From s.franklin08@btinternet.com Fri May 2 00:42:43 2014 From: s.franklin08@btinternet.com (Shirley Franklin) Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 08:42:43 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Claiming a Copyright on Marx? How Uncomradely - NYTimes.com Message-ID: Very uncomradely! L and W were the only publishers whom I had to pay for copyright when I published a pack on School Histories and used their book on the Burtston School Strike. Appalling Shirley mobile.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/arts/claiming-a-copyright-on-marx-how-uncomradely.html?hpw&rref=books&_r=3&referrer= Sent from my iPhone From ablunden@mira.net Fri May 2 01:19:36 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 02 May 2014 18:19:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Claiming a Copyright on Marx? How Uncomradely - NYTimes.com In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <53635518.8090902@mira.net> http://chronicle.com/article/Readers-of-MarxEngels/146251/ Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Shirley Franklin wrote: > Very uncomradely! > > L and W were the only publishers whom I had to pay for copyright when I published a pack on School Histories and used their book on the Burtston School Strike. > Appalling > > Shirley > > mobile.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/arts/claiming-a-copyright-on-marx-how-uncomradely.html?hpw&rref=books&_r=3&referrer= > > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > From smago@uga.edu Fri May 2 10:08:08 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 17:08:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Spring Issue of JoLLE now availabe online Message-ID: <6fef2051b6924464bc6d29ee6f938604@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/current-issue/ Editor's Introduction | Research Articles | Book Reviews | Poetry and Art | Scholars Speak Out | JoLLE@UGA 2014 Spring Conference Reflections | The views expressed on this website and contained within featured documents are solely those of the author(s) and artist(s) and do not reflect the views of the JoLLE Editorial Board, Department of Language & Literacy Education, The College of Education, or The University of Georgia [Cover Art Spring 2014] Casting A Long Shadow, by Jerome Harste Volume 10(1): JoLLE Editors Intro Spring 2014 Stephanie Anne Shelton, jolle@uga.edu, Principal Editor Research Articles Redefining our understandings... (Re)Writing One's Self as an Activist Across Schools and Sexual and Gender Identities: An Investigation of the Limits of LGBT-Inclusive and Queering Discourses Mollie V. Blackburn, blackburn.99@osu.edu, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA When School Literacy and School Discipline Practices Intersect: Why Schools Punish Student Writing Cathy Amanti, cbamanti@gmail.com, Georgia Perimeter College, Decatur, GA, USA Adolescent Perspectives on Authentic Writing Instruction Nadia Behizadeh, nbehizadeh@gsu.edu, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA The Power of Applying Reimagined/Redefined Literacy in Classrooms Creating a Critical Literacy Milieu in a Kindergarten Classroom Stacia M. Stribling, sstribli@gmu.edu, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA Writing between the Lines: Aaliya's Dialogic Strategies for Overcoming Academic Writing Disengagement Anne Peel, peela@tcnj.edu, The College of New Jersey, Ewing Township, New Jersey, USA "We Gotta Change First": Racial Literacy in a High School English Classroom Amy Vetter, amvetter@uncg.edu, The University of North Carolina, Greensboro, North Carolina, USA Holly Hungerford-Kressor, hkresser@uta.edu, The University of Texas, Arlington, Texas, USA Students with Learning Disabilities in an Inclusive Writing Classroom Patricia Jacobs, patrjac@ufl.edu Danling Fu, danlingfu@coe.ufl.edu University of Florida, Gainseville, Florida, USA Multiliteracies in the classroom: Confronting the Reality of the First Year of Teaching Benjamin Boche, bboche@purdue.edu, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA The Power of Applying Reimagined/Redefined Literacy Beyond the Classroom De/colonizing Preservice Teacher Education: Theatre of the Academic Absurd Spy D?nomm?-Welch, spy.denomme-welch@uregina.ca, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada Kristiina M. Montero, kmontero@wlu.ca, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Teaching Under Policy Cascades: Common Core and Literacy Instruction Aimee Papola-Ellis, apapola@luc.edu, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, USA Voices from the Field: Turning Schools Inside Out: Connecting Schools and Communities Through Public Arts and Literacies Charest, Brian C., bchare2@uic.edu Bell, Lauren D., ldejbell@gmail.com Gonzalez, Marialuisa, magonzalez68@cps.edu Parker, Veronica L., rparke2@gmail.com University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, USA Book Reviews [Generation Bullied 2.0] Generation Bullied 2.0: Prevention and Intervention Strategies for Our Most Vulnerable Students Shelton, S.A. (2014). Review of generation bullied 2.0: Prevention and intervention strategies for our most vulnerable students. Journal of Language and Literacy Education [Online], 10(1), 204-210. [Teaching Writing Grades 7-12] Teaching Writing Grades 7-12 in an Era of Assessment Thornton, M.B. (2014). Review of teaching writing grades 7-12 in an era of assessment: Passion and practice. Journal of Language and Literacy Education [Online], 10(1), 211-215. [Mismeasure of Education] The Mismeasure of Education Wraga, W. (2014). Review of the mismeasure of education. Journal of Language and Literacy Education [Online], 10(1), 216-220. [A Search Past Silence] A Search Past Silence: The Literacy of Young Black Men Rhym, D. (2014). Review of a search past silence: The literacy of young black men. Journal of Language and Literacy Education [Online],10(1), 221-227. [Guided Comprehension for English Learners] Guided Comprehension for English Learners Liao, J. (2014). Review of guided comprehension for English learners.Journal of Language and Literacy Education [Online], 10(1), 228-232. [Reading in the Wild] Reading in the Wild: The Book Whisperer's Keys to Cultivating Lifelong Reading Habits Sanden, S. (2014). Review of reading in the wild: The book whisperer's keys to cultivating lifelong reading habits. Journal of Language and Literacy Education [Online], 10(1), 233-237. Poetry and Art Paul Ayo "Melanin in the Sun" Paul Ayo was born in Atlanta, GA. He received his B.A. in Creative Writing, Certification in Nonprofit Management, and Masters in Secondary Education from Georgia College. Paul founded the award winning nonprofit organization, Art as an Agent for Change, which works to build lasting human connections through the art of the written word. Paul teaches English at Baldwin High School and devotes his life to activism, poetry, and the relentless pursuit of a better world. Laura Apol "Language Lessons: Poems from Rwanda" Laura Apol is an associate professor at Michigan State University, where she teaches children's literature and poetry. In addition to numerous professional publications, she is the author of two collections of her own poems: Falling into Grace, and Crossing the Ladder of Sun (winner of the Oklahoma Book Award). Her third collection, Requiem, Rwanda (forthcoming in 2015), is drawn from her work using writing to facilitate healing among survivors of the 1994 genocide against Tutsi. Theresa Redmond and John Henson Media Maker [pa2014_5_Redmond] Theresa Redmond is Assistant Professor in the College of Education at Appalachian State University. Redmond teaches a range of media studies and technology courses across degree tracks in both face-to-face and online formats. Her research focuses on understanding educational practice and pedagogy in teaching and learning with/through/about media and technology to support learning, literacy, and creative expression in the digital world. John Henson brings a background of professional photography, video production, technology integration, and curriculum design his work as both a doctoral student and instructor at Appalachian State University. He is working to incorporate media production and design elements into his research to produce texts that are both creative and academically relevant. John S. O'Connor "Adult Literacy" John S. O'Connor teaches full time in a public school outside Chicago and part time in the School of Education and Social Policy at Northwestern University. His recent poetry has appeared in places such as The Cortland Review, Rhino, and Poetry East. He has published two chapbooks of poems and two books on the teaching of writing (Wordplaygrounds and This Time It's Personal). The first chapter of the latter was named a Notable Essay in Best American Essays, 2011. David Low Income Equality Science Fair [pa2014_10_Low small] David Low is a doctoral candidate in Reading/Writing/Literacy at the University of Pennsylvania. His academic work has appeared in Voices from the Middle, Children's Literature in Education, and Literacy. His cartoons have appeared in English Journal and Funny Times. James Damico "Conference Room on March 1st" James Damico is a former elementary/middle school teacher and currently Associate Professor of Literacy, Culture, & Language Education at Indiana University. His interests center on inquiry-based learning and teaching and enacting critical literacies to understand and address complex problems, such as global climate change. He remains grateful to the many students and teachers across the years for cultivating his love of poetry and songwriting. Jerome Harste Casting a Long Shadow [pa2014_23_HarsteCasting] Jerome Harste is a retired professor of literacy education from Indiana University. Upon his retirement he took up watercolor and has now earned "signature status" in both the Bloomington Watercolor Society and the Missouri Watercolor Society. This piece was motivated by his belief in graffiti as common man's way of speaking back to the powers that be. He also collects photographs of graffiti. His favor is one he found in Toronto on the side of a building which read: "Billboards for the rich; Spray Cans for the poor!" Gabriela del Villar "Funds of Knowledge" Gabriela del Villar was born and raised in Oaxaca, Mexico. She is a doctoral student in the Language and Literacy Department in the UGA College of Education. She holds a master in Spanish Literature from Auburn University. She writes poetry and essays in her spare time. Beatriz Rodriguez Space Queen Style [pa2014_26a_Rodriguez small] Space Queen Style, a 17"x11" blackbook 'masterpiece', is a teaching tool for animating students' creative literacies. Encoded within are the pedagogies and practices of name-invention and -writing known as "StyleWriting," the visual language pillar of Hip Hop culture (KRS-One, 2009). This piece captures my creative visions and improvisations, scaffolding for students' pathways through exploring and expressing self, knowledge, and communicative possibility at once. The Queen figure merges color and symbol patterns of my Puerto Rican/Cuban heritage with the Kemetic hieroglyph for Seshat; written below in the true school mechanical letter style of Hip Hop tradition, is my pseudonym -'TRIZ'. References KRS-One. (2009). The Gospel of Hip Hop. Brooklyn: Power House Books. Gloria-Beatriz Rodr?guez is a doctoral candidate in Urban Schooling at UCLA. Her forthcoming dissertation, "Writing Names, Reading Hip Hop," analyzes literacies emergent through children's self-naming practices. It also articulates the "all-elements" pedagogy of Hip Hop culture, a youth cultural production model for teaching and learning through the arts. Beatriz has taught in K-16 level classrooms since 1997. She holds a Master's in Education (2009, University of San Francisco) and a JD (2000, University of Pennsylvania). James F. Woglom and Jenny Mary Brown Personal Ad for Jim [pa2014_1aBrownWoglom] [pa2014_1a2_BrownWoglom] Another Personal Ad (After Allen Ginsberg) [pa2014_1c_BrownWoglom][pa2014_1c2_BrownWoglom] James F. Woglom is a multimedia artist and educator. He is currently working towards the completion of a PhD in art education at The University of Georgia, where he works as a graduate teaching assistant. His work has appeared on the cover of New South, in Unsplendid, The Journal of Adolescent and Adult Literacy, an anthology by Stylus Press, Teacher's College Record, Harvard Education Review, Haiku Journal, Smokelong Quarterly, Hot Metal Bridge, and is forthcoming from the Journal of Teachingand Learning and Kappan Magazine. Jenny Mary Brown's work has either featured or forthcoming from Berkeley Poetry Review, Tipton Poetry Review and Pale Horse, among others. She is a PhD candidate in English for Creative Writing - Poetry at Georgia State University. She received her MA in Creative Writing from University College in Dublin, Ireland in 2009. She is currently the art director at District Lit and the Editor-in-Chief of New South. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: image013.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 29792 bytes Desc: image013.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140502/4c2d817d/attachment-0012.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image014.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 37152 bytes Desc: image014.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140502/4c2d817d/attachment-0013.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image015.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 33354 bytes Desc: image015.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140502/4c2d817d/attachment-0014.jpg From blantonwe@comcast.net Fri May 2 16:23:23 2014 From: blantonwe@comcast.net (Bill Blanton) Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 23:23:23 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Arne Raeithel's Genealogy Map In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1967176008.2056487.1399073003131.JavaMail.root@comcast.net> Here is an Arne I was tinkering with to connect the 5thD with. It accurate but not pretty. BB -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Historical Connections.pptx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation Size: 97372 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140502/1adc509b/attachment.bin From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun May 4 06:16:05 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 06:16:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Questioning universal core emotions Message-ID: Perhaps of interest mike http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun May 4 06:55:21 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 14:55:21 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Well Mike I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know where these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I am not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of the language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room here. This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point that out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent to the others. Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this research. Carol On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > Perhaps of interest > mike > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun May 4 09:05:33 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 09:05:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Both the Ekman and this task were "western-type", Carol. Both used photographs, for openers. As to the people referred to in Namibia, you know a lot more than I do, that is for sure! I will get the published article when I get a chance. If its boring, delete! If its a fraud, call it out with all the aspersions you like. :-) mike On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 6:55 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Well Mike > > I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know where > these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I am > not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of the > language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room here. > This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point that > out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent to > the others. > > Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > research. > > Carol > > > On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > >> Perhaps of interest >> mike >> >> >> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >> > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun May 4 09:15:25 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 16:15:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <97D07AE2-1B5F-47A5-A01B-AD4C76F3CDFB@uniandes.edu.co> Here's the paper on verbal display... Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Gendron et al 2014.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 258226 bytes Desc: Gendron et al 2014.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140504/8220149f/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.txt Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140504/8220149f/attachment-0001.txt From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun May 4 09:24:00 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 10:24:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed to do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some interesting details about the Himba. It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the key Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - these means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such as "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on this very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have begun sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The Himba are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools don't teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able to keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their cattle individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really matters are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one fails to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to happen to oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the study, it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as the Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might argue that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, arguable). So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. Are emotions universal? I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not universal? I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture of a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture is "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, but that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology since Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already defined by the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very familiar). Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem to suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and force these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? -greg On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Well Mike > > I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know where > these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I am > not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of the > language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room here. > This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point that > out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent to > the others. > > Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > research. > > Carol > > > On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > > > Perhaps of interest > > mike > > > > > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun May 4 17:20:35 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 20:20:35 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: EARLI - job announcements: Assistant/associate professors in Switzerland, Denmark and Germany References: <20140430223231.C84CE5615EB@web04.level27.be> Message-ID: <20C825D8-F40F-4423-9684-B752DB1AC74E@gmail.com> This just came from EARLI and may fit people from this list. DP Begin forwarded message: > Assistant professor in sociocultural psychology (100%) > The candidate will contribute to research on the articulation of psychological and sociocultural processes, within the broad field of educational sciences. More specifically, the candidate should belong to the field of social and cultural psychology, show an interest for educational research in a broad sense as well as for migrations and/or mobilities. The candidate should develop a line of work complementary complementary to that of the Institute of psychology and education, show an ability to work interdisciplinary within the MAPS (Center for the Understanding of Social Processes, and be able to contribute to the University's National Centre of Competence in Research NCCR (NCCR) "On the Move, The Migration-Mobility Nexus". The candidate will teach BA and MA courses, in lectures and seminars. > Beginning of position: February 1st, 2015, or to be discussed > Requirements: The candidate should have a have a high-level and diversified publication record. > For more information, please see the Institute's webpage www.unine.ch/ipe as well as the MAPS www.unine.ch/maps, or contact prof. Tania Zittountania.zittoun@unine.ch > Candidates with PhD are invited to submit their full application as one single pdf document on the website www.unine.ch/candis by May the 31st 2014. The application should include a motivation letter, a detailed curriculum vitae including teaching and research activities, a publication list, as well as a document presenting the candidate's scientific vision for the post, planned teaching and research projects (3 pages). Candidates are requested to ask three referees to directly send a letter of recommendation to the president of the recruiting committee (tania.zittoun@unine.ch). > Please do not send any publication at this stage. > The University of Neuch?tel is an equal opportunity employeur. From joeg4us@roadrunner.com Sun May 4 17:28:53 2014 From: joeg4us@roadrunner.com (Joseph Gilbert) Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 17:28:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Regarding core emotions: First, what are emotions? How do emotions relate to feelings? I have found that the phones correlate to, represent and convey/transmit feelings-emotions. The emotional relevance of the phones can be experienced by voicing them over and over. We normally do not notice that relatedness between phones and feelings-emotions because we almost never vocalize unless we are verbalizing, and when we are verbalizing, we are focused on the referential function of words There is a de-facto prohibition against simply vocalizing, in public and in private also. Doing so "rattles the cage" of our reliance on the sounds of words to inform us of the effects on us - and hence, the meanings of - the things that make up our world. Breaking words down into separate sounds shines a light on the fact that the sounds of words do not necessarily represent the things to which we refer with them in our familiar language. Joseph Carroll Gilbert On May 4, 2014, at 6:16 AM, mike cole wrote: > Perhaps of interest > mike > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions- > are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 5 20:56:32 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 12:56:32 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, in which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, others with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that appears to be laughter. I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such a way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a universal human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting exercise that would come to the same conclusion. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working > among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed to > do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some > interesting details about the Himba. > > It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with > Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger > cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that > would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( > http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > > At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the key > Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" > (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling > takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - these > means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such as > "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > > Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the > Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on this > very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have begun > sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The Himba > are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools don't > teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able to > keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their cattle > individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really matters > are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one fails > to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to happen to > oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > > Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the study, > it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as the > Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might argue > that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, arguable). > > So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. Are > emotions universal? > I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are > missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a > different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not > universal? > > I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture of > a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture is > "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, but > that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology since > Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already defined by > the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very familiar). > > Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking > Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of > "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The > argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem to > suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the > findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and force > these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. > > But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > -greg > > > > > On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald >wrote: > > > Well Mike > > > > I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know where > > these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I am > > not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of the > > language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room here. > > This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point > that > > out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent > to > > the others. > > > > Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > > research. > > > > Carol > > > > > > On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Perhaps of interest > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 5 21:09:21 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 06 May 2014 14:09:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all clearly feeling different about it. Or was that your point? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, in > which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, others > with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that > appears to be laughter. > > I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such a > way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a universal > human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting > exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working >> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed to >> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some >> interesting details about the Himba. >> >> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with >> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger >> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that >> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( >> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >> >> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the key >> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" >> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling >> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - these >> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such as >> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >> >> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the >> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on this >> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have begun >> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The Himba >> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools don't >> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able to >> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their cattle >> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really matters >> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one fails >> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to happen to >> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >> >> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the study, >> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as the >> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might argue >> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, arguable). >> >> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. Are >> emotions universal? >> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are >> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a >> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not >> universal? >> >> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture of >> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture is >> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, but >> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology since >> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already defined by >> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very familiar). >> >> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking >> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of >> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The >> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem to >> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the >> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and force >> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. >> >> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well Mike >>> >>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know where >>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I am >>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of the >>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room here. >>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point >>> >> that >> >>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent >>> >> to >> >>> the others. >>> >>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this >>> research. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> >>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Perhaps of interest >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > > From smago@uga.edu Tue May 6 09:36:27 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 16:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Written Communication Special Issue Call for Papers In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9d60537bae584ae785fa431cc88ca625@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> From: writcomm Written Communication [mailto:writcomm@umn.edu] I am writing to bring to your attention the attached CFP for a special issue for WC on Writing and Ritual, Faith Communities, and Religious Practices. Please circulate. ~Chris ~~ Christina Haas, Professor of Writing Studies College of Liberal Arts ~ University of Minnesota Editor, Written Communication *follow WC on twitter - @writtencomm -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: WC_SI_CFP_April2014.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 113344 bytes Desc: WC_SI_CFP_April2014.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140506/9aa51963/attachment.pdf From swaiev@gmail.com Tue May 6 12:28:41 2014 From: swaiev@gmail.com (Elinami Swai) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 22:28:41 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> Message-ID: I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal > either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the > interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") > is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all > clearly feeling different about it. > > Or was that your point? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: >> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, in >> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, >> others >> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that >> appears to be laughter. >> >> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such >> a >> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >> universal >> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting >> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working >>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed >>> to >>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some >>> interesting details about the Himba. >>> >>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with >>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger >>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that >>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( >>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>> >>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the key >>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" >>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling >>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - >>> these >>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such as >>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>> >>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the >>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on this >>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have begun >>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The >>> Himba >>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools don't >>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able >>> to >>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their >>> cattle >>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really >>> matters >>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one >>> fails >>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to happen >>> to >>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>> >>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>> study, >>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as the >>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might argue >>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>> arguable). >>> >>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. >>> Are >>> emotions universal? >>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are >>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a >>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not >>> universal? >>> >>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture >>> of >>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture >>> is >>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, >>> but >>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology >>> since >>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already defined >>> by >>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very familiar). >>> >>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking >>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of >>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The >>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem to >>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the >>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and >>> force >>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. >>> >>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well Mike >>>> >>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know >>>> where >>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I >>>> am >>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of >>>> the >>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room >>>> here. >>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point >>>> >>> that >>> >>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent >>>> >>> to >>> >>>> the others. >>>> >>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this >>>> research. >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> >> >> > > -- Dr. Elinami Swai Senior Lecturer Associate Dean Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies Faculty of Education Open University of Tanzania P.O.Box 23409 Dar-Es-Salaam Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 Fax:022-2668759 Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ 0230102484 ...this faith will still deliver If you live it first to last Not everything which blooms must wither. Not all that was is past From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue May 6 13:08:12 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 20:08:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C330@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I wonder how this conversation would be different if we used the term species wide instead of universal. Universal has such extraordinary baggage. But doesn't Franz de Waal discuss universal emotions of gorillas? Just a thought. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Elinami Swai [swaiev@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 06, 2014 3:28 PM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal > either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the > interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") > is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all > clearly feeling different about it. > > Or was that your point? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: >> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, in >> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, >> others >> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that >> appears to be laughter. >> >> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such >> a >> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >> universal >> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting >> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working >>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed >>> to >>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some >>> interesting details about the Himba. >>> >>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with >>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger >>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that >>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( >>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>> >>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the key >>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" >>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling >>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - >>> these >>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such as >>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>> >>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the >>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on this >>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have begun >>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The >>> Himba >>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools don't >>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able >>> to >>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their >>> cattle >>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really >>> matters >>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one >>> fails >>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to happen >>> to >>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>> >>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>> study, >>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as the >>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might argue >>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>> arguable). >>> >>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. >>> Are >>> emotions universal? >>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are >>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a >>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not >>> universal? >>> >>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture >>> of >>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture >>> is >>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, >>> but >>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology >>> since >>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already defined >>> by >>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very familiar). >>> >>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking >>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of >>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The >>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem to >>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the >>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and >>> force >>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. >>> >>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well Mike >>>> >>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know >>>> where >>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I >>>> am >>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of >>>> the >>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room >>>> here. >>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point >>>> >>> that >>> >>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent >>>> >>> to >>> >>>> the others. >>>> >>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this >>>> research. >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> >> >> > > -- Dr. Elinami Swai Senior Lecturer Associate Dean Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies Faculty of Education Open University of Tanzania P.O.Box 23409 Dar-Es-Salaam Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 Fax:022-2668759 Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ 0230102484 ...this faith will still deliver If you live it first to last Not everything which blooms must wither. Not all that was is past From ewall@umich.edu Tue May 6 13:19:52 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 15:19:52 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> Message-ID: <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining Emotions. In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation about 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' emotion. Ed Wall On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: >> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal >> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the >> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is >> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not >> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") >> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all >> clearly feeling different about it. >> >> Or was that your point? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, in >>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, >>> others >>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that >>> appears to be laughter. >>> >>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such >>> a >>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >>> universal >>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting >>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working >>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed >>>> to >>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some >>>> interesting details about the Himba. >>>> >>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with >>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger >>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that >>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( >>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>>> >>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the key >>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" >>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling >>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - >>>> these >>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such as >>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>>> >>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the >>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on this >>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have begun >>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The >>>> Himba >>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools don't >>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able >>>> to >>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their >>>> cattle >>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really >>>> matters >>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one >>>> fails >>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to happen >>>> to >>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>>> >>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>>> study, >>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as the >>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might argue >>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>>> arguable). >>>> >>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. >>>> Are >>>> emotions universal? >>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are >>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not >>>> universal? >>>> >>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture >>>> of >>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture >>>> is >>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, >>>> but >>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology >>>> since >>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already defined >>>> by >>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very familiar). >>>> >>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking >>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of >>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem to >>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and >>>> force >>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. >>>> >>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald >>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Well Mike >>>>> >>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know >>>>> where >>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I >>>>> am >>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of >>>>> the >>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room >>>>> here. >>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point >>>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the equivalent >>>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>> the others. >>>>> >>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this >>>>> research. >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue May 6 14:03:16 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 14:03:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed. I started the trouble here by posting the following story which purported to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears to have morphed into personal views of the matter. I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have done so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not appeared so far as I can tell. Back to methodology? mike On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining Emotions. > In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. > > In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation about > 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' emotion. > > Ed Wall > > On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > > > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal > >> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the > >> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > >> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > >> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") > >> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all > >> clearly feeling different about it. > >> > >> Or was that your point? > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> David Kellogg wrote: > >>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, > in > >>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, > >>> others > >>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that > >>> appears to be laughter. > >>> > >>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in > such > >>> a > >>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a > >>> universal > >>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting > >>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>> > >>> > >>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been > working > >>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed > >>>> to > >>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some > >>>> interesting details about the Himba. > >>>> > >>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with > >>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger > >>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that > >>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( > >>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >>>> > >>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the > key > >>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" > >>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling > >>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - > >>>> these > >>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such > as > >>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > >>>> > >>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the > >>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on > this > >>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > begun > >>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The > >>>> Himba > >>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools > don't > >>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > >>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able > >>>> to > >>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their > >>>> cattle > >>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really > >>>> matters > >>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one > >>>> fails > >>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to > happen > >>>> to > >>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > >>>> > >>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > >>>> study, > >>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as > the > >>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > argue > >>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > >>>> arguable). > >>>> > >>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. > >>>> Are > >>>> emotions universal? > >>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists > are > >>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a > >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not > >>>> universal? > >>>> > >>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a > picture > >>>> of > >>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the > picture > >>>> is > >>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, > >>>> but > >>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology > >>>> since > >>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > defined > >>>> by > >>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > familiar). > >>>> > >>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking > >>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of > >>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The > >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem > to > >>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the > >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and > >>>> force > >>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined > domain. > >>>> > >>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < > carolmacdon@gmail.com > >>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Well Mike > >>>>> > >>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know > >>>>> where > >>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: > I > >>>>> am > >>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of > >>>>> the > >>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room > >>>>> here. > >>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point > >>>>> > >>>> that > >>>> > >>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > equivalent > >>>>> > >>>> to > >>>> > >>>>> the others. > >>>>> > >>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > >>>>> research. > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Perhaps of interest > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Dr. Elinami Swai > > Senior Lecturer > > Associate Dean > > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > > Faculty of Education > > Open University of Tanzania > > P.O.Box 23409 > > Dar-Es-Salaam > > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > > Fax:022-2668759 > > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > > 0230102484 > > ...this faith will still deliver > > If you live it first to last > > Not everything which blooms must > > wither. > > Not all that was is past > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Psychological Science-2014-Gendron-911-20.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 640786 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140506/d118b7e6/attachment-0001.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue May 6 15:15:32 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 16:15:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> Message-ID: and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for studying this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece that Mike forwarded: "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, they first identified the action instead of making a mental-state inference?. For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they often used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). Woohoo! -greg On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Ed. > > I started the trouble here by posting the following story which purported > to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears to > have morphed into personal views of the matter. > > I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the > story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have done > so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with > respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not > appeared so far as I can tell. > > Back to methodology? > mike > > > > On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining Emotions. > > In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. > > > > In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation about > > 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' > emotion. > > > > Ed Wall > > > > On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > > > > > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > > > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > > > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > > > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > > > > > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal > > >> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after > the > > >> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > > >> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > > >> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think > "feeling") > > >> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are > all > > >> clearly feeling different about it. > > >> > > >> Or was that your point? > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> David Kellogg wrote: > > >>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing > torture, > > in > > >>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, > > >>> others > > >>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something > that > > >>> appears to be laughter. > > >>> > > >>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in > > such > > >>> a > > >>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a > > >>> universal > > >>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a > sorting > > >>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > > >>> > > >>> David Kellogg > > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been > > working > > >>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students > headed > > >>>> to > > >>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some > > >>>> interesting details about the Himba. > > >>>> > > >>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact > with > > >>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the > larger > > >>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam > that > > >>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors > ( > > >>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > > >>>> > > >>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the > > key > > >>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about > "emotions" > > >>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western > schooling > > >>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - > > >>>> these > > >>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - > such > > as > > >>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > > >>>> > > >>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack > the > > >>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on > > this > > >>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > > begun > > >>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The > > >>>> Himba > > >>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools > > don't > > >>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > > >>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are > able > > >>>> to > > >>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their > > >>>> cattle > > >>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really > > >>>> matters > > >>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If > one > > >>>> fails > > >>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to > > happen > > >>>> to > > >>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > > >>>> > > >>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > > >>>> study, > > >>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as > > the > > >>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > > argue > > >>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > > >>>> arguable). > > >>>> > > >>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your > critique. > > >>>> Are > > >>>> emotions universal? > > >>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists > > are > > >>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a > > >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not > > >>>> universal? > > >>>> > > >>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a > > picture > > >>>> of > > >>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the > > picture > > >>>> is > > >>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as > well, > > >>>> but > > >>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology > > >>>> since > > >>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > > defined > > >>>> by > > >>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > > familiar). > > >>>> > > >>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with > taking > > >>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain > of > > >>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The > > >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that > seem > > to > > >>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the > > >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and > > >>>> force > > >>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined > > domain. > > >>>> > > >>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > > >>>> -greg > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < > > carolmacdon@gmail.com > > >>>> > > >>>>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Well Mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know > > >>>>> where > > >>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the > article: > > I > > >>>>> am > > >>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one > of > > >>>>> the > > >>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room > > >>>>> here. > > >>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to > point > > >>>>> > > >>>> that > > >>>> > > >>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > > equivalent > > >>>>> > > >>>> to > > >>>> > > >>>>> the others. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > > >>>>> research. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Carol > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Perhaps of interest > > >>>>>> mike > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>> > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > >>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> -- > > >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > > >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Dr. Elinami Swai > > > Senior Lecturer > > > Associate Dean > > > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > > > Faculty of Education > > > Open University of Tanzania > > > P.O.Box 23409 > > > Dar-Es-Salaam > > > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > > > Fax:022-2668759 > > > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > > > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > > > 0230102484 > > > ...this faith will still deliver > > > If you live it first to last > > > Not everything which blooms must > > > wither. > > > Not all that was is past > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 6 17:19:03 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 7 May 2014 09:19:03 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> Message-ID: I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six fundamental, irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in laboratories and describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the problem is methodological, or even definitional. And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or "feeling", or "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example pain is a biological universal (something we share with other species, in fact), and that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically (although I think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure idealism, on a par with his statement that material reality is "what is given to us"). I agree with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly mediated by language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of Fet that I once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and when I read it I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating it, including a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the second line). But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation means that they are somehow more subjective and less universal. For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by language, this implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find myself shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went through several translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what sense are you doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the field and you can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of course that's exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on Pedology", which we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech from every other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal until you put it in context. We know that children often assume that animals that make noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot believed that if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do as Doctor Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's version of the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that if a lion could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, because we would not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's speech referred (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" probably includes an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features of the domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, the lioness has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may share pain with lions, but we do not share emotions. For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of Spinoza and Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was somehow "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite the contrary. I think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective than, say, seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what distinguishes language as language is that language does not contain the conditions for its own understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter or a sob of unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions as language are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal is in the gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see in the example of paper money). To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, potentially, less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the example of Himba ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions are actually more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically sharable. It seems that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some way (and no lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry grandmothers). So I think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a precondition for culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation is messy, non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true that there is no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring that language is universally human. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson wrote: > and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for studying > this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece that > Mike forwarded: > > "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe > vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, they > first identified the action instead of making a mental-state inference?. > For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they often > used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). > > > Woohoo! > > -greg > > > > > On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi Ed. > > > > I started the trouble here by posting the following story which purported > > to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. > > > > > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > > > That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears to > > have morphed into personal views of the matter. > > > > I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the > > story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have > done > > so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with > > respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not > > appeared so far as I can tell. > > > > Back to methodology? > > mike > > > > > > > > On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining > Emotions. > > > In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. > > > > > > In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation > about > > > 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' > > emotion. > > > > > > Ed Wall > > > > > > On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > > > > > > > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > > > > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > > > > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > > > > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of > view. > > > > > > > > > > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as > universal > > > >> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after > > the > > > >> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > > > >> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > > > >> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think > > "feeling") > > > >> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are > > all > > > >> clearly feeling different about it. > > > >> > > > >> Or was that your point? > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> David Kellogg wrote: > > > >>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing > > torture, > > > in > > > >>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture > stoically, > > > >>> others > > > >>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something > > that > > > >>> appears to be laughter. > > > >>> > > > >>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in > > > such > > > >>> a > > > >>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a > > > >>> universal > > > >>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a > > sorting > > > >>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > > > >>> > > > >>> David Kellogg > > > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been > > > working > > > >>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students > > headed > > > >>>> to > > > >>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up > some > > > >>>> interesting details about the Himba. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact > > with > > > >>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the > > larger > > > >>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam > > that > > > >>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their > ancestors > > ( > > > >>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of > the > > > key > > > >>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about > > "emotions" > > > >>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western > > schooling > > > >>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach > literacy - > > > >>>> these > > > >>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - > > such > > > as > > > >>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack > > the > > > >>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research > on > > > this > > > >>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > > > begun > > > >>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. > The > > > >>>> Himba > > > >>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools > > > don't > > > >>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > > > >>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are > > able > > > >>>> to > > > >>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of > their > > > >>>> cattle > > > >>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what > really > > > >>>> matters > > > >>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If > > one > > > >>>> fails > > > >>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to > > > happen > > > >>>> to > > > >>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > > > >>>> study, > > > >>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same > as > > > the > > > >>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > > > argue > > > >>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > > > >>>> arguable). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your > > critique. > > > >>>> Are > > > >>>> emotions universal? > > > >>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these > psychologists > > > are > > > >>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in > quite a > > > >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is > not > > > >>>> universal? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a > > > picture > > > >>>> of > > > >>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the > > > picture > > > >>>> is > > > >>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as > > well, > > > >>>> but > > > >>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research > methodology > > > >>>> since > > > >>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > > > defined > > > >>>> by > > > >>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > > > familiar). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with > > taking > > > >>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain > > of > > > >>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). > The > > > >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that > > seem > > > to > > > >>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, > the > > > >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains > and > > > >>>> force > > > >>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined > > > domain. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > > > >>>> -greg > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < > > > carolmacdon@gmail.com > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Well Mike > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to > know > > > >>>>> where > > > >>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the > > article: > > > I > > > >>>>> am > > > >>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one > > of > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the > room > > > >>>>> here. > > > >>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to > > point > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> that > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > > > equivalent > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> to > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> the others. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on > this > > > >>>>> research. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Carol > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Perhaps of interest > > > >>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>> > > > > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> -- > > > >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > > >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > > > >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > > >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> -- > > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > >>>> Assistant Professor > > > >>>> Department of Anthropology > > > >>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > >>>> Brigham Young University > > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Dr. Elinami Swai > > > > Senior Lecturer > > > > Associate Dean > > > > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > > > > Faculty of Education > > > > Open University of Tanzania > > > > P.O.Box 23409 > > > > Dar-Es-Salaam > > > > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > > > > Fax:022-2668759 > > > > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > > > > > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > > > > 0230102484 > > > > ...this faith will still deliver > > > > If you live it first to last > > > > Not everything which blooms must > > > > wither. > > > > Not all that was is past > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 6 18:35:21 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 11:35:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> Message-ID: <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my ear. You could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have to confirm, I hear it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of the time "it does not exist for me." Obviously what is happening on my auditory nerves is the same all the time, but according to whether my attention is on it, it exists or doesn't, for me. (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go into therapy to learn how to ignore it). You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following Manfred Holodynski's usage of these terms. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in opposite senses. "Expression" is something else again. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding > fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six fundamental, > irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in laboratories and > describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the problem is > methodological, or even definitional. > > And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or "feeling", or > "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example pain is a > biological universal (something we share with other species, in fact), and > that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically (although I > think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the > interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure idealism, on a par > with his statement that material reality is "what is given to us"). I agree > with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly mediated by > language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of Fet that I > once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and when I read it > I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating it, including > a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the second line). > But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation means that > they are somehow more subjective and less universal. > > For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by language, this > implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find myself > shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went through several > translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a > translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what sense are you > doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the field and you > can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of course that's > exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) > > Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on Pedology", which > we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech from every > other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal until you put > it in context. We know that children often assume that animals that make > noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot believed that > if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do as Doctor > Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's version of > the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". > > It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that if a lion > could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, because we would > not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's speech referred > (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" probably includes > an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features of the > domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, the lioness > has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may share pain > with lions, but we do not share emotions. > > For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of Spinoza and > Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was somehow > "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite the contrary. I > think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective than, say, > seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), > signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what distinguishes language as > language is that language does not contain the conditions for its own > understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter or a sob of > unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions as language > are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal is in the > gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see in the > example of paper money). > > To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, potentially, > less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the example of Himba > ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions are actually > more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically sharable. It seems > that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some way (and no > lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry grandmothers). So I > think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a precondition for > culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great > bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, > nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation is messy, > non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch > concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true that there is > no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring that language > is universally human. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for studying >> this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece that >> Mike forwarded: >> >> "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe >> vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, they >> first identified the action instead of making a mental-state inference?. >> For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they often >> used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). >> >> >> Woohoo! >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Ed. >>> >>> I started the trouble here by posting the following story which purported >>> to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. >>> >>> >>> >>> >> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >> >>> That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears to >>> have morphed into personal views of the matter. >>> >>> I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the >>> story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have >>> >> done >> >>> so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with >>> respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not >>> appeared so far as I can tell. >>> >>> Back to methodology? >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining >>>> >> Emotions. >> >>>> In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. >>>> >>>> In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation >>>> >> about >> >>>> 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' >>>> >>> emotion. >>> >>>> Ed Wall >>>> >>>> On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also >>>>> believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned >>>>> and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make >>>>> interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of >>>>> >> view. >> >>>>> On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as >>>>>> >> universal >> >>>>>> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after >>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is >>>>>> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not >>>>>> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think >>>>>> >>> "feeling") >>> >>>>>> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are >>>>>> >>> all >>> >>>>>> clearly feeling different about it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Or was that your point? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing >>>>>>> >>> torture, >>> >>>> in >>>> >>>>>>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture >>>>>>> >> stoically, >> >>>>>>> others >>>>>>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something >>>>>>> >>> that >>> >>>>>>> appears to be laughter. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in >>>>>>> >>>> such >>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a >>>>>>> >>> sorting >>> >>>>>>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson >>>>>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been >>>>>>>> >>>> working >>>> >>>>>>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students >>>>>>>> >>> headed >>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up >>>>>>>> >> some >> >>>>>>>> interesting details about the Himba. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact >>>>>>>> >>> with >>> >>>>>>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the >>>>>>>> >>> larger >>> >>>>>>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam >>>>>>>> >>> that >>> >>>>>>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their >>>>>>>> >> ancestors >> >>> ( >>> >>>>>>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of >>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>> key >>>> >>>>>>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about >>>>>>>> >>> "emotions" >>> >>>>>>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western >>>>>>>> >>> schooling >>> >>>>>>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach >>>>>>>> >> literacy - >> >>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - >>>>>>>> >>> such >>> >>>> as >>>> >>>>>>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack >>>>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research >>>>>>>> >> on >> >>>> this >>>> >>>>>>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have >>>>>>>> >>>> begun >>>> >>>>>>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. >>>>>>>> >> The >> >>>>>>>> Himba >>>>>>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools >>>>>>>> >>>> don't >>>> >>>>>>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>>>>>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are >>>>>>>> >>> able >>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of >>>>>>>> >> their >> >>>>>>>> cattle >>>>>>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what >>>>>>>> >> really >> >>>>>>>> matters >>>>>>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If >>>>>>>> >>> one >>> >>>>>>>> fails >>>>>>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to >>>>>>>> >>>> happen >>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>>>>>>> study, >>>>>>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same >>>>>>>> >> as >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might >>>>>>>> >>>> argue >>>> >>>>>>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>>>>>>> arguable). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your >>>>>>>> >>> critique. >>> >>>>>>>> Are >>>>>>>> emotions universal? >>>>>>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these >>>>>>>> >> psychologists >> >>>> are >>>> >>>>>>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in >>>>>>>> >> quite a >> >>>>>>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is >>>>>>>> >> not >> >>>>>>>> universal? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a >>>>>>>> >>>> picture >>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the >>>>>>>> >>>> picture >>>> >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as >>>>>>>> >>> well, >>> >>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research >>>>>>>> >> methodology >> >>>>>>>> since >>>>>>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already >>>>>>>> >>>> defined >>>> >>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very >>>>>>>> >>>> familiar). >>>> >>>>>>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with >>>>>>>> >>> taking >>> >>>>>>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain >>>>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). >>>>>>>> >> The >> >>>>>>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that >>>>>>>> >>> seem >>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>>>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, >>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains >>>>>>>> >> and >> >>>>>>>> force >>>>>>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined >>>>>>>> >>>> domain. >>>> >>>>>>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < >>>>>>>> >>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Well Mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to >>>>>>>>> >> know >> >>>>>>>>> where >>>>>>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the >>>>>>>>> >>> article: >>> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one >>>>>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the >>>>>>>>> >> room >> >>>>>>>>> here. >>>>>>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to >>>>>>>>> >>> point >>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the >>>>>>>>> >>>> equivalent >>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the others. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on >>>>>>>>> >> this >> >>>>>>>>> research. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>>> Senior Lecturer >>>>> Associate Dean >>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>>> Faculty of Education >>>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>>> >>>>> >> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >> >>>>> 0230102484 >>>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>>> If you live it first to last >>>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>>> wither. >>>>> Not all that was is past >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue May 6 18:47:51 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 6 May 2014 18:47:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> Message-ID: On universality of emotions. There is no substitute for reading the original, but here is a quick summary of a discussion of litost, a Czech term. mike ------ http://archives.dailynews.lk/2008/11/07/fea15.asp On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 6:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my ear. You > could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have to confirm, I hear > it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of the time "it does not exist > for me." Obviously what is happening on my auditory nerves is the same all > the time, but according to whether my attention is on it, it exists or > doesn't, for me. (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go > into therapy to learn how to ignore it). > You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. > https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > > And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following Manfred > Holodynski's usage of these terms. > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf > Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in opposite > senses. "Expression" is something else again. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding >> fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six fundamental, >> irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in laboratories and >> describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the problem is >> methodological, or even definitional. >> >> And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or "feeling", or >> "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example pain is a >> biological universal (something we share with other species, in fact), and >> that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically (although I >> think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the >> interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure idealism, on a par >> with his statement that material reality is "what is given to us"). I >> agree >> with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly mediated by >> language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of Fet that I >> once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and when I read >> it >> I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating it, >> including >> a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the second line). >> But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation means that >> they are somehow more subjective and less universal. >> >> For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by language, this >> implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find myself >> shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went through >> several >> translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a >> translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what sense are you >> doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the field and you >> can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of course that's >> exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) >> >> Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on Pedology", which >> we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech from every >> other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal until you put >> it in context. We know that children often assume that animals that make >> noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot believed that >> if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do as Doctor >> Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's version of >> the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". >> >> It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that if a lion >> could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, because we would >> not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's speech referred >> (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" probably includes >> an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features of the >> domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, the lioness >> has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may share pain >> with lions, but we do not share emotions. >> >> For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of Spinoza and >> Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was somehow >> "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite the contrary. >> I >> think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective than, say, >> seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), >> signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what distinguishes language >> as >> language is that language does not contain the conditions for its own >> understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter or a sob of >> unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions as language >> are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal is in the >> gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see in the >> example of paper money). >> >> To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, potentially, >> less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the example of Himba >> ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions are actually >> more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically sharable. It >> seems >> that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some way (and no >> lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry grandmothers). So I >> think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a precondition for >> culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great >> bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, >> nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation is messy, >> non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch >> concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true that there is >> no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring that >> language >> is universally human. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >> >>> and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for >>> studying >>> this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece >>> that >>> Mike forwarded: >>> >>> "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe >>> vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, >>> they >>> first identified the action instead of making a mental-state inference?. >>> For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they often >>> used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). >>> >>> >>> Woohoo! >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Ed. >>>> >>>> I started the trouble here by posting the following story which >>>> purported >>>> to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>> >>>> That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears >>>> to >>>> have morphed into personal views of the matter. >>>> >>>> I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the >>>> story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have >>>> >>>> >>> done >>> >>> >>>> so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with >>>> respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not >>>> appeared so far as I can tell. >>>> >>>> Back to methodology? >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Emotions. >>> >>> >>>> In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. >>>>> >>>>> In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation >>>>> >>>>> >>>> about >>> >>> >>>> 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' >>>>> >>>>> >>>> emotion. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also >>>>>> believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned >>>>>> and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make >>>>>> interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> view. >>> >>> >>>> On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> universal >>> >>> >>>> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is >>>>>>> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not >>>>>>> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> "feeling") >>>> >>>> >>>>> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> all >>>> >>>> >>>>> clearly feeling different about it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or was that your point? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> torture, >>>> >>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> stoically, >>> >>> >>>> others >>>>>>>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>> appears to be laughter. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> such >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> sorting >>>> >>>> >>>>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> working >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> headed >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> some >>> >>> >>>> interesting details about the Himba. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> larger >>>> >>>> >>>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ancestors >>> >>> >>>> ( >>>> >>>> >>>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> key >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "emotions" >>>> >>>> >>>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> schooling >>>> >>>> >>>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> literacy - >>> >>> >>>> these >>>>>>>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> such >>>> >>>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on >>> >>> >>>> this >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> begun >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>> >>> >>>> Himba >>>>>>>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> don't >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>>>>>>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> able >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> their >>> >>> >>>> cattle >>>>>>>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> really >>> >>> >>>> matters >>>>>>>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> one >>>> >>>> >>>>> fails >>>>>>>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> happen >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>>>>>>>> study, >>>>>>>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as >>> >>> >>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> argue >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>>>>>>>> arguable). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> critique. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Are >>>>>>>>> emotions universal? >>>>>>>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> psychologists >>> >>> >>>> are >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> quite a >>> >>> >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> not >>> >>> >>>> universal? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> picture >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> picture >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> well, >>>> >>>> >>>>> but >>>>>>>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> methodology >>> >>> >>>> since >>>>>>>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> defined >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> familiar). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> taking >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>> >>> >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seem >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>> >>> >>>> force >>>>>>>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> domain. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> know >>> >>> >>>> where >>>>>>>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> article: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> room >>> >>> >>>> here. >>>>>>>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> point >>>> >>>> >>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the others. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> this >>> >>> >>>> research. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>> >>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>>>> Senior Lecturer >>>>>> Associate Dean >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>>>> Faculty of Education >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>> >>> >>>> 0230102484 >>>>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>>>> If you live it first to last >>>>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>>>> wither. >>>>>> Not all that was is past >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 7 16:44:04 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 08:44:04 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy-- Sorry--I'm not following. You are saying that your tintinnatus only exists when you are interpreting it, yes? And the same thing goes for, say, Smetana's tintinnatus, which appears, without his knowledge, in many of his operas and which eventually drove him mad? What about torture? You are arguing that torture only exists when we interpret it as torture? I can tell you--from some first hand observations made in the early eighties--that it ain't so. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 7 May 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my ear. You > could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have to confirm, I hear > it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of the time "it does not exist > for me." Obviously what is happening on my auditory nerves is the same all > the time, but according to whether my attention is on it, it exists or > doesn't, for me. (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go > into therapy to learn how to ignore it). > You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. > https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > > And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following Manfred > Holodynski's usage of these terms. > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf > Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in opposite > senses. "Expression" is something else again. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding >> fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six fundamental, >> irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in laboratories and >> describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the problem is >> methodological, or even definitional. >> >> And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or "feeling", or >> "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example pain is a >> biological universal (something we share with other species, in fact), and >> that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically (although I >> think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the >> interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure idealism, on a par >> with his statement that material reality is "what is given to us"). I >> agree >> with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly mediated by >> language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of Fet that I >> once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and when I read >> it >> I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating it, >> including >> a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the second line). >> But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation means that >> they are somehow more subjective and less universal. >> >> For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by language, this >> implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find myself >> shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went through >> several >> translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a >> translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what sense are you >> doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the field and you >> can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of course that's >> exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) >> >> Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on Pedology", which >> we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech from every >> other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal until you put >> it in context. We know that children often assume that animals that make >> noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot believed that >> if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do as Doctor >> Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's version of >> the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". >> >> It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that if a lion >> could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, because we would >> not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's speech referred >> (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" probably includes >> an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features of the >> domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, the lioness >> has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may share pain >> with lions, but we do not share emotions. >> >> For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of Spinoza and >> Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was somehow >> "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite the contrary. >> I >> think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective than, say, >> seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), >> signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what distinguishes language >> as >> language is that language does not contain the conditions for its own >> understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter or a sob of >> unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions as language >> are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal is in the >> gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see in the >> example of paper money). >> >> To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, potentially, >> less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the example of Himba >> ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions are actually >> more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically sharable. It >> seems >> that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some way (and no >> lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry grandmothers). So I >> think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a precondition for >> culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great >> bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, >> nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation is messy, >> non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch >> concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true that there is >> no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring that >> language >> is universally human. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >> >>> and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for >>> studying >>> this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece >>> that >>> Mike forwarded: >>> >>> "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe >>> vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, >>> they >>> first identified the action instead of making a mental-state inference?. >>> For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they often >>> used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). >>> >>> >>> Woohoo! >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Ed. >>>> >>>> I started the trouble here by posting the following story which >>>> purported >>>> to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>> >>>> That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears >>>> to >>>> have morphed into personal views of the matter. >>>> >>>> I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the >>>> story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have >>>> >>>> >>> done >>> >>> >>>> so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with >>>> respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not >>>> appeared so far as I can tell. >>>> >>>> Back to methodology? >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Emotions. >>> >>> >>>> In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. >>>>> >>>>> In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation >>>>> >>>>> >>>> about >>> >>> >>>> 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' >>>>> >>>>> >>>> emotion. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also >>>>>> believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned >>>>>> and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make >>>>>> interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> view. >>> >>> >>>> On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> universal >>> >>> >>>> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is >>>>>>> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not >>>>>>> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> "feeling") >>>> >>>> >>>>> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> all >>>> >>>> >>>>> clearly feeling different about it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or was that your point? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> torture, >>>> >>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> stoically, >>> >>> >>>> others >>>>>>>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>> appears to be laughter. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> such >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> sorting >>>> >>>> >>>>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> working >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> headed >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> some >>> >>> >>>> interesting details about the Himba. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> larger >>>> >>>> >>>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ancestors >>> >>> >>>> ( >>>> >>>> >>>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> key >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "emotions" >>>> >>>> >>>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> schooling >>>> >>>> >>>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> literacy - >>> >>> >>>> these >>>>>>>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> such >>>> >>>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on >>> >>> >>>> this >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> begun >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>> >>> >>>> Himba >>>>>>>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> don't >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>>>>>>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> able >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> their >>> >>> >>>> cattle >>>>>>>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> really >>> >>> >>>> matters >>>>>>>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> one >>>> >>>> >>>>> fails >>>>>>>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> happen >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>>>>>>>> study, >>>>>>>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as >>> >>> >>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> argue >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>>>>>>>> arguable). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> critique. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Are >>>>>>>>> emotions universal? >>>>>>>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> psychologists >>> >>> >>>> are >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> quite a >>> >>> >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> not >>> >>> >>>> universal? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> picture >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> picture >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> well, >>>> >>>> >>>>> but >>>>>>>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> methodology >>> >>> >>>> since >>>>>>>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> defined >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> familiar). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> taking >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>> >>> >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seem >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>> >>> >>>> force >>>>>>>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> domain. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> know >>> >>> >>>> where >>>>>>>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> article: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> room >>> >>> >>>> here. >>>>>>>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> point >>>> >>>> >>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the others. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> this >>> >>> >>>> research. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>> >>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>>>> Senior Lecturer >>>>>> Associate Dean >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>>>> Faculty of Education >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>> >>> >>>> 0230102484 >>>>>> ...this faith will still deliver >>>>>> If you live it first to last >>>>>> Not everything which blooms must >>>>>> wither. >>>>>> Not all that was is past >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed May 7 18:38:07 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 08 May 2014 11:38:07 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> Message-ID: <536ADFFF.8080907@mira.net> You are very confused, David. My apologies for any contribution I have made to that. Firstly, tinnitus. Tinnitus is a condition of the audial nerves and although it can be acute and transitory, the case I have is permanent. My audial nerves are always in this condition. This is a physiological fact. But my consciousness of it, including my feeling of it and even the sensation of ringing in the ears is dependent on other aspects of my consciousness, i.e., my attention. Consciousness is different and distinct from physiological conditions. I cannot abolish the ringing. It is always there, but I can ignore it so that it does not exist /within my consciousness/. This is, I know, something which the advocates of "embedded consciousness" and "thoroughgoing materialism" and all the enemies of "Cartesianism" deny. But I experience it every day. Secondly, torture. Torture is /an activity/ in which one or a number of people engage when they purposively inflict pain on another person. This usually involves inflicting physiological effects on the subject. These are facts, objective existences, which cannot be overcome by interpretation, either of the subject or paricipants, or by George Bush or right-wing journalists. But the consciousness arising from this activity in both subject and torturer is dependent on their overall psychological condition, their consciousness. As Franz Fanon has shown it is often the torturer who goes insane and the subject who flourishes. But I am sure in all case, the subject experiences sensations of pain (unlike my experience with tinnitus). But this will have /very different qualities/ according to how it is interpreted. I am sure that living there in Korea you have had plenty of opportunity to observe how the experience of pain can be "overcome" and under appropriate conditions, and up to a point, even be enjoyable. If you are not a martial arts practicioner, just have a good stretch for example. The point is that consciousness arises from the activity of the subject, not physiology as such, even if this distinction is often immaterial. That is why Marx said, in the very first words of "marxism": "The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the Object, actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. " and it is in that sense, that I am happy to wear the label of "idealist." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Andy-- > > Sorry--I'm not following. You are saying that your tintinnatus only > exists when you are interpreting it, yes? And the same thing goes for, > say, Smetana's tintinnatus, which appears, without his knowledge, in > many of his operas and which eventually drove him mad? > > What about torture? You are arguing that torture only exists when we > interpret it as torture? I can tell you--from some first hand > observations made in the early eighties--that it ain't so. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 7 May 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my > ear. You could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have > to confirm, I hear it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of > the time "it does not exist for me." Obviously what is happening > on my auditory nerves is the same all the time, but according to > whether my attention is on it, it exists or doesn't, for me. > (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go into > therapy to learn how to ignore it). > You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. > https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > > And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following > Manfred Holodynski's usage of these terms. > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf > Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in > opposite senses. "Expression" is something else again. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding > fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six > fundamental, > irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in > laboratories and > describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the > problem is > methodological, or even definitional. > > And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or > "feeling", or > "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example > pain is a > biological universal (something we share with other species, > in fact), and > that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically > (although I > think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the > interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure > idealism, on a par > with his statement that material reality is "what is given to > us"). I agree > with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly > mediated by > language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of > Fet that I > once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and > when I read it > I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating > it, including > a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the > second line). > But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation > means that > they are somehow more subjective and less universal. > > For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by > language, this > implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find > myself > shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went > through several > translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a > translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what > sense are you > doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the > field and you > can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of > course that's > exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) > > Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on > Pedology", which > we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech > from every > other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal > until you put > it in context. We know that children often assume that animals > that make > noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot > believed that > if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do > as Doctor > Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's > version of > the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". > > It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that > if a lion > could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, > because we would > not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's > speech referred > (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" > probably includes > an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features > of the > domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, > the lioness > has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may > share pain > with lions, but we do not share emotions. > > For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of > Spinoza and > Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was > somehow > "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite > the contrary. I > think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective > than, say, > seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), > signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what > distinguishes language as > language is that language does not contain the conditions for > its own > understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter > or a sob of > unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions > as language > are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal > is in the > gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see > in the > example of paper money). > > To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, > potentially, > less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the > example of Himba > ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions > are actually > more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically > sharable. It seems > that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some > way (and no > lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry > grandmothers). So I > think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a > precondition for > culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great > bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, > nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation > is messy, > non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch > concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true > that there is > no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring > that language > is universally human. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > and speaking to my previous point about problems with > methods for studying > this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy > Science piece that > Mike forwarded: > > "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency > to describe > vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on > most trials, they > first identified the action instead of making a > mental-state inference?. > For example, instead of describing a vocalization as > fearful, they often > used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). > > > Woohoo! > > -greg > > > > > On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > Hi Ed. > > I started the trouble here by posting the following > story which purported > to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. > > > > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > > That post started a discussion that began with > methodology and appears to > have morphed into personal views of the matter. > > I promised in the original post to find the article > referred to in the > story, but got caught up in other matters and let it > go. I should have > > > done > > > so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view > now, misleading with > respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper > in Emotion has not > appeared so far as I can tell. > > Back to methodology? > mike > > > > On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall > > wrote: > > > > Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited > volume Explaining > > > Emotions. > > > In any case, emotion is a large category as is > expression. > > In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the > ongoing conversation > > > about > > > 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, > perhaps, 'experiencing' > > > emotion. > > > Ed Wall > > On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > > > > I believe that pain, just like feeling is > universal. But I also > believe that emotion (which we can also call > expression) is learned > and thus may differ from one individual to > another. We make > interpretations of emotion and expression from > our own points of > > > view. > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > David, although I am sure that sensations > cannot be taken as > > > universal > > > either, since it is unlikely that there is > anything remaining after > > > the > > > interprettion of the "sensation" is > abstracted. However, it is > nonetheless a different claim to say that > human sensation is not > universal, as to say human emotion (by > which is meant I think > > > "feeling") > > > is not universal. Let's suppose all are > experiencing pain: they are > > > all > > > clearly feeling different about it. > > Or was that your point? > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > > Suppose I put together a set of > pictures of people undergoing > > > torture, > > > in > > > which some people appeared to be > experiencing the torture > > > stoically, > > > others > with resignation, still others with > agony, and some with something > > > that > > > appears to be laughter. > > I think I could probably crop the > photographs and pose questions in > > > such > > > a > way that I could very convincingly > demonstrate that pain is not a > universal > human sensation. Not only that, I > could probably put together a > > > sorting > > > exercise that would come to the same > conclusion. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > I have a colleague down the hall, > David Crandall, that has been > > > working > > > among the Himba for almost 30 > years. I also have three students > > > headed > > > to > do research among the Himba in a > month. So I've been picking up > > > some > > > interesting details about the Himba. > > It seems like it is true that they > have increasingly had contact > > > with > > > Western culture, as evidenced by > recent protests in some of the > > > larger > > > cities that were staged by Himba > opposed to the building of a dam > > > that > > > would cause flooding of some of > the burial sites of their > > > ancestors > > > ( > > > http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > > At the same time, they are > non-numerate people that lack some of > > > the > > > key > > > Western institutions where kids > learn (oddly enough) about > > > "emotions" > > > (think of those pictures of happy > and sad faces that Western > > > schooling > > > takes into the classroom as the > MEANS by which they teach > > > literacy - > > > these > means of teaching literacy always > entail certain cultural ends - > > > such > > > as > > > "emotion" - concepts that are not > emic concepts). > > Among the western institutions > that the Himba lack, the Himba lack > > > the > > > Western model of schooling (one of > my students is doing research > > > on > > > this > > > very issue). It is only in the > last 15 years or so that Himba have > > > begun > > > sending their children to school, > and now only in small numbers. > > > The > > > Himba > are very skeptical of schools > since, in their opinion, the schools > > > don't > > > teach their children anything > worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > unimportant to them since although > they are non-numerate they are > > > able > > > to > keep track of large herds of > cattle because they know each of > > > their > > > cattle > individually and can recognize > when one is missing. But what > > > really > > > matters > are things like knowing how to > properly honor one's ancestors. If > > > one > > > fails > to do that properly, then then > ancestors will cause bad things to > > > happen > > > to > oneself. That is much more > important than knowing how to count. > > Carol, I also agree with your > concerns with the methodology of the > study, > it may not be reasonable to assume > that this research is the same > > > as > > > the > > > Ekman tasks and of-course it is a > Western-type task (but one might > > > argue > > > that it is less so than the Ekman > tasks since it is more open, > arguable). > > So Carol, I wonder what > conclusions you would draw from your > > > critique. > > > Are > emotions universal? > I wonder if there is a further > possibility that these > > > psychologists > > > are > > > missing. Is it possible that > "emotions" are not universal in > > > quite a > > > different sense? Perhaps that the > very category of "emotion" is > > > not > > > universal? > > I think this research points in > that direction - when viewing a > > > picture > > > of > a face, people do not necessarily > assume that the person in the > > > picture > > > is > "emoting". I assume that this > would be true among Westerners as > > > well, > > > but > that possibility doesn't present > itself in the research > > > methodology > > > since > Westerners are asked "what emotion > is this?" The task is already > > > defined > > > by > the domain called "emotion" (with > which they are already very > > > familiar). > > > Anthropologists have done great > work to show the problems with > > > taking > > > Western defined domains into > non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain > > > of > > > "kinship" - David Schneider, the > domain of "color" - John Lucy). > > > The > > > argument is that even though this > research turns up results that > > > seem > > > to > > > suggest that the domains are real > even in non-Western contexts, > > > the > > > findings are plagued by the fact > that they assume these domains > > > and > > > force > these non-Western subjects into > choosing within the pre-defined > > > domain. > > > But then again, perhaps "emotion" > is a universal category? > -greg > > > > > On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, > Carol Macdonald < > > > carolmacdon@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > Well Mike > > I am here working in Namibia > for the year, and I would like to > > > know > > > where > these Himba people are. I > mean the ones referred to in the > > > article: > > > I > > > am > not sure they are *so > *isolated - they are well > recognised as one > > > of > > > the > language groups. And I think > there is also an elephant in the > > > room > > > here. > This is a western-type task, > and Luria would have been quick to > > > point > > > that > > > > out. What makes this woman > think that this task would be the > > > equivalent > > > to > > > > the others. > > Just a couple of basic > principles to cast a small > aspersion on > > > this > > > research. > > Carol > > > On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > > > Perhaps of interest > mike > > > > > > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: > Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > > > > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > > > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu May 8 03:49:17 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 08 May 2014 06:49:17 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions Message-ID: David, How would you interpret self mutilation and sacrifice for a god would that be torture? ?This argument appears to rest on whether it is an etic or emic view. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: David Kellogg
Date:05/07/2014 7:44 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: Andy Blunden ,"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions
Andy-- Sorry--I'm not following. You are saying that your tintinnatus only exists when you are interpreting it, yes? And the same thing goes for, say, Smetana's tintinnatus, which appears, without his knowledge, in many of his operas and which eventually drove him mad? What about torture? You are arguing that torture only exists when we interpret it as torture? I can tell you--from some first hand observations made in the early eighties--that it ain't so. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 7 May 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my ear. You > could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have to confirm, I hear > it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of the time "it does not exist > for me." Obviously what is happening on my auditory nerves is the same all > the time, but according to whether my attention is on it, it exists or > doesn't, for me. (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go > into therapy to learn how to ignore it). > You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. > https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > > And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following Manfred > Holodynski's usage of these terms. > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf > Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in opposite > senses. "Expression" is something else again. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding >> fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six fundamental, >> irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in laboratories and >> describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the problem is >> methodological, or even definitional. >> >> And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or "feeling", or >> "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example pain is a >> biological universal (something we share with other species, in fact), and >> that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically (although I >> think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the >> interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure idealism, on a par >> with his statement that material reality is "what is given to us"). I >> agree >> with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly mediated by >> language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of Fet that I >> once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and when I read >> it >> I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating it, >> including >> a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the second line). >> But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation means that >> they are somehow more subjective and less universal. >> >> For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by language, this >> implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find myself >> shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went through >> several >> translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a >> translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what sense are you >> doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the field and you >> can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of course that's >> exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) >> >> Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on Pedology", which >> we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech from every >> other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal until you put >> it in context. We know that children often assume that animals that make >> noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot believed that >> if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do as Doctor >> Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's version of >> the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". >> >> It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that if a lion >> could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, because we would >> not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's speech referred >> (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" probably includes >> an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features of the >> domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, the lioness >> has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may share pain >> with lions, but we do not share emotions. >> >> For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of Spinoza and >> Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was somehow >> "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite the contrary. >> I >> think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective than, say, >> seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), >> signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what distinguishes language >> as >> language is that language does not contain the conditions for its own >> understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter or a sob of >> unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions as language >> are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal is in the >> gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see in the >> example of paper money). >> >> To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, potentially, >> less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the example of Himba >> ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions are actually >> more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically sharable. It >> seems >> that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some way (and no >> lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry grandmothers). So I >> think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a precondition for >> culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great >> bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, >> nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation is messy, >> non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch >> concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true that there is >> no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring that >> language >> is universally human. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >> >>> and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for >>> studying >>> this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece >>> that >>> Mike forwarded: >>> >>> "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe >>> vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, >>> they >>> first identified the action instead of making a mental-state inference?. >>> For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they often >>> used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). >>> >>> >>> Woohoo! >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Ed. >>>> >>>> I started the trouble here by posting the following story which >>>> purported >>>> to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>> >>>> That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears >>>> to >>>> have morphed into personal views of the matter. >>>> >>>> I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the >>>> story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have >>>> >>>> >>> done >>> >>> >>>> so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading with >>>> respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has not >>>> appeared so far as I can tell. >>>> >>>> Back to methodology? >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Emotions. >>> >>> >>>> In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. >>>>> >>>>> In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation >>>>> >>>>> >>>> about >>> >>> >>>> 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' >>>>> >>>>> >>>> emotion. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> On May 6, 2014, at? 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also >>>>>> believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned >>>>>> and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make >>>>>> interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> view. >>> >>> >>>> On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> universal >>> >>> >>>> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is >>>>>>> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not >>>>>>> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> "feeling") >>>> >>>> >>>>> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> all >>>> >>>> >>>>> clearly feeling different about it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or was that your point? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> torture, >>>> >>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> stoically, >>> >>> >>>> others >>>>>>>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>> appears to be laughter. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> such >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a >>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> sorting >>>> >>>> >>>>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> working >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> headed >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> some >>> >>> >>>> interesting details about the Himba. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> larger >>>> >>>> >>>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ancestors >>> >>> >>>> ( >>>> >>>> >>>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> key >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "emotions" >>>> >>>> >>>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> schooling >>>> >>>> >>>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> literacy - >>> >>> >>>> these >>>>>>>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> such >>>> >>>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on >>> >>> >>>> this >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> begun >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>> >>> >>>> Himba >>>>>>>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> don't >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >>>>>>>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> able >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> their >>> >>> >>>> cattle >>>>>>>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> really >>> >>> >>>> matters >>>>>>>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> one >>>> >>>> >>>>> fails >>>>>>>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> happen >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the >>>>>>>>> study, >>>>>>>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as >>> >>> >>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> argue >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, >>>>>>>>> arguable). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> critique. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Are >>>>>>>>> emotions universal? >>>>>>>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> psychologists >>> >>> >>>> are >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> quite a >>> >>> >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> not >>> >>> >>>> universal? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> picture >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> picture >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> well, >>>> >>>> >>>>> but >>>>>>>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> methodology >>> >>> >>>> since >>>>>>>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> defined >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> familiar). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> taking >>>> >>>> >>>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The >>> >>> >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seem >>>> >>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>> >>> >>>> force >>>>>>>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> domain. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> know >>> >>> >>>> where >>>>>>>>>> these Himba people are.? I mean the ones referred to in the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> article: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> language groups.? And I think there is also an elephant in the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> room >>> >>> >>>> here. >>>>>>>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> point >>>> >>>> >>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the others. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> this >>> >>> >>>> research. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps of interest >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >>> >>> >>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Carol A? Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher,? and Editor >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai >>>>>> Senior Lecturer >>>>>> Associate Dean >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >>>>>> Faculty of Education >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >>> >>> >>>> 0230102484 >>>>>>??????? ...this faith will still deliver >>>>>>??????? If you live it first to last >>>>>>??????? Not everything which blooms must >>>>>>??????? wither. >>>>>>??????? Not all that was is past >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From smago@uga.edu Thu May 8 05:49:45 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 12:49:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] new book of possible interest Message-ID: <6b01533f57ac4c4d81922e4bb4a7db85@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> The Practice of Teachers' Professional Development A Cultural-Historical Approach Helen Grimmett (Monash University, Australia) This book uses Vygotsky's cultural-historical theory to provide a unique theorisation of teachers' professional development as a practice. A practice can be described as the socially structured actions set up to produce a product or service aimed at meeting a collective human need. In this case, collaborative, interventionist work with teachers in ... Click here for a free preview and full description. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 8 15:14:01 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 9 May 2014 07:14:01 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: (First of all--many thanks to Peter and above all to Helen, who often lurks in these waters--I just read the preview, and I'm ordering her wonderful book for our library and our teachers.) A while ago there was some discussion on xmca about whether graphic descriptions of torture should carry a warning. I think Jen and I were alone in arguing that they probably should, because some people really do have uncontrollable reactions to verbal stimuli. If you are one such, this post does contain such, so skip it or at least postpone it to well after breakfast. I certainly agree with Andy that he is confusing, and to the extent that my mental activity is the product of his verbal stimuli, I suppose that makes me, by his definition, very confused. He writes: "Obviously (?) what is happening on my auditory nerves is the same all the time, but according to whether my attention is on it (?), it (??) exists or doesn't, for me. (Thank Christ! Some people find it (???) hard to ignore and go into therapy to learn how to ignore it (????)." It's not at all obvious to me that the word "it" refers to the same thing here. My (confused-by-Andy) interpretation is that the first time Andy says "it" he means what is happening on the auditory nerves, but the second time he uses it he means something like what is happening on the auditory nerves and is contained in Andy's working attention. But with the words "for me" (perhaps they should really be "by me") the issue of whether the sufferer's working attention is under volitional control arises, and that is where Vygotskyan psychology really begins. We may confidently surmise that Christ will have very little to do with his explanation (Vygotsky being Jewish). Have a listen to Mariss Janssons, conducting Smetana's well-known overture to his comic opera, the Bartered Bride: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmHqslLbpyY Notice how, after the initial theme, the noodling of the strings gradually rises and falls (in some versions it actually disappears, but it's clear from the score that this was not Smetana's intention, and I think the Berlin Phil has it just about right here). At first it was thought that Smetana copped this noodling from a folk tune, along with almost all the themes of the opera that was to follow (unlike most overtures, this one was written first, and it has a planning function rather than serving as a waste basket or an abstract).. No such folk tune was ever found, either in Smetana's archives or in the wild. However, similar noodlings occur in almost all of his music, and they reach a crescendo in his later productions when he suffered so much from tinnitus that in 1874 he resigned his position as director of the Prague Opera and repair to an insane asylum for treatment and death. This is an early work--well before Smetana spoke of his tinnitus, and certainly well before he spoke of his tinnitus driving him in the direction of suicide. But I think we can say that when we listen that his tinnitus exists for us, and that therefore it probably existed for him as well. If Andy says that it does not, I think that what this shows is that Andy has a model of the mind rather similar to that of Hilary Putnam (and Putnam acribes this model to Thomas Aquinas): the mind simply contains a kind of processor and whatever happens to be in its working memory and working attention at the moment, with all the other material offloaded into artifacts, including a kind of random access memory located somewhere in the brain. The word "exist", containing as it does the word "it", is a little unfortunate here for two reasons. First of all, unlike most uses of the verb "to be", it's intransitive: it implies only one "be-er". Secondly, unlike the verb "to become" it implies a discontinuity: something either exists or it doesn't. When I listen to the results of Smetana's tinnitus, my relation to it is much more like any other use of "to be"--there are at least two be-ers, or one be-er and one be-ed, or one be-er and one be-ing (as in "it is soft/loud (attribute)" or "it is a kind of dance (classifier)" or "it is the Overture to the Bartered Bride (identifier)". Behind that second "be-er"--attribute, classifier, or identifier--I find a long chain of other be-ers, including, eventually, poor old Bedrich Smetana and his tintinnabulations. When I was in my early twenties, I hitch-hiked through Homs in Syria (the town which was yesterday evacuated to government forces, and which some say gave its name to "hummus"). Then, as now, northern Syria was in revolt, with some areas held by the Muslim Brotherhood and others by a coalition of more secular groups. There was also a very violent government-backed milita, led by the president's brother Rifaat Assad, charged with taking back control of Homs, Hama (later virtually wiped off the map) and Aleppo. I was arrested, along with some friends in the Riyad Turk faction of the Syrian Communist Party who had--I thought mistakenly--supported the revolt. Because I had an American passport, it was almost immediately realized, even in the heat of war, that I was not really torturable. Although there was a lot of fighting and confusion (about eight thousand people were killed that day, I later learned) I think that the militia men never lost sight of this crucial fact. For example, I spent the first few hours of my confinement handcuffed to a friend while they removed his fingernails with pliers. My blindfold was removed during the operation, because the police obviously wanted me to witness it. But I still have all my fingernails to this day. I spent the next couple of months in a series of prisons, first in Aleppo and then in Damascus. In Aleppo I was in a big common cell, with sixty other prisoners, including both Muslim Brothers and Communists. There was a cell outside where they would take us, one by one, for waterboarding. But I was never taken--and the nickname that my cellmates gave me ("Al Azhnavi", or "the outsider") suggested that I was, as Graham Greene would have said, not a member of the torturable class. I certainly felt that I was not torturable; I noticed that the feelings I had listening to torture, even torture of my friends and comrades, was very different from the feelings I had the night that the Muslim Brotherhood stormed the prison and fired their weapons into our cells, apparently oblivious to the fact that their own comrades were inside. Neither was the effect of direct sensation, but I would certainly not say that either was voluntary. In Damascus I was in solitary for fifty-five days, but it was in a cell underneath an interrogation room where they administered "dullab" (that is, they put you in a blown up inner-tube and beat the bottoms of your feet and genitals with a truncheon). Again, the feelings I had listening to the sessions of "dullab" were not under my voluntary control, yet they were still very different from the feelings that the direct participants had. After solitary I was moved back to a common cell with several dozen other prisoners (including non-politicals). I suffered a lot from huge boils under my skin (these are the only scars I have from the whole experience to this day) and one day the police took me out and drove me across town--to a doctor, blindfolded (we were always blindfolded when we taken out of the prison, because the location of the prisons was supposed to be secret). The doctor took one look at me, told the police that I had a bad case of "acne vulgaris", and I was taken back to prison. On the way back, we stopped at a very large garbage pit, and led me out. I stood there for a while, not noticing much except a bad smell, and then I heard a sound like an M-80 going off next to my head and I naturally jumped at the noise. The cops had a good laugh, and then they put me back into the back of the car, complimenting on my bravery. It was only when I got back to the cell that I was told that the cops thought they were doing a mock execution. Amnesty International in London later asked me if I had been tortured. I remember being rather astonished by the question. Actually, I was just too stupid and too convinced of my own untorturability to be tortured psychologically, and the cops were already convinced that they might have to release me soon, so they apparently had to desist from the other kind. But the experiences were certainly not voluntary, and I was always conscious of the precise degree to which they were not under my control (in that sense I think they were very different, both from Andy's tinnitus and from the voluntary rituals that Paul is describing). In "Thinking and Speech" Vygotsky describes the planes through which an intending becomes a thinking and a thinking becomes a saying--inner or outer. I think that we can probably isolate similar planes of pain, feeling, sensation, and emotion, and that the process is probably quite similar, with only the final plane really under voluntary control (and then only through the process of mastering it "from the outside", first through the wordings of others and then through our own word meanings). That's why I think that pain, sensation, feeling, and emotion must lie somewhere on a continuum from an experience which is shared with animals and universal in a biological sense to an experience that is now entirely mediated by word meanings. Yet the fact that you are reading this, and sharing some of the horror I felt, suggests to me that, in the first place, they are linked as well as distinct; in the second place, that calling the former "objective" and the latter "subjective" is highly misleading (and the opposite is in some ways more true), and, (finally!) that for humans, but only for us, emotion is no less universal than pain. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 8 May 2014 19:49, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > David, > > How would you interpret self mutilation and sacrifice for a god would that > be torture? This argument appears to rest on whether it is an etic or emic > view. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com>
Date:05/07/2014 7:44 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: Andy Blunden ,"eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Questioning universal core emotions
>
Andy-- > > Sorry--I'm not following. You are saying that your tintinnatus only exists > when you are interpreting it, yes? And the same thing goes for, say, > Smetana's tintinnatus, which appears, without his knowledge, in many of his > operas and which eventually drove him mad? > > What about torture? You are arguing that torture only exists when we > interpret it as torture? I can tell you--from some first hand observations > made in the early eighties--that it ain't so. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 7 May 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my ear. You > > could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have to confirm, I > hear > > it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of the time "it does not > exist > > for me." Obviously what is happening on my auditory nerves is the same > all > > the time, but according to whether my attention is on it, it exists or > > doesn't, for me. (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go > > into therapy to learn how to ignore it). > > You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. > > > https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > > > > And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following Manfred > > Holodynski's usage of these terms. > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf > > Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in opposite > > senses. "Expression" is something else again. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding > >> fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six fundamental, > >> irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in laboratories and > >> describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the problem is > >> methodological, or even definitional. > >> > >> And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or "feeling", or > >> "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example pain is a > >> biological universal (something we share with other species, in fact), > and > >> that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically (although I > >> think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the > >> interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure idealism, on a par > >> with his statement that material reality is "what is given to us"). I > >> agree > >> with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly mediated by > >> language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of Fet that > I > >> once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and when I read > >> it > >> I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating it, > >> including > >> a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the second line). > >> But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation means that > >> they are somehow more subjective and less universal. > >> > >> For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by language, > this > >> implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find myself > >> shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went through > >> several > >> translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a > >> translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what sense are you > >> doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the field and you > >> can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of course > that's > >> exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) > >> > >> Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on Pedology", > which > >> we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech from every > >> other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal until you > put > >> it in context. We know that children often assume that animals that make > >> noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot believed > that > >> if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do as Doctor > >> Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's version > of > >> the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". > >> > >> It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that if a lion > >> could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, because we > would > >> not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's speech referred > >> (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" probably > includes > >> an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features of the > >> domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, the > lioness > >> has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may share pain > >> with lions, but we do not share emotions. > >> > >> For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of Spinoza and > >> Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was somehow > >> "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite the > contrary. > >> I > >> think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective than, say, > >> seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), > >> signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what distinguishes language > >> as > >> language is that language does not contain the conditions for its own > >> understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter or a sob > of > >> unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions as > language > >> are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal is in the > >> gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see in the > >> example of paper money). > >> > >> To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, potentially, > >> less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the example of Himba > >> ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions are > actually > >> more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically sharable. It > >> seems > >> that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some way (and no > >> lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry grandmothers). So > I > >> think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a precondition for > >> culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great > >> bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, > >> nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation is messy, > >> non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch > >> concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true that there > is > >> no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring that > >> language > >> is universally human. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> and speaking to my previous point about problems with methods for > >>> studying > >>> this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy Science piece > >>> that > >>> Mike forwarded: > >>> > >>> "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency to describe > >>> vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on most trials, > >>> they > >>> first identified the action instead of making a mental-state > inference?. > >>> For example, instead of describing a vocalization as fearful, they > often > >>> used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). > >>> > >>> > >>> Woohoo! > >>> > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Hi Ed. > >>>> > >>>> I started the trouble here by posting the following story which > >>>> purported > >>>> to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- > >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > >>> > >>> > >>>> That post started a discussion that began with methodology and appears > >>>> to > >>>> have morphed into personal views of the matter. > >>>> > >>>> I promised in the original post to find the article referred to in the > >>>> story, but got caught up in other matters and let it go. I should have > >>>> > >>>> > >>> done > >>> > >>> > >>>> so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view now, misleading > with > >>>> respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper in Emotion has > not > >>>> appeared so far as I can tell. > >>>> > >>>> Back to methodology? > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited volume Explaining > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> Emotions. > >>> > >>> > >>>> In any case, emotion is a large category as is expression. > >>>>> > >>>>> In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the ongoing conversation > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> about > >>> > >>> > >>>> 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, perhaps, 'experiencing' > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> emotion. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Ed Wall > >>>>> > >>>>> On May 6, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > >>>>>> believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > >>>>>> and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > >>>>>> interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> view. > >>> > >>> > >>>> On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> universal > >>> > >>> > >>>> either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > >>>>>>> nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > >>>>>>> universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> "feeling") > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> all > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> clearly feeling different about it. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Or was that your point? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> torture, > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> stoically, > >>> > >>> > >>>> others > >>>>>>>> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> that > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> appears to be laughter. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions > in > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> such > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> a > >>>>>>>> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a > >>>>>>>> universal > >>>>>>>> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> sorting > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> working > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> headed > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> some > >>> > >>> > >>>> interesting details about the Himba. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> larger > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> ancestors > >>> > >>> > >>>> ( > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>> > >>> > >>>> key > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> "emotions" > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> schooling > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> literacy - > >>> > >>> > >>>> these > >>>>>>>>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> such > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> as > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba > lack > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> on > >>> > >>> > >>>> this > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> begun > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The > >>> > >>> > >>>> Himba > >>>>>>>>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the > schools > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> don't > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > >>>>>>>>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> able > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> their > >>> > >>> > >>>> cattle > >>>>>>>>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> really > >>> > >>> > >>>> matters > >>>>>>>>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> one > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> fails > >>>>>>>>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> happen > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of > the > >>>>>>>>> study, > >>>>>>>>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> as > >>> > >>> > >>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> argue > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > >>>>>>>>> arguable). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> critique. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Are > >>>>>>>>> emotions universal? > >>>>>>>>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> psychologists > >>> > >>> > >>>> are > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> quite a > >>> > >>> > >>>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> not > >>> > >>> > >>>> universal? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> picture > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> picture > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> well, > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> but > >>>>>>>>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> methodology > >>> > >>> > >>>> since > >>>>>>>>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> defined > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> by > >>>>>>>>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> familiar). > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> taking > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The > >>> > >>> > >>>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> seem > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>> > >>> > >>>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> force > >>>>>>>>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> domain. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > >>>>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald < > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Well Mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> know > >>> > >>> > >>>> where > >>>>>>>>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> article: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> I > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as > one > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> room > >>> > >>> > >>>> here. > >>>>>>>>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> point > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> equivalent > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the others. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> this > >>> > >>> > >>>> research. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps of interest > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial- > >>> expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > >>> > >>> > >>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>>>>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>>>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Dr. Elinami Swai > >>>>>> Senior Lecturer > >>>>>> Associate Dean > >>>>>> Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > >>>>>> Faculty of Education > >>>>>> Open University of Tanzania > >>>>>> P.O.Box 23409 > >>>>>> Dar-Es-Salaam > >>>>>> Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > >>>>>> Fax:022-2668759 > >>>>>> Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > >>> > >>> > >>>> 0230102484 > >>>>>> ...this faith will still deliver > >>>>>> If you live it first to last > >>>>>> Not everything which blooms must > >>>>>> wither. > >>>>>> Not all that was is past > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri May 9 09:56:54 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 9 May 2014 09:56:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Theorizing Resistence Message-ID: The following may be of interest. mike http://www.ccp.aau.dk/activities/activity/rhythms-of-resistance-seminar--new-delhi--india-.cid122351 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sat May 10 10:37:20 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sat, 10 May 2014 18:37:20 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi I think that even pain can be controlled. It's tempting to say this this is universal since is is part of our physiology, but people can control the degree they register pain, some to a remarkable extent. Then too our outward manifestation of pain will also be relative. Carol On 6 May 2014 20:28, Elinami Swai wrote: > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal > > either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the > > interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > > nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > > universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") > > is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all > > clearly feeling different about it. > > > > Or was that your point? > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, > in > >> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, > >> others > >> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that > >> appears to be laughter. > >> > >> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such > >> a > >> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a > >> universal > >> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting > >> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> > >>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working > >>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed > >>> to > >>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some > >>> interesting details about the Himba. > >>> > >>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with > >>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger > >>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that > >>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( > >>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >>> > >>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the > key > >>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" > >>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling > >>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - > >>> these > >>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such > as > >>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > >>> > >>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the > >>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on > this > >>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > begun > >>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The > >>> Himba > >>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools > don't > >>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > >>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able > >>> to > >>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their > >>> cattle > >>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really > >>> matters > >>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one > >>> fails > >>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to > happen > >>> to > >>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > >>> > >>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > >>> study, > >>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as > the > >>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > argue > >>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > >>> arguable). > >>> > >>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. > >>> Are > >>> emotions universal? > >>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are > >>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a > >>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not > >>> universal? > >>> > >>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture > >>> of > >>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture > >>> is > >>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, > >>> but > >>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology > >>> since > >>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > defined > >>> by > >>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > familiar). > >>> > >>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking > >>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of > >>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The > >>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem > to > >>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the > >>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and > >>> force > >>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. > >>> > >>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Well Mike > >>>> > >>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know > >>>> where > >>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I > >>>> am > >>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of > >>>> the > >>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room > >>>> here. > >>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point > >>>> > >>> that > >>> > >>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > equivalent > >>>> > >>> to > >>> > >>>> the others. > >>>> > >>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > >>>> research. > >>>> > >>>> Carol > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Perhaps of interest > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > >>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From djwdoc@yahoo.com Sat May 10 12:10:37 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Sat, 10 May 2014 12:10:37 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <536ADFFF.8080907@mira.net> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> <536ADFFF.8080907@mira.net> Message-ID: <1399749037.98659.YahooMailNeo@web164704.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I am curious as to how cognitive linguistics and Gibson's affordance would fit into this meditation on idealism, as well as the Gestalt perceptual discoveries. The implication for language is that semiotics generally are constrained by certain universals of perception, action, and sensation. For example, anger in language generally is described using "heat" terms, not because of individual subjective experience, or cultural history, but rather because of a common human subjective experience of blood flooding into capillaries. We see the world in certain common ways, and ascribe to others similar perceptions, which are correct far more often than wrong. Red and green have a degree of hardwired perceptual value--indeed, the fact that we see a certain range of colors relevant to us in our development as a species, and not others (such as the ultraviolet patterns bees see in flowers--important for them, but not for us) provide a commonality of meaning. Objects afford particular kinds of activities and interpretations based on human physiology and senses. Ideas--invisible, intangible things--become available to us for use when we "grasp" them, not when we step on them. Our ability to exist and interact in communities requires the ability to attribute certain common perceptions and sensations to one another. I don't think anyone could say that the activity of a subject is not constrained uniquely or through sociocultural experience. But surely the commonality of physiology and perceptual experience must be very deep for cooperative human activity to have been successful, and for cultures with little or no points of sociohistorical contact (admittedly a hard experiment to do these days) to understand each other at all. Beethoven and Smetana's hearing did not isolate them from being able to express meaning to others. Perhaps a better example is Scriaben, whose synesthesia placed him in a state of a high degree of idealism in his perception of music. Perhaps no one has ever perceived Scriaben's music as he perceived it. But the points of commonality between any human (and of course the cultural constraints of the musical culture in which he composed) make it available to anyone, even if one is outside of the particular activity of practice in which he lived. Surely the commonality of physiology and innate activity (eating, breathing, the biomechanics of emotional response at least, at the least) provide a foundation for interaction, even for spheres in Flatland, so to speak, such as Scraben. ?Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, May 7, 2014 6:38 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions You are very confused, David. My apologies for any contribution I have made to that. Firstly, tinnitus. Tinnitus is a condition of the audial nerves and although it can be acute and transitory, the case I have is permanent. My audial nerves are always in this condition. This is a physiological fact. But my consciousness of it, including my feeling of it and even the sensation of ringing in the ears is dependent on other aspects of my consciousness, i.e., my attention. Consciousness is different and distinct from physiological conditions. I cannot abolish the ringing. It is always there, but I can ignore it so that it does not exist /within my consciousness/. This is, I know, something which the advocates of "embedded consciousness" and "thoroughgoing materialism" and all the enemies of "Cartesianism" deny. But I experience it every day. Secondly, torture. Torture is /an activity/ in which one or a number of people engage when they purposively inflict pain on another person. This usually involves inflicting physiological effects on the subject. These are facts, objective existences, which cannot be overcome by interpretation, either of the subject or paricipants, or by George Bush or right-wing journalists. But the consciousness arising from this activity in both subject and torturer is dependent on their overall psychological condition, their consciousness. As Franz Fanon has shown it is often the torturer who goes insane and the subject who flourishes. But I am sure in all case, the subject experiences sensations of pain (unlike my experience with tinnitus). But this will have /very different qualities/ according to how it is interpreted. I am sure that living there in Korea you have had plenty of opportunity to observe how the experience of pain can be "overcome" and under appropriate conditions, and up to a point, even be enjoyable. If you are not a martial arts practicioner, just have a good stretch for example. The point is that consciousness arises from the activity of the subject, not physiology as such, even if this distinction is often immaterial. That is why Marx said, in the very first words of "marxism": "The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the Object, actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. " and it is in that sense, that I am happy to wear the label of "idealist." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Andy-- > > Sorry--I'm not following. You are saying that your tintinnatus only > exists when you are interpreting it, yes? And the same thing goes for, > say, Smetana's tintinnatus, which appears, without his knowledge, in > many of his operas and which eventually drove him mad? > > What about torture? You are arguing that torture only exists when we > interpret it as torture? I can tell you--from some first hand > observations made in the early eighties--that it ain't so. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 7 May 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >? ? David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my >? ? ear. You could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have >? ? to confirm, I hear it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of >? ? the time "it does not exist for me." Obviously what is happening >? ? on my auditory nerves is the same all the time, but according to >? ? whether my attention is on it, it exists or doesn't, for me. >? ? (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go into >? ? therapy to learn how to ignore it). >? ? You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. >? ? https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > >? ? And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following >? ? Manfred Holodynski's usage of these terms. >? ? http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf >? ? Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in >? ? opposite senses. "Expression" is something else again. >? ? Andy >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? *Andy Blunden* >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > >? ? David Kellogg wrote: > >? ? ? ? I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding >? ? ? ? fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six >? ? ? ? fundamental, >? ? ? ? irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in >? ? ? ? laboratories and >? ? ? ? describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the >? ? ? ? problem is >? ? ? ? methodological, or even definitional. > >? ? ? ? And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or >? ? ? ? "feeling", or >? ? ? ? "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example >? ? ? ? pain is a >? ? ? ? biological universal (something we share with other species, >? ? ? ? in fact), and >? ? ? ? that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically >? ? ? ? (although I >? ? ? ? think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the >? ? ? ? interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure >? ? ? ? idealism, on a par >? ? ? ? with his statement that material reality is "what is given to >? ? ? ? us"). I agree >? ? ? ? with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly >? ? ? ? mediated by >? ? ? ? language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of >? ? ? ? Fet that I >? ? ? ? once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and >? ? ? ? when I read it >? ? ? ? I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating >? ? ? ? it, including >? ? ? ? a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the >? ? ? ? second line). >? ? ? ? But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation >? ? ? ? means that >? ? ? ? they are somehow more subjective and less universal. > >? ? ? ? For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by >? ? ? ? language, this >? ? ? ? implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find >? ? ? ? myself >? ? ? ? shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went >? ? ? ? through several >? ? ? ? translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a >? ? ? ? translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what >? ? ? ? sense are you >? ? ? ? doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the >? ? ? ? field and you >? ? ? ? can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of >? ? ? ? course that's >? ? ? ? exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) > >? ? ? ? Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on >? ? ? ? Pedology", which >? ? ? ? we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech >? ? ? ? from every >? ? ? ? other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal >? ? ? ? until you put >? ? ? ? it in context. We know that children often assume that animals >? ? ? ? that make >? ? ? ? noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot >? ? ? ? believed that >? ? ? ? if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do >? ? ? ? as Doctor >? ? ? ? Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's >? ? ? ? version of >? ? ? ? the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". > >? ? ? ? It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that >? ? ? ? if a lion >? ? ? ? could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, >? ? ? ? because we would >? ? ? ? not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's >? ? ? ? speech referred >? ? ? ? (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" >? ? ? ? probably includes >? ? ? ? an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features >? ? ? ? of the >? ? ? ? domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, >? ? ? ? the lioness >? ? ? ? has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may >? ? ? ? share pain >? ? ? ? with lions, but we do not share emotions. > >? ? ? ? For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of >? ? ? ? Spinoza and >? ? ? ? Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was >? ? ? ? somehow >? ? ? ? "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite >? ? ? ? the contrary. I >? ? ? ? think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective >? ? ? ? than, say, >? ? ? ? seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), >? ? ? ? signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what >? ? ? ? distinguishes language as >? ? ? ? language is that language does not contain the conditions for >? ? ? ? its own >? ? ? ? understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter >? ? ? ? or a sob of >? ? ? ? unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions >? ? ? ? as language >? ? ? ? are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal >? ? ? ? is in the >? ? ? ? gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see >? ? ? ? in the >? ? ? ? example of paper money). > >? ? ? ? To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, >? ? ? ? potentially, >? ? ? ? less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the >? ? ? ? example of Himba >? ? ? ? ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions >? ? ? ? are actually >? ? ? ? more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically >? ? ? ? sharable. It seems >? ? ? ? that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some >? ? ? ? way (and no >? ? ? ? lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry >? ? ? ? grandmothers). So I >? ? ? ? think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a >? ? ? ? precondition for >? ? ? ? culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great >? ? ? ? bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, >? ? ? ? nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation >? ? ? ? is messy, >? ? ? ? non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch >? ? ? ? concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true >? ? ? ? that there is >? ? ? ? no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring >? ? ? ? that language >? ? ? ? is universally human. > >? ? ? ? David Kellogg >? ? ? ? Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >? ? ? ? On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson ? ? ? ? > wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? and speaking to my previous point about problems with >? ? ? ? ? ? methods for studying >? ? ? ? ? ? this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy >? ? ? ? ? ? Science piece that >? ? ? ? ? ? Mike forwarded: > >? ? ? ? ? ? "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency >? ? ? ? ? ? to describe >? ? ? ? ? ? vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on >? ? ? ? ? ? most trials, they >? ? ? ? ? ? first identified the action instead of making a >? ? ? ? ? ? mental-state inference?. >? ? ? ? ? ? For example, instead of describing a vocalization as >? ? ? ? ? ? fearful, they often >? ? ? ? ? ? used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). > > >? ? ? ? ? ? Woohoo! > >? ? ? ? ? ? -greg > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole >? ? ? ? ? ? > wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Hi Ed. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I started the trouble here by posting the following >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? story which purported >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? That post started a discussion that began with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? methodology and appears to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? have morphed into personal views of the matter. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I promised in the original post to find the article >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? referred to in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? story, but got caught up in other matters and let it >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? go. I should have >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? done >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? now, misleading with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? in Emotion has not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? appeared so far as I can tell. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Back to methodology? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? mike > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? volume Explaining >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? Emotions. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In any case, emotion is a large category as is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? expression. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ongoing conversation >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? about >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? perhaps, 'experiencing' >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? emotion. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Ed Wall > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On May 6, 2014, at? 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I believe that pain, just like feeling is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal. But I also >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? believe that emotion (which we can also call >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? expression) is learned >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and thus may differ from one individual to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? another. We make >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? interpretations of emotion and expression from >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? our own points of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? view. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > wrote: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David, although I am sure that sensations >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cannot be taken as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? universal >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? either, since it is unlikely that there is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? anything remaining after >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? interprettion of the "sensation" is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? abstracted. However, it is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? nonetheless a different claim to say that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? human sensation is not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal, as to say human emotion (by >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? which is meant I think >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "feeling") >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is not universal. Let's suppose all are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? experiencing pain: they are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? all >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? clearly feeling different about it. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Or was that your point? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *Andy Blunden* >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David Kellogg wrote: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Suppose I put together a set of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? pictures of people undergoing >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? torture, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? which some people appeared to be >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? experiencing the torture >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? stoically, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? others >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? with resignation, still others with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? agony, and some with something >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? appears to be laughter. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I think I could probably crop the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? photographs and pose questions in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? such >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? way that I could very convincingly >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? demonstrate that pain is not a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? human sensation. Not only that, I >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? could probably put together a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? sorting >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? exercise that would come to the same >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? conclusion. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David Kellogg >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wrote: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I have a colleague down the hall, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David Crandall, that has been >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? working >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? among the Himba for almost 30 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? years. I also have three students >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? headed >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? do research among the Himba in a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? month. So I've been picking up >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? some >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? interesting details about the Himba. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? It seems like it is true that they >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? have increasingly had contact >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western culture, as evidenced by >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? recent protests in some of the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? larger >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cities that were staged by Himba >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? opposed to the building of a dam >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? would cause flooding of some of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the burial sites of their >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ancestors >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ( >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? At the same time, they are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? non-numerate people that lack some of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? key >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western institutions where kids >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? learn (oddly enough) about >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emotions" >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (think of those pictures of happy >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and sad faces that Western >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? schooling >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? takes into the classroom as the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? MEANS by which they teach >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? literacy - >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? these >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? means of teaching literacy always >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? entail certain cultural ends - >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? such >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emotion" - concepts that are not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? emic concepts). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Among the western institutions >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that the Himba lack, the Himba lack >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western model of schooling (one of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? my students is doing research >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? on >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? very issue). It is only in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? last 15 years or so that Himba have >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? begun >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? sending their children to school, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and now only in small numbers. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? The >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Himba >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? are very skeptical of schools >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? since, in their opinion, the schools >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? don't >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? teach their children anything >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? unimportant to them since although >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? they are non-numerate they are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? able >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? keep track of large herds of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cattle because they know each of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? their >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cattle >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? individually and can recognize >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? when one is missing. But what >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? really >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? matters >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? are things like knowing how to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? properly honor one's ancestors. If >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? one >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? fails >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to do that properly, then then >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ancestors will cause bad things to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? happen >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? oneself. That is much more >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? important than knowing how to count. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol, I also agree with your >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? concerns with the methodology of the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? study, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? it may not be reasonable to assume >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that this research is the same >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Ekman tasks and of-course it is a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western-type task (but one might >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? argue >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that it is less so than the Ekman >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? tasks since it is more open, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? arguable). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? So Carol, I wonder what >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? conclusions you would draw from your >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? critique. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? emotions universal? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I wonder if there is a further >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? possibility that these >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? psychologists >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? missing. Is it possible that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emotions" are not universal in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? quite a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? different sense? Perhaps that the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? very category of "emotion" is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I think this research points in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that direction - when viewing a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? picture >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? a face, people do not necessarily >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? assume that the person in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? picture >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emoting". I assume that this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? would be true among Westerners as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? well, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? but >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that possibility doesn't present >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? itself in the research >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? methodology >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? since >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Westerners are asked "what emotion >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is this?" The task is already >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? defined >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? by >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the domain called "emotion" (with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? which they are already very >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? familiar). >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Anthropologists have done great >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? work to show the problems with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? taking >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western defined domains into >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "kinship" - David Schneider, the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? domain of "color" - John Lucy). >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? The >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? argument is that even though this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? research turns up results that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? seem >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? suggest that the domains are real >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? even in non-Western contexts, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? findings are plagued by the fact >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that they assume these domains >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? and >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? force >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? these non-Western subjects into >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? choosing within the pre-defined >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? domain. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? But then again, perhaps "emotion" >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is a universal category? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -greg > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol Macdonald < >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? carolmacdon@gmail.com >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Well Mike > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I am here working in Namibia >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? for the year, and I would like to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? know >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? where >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? these Himba people are.? I >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? mean the ones referred to in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? article: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? am >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? not sure they are *so >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *isolated - they are well >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? recognised as one >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? language groups.? And I think >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? there is also an elephant in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? room >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? here. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? This is a western-type task, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and Luria would have been quick to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? point >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? out. What makes this woman >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? think that this task would be the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? equivalent >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the others. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Just a couple of basic >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? principles to cast a small >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? aspersion on >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? research. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wrote: > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Perhaps of interest >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? mike > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol A? Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Developmental psycholinguist >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Academic, Researcher,? and Editor >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Honorary Research Fellow: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Assistant Professor >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Anthropology >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Brigham Young University >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Provo, UT 84602 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Dr. Elinami Swai >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Senior Lecturer >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Associate Dean >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Faculty of Education >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Open University of Tanzania >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P.O.Box 23409 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Dar-Es-Salaam >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Fax:022-2668759 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0230102484 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ...this faith will still deliver >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? If you live it first to last >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Not everything which blooms must >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wither. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Not all that was is past >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >? ? ? ? ? ? Assistant Professor >? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Anthropology >? ? ? ? ? ? 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >? ? ? ? ? ? Brigham Young University >? ? ? ? ? ? Provo, UT 84602 >? ? ? ? ? ? http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? > > > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Sat May 10 12:10:37 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Sat, 10 May 2014 12:10:37 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <536ADFFF.8080907@mira.net> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <6B24931C-482E-4DE6-9770-A12CBD6F55D1@umich.edu> <53698DD9.5070906@mira.net> <536ADFFF.8080907@mira.net> Message-ID: <1399749037.98659.YahooMailNeo@web164704.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I am curious as to how cognitive linguistics and Gibson's affordance would fit into this meditation on idealism, as well as the Gestalt perceptual discoveries. The implication for language is that semiotics generally are constrained by certain universals of perception, action, and sensation. For example, anger in language generally is described using "heat" terms, not because of individual subjective experience, or cultural history, but rather because of a common human subjective experience of blood flooding into capillaries. We see the world in certain common ways, and ascribe to others similar perceptions, which are correct far more often than wrong. Red and green have a degree of hardwired perceptual value--indeed, the fact that we see a certain range of colors relevant to us in our development as a species, and not others (such as the ultraviolet patterns bees see in flowers--important for them, but not for us) provide a commonality of meaning. Objects afford particular kinds of activities and interpretations based on human physiology and senses. Ideas--invisible, intangible things--become available to us for use when we "grasp" them, not when we step on them. Our ability to exist and interact in communities requires the ability to attribute certain common perceptions and sensations to one another. I don't think anyone could say that the activity of a subject is not constrained uniquely or through sociocultural experience. But surely the commonality of physiology and perceptual experience must be very deep for cooperative human activity to have been successful, and for cultures with little or no points of sociohistorical contact (admittedly a hard experiment to do these days) to understand each other at all. Beethoven and Smetana's hearing did not isolate them from being able to express meaning to others. Perhaps a better example is Scriaben, whose synesthesia placed him in a state of a high degree of idealism in his perception of music. Perhaps no one has ever perceived Scriaben's music as he perceived it. But the points of commonality between any human (and of course the cultural constraints of the musical culture in which he composed) make it available to anyone, even if one is outside of the particular activity of practice in which he lived. Surely the commonality of physiology and innate activity (eating, breathing, the biomechanics of emotional response at least, at the least) provide a foundation for interaction, even for spheres in Flatland, so to speak, such as Scraben. ?Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, May 7, 2014 6:38 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions You are very confused, David. My apologies for any contribution I have made to that. Firstly, tinnitus. Tinnitus is a condition of the audial nerves and although it can be acute and transitory, the case I have is permanent. My audial nerves are always in this condition. This is a physiological fact. But my consciousness of it, including my feeling of it and even the sensation of ringing in the ears is dependent on other aspects of my consciousness, i.e., my attention. Consciousness is different and distinct from physiological conditions. I cannot abolish the ringing. It is always there, but I can ignore it so that it does not exist /within my consciousness/. This is, I know, something which the advocates of "embedded consciousness" and "thoroughgoing materialism" and all the enemies of "Cartesianism" deny. But I experience it every day. Secondly, torture. Torture is /an activity/ in which one or a number of people engage when they purposively inflict pain on another person. This usually involves inflicting physiological effects on the subject. These are facts, objective existences, which cannot be overcome by interpretation, either of the subject or paricipants, or by George Bush or right-wing journalists. But the consciousness arising from this activity in both subject and torturer is dependent on their overall psychological condition, their consciousness. As Franz Fanon has shown it is often the torturer who goes insane and the subject who flourishes. But I am sure in all case, the subject experiences sensations of pain (unlike my experience with tinnitus). But this will have /very different qualities/ according to how it is interpreted. I am sure that living there in Korea you have had plenty of opportunity to observe how the experience of pain can be "overcome" and under appropriate conditions, and up to a point, even be enjoyable. If you are not a martial arts practicioner, just have a good stretch for example. The point is that consciousness arises from the activity of the subject, not physiology as such, even if this distinction is often immaterial. That is why Marx said, in the very first words of "marxism": "The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the Object, actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. " and it is in that sense, that I am happy to wear the label of "idealist." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Andy-- > > Sorry--I'm not following. You are saying that your tintinnatus only > exists when you are interpreting it, yes? And the same thing goes for, > say, Smetana's tintinnatus, which appears, without his knowledge, in > many of his operas and which eventually drove him mad? > > What about torture? You are arguing that torture only exists when we > interpret it as torture? I can tell you--from some first hand > observations made in the early eighties--that it ain't so. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 7 May 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >? ? David, I have tinnitus. That is, 24/7 there is a ringing in my >? ? ear. You could ask me any moment if it is there and I would have >? ? to confirm, I hear it. (I hear it now, as I write). But 99.99% of >? ? the time "it does not exist for me." Obviously what is happening >? ? on my auditory nerves is the same all the time, but according to >? ? whether my attention is on it, it exists or doesn't, for me. >? ? (Thank Christ! Some people find it hard to ignore and go into >? ? therapy to learn how to ignore it). >? ? You call that idealism? OK. Then I am happy to wear the label. >? ? https://www.academia.edu/1968768/Hegels_Psychology_-_The_Subjective_Spirit > >? ? And on the matter of emotion and feeling. I was just following >? ? Manfred Holodynski's usage of these terms. >? ? http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/pdfs/20-1-holodynski.pdf >? ? Admittedly, different writers use "feeling" and "emotion" in >? ? opposite senses. "Expression" is something else again. >? ? Andy >? ? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? *Andy Blunden* >? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > >? ? David Kellogg wrote: > >? ? ? ? I think that Barrett is taking an easy pot-shot at the founding >? ? ? ? fathers--Titchener, James, and Wundt--who believed in six >? ? ? ? fundamental, >? ? ? ? irreducible emotions and who set out to isolate them in >? ? ? ? laboratories and >? ? ? ? describe them in minute detail. But as Mike says, I think the >? ? ? ? problem is >? ? ? ? methodological, or even definitional. > >? ? ? ? And to me the real problem is not the word "sensation", or >? ? ? ? "feeling", or >? ? ? ? "emotion". I am perfectly willing to accept that for example >? ? ? ? pain is a >? ? ? ? biological universal (something we share with other species, >? ? ? ? in fact), and >? ? ? ? that "sensation" is somewhat less so, at least biologically >? ? ? ? (although I >? ? ? ? think Andy's idea that nothing remains when we abstract away the >? ? ? ? interpretation of sensation is almost chemically pure >? ? ? ? idealism, on a par >? ? ? ? with his statement that material reality is "what is given to >? ? ? ? us"). I agree >? ? ? ? with Elinami: there are higher emotions which are highly >? ? ? ? mediated by >? ? ? ? language (Elinami reminds me of this by including a snippet of >? ? ? ? Fet that I >? ? ? ? once translated into English at the bottom of her email, and >? ? ? ? when I read it >? ? ? ? I experience almost the exact feeling I had while translating >? ? ? ? it, including >? ? ? ? a certain dissatisfaction with the facile sing-song of the >? ? ? ? second line). >? ? ? ? But I am not at all sure that the fact of language mediation >? ? ? ? means that >? ? ? ? they are somehow more subjective and less universal. > >? ? ? ? For most people, as soon as we say something is mediated by >? ? ? ? language, this >? ? ? ? implies that it cannot be universal. For example, even I find >? ? ? ? myself >? ? ? ? shaking my head when I read that Barrett and her group went >? ? ? ? through several >? ? ? ? translators in the course of their fieldwork. If you are using a >? ? ? ? translator, and you are doing linguistic research, in what >? ? ? ? sense are you >? ? ? ? doing fieldwork? (I know, in the sense that you are in the >? ? ? ? field and you >? ? ? ? can tell what people are feeling by their intonation--but of >? ? ? ? course that's >? ? ? ? exactly what this fieldwork is trying to disprove!) > >? ? ? ? Vygotsky says (in Lecture Number Two of his "Lectures on >? ? ? ? Pedology", which >? ? ? ? we are currently translating) that what distinguishes speech >? ? ? ? from every >? ? ? ? other sound in nature is signifying. That seems rather banal >? ? ? ? until you put >? ? ? ? it in context. We know that children often assume that animals >? ? ? ? that make >? ? ? ? noises are "talking" to each other, and even Binet and Ribot >? ? ? ? believed that >? ? ? ? if somehow we knew the grammar and vocabulary then we could do >? ? ? ? as Doctor >? ? ? ? Doolittle did (or perhaps do as Doctor Ouch did in Chukovsky's >? ? ? ? version of >? ? ? ? the story for Russian children) and "talk to the animals". > >? ? ? ? It wasn't until Wittgenstein that anybody made the point that >? ? ? ? if a lion >? ? ? ? could talk we would simply not be able to understand it, >? ? ? ? because we would >? ? ? ? not be able to grasp the experiences to which the lion's >? ? ? ? speech referred >? ? ? ? (e.g. when the lion refers to your or me, his "meaning" >? ? ? ? probably includes >? ? ? ? an attractive meaty odor). One of the less pleasant features >? ? ? ? of the >? ? ? ? domestic life of the lion is that after giving birth to cubs, >? ? ? ? the lioness >? ? ? ? has to keep the the male lion from devouring the cubs. We may >? ? ? ? share pain >? ? ? ? with lions, but we do not share emotions. > >? ? ? ? For Vygotsky--who was working in the great tradition of >? ? ? ? Spinoza and >? ? ? ? Vico--the fact of signifying did not mean that language was >? ? ? ? somehow >? ? ? ? "subjective" and thus not even potentially universal. Quite >? ? ? ? the contrary. I >? ? ? ? think that for Vygotsky signifying is even more objective >? ? ? ? than, say, >? ? ? ? seeing. This isn't simply because unlike seeing (and unlike pain), >? ? ? ? signifying MUST be shared. As Halliday says, what >? ? ? ? distinguishes language as >? ? ? ? language is that language does not contain the conditions for >? ? ? ? its own >? ? ? ? understanding; unlike a scream of pain or a giggle of laughter >? ? ? ? or a sob of >? ? ? ? unhappiness, the social relations by which language functions >? ? ? ? as language >? ? ? ? are quite external to it, like money (what makes gold a metal >? ? ? ? is in the >? ? ? ? gold, but what makes gold money is not, as we can clearly see >? ? ? ? in the >? ? ? ? example of paper money). > >? ? ? ? To me, what this suggests is that higher emotions are not, >? ? ? ? potentially, >? ? ? ? less universal than lower ones. On the contrary--as the >? ? ? ? example of Himba >? ? ? ? ancestor worship indicates--it suggests that higher emotions >? ? ? ? are actually >? ? ? ? more universal, precisely because they are intrinsically >? ? ? ? sharable. It seems >? ? ? ? that all human cultures treat ancestors as important in some >? ? ? ? way (and no >? ? ? ? lions do; lionesses also have to guard against hungry >? ? ? ? grandmothers). So I >? ? ? ? think reverence for ancestors, like language, may be a >? ? ? ? precondition for >? ? ? ? culture. Together with language, it is rather like the other great >? ? ? ? bifurcations in phylogenesis: inanimate-animate, vegetable-animal, >? ? ? ? nonarticulate animal-articulate animal. Each great bifurcation >? ? ? ? is messy, >? ? ? ? non-empirical, but ultimately quite universal as far as the branch >? ? ? ? concerned goes in time and in space. It is, of course, true >? ? ? ? that there is >? ? ? ? no universal language, but that is simply our way of ensuring >? ? ? ? that language >? ? ? ? is universally human. > >? ? ? ? David Kellogg >? ? ? ? Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >? ? ? ? On 7 May 2014 07:15, Greg Thompson ? ? ? ? > wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? and speaking to my previous point about problems with >? ? ? ? ? ? methods for studying >? ? ? ? ? ? this kind of thing, consider the following from the Psy >? ? ? ? ? ? Science piece that >? ? ? ? ? ? Mike forwarded: > >? ? ? ? ? ? "Himba participants appeared to have a cultural tendency >? ? ? ? ? ? to describe >? ? ? ? ? ? vocalizations in behavioral terms initially; that is, on >? ? ? ? ? ? most trials, they >? ? ? ? ? ? first identified the action instead of making a >? ? ? ? ? ? mental-state inference?. >? ? ? ? ? ? For example, instead of describing a vocalization as >? ? ? ? ? ? fearful, they often >? ? ? ? ? ? used a term that translates to 'scream.'" (p. 913). > > >? ? ? ? ? ? Woohoo! > >? ? ? ? ? ? -greg > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 3:03 PM, mike cole >? ? ? ? ? ? > wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Hi Ed. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I started the trouble here by posting the following >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? story which purported >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to report on the work of Lisa Barrett. > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? That post started a discussion that began with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? methodology and appears to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? have morphed into personal views of the matter. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I promised in the original post to find the article >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? referred to in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? story, but got caught up in other matters and let it >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? go. I should have >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? done >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? so BEFORE I posted the story, which was, in my view >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? now, misleading with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? respect, at least, to this published paper. The paper >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? in Emotion has not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? appeared so far as I can tell. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Back to methodology? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? mike > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ed Wall >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Perhaps of interest is Amelie Rorty's edited >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? volume Explaining >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? Emotions. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In any case, emotion is a large category as is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? expression. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In any case, I admit to some confusion. Is the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ongoing conversation >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? about >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 'expressing' emotion or about 'feellng' or, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? perhaps, 'experiencing' >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? emotion. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Ed Wall > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On May 6, 2014, at? 2:28 PM, Elinami Swai wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I believe that pain, just like feeling is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal. But I also >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? believe that emotion (which we can also call >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? expression) is learned >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and thus may differ from one individual to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? another. We make >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? interpretations of emotion and expression from >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? our own points of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? view. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > wrote: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David, although I am sure that sensations >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cannot be taken as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? universal >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? either, since it is unlikely that there is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? anything remaining after >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? interprettion of the "sensation" is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? abstracted. However, it is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? nonetheless a different claim to say that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? human sensation is not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal, as to say human emotion (by >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? which is meant I think >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "feeling") >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is not universal. Let's suppose all are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? experiencing pain: they are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? all >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? clearly feeling different about it. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Or was that your point? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Andy > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *Andy Blunden* >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David Kellogg wrote: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Suppose I put together a set of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? pictures of people undergoing >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? torture, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? which some people appeared to be >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? experiencing the torture >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? stoically, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? others >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? with resignation, still others with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? agony, and some with something >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? appears to be laughter. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I think I could probably crop the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? photographs and pose questions in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? such >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? way that I could very convincingly >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? demonstrate that pain is not a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? human sensation. Not only that, I >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? could probably put together a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? sorting >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? exercise that would come to the same >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? conclusion. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David Kellogg >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wrote: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I have a colleague down the hall, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? David Crandall, that has been >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? working >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? among the Himba for almost 30 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? years. I also have three students >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? headed >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? do research among the Himba in a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? month. So I've been picking up >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? some >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? interesting details about the Himba. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? It seems like it is true that they >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? have increasingly had contact >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western culture, as evidenced by >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? recent protests in some of the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? larger >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cities that were staged by Himba >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? opposed to the building of a dam >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? would cause flooding of some of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the burial sites of their >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ancestors >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ( >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? At the same time, they are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? non-numerate people that lack some of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? key >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western institutions where kids >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? learn (oddly enough) about >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emotions" >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (think of those pictures of happy >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and sad faces that Western >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? schooling >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? takes into the classroom as the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? MEANS by which they teach >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? literacy - >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? these >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? means of teaching literacy always >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? entail certain cultural ends - >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? such >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emotion" - concepts that are not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? emic concepts). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Among the western institutions >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that the Himba lack, the Himba lack >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western model of schooling (one of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? my students is doing research >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? on >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? very issue). It is only in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? last 15 years or so that Himba have >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? begun >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? sending their children to school, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and now only in small numbers. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? The >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Himba >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? are very skeptical of schools >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? since, in their opinion, the schools >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? don't >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? teach their children anything >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? worthwhile. Knowing how to count is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? unimportant to them since although >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? they are non-numerate they are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? able >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? keep track of large herds of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cattle because they know each of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? their >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? cattle >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? individually and can recognize >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? when one is missing. But what >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? really >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? matters >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? are things like knowing how to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? properly honor one's ancestors. If >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? one >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? fails >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to do that properly, then then >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ancestors will cause bad things to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? happen >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? oneself. That is much more >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? important than knowing how to count. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol, I also agree with your >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? concerns with the methodology of the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? study, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? it may not be reasonable to assume >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that this research is the same >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Ekman tasks and of-course it is a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western-type task (but one might >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? argue >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that it is less so than the Ekman >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? tasks since it is more open, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? arguable). > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? So Carol, I wonder what >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? conclusions you would draw from your >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? critique. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? emotions universal? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I wonder if there is a further >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? possibility that these >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? psychologists >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? are >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? missing. Is it possible that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emotions" are not universal in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? quite a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? different sense? Perhaps that the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? very category of "emotion" is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? not >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? universal? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I think this research points in >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that direction - when viewing a >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? picture >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? a face, people do not necessarily >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? assume that the person in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? picture >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "emoting". I assume that this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? would be true among Westerners as >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? well, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? but >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that possibility doesn't present >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? itself in the research >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? methodology >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? since >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Westerners are asked "what emotion >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is this?" The task is already >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? defined >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? by >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the domain called "emotion" (with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? which they are already very >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? familiar). >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Anthropologists have done great >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? work to show the problems with >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? taking >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Western defined domains into >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "kinship" - David Schneider, the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? domain of "color" - John Lucy). >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? The >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? argument is that even though this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? research turns up results that >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? seem >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? suggest that the domains are real >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? even in non-Western contexts, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? findings are plagued by the fact >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that they assume these domains >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? and >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? force >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? these non-Western subjects into >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? choosing within the pre-defined >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? domain. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? But then again, perhaps "emotion" >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? is a universal category? >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -greg > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol Macdonald < >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? carolmacdon@gmail.com >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wrote: > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Well Mike > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I am here working in Namibia >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? for the year, and I would like to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? know >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? where >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? these Himba people are.? I >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? mean the ones referred to in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? article: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? am >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? not sure they are *so >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? *isolated - they are well >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? recognised as one >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? of >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? language groups.? And I think >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? there is also an elephant in the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? room >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? here. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? This is a western-type task, >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and Luria would have been quick to >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? point >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? that > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? out. What makes this woman >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? think that this task would be the >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? equivalent >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the others. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Just a couple of basic >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? principles to cast a small >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? aspersion on >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? this >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? research. > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wrote: > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Perhaps of interest >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? mike > > > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Carol A? Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Developmental psycholinguist >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Academic, Researcher,? and Editor >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Honorary Research Fellow: >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Assistant Professor >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Anthropology >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Brigham Young University >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Provo, UT 84602 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Dr. Elinami Swai >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Senior Lecturer >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Associate Dean >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Faculty of Education >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Open University of Tanzania >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P.O.Box 23409 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Dar-Es-Salaam >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Fax:022-2668759 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0230102484 >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ...this faith will still deliver >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? If you live it first to last >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Not everything which blooms must >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? wither. >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Not all that was is past >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? ? -- >? ? ? ? ? ? Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >? ? ? ? ? ? Assistant Professor >? ? ? ? ? ? Department of Anthropology >? ? ? ? ? ? 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >? ? ? ? ? ? Brigham Young University >? ? ? ? ? ? Provo, UT 84602 >? ? ? ? ? ? http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? > > >? ? ? ? ? > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun May 11 13:28:46 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 13:28:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Invitation to submit a letter of intent to a special issue in Child Development on the Ontogeny of Human Cultural Learning In-Reply-To: <53892DEA-D85E-4C01-8608-512AFA430C98@austin.utexas.edu> References: <53892DEA-D85E-4C01-8608-512AFA430C98@austin.utexas.edu> Message-ID: Here is a very interesting opportunity to write about empirical research on culture and development should you have data on this topic. I am not sure what counts as empirical data for Child Development, but I am sure the editors can answer you questions! Great opportunity to publish in a fine venue and make lots of references to work in MCA! :-)) mike On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 11:59 AM, Legare, Cristine H < legare@austin.utexas.edu> wrote: > Dear friends and colleagues, > > We are writing to announce that Paul and I will be guest editors for a > special issue on the Ontogeny of Human Cultural Learning to be published in > Child Development. Given your expertise on this topic, we would like for > you to consider submitting empirical papers for consideration for > publication. > > The following link contains information about the content of the special > issue as well as instructions for submitting a letter of intent (due July > 1st): > > > http://www.srcd.org/publications/child-development/calls-special-issues-sections > > With best regards, > > Cristine Legare and Paul Harris > *************************************************** > Cristine H. Legare, Ph.D. > Associate Professor > Director of the Cognition, Culture, & Development Lab > The University of Texas at Austin > Department of Psychology > 1 University Station #A8000 > Austin, Texas 78712-0187 > email: legare@austin.utexas.edu > webpage: http://www.ccdlab.net > ph: (512)468-8238 | fax: (512)471-6175 > *************************************************** > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun May 11 19:36:00 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 19:36:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Teachers and Facebook In-Reply-To: <4c37917496c540418cd71d0367650410@BY2PR03MB428.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> References: <4c37917496c540418cd71d0367650410@BY2PR03MB428.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Nice to see your voice, Bill. This seems like a perfect project for a Communication scholar who thought CHAT was a useful analytic tool. In after-school institutions that are supposed to be helpful to kids' development there is a constant pressure to "make sure that nothing bad (e.g., unlawful, immoral...) happens." Our activities are organized to maximize the possibility of "good things" happening. When the two orientations occupy the same space, things certainly get interesting. mike On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Barowy, William wrote: > Hi all, > > There was a local incident in my area earlier this month that I've briefly > described in the following blog entry. I don't have time myself to do it, > but it occurred to me that this could be an excellent controversial > situation for an activity theoretical analysis, perhaps for a grad student. > > > http://www.lesley.edu/blog/technology-in-classroom/2014/04/should-teachers-be-allowed-to-friend-their-students-on-facebook/ > > --- > William Barowy, Ph. D. > Associate Professor, > Lesley University > 29 Everett Street, > Cambridge, MA 02138-2790 > Desktop: http://bill.barowy.net/ > Mobile: http://bill.barowy.net/m/ > > "I am always doing that which I cannot do, in order that I may learn how > to do it." > --Pablo Picasso > > > From tvmathdude@aol.com Mon May 12 07:47:27 2014 From: tvmathdude@aol.com (Tvmathdude) Date: Mon, 12 May 2014 10:47:27 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> Message-ID: <8D13C083A20FB04-11EC-78A3@webmail-va048.sysops.aol.com> I see pain as a communication from one part off my body to several others. In some areas the reaction is automatic and instant. In others I see our ability - to different degrees - to choose our reaction. In my own body, I view pain and its manifestation as separate. Cause - effect - reaction. What would Vygotsky say? Roger -----Original Message----- From: Carol Macdonald To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Sent: Sat, May 10, 2014 1:38 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions Hi I think that even pain can be controlled. It's tempting to say this this is universal since is is part of our physiology, but people can control the degree they register pain, some to a remarkable extent. Then too our outward manifestation of pain will also be relative. Carol On 6 May 2014 20:28, Elinami Swai wrote: > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as universal > > either, since it is unlikely that there is anything remaining after the > > interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. However, it is > > nonetheless a different claim to say that human sensation is not > > universal, as to say human emotion (by which is meant I think "feeling") > > is not universal. Let's suppose all are experiencing pain: they are all > > clearly feeling different about it. > > > > Or was that your point? > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing torture, > in > >> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture stoically, > >> others > >> with resignation, still others with agony, and some with something that > >> appears to be laughter. > >> > >> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in such > >> a > >> way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is not a > >> universal > >> human sensation. Not only that, I could probably put together a sorting > >> exercise that would come to the same conclusion. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> > >>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been working > >>> among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three students headed > >>> to > >>> do research among the Himba in a month. So I've been picking up some > >>> interesting details about the Himba. > >>> > >>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact with > >>> Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of the larger > >>> cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the building of a dam that > >>> would cause flooding of some of the burial sites of their ancestors ( > >>> http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >>> > >>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of the > key > >>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" > >>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western schooling > >>> takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they teach literacy - > >>> these > >>> means of teaching literacy always entail certain cultural ends - such > as > >>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > >>> > >>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack the > >>> Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing research on > this > >>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > begun > >>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. The > >>> Himba > >>> are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, the schools > don't > >>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > >>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are able > >>> to > >>> keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each of their > >>> cattle > >>> individually and can recognize when one is missing. But what really > >>> matters > >>> are things like knowing how to properly honor one's ancestors. If one > >>> fails > >>> to do that properly, then then ancestors will cause bad things to > happen > >>> to > >>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > >>> > >>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > >>> study, > >>> it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is the same as > the > >>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > argue > >>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > >>> arguable). > >>> > >>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. > >>> Are > >>> emotions universal? > >>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these psychologists are > >>> missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not universal in quite a > >>> different sense? Perhaps that the very category of "emotion" is not > >>> universal? > >>> > >>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a picture > >>> of > >>> a face, people do not necessarily assume that the person in the picture > >>> is > >>> "emoting". I assume that this would be true among Westerners as well, > >>> but > >>> that possibility doesn't present itself in the research methodology > >>> since > >>> Westerners are asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > defined > >>> by > >>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > familiar). > >>> > >>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with taking > >>> Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the domain of > >>> "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - John Lucy). The > >>> argument is that even though this research turns up results that seem > to > >>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, the > >>> findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these domains and > >>> force > >>> these non-Western subjects into choosing within the pre-defined domain. > >>> > >>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Well Mike > >>>> > >>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to know > >>>> where > >>>> these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to in the article: I > >>>> am > >>>> not sure they are *so *isolated - they are well recognised as one of > >>>> the > >>>> language groups. And I think there is also an elephant in the room > >>>> here. > >>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to point > >>>> > >>> that > >>> > >>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > equivalent > >>>> > >>> to > >>> > >>>> the others. > >>>> > >>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on this > >>>> research. > >>>> > >>>> Carol > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Perhaps of interest > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-are-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > >>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 12 18:28:59 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 10:28:59 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Jesper Juul, Ludologist Message-ID: Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we do for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy (like television and certain forms of drugs). I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of the game as well. (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text intrinsic and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the teacher!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Mon May 12 19:16:38 2014 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (valerie A. Wilkinson) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 11:16:38 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <003f01cf6e51$5f991cf0$1ecb56d0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Thank you for the word "ludologist" Of course! I mean if we are going to say "homo ludens" it's a short jump. The problem is the Greek! Homo sapiens is Greek Greek, but what is Greek for play? Game or theater or refresh. "All learning is gaming: mirror work (analog) and getting it right." Vandy -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 10:29 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Jesper Juul, Ludologist Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we do for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy (like television and certain forms of drugs). I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of the game as well. (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text intrinsic and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the teacher!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon May 12 23:48:25 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 06:48:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <8D13C083A20FB04-11EC-78A3@webmail-va048.sysops.aol.com> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <8D13C083A20FB04-11EC-78A3@webmail-va048.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31101DA7020@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I hope someone will be able to throw some light on whether there are different 'levels' of pain processing - or at least of processing of information signalling different forms of stress/distress. So some signals will lead to unconscious reactions while others will 'escalate' to conscious awareness (I suppose some would argue that only these would count as pain signals) and only these latter admit 'conscious interference' or opportunities for decision making. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Tvmathdude Sent: 12 May 2014 15:47 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions I see pain as a communication from one part off my body to several others. In some areas the reaction is automatic and instant. In others I see our ability - to different degrees - to choose our reaction. In my own body, I view pain and its manifestation as separate. Cause - effect - reaction. What would Vygotsky say? Roger -----Original Message----- From: Carol Macdonald To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Sent: Sat, May 10, 2014 1:38 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions Hi I think that even pain can be controlled. It's tempting to say this this is universal since is is part of our physiology, but people can control the degree they register pain, some to a remarkable extent. Then too our outward manifestation of pain will also be relative. Carol On 6 May 2014 20:28, Elinami Swai wrote: > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as > > universal either, since it is unlikely that there is anything > > remaining after the interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. > > However, it is nonetheless a different claim to say that human > > sensation is not universal, as to say human emotion (by which is > > meant I think "feeling") is not universal. Let's suppose all are > > experiencing pain: they are all clearly feeling different about it. > > > > Or was that your point? > > > > Andy > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ---- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing > >> torture, > in > >> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture > >> stoically, others with resignation, still others with agony, and > >> some with something that appears to be laughter. > >> > >> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in > >> such a way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is > >> not a universal human sensation. Not only that, I could probably > >> put together a sorting exercise that would come to the same > >> conclusion. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> > >>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been > >>> working among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three > >>> students headed to do research among the Himba in a month. So I've > >>> been picking up some interesting details about the Himba. > >>> > >>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact > >>> with Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of > >>> the larger cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the > >>> building of a dam that would cause flooding of some of the burial > >>> sites of their ancestors ( http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > >>> > >>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of > >>> the > key > >>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" > >>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western > >>> schooling takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they > >>> teach literacy - these means of teaching literacy always entail > >>> certain cultural ends - such > as > >>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > >>> > >>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack > >>> the Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing > >>> research on > this > >>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > begun > >>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. > >>> The Himba are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, > >>> the schools > don't > >>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > >>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are > >>> able to keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each > >>> of their cattle individually and can recognize when one is > >>> missing. But what really matters are things like knowing how to > >>> properly honor one's ancestors. If one fails to do that properly, > >>> then then ancestors will cause bad things to > happen > >>> to > >>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > >>> > >>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > >>> study, it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is > >>> the same as > the > >>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > argue > >>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > >>> arguable). > >>> > >>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your critique. > >>> Are > >>> emotions universal? > >>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these > >>> psychologists are missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not > >>> universal in quite a different sense? Perhaps that the very > >>> category of "emotion" is not universal? > >>> > >>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a > >>> picture of a face, people do not necessarily assume that the > >>> person in the picture is "emoting". I assume that this would be > >>> true among Westerners as well, but that possibility doesn't > >>> present itself in the research methodology since Westerners are > >>> asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > defined > >>> by > >>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > familiar). > >>> > >>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with > >>> taking Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the > >>> domain of "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - > >>> John Lucy). The argument is that even though this research turns > >>> up results that seem > to > >>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, > >>> the findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these > >>> domains and force these non-Western subjects into choosing within > >>> the pre-defined domain. > >>> > >>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald > >>> >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Well Mike > >>>> > >>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to > >>>> know where these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to > >>>> in the article: I am not sure they are *so *isolated - they are > >>>> well recognised as one of the language groups. And I think there > >>>> is also an elephant in the room here. > >>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to > >>>> point > >>>> > >>> that > >>> > >>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > equivalent > >>>> > >>> to > >>> > >>>> the others. > >>>> > >>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on > >>>> this research. > >>>> > >>>> Carol > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Perhaps of interest > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-ar > e-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > >>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- > Dr. Elinami Swai > Senior Lecturer > Associate Dean > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > Faculty of Education > Open University of Tanzania > P.O.Box 23409 > Dar-Es-Salaam > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > Fax:022-2668759 > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > 0230102484 > ...this faith will still deliver > If you live it first to last > Not everything which blooms must > wither. > Not all that was is past > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue May 13 00:00:20 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 07:00:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist In-Reply-To: <003f01cf6e51$5f991cf0$1ecb56d0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> References: <003f01cf6e51$5f991cf0$1ecb56d0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31101DA705E@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I think it is interesting to look at the various ways in which the Latin root 'ludere' has infiltrated into English - and the attitudes to pay and playfulness which this sometimes reveals (Delusion, Illusion, Collusion, Ludicrous ..) not a lot of positivity! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of valerie A. Wilkinson Sent: 13 May 2014 03:17 To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist Thank you for the word "ludologist" Of course! I mean if we are going to say "homo ludens" it's a short jump. The problem is the Greek! Homo sapiens is Greek Greek, but what is Greek for play? Game or theater or refresh. "All learning is gaming: mirror work (analog) and getting it right." Vandy -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 10:29 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Jesper Juul, Ludologist Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we do for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy (like television and certain forms of drugs). I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of the game as well. (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text intrinsic and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the teacher!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From wagner.schmit@gmail.com Tue May 13 00:05:15 2014 From: wagner.schmit@gmail.com (Wagner Luiz Schmit) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 16:05:15 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31101DA705E@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <003f01cf6e51$5f991cf0$1ecb56d0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31101DA705E@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: There is a debate on the term, you can find some here: http://www.ludology.org/ I still did not read any book from Jesper yet to say more, sorry. Wagner On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > I think it is interesting to look at the various ways in which the Latin > root 'ludere' has infiltrated into English - and the attitudes to pay and > playfulness which this sometimes reveals (Delusion, Illusion, Collusion, > Ludicrous ..) not a lot of positivity! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of valerie A. Wilkinson > Sent: 13 May 2014 03:17 > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > Thank you for the word "ludologist" > Of course! I mean if we are going to say "homo ludens" it's a short jump. > The problem is the Greek! Homo sapiens is Greek Greek, but what is Greek > for play? > Game or theater or refresh. > "All learning is gaming: mirror work (analog) and getting it right." > Vandy > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 10:29 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we do > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of > the game as well. > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text intrinsic > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > teacher!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From barowy@lesley.edu Tue May 13 06:20:54 2014 From: barowy@lesley.edu (Barowy, William) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 13:20:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Teachers and Facebook In-Reply-To: References: <4c37917496c540418cd71d0367650410@BY2PR03MB428.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Yeah -- two orientations occupying the same space -- I've taught an applied research course (empirical lead up to a thesis in a now defunct program) and students who are practicing teachers usually have studied their own setting in some way, all too often with conflict between arising between teaching and research. Here it might be two orientations occupying the same person-space. --- William Barowy, Ph. D. Associate Professor, Lesley University 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790 Desktop: http://bill.barowy.net/ Mobile: http://bill.barowy.net/m/ ?I am always doing that which I cannot do, in order that I may learn how to do it.? --Pablo Picasso -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Sunday, May 11, 2014 10:36 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Teachers and Facebook Nice to see your voice, Bill. This seems like a perfect project for a Communication scholar who thought CHAT was a useful analytic tool. In after-school institutions that are supposed to be helpful to kids' development there is a constant pressure to "make sure that nothing bad (e.g., unlawful, immoral...) happens." Our activities are organized to maximize the possibility of "good things" happening. When the two orientations occupy the same space, things certainly get interesting. mike On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Barowy, William wrote: > Hi all, > > There was a local incident in my area earlier this month that I've > briefly described in the following blog entry. I don't have time > myself to do it, but it occurred to me that this could be an excellent > controversial situation for an activity theoretical analysis, perhaps for a grad student. > > > http://www.lesley.edu/blog/technology-in-classroom/2014/04/should-teac > hers-be-allowed-to-friend-their-students-on-facebook/ > > --- > William Barowy, Ph. D. > Associate Professor, > Lesley University > 29 Everett Street, > Cambridge, MA 02138-2790 > Desktop: http://bill.barowy.net/ > Mobile: http://bill.barowy.net/m/ > > "I am always doing that which I cannot do, in order that I may learn > how to do it." > --Pablo Picasso > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue May 13 10:19:14 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 11:19:14 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31101DA7020@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <53686071.3010402@mira.net> <8D13C083A20FB04-11EC-78A3@webmail-va048.sysops.aol.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31101DA7020@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: In connection with "pain" perceptions, consider this podcast about pain and the "placebo effect": http://www.radiolab.org/story/91539-placebo/ In one segment, they explore pain and how pain depends on on'es context and one's trajectory of identification within that context (the story is about the difference in the pain experienced by soldiers at war as compared to that of civilians at home). They also have another show dedicated to pain in which they try to get to the bottom of it. They explore three efforts to try to put a number to pain: http://www.radiolab.org/story/233143-pain-scale/ Great listening for a commute. -greg On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 12:48 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > I hope someone will be able to throw some light on whether there are > different 'levels' of pain processing - or at least of processing of > information signalling different forms of stress/distress. So some signals > will lead to unconscious reactions while others will 'escalate' to > conscious awareness (I suppose some would argue that only these would count > as pain signals) and only these latter admit 'conscious interference' or > opportunities for decision making. > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Tvmathdude > Sent: 12 May 2014 15:47 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions > > I see pain as a communication from one part off my body to several others. > In some areas the reaction is automatic and instant. In others I see our > ability - to different degrees - to choose our reaction. In my own body, I > view pain and its manifestation as separate. Cause - effect - reaction. > > > What would Vygotsky say? > > > > Roger > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Carol Macdonald > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Sent: Sat, May 10, 2014 1:38 pm > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Questioning universal core emotions > > > Hi > > I think that even pain can be controlled. It's tempting to say this this > is universal since is is part of our physiology, but people can control the > degree they register pain, some to a remarkable extent. Then too our > outward manifestation of pain will also be relative. > > Carol > > > On 6 May 2014 20:28, Elinami Swai wrote: > > > I believe that pain, just like feeling is universal. But I also > > believe that emotion (which we can also call expression) is learned > > and thus may differ from one individual to another. We make > > interpretations of emotion and expression from our own points of view. > > > > > > On 5/6/14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > David, although I am sure that sensations cannot be taken as > > > universal either, since it is unlikely that there is anything > > > remaining after the interprettion of the "sensation" is abstracted. > > > However, it is nonetheless a different claim to say that human > > > sensation is not universal, as to say human emotion (by which is > > > meant I think "feeling") is not universal. Let's suppose all are > > > experiencing pain: they are all clearly feeling different about it. > > > > > > Or was that your point? > > > > > > Andy > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ---- > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > >> Suppose I put together a set of pictures of people undergoing > > >> torture, > > in > > >> which some people appeared to be experiencing the torture > > >> stoically, others with resignation, still others with agony, and > > >> some with something that appears to be laughter. > > >> > > >> I think I could probably crop the photographs and pose questions in > > >> such a way that I could very convincingly demonstrate that pain is > > >> not a universal human sensation. Not only that, I could probably > > >> put together a sorting exercise that would come to the same > > >> conclusion. > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > >> > > >> On 5 May 2014 01:24, Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> I have a colleague down the hall, David Crandall, that has been > > >>> working among the Himba for almost 30 years. I also have three > > >>> students headed to do research among the Himba in a month. So I've > > >>> been picking up some interesting details about the Himba. > > >>> > > >>> It seems like it is true that they have increasingly had contact > > >>> with Western culture, as evidenced by recent protests in some of > > >>> the larger cities that were staged by Himba opposed to the > > >>> building of a dam that would cause flooding of some of the burial > > >>> sites of their ancestors ( http://www.huntingtonnews.net/84854). > > >>> > > >>> At the same time, they are non-numerate people that lack some of > > >>> the > > key > > >>> Western institutions where kids learn (oddly enough) about "emotions" > > >>> (think of those pictures of happy and sad faces that Western > > >>> schooling takes into the classroom as the MEANS by which they > > >>> teach literacy - these means of teaching literacy always entail > > >>> certain cultural ends - such > > as > > >>> "emotion" - concepts that are not emic concepts). > > >>> > > >>> Among the western institutions that the Himba lack, the Himba lack > > >>> the Western model of schooling (one of my students is doing > > >>> research on > > this > > >>> very issue). It is only in the last 15 years or so that Himba have > > begun > > >>> sending their children to school, and now only in small numbers. > > >>> The Himba are very skeptical of schools since, in their opinion, > > >>> the schools > > don't > > >>> teach their children anything worthwhile. Knowing how to count is > > >>> unimportant to them since although they are non-numerate they are > > >>> able to keep track of large herds of cattle because they know each > > >>> of their cattle individually and can recognize when one is > > >>> missing. But what really matters are things like knowing how to > > >>> properly honor one's ancestors. If one fails to do that properly, > > >>> then then ancestors will cause bad things to > > happen > > >>> to > > >>> oneself. That is much more important than knowing how to count. > > >>> > > >>> Carol, I also agree with your concerns with the methodology of the > > >>> study, it may not be reasonable to assume that this research is > > >>> the same as > > the > > >>> Ekman tasks and of-course it is a Western-type task (but one might > > argue > > >>> that it is less so than the Ekman tasks since it is more open, > > >>> arguable). > > >>> > > >>> So Carol, I wonder what conclusions you would draw from your > critique. > > >>> Are > > >>> emotions universal? > > >>> I wonder if there is a further possibility that these > > >>> psychologists are missing. Is it possible that "emotions" are not > > >>> universal in quite a different sense? Perhaps that the very > > >>> category of "emotion" is not universal? > > >>> > > >>> I think this research points in that direction - when viewing a > > >>> picture of a face, people do not necessarily assume that the > > >>> person in the picture is "emoting". I assume that this would be > > >>> true among Westerners as well, but that possibility doesn't > > >>> present itself in the research methodology since Westerners are > > >>> asked "what emotion is this?" The task is already > > defined > > >>> by > > >>> the domain called "emotion" (with which they are already very > > familiar). > > >>> > > >>> Anthropologists have done great work to show the problems with > > >>> taking Western defined domains into non-Western contexts (e.g. the > > >>> domain of "kinship" - David Schneider, the domain of "color" - > > >>> John Lucy). The argument is that even though this research turns > > >>> up results that seem > > to > > >>> suggest that the domains are real even in non-Western contexts, > > >>> the findings are plagued by the fact that they assume these > > >>> domains and force these non-Western subjects into choosing within > > >>> the pre-defined domain. > > >>> > > >>> But then again, perhaps "emotion" is a universal category? > > >>> -greg > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Carol Macdonald > > >>> > >>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Well Mike > > >>>> > > >>>> I am here working in Namibia for the year, and I would like to > > >>>> know where these Himba people are. I mean the ones referred to > > >>>> in the article: I am not sure they are *so *isolated - they are > > >>>> well recognised as one of the language groups. And I think there > > >>>> is also an elephant in the room here. > > >>>> This is a western-type task, and Luria would have been quick to > > >>>> point > > >>>> > > >>> that > > >>> > > >>>> out. What makes this woman think that this task would be the > > equivalent > > >>>> > > >>> to > > >>> > > >>>> the others. > > >>>> > > >>>> Just a couple of basic principles to cast a small aspersion on > > >>>> this research. > > >>>> > > >>>> Carol > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On 4 May 2014 14:16, mike cole wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> Perhaps of interest > > >>>>> mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>> > > http://www.psypost.org/2014/03/the-six-universal-facial-expressions-ar > > e-not-universal-cross-cultural-study-shows-23471 > > >>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > >>>> Developmental psycholinguist > > >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > > >>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>> Assistant Professor > > >>> Department of Anthropology > > >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>> Brigham Young University > > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Dr. Elinami Swai > > Senior Lecturer > > Associate Dean > > Coordinator, Postgraduate Studies > > Faculty of Education > > Open University of Tanzania > > P.O.Box 23409 > > Dar-Es-Salaam > > Tell:255-022-2668992/2668820/2668445/26687455 > > Fax:022-2668759 > > Cell: (255) 076-722-8353; (255) 068-722-8353 > > http://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Womens-Empowerment-Africa-Dislocation/dp/ > > 0230102484 > > ...this faith will still deliver > > If you live it first to last > > Not everything which blooms must > > wither. > > Not all that was is past > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed May 14 07:55:51 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 07:55:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" Message-ID: Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of reasoning". Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" Binswanger refers to "world designs" Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the dialogical nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as world-designs. I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. Larry From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed May 14 08:25:34 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 16:25:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we do > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of > the game as well. > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in writing games etc. > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text intrinsic > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > teacher!) > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with respect to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. Radzikhovskii, L. A. Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. Best, Huw > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > From C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk Wed May 14 08:53:43 2014 From: C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk (C Barker) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 15:53:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Radzikhovskii, L. - article Message-ID: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> Huw wrote: Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. Radzikhovskii, L. A. Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. I seem unable to get access to this article. Does anyone have a .pdf they could pass on? Thanks Colin Barker ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] Sent: 14 May 2014 16:25 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we do > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of > the game as well. > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in writing games etc. > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text intrinsic > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > teacher!) > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with respect to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. Radzikhovskii, L. A. Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. Best, Huw > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on its website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed May 14 09:23:16 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 17:23:16 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article In-Reply-To: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> References: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> Message-ID: On 14 May 2014 16:53, C Barker wrote: > Huw wrote: > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > Radzikhovskii, L. > A.< > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > , > L. A.> > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > I seem unable to get access to this article. Does anyone have a .pdf they > could pass on? > > I've just the paper copy which I obtained via an inter-library service (probably from the British Library). Best, Huw > Thanks > > Colin Barker > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > Sent: 14 May 2014 16:25 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the ludologist? > > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on computer > > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we > do > > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy > > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless games > > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly an > > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should > > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality of > > the game as well. > > > > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. > > >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in writing > games etc. > > > > > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text > intrinsic > > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > > teacher!) > > > > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with respect > to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > Radzikhovskii, L. > A.< > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > , > L. A.> > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read > the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on its > website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Wed May 14 11:56:47 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 14:56:47 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Call for papers Message-ID: Dear colleagues, I am re-sending this call. If you are interested and have questions about topic and deadlines please do contact me offlist. David Call for papers on mind wandering and learning for a special section of Learning and Individual Differences The research on the impact of mind wandering on the learning process and education is mixed. Thus, some researchers have noted that mind wandering negatively impacts students? performance on school related abilities requiring high levels of concentration and metacognition, such as reading, attending lectures or, more specifically, performance on standardized measures of academic achievement. Yet, other researchers have noticed that mind wandering is a regular part of everyday normal functioning and have called attention to its positive impact on emotional processing, creativity and problem solving. Additionally, the research literature has reported that there are individual differences not only in people?s tendency to engage in mind wandering but also in the content of this wandering. These differences have consequences for how adaptive mind wandering may be in everyday functioning and, specifically, within educational contexts. Here, we seek contributions that represent innovative research on individual differences in mind wandering that: a) synthesize insights from multiple approaches and perspectives on individual differences in mind wandering; b) focus on the integration of research on mind wandering with research on school related abilities with special attention on those that are part and parcel of the core of the schooling process; c) relate mind wandering with the development of abilities and processes that, although not specifically academic, play a relevant role in schooling and education such as creativity, divergent thinking, imagination, and problem solving, among others; d) and investigate the connection between mind wandering and school related performance at different stages of schooling, from elementary school through college. Special consideration will be given to articles that place mind wandering in the context of overall human development. Original research and review articles will be considered. Submissions allow two formats: full-length articles (10,000 words) and short empirical reports or case studies (5,000 words); the page limits do not include the abstract, references, figures, or tables. Articles should reach the editorial office before June 30th 2014 to receive full consideration. When submitting articles, authors should indicate that their manuscript is intended for the special issue (mind wandering). Contact David Preiss (davidpreiss@uc.cl) if you have questions about the submission. From smago@uga.edu Wed May 14 12:09:04 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 19:09:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of the Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of reasoning". Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" Binswanger refers to "world designs" Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the dialogical nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as world-designs. I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. Larry From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed May 14 12:49:19 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 12:49:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article In-Reply-To: References: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> Message-ID: The issue of relation of the concepts of communication and activity was hotly debated in the USSR in the 1980's. Perhaps those interested would comment for others what they find important and interesting, problematic, worth discussion in this paper? mike On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 9:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 14 May 2014 16:53, C Barker wrote: > > > Huw wrote: > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > A.< > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > > , > > L. A.> > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > I seem unable to get access to this article. Does anyone have a .pdf they > > could pass on? > > > > > I've just the paper copy which I obtained via an inter-library service > (probably from the British Library). > > Best, > Huw > > > > Thanks > > > > Colin Barker > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > > Sent: 14 May 2014 16:25 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > > > On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the > ludologist? > > > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > > > > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on > computer > > > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we > > do > > > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy > > > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > > > > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless > games > > > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly > an > > > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > > > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should > > > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality > of > > > the game as well. > > > > > > > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. > > > > >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in writing > > games etc. > > > > > > > > > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > > > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text > > intrinsic > > > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > > > teacher!) > > > > > > > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with respect > > to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > A.< > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > > , > > L. A.> > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read > > the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on its > > website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: comm&activity.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 975996 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140514/fc97602e/attachment-0001.pdf From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed May 14 13:18:09 2014 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 20:18:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article In-Reply-To: References: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> Message-ID: Thank you Mike! Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 3:49 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article The issue of relation of the concepts of communication and activity was hotly debated in the USSR in the 1980's. Perhaps those interested would comment for others what they find important and interesting, problematic, worth discussion in this paper? mike On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 9:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 14 May 2014 16:53, C Barker wrote: > > > Huw wrote: > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > A.< > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType > =a&term=Radzikhovskii > > , > > L. A.> > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > I seem unable to get access to this article. Does anyone have a .pdf > > they could pass on? > > > > > I've just the paper copy which I obtained via an inter-library service > (probably from the British Library). > > Best, > Huw > > > > Thanks > > > > Colin Barker > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > > Sent: 14 May 2014 16:25 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > > > On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the > ludologist? > > > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > > > > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on > computer > > > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is > > > something we > > do > > > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us > > > unhappy (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > > > > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless > games > > > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's > > > mostly > an > > > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is > > > really designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically > > > why we should avoid thinking about play without thinking about the > > > intrinsic quality > of > > > the game as well. > > > > > > > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. > > > > >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in > > >writing > > games etc. > > > > > > > > > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > > > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text > > intrinsic > > > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and > > > the > > > teacher!) > > > > > > > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with > > respect to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > A.< > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType > =a&term=Radzikhovskii > > , > > L. A.> > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should > > read the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer > > available on its website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " > > > > > From C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk Wed May 14 16:07:18 2014 From: C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk (C Barker) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 23:07:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article In-Reply-To: References: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> , Message-ID: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D035E@exmb2> Many thanks for this Mike ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: 14 May 2014 20:49 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article The issue of relation of the concepts of communication and activity was hotly debated in the USSR in the 1980's. Perhaps those interested would comment for others what they find important and interesting, problematic, worth discussion in this paper? mike On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 9:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 14 May 2014 16:53, C Barker wrote: > > > Huw wrote: > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > A.< > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > > , > > L. A.> > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > I seem unable to get access to this article. Does anyone have a .pdf they > > could pass on? > > > > > I've just the paper copy which I obtained via an inter-library service > (probably from the British Library). > > Best, > Huw > > > > Thanks > > > > Colin Barker > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > > Sent: 14 May 2014 16:25 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > > > On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the > ludologist? > > > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > > > > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on > computer > > > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something we > > do > > > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us unhappy > > > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > > > > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless > games > > > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's mostly > an > > > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > > > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we should > > > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic quality > of > > > the game as well. > > > > > > > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. > > > > >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in writing > > games etc. > > > > > > > > > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > > > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text > > intrinsic > > > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > > > teacher!) > > > > > > > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with respect > > to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > A.< > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > > , > > L. A.> > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read > > the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on its > > website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " > > > > > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on its website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed May 14 19:13:42 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 19:13:42 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" In-Reply-To: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Thanks, Peter What year was volume 49 (2) ?? Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing distinct formations historically and these various formations continuing to be in *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier formations that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of how Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. Kozulin wrote: "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed in the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The first direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the study of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second direction of research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique of psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for the NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction explored the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work of Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness came to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these three directions. The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new direction. Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* by *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY by plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At the same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes *authoring*. Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but can be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the idea of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural schemas of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is an example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within humanistic psychology. The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different SYSTEMS OF LOGIC]. Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different *systems of thought*. Kozulin writes: "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* by different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as long as the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression of thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, HIGHER forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." [page 270] Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a analysis of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea of dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt dialogue in which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. This sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why language, according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather than that of the intellect." [page 271] Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices from Kozulin's *readings*. The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central point is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir Bibler has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help students learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. He assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can also learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the multiple types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's legacy or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and re-search? Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and interpret Larry Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of the > Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, > 49(2), > http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo > > Peter Smagorinsky > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > Department of Language and Literacy Education > The University of Georgia > 315 Aderhold Hall > Athens, GA 30602 > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has participated > in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" which uses as its > central construct "formations or systems of reasoning". > Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" > Binswanger refers to "world designs" > Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" > > This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new > *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of consciousness > AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the dialogical nature of this > EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* Bibler has developed a > school system where students engage in USING these various formations of > histrorically developed *reasons* as world-designs. > > I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and Binswanger's > ideas as sharing common intersections. > Larry > > From smago@uga.edu Thu May 15 04:10:37 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 11:10:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Here's my contribution. Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" Thanks, Peter What year was volume 49 (2) ?? Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing distinct formations historically and these various formations continuing to be in *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier formations that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of how Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. Kozulin wrote: "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed in the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The first direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the study of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second direction of research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique of psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for the NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction explored the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work of Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness came to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these three directions. The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new direction. Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* by *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY by plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At the same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes *authoring*. Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but can be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the idea of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural schemas of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is an example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within humanistic psychology. The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different SYSTEMS OF LOGIC]. Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different *systems of thought*. Kozulin writes: "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* by different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as long as the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression of thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, HIGHER forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." [page 270] Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a analysis of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea of dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt dialogue in which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. This sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why language, according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather than that of the intellect." [page 271] Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices from Kozulin's *readings*. The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central point is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir Bibler has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help students learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. He assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can also learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the multiple types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's legacy or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and re-search? Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and interpret Larry Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of the > Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, > 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo > > Peter Smagorinsky > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of > Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia > 315 Aderhold Hall > Athens, GA 30602 > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > xmca-l-bounces+Purss > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has > participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" > which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of reasoning". > Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" > Binswanger refers to "world designs" > Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" > > This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new > *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of > consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the dialogical > nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* > Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING > these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as world-designs. > > I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and > Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. > Larry > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Thu May 15 08:43:27 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 08:43:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Developmental Psychology Position Opening at Boston College, Applications Due Oct 1 2014 In-Reply-To: <6AD11B671D74054FA3E3ABD3E3FED9B3D235C3A6@EBHAZARD02.bc.edu> References: <6AD11B671D74054FA3E3ABD3E3FED9B3D235C3A6@EBHAZARD02.bc.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Ellen Winner Date: Wed, May 14, 2014 at 3:14 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Developmental Psychology Position Opening at Boston College, Applications Due Oct 1 2014 To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Cc: psychoffice The Department of Psychology of *Boston College* invites applications for a tenure-track position as Assistant Professor in *Developmental Psychology*to begin July 1, 2015. For an outstanding candidate, appointment at the Associate or Full Professor level is possible. We are particularly interested in candidates whose research is in the area of cognitive or social-cognitive development or developmental neuroscience. Applicants will be evaluated on their potential to establish a prominent, externally funded research program and to excel in teaching at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Applicants should e-mail to psychsearch.dev@bc.eduone attached pdf document containing a cover letter, cv, research statement, and teaching statement outlining teaching experience and philosophy. Applicants should arrange to have three letters of reference, in pdf format, e-mailed to the same address* (these references should be named in the cover letter).* *All materials must be submitted on or before October 1, 2014 for full consideration. *Review of applications will continue until the position is filled. *Boston College ,** a university of eight schools and colleges, is an equal opportunity employer and supports affirmative action.* Professor and Chair Department of Psychology McGuinn Hall 343 Boston College 140 Commonwealth Ave. Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 Tel: 1-617 552-4118 Fax: 1-815-346-5395 www.ellenwinner.com _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Devel ad2014.doc Type: application/msword Size: 25600 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140515/1a2af4e3/attachment.doc From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri May 16 06:41:55 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 14:41:55 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Radzikhovskii, L. - article In-Reply-To: References: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880E69D01E2@exmb2> Message-ID: On 14 May 2014 20:49, mike cole wrote: > The issue of relation of the concepts of communication and activity was > hotly debated in the USSR in the 1980's. > > Perhaps those interested would comment for others what they find important > and interesting, problematic, worth discussion in this paper? > > mike > > I liked the endeavour to orient to the genetic aspects of activity. This is difficult to do as it inevitably means relating so many different aspects. It is interesting too as a historical document. There are notions discussed which I take as a given, such as the social nature of individual activity. Other notions such as an emphasis on sign as a vehicle to investigate developmental phenomena (particularly with respect to investigating meaning and motive) are interesting too. One aspect of this interest stems from the somewhat dissonant nature of what we are studying: development entails protracted work on the part of the subject that may have an extensive substantive quality to it yet can show up in transitory and ethereal forms. It is difficult to do the paper justice via a brief email. Best, Huw > > On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 9:23 AM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > On 14 May 2014 16:53, C Barker wrote: > > > > > Huw wrote: > > > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > > A.< > > > > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > > > , > > > L. A.> > > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > > > I seem unable to get access to this article. Does anyone have a .pdf > they > > > could pass on? > > > > > > > > I've just the paper copy which I obtained via an inter-library service > > (probably from the British Library). > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > Colin Barker > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > > > Sent: 14 May 2014 16:25 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jesper Juul, Ludologist > > > > > > On 13 May 2014 02:28, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > Does anyone know anything about the work of Jesper Juul, the > > ludologist? > > > > ( don't mean the Danish Doctor Spock.) > > > > > > > > Jesper Juul, ludologist, has apparently written several books on > > computer > > > > games, including one on the curious paradox that gaming is something > we > > > do > > > > for fun even though (despite knowing that) it will soon make us > unhappy > > > > (like television and certain forms of drugs). > > > > > > > > I've only read one article of his, where he talks about playerless > > games > > > > (by which he means games that have no role for free will). It's > mostly > > an > > > > intellectual exercise--a kind of gedankenexperiment which is really > > > > designed to show why we do need players and paradoxically why we > should > > > > avoid thinking about play without thinking about the intrinsic > quality > > of > > > > the game as well. > > > > > > > > > > There's a link to his PhD thesis on the link Wagner posted, I believe. > > > > > > >From the messages there it looks like hes mostly interested in writing > > > games etc. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > (I am actually thinking about this in the context of vocabulary > > > > research--what factors are intrinsic to the word, which are text > > > intrinsic > > > > and which only inhere in the interaction between the learner and the > > > > teacher!) > > > > > > > > > > At a broad guess, is this driven by notions of completeness with > respect > > > to dialogic utterances in comparison to dialogic actions? > > > > > > Radzikhovskii wrote a fine paper pertaining to this: > > > > > > Activity: Structure, genesis, and units of analysis. > > > Radzikhovskii, L. > > > A.< > > > > > > http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.searchResults&latSearchType=a&term=Radzikhovskii > > > , > > > L. A.> > > > Soviet Psychology, Vol 23(2), 1984-1985, 35-53. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read > > > the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on > its > > > website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " > > > > > > > > > From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Fri May 16 10:45:16 2014 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 17:45:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] new article available for discussion Message-ID: <4F9253BD-32AA-44E3-95C4-DED68C406B1A@mail.ubc.ca> Dear XMCA Folks, We've been granted access to share Rolf Steier's article from Mind, Culture, and Activity, 21(2), just published. The Taylor and Francis Folks will open access to it on the web page below early next week. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3ZM6ijsq24 If you have trouble accessing it let me know and I will help. Rolf is on XMCA and has kindly agreed to respond to questions and engage in dialogue around this article, entitled Posing the question: Visitor posing as embodied interpretation in an art museum. The abstract is included below. Best to everyone, jen Posing the Question: Visitor Posing as Embodied Interpretation in an Art Museum DOI: 10.1080/10749039.2013.878361 Rolf Steiera* pages 148-170 Abstract This article identifies and explores posing by visitors to an art gallery as a unique meaning making activity. Conducted as a design experiment in partnership with a national art museum, this study builds on theoretical perspectives related to gesture and embodiment. Empirical findings suggest that particular posing activities function simultaneously to mediate internally and externally oriented processes of interpretation in encounters with art. Accordingly, these complex posing practices may be viewed as an integrated part of visitors? meaning making experiences. Implications for this research include expanding our understanding of the roles of the body in visitor?s museum experiences. From lspopov@bgsu.edu Fri May 16 12:22:58 2014 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 19:22:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: new article available for discussion In-Reply-To: <4F9253BD-32AA-44E3-95C4-DED68C406B1A@mail.ubc.ca> References: <4F9253BD-32AA-44E3-95C4-DED68C406B1A@mail.ubc.ca> Message-ID: <12db5fd4581f47b09d33ace499df4652@CO2PR0501MB855.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Dear Jennifer, I tried to access the article, but the system asks me for payment. The only piece I could access was the short CFP for this issue. By the way, does anybody know if ISCAR members have free access to the journal? Thank you very much, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer Sent: Friday, May 16, 2014 1:45 PM To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture Cc: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Subject: [Xmca-l] new article available for discussion Dear XMCA Folks, We've been granted access to share Rolf Steier's article from Mind, Culture, and Activity, 21(2), just published. The Taylor and Francis Folks will open access to it on the web page below early next week. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3ZM6ijsq24 If you have trouble accessing it let me know and I will help. Rolf is on XMCA and has kindly agreed to respond to questions and engage in dialogue around this article, entitled Posing the question: Visitor posing as embodied interpretation in an art museum. The abstract is included below. Best to everyone, jen Posing the Question: Visitor Posing as Embodied Interpretation in an Art Museum DOI: 10.1080/10749039.2013.878361 Rolf Steiera* pages 148-170 Abstract This article identifies and explores posing by visitors to an art gallery as a unique meaning making activity. Conducted as a design experiment in partnership with a national art museum, this study builds on theoretical perspectives related to gesture and embodiment. Empirical findings suggest that particular posing activities function simultaneously to mediate internally and externally oriented processes of interpretation in encounters with art. Accordingly, these complex posing practices may be viewed as an integrated part of visitors' meaning making experiences. Implications for this research include expanding our understanding of the roles of the body in visitor's museum experiences. From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Fri May 16 12:32:14 2014 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 19:32:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: new article available for discussion In-Reply-To: <12db5fd4581f47b09d33ace499df4652@CO2PR0501MB855.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> References: <4F9253BD-32AA-44E3-95C4-DED68C406B1A@mail.ubc.ca> <12db5fd4581f47b09d33ace499df4652@CO2PR0501MB855.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <37DF12D1-C28E-4050-BB80-8A850483BB5E@mail.ubc.ca> Dear Lubomir, It will take T&F some time to open the access, so they said it should be ready early next week. The block next to the article changes to green. I would check the web page again on Monday / Tuesday and I hope it will be ready by then, if not ... Plan B :). Best - jen On 2014-05-16, at 12:22 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Dear Jennifer, > > I tried to access the article, but the system asks me for payment. The only piece I could access was the short CFP for this issue. > > By the way, does anybody know if ISCAR members have free access to the journal? > > Thank you very much, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > Sent: Friday, May 16, 2014 1:45 PM > To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture > Cc: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no > Subject: [Xmca-l] new article available for discussion > > Dear XMCA Folks, > > We've been granted access to share Rolf Steier's article from Mind, Culture, and Activity, 21(2), just published. The Taylor and Francis Folks will open access to it on the web page below early next week. > > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3ZM6ijsq24 > > If you have trouble accessing it let me know and I will help. > > Rolf is on XMCA and has kindly agreed to respond to questions and engage in dialogue around this article, entitled Posing the question: Visitor posing as embodied interpretation in an art museum. The abstract is included below. > > Best to everyone, jen > > Posing the Question: Visitor Posing as Embodied Interpretation in an Art Museum > > DOI: > 10.1080/10749039.2013.878361 > Rolf Steiera* > > pages 148-170 > > Abstract > > This article identifies and explores posing by visitors to an art gallery as a unique meaning making activity. Conducted as a design experiment in partnership with a national art museum, this study builds on theoretical perspectives related to gesture and embodiment. Empirical findings suggest that particular posing activities function simultaneously to mediate internally and externally oriented processes of interpretation in encounters with art. Accordingly, these complex posing practices may be viewed as an integrated part of visitors' meaning making experiences. Implications for this research include expanding our understanding of the roles of the body in visitor's museum experiences. > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sat May 17 15:13:59 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sat, 17 May 2014 15:13:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Invitation to submit a letter of intent to a special issue in Child Development on the Ontogeny of Human Cultural Learning In-Reply-To: References: <53892DEA-D85E-4C01-8608-512AFA430C98@austin.utexas.edu> Message-ID: Regarding the opportunity to publish in Child Development: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Legare, Cristine H Date: Sat, May 17, 2014 at 1:52 PM Subject: Re: Invitation to submit a letter of intent to a special issue in Child Development on the Ontogeny of Human Cultural Learning To: "" Cc: Paul Harris Hi Mike, Thank you very much for passing along the information. We are looking for interdisciplinary papers from a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives (experimental and observational, qualitative and quantitative). With best regards, Cristine *************************************************** Cristine H. Legare, Ph.D. Associate Professor Director of the Cognition, Culture, & Development Lab The University of Texas at Austin Department of Psychology 1 University Station #A8000 Austin, Texas 78712-0187 email: legare@austin.utexas.edu webpage: http://www.ccdlab.net ph: (512)468-8238 | fax: (512)471-6175 *************************************************** On May 11, 2014, at 3:30 PM, mike cole wrote: Hi-- I hope you do not mind me passing along your invitation. Odd, I had just written a note to the lab expressing my dismay that the SRCD special meeting on methodology to be held here in San Diego excludes qualitative research on development as relevant. Hence the remark about my uncertainty concerning the term "empirical." Happy Mother's Day! Nice to hear from you. mike On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 11:59 AM, Legare, Cristine H < legare@austin.utexas.edu> wrote: > Dear friends and colleagues, > > We are writing to announce that Paul and I will be guest editors for a > special issue on the Ontogeny of Human Cultural Learning to be published in > Child Development. Given your expertise on this topic, we would like for > you to consider submitting empirical papers for consideration for > publication. > > The following link contains information about the content of the special > issue as well as instructions for submitting a letter of intent (due July > 1st): > > > http://www.srcd.org/publications/child-development/calls-special-issues-sections > > With best regards, > > Cristine Legare and Paul Harris > *************************************************** > Cristine H. Legare, Ph.D. > Associate Professor > Director of the Cognition, Culture, & Development Lab > The University of Texas at Austin > Department of Psychology > 1 University Station #A8000 > Austin, Texas 78712-0187 > email: legare@austin.utexas.edu > webpage: http://www.ccdlab.net > ph: (512)468-8238 | fax: (512)471-6175 > *************************************************** > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun May 18 18:34:12 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 18:34:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas and their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct summary from Alex Kozulin, Larry. To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in the model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating the conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or business scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the wealthy. What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social category and its related social institutions of implementation? Constantly posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems another. One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! We'll see. Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I will include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better than I. The statement that caught my eye was this: At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of senses (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are not condusive to human develpment.)) mike ? On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Here's my contribution. > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the > Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. Journal of > Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at > http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf > > Peter Smagorinsky > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > Department of Language and Literacy Education > The University of Georgia > 315 Aderhold Hall > Athens, GA 30602 > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > Thanks, Peter > > What year was volume 49 (2) ?? > > Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education > and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing distinct > formations historically and these various formations continuing to be in > *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current > scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing > particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier formations > that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. > > I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex > Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of how > Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. > Kozulin wrote: > "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed in > the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The first > direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of > *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the study > of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second direction of > research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique of > psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for the > NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction explored > the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work of > Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness came > to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a > dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" > Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these three > directions. > The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's > book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new direction. > Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* by > *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY by > plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At the > same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the > requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes *authoring*. > Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but can > be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the idea > of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural schemas > of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION > THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is an > example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within > humanistic psychology. > > The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and > 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. > Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within > dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different SYSTEMS > OF LOGIC]. > Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different *systems > of thought*. Kozulin writes: > "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* by > different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either > final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as long as > the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human > thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the seventeenth > through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression of > thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, HIGHER > forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly > dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them > should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." > [page 270] > > Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: > > " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the > psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a analysis > of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea of > dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt dialogue in > which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, > EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. This > sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the > essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it > seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness and > intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, are > MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by > the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why language, > according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather > than that of the intellect." [page 271] > > Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices from > Kozulin's *readings*. > The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore > DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central point > is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to > contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir Bibler > has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help students > learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. He > assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can also > learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific > reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. > > Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the multiple > types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. > > I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's > legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's legacy > or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and > re-search? > > Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. > > So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and interpret > > Larry > > > > Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has > > > On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of the > > Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, > > 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo > > > > Peter Smagorinsky > > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of > > Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia > > 315 Aderhold Hall > > Athens, GA 30602 > > > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > > xmca-l-bounces+Purss > > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > > > Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has > > participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" > > which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of reasoning". > > Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" > > Binswanger refers to "world designs" > > Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" > > > > This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new > > *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of > > consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the dialogical > > nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* > > Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING > > these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as > world-designs. > > > > I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and > > Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. > > Larry > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 19 06:42:46 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 06:42:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Mike, Peter Thanks for keeping this thread moving. Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built into the model. The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas through an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in school offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be put into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which is biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural extension of the model. Mike, I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of consciousness. The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* speech* AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards cultural historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked *hinges* or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal intersubjective experiences. The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics by the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics within each schema. The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and experiments [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and the reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective reflection. The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are continually in dialogue with later formations. The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored in his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural schemas* as dialogically developing formations. I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received traditions while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as we move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual dialogue towards finding *common ground* within a new commons Larry On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas and > their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct summary > from Alex Kozulin, Larry. > > To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in the > model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating the > conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or business > scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the wealthy. > > What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social > category and its related social institutions of implementation? Constantly > posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems another. > One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! > > We'll see. > > Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I will > include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better than > I. The statement that caught my eye was this: > > At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between > consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, > scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while > consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY > dialogical. > > ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between > consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? > > ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of > senses > (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. > Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are not > condusive to human develpment.)) > > mike > > ? > > On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > Here's my contribution. > > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the > > Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. Journal > of > > Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at > > http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf > > > > Peter Smagorinsky > > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > > Department of Language and Literacy Education > > The University of Georgia > > 315 Aderhold Hall > > Athens, GA 30602 > > > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > > > Thanks, Peter > > > > What year was volume 49 (2) ?? > > > > Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education > > and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing distinct > > formations historically and these various formations continuing to be in > > *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current > > scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing > > particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier > formations > > that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. > > > > I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex > > Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of how > > Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. > > Kozulin wrote: > > "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed in > > the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The first > > direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of > > *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the study > > of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second direction > of > > research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique of > > psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for > the > > NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction > explored > > the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work of > > Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness > came > > to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a > > dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" > > Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these > three > > directions. > > The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's > > book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new > direction. > > Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* by > > *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY by > > plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At > the > > same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the > > requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes > *authoring*. > > Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but can > > be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the > idea > > of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural > schemas > > of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION > > THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is > an > > example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within > > humanistic psychology. > > > > The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and > > 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. > > Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within > > dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different > SYSTEMS > > OF LOGIC]. > > Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different *systems > > of thought*. Kozulin writes: > > "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* by > > different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either > > final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as long > as > > the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human > > thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the seventeenth > > through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression of > > thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, > HIGHER > > forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly > > dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them > > should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." > > [page 270] > > > > Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: > > > > " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the > > psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a > analysis > > of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea > of > > dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt dialogue > in > > which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, > > EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. > This > > sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the > > essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it > > seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness and > > intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, > are > > MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED > by > > the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why language, > > according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather > > than that of the intellect." [page 271] > > > > Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices from > > Kozulin's *readings*. > > The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore > > DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central point > > is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to > > contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir > Bibler > > has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help students > > learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. He > > assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can > also > > learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific > > reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. > > > > Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the > multiple > > types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. > > > > I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's > > legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's > legacy > > or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and > > re-search? > > > > Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. > > > > So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and interpret > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has > > > > > > On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky > wrote: > > > > > Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of the > > > Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, > > > 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo > > > > > > Peter Smagorinsky > > > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of > > > Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia > > > 315 Aderhold Hall > > > Athens, GA 30602 > > > > > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > > > > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > > > xmca-l-bounces+Purss > > > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > > > > > Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has > > > participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" > > > which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of > reasoning". > > > Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" > > > Binswanger refers to "world designs" > > > Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" > > > > > > This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new > > > *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of > > > consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the dialogical > > > nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* > > > Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING > > > these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as > > world-designs. > > > > > > I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and > > > Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 19 15:25:11 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 07:25:11 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out for a specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; it is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva thinks that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy on consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit topic of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on Pedology is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and Speech", where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the far monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a realization of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of intellect, and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, and some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he brings in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and narratives at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper discussed by xmca a few years ago. My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of Act One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. (Miranda sleeps) Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. (Prospero goes to look.) Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from the missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original text we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the distracted Miranda. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: > Mike, Peter > Thanks for keeping this thread moving. > > Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the > ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built > into the model. > The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural > historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations > within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. > > Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas through > an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live > through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema > by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the > unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in school > offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] > > This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical > sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current > sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be put > into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid > formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. > > To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which is > biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural extension > of the model. > > Mike, > I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of > Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with > Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of consciousness. > The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* speech* > AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards cultural > historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked *hinges* > or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. > > This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations > developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal > intersubjective experiences. > > The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging > questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics by > the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics within > each schema. > The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received > *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and experiments > [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and the > reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective reflection. > > The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* > *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are > continually in dialogue with later formations. > > The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored in > his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized > *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to > Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural schemas* > as dialogically developing formations. > I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received traditions > while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go > *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with > *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations > AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This > approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as we > move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. > > Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual dialogue > towards finding *common ground* within a new commons > Larry > > > > > > > On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas > and > > their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct > summary > > from Alex Kozulin, Larry. > > > > To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in the > > model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating the > > conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or > business > > scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the > wealthy. > > > > What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social > > category and its related social institutions of implementation? > Constantly > > posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems > another. > > One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! > > > > We'll see. > > > > Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I > will > > include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better > than > > I. The statement that caught my eye was this: > > > > At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between > > consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, > > scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while > > consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is > NECESSARILY > > dialogical. > > > > ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between > > consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? > > > > ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of > > senses > > (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. > > Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are not > > condusive to human develpment.)) > > > > mike > > > > ? > > > > On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky > wrote: > > > > > Here's my contribution. > > > Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the > > > Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. > Journal > > of > > > Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at > > > http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf > > > > > > Peter Smagorinsky > > > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > > > Department of Language and Literacy Education > > > The University of Georgia > > > 315 Aderhold Hall > > > Athens, GA 30602 > > > > > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > > > > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > > > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > > > > > Thanks, Peter > > > > > > What year was volume 49 (2) ?? > > > > > > Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education > > > and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing > distinct > > > formations historically and these various formations continuing to be > in > > > *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current > > > scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing > > > particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier > > formations > > > that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. > > > > > > I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex > > > Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of > how > > > Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. > > > Kozulin wrote: > > > "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed > in > > > the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The > first > > > direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of > > > *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the > study > > > of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second > direction > > of > > > research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique > of > > > psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for > > the > > > NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction > > explored > > > the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work > of > > > Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness > > came > > > to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a > > > dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" > > > Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these > > three > > > directions. > > > The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's > > > book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new > > direction. > > > Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* > by > > > *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY > by > > > plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At > > the > > > same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the > > > requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes > > *authoring*. > > > Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but > can > > > be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the > > idea > > > of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural > > schemas > > > of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION > > > THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is > > an > > > example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within > > > humanistic psychology. > > > > > > The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and > > > 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. > > > Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within > > > dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different > > SYSTEMS > > > OF LOGIC]. > > > Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different > *systems > > > of thought*. Kozulin writes: > > > "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* > by > > > different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either > > > final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as > long > > as > > > the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human > > > thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the > seventeenth > > > through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression > of > > > thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, > > HIGHER > > > forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly > > > dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them > > > should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." > > > [page 270] > > > > > > Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: > > > > > > " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the > > > psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a > > analysis > > > of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea > > of > > > dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt > dialogue > > in > > > which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, > > > EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. > > This > > > sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the > > > essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it > > > seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness > and > > > intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, > > are > > > MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED > > by > > > the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why > language, > > > according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather > > > than that of the intellect." [page 271] > > > > > > Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices > from > > > Kozulin's *readings*. > > > The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore > > > DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central > point > > > is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to > > > contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir > > Bibler > > > has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help > students > > > learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. > He > > > assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can > > also > > > learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific > > > reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. > > > > > > Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the > > multiple > > > types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. > > > > > > I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's > > > legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's > > legacy > > > or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and > > > re-search? > > > > > > Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. > > > > > > So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and > interpret > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky > > wrote: > > > > > > > Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of > the > > > > Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European > Psychology, > > > > 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo > > > > > > > > Peter Smagorinsky > > > > Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of > > > > Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia > > > > 315 Aderhold Hall > > > > Athens, GA 30602 > > > > > > > > Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > > > > > > > > Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > > > > xmca-l-bounces+Purss > > > > Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > > > > > > > > Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has > > > > participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" > > > > which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of > > reasoning". > > > > Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" > > > > Binswanger refers to "world designs" > > > > Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" > > > > > > > > This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new > > > > *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of > > > > consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the > dialogical > > > > nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* > > > > Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING > > > > these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as > > > world-designs. > > > > > > > > I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and > > > > Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 19 17:12:40 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 10:12:40 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of consciousness." Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of consciousness*. "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the nature of human consciousness." Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in its special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to anatomy of the ape") But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the unit, then you may not read this the same way, "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word is a microcosm of human consciousness." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out for a > specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as > distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; it > is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of > "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva thinks > that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy on > consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit topic > of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in > Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on Pedology > is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic > speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? > > The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and Speech", > where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a > continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the far > monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a realization > of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of intellect, > and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the > solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning > potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, and > some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is > realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he brings > in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and narratives > at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the > episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper discussed > by xmca a few years ago. > > My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The > Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of Act > One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: > > Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? > Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. > > (Miranda sleeps) > > Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. > Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? > Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. > > (Prospero goes to look.) > > Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! > Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... > > (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) > > You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from the > missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some > narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original text > we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the > distracted Miranda. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: > > >> Mike, Peter >> Thanks for keeping this thread moving. >> >> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the >> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built >> into the model. >> The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural >> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations >> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. >> >> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas through >> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live >> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema >> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the >> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in school >> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] >> >> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical >> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current >> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be put >> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid >> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. >> >> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which is >> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural extension >> of the model. >> >> Mike, >> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of >> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with >> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of consciousness. >> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* speech* >> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards cultural >> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked *hinges* >> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. >> >> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations >> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal >> intersubjective experiences. >> >> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging >> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics by >> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics within >> each schema. >> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received >> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and experiments >> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and the >> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective reflection. >> >> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* >> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are >> continually in dialogue with later formations. >> >> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored in >> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized >> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to >> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural schemas* >> as dialogically developing formations. >> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received traditions >> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go >> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with >> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations >> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This >> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as we >> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. >> >> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual dialogue >> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons >> Larry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas >>> >> and >> >>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct >>> >> summary >> >>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry. >>> >>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in the >>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating the >>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or >>> >> business >> >>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the >>> >> wealthy. >> >>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social >>> category and its related social institutions of implementation? >>> >> Constantly >> >>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems >>> >> another. >> >>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! >>> >>> We'll see. >>> >>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I >>> >> will >> >>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better >>> >> than >> >>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this: >>> >>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between >>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, >>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while >>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is >>> >> NECESSARILY >> >>> dialogical. >>> >>> ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between >>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? >>> >>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of >>> senses >>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. >>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are not >>> condusive to human develpment.)) >>> >>> mike >>> >>> ? >>> >>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky >>> >> wrote: >> >>>> Here's my contribution. >>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the >>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. >>>> >> Journal >> >>> of >>> >>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at >>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf >>>> >>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>> The University of Georgia >>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>> >>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>> >>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>> >>>> Thanks, Peter >>>> >>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ?? >>>> >>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education >>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing >>>> >> distinct >> >>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be >>>> >> in >> >>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current >>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing >>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier >>>> >>> formations >>> >>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. >>>> >>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex >>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of >>>> >> how >> >>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. >>>> Kozulin wrote: >>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed >>>> >> in >> >>>> the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The >>>> >> first >> >>>> direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of >>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the >>>> >> study >> >>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second >>>> >> direction >> >>> of >>> >>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique >>>> >> of >> >>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for >>>> >>> the >>> >>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction >>>> >>> explored >>> >>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work >>>> >> of >> >>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness >>>> >>> came >>> >>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a >>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" >>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these >>>> >>> three >>> >>>> directions. >>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's >>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new >>>> >>> direction. >>> >>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* >>>> >> by >> >>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY >>>> >> by >> >>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At >>>> >>> the >>> >>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the >>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes >>>> >>> *authoring*. >>> >>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but >>>> >> can >> >>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the >>>> >>> idea >>> >>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural >>>> >>> schemas >>> >>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION >>>> THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is >>>> >>> an >>> >>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within >>>> humanistic psychology. >>>> >>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and >>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. >>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within >>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different >>>> >>> SYSTEMS >>> >>>> OF LOGIC]. >>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different >>>> >> *systems >> >>>> of thought*. Kozulin writes: >>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* >>>> >> by >> >>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either >>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as >>>> >> long >> >>> as >>> >>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human >>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the >>>> >> seventeenth >> >>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression >>>> >> of >> >>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, >>>> >>> HIGHER >>> >>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly >>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them >>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." >>>> [page 270] >>>> >>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: >>>> >>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the >>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a >>>> >>> analysis >>> >>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea >>>> >>> of >>> >>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt >>>> >> dialogue >> >>> in >>> >>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, >>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. >>>> >>> This >>> >>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the >>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it >>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness >>>> >> and >> >>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, >>>> >>> are >>> >>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED >>>> >>> by >>> >>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why >>>> >> language, >> >>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather >>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271] >>>> >>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices >>>> >> from >> >>>> Kozulin's *readings*. >>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore >>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central >>>> >> point >> >>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to >>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir >>>> >>> Bibler >>> >>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help >>>> >> students >> >>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. >>>> >> He >> >>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can >>>> >>> also >>> >>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific >>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. >>>> >>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the >>>> >>> multiple >>> >>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. >>>> >>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's >>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's >>>> >>> legacy >>> >>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and >>>> re-search? >>>> >>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. >>>> >>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and >>>> >> interpret >> >>>> Larry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European >>>>> >> Psychology, >> >>>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo >>>>> >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of >>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>> >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>> >>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has >>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" >>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of >>>>> >>> reasoning". >>> >>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" >>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs" >>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" >>>>> >>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new >>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of >>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the >>>>> >> dialogical >> >>>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* >>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING >>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as >>>>> >>>> world-designs. >>>> >>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and >>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 19 17:48:23 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 10:48:23 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <537AA657.9040100@mira.net> The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of consciousness." Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of consciousness*. "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the nature of human consciousness." Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in its special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to anatomy of the ape") But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the unit, then you may not read this the same way, "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word is a microcosm of human consciousness." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out for a > specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as > distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; it > is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of > "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva thinks > that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy on > consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit topic > of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in > Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on Pedology > is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic > speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? > > The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and Speech", > where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a > continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the far > monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a realization > of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of intellect, > and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the > solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning > potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, and > some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is > realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he brings > in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and narratives > at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the > episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper discussed > by xmca a few years ago. > > My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The > Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of Act > One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: > > Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? > Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. > > (Miranda sleeps) > > Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. > Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? > Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. > > (Prospero goes to look.) > > Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! > Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... > > (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) > > You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from the > missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some > narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original text > we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the > distracted Miranda. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: > > >> Mike, Peter >> Thanks for keeping this thread moving. >> >> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the >> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built >> into the model. >> The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural >> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations >> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. >> >> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas through >> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live >> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema >> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the >> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in school >> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] >> >> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical >> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current >> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be put >> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid >> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. >> >> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which is >> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural extension >> of the model. >> >> Mike, >> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of >> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with >> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of consciousness. >> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* speech* >> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards cultural >> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked *hinges* >> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. >> >> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations >> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal >> intersubjective experiences. >> >> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging >> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics by >> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics within >> each schema. >> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received >> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and experiments >> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and the >> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective reflection. >> >> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* >> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are >> continually in dialogue with later formations. >> >> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored in >> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized >> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to >> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural schemas* >> as dialogically developing formations. >> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received traditions >> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go >> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with >> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations >> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This >> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as we >> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. >> >> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual dialogue >> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons >> Larry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas >>> >> and >> >>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct >>> >> summary >> >>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry. >>> >>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in the >>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating the >>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or >>> >> business >> >>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the >>> >> wealthy. >> >>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social >>> category and its related social institutions of implementation? >>> >> Constantly >> >>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems >>> >> another. >> >>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! >>> >>> We'll see. >>> >>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I >>> >> will >> >>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better >>> >> than >> >>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this: >>> >>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between >>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, >>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while >>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is >>> >> NECESSARILY >> >>> dialogical. >>> >>> ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between >>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? >>> >>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of >>> senses >>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. >>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are not >>> condusive to human develpment.)) >>> >>> mike >>> >>> ? >>> >>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky >>> >> wrote: >> >>>> Here's my contribution. >>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the >>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. >>>> >> Journal >> >>> of >>> >>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at >>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf >>>> >>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>> The University of Georgia >>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>> >>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>> >>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>> >>>> Thanks, Peter >>>> >>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ?? >>>> >>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education >>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing >>>> >> distinct >> >>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be >>>> >> in >> >>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current >>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing >>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier >>>> >>> formations >>> >>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. >>>> >>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex >>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of >>>> >> how >> >>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. >>>> Kozulin wrote: >>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed >>>> >> in >> >>>> the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The >>>> >> first >> >>>> direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of >>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the >>>> >> study >> >>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second >>>> >> direction >> >>> of >>> >>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique >>>> >> of >> >>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for >>>> >>> the >>> >>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction >>>> >>> explored >>> >>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work >>>> >> of >> >>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness >>>> >>> came >>> >>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a >>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" >>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these >>>> >>> three >>> >>>> directions. >>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's >>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new >>>> >>> direction. >>> >>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* >>>> >> by >> >>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY >>>> >> by >> >>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At >>>> >>> the >>> >>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the >>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes >>>> >>> *authoring*. >>> >>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but >>>> >> can >> >>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the >>>> >>> idea >>> >>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural >>>> >>> schemas >>> >>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION >>>> THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is >>>> >>> an >>> >>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within >>>> humanistic psychology. >>>> >>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and >>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. >>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within >>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different >>>> >>> SYSTEMS >>> >>>> OF LOGIC]. >>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different >>>> >> *systems >> >>>> of thought*. Kozulin writes: >>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* >>>> >> by >> >>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either >>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as >>>> >> long >> >>> as >>> >>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human >>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the >>>> >> seventeenth >> >>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression >>>> >> of >> >>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, >>>> >>> HIGHER >>> >>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly >>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them >>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." >>>> [page 270] >>>> >>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: >>>> >>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the >>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a >>>> >>> analysis >>> >>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea >>>> >>> of >>> >>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt >>>> >> dialogue >> >>> in >>> >>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, >>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. >>>> >>> This >>> >>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the >>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it >>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness >>>> >> and >> >>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, >>>> >>> are >>> >>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED >>>> >>> by >>> >>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why >>>> >> language, >> >>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather >>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271] >>>> >>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices >>>> >> from >> >>>> Kozulin's *readings*. >>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore >>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central >>>> >> point >> >>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to >>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir >>>> >>> Bibler >>> >>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help >>>> >> students >> >>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. >>>> >> He >> >>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can >>>> >>> also >>> >>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific >>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. >>>> >>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the >>>> >>> multiple >>> >>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. >>>> >>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's >>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's >>>> >>> legacy >>> >>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and >>>> re-search? >>>> >>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. >>>> >>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and >>>> >> interpret >> >>>> Larry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European >>>>> >> Psychology, >> >>>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo >>>>> >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of >>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>> >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry >>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>> >>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has >>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" >>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of >>>>> >>> reasoning". >>> >>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" >>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs" >>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" >>>>> >>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new >>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of >>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the >>>>> >> dialogical >> >>>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* >>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING >>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as >>>>> >>>> world-designs. >>>> >>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and >>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue May 20 08:14:33 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 08:14:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, David Mike's question is generating answers. Andy, you quoted: "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness" The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical] Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic forms of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers." Bahktin wrote: "Actual act-performing thinking is an emotional-volitional thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content." Vygotsky wrote: "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking .... and makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action of thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life." Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes. The back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something VAGUE develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea." Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement: A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating, the preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine that DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) " I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS. larry On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf > > "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized > by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of > consciousness." > > Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of > consciousness*. > > "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the > nature of human consciousness." > > Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by > understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in its > special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to > anatomy of the ape") > > But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the > unit, then you may not read this the same way, > > "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is > consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore > for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the > development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the > development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the > word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the > whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in > Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but > possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the > historical nature of human consciousness. > Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in > a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, > related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an > organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word > is a microcosm of human consciousness." > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out for a >> specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as >> distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; it >> is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of >> "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva >> thinks >> that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy >> on >> consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit topic >> of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in >> Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on Pedology >> is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic >> speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? >> >> The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and >> Speech", >> where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a >> continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the >> far >> monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a >> realization >> of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of intellect, >> and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the >> solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning >> potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, >> and >> some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is >> realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he brings >> in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and narratives >> at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the >> episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper discussed >> by xmca a few years ago. >> >> My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The >> Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of Act >> One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: >> >> Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? >> Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. >> >> (Miranda sleeps) >> >> Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. >> Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? >> Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. >> >> (Prospero goes to look.) >> >> Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! >> Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... >> >> (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) >> >> You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from the >> missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some >> narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original text >> we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the >> distracted Miranda. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> >> On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> >> >>> Mike, Peter >>> Thanks for keeping this thread moving. >>> >>> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the >>> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built >>> into the model. >>> The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural >>> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations >>> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. >>> >>> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas through >>> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live >>> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema >>> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the >>> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in school >>> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] >>> >>> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical >>> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current >>> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be put >>> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid >>> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. >>> >>> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which is >>> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural >>> extension >>> of the model. >>> >>> Mike, >>> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of >>> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with >>> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of >>> consciousness. >>> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* speech* >>> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards >>> cultural >>> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked >>> *hinges* >>> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. >>> >>> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations >>> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal >>> intersubjective experiences. >>> >>> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging >>> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics by >>> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics within >>> each schema. >>> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received >>> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and >>> experiments >>> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and the >>> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective reflection. >>> >>> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* >>> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are >>> continually in dialogue with later formations. >>> >>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored >>> in >>> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized >>> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to >>> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural >>> schemas* >>> as dialogically developing formations. >>> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received >>> traditions >>> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go >>> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with >>> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations >>> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This >>> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as we >>> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. >>> >>> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual dialogue >>> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons >>> Larry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas >>>> >>>> >>> and >>> >>> >>>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct >>>> >>>> >>> summary >>> >>> >>>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry. >>>> >>>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in the >>>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating >>>> the >>>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or >>>> >>>> >>> business >>> >>> >>>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the >>>> >>>> >>> wealthy. >>> >>> >>>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social >>>> category and its related social institutions of implementation? >>>> >>>> >>> Constantly >>> >>> >>>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems >>>> >>>> >>> another. >>> >>> >>>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! >>>> >>>> We'll see. >>>> >>>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I >>>> >>>> >>> will >>> >>> >>>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better >>>> >>>> >>> than >>> >>> >>>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this: >>>> >>>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction >>>> between >>>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, >>>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while >>>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is >>>> >>>> >>> NECESSARILY >>> >>> >>>> dialogical. >>>> >>>> ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between >>>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? >>>> >>>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of >>>> senses >>>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. >>>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are not >>>> condusive to human develpment.)) >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>> >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Here's my contribution. >>>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the >>>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Journal >>> >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at >>>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> The University of Georgia >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>> >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>> >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, Peter >>>>> >>>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ?? >>>>> >>>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to education >>>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing >>>>> >>>>> >>>> distinct >>> >>> >>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be >>>>> >>>>> >>>> in >>> >>> >>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current >>>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation expressing >>>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier >>>>> >>>>> >>>> formations >>>> >>>> >>>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. >>>>> >>>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in Alex >>>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of >>>>> >>>>> >>>> how >>> >>> >>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. >>>>> Kozulin wrote: >>>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed >>>>> >>>>> >>>> in >>> >>> >>>> the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The >>>>> >>>>> >>>> first >>> >>> >>>> direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of >>>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> study >>> >>> >>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second >>>>> >>>>> >>>> direction >>> >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique >>>>> >>>>> >>>> of >>> >>> >>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for >>>>> >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction >>>>> >>>>> >>>> explored >>>> >>>> >>>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the work >>>>> >>>>> >>>> of >>> >>> >>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness >>>>> >>>>> >>>> came >>>> >>>> >>>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a >>>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" >>>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these >>>>> >>>>> >>>> three >>>> >>>> >>>>> directions. >>>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references Vasilyk's >>>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new >>>>> >>>>> >>>> direction. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of *overcoming* >>>>> >>>>> >>>> by >>> >>> >>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY >>>>> >>>>> >>>> by >>> >>> >>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. At >>>>> >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the >>>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes >>>>> >>>>> >>>> *authoring*. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but >>>>> >>>>> >>>> can >>> >>> >>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> idea >>>> >>>> >>>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural >>>>> >>>>> >>>> schemas >>>> >>>> >>>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of MEDIATION >>>>> THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk is >>>>> >>>>> >>>> an >>>> >>>> >>>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended within >>>>> humanistic psychology. >>>>> >>>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and >>>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. >>>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within >>>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different >>>>> >>>>> >>>> SYSTEMS >>>> >>>> >>>>> OF LOGIC]. >>>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different >>>>> >>>>> >>>> *systems >>> >>> >>>> of thought*. Kozulin writes: >>>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* >>>>> >>>>> >>>> by >>> >>> >>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either >>>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as >>>>> >>>>> >>>> long >>> >>> >>>> as >>>> >>>> >>>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of human >>>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> seventeenth >>> >>> >>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression >>>>> >>>>> >>>> of >>> >>> >>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, >>>>> >>>>> >>>> HIGHER >>>> >>>> >>>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly >>>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of them >>>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED one." >>>>> [page 270] >>>>> >>>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: >>>>> >>>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the >>>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a >>>>> >>>>> >>>> analysis >>>> >>>> >>>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the idea >>>>> >>>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt >>>>> >>>>> >>>> dialogue >>> >>> >>>> in >>>> >>>> >>>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a text, >>>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> This >>>> >>>> >>>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the >>>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment it >>>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness >>>>> >>>>> >>>> and >>> >>> >>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, >>>>> >>>>> >>>> are >>>> >>>> >>>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is ORGANIZED >>>>> >>>>> >>>> by >>>> >>>> >>>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why >>>>> >>>>> >>>> language, >>> >>> >>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness rather >>>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271] >>>>> >>>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices >>>>> >>>>> >>>> from >>> >>> >>>> Kozulin's *readings*. >>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore >>>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central >>>>> >>>>> >>>> point >>> >>> >>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to >>>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Bibler >>>> >>>> >>>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help >>>>> >>>>> >>>> students >>> >>> >>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> He >>> >>> >>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can >>>>> >>>>> >>>> also >>>> >>>> >>>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific >>>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. >>>>> >>>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> multiple >>>> >>>> >>>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. >>>>> >>>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's >>>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's >>>>> >>>>> >>>> legacy >>>> >>>> >>>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and >>>>> re-search? >>>>> >>>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. >>>>> >>>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and >>>>> >>>>> >>>> interpret >>> >>> >>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>> >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Psychology, >>> >>> >>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo >>>>>> >>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of >>>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia >>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>>> >>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>> >>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>>> >>>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has >>>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" >>>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> reasoning". >>>> >>>> >>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" >>>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs" >>>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" >>>>>> >>>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new >>>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of >>>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> dialogical >>> >>> >>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* >>>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING >>>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> world-designs. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and >>>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 20 18:07:13 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 10:07:13 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> Message-ID: I certainly don't think we can say, surely or otherwise, that the last words of "Thinking and Speech" put an end to the matter. After all, what Vygotsky himself said, in the first words of the book, was that the investigation was broken off at the threshold. Mike's question is about where and when Vygotsky made a clear distinction between consciousness and intellect. Even if we agree that what is meant by "consciousness" is not dialogic consciousness but merely consciousness of sensation, we still need a term for dialogic consciousness. I also think that using the term "consciousness" to refer to consciousness of sensation leaves a gap--we no longer have a clear, unambiguous term for general consciousness of which consciousness of sensation, dialogic consciousness and intellect are all parts. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 21 May 2014 00:14, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, David > > Mike's question is generating answers. > Andy, you quoted: > > "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely > impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct > manifestation of the historical nature of human > consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is > reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness" > > The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but > possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical] > > Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE > verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic forms > of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers." > > Bahktin wrote: "Actual act-performing thinking is an emotional-volitional > thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an > ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content." > > Vygotsky wrote: "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect > forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking .... and > makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action of > thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life." > > Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where > the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS > of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and > going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves > manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT > say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the > other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes. The > back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result > of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something VAGUE > develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an > expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN > SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea." > > Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement: > A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public > forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating, the > preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine that > DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the > individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon > specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) " > > I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and > prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and > dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS. > > > larry > > > > > > > > On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter > > > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf > > > > "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized > > by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of > > consciousness." > > > > Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of > > consciousness*. > > > > "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the > > nature of human consciousness." > > > > Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by > > understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in > its > > special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to > > anatomy of the ape") > > > > But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the > > unit, then you may not read this the same way, > > > > "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is > > consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore > > for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the > > development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the > > development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the > > word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the > > whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in > > Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but > > possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the > > historical nature of human consciousness. > > Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in > > a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, > > related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an > > organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word > > is a microcosm of human consciousness." > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out > for a > >> specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as > >> distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; > it > >> is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of > >> "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva > >> thinks > >> that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy > >> on > >> consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit > topic > >> of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in > >> Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on > Pedology > >> is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic > >> speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? > >> > >> The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and > >> Speech", > >> where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a > >> continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the > >> far > >> monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a > >> realization > >> of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of > intellect, > >> and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the > >> solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning > >> potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, > >> and > >> some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is > >> realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he > brings > >> in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and > narratives > >> at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the > >> episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper > discussed > >> by xmca a few years ago. > >> > >> My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The > >> Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of > Act > >> One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: > >> > >> Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? > >> Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. > >> > >> (Miranda sleeps) > >> > >> Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. > >> Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? > >> Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. > >> > >> (Prospero goes to look.) > >> > >> Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! > >> Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... > >> > >> (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) > >> > >> You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from > the > >> missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some > >> narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original > text > >> we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the > >> distracted Miranda. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> Mike, Peter > >>> Thanks for keeping this thread moving. > >>> > >>> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the > >>> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built > >>> into the model. > >>> The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural > >>> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations > >>> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. > >>> > >>> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas > through > >>> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live > >>> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema > >>> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the > >>> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in > school > >>> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] > >>> > >>> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical > >>> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current > >>> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be > put > >>> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid > >>> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. > >>> > >>> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which > is > >>> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural > >>> extension > >>> of the model. > >>> > >>> Mike, > >>> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of > >>> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with > >>> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of > >>> consciousness. > >>> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* > speech* > >>> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards > >>> cultural > >>> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked > >>> *hinges* > >>> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. > >>> > >>> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations > >>> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal > >>> intersubjective experiences. > >>> > >>> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging > >>> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics > by > >>> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics > within > >>> each schema. > >>> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received > >>> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and > >>> experiments > >>> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and > the > >>> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective > reflection. > >>> > >>> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* > >>> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are > >>> continually in dialogue with later formations. > >>> > >>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored > >>> in > >>> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized > >>> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to > >>> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural > >>> schemas* > >>> as dialogically developing formations. > >>> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received > >>> traditions > >>> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go > >>> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with > >>> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations > >>> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This > >>> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as > we > >>> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. > >>> > >>> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual > dialogue > >>> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons > >>> Larry > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas > >>>> > >>>> > >>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct > >>>> > >>>> > >>> summary > >>> > >>> > >>>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry. > >>>> > >>>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in > the > >>>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating > >>>> the > >>>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or > >>>> > >>>> > >>> business > >>> > >>> > >>>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the > >>>> > >>>> > >>> wealthy. > >>> > >>> > >>>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social > >>>> category and its related social institutions of implementation? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> Constantly > >>> > >>> > >>>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems > >>>> > >>>> > >>> another. > >>> > >>> > >>>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! > >>>> > >>>> We'll see. > >>>> > >>>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I > >>>> > >>>> > >>> will > >>> > >>> > >>>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better > >>>> > >>>> > >>> than > >>> > >>> > >>>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this: > >>>> > >>>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction > >>>> between > >>>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, > >>>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while > >>>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is > >>>> > >>>> > >>> NECESSARILY > >>> > >>> > >>>> dialogical. > >>>> > >>>> ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between > >>>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? > >>>> > >>>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of > >>>> senses > >>>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. > >>>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are > not > >>>> condusive to human develpment.)) > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> ? > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky > >>>> > >>>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Here's my contribution. > >>>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the > >>>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> Journal > >>> > >>> > >>>> of > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at > >>>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter Smagorinsky > >>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education > >>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education > >>>>> The University of Georgia > >>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall > >>>>> Athens, GA 30602 > >>>>> > >>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > >>>>> > >>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks, Peter > >>>>> > >>>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ?? > >>>>> > >>>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to > education > >>>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> distinct > >>> > >>> > >>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> in > >>> > >>> > >>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current > >>>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation > expressing > >>>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> formations > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. > >>>>> > >>>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in > Alex > >>>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> how > >>> > >>> > >>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. > >>>>> Kozulin wrote: > >>>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> in > >>> > >>> > >>>> the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> first > >>> > >>> > >>>> direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of > >>>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> study > >>> > >>> > >>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> direction > >>> > >>> > >>>> of > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> of > >>> > >>> > >>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> explored > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the > work > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> of > >>> > >>> > >>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> came > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a > >>>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" > >>>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> three > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> directions. > >>>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references > Vasilyk's > >>>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> direction. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of > *overcoming* > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> by > >>> > >>> > >>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> by > >>> > >>> > >>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. > At > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the > >>>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> *authoring*. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> can > >>> > >>> > >>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> idea > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> schemas > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of > MEDIATION > >>>>> THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk > is > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> an > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended > within > >>>>> humanistic psychology. > >>>>> > >>>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and > >>>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. > >>>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within > >>>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> SYSTEMS > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> OF LOGIC]. > >>>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> *systems > >>> > >>> > >>>> of thought*. Kozulin writes: > >>>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> by > >>> > >>> > >>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either > >>>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> long > >>> > >>> > >>>> as > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of > human > >>>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> seventeenth > >>> > >>> > >>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> of > >>> > >>> > >>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> HIGHER > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly > >>>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of > them > >>>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED > one." > >>>>> [page 270] > >>>>> > >>>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: > >>>>> > >>>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the > >>>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> analysis > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the > idea > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> of > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> dialogue > >>> > >>> > >>>> in > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a > text, > >>>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> This > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the > >>>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment > it > >>>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> are > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is > ORGANIZED > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> by > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> language, > >>> > >>> > >>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness > rather > >>>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271] > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> from > >>> > >>> > >>>> Kozulin's *readings*. > >>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore > >>>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> point > >>> > >>> > >>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to > >>>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> Bibler > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> students > >>> > >>> > >>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> He > >>> > >>> > >>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> also > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific > >>>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. > >>>>> > >>>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> multiple > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. > >>>>> > >>>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's > >>>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> legacy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and > >>>>> re-search? > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. > >>>>> > >>>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> interpret > >>> > >>> > >>>> Larry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>> > >>> > >>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> Psychology, > >>> > >>> > >>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky > >>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of > >>>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia > >>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall > >>>>>> Athens, GA 30602 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss > >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has > >>>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" > >>>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> reasoning". > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" > >>>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs" > >>>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new > >>>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of > >>>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> dialogical > >>> > >>> > >>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* > >>>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING > >>>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> world-designs. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and > >>>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. > >>>>>> Larry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 20 19:21:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 12:21:32 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> Message-ID: <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the content of the science. Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the terminological mess. I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" typologically to language use, then I think that that is too unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of sign-use. I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > I certainly don't think we can say, surely or otherwise, that the last > words of "Thinking and Speech" put an end to the matter. After all, what > Vygotsky himself said, in the first words of the book, was that the > investigation was broken off at the threshold. > > Mike's question is about where and when Vygotsky made a clear distinction > between consciousness and intellect. Even if we agree that what is meant by > "consciousness" is not dialogic consciousness but merely consciousness of > sensation, we still need a term for dialogic consciousness. I also think > that using the term "consciousness" to refer to consciousness of > sensation leaves a gap--we no longer have a clear, unambiguous term for > general consciousness of which consciousness of sensation, dialogic > consciousness and intellect are all parts. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 21 May 2014 00:14, Larry Purss wrote: > > >> Andy, David >> >> Mike's question is generating answers. >> Andy, you quoted: >> >> "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely >> impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct >> manifestation of the historical nature of human >> consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is >> reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness" >> >> The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but >> possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical] >> >> Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE >> verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic forms >> of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers." >> >> Bahktin wrote: "Actual act-performing thinking is an emotional-volitional >> thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an >> ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content." >> >> Vygotsky wrote: "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect >> forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking .... and >> makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action of >> thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life." >> >> Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where >> the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS >> of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and >> going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves >> manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT >> say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the >> other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes. The >> back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result >> of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something VAGUE >> develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an >> expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN >> SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea." >> >> Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement: >> A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public >> forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating, the >> preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine that >> DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the >> individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon >> specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) " >> >> I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and >> prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and >> dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS. >> >> >> larry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter >>> >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf >>> >>> "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized >>> by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of >>> consciousness." >>> >>> Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of >>> consciousness*. >>> >>> "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the >>> nature of human consciousness." >>> >>> Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by >>> understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in >>> >> its >> >>> special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to >>> anatomy of the ape") >>> >>> But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the >>> unit, then you may not read this the same way, >>> >>> "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is >>> consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore >>> for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the >>> development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the >>> development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the >>> word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the >>> whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in >>> Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but >>> possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the >>> historical nature of human consciousness. >>> Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in >>> a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, >>> related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an >>> organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word >>> is a microcosm of human consciousness." >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> >>>> But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out >>>> >> for a >> >>>> specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as >>>> distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; >>>> >> it >> >>>> is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of >>>> "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva >>>> thinks >>>> that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy >>>> on >>>> consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit >>>> >> topic >> >>>> of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in >>>> Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on >>>> >> Pedology >> >>>> is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic >>>> speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? >>>> >>>> The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and >>>> Speech", >>>> where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a >>>> continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the >>>> far >>>> monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a >>>> realization >>>> of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of >>>> >> intellect, >> >>>> and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the >>>> solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning >>>> potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, >>>> and >>>> some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is >>>> realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he >>>> >> brings >> >>>> in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and >>>> >> narratives >> >>>> at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the >>>> episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper >>>> >> discussed >> >>>> by xmca a few years ago. >>>> >>>> My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The >>>> Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of >>>> >> Act >> >>>> One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: >>>> >>>> Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? >>>> Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. >>>> >>>> (Miranda sleeps) >>>> >>>> Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. >>>> Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? >>>> Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. >>>> >>>> (Prospero goes to look.) >>>> >>>> Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! >>>> Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... >>>> >>>> (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) >>>> >>>> You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from >>>> >> the >> >>>> missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some >>>> narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original >>>> >> text >> >>>> we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the >>>> distracted Miranda. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Mike, Peter >>>>> Thanks for keeping this thread moving. >>>>> >>>>> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the >>>>> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built >>>>> into the model. >>>>> The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural >>>>> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations >>>>> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. >>>>> >>>>> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas >>>>> >> through >> >>>>> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live >>>>> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema >>>>> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the >>>>> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in >>>>> >> school >> >>>>> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] >>>>> >>>>> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical >>>>> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current >>>>> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be >>>>> >> put >> >>>>> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid >>>>> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases. >>>>> >>>>> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which >>>>> >> is >> >>>>> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural >>>>> extension >>>>> of the model. >>>>> >>>>> Mike, >>>>> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of >>>>> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with >>>>> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of >>>>> consciousness. >>>>> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* >>>>> >> speech* >> >>>>> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards >>>>> cultural >>>>> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked >>>>> *hinges* >>>>> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. >>>>> >>>>> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations >>>>> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal >>>>> intersubjective experiences. >>>>> >>>>> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging >>>>> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics >>>>> >> by >> >>>>> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics >>>>> >> within >> >>>>> each schema. >>>>> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received >>>>> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and >>>>> experiments >>>>> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective >>>>> >> reflection. >> >>>>> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* >>>>> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are >>>>> continually in dialogue with later formations. >>>>> >>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored >>>>> in >>>>> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized >>>>> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to >>>>> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural >>>>> schemas* >>>>> as dialogically developing formations. >>>>> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received >>>>> traditions >>>>> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go >>>>> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with >>>>> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations >>>>> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This >>>>> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as >>>>> >> we >> >>>>> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. >>>>> >>>>> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual >>>>> >> dialogue >> >>>>> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> summary >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry. >>>>>> >>>>>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in >>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating >>>>>> the >>>>>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> business >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> wealthy. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social >>>>>> category and its related social institutions of implementation? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Constantly >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> another. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! >>>>>> >>>>>> We'll see. >>>>>> >>>>>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> will >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> than >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this: >>>>>> >>>>>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction >>>>>> between >>>>>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, >>>>>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while >>>>>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> NECESSARILY >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> dialogical. >>>>>> >>>>>> ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between >>>>>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? >>>>>> >>>>>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of >>>>>> senses >>>>>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. >>>>>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are >>>>>> >> not >> >>>>>> condusive to human develpment.)) >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> ? >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Here's my contribution. >>>>>> >>>>>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the >>>>>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Journal >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at >>>>>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>>> The University of Georgia >>>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, Peter >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ?? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to >>>>>>> >> education >> >>>>>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> distinct >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current >>>>>> >>>>>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation >>>>>>> >> expressing >> >>>>>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> formations >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in >>>>>>> >> Alex >> >>>>>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> how >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kozulin wrote: >>>>>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> first >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of >>>>>> >>>>>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> study >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> direction >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> explored >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the >>>>>>> >> work >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> came >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a >>>>>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" >>>>>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> three >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> directions. >>>>>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references >>>>>>> >> Vasilyk's >> >>>>>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> direction. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of >>>>>>> >> *overcoming* >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. >>>>>> >> At >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the >>>>>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> *authoring*. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> can >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> idea >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> schemas >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of >>>>>>> >> MEDIATION >> >>>>>>> THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk >>>>>>> >> is >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> an >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended >>>>>>> >> within >> >>>>>>> humanistic psychology. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and >>>>>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. >>>>>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within >>>>>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> SYSTEMS >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> OF LOGIC]. >>>>>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> *systems >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of thought*. Kozulin writes: >>>>>> >>>>>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either >>>>>> >>>>>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> long >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> as >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of >>>>>>> >> human >> >>>>>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> seventeenth >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> HIGHER >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly >>>>>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of >>>>>>> >> them >> >>>>>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED >>>>>>> >> one." >> >>>>>>> [page 270] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the >>>>>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> analysis >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the >>>>>>> >> idea >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> dialogue >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a >>>>>>> >> text, >> >>>>>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> This >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the >>>>>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment >>>>>>> >> it >> >>>>>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning, >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> are >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is >>>>>>> >> ORGANIZED >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> language, >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness >>>>>> >> rather >> >>>>>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> from >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Kozulin's *readings*. >>>>>> >>>>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore >>>>>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> point >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to >>>>>> >>>>>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Bibler >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> students >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason. >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> He >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> also >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific >>>>>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> multiple >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's >>>>>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> legacy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and >>>>>>> re-search? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> interpret >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European >>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Psychology, >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of >>>>>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia >>>>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss >>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has >>>>>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" >>>>>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> reasoning". >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs" >>>>>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new >>>>>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of >>>>>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> dialogical >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING >>>>>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> world-designs. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and >>>>>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>> > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue May 20 20:48:53 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 20:48:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> Message-ID: Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core Vygotskian concepts. I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar, especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is Spinoza and emotion. mike On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the content of > the science. > Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the threshold of > the content of the science, and regretably, being a pioneer meant that his > terminology was also unstable and rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was > decisive in relaiton to the categorical distinctions underlying the > science, despite the terminological mess. > > I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a > Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure legitimate > standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is some basis for > taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in line with Marxist > terminology at the time indicating the entire class of phenomena > encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps similar to what you mean by > "general consciousness"? > As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and "intellect", > if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" typologically to language > use, then I think that that is too unstable and problematic for a > categorical distinction. If on the other than we were to widen the meaning > of "dialogical" to sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The > spoken word is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of > sign-use. > > I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing lines, > specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the *intellect* (the > special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for psychological research into human > *consciousness* (as a whole). > > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> I certainly don't think we can say, surely or otherwise, that the last >> words of "Thinking and Speech" put an end to the matter. After all, what >> Vygotsky himself said, in the first words of the book, was that the >> investigation was broken off at the threshold. >> >> Mike's question is about where and when Vygotsky made a clear distinction >> between consciousness and intellect. Even if we agree that what is meant >> by >> "consciousness" is not dialogic consciousness but merely consciousness of >> sensation, we still need a term for dialogic consciousness. I also think >> that using the term "consciousness" to refer to consciousness of >> sensation leaves a gap--we no longer have a clear, unambiguous term for >> general consciousness of which consciousness of sensation, dialogic >> consciousness and intellect are all parts. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 21 May 2014 00:14, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> >> >>> Andy, David >>> >>> Mike's question is generating answers. >>> Andy, you quoted: >>> >>> "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is >>> absolutely >>> impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most >>> direct >>> manifestation of the historical nature of human >>> consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is >>> reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of >>> consciousness" >>> >>> The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but >>> possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical] >>> >>> Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE >>> verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic >>> forms >>> of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers." >>> >>> Bahktin wrote: "Actual act-performing thinking is an >>> emotional-volitional >>> thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an >>> ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content." >>> >>> Vygotsky wrote: "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect >>> forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking .... >>> and >>> makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action >>> of >>> thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life." >>> >>> Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where >>> the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS >>> of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and >>> going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves >>> manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT >>> say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the >>> other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes. >>> The >>> back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result >>> of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something >>> VAGUE >>> develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an >>> expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN >>> SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea." >>> >>> Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement: >>> A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public >>> forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating, >>> the >>> preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine >>> that >>> DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the >>> individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon >>> specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) " >>> >>> I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and >>> prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and >>> dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS. >>> >>> >>> larry >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter >>>> >>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf >>>> >>>> "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized >>>> by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of >>>> consciousness." >>>> >>>> Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of >>>> consciousness*. >>>> >>>> "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the >>>> nature of human consciousness." >>>> >>>> Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by >>>> understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in >>>> >>>> >>> its >>> >>> >>>> special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to >>>> anatomy of the ape") >>>> >>>> But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the >>>> unit, then you may not read this the same way, >>>> >>>> "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is >>>> consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore >>>> for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the >>>> development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the >>>> development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the >>>> word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the >>>> whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in >>>> Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but >>>> possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the >>>> historical nature of human consciousness. >>>> Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in >>>> a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness, >>>> related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an >>>> organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word >>>> is a microcosm of human consciousness." >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out >>>>> >>>>> >>>> for a >>> >>> >>>> specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as >>>>> distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot; >>>>> >>>>> >>>> it >>> >>> >>>> is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of >>>>> "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva >>>>> thinks >>>>> that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer >>>>> trilogy >>>>> on >>>>> consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit >>>>> >>>>> >>>> topic >>> >>> >>>> of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in >>>>> Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Pedology >>> >>> >>>> is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic >>>>> speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other? >>>>> >>>>> The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and >>>>> Speech", >>>>> where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a >>>>> continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the >>>>> far >>>>> monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a >>>>> realization >>>>> of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of >>>>> >>>>> >>>> intellect, >>> >>> >>>> and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the >>>>> solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning >>>>> potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech, >>>>> and >>>>> some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is >>>>> realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he >>>>> >>>>> >>>> brings >>> >>> >>>> in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and >>>>> >>>>> >>>> narratives >>> >>> >>>> at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the >>>>> episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper >>>>> >>>>> >>>> discussed >>> >>> >>>> by xmca a few years ago. >>>>> >>>>> My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's >>>>> "The >>>>> Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Act >>> >>> >>>> One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue: >>>>> >>>>> Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover? >>>>> Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming. >>>>> >>>>> (Miranda sleeps) >>>>> >>>>> Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked. >>>>> Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers? >>>>> Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor. >>>>> >>>>> (Prospero goes to look.) >>>>> >>>>> Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....! >>>>> Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury.... >>>>> >>>>> (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.) >>>>> >>>>> You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from >>>>> >>>>> >>>> the >>> >>> >>>> missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some >>>>> narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original >>>>> >>>>> >>>> text >>> >>> >>>> we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the >>>>> distracted Miranda. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Mike, Peter >>>>>> Thanks for keeping this thread moving. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the >>>>>> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* >>>>>> built >>>>>> into the model. >>>>>> The model seems to presume multiple logics and rationalities >>>>>> [cultural >>>>>> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations >>>>>> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> through >>> >>> >>>> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live >>>>>> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema >>>>>> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the >>>>>> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> school >>> >>> >>>> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations] >>>>>> >>>>>> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical >>>>>> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current >>>>>> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> put >>> >>> >>>> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid >>>>>> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific >>>>>> biases. >>>>>> >>>>>> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> is >>> >>> >>>> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural >>>>>> extension >>>>>> of the model. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike, >>>>>> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of >>>>>> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with >>>>>> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of >>>>>> consciousness. >>>>>> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> speech* >>> >>> >>>> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards >>>>>> cultural >>>>>> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked >>>>>> *hinges* >>>>>> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay. >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations >>>>>> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal >>>>>> intersubjective experiences. >>>>>> >>>>>> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging >>>>>> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> by >>> >>> >>>> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> within >>> >>> >>>> each schema. >>>>>> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received >>>>>> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and >>>>>> experiments >>>>>> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> reflection. >>> >>> >>>> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms* >>>>>> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are >>>>>> continually in dialogue with later formations. >>>>>> >>>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin >>>>>> explored >>>>>> in >>>>>> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized >>>>>> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to >>>>>> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural >>>>>> schemas* >>>>>> as dialogically developing formations. >>>>>> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received >>>>>> traditions >>>>>> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go >>>>>> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with >>>>>> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations >>>>>> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. >>>>>> This >>>>>> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> we >>> >>> >>>> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action. >>>>>> >>>>>> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> dialogue >>> >>> >>>> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's >>>>>>> ideas >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> summary >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> business >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> wealthy. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social >>>>>>> category and its related social institutions of implementation? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Constantly >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> another. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We'll see. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> will >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> than >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction >>>>>>> between >>>>>>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, >>>>>>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while >>>>>>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> NECESSARILY >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> dialogical. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ?Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between >>>>>>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> senses >>>>>>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global. >>>>>>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> not >>> >>> >>>> condusive to human develpment.)) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Here's my contribution. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the >>>>>>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Journal >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at >>>>>>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education >>>>>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>>>> The University of Georgia >>>>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss >>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks, Peter >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ?? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> education >>> >>> >>>> and its purpose as *humanistic*. Seeing *reason* as developing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> distinct >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding. The current >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> expressing >>> >>> >>>> particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> formations >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alex >>> >>> >>>> Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> how >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kozulin wrote: >>>>>>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was >>>>>>>> developed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the 1970's and 1980's I will concentrate on three directions. The >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> first >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> direction included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of a new program for the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> study >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> direction >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological >>>>>>>> critique >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy. The third direction >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> explored >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> work >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> came >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a >>>>>>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*" >>>>>>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> three >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> directions. >>>>>>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Vasilyk's >>> >>> >>>> book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> direction. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *overcoming* >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> At >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *authoring*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> schemas >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> MEDIATION >>> >>> >>>> THROUGH THE SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> is >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> within >>> >>> >>>> humanistic psychology. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and >>>>>>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature. >>>>>>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within >>>>>>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> SYSTEMS >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> OF LOGIC]. >>>>>>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *systems >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> of thought*. Kozulin writes: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as >>>>>>>> *encircled* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is >>>>>>> either >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> long >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> as >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> human >>> >>> >>>> thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> seventeenth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> HIGHER >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly >>>>>>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> them >>> >>> >>>> should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> one." >>> >>> >>>> [page 270] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the >>>>>>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> idea >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> dialogue >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> text, >>> >>> >>>> EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> This >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the >>>>>>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> it >>> >>> >>>> seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific >>>>>>> reasoning, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ORGANIZED >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical. That is why >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> language, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> rather >>> >>> >>>> than that of the intellect." [page 271] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> from >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Kozulin's *readings*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore >>>>>>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> point >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bibler >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> students >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of >>>>>>> reason. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> He >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> also >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific >>>>>>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> multiple >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing >>>>>>>> interplay. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> legacy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and >>>>>>>> re-search? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> interpret >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Psychology, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of >>>>>>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia >>>>>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall >>>>>>>>> Athens, GA 30602 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss >>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has >>>>>>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures" >>>>>>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> reasoning". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs" >>>>>>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new >>>>>>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of >>>>>>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> dialogical >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING >>>>>>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> world-designs. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and >>>>>>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections. >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 20 21:09:51 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 14:09:51 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> Message-ID: <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> "A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike. Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his work on the emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our time have been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions, thanks to the fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the intellect. I take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality through perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this > topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > Vygotskian concepts. > > I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of > consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar, > especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is > Spinoza and emotion. > > mike > > > > On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the > content of the science. > Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the > threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a > pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and > rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the > categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the > terminological mess. > > I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a > Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure > legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is > some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in > line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire > class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps > similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? > As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and > "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" > typologically to language use, then I think that that is too > unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the > other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to > sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word > is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of sign-use. > > I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing > lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the > *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for > psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). > > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed May 21 04:25:36 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 07:25:36 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Regeneration, Enterprise, Sport and Tourism 2014 - Call for Papers Message-ID: Fyi... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: ruth.harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Date:05/21/2014 7:00 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: Regeneration, Enterprise, Sport and Tourism 2014 - Call for Papers
21-May-2014 WITH APOLOGIES FOR CROSS-POSTING Dear Colleague Please find attached a Call for Papers for an urban conference on ?Regeneration, Enterprise, Sport and Tourism ? which is to be held on 8-9 September 2014 at the Glasgow Caledonian University. I would be grateful if you could forward the attached information to staff within your institution who may find it of interest. Yours sincerely Professor Andrew Cumbers Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow Glasgow G12 8QQ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: * Call-for-Papers.docx Type: application/octet-stream Size: 706046 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140521/6dc0e07e/attachment-0001.obj From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 21 11:13:12 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 18:13:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Call For Papers - 2015 International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences References: Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From: Interdisciplinary Social Sciences > Subject: Call For Papers - 2015 International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Date: May 21, 2014 at 12:38:03 PM GMT-5 To: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Reply-To: Interdisciplinary Social Sciences > Having trouble? Click here to view this email in your browser. [http://www.newsletter.illinois.mx3a.com/cg-social-sciences/interdisciplinarySocialSciences_full_rgb_1.png] [Twitter] [Facebook] [YouTube] [http://www.newsletter.illinois.mx3a.com/cg-social-sciences/scholar_titled.gif] TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES [http://www.newsletter.illinois.mx3a.com/cg-social-sciences/I15/I15_Promo_1_Banner_A.png] Call For Papers The International Advisory Board is pleased to announce the Call For Papers for the Tenth International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences. The Social Sciences Conference will be held 11-14 June 2015 at the University of Split in Split, Croatia. SPECIAL CONFERENCE FOCUS: "Interdisciplinary Approaches to Contemporary Social Change" Modern societies face a number of overarching changes. The consequences of these changes are equally evident at the local as well as global level, influencing the everyday lives of individuals and large societal aggregates. The role of the social sciences is of pivotal significance in the interpretation of these intense social changes. More than other disciplines, the social sciences are in an integral position to recognize changes and problems, determine causal links, interpret the available information, and offer solutions. Accordingly, the aim of the 2015 Social Sciences Conference is to contribute to the identification and understanding of different recent social issues, with a focus on social changes that we face in the various segments of the social world. The conference offers a wide range of topics that may be discussed in local and global terms, either through the prism of the social sciences or through interdisciplinary collaborations. CONFERENCE THEMES: Proposals for paper presentations, workshops, poster presentations, or colloquia are invited that discuss the broader themes listed below. In addition to the special focus, paper presentations will be grouped into one of the following categories for presentation at the conference: Theme 1: Social and Community Studies Theme 5: Environmental Studies Theme 2: Civic and Political Studies Theme 6: Organizational Studies Theme 3: Cultural Studies Theme 7: Educational Studies Theme 4: Global Studies Theme 8: Communication ________________________________ Proposal Submissions and Deadlines The current review period closing date for the latest round of submissions to the conference Call For Papers(a title and short abstract) is 10 June 2014*. To submit a proposal and for more information on the conference, please click on the link below. If you are unable to attend the conference in person, you may still join the community and submit your article for peer review and possible publication, upload an online presentation, and enjoy subscriber access to The Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Collection. *Proposals are reviewed in rounds adhering to monthly deadlines. Check the website often to see the current review round. Submit A Proposal [http://www.newsletter.illinois.mx3a.com/cg-social-sciences/I15/university_of_split.png] [http://www.newsletter.illinois.mx3a.com/common-ground/_template_images/_footer_logos/cg_logo.png] Common Ground Publishing University of Illinois Research Park 2001 South First Street, Suite 202 Champaign, IL 61820 USA Unsubscribe | Conditions Copyright ? 2014 Common Ground Publishing From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Thu May 22 09:09:24 2014 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Thu, 22 May 2014 16:09:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] discussing "Posing the question" Message-ID: Dear XMCA, Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open on the T and F website: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning shaped by access to this experience in a museum? More questions? Best - jen From shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au Thu May 22 21:02:44 2014 From: shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au (Shannon Brincat) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 14:02:44 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] A question on Vygotsky and Imagination Message-ID: Dear all, I am new to this list ?? so thanks for your time. Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and imagination. Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of looking at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination is just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human cognition. I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or even key aspects of Vygotsky??s work that you deem relevant, would be great. Once again, thanks! Shannon This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work of Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. After engaging with the limitations in Kant??s productive imagination, Husserl??s phenomenological imagination, and Freud??s irrational understanding of imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky??s analysis that demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are routinely denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we contend that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a link between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive social development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination??s link to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky??s account tells Us only of the positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his attention to the ?darkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, ?othering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings of a theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand this complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. Dr. Shannon K. Brincat Griffith University Research Fellow Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | School of Government and International Relations Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | Brisbane | Queensland | 4111 | Australia Global Discourse, Co-Editor http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM New edited series available through Praeger Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 From ajrajala@gmail.com Thu May 22 22:09:11 2014 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 08:09:11 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Shannon, I would warmly recommend Tania Zittoun's work. A good reference point is her and her colleagues' recent book: Human Development in the Life Course: Melodies of living (Cambridge university press, 2013), but she has published also articles and is currently working on the topic across a range of settings. For example, you can find relevant conceptual elaboration in Zittoun, T., & Cerchia, F. (2013). Imagination as expansion of experience. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, *47*(3), 305-324. Warm wishes, Antti On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 7:02 AM, Shannon Brincat < shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > Dear all, > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and imagination. > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of looking > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination > is > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > cognition. > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be great. > > Once again, thanks! > > Shannon > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work of > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. After > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, Husserl?s > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are routinely > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we contend > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a link > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive social > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > link > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings of > a > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > this > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > Griffith University Research Fellow > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > School > of Government and International Relations > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | Brisbane > | > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > New edited series available through Praeger > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Fri May 23 03:47:56 2014 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 12:47:56 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello All, Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts and questions. Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this "design experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences with the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So first of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of interactive media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited to audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. The museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, of which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including looking at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence the practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an institution. One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of the guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also facilitating some of the interactive activities in this project room. In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to be a focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of the curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more closely at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors in the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as part of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that since the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could pose for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a conference paper here - http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/). Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I think this aspect is very much present in the work. So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more micro-analytic methods? Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, Rolf On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > Dear XMCA, > > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open > on the T and F website: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > More questions? > > Best - jen > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 23 07:33:06 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 07:33:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> Message-ID: I want to thank everyone for their reflections on consciousness and intellect. Mike commented, Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core Vygotskian concepts. I re-read Alex last comment in the epilogue of his book *Vygotsky's Psychology* which gives his understanding of why he wrote this book. Alex reads Vygotsky's legacy as having moved through 3 stages. In the 1920's and 1930's the focus was on SOCIAL mediation to help create the *new man*. In the 1960's Vygotsky was re-discovered in the West as a response to Piaget's quasi-naturalistic theory of development. In 1990, when the book was written Kozulin suggest a new plane opened. Here is Kozulin's understanding of this third phase of Vygotsky's legacy. [page 278] "The third plane of Vygotsky's theory, the contours of which are only just emerging, presupposes both the re-evaluation of its origins and its projection into the future of psychology. What in the 1920's appeared to be a rather straight forward thesis of SOCIAL mediation, and in the 1960's as a necessary correction to the overly individualistic approaches of Western psychology, nowadays appears as a new problem emerging from the realization that social and cultural mediatory mechanisms do not coincide. Vygotsky's analysis of the crisis in psychology, earlier perceived as a critique of psychology's past, is now recognized as an inquiry into the fundamental mechanism of psychology's divergent development. The origins and context of Vygotsky's theory are now being seen in a new light.; in the place of comparisons to Pavlov, the Gestaltists and Piaget comes the context of PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. In an even broader sense, what once looked like Vygotsky's contribution TO psychology appears now as leading BEYOND psychology or at least beyond traditional psychology and into the sphere of the human studies BASED on the humanities, rather than the scientific model." Mike, how others *respond* to Kozulin's vision that a new plane based on the humanities is a re-visioning that goes too far BEYOND Vygotsky or if they acknowledge this third plane as a valid emerging of a hermeneutical response is an open question. Thought Kozulin's epilogue may generate more reflections and responses on his perspective of the relation of [intellect] and [consciousness] Larry On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > "A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike. > Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his work on the > emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a > conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our time have > been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions, thanks to the > fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the intellect. I > take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality through > perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on >> Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this >> topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core >> Vygotskian concepts. >> >> I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of >> consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar, >> especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is >> Spinoza and emotion. >> >> mike >> >> >> >> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the >> content of the science. >> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the >> threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a >> pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and >> rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the >> categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the >> terminological mess. >> >> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a >> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure >> legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is >> some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in >> line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire >> class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps >> similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? >> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and >> "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" >> typologically to language use, then I think that that is too >> unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the >> other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to >> sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word >> is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of sign-use. >> >> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing >> lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the >> *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for >> psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). >> >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> >> > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri May 23 08:43:42 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 08:43:42 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> Message-ID: I have in fact been reading Alex's book, Larry. I recommend strongly his chapters on Tool and Symbol and Language and Thought. Especially the former I found to be unusually well presented in ways that helped me. The future that Alex was pointing towards looks a good deal like what became the concerns of the Comm department here at UCSD - a combination of humanities, social sciences, and arts with mediation as its central organizing concept. If some group of xmca-ites would like to jointly read a chapter or two, I would be glad to join in. mike? On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 7:33 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > I want to thank everyone for their reflections on consciousness and > intellect. > Mike commented, > Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this > topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > Vygotskian concepts. > > I re-read Alex last comment in the epilogue of his book *Vygotsky's > Psychology* which gives his understanding of why he wrote this book. Alex > reads Vygotsky's legacy as having moved through 3 stages. > In the 1920's and 1930's the focus was on SOCIAL mediation to help create > the *new man*. > In the 1960's Vygotsky was re-discovered in the West as a response to > Piaget's quasi-naturalistic theory of development. > > In 1990, when the book was written Kozulin suggest a new plane opened. Here > is Kozulin's understanding of this third phase of Vygotsky's legacy. [page > 278] > > "The third plane of Vygotsky's theory, the contours of which are only just > emerging, presupposes both the re-evaluation of its origins and its > projection into the future of psychology. What in the 1920's appeared to be > a rather straight forward thesis of SOCIAL mediation, and in the 1960's as > a necessary correction to the overly individualistic approaches of Western > psychology, nowadays appears as a new problem emerging from the realization > that social and cultural mediatory mechanisms do not coincide. Vygotsky's > analysis of the crisis in psychology, earlier perceived as a critique of > psychology's past, is now recognized as an inquiry into the fundamental > mechanism of psychology's divergent development. The origins and context of > Vygotsky's theory are now being seen in a new light.; in the place of > comparisons to Pavlov, the Gestaltists and Piaget comes the context of > PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. In an > even broader sense, what once looked like Vygotsky's contribution TO > psychology appears now as leading BEYOND psychology or at least beyond > traditional psychology and into the sphere of the human studies BASED on > the humanities, rather than the scientific model." > > Mike, how others *respond* to Kozulin's vision that a new plane based on > the humanities is a re-visioning that goes too far BEYOND Vygotsky or if > they acknowledge this third plane as a valid emerging of a hermeneutical > response is an open question. > Thought Kozulin's epilogue may generate more reflections and responses on > his perspective of the relation of [intellect] and [consciousness] > > Larry > > > > > > On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > "A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike. > > Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his work on the > > emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a > > conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our time have > > been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions, thanks to the > > fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the intellect. I > > take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality through > > perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > >> Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > >> Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this > >> topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > >> Vygotskian concepts. > >> > >> I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of > >> consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar, > >> especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is > >> Spinoza and emotion. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the > >> content of the science. > >> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the > >> threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a > >> pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and > >> rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the > >> categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the > >> terminological mess. > >> > >> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a > >> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure > >> legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is > >> some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in > >> line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire > >> class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps > >> similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? > >> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and > >> "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" > >> typologically to language use, then I think that that is too > >> unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the > >> other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to > >> sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word > >> is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of > sign-use. > >> > >> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing > >> lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the > >> *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for > >> psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). > >> > >> > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> ------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >> > >> > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri May 23 09:23:24 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 17:23:24 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> Message-ID: On 23 May 2014 16:43, mike cole wrote: > I have in fact been reading Alex's book, Larry. > > I recommend strongly his chapters on Tool and Symbol and Language and > Thought. > > Especially the former I found to be unusually well presented in ways that > helped me. > > The future that Alex was pointing towards looks a good deal like what > became the concerns of the Comm department here at UCSD - a combination of > humanities, social sciences, and arts with mediation as its central > organizing concept. > > If some group of xmca-ites would like to jointly read a chapter or two, I > would be glad to join in. > > mike? > > Yes, count me in. I think we should do Rolf Steier's paper justice first, though, which I haven't even downloaded yet. Best, Huw > On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 7:33 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I want to thank everyone for their reflections on consciousness and > > intellect. > > Mike commented, > > Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > > Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this > > topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > > Vygotskian concepts. > > > > I re-read Alex last comment in the epilogue of his book *Vygotsky's > > Psychology* which gives his understanding of why he wrote this book. Alex > > reads Vygotsky's legacy as having moved through 3 stages. > > In the 1920's and 1930's the focus was on SOCIAL mediation to help create > > the *new man*. > > In the 1960's Vygotsky was re-discovered in the West as a response to > > Piaget's quasi-naturalistic theory of development. > > > > In 1990, when the book was written Kozulin suggest a new plane opened. > Here > > is Kozulin's understanding of this third phase of Vygotsky's legacy. > [page > > 278] > > > > "The third plane of Vygotsky's theory, the contours of which are only > just > > emerging, presupposes both the re-evaluation of its origins and its > > projection into the future of psychology. What in the 1920's appeared to > be > > a rather straight forward thesis of SOCIAL mediation, and in the 1960's > as > > a necessary correction to the overly individualistic approaches of > Western > > psychology, nowadays appears as a new problem emerging from the > realization > > that social and cultural mediatory mechanisms do not coincide. Vygotsky's > > analysis of the crisis in psychology, earlier perceived as a critique of > > psychology's past, is now recognized as an inquiry into the fundamental > > mechanism of psychology's divergent development. The origins and context > of > > Vygotsky's theory are now being seen in a new light.; in the place of > > comparisons to Pavlov, the Gestaltists and Piaget comes the context of > > PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. In an > > even broader sense, what once looked like Vygotsky's contribution TO > > psychology appears now as leading BEYOND psychology or at least beyond > > traditional psychology and into the sphere of the human studies BASED on > > the humanities, rather than the scientific model." > > > > Mike, how others *respond* to Kozulin's vision that a new plane based on > > the humanities is a re-visioning that goes too far BEYOND Vygotsky or if > > they acknowledge this third plane as a valid emerging of a hermeneutical > > response is an open question. > > Thought Kozulin's epilogue may generate more reflections and responses on > > his perspective of the relation of [intellect] and [consciousness] > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > "A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike. > > > Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his work on the > > > emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a > > > conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our time have > > > been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions, thanks to the > > > fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the intellect. I > > > take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality through > > > perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us. > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > > >> Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this > > >> topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > > >> Vygotskian concepts. > > >> > > >> I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of > > >> consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar, > > >> especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is > > >> Spinoza and emotion. > > >> > > >> mike > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >> > > >> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the > > >> content of the science. > > >> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the > > >> threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a > > >> pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and > > >> rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the > > >> categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the > > >> terminological mess. > > >> > > >> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a > > >> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure > > >> legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is > > >> some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in > > >> line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire > > >> class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps > > >> similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? > > >> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and > > >> "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" > > >> typologically to language use, then I think that that is too > > >> unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the > > >> other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to > > >> sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word > > >> is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of > > sign-use. > > >> > > >> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing > > >> lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the > > >> *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for > > >> psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> ------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri May 23 09:56:54 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 09:56:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> Message-ID: By ALL MEANS lets discuss Rolf's paper as a priority! A reading of Kozulin seems like a nice summer activity. mike On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 9:23 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > On 23 May 2014 16:43, mike cole wrote: > >> I have in fact been reading Alex's book, Larry. >> >> I recommend strongly his chapters on Tool and Symbol and Language and >> Thought. >> >> Especially the former I found to be unusually well presented in ways that >> helped me. >> >> The future that Alex was pointing towards looks a good deal like what >> became the concerns of the Comm department here at UCSD - a combination of >> humanities, social sciences, and arts with mediation as its central >> organizing concept. >> >> If some group of xmca-ites would like to jointly read a chapter or two, I >> would be glad to join in. >> >> mike? >> >> > Yes, count me in. I think we should do Rolf Steier's paper justice first, > though, which I haven't even downloaded yet. > > Best, > Huw > > > >> On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 7:33 AM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >> >> > I want to thank everyone for their reflections on consciousness and >> > intellect. >> > Mike commented, >> > Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on >> > Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this >> > topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core >> > Vygotskian concepts. >> > >> > I re-read Alex last comment in the epilogue of his book *Vygotsky's >> > Psychology* which gives his understanding of why he wrote this book. >> Alex >> > reads Vygotsky's legacy as having moved through 3 stages. >> > In the 1920's and 1930's the focus was on SOCIAL mediation to help >> create >> > the *new man*. >> > In the 1960's Vygotsky was re-discovered in the West as a response to >> > Piaget's quasi-naturalistic theory of development. >> > >> > In 1990, when the book was written Kozulin suggest a new plane opened. >> Here >> > is Kozulin's understanding of this third phase of Vygotsky's legacy. >> [page >> > 278] >> > >> > "The third plane of Vygotsky's theory, the contours of which are only >> just >> > emerging, presupposes both the re-evaluation of its origins and its >> > projection into the future of psychology. What in the 1920's appeared >> to be >> > a rather straight forward thesis of SOCIAL mediation, and in the 1960's >> as >> > a necessary correction to the overly individualistic approaches of >> Western >> > psychology, nowadays appears as a new problem emerging from the >> realization >> > that social and cultural mediatory mechanisms do not coincide. >> Vygotsky's >> > analysis of the crisis in psychology, earlier perceived as a critique of >> > psychology's past, is now recognized as an inquiry into the fundamental >> > mechanism of psychology's divergent development. The origins and >> context of >> > Vygotsky's theory are now being seen in a new light.; in the place of >> > comparisons to Pavlov, the Gestaltists and Piaget comes the context of >> > PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. In >> an >> > even broader sense, what once looked like Vygotsky's contribution TO >> > psychology appears now as leading BEYOND psychology or at least beyond >> > traditional psychology and into the sphere of the human studies BASED on >> > the humanities, rather than the scientific model." >> > >> > Mike, how others *respond* to Kozulin's vision that a new plane based on >> > the humanities is a re-visioning that goes too far BEYOND Vygotsky or if >> > they acknowledge this third plane as a valid emerging of a hermeneutical >> > response is an open question. >> > Thought Kozulin's epilogue may generate more reflections and responses >> on >> > his perspective of the relation of [intellect] and [consciousness] >> > >> > Larry >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> > >> > > "A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike. >> > > Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his work on >> the >> > > emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a >> > > conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our time have >> > > been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions, thanks to the >> > > fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the intellect. I >> > > take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality through >> > > perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us. >> > > >> > > Andy >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > *Andy Blunden* >> > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> > > >> > > >> > > mike cole wrote: >> > > >> > >> Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on >> > >> Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought >> this >> > >> topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core >> > >> Vygotskian concepts. >> > >> >> > >> I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of >> > >> consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic >> exemplar, >> > >> especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is >> > >> Spinoza and emotion. >> > >> >> > >> mike >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden > > > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> > >> >> > >> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the >> > >> content of the science. >> > >> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the >> > >> threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a >> > >> pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and >> > >> rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to >> the >> > >> categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the >> > >> terminological mess. >> > >> >> > >> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a >> > >> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure >> > >> legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is >> > >> some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" >> in >> > >> line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire >> > >> class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps >> > >> similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? >> > >> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and >> > >> "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" >> > >> typologically to language use, then I think that that is too >> > >> unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the >> > >> other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to >> > >> sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken >> word >> > >> is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of >> > sign-use. >> > >> >> > >> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing >> > >> lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the >> > >> *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for >> > >> psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Andy >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > >> ------------ >> > >> *Andy Blunden* >> > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > >> > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 23 10:45:06 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 11:45:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Shannon, This looks like a wonderfully interesting project! As for thoughts here, I wonder what others on the list think, but with regard to your third limitation of Vygotsky's idea of imagination and whether or not it is intersubjective, I wonder if that is accurate. Generally speaking, I think of Vygotsky's main points as being that thinking is fundamentally intersubjective so it is difficult for me to imagine (!) how imagination could be otherwise. Perhaps you have some specific writings where you see this? Or perhaps we mean something different by these terms? I'm sure you're already familiar with them, but some other classics to consider are Bakhtin's Dialogic Imagination and Volosinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language are two other very good places to look for developing a Vygotsky-like approach to imagination. When put together with Vygotsky, I think they make for a powerful trio for understanding imagination in politics! Hope to hear more. -greg On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Shannon Brincat < shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > Dear all, > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and imagination. > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of looking > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination > is > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > cognition. > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be great. > > Once again, thanks! > > Shannon > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work of > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. After > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, Husserl?s > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are routinely > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we contend > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a link > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive social > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > link > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings of > a > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > this > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > Griffith University Research Fellow > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > School > of Government and International Relations > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | Brisbane > | > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > New edited series available through Praeger > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri May 23 13:28:29 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 13:28:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Shannon- I am really uncertain about how to contribute to the discourse of political science but perhaps its through the notion of global discourse. In my prior note on the Dialogue of Cultures school, I said that it demanded, in addition to a pretty well off segment of any existing state, a really global set of polylogues to avoid the problems of the binary involved in the notion of dia - logue. I had not connected this with the question of imagination. >From recent discussion with Russian colleagues, it seems that the entire line of work that descends from Zaporozhets, which includes Zinchenko and Bodrova (in the US), Kudravstev (in Russia) focuses on the Kantian notion of productive imagination. They analyze this notion in terms of early developmental processes. An article by Repina in *The psychology of Preschool Children* edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin provides some notion of the early theorizing. Articles by Zaporozhets in the *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology* might be helpful. Vladimir Kudravstev is currently continuing this line of work. The work of the playworlds consortium, published in MCA http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749030903342246?journalCode=hmca20#previewis perhaps relevant. Finally, I attach a paper that discusses imagination from what we take to be a Vygotskian perspective or at least an inspiration. Hard to imagine that imagination is everywhere one looks.... but such is the nature of human thought! :-) mike On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Shannon, > This looks like a wonderfully interesting project! > As for thoughts here, I wonder what others on the list think, but with > regard to your third limitation of Vygotsky's idea of imagination and > whether or not it is intersubjective, I wonder if that is accurate. > Generally speaking, I think of Vygotsky's main points as being that > thinking is fundamentally intersubjective so it is difficult for me to > imagine (!) how imagination could be otherwise. Perhaps you have some > specific writings where you see this? Or perhaps we mean something > different by these terms? > I'm sure you're already familiar with them, but some other classics to > consider are Bakhtin's Dialogic Imagination and Volosinov's Marxism and the > Philosophy of Language are two other very good places to look for > developing a Vygotsky-like approach to imagination. When put together with > Vygotsky, I think they make for a powerful trio for understanding > imagination in politics! > Hope to hear more. > -greg > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Shannon Brincat < > shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > > Dear all, > > > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and > imagination. > > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of > looking > > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination > > is > > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > > cognition. > > > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or > > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be > great. > > > > Once again, thanks! > > > > Shannon > > > > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic > > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work > of > > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human > > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. > After > > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, Husserl?s > > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are > routinely > > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated > > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we > contend > > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing > > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a > link > > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive > social > > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > > link > > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, > > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the > > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings > of > > a > > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by > > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > > this > > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > > Griffith University Research Fellow > > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > > School > > of Government and International Relations > > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | > Brisbane > > | > > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > > > New edited series available through Praeger > > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ETMCimagination.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 449147 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140523/f1ae3bd6/attachment.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 23 22:25:23 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 22:25:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness In-Reply-To: References: <3efcbe95892a401a826ac8d47deb17e2@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <537A9DF8.5080003@mira.net> <537C0DAC.30501@mira.net> <537C270F.9080900@mira.net> Message-ID: Mike, I also would enjoy reading a few chapters of Kozulin's book as a summer project. I read closely Kozulin's reflections on tool and symbol and how it contrasted with his interpretation of Activity Theory. Will be an interesting conversation. Larry On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 9:56 AM, mike cole wrote: > By ALL MEANS lets discuss Rolf's paper as a priority! A reading of Kozulin > seems like a nice summer activity. > mike > > > > > On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 9:23 AM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 23 May 2014 16:43, mike cole wrote: > > > >> I have in fact been reading Alex's book, Larry. > >> > >> I recommend strongly his chapters on Tool and Symbol and Language and > >> Thought. > >> > >> Especially the former I found to be unusually well presented in ways > that > >> helped me. > >> > >> The future that Alex was pointing towards looks a good deal like what > >> became the concerns of the Comm department here at UCSD - a combination > of > >> humanities, social sciences, and arts with mediation as its central > >> organizing concept. > >> > >> If some group of xmca-ites would like to jointly read a chapter or two, > I > >> would be glad to join in. > >> > >> mike? > >> > >> > > Yes, count me in. I think we should do Rolf Steier's paper justice > first, > > though, which I haven't even downloaded yet. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > >> On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 7:33 AM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >> > >> > I want to thank everyone for their reflections on consciousness and > >> > intellect. > >> > Mike commented, > >> > Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > >> > Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this > >> > topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > >> > Vygotskian concepts. > >> > > >> > I re-read Alex last comment in the epilogue of his book *Vygotsky's > >> > Psychology* which gives his understanding of why he wrote this book. > >> Alex > >> > reads Vygotsky's legacy as having moved through 3 stages. > >> > In the 1920's and 1930's the focus was on SOCIAL mediation to help > >> create > >> > the *new man*. > >> > In the 1960's Vygotsky was re-discovered in the West as a response to > >> > Piaget's quasi-naturalistic theory of development. > >> > > >> > In 1990, when the book was written Kozulin suggest a new plane opened. > >> Here > >> > is Kozulin's understanding of this third phase of Vygotsky's legacy. > >> [page > >> > 278] > >> > > >> > "The third plane of Vygotsky's theory, the contours of which are only > >> just > >> > emerging, presupposes both the re-evaluation of its origins and its > >> > projection into the future of psychology. What in the 1920's appeared > >> to be > >> > a rather straight forward thesis of SOCIAL mediation, and in the > 1960's > >> as > >> > a necessary correction to the overly individualistic approaches of > >> Western > >> > psychology, nowadays appears as a new problem emerging from the > >> realization > >> > that social and cultural mediatory mechanisms do not coincide. > >> Vygotsky's > >> > analysis of the crisis in psychology, earlier perceived as a critique > of > >> > psychology's past, is now recognized as an inquiry into the > fundamental > >> > mechanism of psychology's divergent development. The origins and > >> context of > >> > Vygotsky's theory are now being seen in a new light.; in the place of > >> > comparisons to Pavlov, the Gestaltists and Piaget comes the context of > >> > PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. In > >> an > >> > even broader sense, what once looked like Vygotsky's contribution TO > >> > psychology appears now as leading BEYOND psychology or at least beyond > >> > traditional psychology and into the sphere of the human studies BASED > on > >> > the humanities, rather than the scientific model." > >> > > >> > Mike, how others *respond* to Kozulin's vision that a new plane based > on > >> > the humanities is a re-visioning that goes too far BEYOND Vygotsky or > if > >> > they acknowledge this third plane as a valid emerging of a > hermeneutical > >> > response is an open question. > >> > Thought Kozulin's epilogue may generate more reflections and responses > >> on > >> > his perspective of the relation of [intellect] and [consciousness] > >> > > >> > Larry > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > "A" paradigmatic exemplar will do, Mike. > >> > > Vygotsky worked hard on the emotions, but my reading of his work on > >> the > >> > > emotions is that he did not bring his methodological work to a > >> > > conclusive outcome, but I think nonetheless, writers of our time > have > >> > > been able to write Vygotskyan studies of the emotions, thanks to the > >> > > fact that Vygotsky gave us an exemplar with study of the intellect. > I > >> > > take Vygotsky's work on the development of the personality through > >> > > perezhivanija as *another* exermplar he left us. > >> > > > >> > > Andy > >> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > > *Andy Blunden* > >> > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > mike cole wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on > >> > >> Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought > >> this > >> > >> topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core > >> > >> Vygotskian concepts. > >> > >> > >> > >> I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of > >> > >> consciousness before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic > >> exemplar, > >> > >> especially when that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L > is > >> > >> Spinoza and emotion. > >> > >> > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the > >> > >> content of the science. > >> > >> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the > >> > >> threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being > a > >> > >> pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and > >> > >> rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to > >> the > >> > >> categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the > >> > >> terminological mess. > >> > >> > >> > >> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a > >> > >> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure > >> > >> legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there > is > >> > >> some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" > >> in > >> > >> line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire > >> > >> class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps > >> > >> similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? > >> > >> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and > >> > >> "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" > >> > >> typologically to language use, then I think that that is too > >> > >> unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on > the > >> > >> other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to > >> > >> sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken > >> word > >> > >> is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of > >> > sign-use. > >> > >> > >> > >> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing > >> > >> lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the > >> > >> *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for > >> > >> psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole). > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > >> ------------ > >> > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > > > > From dansgui@gmail.com Sun May 25 07:14:30 2014 From: dansgui@gmail.com (dansgui@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 25 May 2014 14:14:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?A_question_on_Vygotsky_and_Imagination?= In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <5381fc13.6914ec0a.11ca.13ab@mx.google.com> Dear Shannon, I?m also trying to develop some ideas on imagination in affective-cognitive processes articulated with antropological and sociopolitical issues. To these works (see attached), Vygotski was na importante reference. Maybe it can be of any contribution. Best wishes, Danilo De: mike cole Enviado: ?sexta-feira?, ?23? de ?maio? de ?2014 ?17?:?28 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Hi Shannon- I am really uncertain about how to contribute to the discourse of political science but perhaps its through the notion of global discourse. In my prior note on the Dialogue of Cultures school, I said that it demanded, in addition to a pretty well off segment of any existing state, a really global set of polylogues to avoid the problems of the binary involved in the notion of dia - logue. I had not connected this with the question of imagination. >From recent discussion with Russian colleagues, it seems that the entire line of work that descends from Zaporozhets, which includes Zinchenko and Bodrova (in the US), Kudravstev (in Russia) focuses on the Kantian notion of productive imagination. They analyze this notion in terms of early developmental processes. An article by Repina in *The psychology of Preschool Children* edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin provides some notion of the early theorizing. Articles by Zaporozhets in the *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology* might be helpful. Vladimir Kudravstev is currently continuing this line of work. The work of the playworlds consortium, published in MCA http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749030903342246?journalCode=hmca20#previewis perhaps relevant. Finally, I attach a paper that discusses imagination from what we take to be a Vygotskian perspective or at least an inspiration. Hard to imagine that imagination is everywhere one looks.... but such is the nature of human thought! :-) mike On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Shannon, > This looks like a wonderfully interesting project! > As for thoughts here, I wonder what others on the list think, but with > regard to your third limitation of Vygotsky's idea of imagination and > whether or not it is intersubjective, I wonder if that is accurate. > Generally speaking, I think of Vygotsky's main points as being that > thinking is fundamentally intersubjective so it is difficult for me to > imagine (!) how imagination could be otherwise. Perhaps you have some > specific writings where you see this? Or perhaps we mean something > different by these terms? > I'm sure you're already familiar with them, but some other classics to > consider are Bakhtin's Dialogic Imagination and Volosinov's Marxism and the > Philosophy of Language are two other very good places to look for > developing a Vygotsky-like approach to imagination. When put together with > Vygotsky, I think they make for a powerful trio for understanding > imagination in politics! > Hope to hear more. > -greg > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Shannon Brincat < > shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > > Dear all, > > > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and > imagination. > > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of > looking > > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination > > is > > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > > cognition. > > > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or > > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be > great. > > > > Once again, thanks! > > > > Shannon > > > > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic > > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work > of > > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human > > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. > After > > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, Husserl?s > > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are > routinely > > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated > > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we > contend > > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing > > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a > link > > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive > social > > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > > link > > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, > > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the > > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings > of > > a > > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by > > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > > this > > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > > Griffith University Research Fellow > > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > > School > > of Government and International Relations > > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | > Brisbane > > | > > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > > > New edited series available through Praeger > > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Guimaraes, 2013.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 409629 bytes Desc: =?utf-8?Q?Guimaraes,_2013.pdf?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140525/59916713/attachment-0003.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Guimaraes, 2011.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 316283 bytes Desc: =?utf-8?Q?Guimaraes,_2011.pdf?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140525/59916713/attachment-0004.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Guimar?es, 2010a.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 190343 bytes Desc: =?utf-8?Q?Guimar=C3=A3es,_2010a.pdf?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140525/59916713/attachment-0005.pdf From sirlenea@terra.com.br Sun May 25 07:27:36 2014 From: sirlenea@terra.com.br (Sirlene) Date: Sun, 25 May 2014 11:27:36 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] RES: Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: <5381fc13.6914ec0a.11ca.13ab@mx.google.com> References: , <5381fc13.6914ec0a.11ca.13ab@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <000801cf7825$7adb28e0$70917aa0$@terra.com.br> Danilo, Thank you for sharing! Sirlene -----Mensagem original----- De: xmca-l-bounces+sirlenea=terra.com.br@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+sirlenea=terra.com.br@mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de dansgui@gmail.com Enviada em: domingo, 25 de maio de 2014 11:15 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; lchcmike@gmail.com Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination Dear Shannon, I?m also trying to develop some ideas on imagination in affective-cognitive processes articulated with antropological and sociopolitical issues. To these works (see attached), Vygotski was na importante reference. Maybe it can be of any contribution. Best wishes, Danilo De: mike cole Enviado: ?sexta-feira?, ?23? de ?maio? de ?2014 ?17?:?28 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Hi Shannon- I am really uncertain about how to contribute to the discourse of political science but perhaps its through the notion of global discourse. In my prior note on the Dialogue of Cultures school, I said that it demanded, in addition to a pretty well off segment of any existing state, a really global set of polylogues to avoid the problems of the binary involved in the notion of dia - logue. I had not connected this with the question of imagination. >From recent discussion with Russian colleagues, it seems that the >entire line of work that descends from Zaporozhets, which includes Zinchenko and Bodrova (in the US), Kudravstev (in Russia) focuses on the Kantian notion of productive imagination. They analyze this notion in terms of early developmental processes. An article by Repina in *The psychology of Preschool Children* edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin provides some notion of the early theorizing. Articles by Zaporozhets in the *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology* might be helpful. Vladimir Kudravstev is currently continuing this line of work. The work of the playworlds consortium, published in MCA http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749030903342246?journalCode=hmca20#previewis perhaps relevant. Finally, I attach a paper that discusses imagination from what we take to be a Vygotskian perspective or at least an inspiration. Hard to imagine that imagination is everywhere one looks.... but such is the nature of human thought! :-) mike On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Shannon, > This looks like a wonderfully interesting project! > As for thoughts here, I wonder what others on the list think, but with > regard to your third limitation of Vygotsky's idea of imagination and > whether or not it is intersubjective, I wonder if that is accurate. > Generally speaking, I think of Vygotsky's main points as being that > thinking is fundamentally intersubjective so it is difficult for me to > imagine (!) how imagination could be otherwise. Perhaps you have some > specific writings where you see this? Or perhaps we mean something > different by these terms? > I'm sure you're already familiar with them, but some other classics to > consider are Bakhtin's Dialogic Imagination and Volosinov's Marxism > and the Philosophy of Language are two other very good places to look > for developing a Vygotsky-like approach to imagination. When put > together with Vygotsky, I think they make for a powerful trio for > understanding imagination in politics! > Hope to hear more. > -greg > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Shannon Brincat < > shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > > Dear all, > > > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and > imagination. > > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of > looking > > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) > > imagination is just ignored as something fanciful rather than > > intrinsic to human cognition. > > > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary > > literature, or even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem > > relevant, would be > great. > > > > Once again, thanks! > > > > Shannon > > > > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something > > intrinsic to political life ins world politics. We focus on the > > psychological work > of > > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of > > human cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. > After > > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, > > Husserl?s phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational > > understanding of imagination, we emphasise three elements of > > Vygotsky?s analysis that demonstrate the significance of imagination > > to politics that are > routinely > > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). > > These include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, > > interpenetrated with reality, and dependent on social-history and > > culture. While we > contend > > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the > > closing section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while > > Vygotsky offers a > link > > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive > social > > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of > > imagination?s link to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account > > tells Us only of the positively productive elements of imagination > > but he did not turn his attention to the ?arkside of imagination > > regarding the politics of fear, ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, > > Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the intersubjective > > processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings > of > > a > > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We > > close by advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us > > better understand this complex faculty of imagination and its > > relation to politics. > > > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > > Griffith University Research Fellow > > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy > > | School of Government and International Relations Nathan Campus | > > Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | > Brisbane > > | > > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > > > New edited series available through Praeger Communism in the 21st > > Century (3 Vols.) > > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > --- Este email est? limpo de v?rus e malwares porque a prote??o do avast! Antiv?rus est? ativa. http://www.avast.com From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun May 25 08:08:51 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 25 May 2014 08:08:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: <5381fc13.6914ec0a.11ca.13ab@mx.google.com> References: <5381fc13.6914ec0a.11ca.13ab@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Those papers look much more relevant to Shannon's interests, Danilo. mike On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 7:14 AM, wrote: > Dear Shannon, > > I?m also trying to develop some ideas on imagination in > affective-cognitive processes articulated with antropological and > sociopolitical issues. To these works (see attached), Vygotski was na > importante reference. Maybe it can be of any contribution. > > Best wishes, > Danilo > > > > > *De:* mike cole > *Enviado:* ?sexta-feira?, ?23? de ?maio? de ?2014 ?17?:?28 > *Para:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Hi Shannon- I am really uncertain about how to contribute to the discourse > of political science but perhaps its through the notion of global > discourse. > > In my prior note on the Dialogue of Cultures school, I said that it > demanded, in addition to a pretty well off segment of any existing state, a > really global set of polylogues to avoid the problems of the binary > involved in the notion of dia - logue. I had not connected this with the > question of imagination. > > >From recent discussion with Russian colleagues, it seems that the entire > line of work that descends from Zaporozhets, which includes Zinchenko and > Bodrova (in the US), Kudravstev (in Russia) focuses on the Kantian notion > of productive imagination. They analyze this notion in terms of early > developmental processes. An article by Repina in *The psychology of > Preschool Children* edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin provides some notion > of the early theorizing. Articles by Zaporozhets in the *Journal of > Russian and East European Psychology* might be helpful. Vladimir Kudravstev > > is currently continuing this line of work. > > The work of the playworlds consortium, published in MCA > > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749030903342246?journalCode=hmca20#previewis > perhaps relevant. > > Finally, I attach a paper that discusses imagination from what we take to > be a Vygotskian perspective or at least an inspiration. > > Hard to imagine that imagination is everywhere one looks.... but such is > the nature of human thought! :-) > > mike > > > On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Shannon, > > This looks like a wonderfully interesting project! > > As for thoughts here, I wonder what others on the list think, but with > > regard to your third limitation of Vygotsky's idea of imagination and > > whether or not it is intersubjective, I wonder if that is accurate. > > Generally speaking, I think of Vygotsky's main points as being that > > thinking is fundamentally intersubjective so it is difficult for me to > > imagine (!) how imagination could be otherwise. Perhaps you have some > > specific writings where you see this? Or perhaps we mean something > > different by these terms? > > I'm sure you're already familiar with them, but some other classics to > > consider are Bakhtin's Dialogic Imagination and Volosinov's Marxism and > the > > Philosophy of Language are two other very good places to look for > > developing a Vygotsky-like approach to imagination. When put together > with > > Vygotsky, I think they make for a powerful trio for understanding > > imagination in politics! > > Hope to hear more. > > -greg > > > > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Shannon Brincat < > > shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > > > > Dear all, > > > > > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > > > > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and > > imagination. > > > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of > > looking > > > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > > > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) > imagination > > > is > > > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > > > cognition. > > > > > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, > or > > > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be > > great. > > > > > > Once again, thanks! > > > > > > Shannon > > > > > > > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > > > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something > intrinsic > > > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological > work > > of > > > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > > > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of > human > > > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. > > After > > > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, > Husserl?s > > > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > > > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > > > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are > > routinely > > > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > > > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, > interpenetrated > > > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we > > contend > > > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > > > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the > closing > > > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a > > link > > > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive > > social > > > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > > > link > > > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > > > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > > > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of > fear, > > > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of > the > > > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings > > of > > > a > > > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close > by > > > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > > > this > > > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > > > > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > > > Griffith University Research Fellow > > > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > > > School > > > of Government and International Relations > > > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | > > Brisbane > > > | > > > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > > > > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > > > > > New edited series available through Praeger > > > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > > > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Mon May 26 13:48:58 2014 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 20:48:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4D5AD039-2135-4A41-B56B-8634E7626FE4@mail.ubc.ca> Hello Rolf and Everyone, I would be interested in hearing more about the differences between design experiments, interactive analysis, and more micro-analytic methods, what are the overlaps and differences? This might be too broad, so carve this in a manner that feels useful. I was also thinking of the three other exhibits and the outcomes there, what were they like and how did they engage young people? Were there aspects of engagement with these three exhibits that made visible participants' embodiment as a sense making activity? Another thought is about the "museum as an institution" ... when interaction shifts, does it become more "school-like"? What are other possibilities? Lots here to think about, best - jen On 2014-05-23, at 3:47 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hello All, > Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who > wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts and > questions. > > Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project > that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this "design > experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce > digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young > people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences with > the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So first > of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented > demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of interactive > media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited to > audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. The > museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of > communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. > > In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, of > which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including looking > at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence the > practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an institution. > One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of the > guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also facilitating > some of the interactive activities in this project room. > > In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to be a > focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of the > curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity > became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more closely > at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors in > the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as part > of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that since > the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing > activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could pose > for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a > conference paper here - > http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/). > Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new > national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive > activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I > think this aspect is very much present in the work. > > So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the > phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The > specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as > interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have > thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more > micro-analytic methods? > > > Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, > Rolf > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > >> Dear XMCA, >> >> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open >> on the T and F website: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 >> >> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. >> >> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in >> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense >> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning >> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? >> >> More questions? >> >> Best - jen >> From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon May 26 14:28:04 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 15:28:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: <4D5AD039-2135-4A41-B56B-8634E7626FE4@mail.ubc.ca> References: <4D5AD039-2135-4A41-B56B-8634E7626FE4@mail.ubc.ca> Message-ID: Rolff, I wonder if you have seen the cover of Ian Hodder's book Entanglements? http://narratingwaste.wordpress.com/2013/07/30/review-of-ian-hodders-entangled-an-archaeology-of-the-relationships-between-humans-and-things/ It seems nearly perfect for your project - would only be better if the museum goer in the picture was actually entangled in the webs... And btw, I too am interested in Jen's question. -greg On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > Hello Rolf and Everyone, > > I would be interested in hearing more about the differences between design > experiments, interactive analysis, and more micro-analytic methods, what > are the overlaps and differences? This might be too broad, so carve this in > a manner that feels useful. > > I was also thinking of the three other exhibits and the outcomes there, > what were they like and how did they engage young people? Were there > aspects of engagement with these three exhibits that made visible > participants' embodiment as a sense making activity? > > Another thought is about the "museum as an institution" ... when > interaction shifts, does it become more "school-like"? What are other > possibilities? > > Lots here to think about, best - jen > > > On 2014-05-23, at 3:47 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > Hello All, > > Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who > > wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts and > > questions. > > > > Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project > > that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this > "design > > experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce > > digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young > > people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences > with > > the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So > first > > of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented > > demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of > interactive > > media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited to > > audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. > The > > museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of > > communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. > > > > In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, of > > which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including looking > > at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence > the > > practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an > institution. > > One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of > the > > guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also > facilitating > > some of the interactive activities in this project room. > > > > In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to be > a > > focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of > the > > curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity > > became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more > closely > > at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors > in > > the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as > part > > of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that since > > the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing > > activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could > pose > > for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a > > conference paper here - > > > http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/ > ). > > Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new > > national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive > > activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I > > think this aspect is very much present in the work. > > > > So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the > > phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The > > specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as > > interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have > > thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more > > micro-analytic methods? > > > > > > Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, > > Rolf > > > > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > > > >> Dear XMCA, > >> > >> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is > open > >> on the T and F website: > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > >> > >> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > >> > >> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > >> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > sense > >> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > >> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > >> > >> More questions? > >> > >> Best - jen > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon May 26 14:28:04 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 15:28:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: <4D5AD039-2135-4A41-B56B-8634E7626FE4@mail.ubc.ca> References: <4D5AD039-2135-4A41-B56B-8634E7626FE4@mail.ubc.ca> Message-ID: Rolff, I wonder if you have seen the cover of Ian Hodder's book Entanglements? http://narratingwaste.wordpress.com/2013/07/30/review-of-ian-hodders-entangled-an-archaeology-of-the-relationships-between-humans-and-things/ It seems nearly perfect for your project - would only be better if the museum goer in the picture was actually entangled in the webs... And btw, I too am interested in Jen's question. -greg On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > Hello Rolf and Everyone, > > I would be interested in hearing more about the differences between design > experiments, interactive analysis, and more micro-analytic methods, what > are the overlaps and differences? This might be too broad, so carve this in > a manner that feels useful. > > I was also thinking of the three other exhibits and the outcomes there, > what were they like and how did they engage young people? Were there > aspects of engagement with these three exhibits that made visible > participants' embodiment as a sense making activity? > > Another thought is about the "museum as an institution" ... when > interaction shifts, does it become more "school-like"? What are other > possibilities? > > Lots here to think about, best - jen > > > On 2014-05-23, at 3:47 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > Hello All, > > Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who > > wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts and > > questions. > > > > Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project > > that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this > "design > > experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce > > digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young > > people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences > with > > the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So > first > > of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented > > demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of > interactive > > media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited to > > audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. > The > > museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of > > communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. > > > > In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, of > > which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including looking > > at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence > the > > practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an > institution. > > One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of > the > > guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also > facilitating > > some of the interactive activities in this project room. > > > > In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to be > a > > focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of > the > > curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity > > became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more > closely > > at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors > in > > the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as > part > > of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that since > > the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing > > activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could > pose > > for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a > > conference paper here - > > > http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/ > ). > > Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new > > national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive > > activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I > > think this aspect is very much present in the work. > > > > So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the > > phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The > > specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as > > interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have > > thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more > > micro-analytic methods? > > > > > > Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, > > Rolf > > > > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > > > >> Dear XMCA, > >> > >> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is > open > >> on the T and F website: > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > >> > >> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > >> > >> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > >> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > sense > >> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > >> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > >> > >> More questions? > >> > >> Best - jen > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 26 15:18:42 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 07:18:42 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's intriguing article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which is also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and Creativity. Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover of our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai Bogdanov-Belsky. http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on creativity and imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" account ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in JREEP in 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was published in "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky Reader (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", part of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky asks--and answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing vigorously. The child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes disillusioned with mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, at a certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as captured by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now powerless and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call "imagination", is all that is left. I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to recover a kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very convincing and shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a statistically equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying structure far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal artistic experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in museums recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good thing: Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. Some specific questions: a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the basis of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry cultural meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making itself? b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor with Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how children can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in order to have a metaphor you need a concept first. c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at all? d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE stance, while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the artwork? Just a thought. I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of Xi'an in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the art students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, though, neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to reproduce any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the window than in looking back at the exhibition. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer wrote: > Dear XMCA, > > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open > on the T and F website: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > More questions? > > Best - jen > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon May 26 15:55:15 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 23:55:15 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Rolf, Thanks for sharing your paper. I am offering two related "problematic" thoughts that I considered whilst reading your paper. One thought I kept returning to in reading the paper was whether the phrase "making meaning" was an accurate depiction and on what basis it is both a meaning and something that is made. By way of elaboration, we can contrast the "making" with discovering. Discovering seems to be what you're referring to when you mention testing. The dialogue and sharing of impressions between visitors might be construed as contributing towards this process, i.e. that there may be other things to consider which may inform the "discovery" (if that is what it is interpreted as being). With respect to the labelling of phenomena as meaning, I attribute the term to the understood consequences (aesthetic feeling impressions in relation to the art in this case). If this is so, then it seems to follow that gestures are either used in an (internally) congruent manner to test and explore the meaning or, alternatively, the gestures may take on an exaggerated or stereotyped pose designed to have some form of understood consequence, e.g. a pantomime of what one "should feel". It seems to me that such a difference would implicate two rather different orientations to the artefacts (perhaps akin to a pre-conceputal and post-conceptual appreciation of the art as art). A second thought I had was the relations between your references to the internal and the external. Do you perceive this to be a genetic relation? For example, in considering a need for a space to explore an artefact are you considering the experiences that a participant brings to the scene and their ability to relate their experiences to the artefacts in a silent mode (i.e. analogous to inner speech)? The implication is that there is a necessarily "noisy" prerequisite activity prior to the silent appreciation, but is this actually engaging with the art, i.e. discovering the meaning, or is it a process of imposing a meaning ("what one should feel"), i.e a made up meaning, to the situation? An alternative account to the "noisy" mode, is that the "noisiness" is the business of life experience to which the artist is relating. According to this line of thinking, one cannot be taught what to feel in response to art, rather the feeling is a consequence of engaging with the art which may assist in the process of reflection, i.e. of orienting to images conveyed by the artist on the basis of one's experiences. Presumably, these concerns are predicated on the purposes of the museum organisers. Are they hoping that young people engage with the art in particular ways? Do they believe that there are significant things to discover, or is it all simply "what you make of it"? I hope this helps! Best, Huw On 23 May 2014 11:47, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hello All, > Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who > wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts and > questions. > > Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project > that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this "design > experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce > digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young > people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences with > the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So first > of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented > demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of interactive > media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited to > audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. The > museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of > communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. > > In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, of > which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including looking > at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence the > practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an institution. > One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of the > guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also facilitating > some of the interactive activities in this project room. > > In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to be a > focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of the > curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity > became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more closely > at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors in > the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as part > of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that since > the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing > activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could pose > for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a > conference paper here - > > http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/ > ). > Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new > national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive > activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I > think this aspect is very much present in the work. > > So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the > phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The > specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as > interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have > thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more > micro-analytic methods? > > > Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, > Rolf > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > > > Dear XMCA, > > > > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open > > on the T and F website: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > > > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > > > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense > > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > > > More questions? > > > > Best - jen > > > From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Tue May 27 03:01:16 2014 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 12:01:16 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: <4D5AD039-2135-4A41-B56B-8634E7626FE4@mail.ubc.ca> Message-ID: Hello All, Much to respond to this morning so thank you for some of these comments! Jennifer asked about these methodological distinctions related to design experiments. I don't have more to say on that yet, but I would love to hear what others have to say in response to this (or to the "Designing For Change" editorial from this issue). This notion of "Museum as Institution" is also one that I'm really interested in. In this study, I was explicitly trying to minimize the school context through both recruitment methods and through the minimal instructions given to participants. There is a much larger body of research on youth visiting museums during field trips and in family visits than exists for peer groups so this was an important distinction for me. I think there certainly can be a shift to a more school-like context if interactivity is introduced that structures activity formally. One interesting observation that I had from sitting in this project room was the hesitancy of visitors to enter if the room was empty. People would peek their heads through the door and often back away if no one was participating inside. I think there was a pretty dramatic shift for people between this traditional gallery space and this interactive space that violated people's expectations - they weren't sure what to do. If visitors were already inside talking or engaging with the technology then people seemed more comfortable entering. Greg - thank you! That cover did in fact catch my eye last year but I didn't have a chance to go through it yet. Thank you for reminding me though. On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 11:28 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Rolff, > > I wonder if you have seen the cover of Ian Hodder's book Entanglements? > > http://narratingwaste.wordpress.com/2013/07/30/review-of-ian-hodders-entangled-an-archaeology-of-the-relationships-between-humans-and-things/ > > It seems nearly perfect for your project - would only be better if the > museum goer in the picture was actually entangled in the webs... > > And btw, I too am interested in Jen's question. > -greg > > > On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > >> Hello Rolf and Everyone, >> >> I would be interested in hearing more about the differences between >> design experiments, interactive analysis, and more micro-analytic methods, >> what are the overlaps and differences? This might be too broad, so carve >> this in a manner that feels useful. >> >> I was also thinking of the three other exhibits and the outcomes there, >> what were they like and how did they engage young people? Were there >> aspects of engagement with these three exhibits that made visible >> participants' embodiment as a sense making activity? >> >> Another thought is about the "museum as an institution" ... when >> interaction shifts, does it become more "school-like"? What are other >> possibilities? >> >> Lots here to think about, best - jen >> >> >> On 2014-05-23, at 3:47 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: >> >> > Hello All, >> > Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who >> > wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts >> and >> > questions. >> > >> > Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project >> > that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this >> "design >> > experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce >> > digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young >> > people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences >> with >> > the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So >> first >> > of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented >> > demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of >> interactive >> > media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited >> to >> > audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. >> The >> > museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of >> > communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. >> > >> > In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, >> of >> > which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including >> looking >> > at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence >> the >> > practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an >> institution. >> > One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of >> the >> > guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also >> facilitating >> > some of the interactive activities in this project room. >> > >> > In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to >> be a >> > focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of >> the >> > curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity >> > became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more >> closely >> > at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the >> visitors in >> > the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as >> part >> > of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that >> since >> > the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing >> > activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could >> pose >> > for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a >> > conference paper here - >> > >> http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/ >> ). >> > Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new >> > national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive >> > activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I >> > think this aspect is very much present in the work. >> > >> > So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the >> > phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The >> > specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as >> > interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have >> > thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more >> > micro-analytic methods? >> > >> > >> > Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, >> > Rolf >> > >> > >> > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < >> > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: >> > >> >> Dear XMCA, >> >> >> >> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is >> open >> >> on the T and F website: >> >> >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 >> >> >> >> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. >> >> >> >> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in >> >> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what >> sense >> >> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning >> >> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? >> >> >> >> More questions? >> >> >> >> Best - jen >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Tue May 27 06:14:01 2014 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 15:14:01 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello David, Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add to this depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at all outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a particularly large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to this study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when approaching Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to ?scream? as a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is building off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and conversations with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works with photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what expectations youth bring to these experiences. You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think is really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating the appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think both are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the artwork - but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic relationship between the participants. I used the concept of depiction to be consistent with Streeck?s framework. You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can elaborate on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the impression that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of this article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). Thank you! On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's intriguing > article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which is > also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and > Creativity. > > Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover of > our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai > Bogdanov-Belsky. > > http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 > > The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on creativity and > imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" account > ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in JREEP in > 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was published in > "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky Reader > (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", part > of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. > > But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky asks--and > answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is > exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing vigorously. The > child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes disillusioned with > mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, at a > certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real > progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up > writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as captured > by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write > compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now powerless > and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call "imagination", is > all that is left. > > I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a > "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and > internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to recover a > kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment > from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very convincing and > shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a statistically > equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying structure > far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal artistic > experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. > > But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in museums > recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little > depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident > understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any > posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good thing: > Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. > > Some specific questions: > > a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". > Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the basis > of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry cultural > meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making itself? > > b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor with > Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how children > can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in order > to have a metaphor you need a concept first. > > c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or > deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at all? > > d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE stance, > while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the > artwork? Just a thought. > > I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of Xi'an > in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and > invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big > university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the art > students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, though, > neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to reproduce > any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the window > than in looking back at the exhibition. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > wrote: > > > Dear XMCA, > > > > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open > > on the T and F website: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > > > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > > > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense > > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > > > More questions? > > > > Best - jen > > > From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Tue May 27 06:22:25 2014 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 15:22:25 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Huw, You raise some really interesting questions that I hope others can comment on as well. I would say that ?making? and ?discovering? as you put it are very much related as processes. It might be that features of the artifact are discovered and then in combination contribute to an interpretation (making) of meaning of the artifact. We could argue that a feature of the artifact (the pose of a figure in a painting) is discovered as being relevant and implying some intended meaning - but that the realization of this meaning is made by the participants. The notion of ?testing? is also worth exploring more I think. For me, ?testing? is related to Sch?n?s notion of ?reflection in action.? The testing of a pose isn?t necessarily discovering a fixed meaning, but exploring the implications of taking that pose. Here I have pasted the section that mentions testing on p 161 in case others have thoughts on this: As the interaction unfolds, we see Sara mimic the gesture of Mari in Panel > 3, seemingly in an attempt to join Mari?s interpretive process. Sara > doesn?t simply accept Mari?s suggestion; she performs the gesture seemingly > to test the gesture as a representation of ?speech.? This testing may serve > as another conceptual gesture (Streeck, 2009b) to internalize this > particular expla- nation. In this instance, Sara?s gesture is functioning > simultaneously as a part of her cognitive process but also as a > demonstration to Mari that she acknowledges Mari?s suggestion. I?m also glad that you asked about this relationship between internal and external, because this is a theme I would love to explore further. I agree that participants are absolutely bringing experiences to the scene- though the roles of these types of experiences are more difficult to interpret with this kind of analysis. For me, this internal/external relationship is more about how one ?discovered? interpretation becomes both publicly shared and individually evaluated through bodily action. This is definitely a topic I would like to explore more so I hope others can chime in. best, Rolf On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:55 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Rolf, > > Thanks for sharing your paper. I am offering two related "problematic" > thoughts that I considered whilst reading your paper. > > One thought I kept returning to in reading the paper was whether the > phrase "making meaning" was an accurate depiction and on what basis it is > both a meaning and something that is made. > > By way of elaboration, we can contrast the "making" with discovering. > Discovering seems to be what you're referring to when you mention testing. > The dialogue and sharing of impressions between visitors might be > construed as contributing towards this process, i.e. that there may be > other things to consider which may inform the "discovery" (if that is what > it is interpreted as being). > > With respect to the labelling of phenomena as meaning, I attribute the > term to the understood consequences (aesthetic feeling impressions in > relation to the art in this case). If this is so, then it seems to follow > that gestures are either used in an (internally) congruent manner to test > and explore the meaning or, alternatively, the gestures may take on an > exaggerated or stereotyped pose designed to have some form of understood > consequence, e.g. a pantomime of what one "should feel". It seems to me > that such a difference would implicate two rather different orientations to > the artefacts (perhaps akin to a pre-conceputal and post-conceptual > appreciation of the art as art). > > A second thought I had was the relations between your references to the > internal and the external. Do you perceive this to be a genetic relation? > For example, in considering a need for a space to explore an artefact are > you considering the experiences that a participant brings to the scene and > their ability to relate their experiences to the artefacts in a silent mode > (i.e. analogous to inner speech)? The implication is that there is a > necessarily "noisy" prerequisite activity prior to the silent > appreciation, but is this actually engaging with the art, i.e. discovering > the meaning, or is it a process of imposing a meaning ("what one should > feel"), i.e a made up meaning, to the situation? > > An alternative account to the "noisy" mode, is that the "noisiness" is the > business of life experience to which the artist is relating. According to > this line of thinking, one cannot be taught what to feel in response to > art, rather the feeling is a consequence of engaging with the art which may > assist in the process of reflection, i.e. of orienting to images conveyed > by the artist on the basis of one's experiences. > > Presumably, these concerns are predicated on the purposes of the museum > organisers. Are they hoping that young people engage with the art in > particular ways? Do they believe that there are significant things to > discover, or is it all simply "what you make of it"? > > I hope this helps! > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 23 May 2014 11:47, Rolf Steier wrote: > >> Hello All, >> Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who >> wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts and >> questions. >> >> Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project >> that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this "design >> experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce >> digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young >> people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences with >> the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So first >> of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented >> demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of >> interactive >> media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited to >> audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. The >> museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of >> communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. >> >> In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, of >> which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including looking >> at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence the >> practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an >> institution. >> One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of the >> guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also facilitating >> some of the interactive activities in this project room. >> >> In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to be a >> focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of >> the >> curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity >> became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more closely >> at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors >> in >> the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as >> part >> of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that since >> the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing >> activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could pose >> for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a >> conference paper here - >> >> http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/ >> ). >> Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new >> national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive >> activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I >> think this aspect is very much present in the work. >> >> So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the >> phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The >> specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as >> interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have >> thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more >> micro-analytic methods? >> >> >> Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, >> Rolf >> >> >> On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < >> j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: >> >> > Dear XMCA, >> > >> > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is >> open >> > on the T and F website: >> > >> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 >> > >> > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. >> > >> > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in >> > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what >> sense >> > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning >> > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? >> > >> > More questions? >> > >> > Best - jen >> > >> > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue May 27 10:40:43 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 10:40:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Very interesting conversation about your paper, Rolf. To me the NON schoolness of the activity is central to its importance. That people looked into the room and hesitated to enter speaks to its unusualness and the fact that you were in a place where youth come in on their own is wonderful. With respect to the issue of "design experiments": There is pretty sure to be a discussion of this issue of XMCA upcoming. In addition to the papers in the same issue of MCA as your article each of which speaks directly to that term and related terms of concern to xmca participants. In a month there will be a symposium at the International Conference of Learning Sciences (ICLS) on the topic that will involve the authors of those papers and others, from which an issue of MCA may well spring. Whatever one wants to call what you did, its thought provoking without having to dig into the multiple meanings of design experiment. Thanks for engaging in the discussion! mike On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 6:22 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hi Huw, > > You raise some really interesting questions that I hope others can comment > on as well. I would say that ?making? and ?discovering? as you put it are > very much related as processes. It might be that features of the artifact > are discovered and then in combination contribute to an interpretation > (making) of meaning of the artifact. We could argue that a feature of the > artifact (the pose of a figure in a painting) is discovered as being > relevant and implying some intended meaning - but that the realization of > this meaning is made by the participants. The notion of ?testing? is also > worth exploring more I think. For me, ?testing? is related to Sch?n?s > notion of ?reflection in action.? The testing of a pose isn?t necessarily > discovering a fixed meaning, but exploring the implications of taking that > pose. > > Here I have pasted the section that mentions testing on p 161 in case > others have thoughts on this: > > As the interaction unfolds, we see Sara mimic the gesture of Mari in Panel > > 3, seemingly in an attempt to join Mari?s interpretive process. Sara > > doesn?t simply accept Mari?s suggestion; she performs the gesture > seemingly > > to test the gesture as a representation of ?speech.? This testing may > serve > > as another conceptual gesture (Streeck, 2009b) to internalize this > > particular expla- nation. In this instance, Sara?s gesture is functioning > > simultaneously as a part of her cognitive process but also as a > > demonstration to Mari that she acknowledges Mari?s suggestion. > > > I?m also glad that you asked about this relationship between internal and > external, because this is a theme I would love to explore further. I agree > that participants are absolutely bringing experiences to the scene- though > the roles of these types of experiences are more difficult to interpret > with this kind of analysis. For me, this internal/external relationship is > more about how one ?discovered? interpretation becomes both publicly shared > and individually evaluated through bodily action. This is definitely a > topic I would like to explore more so I hope others can chime in. > > best, > Rolf > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:55 AM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > Hi Rolf, > > > > Thanks for sharing your paper. I am offering two related "problematic" > > thoughts that I considered whilst reading your paper. > > > > One thought I kept returning to in reading the paper was whether the > > phrase "making meaning" was an accurate depiction and on what basis it is > > both a meaning and something that is made. > > > > By way of elaboration, we can contrast the "making" with discovering. > > Discovering seems to be what you're referring to when you mention > testing. > > The dialogue and sharing of impressions between visitors might be > > construed as contributing towards this process, i.e. that there may be > > other things to consider which may inform the "discovery" (if that is > what > > it is interpreted as being). > > > > With respect to the labelling of phenomena as meaning, I attribute the > > term to the understood consequences (aesthetic feeling impressions in > > relation to the art in this case). If this is so, then it seems to > follow > > that gestures are either used in an (internally) congruent manner to test > > and explore the meaning or, alternatively, the gestures may take on an > > exaggerated or stereotyped pose designed to have some form of understood > > consequence, e.g. a pantomime of what one "should feel". It seems to me > > that such a difference would implicate two rather different orientations > to > > the artefacts (perhaps akin to a pre-conceputal and post-conceptual > > appreciation of the art as art). > > > > A second thought I had was the relations between your references to the > > internal and the external. Do you perceive this to be a genetic > relation? > > For example, in considering a need for a space to explore an artefact > are > > you considering the experiences that a participant brings to the scene > and > > their ability to relate their experiences to the artefacts in a silent > mode > > (i.e. analogous to inner speech)? The implication is that there is a > > necessarily "noisy" prerequisite activity prior to the silent > > appreciation, but is this actually engaging with the art, i.e. > discovering > > the meaning, or is it a process of imposing a meaning ("what one should > > feel"), i.e a made up meaning, to the situation? > > > > An alternative account to the "noisy" mode, is that the "noisiness" is > the > > business of life experience to which the artist is relating. According > to > > this line of thinking, one cannot be taught what to feel in response to > > art, rather the feeling is a consequence of engaging with the art which > may > > assist in the process of reflection, i.e. of orienting to images conveyed > > by the artist on the basis of one's experiences. > > > > Presumably, these concerns are predicated on the purposes of the museum > > organisers. Are they hoping that young people engage with the art in > > particular ways? Do they believe that there are significant things to > > discover, or is it all simply "what you make of it"? > > > > I hope this helps! > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 23 May 2014 11:47, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > >> Hello All, > >> Thank you to Jen for inviting me to this discussion and to everyone who > >> wishes to participate! I'll look forward to some interesting thoughts > and > >> questions. > >> > >> Maybe I can start by providing a little context for the research project > >> that wasn't necessarily the focus of the article. As a whole, this > "design > >> experiment" involved a partnership with the National Museum to introduce > >> digital technology and interactive activities in order to engage young > >> people. Working with the museum, we found that teenagers' experiences > with > >> the museum were almost exclusively limited to school field trips. So > first > >> of all, the museum was interested in engaging this underrepresented > >> demographic in non-school contexts. Second, the museum's use of > >> interactive > >> media (and really, interpretive resources in general) had been limited > to > >> audio guides as well as some simple wall texts through out the museum. > The > >> museum then was also interested in experimenting with news ways of > >> communicating with the public and engaging them with these artworks. > >> > >> In designing this project room (which included 4 interactive stations, > of > >> which this posing activity was one) - the broader goals including > looking > >> at how the introduction of such interactive activities might influence > the > >> practices of the visiting public, but also of the museum as an > >> institution. > >> One small example that I found really interesting involved the role of > the > >> guards, which seemed to shift from protecting the art to also > facilitating > >> some of the interactive activities in this project room. > >> > >> In any case, the phenomenon of posing was not necessarily intended to > be a > >> focal point. The activity was designed based on the pedagogical goal of > >> the > >> curator of exploring Munch's use of self-portraits. This one activity > >> became really popular, and it was only after starting to look more > closely > >> at these prompted acts of posing did I return to looking at the visitors > >> in > >> the rest of the gallery. These posing practices then became visible as > >> part > >> of visitors normal interpretive practices. I should also note, that > since > >> the exhibit closed, curators at the museum decided to adapt the posing > >> activity to a classroom setting using photographs that students could > pose > >> for and then paint over with an iPad. (This can be read about in a > >> conference paper here - > >> > >> > http://mw2014.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/posing-with-art-researching-and-designing-for-performative-acts-of-interpretation-2/ > >> ). > >> Another outcome of the project room will be in the design of a new > >> national museum that will incorporate spaces for such interactive > >> activities. In regards to the iterative nature of design experiments, I > >> think this aspect is very much present in the work. > >> > >> So for me, it was this broader design experiment that allowed the > >> phenomenon of posing to emerge as a visible and relevant practice. The > >> specific method of analysis in the article might be better described as > >> interaction analysis then. But maybe this is a question that people have > >> thoughts on? The relationships between design experiments and more > >> micro-analytic methods? > >> > >> > >> Looking forward to some thoughts or other directions for discussion, > >> Rolf > >> > >> > >> On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > >> j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > >> > >> > Dear XMCA, > >> > > >> > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is > >> open > >> > on the T and F website: > >> > > >> > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > >> > > >> > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > >> > > >> > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is > in > >> > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > >> sense > >> > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > >> > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > >> > > >> > More questions? > >> > > >> > Best - jen > >> > > >> > > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue May 27 12:15:10 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 14:15:10 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5369818B-A177-4BA4-817D-AF2F66EF077C@umich.edu> Rolf If you would, could you say more why you think 'depiction' rather than 'mimesis' better captures the dialogic relationship between the participants. An example from your paper would be helpful. Ed Wall On May 27, 2014, at 8:14 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hello David, > > Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. > > You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a > little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add to this > depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at all > outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a particularly > large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to this > study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when approaching > Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to ?scream? as > a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is building > off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and conversations > with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works with > photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what > expectations youth bring to these experiences. > > You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You > mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think is > really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating the > appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think both > are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? > implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the artwork - > but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic > relationship between the participants. I used the concept of depiction to > be consistent with Streeck?s framework. > > You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic > suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can elaborate > on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the impression > that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of this > article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). > > Thank you! > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's intriguing >> article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which is >> also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and >> Creativity. >> >> Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover of >> our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai >> Bogdanov-Belsky. >> >> http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 >> >> The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on creativity and >> imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" account >> ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in JREEP in >> 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was published in >> "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky Reader >> (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", part >> of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. >> >> But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky asks--and >> answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is >> exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing vigorously. The >> child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes disillusioned with >> mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, at a >> certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real >> progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up >> writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as captured >> by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write >> compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now powerless >> and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call "imagination", is >> all that is left. >> >> I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a >> "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and >> internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to recover a >> kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment >> from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very convincing and >> shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a statistically >> equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying structure >> far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal artistic >> experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. >> >> But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in museums >> recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little >> depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident >> understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any >> posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good thing: >> Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. >> >> Some specific questions: >> >> a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". >> Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the basis >> of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry cultural >> meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making itself? >> >> b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor with >> Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how children >> can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in order >> to have a metaphor you need a concept first. >> >> c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or >> deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at all? >> >> d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE stance, >> while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the >> artwork? Just a thought. >> >> I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of Xi'an >> in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and >> invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big >> university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the art >> students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, though, >> neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to reproduce >> any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the window >> than in looking back at the exhibition. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer >> wrote: >> >>> Dear XMCA, >>> >>> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open >>> on the T and F website: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 >>> >>> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. >>> >>> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in >>> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense >>> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning >>> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? >>> >>> More questions? >>> >>> Best - jen >>> >> From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Tue May 27 14:24:04 2014 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 23:24:04 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: <5369818B-A177-4BA4-817D-AF2F66EF077C@umich.edu> References: <5369818B-A177-4BA4-817D-AF2F66EF077C@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed, Thank you for asking this because I had been reflecting some after sending the previous email and thought this topic might need more discussion. I view mimesis as one form of gestural depiction. Streeck defines Mimetic Gesturing as ?the performance of gestures to depict physical acts or behavior? (p 144 of Gesturecraft). I absolutely agree that posing with an artwork can be interpreted as mimesis. Where this becomes more complex (and I think interesting!) - Is when we ask what it is that is being depicted? If we use Episode 1 from the article (Figure 6 on p160) - it might be that the girls are depicting the body of the figure in the work. Another interpretation could be that they are depicting the painting itself (with the implication that they are acknowledging the intentionality of the artist in forming her own depiction). I believe that at some point in this interaction, the girls are implicitly acknowledging the intentionality of the artist because the girl on the left incorporates the title of the work (Four Artists) into her interpretation. I chose to use the term ?posing gesture? as a form of gestural depiction that is distinct from mimesis. I think that relationships between the artist, figure, artwork, and visitors are complex and that some aspect of these relationships might be lost if we interpret it only as a gesture ?depicting a physical act.? There is also the issue of who the gesture is for (the self, the friend, or both). Perhaps this contradicts my previous email a little, but thank you for asking me to reflect on it again. Ed - what do you think? Maybe there is a broader question here about the object of representation.. what a gesture is of? and who it is for? On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Rolf > > If you would, could you say more why you think 'depiction' rather > than 'mimesis' better captures the dialogic relationship between the > participants. An example from your paper would be helpful. > > Ed Wall > > On May 27, 2014, at 8:14 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > Hello David, > > > > Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. > > > > You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a > > little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add to > this > > depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at all > > outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a particularly > > large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to this > > study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when > approaching > > Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to ?scream? > as > > a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is building > > off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and > conversations > > with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works with > > photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what > > expectations youth bring to these experiences. > > > > You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You > > mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think is > > really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating the > > appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think both > > are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? > > implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the artwork - > > but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic > > relationship between the participants. I used the concept of depiction to > > be consistent with Streeck?s framework. > > > > You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic > > suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can > elaborate > > on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the > impression > > that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of this > > article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). > > > > Thank you! > > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg >wrote: > > > >> I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's > intriguing > >> article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which is > >> also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and > >> Creativity. > >> > >> Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover of > >> our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai > >> Bogdanov-Belsky. > >> > >> http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 > >> > >> The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on creativity > and > >> imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" > account > >> ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in > JREEP in > >> 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was published > in > >> "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky > Reader > >> (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", > part > >> of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. > >> > >> But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky asks--and > >> answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is > >> exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing vigorously. > The > >> child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes disillusioned > with > >> mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, > at a > >> certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real > >> progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up > >> writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as > captured > >> by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write > >> compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now > powerless > >> and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call "imagination", > is > >> all that is left. > >> > >> I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a > >> "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and > >> internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to > recover a > >> kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment > >> from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very convincing > and > >> shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a > statistically > >> equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying structure > >> far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal > artistic > >> experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. > >> > >> But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in > museums > >> recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little > >> depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident > >> understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any > >> posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good thing: > >> Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. > >> > >> Some specific questions: > >> > >> a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". > >> Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the > basis > >> of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry cultural > >> meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making itself? > >> > >> b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor with > >> Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how > children > >> can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in > order > >> to have a metaphor you need a concept first. > >> > >> c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or > >> deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at all? > >> > >> d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE stance, > >> while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the > >> artwork? Just a thought. > >> > >> I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of > Xi'an > >> in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and > >> invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big > >> university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the art > >> students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, though, > >> neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to reproduce > >> any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the window > >> than in looking back at the exhibition. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> > >> On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Dear XMCA, > >>> > >>> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is > open > >>> on the T and F website: > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > >>> > >>> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > >>> > >>> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > >>> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > sense > >>> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > >>> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > >>> > >>> More questions? > >>> > >>> Best - jen > >>> > >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 27 14:44:45 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 06:44:45 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Well, first of all, I hasten to emphasize that the book is in Korean. I really just wanted people to look at the cover, rather the way that a museum curator wants the visitors to look at paintings. The cover, to me, expresses the key problem. It's this. When we confront children with works of art, they are faced with cultural artefacts that are saturated in history, replete with cultural experience and super-productive in terms of their actual and above all their potential meaning. In order to develop the child's own imagination, the child must somehow master these means of creativity. How can that happen without the superproductivity of the cultural artefact drowning out the relatively short memory, the relatively poor experience, and the relatively concrete imagination of the child? Let me put it another way. We know that the chld masters a cultural artefact such as speech is by "internalizing" word meanings. But we sometimes imagine this process as a magical one, a little like swallowing a pill. The child digests the sugar-coating of the phonology and somehow assimilates the history, cultural experience, and meaning potential which is somehow "embedded" in the word. When we actually study the process of internalizing a word meaning as it occurs (say, in classroom discourse), we find that the process is not at all like digestion; it is much more like what the kids are doing in your museum data. The real task is not to "assimilate" history, cultural experience and meaning potential but rather to reimagine and even imaginatively recreate them. The child cannot really do this: history is too long and life is too short; words are too productive and child memories too restricted; the grammatical system itself can say far more than any of us can ever hope to mean. And very often, when children seek nonverbal means for expression (e.g. posing, or even painting) it is an act of alienation, isolation, and despair. For example, many of the pictures I have seen on Flickr of people posing with great works of art are clearly parodistic rather than genuinely understanding, and the child sometimes seems to be parodying him or herself rather than the painting. The distinction I see between depiction and mimesis is slightly different from yours. Imagine I want to tell the story of Little Red Riding Hood. I can "become" the wolf, by making my hands like claws, and of course this is a mimetic gesture; I am placing myself INSIDE the story as the wolf. I am ready to address Little Red Riding Hood in all my lupine splendour. Alternatively, I can depict the wolf by using one hand as a shadow puppet, with my thumb as the wolf's ear, and a jaunty pinkie finger as the wolf's gaping jaw. When I do this, I am placing myself at arm's length from the wolf, and my position is not that of a character but that of a story-teller. So I think that depictive gestures are NARRATIVISTIC rather than dialogic, and mimetic ones are DIALOGIC rather than narrativistic. In your article, you point out that the process of understanding a work of art is not the simple "going out and coming back" from the one's own viewpoint to that of the artwork that Bakhtin assumes in "Art and Answerability". Instead, there are many moments: pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment. But you also point out that all of these moments have something in common. They all involve turning the position of the viewer and the viewed around--the self-directed becomes other-directed and vice versa. In verbal art, the way this happens is that the narrative becomes dialogue (e.g. in Shakespeare, repartee becomes soliloquy). But in visual art the viewpoints are more akin to depiction and mimesis. One more question. Bakhtin claims that ALL self-portraits look astonished, because the artist is surprised at the difference between just looking in a mirror and actually trying to overcome the "surplus of seeing", the intrinsic inability of every artist to get to the parts of the self that are actually visible to everybody else on a daily basis. One obvious way this happens is when the artist tries to overcome the left-right problem and portray his or herself as others actually see him or her rather than the way that she or he appears in a mirror. This must have occurred to Munch when he tried to show himself holding a cigarette in his right hand, and it kept appearing in his left. Is there any suggestion of this astonishment anywhere in the data? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies . On 27 May 2014 22:14, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hello David, > > Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. > > You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a > little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add to this > depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at all > outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a particularly > large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to this > study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when approaching > Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to ?scream? as > a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is building > off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and conversations > with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works with > photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what > expectations youth bring to these experiences. > > You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You > mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think is > really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating the > appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think both > are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? > implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the artwork - > but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic > relationship between the participants. I used the concept of depiction to > be consistent with Streeck?s framework. > > You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic > suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can elaborate > on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the impression > that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of this > article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). > > Thank you! > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg >wrote: > > > I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's intriguing > > article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which is > > also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and > > Creativity. > > > > Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover of > > our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai > > Bogdanov-Belsky. > > > > http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 > > > > The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on creativity > and > > imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" > account > > ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in JREEP > in > > 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was published > in > > "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky > Reader > > (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", > part > > of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. > > > > But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky asks--and > > answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is > > exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing vigorously. > The > > child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes disillusioned > with > > mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, at > a > > certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real > > progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up > > writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as captured > > by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write > > compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now > powerless > > and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call "imagination", is > > all that is left. > > > > I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a > > "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and > > internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to recover > a > > kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment > > from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very convincing > and > > shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a statistically > > equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying structure > > far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal artistic > > experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. > > > > But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in museums > > recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little > > depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident > > understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any > > posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good thing: > > Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. > > > > Some specific questions: > > > > a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". > > Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the basis > > of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry cultural > > meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making itself? > > > > b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor with > > Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how > children > > can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in order > > to have a metaphor you need a concept first. > > > > c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or > > deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at all? > > > > d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE stance, > > while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the > > artwork? Just a thought. > > > > I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of > Xi'an > > in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and > > invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big > > university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the art > > students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, though, > > neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to reproduce > > any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the window > > than in looking back at the exhibition. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > > wrote: > > > > > Dear XMCA, > > > > > > Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is > open > > > on the T and F website: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > > > > > Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > > > > > There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > > > relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > sense > > > is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > > > shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > > > > > More questions? > > > > > > Best - jen > > > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Wed May 28 11:16:41 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 13:16:41 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: <5369818B-A177-4BA4-817D-AF2F66EF077C@umich.edu> Message-ID: <3EE98002-9D92-4C80-A2FC-CA6416FF6FD2@umich.edu> Rolf Thanks for giving me an opportunity to think more about mimesis. Some rambling follows: Gebauer and Wulf in Memesis (around p315 there is a summary of much of what I am paraphrasing/interpreting) suggest that mimesis concerns the making [I think here about your conversation with Huw about 'discovery' and 'making'] of symbolic worlds with, for instance, gesture, Such worlds have an existence of their own; i.e. they can be understood from within in their own terms. These symbolic worlds are transformations of a prior world (the world of 'Others') into the world of 'I/we.' Mimesis is realized, in essence, as a dialogic activity (I don't think this necessarily excludes narration, but I could be wrong) taken by participants, a deed or doing. In this frame Mimetic Gesturing is one way of transforming the 'Other'; however depiction (as distinct from Mimetic Gesturing) seems another. So, perhaps (and this is complete speculation) the girls have purposively intertwined their depiction of the body of the figure in the work with its title to produce/make, in their eyes, a 'standalone' dialogical event (or symbolic world). Perhaps, the gesturing is for the self and/or friend (I mean I/we). In any case, in this framing the transformation has its roots in the object of representation and is realized in the gesture and its uptake by the recipient. So your questions below are critical. I hope this makes some sort of sense as I am still thinking about mimesis and depiction. Best Ed On May 27, 2014, at 4:24 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > Hi Ed, > Thank you for asking this because I had been reflecting some after sending the previous email and thought this topic might need more discussion. I view mimesis as one form of gestural depiction. Streeck defines Mimetic Gesturing as ?the performance of gestures to depict physical acts or behavior? (p 144 of Gesturecraft). > > I absolutely agree that posing with an artwork can be interpreted as mimesis. Where this becomes more complex (and I think interesting!) - Is when we ask what it is that is being depicted? If we use Episode 1 from the article (Figure 6 on p160) - it might be that the girls are depicting the body of the figure in the work. Another interpretation could be that they are depicting the painting itself (with the implication that they are acknowledging the intentionality of the artist in forming her own depiction). I believe that at some point in this interaction, the girls are implicitly acknowledging the intentionality of the artist because the girl on the left incorporates the title of the work (Four Artists) into her interpretation. I chose to use the term ?posing gesture? as a form of gestural depiction that is distinct from mimesis. I think that relationships between the artist, figure, artwork, and visitors are complex and that some aspect of these relationships might be lost if we interpret it only as a gesture ?depicting a physical act.? There is also the issue of who the gesture is for (the self, the friend, or both). Perhaps this contradicts my previous email a little, but thank you for asking me to reflect on it again. > > Ed - what do you think? Maybe there is a broader question here about the object of representation.. what a gesture is of? and who it is for? > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Rolf > > If you would, could you say more why you think 'depiction' rather than 'mimesis' better captures the dialogic relationship between the participants. An example from your paper would be helpful. > > Ed Wall > > On May 27, 2014, at 8:14 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > Hello David, > > > > Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. > > > > You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a > > little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add to this > > depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at all > > outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a particularly > > large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to this > > study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when approaching > > Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to ?scream? as > > a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is building > > off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and conversations > > with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works with > > photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what > > expectations youth bring to these experiences. > > > > You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You > > mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think is > > really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating the > > appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think both > > are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? > > implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the artwork - > > but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic > > relationship between the participants. I used the concept of depiction to > > be consistent with Streeck?s framework. > > > > You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic > > suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can elaborate > > on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the impression > > that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of this > > article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). > > > > Thank you! > > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's intriguing > >> article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which is > >> also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and > >> Creativity. > >> > >> Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover of > >> our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai > >> Bogdanov-Belsky. > >> > >> http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 > >> > >> The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on creativity and > >> imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" account > >> ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in JREEP in > >> 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was published in > >> "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky Reader > >> (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", part > >> of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. > >> > >> But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky asks--and > >> answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is > >> exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing vigorously. The > >> child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes disillusioned with > >> mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, at a > >> certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real > >> progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up > >> writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as captured > >> by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write > >> compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now powerless > >> and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call "imagination", is > >> all that is left. > >> > >> I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a > >> "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and > >> internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to recover a > >> kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and adjustment > >> from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very convincing and > >> shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a statistically > >> equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying structure > >> far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal artistic > >> experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. > >> > >> But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in museums > >> recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little > >> depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident > >> understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any > >> posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good thing: > >> Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. > >> > >> Some specific questions: > >> > >> a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". > >> Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the basis > >> of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry cultural > >> meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making itself? > >> > >> b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor with > >> Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how children > >> can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in order > >> to have a metaphor you need a concept first. > >> > >> c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or > >> deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at all? > >> > >> d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE stance, > >> while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the > >> artwork? Just a thought. > >> > >> I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of Xi'an > >> in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and > >> invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big > >> university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the art > >> students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, though, > >> neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to reproduce > >> any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the window > >> than in looking back at the exhibition. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> > >> On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Dear XMCA, > >>> > >>> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is open > >>> on the T and F website: > >>> > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > >>> > >>> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > >>> > >>> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is in > >>> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what sense > >>> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > >>> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > >>> > >>> More questions? > >>> > >>> Best - jen > >>> > >> > > From rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no Thu May 29 08:13:33 2014 From: rolf.steier@intermedia.uio.no (Rolf Steier) Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 17:13:33 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: <3EE98002-9D92-4C80-A2FC-CA6416FF6FD2@umich.edu> References: <5369818B-A177-4BA4-817D-AF2F66EF077C@umich.edu> <3EE98002-9D92-4C80-A2FC-CA6416FF6FD2@umich.edu> Message-ID: David and Ed, I'm going to think about this a little more but first thank you for these thoughtful responses, rolf On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 8:16 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Rolf > > Thanks for giving me an opportunity to think more about mimesis. > Some rambling follows: > > Gebauer and Wulf in Memesis (around p315 there is a summary of much > of what I am paraphrasing/interpreting) suggest that mimesis concerns the > making [I think here about your conversation with Huw about 'discovery' > and 'making'] of symbolic worlds with, for instance, gesture, Such worlds > have an existence of their own; i.e. they can be understood from within in > their own terms. These symbolic worlds are transformations of a prior world > (the world of 'Others') into the world of 'I/we.' Mimesis is realized, in > essence, as a dialogic activity (I don't think this necessarily excludes > narration, but I could be wrong) taken by participants, a deed or doing. In > this frame Mimetic Gesturing is one way of transforming the 'Other'; > however depiction (as distinct from Mimetic Gesturing) seems another. > > So, perhaps (and this is complete speculation) the girls have > purposively intertwined their depiction of the body of the figure in the > work with its title to produce/make, in their eyes, a 'standalone' > dialogical event (or symbolic world). Perhaps, the gesturing is for the > self and/or friend (I mean I/we). In any case, in this framing the > transformation has its roots in the object of representation and is > realized in the gesture and its uptake by the recipient. So your questions > below are critical. > > I hope this makes some sort of sense as I am still thinking about > mimesis and depiction. > > Best > > Ed > > On May 27, 2014, at 4:24 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > Hi Ed, > > Thank you for asking this because I had been reflecting some after > sending the previous email and thought this topic might need more > discussion. I view mimesis as one form of gestural depiction. Streeck > defines Mimetic Gesturing as ?the performance of gestures to depict > physical acts or behavior? (p 144 of Gesturecraft). > > > > I absolutely agree that posing with an artwork can be interpreted as > mimesis. Where this becomes more complex (and I think interesting!) - Is > when we ask what it is that is being depicted? If we use Episode 1 from the > article (Figure 6 on p160) - it might be that the girls are depicting the > body of the figure in the work. Another interpretation could be that they > are depicting the painting itself (with the implication that they are > acknowledging the intentionality of the artist in forming her own > depiction). I believe that at some point in this interaction, the girls are > implicitly acknowledging the intentionality of the artist because the girl > on the left incorporates the title of the work (Four Artists) into her > interpretation. I chose to use the term ?posing gesture? as a form of > gestural depiction that is distinct from mimesis. I think that > relationships between the artist, figure, artwork, and visitors are complex > and that some aspect of these relationships might be lost if we interpret > it only as a gesture ?depicting a physical act.? There is also the issue of > who the gesture is for (the self, the friend, or both). Perhaps this > contradicts my previous email a little, but thank you for asking me to > reflect on it again. > > > > Ed - what do you think? Maybe there is a broader question here about the > object of representation.. what a gesture is of? and who it is for? > > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > Rolf > > > > If you would, could you say more why you think 'depiction' rather > than 'mimesis' better captures the dialogic relationship between the > participants. An example from your paper would be helpful. > > > > Ed Wall > > > > On May 27, 2014, at 8:14 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > > > Hello David, > > > > > > Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. > > > > > > You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a > > > little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add to > this > > > depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at > all > > > outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a > particularly > > > large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to > this > > > study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when > approaching > > > Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to > ?scream? as > > > a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is > building > > > off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and > conversations > > > with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works with > > > photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what > > > expectations youth bring to these experiences. > > > > > > You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You > > > mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think is > > > really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating the > > > appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think > both > > > are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? > > > implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the > artwork - > > > but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic > > > relationship between the participants. I used the concept of depiction > to > > > be consistent with Streeck?s framework. > > > > > > You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic > > > suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can > elaborate > > > on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the > impression > > > that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of this > > > article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). > > > > > > Thank you! > > > > > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg >wrote: > > > > > >> I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's > intriguing > > >> article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book which > is > > >> also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and > > >> Creativity. > > >> > > >> Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the cover > of > > >> our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai > > >> Bogdanov-Belsky. > > >> > > >> http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 > > >> > > >> The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on > creativity and > > >> imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" > account > > >> ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in > JREEP in > > >> 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was > published in > > >> "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky > Reader > > >> (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in Childhood", > part > > >> of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. > > >> > > >> But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky > asks--and > > >> answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is > > >> exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing > vigorously. The > > >> child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes > disillusioned with > > >> mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. Then, > at a > > >> certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making real > > >> progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up > > >> writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as > captured > > >> by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to write > > >> compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now > powerless > > >> and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call > "imagination", is > > >> all that is left. > > >> > > >> I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as a > > >> "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and > > >> internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to > recover a > > >> kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and > adjustment > > >> from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very > convincing and > > >> shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a > statistically > > >> equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying > structure > > >> far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal > artistic > > >> experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. > > >> > > >> But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in > museums > > >> recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little > > >> depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident > > >> understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even any > > >> posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good > thing: > > >> Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. > > >> > > >> Some specific questions: > > >> > > >> a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the word". > > >> Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the > basis > > >> of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry > cultural > > >> meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making > itself? > > >> > > >> b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor > with > > >> Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how > children > > >> can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in > order > > >> to have a metaphor you need a concept first. > > >> > > >> c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic or > > >> deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at > all? > > >> > > >> d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE > stance, > > >> while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the > > >> artwork? Just a thought. > > >> > > >> I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of > Xi'an > > >> in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit and > > >> invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big > > >> university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the > art > > >> students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, > though, > > >> neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to > reproduce > > >> any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the > window > > >> than in looking back at the exhibition. > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> Dear XMCA, > > >>> > > >>> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" is > open > > >>> on the T and F website: > > >>> > > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > >>> > > >>> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > >>> > > >>> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind is > in > > >>> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > sense > > >>> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is learning > > >>> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > >>> > > >>> More questions? > > >>> > > >>> Best - jen > > >>> > > >> > > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Thu May 29 13:08:56 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 20:08:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative Message-ID: <3d5815f1543e4921867d7d67b7800aa7@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> http://fyi.coe.uga.edu/2014/05/29/deadline-may-30th-call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative/ From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Thu May 29 20:49:45 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 23:49:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Shannon and Everyone, Speaking of imagination, *Our extended academic family suffered a tremendous loss today with the passing of Maxine Greene after a final bout with pneumonia. She was 96 and worked right up until the end, serving on a dissertation committee just a few weeks ago. Here is a little about her life.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxine_Greene * On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 12:02 AM, Shannon Brincat < shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > Dear all, > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and imagination. > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of looking > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination > is > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > cognition. > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be great. > > Once again, thanks! > > Shannon > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work of > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. After > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, Husserl?s > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are routinely > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we contend > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a link > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive social > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > link > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings of > a > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > this > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > Griffith University Research Fellow > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > School > of Government and International Relations > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | Brisbane > | > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > New edited series available through Praeger > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri May 30 08:35:13 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 08:35:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A question on Vygotsky and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks very much for bringing the life and work of Maxine Greene to the group, Robert. I knew about her published work, but not about the foundation, which is a fascinating idea. mike On Thu, May 29, 2014 at 8:49 PM, Robert Lake wrote: > Hi Shannon and Everyone, > Speaking of imagination, > *Our extended academic family suffered a tremendous loss today with the > passing of Maxine Greene after a final bout with pneumonia. She was 96 and > worked right up until the end, serving on a dissertation committee just a > few weeks ago. Here is a little about her > life.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxine_Greene > * > > > On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 12:02 AM, Shannon Brincat < > shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au> wrote: > > > Dear all, > > > > I am new to this list ? so thanks for your time. > > > > Presently, I am trying to write up an article on Vygotsky and > imagination. > > Essentially, my interest is to draw attention to a different way of > looking > > at, and deploying imagination in politics, and one that emphases its > > creative potential. In my field, International Relations (IR) imagination > > is > > just ignored as something fanciful rather than intrinsic to human > > cognition. > > > > I have pasted the abstract below. Any advice on secondary literature, or > > even key aspects of Vygotsky?s work that you deem relevant, would be > great. > > > > Once again, thanks! > > > > Shannon > > > > > > This article seeks to demonstrate the political significance of > > imagination and to reclaim this cognitive faculty as something intrinsic > > to political life ins world politics. We focus on the psychological work > of > > Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) who, we argue, offers a > > reconceptualisation of the faculty of imagination as a key part of human > > cognitive development and as something central to creative activity. > After > > engaging with the limitations in Kant?s productive imagination, Husserl?s > > phenomenological imagination, and Freud?s irrational understanding of > > imagination, we emphasise three elements of Vygotsky?s analysis that > > demonstrate the significance of imagination to politics that are > routinely > > denied in mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR). These > > include how the faculty of imagination is developmental, interpenetrated > > with reality, and dependent on social-history and culture. While we > contend > > that Vygotsky offers significant advances in how we can conceive and > > approach the faculty of imagination in political thought, in the closing > > section we identify three weaknesses. Firstly, while Vygotsky offers a > link > > between imagination and practice, and was concerned with progressive > social > > development, it offers only a weakly developed account of imagination?s > > link > > to political praxis. Secondly, Vygotsky?s account tells Us only of the > > positively productive elements of imagination but he did not turn his > > attention to the ?arkside of imagination regarding the politics of fear, > > ?thering, and hate. Thirdly, Vygotsky provides only a thin account of the > > intersubjective processes of imagination and offers only the beginnings > of > > a > > theory that could embed imagination within social-relations. We close by > > advancing a heuristic of imagination that can help us better understand > > this > > complex faculty of imagination and its relation to politics. > > > > Dr. Shannon K. Brincat > > Griffith University Research Fellow > > Room -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy | > > School > > of Government and International Relations > > Nathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | > Brisbane > > | > > Queensland | 4111 | Australia > > > > Global Discourse, Co-Editor > > http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM > > > > New edited series available through Praeger > > Communism in the 21st Century (3 Vols.) > > http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 > > > > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri May 30 09:42:35 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 16:42:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Where bureaucrats feast Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F901083C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Just an interesting discovery maybe some people might be interested in. I have been doing some research on Vannevar Bush who it seems was one of the most extraordinary people of the 2oth century - and yet I had never heard of him until a few years ago - funny that. It was Bush who more or less envisioned the information age and the Internet in a short, very public article in 1945 called "As We May Think." What I just found out is that Bush - who was chief engineer for the allies during WW II also was instrumental in developing our current university research system including the NSF (and I guess by extension the NIH). Bush wanted research to be funded separately from commercial interests because he believed really worthwhile research as associative, where researchers followed ideas wherever those ideas took them. There should be no absolute end point because that would destroy innovation. Innovation is in large part serendipitous, allowing human thinking to take ideas where they may go. I think today how projects are funded with specific outcomes and intense methodological sections showing how you are going to get there, tightly controlled, with not an inch left for the odd left turn. More and more emphasis on a preordained bottom line (so of course there is not innovation). It made me think, that bureaucrats feast in vineyards planted by visionaries. For what it's worth. Michael From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Fri May 30 09:50:10 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 12:50:10 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Where bureaucrats feast In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F901083C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F901083C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: I love this line Michael . *"**It made me think, that bureaucrats feast in vineyards planted by visionaries.*" You might consider writing a piece for the *Chronicle of Higher Ed*. on Bush with this in the title. RL On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 12:42 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Just an interesting discovery maybe some people might be interested in. I > have been doing some research on Vannevar Bush who it seems was one of the > most extraordinary people of the 2oth century - and yet I had never heard > of him until a few years ago - funny that. > > It was Bush who more or less envisioned the information age and the > Internet in a short, very public article in 1945 called "As We May Think." > What I just found out is that Bush - who was chief engineer for the allies > during WW II also was instrumental in developing our current university > research system including the NSF (and I guess by extension the NIH). Bush > wanted research to be funded separately from commercial interests because > he believed really worthwhile research as associative, where researchers > followed ideas wherever those ideas took them. There should be no absolute > end point because that would destroy innovation. Innovation is in large > part serendipitous, allowing human thinking to take ideas where they may go. > > I think today how projects are funded with specific outcomes and intense > methodological sections showing how you are going to get there, tightly > controlled, with not an inch left for the odd left turn. More and more > emphasis on a preordained bottom line (so of course there is not > innovation). > > It made me think, that bureaucrats feast in vineyards planted by > visionaries. > > For what it's worth. > > Michael > > From geraldine.mcdonald@clear.net.nz Fri May 30 13:49:06 2014 From: geraldine.mcdonald@clear.net.nz (geraldine.mcdonald) Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 08:49:06 +1200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Maxine Greene Message-ID: <5388eec2.28a.4c37.29778@clear.net.nz> I have never forgotten walking along a corridor at Teachers College one evening many years ago and passing an open door. The room was packed and Maxine Greene was lecturing. The members of her class were transfixed. Some time later Maxine came to New Zealand. She had exactly the same effect on audiences here. She was someone who helped others if she felt they would further the cause of the arts in education. Maxine may no longer be with us but she lives on in her philosphical writing and her passion for the arts. Farewell Maxine. Geraldine McDonald From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri May 30 14:56:46 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 06:56:46 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: discussing "Posing the question" In-Reply-To: References: <5369818B-A177-4BA4-817D-AF2F66EF077C@umich.edu> <3EE98002-9D92-4C80-A2FC-CA6416FF6FD2@umich.edu> Message-ID: Rolf asked me to elaborate a little on why I think that treating gestures as iconic or deictic circumvents the ideal content of an artwork. I am assuming that a deictic is a pointing gesture; for example, standing in front of a Munch painting and pointing to it, so as to direct the attention of the viewer to the painting and away from myself. I am also assuming that "icon" means what it means in the work of C.S. Peirce; that is, a kind of firstness, a presentation of the art object as mere object and not as a signifier pointing to some other meaning for some other person. I realize that in the work of David McNeill it means something slightly different, something closer to an icon on the desktop of my computer. It means that a gesture has meaning because of some physical similarity to an actual action, as when I lift my hands to indicate standing up, or I reach with my hands to indicate reaching, or when when I portray a wolf by using a shadow puppet of my hand with a prehensile pinkie as its jaw and my thumb as its ear. But McNeill is using the term "iconic" to contrast such gestures with "beats" (which really just have a textual function, ordering the stresses of what I say) on the one hand, and with "metaphorics" (which have a more symbolic relationship to meaning, as when I "give" you a box to suggest defining a particular subject). I have always read this as a kind of cline, going from "beats" which have very little ideal content (they really do order stresses in speech, according to my data anyway) to metaphorics, which are essentially symbols (there isn't really any "up" in "thumbs up"). It seems to me that in both iconic posing and deictic posing the emphasis is on the artwork as object, the way that, for example, it might be listed in the catalogue of an auction house rather than the way it is displayed in a museum. In both cases the object is a physical object, in more or less good condition, something that can be owned or sold, pointed to or imitated, but which does not have to be interpreted or even appreciated. It's in that sense that I think that pointing and reproducing an art work does not necessarily include its ideal value and may even exclude it. Of course, I realize that the distinction I'm making is a relative one, but so is the distinction between a child who is scribbling and coloring (that is, repeating an action for the sake of the action itself) and a child who is doodling or drawing (that is, allowing signs and even symbols to arise in his or her artwork). A relative distinction is still real. In an earlier thread, Andy argued that intellect was the most finished form of human consciousness, despite the fact that it is monologic. Of course, in a sense, he is right, but I think it is in a rather tautological sense: it is only in a monologic form that (one) human consciousness can be said to be finished (in death). I prefer to think that Kozulin's distinction between consciousness and intellect means two different poles inherent in all communication, e.g. from the more narrativistic (but still dialogic) mode of writing to the more dialogical (but nevertheless narrativistic) mode of speaking. In that sense, the iconic and deictic treatment of an artwork is more or less an acknowledgement of its existence as an object but a refusal of existence as an act of human communication, while, say, a more parodistic treatment at least acknowledges the intention to communicate on the part of the artist and the very best of Rolf's data does indeed show the museum viewer interrogating and obtaining a dialogic response from Munch the man. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 30 May 2014 00:13, Rolf Steier wrote: > David and Ed, I'm going to think about this a little more but first thank > you for these thoughtful responses, > rolf > > > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 8:16 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Rolf > > > > Thanks for giving me an opportunity to think more about mimesis. > > Some rambling follows: > > > > Gebauer and Wulf in Memesis (around p315 there is a summary of much > > of what I am paraphrasing/interpreting) suggest that mimesis concerns the > > making [I think here about your conversation with Huw about 'discovery' > > and 'making'] of symbolic worlds with, for instance, gesture, Such worlds > > have an existence of their own; i.e. they can be understood from within > in > > their own terms. These symbolic worlds are transformations of a prior > world > > (the world of 'Others') into the world of 'I/we.' Mimesis is realized, > in > > essence, as a dialogic activity (I don't think this necessarily excludes > > narration, but I could be wrong) taken by participants, a deed or doing. > In > > this frame Mimetic Gesturing is one way of transforming the 'Other'; > > however depiction (as distinct from Mimetic Gesturing) seems another. > > > > So, perhaps (and this is complete speculation) the girls have > > purposively intertwined their depiction of the body of the figure in the > > work with its title to produce/make, in their eyes, a 'standalone' > > dialogical event (or symbolic world). Perhaps, the gesturing is for the > > self and/or friend (I mean I/we). In any case, in this framing the > > transformation has its roots in the object of representation and is > > realized in the gesture and its uptake by the recipient. So your > questions > > below are critical. > > > > I hope this makes some sort of sense as I am still thinking about > > mimesis and depiction. > > > > Best > > > > Ed > > > > On May 27, 2014, at 4:24 PM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > > > Hi Ed, > > > Thank you for asking this because I had been reflecting some after > > sending the previous email and thought this topic might need more > > discussion. I view mimesis as one form of gestural depiction. Streeck > > defines Mimetic Gesturing as ?the performance of gestures to depict > > physical acts or behavior? (p 144 of Gesturecraft). > > > > > > I absolutely agree that posing with an artwork can be interpreted as > > mimesis. Where this becomes more complex (and I think interesting!) - Is > > when we ask what it is that is being depicted? If we use Episode 1 from > the > > article (Figure 6 on p160) - it might be that the girls are depicting the > > body of the figure in the work. Another interpretation could be that they > > are depicting the painting itself (with the implication that they are > > acknowledging the intentionality of the artist in forming her own > > depiction). I believe that at some point in this interaction, the girls > are > > implicitly acknowledging the intentionality of the artist because the > girl > > on the left incorporates the title of the work (Four Artists) into her > > interpretation. I chose to use the term ?posing gesture? as a form of > > gestural depiction that is distinct from mimesis. I think that > > relationships between the artist, figure, artwork, and visitors are > complex > > and that some aspect of these relationships might be lost if we interpret > > it only as a gesture ?depicting a physical act.? There is also the issue > of > > who the gesture is for (the self, the friend, or both). Perhaps this > > contradicts my previous email a little, but thank you for asking me to > > reflect on it again. > > > > > > Ed - what do you think? Maybe there is a broader question here about > the > > object of representation.. what a gesture is of? and who it is for? > > > > > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Rolf > > > > > > If you would, could you say more why you think 'depiction' rather > > than 'mimesis' better captures the dialogic relationship between the > > participants. An example from your paper would be helpful. > > > > > > Ed Wall > > > > > > On May 27, 2014, at 8:14 AM, Rolf Steier wrote: > > > > > > > Hello David, > > > > > > > > Thank you for your comments and for sharing your book as well. > > > > > > > > You noted that you found the idea of young people posing for Flickr a > > > > little depressing - and I can certainly understand this. Not to add > to > > this > > > > depression, but remember that few young people even visit museums at > > all > > > > outside of school visits! I don?t think that ?flickr? was a > > particularly > > > > large motivator in the end. The most surprising finding that led to > > this > > > > study was that visitors ?pose? naturally. Many many people when > > approaching > > > > Munch?s ?The Scream? would bring their hands to their faces to > > ?scream? as > > > > a part of normal museum practice. I think the exciting thing is > > building > > > > off of this natural tendency to create richer engagements and > > conversations > > > > with and about the art- Not to replace interactions with the works > with > > > > photo taking activities. Although it is also interesting to see what > > > > expectations youth bring to these experiences. > > > > > > > > You also provided a few questions that I wanted to follow up on. You > > > > mention a distinction between ?mimesis? and ?depiction? that I think > is > > > > really interesting. I actually spent a great deal of time debating > the > > > > appropriate concept to use to describe these activities and I think > > both > > > > are appropriate and share subtle distinctions. I agree that ?mimesis? > > > > implies a dialogic relationship between the participant and the > > artwork - > > > > but I would also argue that ?depiction? better captures the dialogic > > > > relationship between the participants. I used the concept of > depiction > > to > > > > be consistent with Streeck?s framework. > > > > > > > > You also mention that assuming gestures are either iconic or deictic > > > > suggests that artwork does not have ideal content? Maybe you can > > elaborate > > > > on what you mean by ideal content? I hope that I didn?t give the > > impression > > > > that I feel visitor gestures are limited to these types (A goal of > this > > > > article was to introduce posing as a unique gestural activity). > > > > > > > > Thank you! > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 12:18 AM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > >wrote: > > > > > > > >> I think I'd like to try to tie the discussion of Rolf Steier's > > intriguing > > > >> article to a book we published in January here in Korea, a book > which > > is > > > >> also related to the discussion of Vygotsky, the Imagination, and > > > >> Creativity. > > > >> > > > >> Since we are discussing posing and artworks, let me provide the > cover > > of > > > >> our book, a painting by the Russian children's portraitist Nikolai > > > >> Bogdanov-Belsky. > > > >> > > > >> http://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ISBN=8994445536 > > > >> > > > >> The book contains three very different works by Vygotsky on > > creativity and > > > >> imagination, which we translated into Korean: his "popular science" > > account > > > >> ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child", which was published in > > JREEP in > > > >> 2004), "Imagination and Creativity in Adolescence", which was > > published in > > > >> "Pedology of the Adolescent" and which can be found in the Vygotsky > > Reader > > > >> (Blackwell, 1994) and "Imagination and its Development in > Childhood", > > part > > > >> of which appears in Volume One of the English Collected Works. > > > >> > > > >> But the cover painting really says it all in gesture: Vygotsky > > asks--and > > > >> answers--the question of why one form of creativity after another is > > > >> exhausted, when the child's imagination is still developing > > vigorously. The > > > >> child poses. Then, at a certain point, the child becomes > > disillusioned with > > > >> mere posing and becomes interested in drawing. The child draws. > Then, > > at a > > > >> certain point (usually right when the child appears to be making > real > > > >> progress), the child becomes disillusioned with drawing and takes up > > > >> writing. The child writes. Then, at a certain point (usually, as > > captured > > > >> by Bogdanov-Belsky, right when the child begins to learn how to > write > > > >> compositions in school) the child becomes disillusioned. The now > > powerless > > > >> and disillusioned daydream, which we extravagantly call > > "imagination", is > > > >> all that is left. > > > >> > > > >> I liked the article. I loved the idea that recreating a painting as > a > > > >> "tableau vivant" includes both an external plane (dialogue) and and > > > >> internal one (narrative). I thought the ability of the author to > > recover a > > > >> kind of underlying structure of pose, comparison, focus, and > > adjustment > > > >> from the careful analysis of two incidents was actually very > > convincing and > > > >> shows the power of a theoretically informed analysis over a > > statistically > > > >> equipped but merely empirical one. I also find this underlying > > structure > > > >> far more helpful than the usual vague talk about extra-corporeal > > artistic > > > >> experience and reflection that we get, even in the work of Bakhtin. > > > >> > > > >> But I confess, I found the idea that children spend their days in > > museums > > > >> recreating paintings with their bodies for a Flickr account a little > > > >> depressing. I wonder if there is any evidence that the evident > > > >> understanding that emerges leads to any actual creativity or even > any > > > >> posing outside the museum. Perhaps, if it doesn't, that is a good > > thing: > > > >> Munch, in addition to being a smoker, was a notorious depressive. > > > >> > > > >> Some specific questions: > > > >> > > > >> a) On p. 149, the author says that "meaning is embedded in the > word". > > > >> Doesn't this imply a conduit metaphor? Isn't it more likely--on the > > basis > > > >> of the author's own argument--that the way in which words carry > > cultural > > > >> meaning is by forcing the hearer to re-enact the meaning making > > itself? > > > >> > > > >> b) On p. 151, the author appears to confuse the concept of metaphor > > with > > > >> Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor". Also, I can't see how > > children > > > >> can develop concepts from metaphors, because it seems to me that in > > order > > > >> to have a metaphor you need a concept first. > > > >> > > > >> c) On p. 152: if we assume that visitor gestures are either iconic > or > > > >> deictic, doesn't that suggest that artwork has no ideal content at > > all? > > > >> > > > >> d) On p. 152, the bottom: isn't "depiction" more of a NARRATIVE > > stance, > > > >> while mimesis is a more DIALOGIC one because it places us inside the > > > >> artwork? Just a thought. > > > >> > > > >> I remember taking part in an art exhibition in my wife's hometown of > > Xi'an > > > >> in China twenty years ago where we left a huge canvas by the exit > and > > > >> invited all the viewers to try to paint something. It was at a big > > > >> university and some of engineering students tried gamely, until the > > art > > > >> students came along and painted everything black. Interestingly, > > though, > > > >> neither the engineering students nor the art students tried to > > reproduce > > > >> any of the artworks--they were more interested in looking out the > > window > > > >> than in looking back at the exhibition. > > > >> > > > >> David Kellogg > > > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On 23 May 2014 01:09, Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer > > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Dear XMCA, > > > >>> > > > >>> Rolf Steier is now on XMCA, and his article "Posing the question" > is > > open > > > >>> on the T and F website: > > > >>> > > > >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/.U3zs4Sjsq24 > > > >>> > > > >>> Just click on the green button to the right side of the article. > > > >>> > > > >>> There is loads to talk about, and one question that comes to mind > is > > in > > > >>> relation to the museum installation as a design experiment. In what > > sense > > > >>> is it a design experiment? What does it make visible? How is > learning > > > >>> shaped by access to this experience in a museum? > > > >>> > > > >>> More questions? > > > >>> > > > >>> Best - jen > > > >>> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri May 30 19:56:21 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 19:56:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maxine Greene In-Reply-To: <5388eec2.28a.4c37.29778@clear.net.nz> References: <5388eec2.28a.4c37.29778@clear.net.nz> Message-ID: And in the memories and practices of others who help others if they feel that they woul further the cause of arts in education. Mike On Friday, May 30, 2014, geraldine.mcdonald wrote: > I have never forgotten walking along a corridor at Teachers > College one evening many years ago and passing an open door. > The room was packed and Maxine Greene was lecturing. The > members of her class were transfixed. Some time later Maxine > came to New Zealand. She had exactly the same effect on > audiences here. She was someone who helped others if she > felt they would > further the cause of the arts in education. > Maxine may no longer be with us but she lives on in her > philosphical writing and her passion for the arts. > Farewell Maxine. > Geraldine McDonald > From ellampert@gmail.com Sat May 31 06:14:52 2014 From: ellampert@gmail.com (Elina Lampert-Shepel) Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 09:14:52 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maxine Greene In-Reply-To: References: <5388eec2.28a.4c37.29778@clear.net.nz> Message-ID: Maxine knew how to inspire, I will be eternally thankful for the richness of spirit and dialectics of freedom she introduced us to as doctoral students at Teachers College. Farewell, Maxine. On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 10:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > And in the memories and practices of others who help others if they feel > that they woul further the cause of arts in education. > Mike > > On Friday, May 30, 2014, geraldine.mcdonald < > geraldine.mcdonald@clear.net.nz> > wrote: > > > I have never forgotten walking along a corridor at Teachers > > College one evening many years ago and passing an open door. > > The room was packed and Maxine Greene was lecturing. The > > members of her class were transfixed. Some time later Maxine > > came to New Zealand. She had exactly the same effect on > > audiences here. She was someone who helped others if she > > felt they would > > further the cause of the arts in education. > > Maxine may no longer be with us but she lives on in her > > philosphical writing and her passion for the arts. > > Farewell Maxine. > > Geraldine McDonald > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sat May 31 09:42:48 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 11:42:48 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maxine Greene In-Reply-To: References: <5388eec2.28a.4c37.29778@clear.net.nz> Message-ID: <27BE54EF-CF7C-498A-95CA-A17E7F8D8721@umich.edu> I was invited, a few years ago, to take part in a small reading group that met at intervals in her apartment overlooking Central Park. The incisiveness and graciousness of her intellect was more than notable. I will miss and remember such times. On May 31, 2014, at 8:14 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel wrote: > Maxine knew how to inspire, I will be eternally thankful for the richness > of spirit and dialectics of freedom she introduced us to as doctoral > students at Teachers College. Farewell, Maxine. > > > On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 10:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> And in the memories and practices of others who help others if they feel >> that they woul further the cause of arts in education. >> Mike >> >> On Friday, May 30, 2014, geraldine.mcdonald < >> geraldine.mcdonald@clear.net.nz> >> wrote: >> >>> I have never forgotten walking along a corridor at Teachers >>> College one evening many years ago and passing an open door. >>> The room was packed and Maxine Greene was lecturing. The >>> members of her class were transfixed. Some time later Maxine >>> came to New Zealand. She had exactly the same effect on >>> audiences here. She was someone who helped others if she >>> felt they would >>> further the cause of the arts in education. >>> Maxine may no longer be with us but she lives on in her >>> philosphical writing and her passion for the arts. >>> Farewell Maxine. >>> Geraldine McDonald >>> >> From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Sat May 31 14:47:24 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 16:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative In-Reply-To: <3d5815f1543e4921867d7d67b7800aa7@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <3d5815f1543e4921867d7d67b7800aa7@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Peter, Since the call for papers was only posted on May 29th, can the deadline for proposals be extended beyond May 30th. I can submit a proposal for may my paper on Creativity and Cultural Synergy in just a couple days. Thanks - Francine > From: smago@uga.edu > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; NCRLL@LISTSERV.SYR.EDU > Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 20:08:56 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative > > http://fyi.coe.uga.edu/2014/05/29/deadline-may-30th-call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative/ From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Sat May 31 19:53:41 2014 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (valerie A. Wilkinson) Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2014 11:53:41 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative In-Reply-To: References: <3d5815f1543e4921867d7d67b7800aa7@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <000f01cf7d44$b2b26e80$18174b80$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Peter, I have the same question as Francine's below. I didn't think I could ask it! But once the wheels start turning ... Valerie -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of larry smolucha Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 6:47 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative Peter, Since the call for papers was only posted on May 29th, can the deadline for proposals be extended beyond May 30th. I can submit a proposal for may my paper on Creativity and Cultural Synergy in just a couple days. Thanks - Francine > From: smago@uga.edu > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; NCRLL@LISTSERV.SYR.EDU > Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 20:08:56 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] > call-for-papers-international-creativity-collaborative > > http://fyi.coe.uga.edu/2014/05/29/deadline-may-30th-call-for-papers-in > ternational-creativity-collaborative/