[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Fri Dec 19 13:15:43 PST 2014
Thank you, Francine! Gesture is great stuff. McNeill’s work very interesting, especially, I think, for the rhythmic integration of speech and gesture. I think the Scollons work on this. I won’t in Europe until early summer. Bon voyage.
Henry
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 10:09 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Message from Francine:
>
> Henry, if you go to Amazon Books and type in David McNeill you will
> get a list of his publications. The first one on the list is his most recent
> book from 2012 titled How Language Began: Gesture and Speech in
> Human Evolution (Cambridge University Press).
> It is the third book he has written on this topic.
>
> McNeill's work is based on his empirical research and and interest in
> Vygotsky's writings. So we have actual research, which XMCARs sometimes
> bemoan the lack of.
>
> Bye the way, I would be in Britain this Spring.
>
>> From: hshonerd@gmail.com
>> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:57:07 -0700
>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>
>>
>> So sorry, I can’t find the David McNeill reference. A title? A link? I’ll just google for now.
>> Henry
>>
>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:12 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Message from Francine:
>>>
>>> We want to add these works to a bibliography on imagination.
>>> I.A. Richard's quote is right on the mark and interesting in regard to
>>> David McNeill's research on hand gestures (see my recent post).
>>>
>>> Seems to me that we have a Zeitgeist is emerging in our XMCA community.
>>>
>>>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
>>>> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500
>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>
>>>> Hi Francine,
>>>> I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on
>>>> imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between
>>>> imagination, inner speech and metaphor as
>>>> the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies.
>>>> Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people
>>>> I talked to about this work.
>>>> In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that
>>>> grew directly out of Vico’s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is
>>>> metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language
>>>> derive therefrom” (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of
>>>> all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one
>>>> step further when he suggests that metaphors are “cognitively irreducible”
>>>> (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly
>>>> created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a
>>>> literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote
>>>> something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient
>>>> consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows,
>>>> and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, “new” in some
>>>> wonderful fashion” (Greene, 2001, p 154).
>>>>
>>>> For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-)
>>>>
>>>> The Road Not Taken
>>>> By Robert Frost <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/bio/robert-frost>
>>>> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
>>>> And sorry I could not travel both
>>>> And be one traveler, long I stood
>>>> And looked down one as far as I could
>>>> To where it bent in the undergrowth;
>>>>
>>>> Then took the other, as just as fair,
>>>> And having perhaps the better claim,
>>>> Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
>>>> Though as for that the passing there
>>>> Had worn them really about the same,
>>>>
>>>> And both that morning equally lay
>>>> In leaves no step had trodden black.
>>>> Oh, I kept the first for another day!
>>>> Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
>>>> I doubted if I should ever come back.
>>>>
>>>> I shall be telling this with a sigh
>>>> Somewhere ages and ages hence:
>>>> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
>>>> I took the one less traveled by,
>>>> And that has made all the difference.
>>>> Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536
>>>>
>>>> References
>>>>
>>>> Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers
>>>> College Press.
>>>>
>>>> Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis,
>>>> MN: University of Minnesota Press.
>>>>
>>>> Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford
>>>> University Press.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>
>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>>>
>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>>>>
>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of
>>>>> the
>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are
>>>>> flammable
>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>>>>
>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
>>>>> Developmental
>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's
>>>>> Genetic
>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>>>
>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example
>>>>> of H2O.
>>>>>
>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be
>>>>> imagined"
>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain
>>>>> has
>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of
>>>>> the Gestalt
>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
>>>>> accurately reproduce
>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal
>>>>> of combinatory
>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings,
>>>>> and even
>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and
>>>>> symbols.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that
>>>>> things and concepts can be
>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>>>>> I can add water and it
>>>>> dissolves a bit
>>>>>> But adding heat changes the
>>>>> combination into a pancake.
>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to
>>>>> put the discussion
>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists
>>>>> who
>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism
>>>>> exists and
>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and
>>>>> our
>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in
>>>>> order
>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way
>>>>> as
>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
>>>>> language is
>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>>>>> exceptionalism.
>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard
>>>>> role
>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
>>>>> (tools) and
>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
>>>>> species, it
>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short
>>>>> on
>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily,
>>>>> here
>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is
>>>>> simply the
>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only
>>>>> two
>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination
>>>>> is
>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and
>>>>> nothing
>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word
>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with
>>>>> silver
>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well,
>>>>> we
>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The
>>>>> method
>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum
>>>>> on
>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over
>>>>> every
>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the
>>>>> pressure
>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the
>>>>> old
>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known
>>>>> Greek
>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>>>>> relationship
>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar
>>>>> to the
>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist,
>>>>> “sees
>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because
>>>>> Ribot is
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>>>>> attention.
>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from
>>>>> forest
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between
>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical
>>>>> world of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses
>>>>> in life
>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>>>>> (that
>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
>>>>> months are
>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter
>>>>> talking
>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has
>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
>>>>> underpins
>>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>>>>> really
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination,
>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and
>>>>> animal
>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at
>>>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
>>>>> thanks to
>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
>>>>> around the
>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had
>>>>> seen work
>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>>>>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>>>>> development
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a
>>>>> relative
>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some
>>>>> weeks
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>>>>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
>>>>> Puns,
>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they
>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>>>>> followers as an
>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so
>>>>> its of
>>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>>>>> translation,
>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in
>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>>>>> distinction to
>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>>>>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>>>>> colleagues have
>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists
>>>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>>>>> interestingly
>>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>>>>> act.
>>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that
>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>>>>> creativity
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see
>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>>>>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it
>>>>> may be
>>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>>>>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>>>>> Imagination,
>>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he
>>>>> says
>>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>>>>> words,
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>>>>> accomplished
>>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>>>>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i
>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>>>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>>>>> there
>>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I
>>>>> learned
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is
>>>>> linked
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>>>>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>>>>> (starting
>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>>>>> provides
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>>>>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>>>>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>>>>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>>>>> structure), which
>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space*
>>>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
>>>>> notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
>>>>> explored under
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>>>>> modalities
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing
>>>>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if
>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>>>>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as
>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>>>>> triads,
>>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega
>>>>> pa’
>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached
>>>>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists
>>>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>>>>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>>>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>>>>> intention of
>>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>>>>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I
>>>>> came
>>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
>>>>> linked at
>>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
>>>>> Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>>>>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
>>>>> concerns
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps
>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>>>> science
>>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor
>>>> Social Foundations of Education
>>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
>>>> Georgia Southern University
>>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
>>>> P. O. Box 8144
>>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355
>>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382
>>>> Statesboro, GA 30460
>>>
>>
>>
>
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