[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Tue Dec 2 19:39:49 PST 2014
Muito obrigado!
> On Dec 2, 2014, at 5:50 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> I do not have a copy of the distributed cognition article with Engestrom,
> either, Henry.
> Maybe someone on the list does, or I can get one made.
>
> Here is a copy of a paper by Ed Hutchins originally given as a talk at a
> Sylvia Scribner
> memorial meeting at (I think) the anthro meetings. I think lots of
> affinities between perspectives are on display here.
> mike
> for the "this thread" library :-)
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 4:23 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I’m game. I tried to find your article with Engstrom and got nowhere. I
>> would like to read it. I need an affordance here to see if I’m using the
>> right word.
>> Henry
>>
>>> On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:44 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
>>>
>>> Michael
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>
>>> Interloper, Michael?
>>>
>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive
>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on
>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered
>>> up.
>>>
>>> mike
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He
>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between
>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning
>> are
>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if
>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a
>> complex
>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on
>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context
>> may
>>>> result in organic affordances in another context.
>>>>
>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he
>> was
>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
>> constraints.
>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or
>> are
>>>> they designed to create constraints.
>>>>
>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
>> mention
>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an
>>>> interloper.
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>
>>>> Annalisa-
>>>>
>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not
>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the
>> d-cog
>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
>>>>
>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the
>> notion
>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of
>> these
>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in
>>>>
>>>> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
>>>> distributed*
>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological
>> and
>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Mike,
>>>>>
>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that
>>>> wish!
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I
>> was
>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned
>> about
>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985).
>>>>>
>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
>>>>>
>>>>> I looked here for clarity:
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
>>>>>
>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
>> cognitive
>>>>> artifacts?
>>>>>
>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play,
>> and
>>>>> even joy!
>>>>>
>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until
>> then
>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>
>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
>> artifacts
>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source
>> that
>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might
>> be a
>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro
>>>> for
>>>>> newcomers to the discussion.
>>>>>
>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
>> newcomer's
>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to
>>>> sort
>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
>>>> insuficiently
>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
>>>>>
>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks,
>> so
>>>>> little time"!
>>>>>
>>>>> Mike
>>>>>
>>>>> A
>>>>>
>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation"
>> is
>>>>>> coming closer!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory
>> of
>>>>>> affordances.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But
>>>> I
>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
>>>> important
>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade
>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If
>>>>> you
>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to
>>>>> your
>>>>>> reply, Martin.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at
>>>> UCSD
>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences
>>>> your
>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>>>> community
>>>>> in
>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
>>>> phrased
>>>>>> that way).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Martin
>>>> John
>>>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to
>>>> me
>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even
>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in
>> the
>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define
>> the
>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we
>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
>>>> anything
>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
>>>> Titchener
>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior
>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have
>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading
>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read
>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
>>>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
>>>> experience
>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately
>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel fresco
>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she
>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the
>>>>>> root of all thinking.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon
>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I
>>>>> like
>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by
>>>> the
>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
>>>> Hackett
>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you
>>>>> already
>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing
>>>> to
>>>>>> take a look.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
>>>> controversial.
>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says
>>>>> "this
>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
>>>> observation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that
>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand?
>>>>> Just a
>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Larry
>>>>> Purss <
>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David K
>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My
>>>> reason
>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a
>>>>> basic
>>>>>>>> question.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding
>>>>>> images
>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological
>>>>> path
>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character
>>>>> of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
>>>>> brackets -
>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> AND
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
>>>>> metaphor
>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
>>>>>>>> *objectivity*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself
>>>>> *in*
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images
>>>> has
>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>> established.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this
>>>> topic
>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>> become [again]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental]
>>>> and
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It
>>>> seems
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
>>>>>> writings
>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> <Hutchins Cockpit.pdf>
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