment" lecture. > > Such is my addition to this conversation! :) > > Sincerely, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Bella > Kotik-Friedgut > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 4:12 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya > > Russian Wikipedia has a lot of information about Zoya and her family. It is > too long to start translation. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:12 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Dear Ulvi, > > > > Thank you for your post, which for me is like a single bird singing on a > > branch of its own (on this list). I do not know about Zoya, but I am > > curious to learn more. > > > > I fear that there has been silence to your post because it is a holiday > > weekend here in the US and most are with their families eating and eating > > and eating. Did I mention they are eating? > > > > So I am crafting a quick reply so you know at least your post was > noticed! > > > > I believe myself that there _is_ one big happiness for all, so this > > resonated for me very, very much. > > > > What are your pressing questions in this regard? That is: in regard of > > Zoya's life? in regard to analysis of child development? > > > > Would you describe for me more fully the scope of your interest and > > inquiry? > > > > Kindest regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > > Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 3:30 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya > > > > Just a curiosity for the contuinity of past and present across > generations: > > > > Anyone who heard about Zoya, died on 29th November 1942, against Nazis. > > > > For me , she is rather, in the context of this xmca group, an issue on > the > > human development of a Soviet child and young for highest ideals. > > > > For instance, as a child, she asks to a writer: > > "Is there not a big, one common happiness for all?" > > > > I think this is a great question across all ages of humanity eternally. > > > > She decides that this common happiness is the land of Soviets. > > > > I am interested on the life, rather than death of her, as an analysis of > a > > child and youth development issue. > > > > Best, > > Ulvi > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 30 13:29:49 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 21:29:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <1417239585878.37588@unm.edu> , Message-ID: <1417382988794.66302@unm.edu> Hi David! Thank your for that, or those! :) Why on earth are artists groundhogs? Why are they not eagles? I see them as eagles perched on mountain sides surveying the terrain from far away, identifying movement in many nooks and crannies below. Then they soar about when they are hungry, perhaps snatching an occasional groundhog for lunch. See, I would say scientists are groundhogs, um, ok not groundhogs. How about... little dwarves, mining the earth for gold and sundry metals, one scoop at a time? But this is no invitation for a "war on metaphor" (Try, just try, to say that 10 times fast!) The juxtaposition of Cubism with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has to do with being in two places at the same time, depending upon the observer. Isn't this right? So Cubism is about multiple perspectives at the same time. So I don't think this runs against what you propose in terms of abstract objectivism. I do enjoy your bas-relief pertaining to notions of time and space and how you attribute one to Braque and the other to Duchamp. Certainly these paintings make reference to the notion of appearance and illusion, a topic of immense dimensions on this list as of late. In Vedic thought there is a Sanskrit word, "mitya." It means "apparent reality" in the sense that we cannot say "nothing exists", while at the same time we cannot say "everything exists". _At the same time_ is a key aspect of the definition of this word. It is there and not there _at once_ in time and space. I love this word. If this notion of apparent reality can never be negated, then it may suggest why Cartesian science is destined to fail, because it will be an endless task of dividing into smaller and smaller pieces, in search of the basis of all reality. It is likely, with better measuring tools, we will find still smaller and smaller parts, this seems to be the case, anyway. The Braque and Duchamp paintings illustrate mitya beautifully. Our science has also shown this, but I'm not so sure we've gotten the message. Somewhere there is a disconnect. These, as forms, are paintings, derived by the artists' ideas about something they each experienced in the world. They are static objects, and yet they suggest a form in the idea without a form in the idea, implying movement and form, fixity and formlessness depending on the painting. Totally awesome! Vedic thought claims that all that is here are names and forms, ("nama rupa") in a constant dance of change. Since we desire to move forward from that position, even if it is taking one step with the expectation that the earth will be there to meet the one's foot, we must accept this state of being-there-without-being-there. Or without-being-there-being-there, take your pick. This is not an unnatural human activity if we consider it. We do this all the time, casting ourselves into the void, as it were, and then the world catches us by the foot, one step at a time. Why we don't just fly off the planet boggles my mind. What this suggests is that rather than make sense of things by seeing static objects (made by parts) from a static point of view (by one person), the method in which we actually _make sense_ of things is to see them as whole-in-themselves in movement past many perspectives. (Just like history!) This wholeness-in-itself is not by dictat, but by fluid frames that are produced spontaneously in the moment and with the function of recognition, like the way a photographer will frame the photograph and take the picture, which is why "poignance," as a word, is growing on me. The frame edges are apparent: we know as viewers there is more to the world than what the photo reveals, yet we accept the photograph as a real object standing on its own. The photograph appears to divide the world into squares and rectangles, but does it really? The photograph reveals something subjective, what is in the photographer's mind at the time the shot was taken, because otherwise if it wasn't important the photographer wouldn't have wasted the film, nor bothered to print it. The more photographs the photographer takes slowly reveals a philosophy, with each photograph being a data-point captured of a moment in the apparent world. I would say this "philosophy building" holds the same for the tintype photographer taking penny portraits as for some of our "master" photographers like Cartier-Bresson or Man Ray. Thus, your mention of Muybridge is certainly apt in many ways! This hearkens back to your mention of listening to what is there, versus listening for what is there. But to sum this up, this is my attraction to Vygotsky's unit for analysis. The UOA is a frame, a point of reference ?not THE point of reference? upon a single object, and not THE point of reference of the whole, either, but a point of reference for the sole purpose to analyze something for investigation. As the photographer will investigate the world with her camera. [click!] Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2014 2:58 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] Yes, Annalisa's right. Artists are groundhogs, that is, harbingers of the spring thaw, and her example of "The Yellow Wall Paper" prefiguring the idea of repression as a source of mental illness is particularly apposite (Freud's very blokish transformation of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's theme of professional frustration into sexual frustration had more bad art in it than bad science, but Leontiev's idea that the child plays only because we frustrate his desire to work is very similar). Even more often, though, artists are dragonflies; early indicators of the brief Russian autumn that usher in the long winter months. So for example I think that cubism really has little to do with Heisenberg and uncertainty, but it does have a lot to do with the the long and intellectually sterile domination of abstract objectivism (formalism, structuralism) in linguistics. Why should that be? Compare THIS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Braque#mediaviewer/File:Violin_and_Candlestick.jpg And THIS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nude_Descending_a_Staircase,_No._2#mediaviewer/File:Duchamp_-_Nude_Descending_a_Staircase.jpg You can see that both have the cubist idea (not the inability to fix both position and speed simultaneously, but the attempt to super-impose many different points of view on top of each other, like a kind of Galton photograph. Braque, however, applies the cubist idea to space, while Duchamp has the brilliant idea of applying it to time, and produces for us something very much like one of Muybridge's movies. In fact, almost identical! http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Female_nude_motion_study_by_Eadweard_Muybridge_(2).jpg Muybridge was exactly the kind of artist that Annalisa is talking about: a little bit of a scientist, or rather a technician. And it was actually Muybridge who demonstrated that for centuries artists hadn't seen what they were looking at but instead found what they were looking for. Today, with the first really good transcriptions and spectrographs of human voices talking, we can show that for centuries linguists haven't really heard what they were trying to listen to but instead found what they were listening for. Like most people on this list, I cannot match Larry's stunning erudition; I know Hackett only through Larry, and the height of the stack of books on my night-table which demand to be read when I have cleared away the reading I must do for my daily lectures forbids me any closer approach. I have, however, read a lot in the lchc archives, and I think that, rich as they are, there are themes left almost wholly unexplored, and this is one of them. Trotsky remarks in "Literature and Revolution" (a book that we now know had a big influence on Vygotsky) that art is man's expression of longing for all the things of which class society deprives us: a sense of harmony, a pride in creativity, a sensitivity to nuance, a feeling of empathy, and above all a sound foundation for hope in an apparently hopeless historical situation. The problem is that in this apparently hopeless historical situation when we express these things, their expression becomes a substitute for them, a purely abstract realization of them confined to precisely those of us who need them least, namely artists and scientists. Vygotsky's psychological theory, at least as I understand it, depends crucially on understanding the inadequacy of both heredity and the environment in solving the tasks of social development. Most of the twentieth century was wasted on the intuitively appealing but terribly wrong idea that since heredity is necessary but not sufficient to explain development and the environment is necessary but not sufficient to explain development if we somehow put them together we will get something that is both necessary and sufficient. That's exactly the kind of hope that is hard to resist, but retrospectively a complete non sequitur. Of course, as the material in the lchc archives (I am thinking of the wonderful work by people like Saxe and Hutchins) attests, culture gives the child legions of allies and a rich patrimony to solve the otherwise insuperable problem left by his biological and environmental endowment. But they also bring a whole new set of social and cultural conflicts, not all of which art has the power to resolve. For art to be more than a lightening rod, or a quack love elixir, for art to be able to do more than a poor (or rather a rich) substitute for the good life, artists will have to understand the inadequacy of art and even the inadequacy of individual emotion generally in the face of these new problems, these problems that inhere in the nature of society and culture itself. As Vygotsky says, art has to see itself as the socially derived technique of emotion rather than as a kind of individually derived social contagion. That's why, although I very much enjoyed hearing from Annalisa about her old professor and his lectures on models and modernisms (and I could add a few examples to his list), I think Annalisa's truest word of all is when she says that the best artist has to have a bit of a scientist in her, just as the best scientist has to be a bit of an artist. As Annalisa says, it's not so much a matter of being able to break down walls and build bridges between domains of knowledge, although replacing disciplinary walls with bridges is crucially important. It's a matter of being able to see and realize the very general in the individual (rather than vice-versa, which is the scientists' job). As Virginia Woolf said in her first movie reviews, if you want to see how little the eye can do without the brain (and how little the image accomplishes without the word), just go see the movie adaptation of your favorite novel, David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: I think Andy has been pretty roundly misunderstood--we should all remember the great patience with which he waded through that awful article by Leontiev-- but perhaps sometimes Andy does underestimates the difference between an inter-disciplinary and a trans-disciplinary approach. When Andy calls activity theory an inter-disciplinary approach, he is pointing quite precisely to its greatest weakness: compare the way in which Vygotsky began to construct a transdisciplinary, THEMATIC approach to development by first EVISCERATING the word "pedology" of its content, the study of the eternal child. I think that an interdisciplinary approach is largely a call for more bridges, and the very bridges it constructs sometimes turn into walls. dk On 29 November 2014 at 23:58, Larry Purss wrote: > Annalisa, > I want to follow your thread and link it to my reflection on method and > disposition and also "modes": > > My reading that is exploring the notion of *seeing as* as a path/disposition > You wrote: > > "He showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were > precursors to the work of scientific discovery." > > In other words the aesthetic "mode" is "prior" to the scientific "mode". > Another perspective is they share the same images one not prior to the > other. > > I want to return to Chris Hackett who is exploring the theme of methods and > modes. > > He gives a description of the "transcendental mode" as method: > "The priority of possibility 'higher than actuality', defines the > 'metaphysics' of transcendental modes of thought where possibility and > rationality are identified; here, in the domain of metaphysics, abstracted > from existence, and seeking to 'replace' the ever-greater EXCESS of > existence with its own manageable, pre-conceived intelligibility [according > to science as 'tekne'], reason institutes itself as FIRST foundation; > nothing can APPEAR but what reason defines as POSSIBLE." [Hackett, page 65 > in Method, Metaphysics, Metaphor] > > Annalisa, this quote is Hackett's attempt to situate a particular mode of > reasoning as transcendental and if following this path a transcendental > disposition. > > Now I want to bring in a central concept - "image" or appearance that > circulates within this mode of reason. It is Schelling who is exploring the > relation of possibility and actuality. > > Here is quote from Chris Hackett developing Hackett's interpretation > of Schelling's reasoning on reason: > > "Yet, 'reason' as Schelling pleaded, is not possible as totally > 'indifferent' to existence, which is sovereignly free from all subjective > CONSTITUTION, and which already founds the world. Reason requires existence > ... for it is only AS AN IMAGE, imbued with the life of existence, bearing > that existence as its primal expression, manifesting the ACT of existence > that things are, that reason WORKS. To the degree that existence EXCEEDS > reason, and therefore, to the degree that reason NEEDS AN IMAGE as *pre* > and *post*-rationally DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility, to that degree > reason is rational" > > Annalisa, Chris Hackett is situating both the aesthetic and the scientific > in modes and methods which centrally need IMAGES. [appearances]. These > modes and relations are indicating dispositions towards possibility and > actuality. A particular mode follows the path of the transcendental and > values *possibility* as a metaphysical path. > Another approach [path] values existence as EXCESS. What is *excess* > exists within acts of existence, as relational acts. > To the degree that existence EXCEEDS reason, is the degree that reason > NEEDS AN IMAGE [an appearance] as DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility. > > The path Chris Hackett is walking is leading to the centrality of tying > meta-phor & meta-physics & meta-hodos [meta-knowledge] into an interpretive > mode situated within questions. > > [I was wondering if I should have started a new thread? to post this answer > to Annalisa. It is touching and overlapping previous turns in the > conversation.] > > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> >> If I may, to all and sundry, >> >> I recall in a course called Methodologies of Modernism, as an art student, >> there was one fantastic lecture by my humanities professor Ray Mondini. He >> showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were precursors to >> the work of scientific discovery. There were about eight different examples >> he gave. Unfortunately I do not remember them all. I recall The Yellow >> Wallpaper came just before Freud's solidifying work on repression and the >> unconscious. Cubism came just before Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. >> The others I don't remember. It made me see that artists are very capable >> of either catching the zietgeist of thought and reifying it in their art, >> which might then direct the attention of scientists, or perhaps something >> more ethereal is going on, not spiritual, but something more subtle on the >> social plane of historical existence. A similar phenomenon in kind when >> Darwin and Wallace came up with their versions of the theory of evolution, >> but in that case it seems it is because they'd both read a book by Malthus >> on populations, so they shared similar inspiration from the same source. >> >> So I'm inclined to stand by David on this trans-disciplinary position. >> However I don't think it's about weak versus strong frames. I see it >> differently. For artists, they see the world from the general to the >> specific. For scientists, they see the world from the specific to the >> general. Of course these "laws" I have observed in thinking patterns vis a >> vis scientists and artists are not hard and fast, but that is my lived >> experience. >> >> To be an artist is to be a scientist in terms of form and color, tone and >> texture. But artists are not attempting to discover new worlds of material, >> they are searching for new worlds of meaning through testing the material. >> I haven't worked closely with scientists, however we know from Einstein his >> position on visualization and imagination. This presents me with a personal >> hypothesis, if I'm allowed to engender a personal one, that the best >> artists are ones with a bit of the scientist in them, and the best >> scientists are ones with a bit of the artist in them. Not sure how to >> quantify that exactly, except perhaps through play. >> >> If anyone wants to know what lays ahead in scientific discovery, one thing >> to do is bone up on what the art scene is, because they are experimenting >> on the same thoughts as scientists, just from the top-down. A starting >> point is by perusing magazines like Art Forum, ARTnews, Art in America, Art >> Review, and others. I'm sure you can find themes that resonate and run >> parallel. >> >> Just follow your nose. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 5:04 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] >> >> Hi David, >> Sorry I?m way behind. Respectfully: >> Would it be fair to say that science needs art if both are to be creative? >> And that time and space are prototypical themes in both art and science? >> So, a 2-by-2 matrix with prototypical examples of the mash up in each >> quadrant. Just a thought. >> Henry >> >> > On Nov 27, 2014, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > >> > I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his >> > compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, >> > strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way >> > that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining >> > his argument. >> > >> > On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't >> > think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the >> > whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. >> > "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate >> > (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views >> > to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real >> > utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary >> > that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in >> > addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an >> > intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put >> > it more charitably. >> > >> > But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the >> > aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly >> > framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of >> > knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a >> > perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than >> > "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike >> > can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather >> > than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, >> > living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if >> > strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must >> > predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the >> > hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts >> > can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of >> > knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in >> > ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). >> > >> > We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion >> > education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol >> > Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes >> > like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is >> > not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) >> > Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my >> > students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students >> > contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, >> > so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. >> > >> > She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a >> > newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work >> > on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into >> > a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was >> > reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of >> > Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual >> > above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had >> > constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics >> > for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. >> > Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > >> > On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >> I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >> >> Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >> >> Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to >> me >> >> that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few >> stones to >> >> find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >> >> second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source >> of >> >> so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with >> us >> >> today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >> >> >> >> Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >> >> utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >> >> muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is >> to be >> >> precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions >> steady >> >> and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >> >> articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >> >> circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form >> but is >> >> concerned with their configuration and placement. >> >> >> >> On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal >> distinction >> >> between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I >> think >> >> we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied >> phenomena. >> >> We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >> >> calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from >> without >> >> (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >> >> the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >> >> calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >> >> manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Nov 30 15:11:36 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 16:11:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] In-Reply-To: References: <1417239585878.37588@unm.edu> Message-ID: <7FEFE54C-B42E-4AC1-AF66-C7910A44B863@gmail.com> David and Annalisa are conspiring to give great mash ups of science and art. Would it be fair to say that the good mash ups are creative projects? David?s Braque/Duchamp/Muybridge narrative was, like Duchamp?s visual narrative (of a nude descending), historical, but in different time scales. Might one call this collaborative mash up a fracticaling, discovering rich mappings between complex narratives at different temporal and spatial scales. Oh so distributed. Henry > On Nov 29, 2014, at 2:58 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Yes, Annalisa's right. Artists are groundhogs, that is, harbingers of > the spring thaw, and her example of "The Yellow Wall Paper" > prefiguring the idea of repression as a source of mental illness is > particularly apposite (Freud's very blokish transformation of > Charlotte Perkins Gilman's theme of professional frustration into > sexual frustration had more bad art in it than bad science, but > Leontiev's idea that the child plays only because we frustrate his > desire to work is very similar). Even more often, though, artists are > dragonflies; early indicators of the brief Russian autumn that usher > in the long winter months. So for example I think that cubism really > has little to do with Heisenberg and uncertainty, but it does have a > lot to do with the the long and intellectually sterile domination of > abstract objectivism (formalism, structuralism) in linguistics. > > Why should that be? Compare THIS: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Braque#mediaviewer/File:Violin_and_Candlestick.jpg > > And THIS: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nude_Descending_a_Staircase,_No._2#mediaviewer/File:Duchamp_-_Nude_Descending_a_Staircase.jpg > > > You can see that both have the cubist idea (not the inability to fix > both position and speed simultaneously, but the attempt to > super-impose many different points of view on top of each other, like > a kind of Galton photograph. Braque, however, applies the cubist idea > to space, while Duchamp has the brilliant idea of applying it to time, > and produces for us something very much like one of Muybridge's > movies. In fact, almost identical! > > http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Female_nude_motion_study_by_Eadweard_Muybridge_(2).jpg > > Muybridge was exactly the kind of artist that Annalisa is talking > about: a little bit of a scientist, or rather a technician. And it was > actually Muybridge who demonstrated that for centuries artists hadn't > seen what they were looking at but instead found what they were > looking for. Today, with the first really good transcriptions and > spectrographs of human voices talking, we can show that for centuries > linguists haven't really heard what they were trying to listen to but > instead found what they were listening for. > > Like most people on this list, I cannot match Larry's stunning > erudition; I know Hackett only through Larry, and the height of the > stack of books on my night-table which demand to be read when I have > cleared away the reading I must do for my daily lectures forbids me > any closer approach. I have, however, read a lot in the lchc archives, > and I think that, rich as they are, there are themes left almost > wholly unexplored, and this is one of them. > > Trotsky remarks in "Literature and Revolution" (a book that we now > know had a big influence on Vygotsky) that art is man's expression of > longing for all the things of which class society deprives us: a sense > of harmony, a pride in creativity, a sensitivity to nuance, a feeling > of empathy, and above all a sound foundation for hope in an apparently > hopeless historical situation. The problem is that in this apparently > hopeless historical situation when we express these things, their > expression becomes a substitute for them, a purely abstract > realization of them confined to precisely those of us who need them > least, namely artists and scientists. > > Vygotsky's psychological theory, at least as I understand it, depends > crucially on understanding the inadequacy of both heredity and the > environment in solving the tasks of social development. Most of the > twentieth century was wasted on the intuitively appealing but terribly > wrong idea that since heredity is necessary but not sufficient to > explain development and the environment is necessary but not > sufficient to explain development if we somehow put them together we > will get something that is both necessary and sufficient. That's > exactly the kind of hope that is hard to resist, but retrospectively a > complete non sequitur. > > Of course, as the material in the lchc archives (I am thinking of the > wonderful work by people like Saxe and Hutchins) attests, culture > gives the child legions of allies and a rich patrimony to solve the > otherwise insuperable problem left by his biological and environmental > endowment. But they also bring a whole new set of social and cultural > conflicts, not all of which art has the power to resolve. For art to > be more than a lightening rod, or a quack love elixir, for art to be > able to do more than a poor (or rather a rich) substitute for the good > life, artists will have to understand the inadequacy of art and even > the inadequacy of individual emotion generally in the face of these > new problems, these problems that inhere in the nature of society and > culture itself. As Vygotsky says, art has to see itself as the > socially derived technique of emotion rather than as a kind of > individually derived social contagion. > > That's why, although I very much enjoyed hearing from Annalisa about > her old professor and his lectures on models and modernisms (and I > could add a few examples to his list), I think Annalisa's truest word > of all is when she says that the best artist has to have a bit of a > scientist in her, just as the best scientist has to be a bit of an > artist. As Annalisa says, it's not so much a matter of being able to > break down walls and build bridges between domains of knowledge, > although replacing disciplinary walls with bridges is crucially > important. It's a matter of being able to see and realize the very > general in the individual (rather than vice-versa, which is the > scientists' job). As Virginia Woolf said in her first movie reviews, > if you want to see how little the eye can do without the brain (and > how little the image accomplishes without the word), just go see the > movie adaptation of your favorite novel, > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: I think Andy has been pretty roundly misunderstood--we should all > remember the great patience with which he waded through that awful > article by Leontiev-- but perhaps sometimes Andy does underestimates > the difference between an inter-disciplinary and a trans-disciplinary > approach. When Andy calls activity theory an inter-disciplinary > approach, he is pointing quite precisely to its greatest weakness: > compare the way in which Vygotsky began to construct a > transdisciplinary, THEMATIC approach to development by first > EVISCERATING the word "pedology" of its content, the study of the > eternal child. I think that an interdisciplinary approach is largely a > call for more bridges, and the very bridges it constructs sometimes > turn into walls. > > dk > > On 29 November 2014 at 23:58, Larry Purss wrote: >> Annalisa, >> I want to follow your thread and link it to my reflection on method and >> disposition and also "modes": >> >> My reading that is exploring the notion of *seeing as* as a path/disposition >> You wrote: >> >> "He showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were >> precursors to the work of scientific discovery." >> >> In other words the aesthetic "mode" is "prior" to the scientific "mode". >> Another perspective is they share the same images one not prior to the >> other. >> >> I want to return to Chris Hackett who is exploring the theme of methods and >> modes. >> >> He gives a description of the "transcendental mode" as method: >> "The priority of possibility 'higher than actuality', defines the >> 'metaphysics' of transcendental modes of thought where possibility and >> rationality are identified; here, in the domain of metaphysics, abstracted >> from existence, and seeking to 'replace' the ever-greater EXCESS of >> existence with its own manageable, pre-conceived intelligibility [according >> to science as 'tekne'], reason institutes itself as FIRST foundation; >> nothing can APPEAR but what reason defines as POSSIBLE." [Hackett, page 65 >> in Method, Metaphysics, Metaphor] >> >> Annalisa, this quote is Hackett's attempt to situate a particular mode of >> reasoning as transcendental and if following this path a transcendental >> disposition. >> >> Now I want to bring in a central concept - "image" or appearance that >> circulates within this mode of reason. It is Schelling who is exploring the >> relation of possibility and actuality. >> >> Here is quote from Chris Hackett developing Hackett's interpretation >> of Schelling's reasoning on reason: >> >> "Yet, 'reason' as Schelling pleaded, is not possible as totally >> 'indifferent' to existence, which is sovereignly free from all subjective >> CONSTITUTION, and which already founds the world. Reason requires existence >> ... for it is only AS AN IMAGE, imbued with the life of existence, bearing >> that existence as its primal expression, manifesting the ACT of existence >> that things are, that reason WORKS. To the degree that existence EXCEEDS >> reason, and therefore, to the degree that reason NEEDS AN IMAGE as *pre* >> and *post*-rationally DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility, to that degree >> reason is rational" >> >> Annalisa, Chris Hackett is situating both the aesthetic and the scientific >> in modes and methods which centrally need IMAGES. [appearances]. These >> modes and relations are indicating dispositions towards possibility and >> actuality. A particular mode follows the path of the transcendental and >> values *possibility* as a metaphysical path. >> Another approach [path] values existence as EXCESS. What is *excess* >> exists within acts of existence, as relational acts. >> To the degree that existence EXCEEDS reason, is the degree that reason >> NEEDS AN IMAGE [an appearance] as DETERMINATIVE of intelligibility. >> >> The path Chris Hackett is walking is leading to the centrality of tying >> meta-phor & meta-physics & meta-hodos [meta-knowledge] into an interpretive >> mode situated within questions. >> >> [I was wondering if I should have started a new thread? to post this answer >> to Annalisa. It is touching and overlapping previous turns in the >> conversation.] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> >>> If I may, to all and sundry, >>> >>> I recall in a course called Methodologies of Modernism, as an art student, >>> there was one fantastic lecture by my humanities professor Ray Mondini. He >>> showed us how it was that the themes and work of artists were precursors to >>> the work of scientific discovery. There were about eight different examples >>> he gave. Unfortunately I do not remember them all. I recall The Yellow >>> Wallpaper came just before Freud's solidifying work on repression and the >>> unconscious. Cubism came just before Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. >>> The others I don't remember. It made me see that artists are very capable >>> of either catching the zietgeist of thought and reifying it in their art, >>> which might then direct the attention of scientists, or perhaps something >>> more ethereal is going on, not spiritual, but something more subtle on the >>> social plane of historical existence. A similar phenomenon in kind when >>> Darwin and Wallace came up with their versions of the theory of evolution, >>> but in that case it seems it is because they'd both read a book by Malthus >>> on populations, so they shared similar inspiration from the same source. >>> >>> So I'm inclined to stand by David on this trans-disciplinary position. >>> However I don't think it's about weak versus strong frames. I see it >>> differently. For artists, they see the world from the general to the >>> specific. For scientists, they see the world from the specific to the >>> general. Of course these "laws" I have observed in thinking patterns vis a >>> vis scientists and artists are not hard and fast, but that is my lived >>> experience. >>> >>> To be an artist is to be a scientist in terms of form and color, tone and >>> texture. But artists are not attempting to discover new worlds of material, >>> they are searching for new worlds of meaning through testing the material. >>> I haven't worked closely with scientists, however we know from Einstein his >>> position on visualization and imagination. This presents me with a personal >>> hypothesis, if I'm allowed to engender a personal one, that the best >>> artists are ones with a bit of the scientist in them, and the best >>> scientists are ones with a bit of the artist in them. Not sure how to >>> quantify that exactly, except perhaps through play. >>> >>> If anyone wants to know what lays ahead in scientific discovery, one thing >>> to do is bone up on what the art scene is, because they are experimenting >>> on the same thoughts as scientists, just from the top-down. A starting >>> point is by perusing magazines like Art Forum, ARTnews, Art in America, Art >>> Review, and others. I'm sure you can find themes that resonate and run >>> parallel. >>> >>> Just follow your nose. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of HENRY SHONERD >>> Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 5:04 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance [Language as a form] >>> >>> Hi David, >>> Sorry I?m way behind. Respectfully: >>> Would it be fair to say that science needs art if both are to be creative? >>> And that time and space are prototypical themes in both art and science? >>> So, a 2-by-2 matrix with prototypical examples of the mash up in each >>> quadrant. Just a thought. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Nov 27, 2014, at 3:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> I too liked Huw's comments, but for rather different reasons than his >>>> compelling defense of what Basil Bernstein calls "strongly framed, >>>> strongly classified" categories of knowledge. What I liked is the way >>>> that he brought in Dickens, simultaneously enriching and undermining >>>> his argument. >>>> >>>> On the one hand, Dickens is the ultimate in blokish writers (I can't >>>> think of a single likeable or even bearable female character in the >>>> whole of his oeuvre). On the other, Dickens will begin a book (e.g. >>>> "Hard Times") with a clear list of characters he intends to slate >>>> (utilitarians and political economists) and then he'll attribute views >>>> to them that are really quite the opposite of what they hold (real >>>> utilitarians and political economists actually agreed with Mr. Sleary >>>> that work is a curse and that "The people mutht be amuthed"). So in >>>> addition to being a blokish writer, Dickens is a bit of an >>>> intellectual slob (as opposed to a snob): a masher-together-er, to put >>>> it more charitably. >>>> >>>> But by bringing in Dickens I think Huw also brings in the >>>> aesthetic--and even the ethical. And here what Huw says about strongly >>>> framed and strongly classified (or "technical") categories of >>>> knowledge is much less compelling. I have been arguing for a >>>> perspective that is "trans-disciplinary" rather than >>>> "inter-disciplinary", where inquiries into art and into science alike >>>> can be based on themes like quantity, history and structure rather >>>> than narrowly defined according to objects of study such as matter, >>>> living things, society and consciousness; it seems to me that if >>>> strongly framed and strongly classified categories of knowledge must >>>> predominate in scientific categories (else it is hard to see how the >>>> hiearchical structures Vygotsky sees as essential to science concepts >>>> can emerge) then weakly framed and weakly classified categories of >>>> knowlede necessarily predominate in aesthetic ones, and even in >>>> ethical ones (which I believe are closely related). >>>> >>>> We are reaching the end of the semester in my class on immersion >>>> education, in which I adopted a syllabus idea I stole from Carol >>>> Macdonald, to wit, that immersion classes might begin with classes >>>> like Physical Education, Music and Mathematics (where word meaning is >>>> not a central concern) and only end with classes like (Natural) >>>> Science, Social Science and Ethics. That means that this week my >>>> students are preparing immersion classes in ethics. One of my students >>>> contested the idea that ethical education was for higher grades only, >>>> so I asked her when she thought ethics education should begin. >>>> >>>> She said that ethics education really begins with a mother holding a >>>> newborn infant. On my way home from class, I thought of Martin's work >>>> on the prisoner's dilemma, and how it fit, quite despite itself, into >>>> a whole tradition of neo-Kohlbergian ethics education. And I was >>>> reminded of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' critique of >>>> Kohlberg--the critique that by emphasizing the autonomous individual >>>> above the relational one, and "justice" above "caring", Kohlberg had >>>> constructed a blokish ethics, for gentlemen only. It is also an ethics >>>> for small businessmen rather than young mothers and teachers: Mr. >>>> Sleary and his creator would have been amuthed. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 27 November 2014 at 20:46, Huw Lloyd >>> wrote: >>>>> I have been reading McLellan's "new abridgement" of Capital recently. >>>>> Probably my most powerful impression is the prevalence of the conditions >>>>> Marx documents. Unlike writers of fiction today, it is quite clear to >>> me >>>>> that his contemporary, Dickens, was barely required to lift a few >>> stones to >>>>> find the extremes of luck, fate and chance that he also portrays. A >>>>> second, more palliative, impression is the documentation of the source >>> of >>>>> so many of the problems arising in working conditions that remain with >>> us >>>>> today, albeit in more 'civilised' form. >>>>> >>>>> Regarding 'muscularity', I find it interesting to consider how technical >>>>> utterances and work-a-day competences do tend to carry a certain kind of >>>>> muscularity in a literal sense of holding steady. To be technical is >>> to be >>>>> precise under varying conditions in which one holds those conditions >>> steady >>>>> and it is normal to hear technical discourse with some degree of >>>>> articulatory stress and moderate facial tension etc. Under such >>>>> circumstances, one doesn't merely pile up the words in additive form >>> but is >>>>> concerned with their configuration and placement. >>>>> >>>>> On the business of the objectivity of consciousness and focal >>> distinction >>>>> between the experience of consciousness and that which yields it, I >>> think >>>>> we can make the same statement about any scientifically studied >>> phenomena. >>>>> We are not aware of the internally manifest form of any kind of internal >>>>> calculus undertaken by a studied system, yet we may study it from >>> without >>>>> (with meter readings etc) and perform equivalent calculations and follow >>>>> the transformations taking place. Alternatively, we can study that >>>>> calculus as a system itself, which will have, again, its own internal >>>>> manifestation. That's how we come to improve our approximations... >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>> >>> > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Nov 30 17:39:52 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 01:39:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> Hi Larry and David, Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? David K I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic question. Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images upon which thinking rests" The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and illusions was also exploring this theme. Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process *metaphoricity*. Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the *spontaneous event* of meaning. He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - finds itself implicated in this guiding image. AND it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the meaning of its very self. Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in *objectivity* This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the mode [path] of the concept occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been established. In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the image-character of the guiding image. I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may become [again] However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I personally am following this path for now. Larry From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Nov 30 22:53:43 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 15:53:43 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> Message-ID: Larry, Annalisa: People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a non-image based mental representation. As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have time or ability to process complex problems in real time. I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read this article--instead, look at Figure 11. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any recognizable figures upon which to focus. However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Larry and David, > > Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. > > Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. > > As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > > It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. > > What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > David K > I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for > exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic > question. > > Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images > upon which thinking rests" > > The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > illusions was also exploring this theme. > > Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process > *metaphoricity*. > > Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the > *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - > finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > AND > > it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > meaning of its very self. > > Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can > invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > *objectivity* > > This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the > mode [path] of the concept > occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been > established. > > In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the > image-character of the guiding image. > > I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may > become [again] > > However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is > not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to > have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings > and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > personally am following this path for now. > > Larry >