[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
Annalisa Aguilar
annalisa@unm.edu
Thu Dec 18 16:35:36 PST 2014
I'd also like to add this quote from the paper by Modell that Robert Lake added to the fray:
page 34:
"What is uniquely human is a generative imagination from which the individual can create an internal unseen world. If the neural correlates of a metaphoric process are established, it is likely to reflect some form of bootstrapping, some form of the brain’s “turning around upon its own schemata,” something analogous to what has been described by Edelman as a “higher order” consciousness that incorporates a capacity for self-reflection. Edelman proposed that a “higher order” consciousness is multilayered and complex, as compared to a comparatively less complex primary consciousness, which is “the remembered present” (1992, p. 109). Edelman does not directly propose a neural theory of metaphor or of imagination, but he does suggest that higher mental functions such as the formation of conceptual categories may reflect “higher-order maps,” that to construct conceptual categories the brain constructs maps of its own activities, that the brain makes maps of its own maps, which are not fixed topographically. Indeterminism is a necessary attribute of such higher-order functions."
--end quote
This would seem that our neuronal functioning must stay agile and flexible in order to make these connections at the "speed of light." This description of "the brain’s 'turning around upon its own schemata,'" seems to correspond to the way that a metaphor functions.
This indeterminism also supports why there is no one method of thinking processes, that each individual's brain is responding to layers of events and cues and its own ecology determines how it "makes sense" of the content that a person is exposed to in "external" and "internal" worlds. (Sorry Martin!) This content exposure will determine maps of maps of maps that are unique to the individual. I also wonder if the reason memory fails us is that we may lose these maps if they are not utilized.
On a little bit different note: Syntax and "indeterminancy" don't seem to go together that well. Meaning does couple with this because meaning can shift based upon use and insight. I'm willing to accept syntax as functioning something like the root or the trunk of the tree, and the branches and leaves being more flexible would be analogous to the infinite ways we can use language through metaphor and combination.
Such is my paltry attempt at a linguistic endeavor.
Kind regards,
Annalisa
________________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 5:09 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
Annalisa touches on so much. I would just like to comment on her last paragraph on hieroglyphs. Apparently all writing systems go through stages starting with pictographs. Some go logographic, like Chinese, where you can see the pictographic beginnings. Other languages go alphabetic, whereby the pictographic beginnings are less apparent. The advantage of the logographic, with Chinese in particular, is that very different spoken varieties of the language (Mandarin and Cantonese) have a common written form. Disadvantage: Lots of characters. The advantage of the alphabetic is the fewer number of characters for writing. Disadvantage: Mismatches of pronunciation and writing over time and space.
Henry
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>
> Before we head into symbolic territory, I'd like to add that metaphors are useful because they are in a sense their own systems of meaning, little subtextual blocks that are lifted from the world, like a photograph.
> Just like a photograph, it is a simulation of the world, in terms of an object in the world, activity in the world, or a relationship in the world. Yet the metaphor cannot stand in for the object, activity, or relationship, because then we would just mean the world in which the metaphor reference sits. So the metaphor must be contextualized in terms of how the speaker means it.
>
> Perhaps this is why we make distinctions between a metaphor, a metonym, a synonym, a simile, or an analogy?
>
> So in this case meaning to the metaphor is like what the photograph references to the photograph.
>
> "This is me, this is a picture of me."
>
> In painting from the middle ages and the Renaissance for example, biblical references are frequently made from objects in the painting, especially with regard to the Christian saints and disciples. These object-references are not isolated to Christianity iconography, but are available in the Greek Pantheon, the Ancient Egyptians, the Mayans, the Incans, the Aztecs, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other cultures with close proximity to natural environments. It would seem that this is something humans _do_ with imagery.
>
> Over time, these metaphors become a kind of language on their own, but they require a context in order to unlock their meaning. That's why I like to compare them to photographs because an "enlightened" audience is required, not just a speaker.
>
> Hieroglyphs are interesting to me because they are like letters, but they are not letters. They are like pictures, but then they are not pictures.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Annalisa
>
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 3:12 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors
>
> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
>
> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive,
> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking
> today."
>
> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
>
> Thank you,
>
> Helena
>
>
> Helena Worthen
> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>
>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what
>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls
>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three
>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
>>
>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually,
>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a
>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
>>
>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the
>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics)
>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
>>
>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect,
>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has
>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your
>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer
>> to a book or even a footnote.
>>
>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much
>> define the difference between learning and development, at least as I
>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions
>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of
>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific
>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning
>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while
>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just
>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
>>
>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people
>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the
>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and
>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive,
>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking
>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third
>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and
>> the break into disciplinary language in school work).
>>
>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero
>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a
>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are
>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a
>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in
>> Christmas' (season).
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>
>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual
>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70
>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this
>>> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm).
>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in
>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent
>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
>>>
>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the
>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested
>>> by contemporary prepositions.
>>>
>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
>>>
>>> Helena Worthen
>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>
>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>>
>>>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied,
>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For
>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on “lexicon”:
>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part
>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no
>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo
>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the
>>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great
>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In
>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
>>>> Henry
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical
>>> use of prepositions like:
>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>>>>
>>>>> and so on.
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English
>>> 1962]
>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value
>>> of the
>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are
>>> flammable
>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
>>> Developmental
>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's
>>> Genetic
>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis
>>> based on
>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's
>>> example of H2O.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be
>>> imagined"
>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the
>>> brain has
>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level
>>> of the Gestalt
>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
>>> accurately reproduce
>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the
>>> goal of combinatory
>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams,
>>> musings, and even
>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects
>>> and symbols.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that
>>> things and concepts can be
>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>>>>>> I can add water and it
>>> dissolves a bit
>>>>>>> But adding heat changes the
>>> combination into a pancake.
>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples
>>> to put the discussion
>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's
>>> not
>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
>>> associationists who
>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism
>>> exists and
>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain
>>> the
>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its
>>> own
>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it
>>> than
>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and
>>> our
>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in
>>> order
>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same
>>> way as
>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
>>> language is
>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>>> exceptionalism.
>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the
>>> vanguard role
>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick
>>> and the
>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
>>> (tools) and
>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
>>> species, it
>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
>>> "circuitous,
>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been
>>> short on
>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material
>>> culture
>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter:
>>> verily, here
>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is
>>> simply the
>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are
>>> only two
>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
>>> imagination is
>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and
>>> nothing
>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear
>>> the
>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be
>>> able to
>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word
>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given
>>> a
>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with
>>> silver
>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold.
>>> Well, we
>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The
>>> method
>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a
>>> velum on
>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over
>>> every
>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the
>>> pressure
>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the
>>> old
>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known
>>> Greek
>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>>> relationship
>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are
>>> related to
>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar
>>> to the
>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist,
>>> “sees
>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
>>> between
>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because
>>> Ribot is
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>>> attention.
>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from
>>> forest
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between
>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical
>>> world of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses
>>> in life
>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>>> (that
>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
>>> months are
>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter
>>> talking
>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has
>>> to be
>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
>>> underpins
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out
>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>>> really
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination,
>>> there
>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and
>>> animal
>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without
>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at
>>> all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
>>> thanks to
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
>>> around the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had
>>> seen work
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>>> development
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a
>>> relative
>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some
>>> weeks
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
>>> Puns,
>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they
>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>>> followers as an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so
>>> its of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>>> translation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in
>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>>> distinction to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>>> colleagues have
>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists
>>> who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>>> interestingly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>>> act.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that
>>> was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>>> creativity
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see
>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>>> ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it
>>> may be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>>> Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he
>>> says
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>>> accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i
>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I
>>> learned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is
>>> linked
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>>> (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>>> provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground
>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>>> structure), which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space*
>>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
>>> notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
>>> explored under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>>> modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing
>>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if
>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as
>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>>> triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of
>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega
>>> pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached
>>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists
>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>>> intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I
>>> came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
>>> linked at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
>>> Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance
>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
>>> concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps
>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>> science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
>
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