[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors

[HENRY SHONERD]

David stirred up a lot of stuff. I was especially interested in his invented dialog (I think invented) between a mother and child, showing how grammar is built from dialog, that is grammar is usage based, rather than usage being grammar based. 
Henry

> On Dec 19, 2014, at 5:41 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> David, Robert, Francine
> I find the insights offered by "grammatical metaphor" [contrasted with
> "lexical metaphor"] and the comparison of Chaucer's use of grammatical
> metaphor in relation TO Newton as potentially pregnant with possibility.
> 
> LINKING also to Hopi ways of moving in the world and Aboriginal ways of
> orienting indicates a potent vantage point for elaborating
> cultural-historical theory and sociocritical literacy.
> Is "metaphor" too vast a topic line. David's examples of "grammatical
> metaphor" within specific historical developments seem to situate science
> and reason and equating in a radically different relation to the
> imaginal?.
> 
> I also wonder if another thread should explore the multiple complex German
> themes of the imaginal in Kant, Hegel, that was recently posted. I was lost
> in the subtle differences but sense these differences in German may be
> relevant to our exploration of the imaginal.
> I am learning the complexity of this theme and "grammatical metaphor" seems
> to be key to different notions of the fact/fiction reciprocal trans-lations
> Larry
> 
> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>> 
>> Message from Francine:
>> 
>> Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result
>> of developing a written language based on an alphabet?
>> 
>> Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ
>> significantly.
>> 
>> And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform,
>> Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience
>> differently.
>> 
>> 
>>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
>>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500
>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
>>> 
>>> Hi Everyone,
>>> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on  the relativistic character of
>>> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of
>>> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and
>>> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological
>>> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways,
>>> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of
>>> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example  of early 20th
>> century
>>> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the
>> present
>>> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought .
>>> 
>>> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north
>>> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to
>>> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when
>>> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say “move a bit
>>> to the east.” To tell you where exactly they left something in your
>> house,
>>> they’ll say, “I left it on the southern edge of the western table.”
>> (Deutscher,
>>> 2010, p. MM 42)
>>> 
>>> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the
>>> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that
>>> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr
>> includes
>>> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise  hand
>>> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition
>>> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the
>>> compass.  Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory
>>> is stored for the speakers of this language.  The story also serves as a
>>> clear example of Vygotsky’s notion of language as a mediating tool as a
>>> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial
>>> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of
>> how
>>> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older
>> person
>>> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into
>>> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to
>>> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned
>> at
>>> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from
>>> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it
>> was
>>> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the
>>> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the
>>> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the
>> cardinal
>>> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the
>>> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The
>>> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more
>>> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story.
>>> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in
>>> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the
>> speaker
>>> was facing in the two films (ibid).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> *Robert*
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think?
>> *The
>>> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
>>>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
>>>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now
>>>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
>>>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
>>>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
>>>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language
>> there
>>>> has to be some change in the nature of communication.
>>>> 
>>>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi
>>>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific
>> writings of
>>>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
>>>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like
>> "bounce
>>>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
>>>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make
>> scientific
>>>> English possible?
>>>> 
>>>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the
>> laws of
>>>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he
>> really
>>>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation".
>> Gravity
>>>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but
>> rather
>>>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!).
>> So
>>>> how and above all why does it become an entity?
>>>> 
>>>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's
>> on
>>>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize
>> almost
>>>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark
>>>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did
>> this;
>>>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
>>>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's
>> lectures
>>>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble
>>>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to
>>>> write his conclusion in the form of a law).
>>>> 
>>>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
>>>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens
>> yields
>>>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from
>> the
>>>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
>>>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the
>>>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be
>>>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun,
>> creating
>>>> an imaginary entity.
>>>> 
>>>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized
>> by a
>>>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or
>> something
>>>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden").
>> We
>>>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the
>> rules.
>>>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through
>> ignorance",
>>>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
>>>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental
>> function is
>>>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical
>>>> metaphor.
>>>> 
>>>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
>> hypothesis
>>>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their
>> homework
>>>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which
>> "do" to
>>>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially
>>>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do
>> students
>>>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a
>> process of
>>>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for
>>>> exchanges:
>>>> 
>>>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
>>>> Child: No.
>>>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
>>>> Child: No.
>>>> Mother: You didn't do well?
>>>> Child: No.
>>>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other
>>>> students do well?
>>>> Child: Some of them.
>>>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do
>> well?
>>>> 
>>>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two
>>>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental
>> function
>>>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental
>> function
>>>> (discourse).
>>>> 
>>>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract
>> and
>>>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical
>> kind.
>>>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful
>> and
>>>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical
>> metaphor
>>>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while
>> the
>>>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I
>> must
>>>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> , or "the
>>>> 
>>>> . He
>>>> 
>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Helena and David,
>>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the
>> so-called
>>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred
>> tradition to
>>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi
>> notion of
>>>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English)
>> notion
>>>> of
>>>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances
>> of
>>>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding,
>> English
>>>> has
>>>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I
>> think the
>>>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that
>> first
>>>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination").
>>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
>>>>> -greg
>>>>> 
>>>>> Taken from:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html
>>>>> 
>>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset"
>> are
>>>> with
>>>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other
>> nouns.
>>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in
>> winter"
>>>> just
>>>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and
>>>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our
>> thought
>>>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without
>>>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time,
>> i.e.
>>>> of
>>>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic
>> phase
>>>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration.
>> Only by
>>>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and
>> another in
>>>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But
>>>> such
>>>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic
>>>> phasing.
>>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
>>>> "phasing."
>>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting
>> binomial
>>>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is
>> implicit for
>>>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like
>> "substance,
>>>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide
>>>> range
>>>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in
>> our
>>>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item,
>> "time."
>>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in
>> the
>>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in
>> the
>>>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and
>>>> think
>>>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again
>> point
>>>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a
>> piece of
>>>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually
>>>> contains
>>>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time."
>>>>> 
>>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are
>> not
>>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are
>> a
>>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and
>> even
>>>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative
>>>> pattern,
>>>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like
>> one
>>>> of
>>>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or
>> "while
>>>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as
>> subjects
>>>> or
>>>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer"
>> or
>>>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions
>> are
>>>> hot,
>>>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or
>>>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an
>> extent, a
>>>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested
>> about
>>>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no
>> basis
>>>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen <
>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>>> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
>>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
>> create
>>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
>> productive,
>>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
>>>> thinking
>>>>>> today."
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you
>> when
>>>>> you
>>>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Helena
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Helena Worthen
>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical"
>> end of
>>>>> what
>>>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
>> Halliday
>>>>> calls
>>>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
>>>> three
>>>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
>>>>>> actually,
>>>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
>>>> name
>>>>>> or a
>>>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
>>>> field
>>>>>> (the
>>>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
>>>>> linguistics)
>>>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
>>>>> effect,
>>>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the
>> "in"
>>>>> has
>>>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a
>> fly in
>>>>> your
>>>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's
>> hands,
>>>>>> refer
>>>>>>> to a book or even a footnote.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
>>>> much
>>>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least
>> as I
>>>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions
>>>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed
>> set
>>>> of
>>>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill
>>>> specific
>>>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications.
>>>>>> Learning
>>>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
>>>> while
>>>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and
>> forget it
>>>>> just
>>>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue
>> that
>>>>>> people
>>>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end
>> of
>>>> the
>>>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp,
>> concrete,
>>>> and
>>>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations
>> that
>>>>> Newton
>>>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
>> create
>>>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
>>>> productive,
>>>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
>>>>> thinking
>>>>>>> today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is
>> the
>>>>> third
>>>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother
>> tongue
>>>>> and
>>>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
>>>> zero
>>>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line',
>> 'on
>>>> a
>>>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they
>> are
>>>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with
>> time:
>>>> 'at
>>>>> a
>>>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
>>>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and
>> "in
>>>>>>> Christmas' (season).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen <
>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
>>>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the
>> conceptual
>>>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and
>>>>>> between 70
>>>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far
>> as" --
>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> is according to
>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
>>>>> ).
>>>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms.
>> Apparently, in
>>>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections
>> in
>>>>> parent
>>>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection
>> like
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial
>> relationships
>>>>>> suggested
>>>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen
>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
>>>>> embodied,
>>>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
>>>> linguistics
>>>>>> (For
>>>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
>>>>> “lexicon”:
>>>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
>>>> being
>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and
>> Halliday
>>>>>> see no
>>>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
>>>> lexico-grammar.
>>>>>> (Lo
>>>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
>>>> adding
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings
>> are
>>>>> great
>>>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of
>> that?
>>>> In
>>>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
>>>>> metaphorical
>>>>>>>> use of prepositions like:
>>>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> and so on.
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>> 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
>>>>>> possibilities:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published
>> in
>>>>>> Thought
>>>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
>>>>> English
>>>>>>>> 1962]
>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the
>> 'additive'
>>>>> value
>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
>>>>>> vocalization).
>>>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements
>> that
>>>> are
>>>>>>>> flammable
>>>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable
>> nor a
>>>>> gas.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
>> European
>>>>>>>> Developmental
>>>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
>>>> hence
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
>>>>> Piaget's
>>>>>>>> Genetic
>>>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and
>> synthesis
>>>>>>>> based on
>>>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>> example of H2O.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be
>> synergistic
>>>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the
>>>> parts.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more
>> than
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can
>> ever
>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> imagined"
>>>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination
>> as
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> brain has
>>>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
>> simplest
>>>>> level
>>>>>>>> of the Gestalt
>>>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
>>>>> photographic.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try
>> to
>>>>>>>> accurately reproduce
>>>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event.
>> Whereas,
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> goal of combinatory
>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories,
>> dreams,
>>>>>>>> musings, and even
>>>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
>>>>> objects
>>>>>>>> and symbols.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different
>> ways
>>>> that
>>>>>>>> things and concepts can be
>>>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar
>> and
>>>>>> flour.
>>>>>>>>>>>>                                        I can add water and
>> it
>>>>>>>> dissolves a bit
>>>>>>>>>>>>                                        But adding heat
>> changes
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> combination into a pancake.
>>>>>>>>>>>>                     [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>           Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
>>>> examples
>>>>>>>> to put the discussion
>>>>>>>>>>>>           in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
>>>> case
>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I
>> think
>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
>>>>>>>> associationists who
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
>>>> associationism
>>>>>>>> exists and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as
>> mediation.
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
>>>>> explain
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species
>> feels for
>>>>> its
>>>>>>>> own
>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
>>>> Piagetian
>>>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true
>>>> maturity
>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing
>> more to
>>>> it
>>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
>>>> primate,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
>>>> rocks
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> order
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged
>> the
>>>>> same
>>>>>>>> way as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and
>> for
>>>>>>>> language is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>>>>>>>> exceptionalism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for
>> the
>>>>>>>> vanguard role
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
>>>>>> prolonging
>>>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after
>> the
>>>>> sick
>>>>>>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial
>> organs
>>>>>>>> (tools) and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for
>> our
>>>>>>>> species, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
>>>>>>>> "circuitous,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that
>> lead
>>>>> our
>>>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always
>> been
>>>>>>>> short on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for
>> material
>>>>>>>> culture
>>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another
>> matter:
>>>>>>>> verily, here
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
>> attention
>>>> is
>>>>>>>> simply the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says
>> there
>>>> are
>>>>>>>> only two
>>>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
>>>>>>>> imagination is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete
>> experiences,
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says,
>> when you
>>>>>> hear
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been
>> there to
>>>> be
>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at
>> work in
>>>>> word
>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who
>> was
>>>>>> given
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been
>> mixed
>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of
>>>> gold.
>>>>>>>> Well, we
>>>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
>>>>> possible
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
>> precisely.
>>>> The
>>>>>>>> method
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
>> "principal
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
>> palimpsest,
>>>> a
>>>>>>>> velum on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each
>> other.
>>>>>> Because
>>>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
>> written
>>>>> over
>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was
>> soft,
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> pressure
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
>>>> when
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> old
>>>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the
>> only
>>>>> known
>>>>>>>> Greek
>>>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor
>> their
>>>>>>>> relationship
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they
>> are
>>>>>>>> related to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's
>> quite
>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>> to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
>>>>>> associationist,
>>>>>>>> “sees
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the
>> division
>>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
>>>> because
>>>>>>>> Ribot is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal
>> form
>>>> of
>>>>>>>> attention.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
>> transition
>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> forest
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
>>>>> between
>>>>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
>>>> commonsensical
>>>>>>>> world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly
>> prosaic
>>>>> uses
>>>>>>>> in life
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
>>>>>> "imaginative"
>>>>>>>> (that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world
>> of
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long
>> winter
>>>>>>>> months are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
>>>>> encounter
>>>>>>>> talking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
>>>> attention
>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a
>> very
>>>>> clear
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism
>> that
>>>>>>>> underpins
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
>>>> points
>>>>>> out
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
>>>> practices
>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
>>>>> imagination,
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
>>>> human
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> animal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly
>> capable
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than
>> humans).
>>>>>> Without
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis
>> for
>>>>>> Ribot's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
>> functions
>>>> at
>>>>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
>> imagination,
>>>>>>>> thanks to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
>> influential
>>>>>>>> around the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century.
>> I
>>>> had
>>>>>>>> seen work
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective
>> equal
>>>>>>>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies
>> of
>>>>>>>> development
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
>>>> being
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> relative
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my
>> bucket
>>>>> list.
>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings
>> from
>>>>> some
>>>>>>>> weeks
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct
>> that
>>>>>>>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
>>>> aphorizing”.
>>>>>>>> Puns,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <
>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant
>> and
>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>>>>>>>> followers as an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by
>> Hegel,
>>>> so
>>>>>>>> its of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>>>>>>>> translation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word,
>> "recollection"
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>>>>>>>> distinction to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
>>>> contemporary
>>>>>>>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>>>>>>>> colleagues have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
>>>>> theorists
>>>>>>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it
>> was
>>>>> still
>>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>>>>>>>> interestingly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
>>>>> "voluntary"
>>>>>>>> act.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children
>> stuff
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts
>> of
>>>>>>>> creativity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious
>> to
>>>> see
>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
>>>>> himself
>>>>>>>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
>>>> pretty
>>>>>> old
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary,
>> but
>>>> it
>>>>>>>> may be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
>>>> place
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>>>>>>>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>>>>>>>> Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination,
>> which
>>>>> he
>>>>>>>> says
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
>>>> other
>>>>>>>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>>>>>>>> accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading
>> Strawson
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists
>> whose
>>>>> work i
>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>>>>>>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive
>> implies
>>>> that
>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive
>> imagination.
>>>> But
>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> learned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination
>> appears
>>>> and
>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> linked
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable
>> part of
>>>>>>>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                 wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>> (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous
>> look,
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural
>> as
>>>>>> fixed.
>>>>>>>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives
>> me a
>>>>>> ground
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start
>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
>> grammarian
>>>>>>>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive
>> domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is
>> full
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two
>> aspects of
>>>>>>>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>>>>>>>> structure), which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
>>>> both
>>>>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
>>>>> *space*
>>>>>>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and
>> his
>>>>>>>> notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion
>> is
>>>>>>>> explored under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a
>> *set* of
>>>>>>>> modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of
>>>>> knowing
>>>>>>>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
>>>> [perceived??]
>>>>> if
>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as
>>>> *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to
>> say
>>>> how
>>>>>>>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild,
>> the
>>>> mind
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually
>> various
>>>>>>>> triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
>>>> notebooks
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap
>> adentro,
>>>>> luega
>>>>>>>> pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
>>>>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
>>>>> attached
>>>>>>>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
>>>>>> theorists
>>>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>>>>>>>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion
>> of
>>>>>>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have
>> no
>>>>>>>> intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated
>> in
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
>>>>> philosophers,
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very
>> closely
>>>>>>>> linked at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our
>> naivete,
>>>>>>>> Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as
>> a
>>>>> means
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander
>>>> Suvorov.
>>>>>>>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
>>>>>> relevance
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak
>> to
>>>>>>>> concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
>>>>> development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination
>> thread.
>>>>>> Perhaps
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
>>>> natural
>>>>>>>> science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F.
>> Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>>>> science
>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>>> science
>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> --
>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>>> Assistant Professor
>>>>> Department of Anthropology
>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>>>> Brigham Young University
>>>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> 
>>> *Robert Lake  Ed.D.*Associate Professor
>>> Social Foundations of Education
>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
>>> Georgia Southern University
>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
>>> P. O. Box 8144
>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355
>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382
>>> Statesboro, GA  30460
>> 
>>