[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors

[Larry Purss]

Horizontal development AS practices.
What KIND of practices?
Practices that develop "within"
Pracices which develop "across"

These metaphorical words [within, across, and also "between"] CARRY us as
performances which are form[ing] and formative.
Where?
In situated specific practices.
THIS adds to the vertical dimension

On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 10:55 AM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> Message from Francine:
>
> This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed.
> And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon
> like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb
> like wintering in
> Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional
> phrase,
> perhaps adverb  (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can
> function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent
> sentence-
> but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.'
>
> > From: hshonerd@gmail.com
> > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700
> > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >
> > I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations
> capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as
> things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations.
> > Henry
> >
> > > On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > Message from Francine:
> > >
> > > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result
> > > of developing a written language based on an alphabet?
> > >
> > > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ
> > > significantly.
> > >
> > > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform,
> > > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience
> > > differently.
> > >
> > >
> > >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
> > >> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500
> > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> > >>
> > >> Hi Everyone,
> > >> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on  the relativistic character of
> > >> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion
> of
> > >> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and
> > >> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological
> > >> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse
> ways,
> > >> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of
> > >> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example  of early 20th
> century
> > >> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the
> present
> > >> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought .
> > >>
> > >> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from
> north
> > >> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or
> behind to
> > >> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even
> when
> > >> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say “move a
> bit
> > >> to the east.” To tell you where exactly they left something in your
> house,
> > >> they’ll say, “I left it on the southern edge of the western table.”
> (Deutscher,
> > >> 2010, p. MM 42)
> > >>
> > >> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting
> the
> > >> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree
> that
> > >> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr
> includes
> > >> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise
> hand
> > >> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition
> > >> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the
> > >> compass.  Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that
> memory
> > >> is stored for the speakers of this language.  The story also serves
> as a
> > >> clear example of Vygotsky’s notion of language as a mediating tool as
> a
> > >> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial
> > >> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story
> of how
> > >> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older
> person
> > >> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped
> into
> > >> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to
> > >> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more
> concerned at
> > >> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart
> from
> > >> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that
> it was
> > >> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into
> the
> > >> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of
> the
> > >> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the
> cardinal
> > >> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance,
> the
> > >> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The
> > >> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more
> > >> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the
> story.
> > >> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was
> gestured in
> > >> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the
> speaker
> > >> was facing in the two films (ibid).
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> *Robert*
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you
> think? *The
> > >> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
> > >>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
> > >>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who
> now
> > >>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
> > >>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
> > >>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
> > >>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language
> there
> > >>> has to be some change in the nature of communication.
> > >>>
> > >>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in
> Hopi
> > >>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific
> writings of
> > >>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
> > >>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like
> "bounce
> > >>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
> > >>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make
> scientific
> > >>> English possible?
> > >>>
> > >>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the
> laws of
> > >>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he
> really
> > >>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation".
> Gravity
> > >>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but
> rather
> > >>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps,
> again!). So
> > >>> how and above all why does it become an entity?
> > >>>
> > >>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with
> Chaucer's on
> > >>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize
> almost
> > >>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the
> dark
> > >>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I
> did this;
> > >>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
> > >>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's
> lectures
> > >>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some
> trouble
> > >>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard
> to
> > >>> write his conclusion in the form of a law).
> > >>>
> > >>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
> > >>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens
> yields
> > >>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light
> from the
> > >>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
> > >>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of
> the
> > >>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally
> be
> > >>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun,
> creating
> > >>> an imaginary entity.
> > >>>
> > >>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically"
> realized by a
> > >>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or
> something
> > >>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally
> ("redden"). We
> > >>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the
> rules.
> > >>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through
> ignorance",
> > >>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
> > >>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental
> function is
> > >>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of
> grammatical
> > >>> metaphor.
> > >>>
> > >>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
> hypothesis
> > >>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their
> homework
> > >>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which
> "do" to
> > >>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially
> > >>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do
> students
> > >>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a
> process of
> > >>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for
> > >>> exchanges:
> > >>>
> > >>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
> > >>> Child: No.
> > >>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
> > >>> Child: No.
> > >>> Mother: You didn't do well?
> > >>> Child: No.
> > >>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the
> other
> > >>> students do well?
> > >>> Child: Some of them.
> > >>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do
> well?
> > >>>
> > >>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have
> two
> > >>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental
> function
> > >>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental
> function
> > >>> (discourse).
> > >>>
> > >>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and
> abstract and
> > >>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical
> kind.
> > >>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful
> and
> > >>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical
> metaphor
> > >>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world,
> while the
> > >>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I
> must
> > >>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> , or "the
> > >>>
> > >>> . He
> > >>>
> > >>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > >>> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>> Helena and David,
> > >>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the
> so-called
> > >>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred
> tradition to
> > >>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi
> notion of
> > >>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English)
> notion
> > >>> of
> > >>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances
> of
> > >>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding,
> English
> > >>> has
> > >>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I
> think the
> > >>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that
> first
> > >>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination").
> > >>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
> > >>>> -greg
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Taken from:
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>
> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html
> > >>>>
> > >>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset"
> are
> > >>> with
> > >>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other
> nouns.
> > >>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in
> winter"
> > >>> just
> > >>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and
> > >>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our
> thought
> > >>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without
> > >>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time,
> i.e.
> > >>> of
> > >>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic
> phase
> > >>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration.
> Only by
> > >>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and
> another in
> > >>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration.
> "But
> > >>> such
> > >>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic
> > >>> phasing.
> > >>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
> > >>> "phasing."
> > >>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting
> binomial
> > >>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is
> implicit for
> > >>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like
> "substance,
> > >>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously
> wide
> > >>> range
> > >>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take
> in our
> > >>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item,
> "time."
> > >>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in
> the
> > >>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in
> the
> > >>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say
> and
> > >>> think
> > >>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again
> point
> > >>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a
> piece of
> > >>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually
> > >>> contains
> > >>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time."
> > >>>>
> > >>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are
> not
> > >>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They
> are a
> > >>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs,
> and even
> > >>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative
> > >>> pattern,
> > >>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like
> one
> > >>> of
> > >>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or
> "while
> > >>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as
> subjects
> > >>> or
> > >>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer"
> or
> > >>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions
> are
> > >>> hot,
> > >>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now"
> or
> > >>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an
> extent, a
> > >>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested
> about
> > >>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no
> basis
> > >>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen <
> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> > >>>>
> > >>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
> > >>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
> create
> > >>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> productive,
> > >>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
> > >>> thinking
> > >>>>> today."
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you
> when
> > >>>> you
> > >>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Thank you,
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Helena
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Helena Worthen
> > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end
> of
> > >>>> what
> > >>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
> Halliday
> > >>>> calls
> > >>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
> > >>> three
> > >>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
> > >>>>> actually,
> > >>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
> > >>> name
> > >>>>> or a
> > >>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
> > >>> field
> > >>>>> (the
> > >>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
> > >>>> linguistics)
> > >>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
> > >>>> effect,
> > >>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the
> "in"
> > >>>> has
> > >>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly
> in
> > >>>> your
> > >>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's
> hands,
> > >>>>> refer
> > >>>>>> to a book or even a footnote.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
> > >>> much
> > >>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least
> as I
> > >>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions
> > >>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed
> set
> > >>> of
> > >>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill
> > >>> specific
> > >>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications.
> > >>>>> Learning
> > >>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
> > >>> while
> > >>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget
> it
> > >>>> just
> > >>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue
> that
> > >>>>> people
> > >>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp,
> concrete,
> > >>> and
> > >>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that
> > >>>> Newton
> > >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
> create
> > >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> > >>> productive,
> > >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
> > >>>> thinking
> > >>>>>> today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the
> > >>>> third
> > >>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother
> tongue
> > >>>> and
> > >>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work).
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
> > >>> zero
> > >>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line',
> 'on
> > >>> a
> > >>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are
> > >>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time:
> > >>> 'at
> > >>>> a
> > >>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
> > >>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and
> "in
> > >>>>>> Christmas' (season).
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> David Kellogg
> > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen <
> > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> > >>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
> > >>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the
> conceptual
> > >>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and
> > >>>>> between 70
> > >>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far
> as" --
> > >>>>> this
> > >>>>>>> is according to
> > >>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
> > >>>> ).
> > >>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently,
> in
> > >>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in
> > >>>> parent
> > >>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection
> like
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships
> > >>>>> suggested
> > >>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> Helena Worthen
> > >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
> > >>>> embodied,
> > >>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
> > >>> linguistics
> > >>>>> (For
> > >>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
> > >>>> “lexicon”:
> > >>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
> > >>> being
> > >>>>> part
> > >>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and
> Halliday
> > >>>>> see no
> > >>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
> > >>> lexico-grammar.
> > >>>>> (Lo
> > >>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
> > >>> adding
> > >>>>> the
> > >>>>>>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are
> > >>>> great
> > >>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of
> that?
> > >>> In
> > >>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
> > >>>>>>>> Henry
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > >>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
> > >>>> metaphorical
> > >>>>>>> use of prepositions like:
> > >>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> > >>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> > >>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> > >>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> and so on.
> > >>>>>>>>> Andy
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
> > >>>>> possibilities:
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in
> > >>>>> Thought
> > >>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
> > >>>> English
> > >>>>>>> 1962]
> > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the
> 'additive'
> > >>>> value
> > >>>>>>> of the
> > >>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
> > >>>>> vocalization).
> > >>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that
> > >>> are
> > >>>>>>> flammable
> > >>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable
> nor a
> > >>>> gas.
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
> European
> > >>>>>>> Developmental
> > >>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
> > >>> hence
> > >>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
> > >>>> Piaget's
> > >>>>>>> Genetic
> > >>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and
> synthesis
> > >>>>>>> based on
> > >>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
> Vygotsky's
> > >>>>>>> example of H2O.
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> > >>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
> > >>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the
> > >>> parts.
> > >>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more
> than
> > >>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can
> ever
> > >>>> be
> > >>>>>>> imagined"
> > >>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination
> as
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>>> brain has
> > >>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
> simplest
> > >>>> level
> > >>>>>>> of the Gestalt
> > >>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
> > >>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
> > >>>> photographic.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try
> to
> > >>>>>>> accurately reproduce
> > >>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas,
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>>> goal of combinatory
> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories,
> dreams,
> > >>>>>>> musings, and even
> > >>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
> > >>>> objects
> > >>>>>>> and symbols.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways
> > >>> that
> > >>>>>>> things and concepts can be
> > >>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar
> and
> > >>>>> flour.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>                                        I can add water and it
> > >>>>>>> dissolves a bit
> > >>>>>>>>>>>                                        But adding heat
> changes
> > >>>> the
> > >>>>>>> combination into a pancake.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>                     [Is this synergistic?]
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>           Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
> > >>> examples
> > >>>>>>> to put the discussion
> > >>>>>>>>>>>           in the metaphysical realm.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
> > >>> case
> > >>>>> for
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I
> think
> > >>>> it's
> > >>>>>>> not
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
> > >>>>>>> associationists who
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
> > >>> associationism
> > >>>>>>> exists and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as
> mediation.
> > >>>>>>> Vygotsky
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
> > >>>> explain
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels
> for
> > >>>> its
> > >>>>>>> own
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
> > >>> Piagetian
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true
> > >>> maturity
> > >>>>> as a
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more
> to
> > >>> it
> > >>>>>>> than
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
> > >>> primate,
> > >>>>> and
> > >>>>>>> our
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
> > >>> rocks
> > >>>>> in
> > >>>>>>> order
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged
> the
> > >>>> same
> > >>>>>>> way as
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and
> for
> > >>>>>>> language is
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
> > >>>>>>> exceptionalism.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for
> the
> > >>>>>>> vanguard role
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
> > >>>>> prolonging
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after
> the
> > >>>> sick
> > >>>>>>> and the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial
> organs
> > >>>>>>> (tools) and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for
> our
> > >>>>>>> species, it
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
> > >>>>>>> "circuitous,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that
> lead
> > >>>> our
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always
> been
> > >>>>>>> short on
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for
> material
> > >>>>>>> culture
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another
> matter:
> > >>>>>>> verily, here
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
> attention
> > >>> is
> > >>>>>>> simply the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says
> there
> > >>> are
> > >>>>>>> only two
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
> > >>>>>>> imagination is
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences,
> > >>> and
> > >>>>>>> nothing
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when
> you
> > >>>>> hear
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there
> to
> > >>> be
> > >>>>>>> able to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work
> in
> > >>>> word
> > >>>>>>> meaning.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who
> was
> > >>>>> given
> > >>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been
> mixed
> > >>>> with
> > >>>>>>> silver
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of
> > >>> gold.
> > >>>>>>> Well, we
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
> > >>>> possible
> > >>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
> precisely.
> > >>> The
> > >>>>>>> method
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
> "principal
> > >>>> of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
> palimpsest,
> > >>> a
> > >>>>>>> velum on
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each
> other.
> > >>>>> Because
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
> written
> > >>>> over
> > >>>>>>> every
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft,
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>>> pressure
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
> > >>> when
> > >>>>> the
> > >>>>>>> old
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only
> > >>>> known
> > >>>>>>> Greek
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
> > >>>>>>> relationship
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they
> are
> > >>>>>>> related to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite
> > >>>>> similar
> > >>>>>>> to the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <
> > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > >>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
> > >>>>> associationist,
> > >>>>>>> “sees
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
> > >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the
> division
> > >>>>>>> between
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
> > >>> because
> > >>>>>>> Ribot is
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> an
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal
> form
> > >>> of
> > >>>>>>> attention.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
> transition
> > >>>> from
> > >>>>>>> forest
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
> > >>>> between
> > >>>>>>> the two
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
> > >>> commonsensical
> > >>>>>>> world of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly
> prosaic
> > >>>> uses
> > >>>>>>> in life
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
> > >>>>> "imaginative"
> > >>>>>>> (that
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world
> of
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long
> winter
> > >>>>>>> months are
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
> > >>>> encounter
> > >>>>>>> talking
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
> > >>> attention
> > >>>>> has
> > >>>>>>> to be
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a
> very
> > >>>> clear
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
> > >>>>>>> underpins
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
> > >>> points
> > >>>>> out
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
> > >>> practices
> > >>>>>>> really
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> are
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
> > >>>> imagination,
> > >>>>>>> there
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
> > >>> human
> > >>>>> and
> > >>>>>>> animal
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly
> capable
> > >>> of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans).
> > >>>>> Without
> > >>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis
> for
> > >>>>> Ribot's
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
> functions
> > >>> at
> > >>>>>>> all.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > >>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
> imagination,
> > >>>>>>> thanks to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> all
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
> influential
> > >>>>>>> around the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> time
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I
> > >>> had
> > >>>>>>> seen work
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> on
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective
> equal
> > >>>>>>> reproductive?
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies
> of
> > >>>>>>> development
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
> > >>> being
> > >>>> a
> > >>>>>>> relative
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my
> bucket
> > >>>> list.
> > >>>>>>> This
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings
> from
> > >>>> some
> > >>>>>>> weeks
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct
> that
> > >>>>>>> segmented the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
> > >>> aphorizing”.
> > >>>>>>> Puns,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <
> mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > >>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant
> and
> > >>>> they
> > >>>>>>> are
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
> > >>>>>>> followers as an
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by
> Hegel,
> > >>> so
> > >>>>>>> its of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
> > >>>>>>> translation,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> seems
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word,
> "recollection"
> > >>>> in
> > >>>>>>> this
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
> > >>>>>>> distinction to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
> > >>> contemporary
> > >>>>>>> discourse
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
> > >>>>>>> colleagues have
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
> > >>>> theorists
> > >>>>>>> who
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was
> > >>>> still
> > >>>>>>> possible
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
> > >>>>>>> interestingly
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
> > >>>> "voluntary"
> > >>>>>>> act.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children
> stuff
> > >>>>> that
> > >>>>>>> was
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts
> of
> > >>>>>>> creativity
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to
> > >>> see
> > >>>>>>> that the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
> > >>>> himself
> > >>>>>>> writing.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
> > >>> pretty
> > >>>>> old
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary,
> but
> > >>> it
> > >>>>>>> may be
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
> > >>> place
> > >>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
> > >>>>>>> Recollection and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
> > >>>>>>> Imagination,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2)
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination,
> which
> > >>>> he
> > >>>>>>> says
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
> > >>> other
> > >>>>>>> words,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
> > >>>>>>> accomplished
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson
> > >>> and
> > >>>>>>> Williams.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose
> > >>>> work i
> > >>>>>>> am
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
> > >>>>>>> productive
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
> > >>>> imagination
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> develops.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies
> > >>> that
> > >>>>>>> there
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> must
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination.
> > >>> But
> > >>>> I
> > >>>>>>> learned
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears
> > >>> and
> > >>>> is
> > >>>>>>> linked
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part
> of
> > >>>>>>> anticipation
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                 wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
> > >>> imagination
> > >>>>>>> (starting
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous
> look,
> > >>> and
> > >>>>>>> provides
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural
> as
> > >>>>> fixed.
> > >>>>>>> This,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me
> a
> > >>>>> ground
> > >>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> take
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start
> with
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
> grammarian
> > >>>>>>> Langacker on
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive
> domains,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is
> full
> > >>> of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects
> of
> > >>>>>>> temporality:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
> > >>>>>>> structure), which
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
> > >>> both
> > >>>>>>> individual
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
> > >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
> > >>>> *space*
> > >>>>>>> and the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and
> his
> > >>>>>>> notion of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
> > >>>>>>> explored under
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a
> *set* of
> > >>>>>>> modalities
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of
> > >>>> knowing
> > >>>>>>> that is
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
> > >>> [perceived??]
> > >>>> if
> > >>>>>>> we
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as
> > >>> *style*
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to
> say
> > >>> how
> > >>>>>>> jazzed up
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the
> > >>> mind
> > >>>>> as
> > >>>>>>> Larry
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually
> various
> > >>>>>>> triads,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
> > >>> notebooks
> > >>>>> of
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro,
> > >>>> luega
> > >>>>>>> pa’
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
> > >>>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > >>>>>>> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
> > >>>> attached
> > >>>>>>> are two
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
> > >>>>> theorists
> > >>>>>>> like
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
> > >>>>>>> imagination in a
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
> > >>>>>>> productive
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
> > >>>>>>> intention of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated
> in
> > >>> the
> > >>>>>>> attached
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
> > >>>> philosophers,
> > >>>>> I
> > >>>>>>> came
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very
> closely
> > >>>>>>> linked at
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
> > >>>>>>> Ettienne and I
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a
> > >>>> means
> > >>>>> of
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> access
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander
> > >>> Suvorov.
> > >>>>>>> Moreover,
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
> > >>>>> relevance
> > >>>>>>> to
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak
> to
> > >>>>>>> concerns
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
> > >>>> development.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread.
> > >>>>> Perhaps
> > >>>>>>> they
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> > >>> natural
> > >>>>>>> science
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> > >>>> science
> > >>>>>>> with an
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> > >>> science
> > >>>>>>> with an
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>
> > >>>> --
> > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > >>>> Assistant Professor
> > >>>> Department of Anthropology
> > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > >>>> Brigham Young University
> > >>>> Provo, UT 84602
> > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >>>>
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >>
> > >> *Robert Lake  Ed.D.*Associate Professor
> > >> Social Foundations of Education
> > >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> > >> Georgia Southern University
> > >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
> > >> P. O. Box 8144
> > >> Phone: (912) 478-0355
> > >> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> > >> Statesboro, GA  30460
> > >
> >
> >
>
>