[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
Ed Wall
ewall@umich.edu
Tue Dec 2 13:19:18 PST 2014
Mike
Nice and important.
Ed
On Dec 2, 2014, at 2:10 PM, mike cole wrote:
> How interesting:
> techno
>
> word-forming element meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical,
> technology," from Latinized form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of
> tekhne "art,
> skill, craft in work; method, system, an art, a system or method of making
> or doing," from PIE *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from
> suffixed form of root *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates:
> Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to
> weave;" see texture
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=texture&allowed_in_frame=0>(n.)).
>
> *And contextere traces its roots back to the same morpheme. *
> *Context as weaving together*
> *mike*
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 2 December 2014 at 17:43, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Huw,
>>>
>>> Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing
>> it
>>> at this point. Could you explain what you mean by technical?
>>>
>>
>> Yes. In this sense pertaining to the etymological origins:
>>
>> http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0
>>
>> techno-
>> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0>
>> [image:
>> Look up techno- at Dictionary.com]
>> <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=techno->word-forming element
>> meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from Latinized
>> form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in work;
>> method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE
>> *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root
>> *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan "carpenter,"
>> Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture
>> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=texture&allowed_in_frame=0>
>> (n.)).
>>
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>> Michael
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>
>>> I'd take a look.
>>>
>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of
>> your
>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically
>>> manifest.
>>>
>>> Huw
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> ]
>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>
>>>> Interloper, Michael?
>>>>
>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and
>> cognitive
>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom
>> on
>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be
>> gathered
>>>> up.
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He
>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish
>>> between
>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.
>> Meaning
>>>> are
>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word,
>> if
>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a
>>>> complex
>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based
>> on
>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one
>> context
>>>> may
>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context.
>>>>>
>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that
>> he
>>>> was
>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
>>>> constraints.
>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or
>>> are
>>>>> they designed to create constraints.
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
>>> mention
>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an
>>>>> interloper.
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> ]
>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>
>>>>> Annalisa-
>>>>>
>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation
>> not
>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the
>>>> d-cog
>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
>>>>>
>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the
>>>> notion
>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of
>>> these
>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in
>>>>>
>>>>> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
>>>>> distributed*
>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition:
>> Psychological
>>>> and
>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Mike,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied
>> that
>>>>> wish!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections.
>> I
>>>> was
>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned
>>>> about
>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science
>> (1985).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I looked here for clarity:
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
>>>> cognitive
>>>>>> artifacts?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in
>> play,
>>>> and
>>>>>> even joy!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however
>> until
>>>> then
>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>
>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
>>>> artifacts
>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a
>> source
>>>> that
>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it
>> might
>>>> be a
>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of
>>> intro
>>>>> for
>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
>>>> newcomer's
>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking
>>> to
>>>>> sort
>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
>>>>> insuficiently
>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many
>>> rocks,
>>>> so
>>>>>> little time"!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental
>>> representation"
>>>> is
>>>>>>> coming closer!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's
>>> theory
>>>> of
>>>>>>> affordances.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed
>> article.
>>>> But
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
>>>>> important
>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
>>>> grenade
>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the
>> list.
>>>> If
>>>>>> you
>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look
>> forward
>>> to
>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> reply, Martin.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being
>>> at
>>>>> UCSD
>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that
>>> influences
>>>>> your
>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>>>>> community
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
>>>>> phrased
>>>>>>> that way).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
>>> Martin
>>>>> John
>>>>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is
>> interesting,
>>> to
>>>>> me
>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used,
>>>> even
>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images
>> in
>>>> the
>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to
>> define
>>>> the
>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight"
>> when
>>>> we
>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
>>>>> anything
>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe
>>> available
>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations
>>> are
>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century.
>>> In
>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
>>>>> Titchener
>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated
>> that
>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
>>>> anterior
>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would
>> not
>>>> have
>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
>>>> reading
>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than
>> I
>>> am
>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels
>> like
>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do
>> NOT
>>>> read
>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure
>> of
>>>>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any
>>> actual
>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
>>>>> experience
>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then
>>> deliberately
>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel
>>>> fresco
>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He
>> or
>>>> she
>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting
>>> and
>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not
>>> notice
>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in
>>> it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <
>> annalisa@unm.edu
>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are
>> at
>>>> the
>>>>>>> root of all thinking.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently,
>> based
>>>> upon
>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a
>>> phrase
>>>> I
>>>>>> like
>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it
>>> by
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
>>>>> Hackett
>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have
>> you
>>>>>> already
>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be
>>> willing
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> take a look.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
>>>>> controversial.
>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone
>>> says
>>>>>> "this
>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
>>>>> observation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever
>>>> that
>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at
>>> hand?
>>>>>> Just a
>>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model,
>> metaphoricity?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
>> Larry
>>>>>> Purss <
>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> David K
>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce.
>> My
>>>>> reason
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path
>>> pursuing a
>>>>>> basic
>>>>>>>>> question.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
>>>> guiding
>>>>>>> images
>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring
>>> appearances
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new
>>> phenomenological
>>>>>> path
>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names
>>> this
>>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
>>>> image-character
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
>>>>>> brackets -
>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> AND
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject*
>> finds
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
>>>>>> metaphor
>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated
>>> in
>>>>>>>>> *objectivity*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of
>>> itself
>>>>>> *in*
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding
>>> images
>>>>> has
>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>> established.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the
>> path
>>> of
>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived
>>>> from
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial
>> this
>>>>> topic
>>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>>> become [again]
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this
>>>> basic
>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these
>>> images
>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images
>> emerge
>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is
>>> transcendental]
>>>>> and
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical].
>> It
>>>>> seems
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in
>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>>> writings
>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of
>>> XMCA. I
>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>>> an
>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>> an
>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
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