[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 10:12:58 PST 2014
Good on Robert! For me, Robert Frost’s poem connects with the quote from Shakespeare in Andy’s article, Activity, Power, and Human Flourishing:
> “There is a tide in the affairs of men.
> Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
> Omitted, all the voyage of their life
> Is bound in shallows and in miseries."
> [Julius Caesar, Act 4]
The difference is that Frost is talking about the individual, Shakespeare (and Andy) about creative collaboration.
I love this thread!
Henry
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 8:57 AM, Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Francine,
> I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on
> imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between
> imagination, inner speech and metaphor as
> the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies.
> Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people
> I talked to about this work.
> In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that
> grew directly out of Vico’s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is
> metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language
> derive therefrom” (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of
> all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one
> step further when he suggests that metaphors are “cognitively irreducible”
> (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly
> created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a
> literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote
> something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient
> consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows,
> and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, “new” in some
> wonderful fashion” (Greene, 2001, p 154).
>
> For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-)
>
> The Road Not Taken
> By Robert Frost <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/bio/robert-frost>
> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
> And sorry I could not travel both
> And be one traveler, long I stood
> And looked down one as far as I could
> To where it bent in the undergrowth;
>
> Then took the other, as just as fair,
> And having perhaps the better claim,
> Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
> Though as for that the passing there
> Had worn them really about the same,
>
> And both that morning equally lay
> In leaves no step had trodden black.
> Oh, I kept the first for another day!
> Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
> I doubted if I should ever come back.
>
> I shall be telling this with a sigh
> Somewhere ages and ages hence:
> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
> I took the one less traveled by,
> And that has made all the difference.
> Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536
>
> References
>
> Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers
> College Press.
>
> Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis,
> MN: University of Minnesota Press.
>
> Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford
> University Press.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>
>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>
>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>
>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of
>> the
>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are
>> flammable
>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>
>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
>> Developmental
>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's
>> Genetic
>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>
>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example
>> of H2O.
>>
>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>
>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>
>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be
>> imagined"
>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>
>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>
>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain
>> has
>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of
>> the Gestalt
>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>
>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>
>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
>> accurately reproduce
>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal
>> of combinatory
>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings,
>> and even
>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and
>> symbols.
>>>
>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that
>> things and concepts can be
>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>> I can add water and it
>> dissolves a bit
>>> But adding heat changes the
>> combination into a pancake.
>>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>>
>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to
>> put the discussion
>>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>
>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists
>> who
>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism
>> exists and
>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>> Vygotsky
>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>
>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and
>> our
>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in
>> order
>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way
>> as
>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>
>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
>> language is
>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>> exceptionalism.
>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard
>> role
>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and
>> the
>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
>> (tools) and
>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
>> species, it
>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short
>> on
>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily,
>> here
>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>
>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is
>> simply the
>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only
>> two
>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination
>> is
>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and
>> nothing
>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear
>> the
>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able
>> to
>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word
>> meaning.
>>>>
>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with
>> silver
>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well,
>> we
>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The
>> method
>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>
>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum
>> on
>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over
>> every
>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the
>> pressure
>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the
>> old
>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known
>> Greek
>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>
>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>> relationship
>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related
>> to
>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar
>> to the
>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>
>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>
>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist,
>> “sees
>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>> Henry
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
>> between
>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because
>> Ribot is
>>>>> an
>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>> attention.
>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from
>> forest
>>>>> to
>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between
>> the two
>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical
>> world of
>>>>> the
>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses
>> in life
>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>> (that
>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
>> months are
>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter
>> talking
>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has
>> to be
>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
>> underpins
>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out
>> the
>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>> really
>>>>> are
>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination,
>> there
>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and
>> animal
>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>> volitional
>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without
>> a
>>>>> theory
>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at
>> all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
>> thanks to
>>>>> all
>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
>> around the
>>>>> time
>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had
>> seen work
>>>>> on
>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>> reproductive?
>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>> development
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a
>> relative
>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>> This
>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some
>> weeks
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>> segmented the
>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
>> Puns,
>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they
>> are
>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
>> followers as an
>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so
>> its of
>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
>> translation,
>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in
>> this
>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
>> distinction to
>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>> discourse
>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
>> colleagues have
>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists
>> who
>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>> possible
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>> interestingly
>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>> act.
>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that
>> was
>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>> creativity
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see
>> that the
>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>> writing.
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>> ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it
>> may be
>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>> Imagination,
>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he
>> says
>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>> words,
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
>> accomplished
>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i
>> am
>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>> there
>>>>> must
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I
>> learned
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is
>> linked
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>> anticipation
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>> (starting
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>> provides
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground
>> to
>>>>> take
>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
>> structure), which
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>> individual
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space*
>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
>> notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
>> explored under
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>> modalities
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing
>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if
>> we
>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>> jazzed up
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as
>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>> triads,
>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of
>> the
>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega
>> pa’
>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached
>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists
>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>> intention of
>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I
>> came
>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
>> linked at
>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
>> Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>> access
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance
>> to
>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
>> concerns
>>>>> about
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps
>> they
>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>> science
>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>> with an
>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>> with an
>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
>
> --
>
> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor
> Social Foundations of Education
> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> Georgia Southern University
> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
> P. O. Box 8144
> Phone: (912) 478-0355
> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> Statesboro, GA 30460
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