[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Thu Dec 18 01:54:15 PST 2014
the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical
use of prepositions like:
- "there is some value IN your argument"
- "I'd like to go OVER that again"
- "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
- "Let's go THROUGH that again"
and so on.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
larry smolucha wrote:
> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>
> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>
> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>
> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the
> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable
> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>
> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental
> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic
> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>
> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O.
>
>
>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>
>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>
>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined"
>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>
>> A couple things to consider:
>>
>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has
>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt
>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>
>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>
>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce
>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory
>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even
>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols.
>>
>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be
>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit
>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake.
>> [Is this synergistic?]
>>
>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion
>> in the metaphysical realm.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>
>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who
>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and
>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky
>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>
>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our
>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order
>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as
>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>
>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is
>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism.
>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role
>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the
>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and
>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it
>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on
>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here
>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>
>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the
>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two
>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is
>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing
>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the
>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to
>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning.
>>>
>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver
>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we
>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method
>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>
>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on
>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every
>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure
>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old
>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek
>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>
>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship
>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to
>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the
>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>
>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>
>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, “sees
>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>> Henry
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is
>>>>>
>>>> an
>>>>
>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest
>>>>>
>>>> to
>>>>
>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of
>>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>
>>>> farm,where
>>>>
>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>
>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins
>>>>>
>>>> Ribot
>>>>
>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really
>>>>>
>>>> are
>>>>
>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>
>>>> volitional
>>>>
>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a
>>>>>
>>>> theory
>>>>
>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to
>>>>>>
>>>> all
>>>>
>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the
>>>>>>
>>>> time
>>>>
>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work
>>>>>>
>>>> on
>>>>
>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development
>>>>>>
>>>> of
>>>>
>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks
>>>>>>>
>>>> in
>>>>
>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
>>>>>>>>
>>>> doing
>>>>
>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an
>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
>>>>>>>>
>>>> seems
>>>>
>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> links
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> also
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity
>>>>>>>>
>>>> and
>>>>
>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> two
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing.
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> (2)
>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> through
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> develops.
>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> must
>>>>
>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> a
>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> take
>>>>
>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> particularly
>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> imagination
>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> think
>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> access
>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>> about
>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> will
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>
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