[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 14:02:18 PST 2014
I am confident Helena knows more than I, but perhaps what I know is complementary. David K. has spoken of “open” and “closed” word classes. Traditionally semantics focuses on the open classes (nouns, verbs, adjectives) which are constantly being added to, constantly dropping out of usage,. Prepositions and verb inflections are part of the closed classes whose members are smaller in number and come into a language and drop out more slowly. It may be because of the difference in the speed with which the two classes change that accounts for the focus in traditional semantics on the open classes vis-a-vis the closed. The closed classes are like water for fish? Or oxygen for humans. You just don’t think about it. Vygotsky has said somewhere that science is about discovering such open secrets? Hiding in plain sight.
Henry
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 12:32 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses.
>
> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions.
>
> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
>
> Helena Worthen
> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>
>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on “lexicon”: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
>> Henry
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like:
>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>>
>>> and so on.
>>> Andy
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>
>>>
>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>
>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>>
>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>>>
>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the
>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable
>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>>>
>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental
>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic
>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>>
>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>
>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>>
>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined"
>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>>
>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has
>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt
>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>>>
>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce
>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory
>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even
>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols.
>>>>>
>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be
>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>>>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit
>>>>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake.
>>>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>>
>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion
>>>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who
>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and
>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky
>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our
>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order
>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as
>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is
>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism.
>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role
>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the
>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and
>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it
>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on
>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here
>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the
>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two
>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is
>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing
>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the
>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to
>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver
>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we
>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method
>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on
>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every
>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure
>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old
>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek
>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship
>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to
>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the
>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, “sees
>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an
>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing.
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
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