[Xmca-l] Re: How basic are images?

Tue Dec 2 09:43:45 PST 2014

Hi Huw,

Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing it at this point.  Could you explain what you mean by technical?

Michael
________________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?

I'd take a look.

Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.  My equivalent of your
perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically manifest.

Huw

On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu> wrote:

> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
>
> Michael
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>
> Interloper, Michael?
>
> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive
> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on
> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered
> up.
>
> mike
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
>
> > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).  He
> > actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish between
> > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
> > designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.  Meaning
> are
> > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
> > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if
> > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a
> complex
> > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on
> > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context
> may
> > result in organic affordances in another context.
> >
> > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he
> was
> > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
> constraints.
> > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are
> > they designed to create constraints.
> >
> > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention
> > just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of an
> > interloper.
> >
> > Michael
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >
> > Annalisa-
> >
> > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not
> > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
> > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
> > Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of the
> d-cog
> > idea which also has deep roots in chat.
> >
> > No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among the
> notion
> > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion  of these
> > connections can be found, among other places, in
> >
> >  Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
> > distributed*
> > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological
> and
> > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
> >
> > mike
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Hi Mike,
> > >
> > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that
> > wish!
> > >
> > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I
> was
> > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned
> about
> > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985).
> > >
> > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
> > >
> > > I looked here for clarity:
> > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
> > >
> > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
> cognitive
> > > artifacts?
> > >
> > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play,
> and
> > > even joy!
> > >
> > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until
> then
> > > I will remain with the ineffable.
> > >
> > > Kind regards,
> > >
> > > Annalisa
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> > > on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> > >
> > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
> > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
> artifacts
> > > right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a source
> that
> > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might
> be a
> > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro
> > for
> > > newcomers to the discussion.
> > >
> > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
> newcomer's
> > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to
> > sort
> > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
> > insuficiently
> > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
> > >
> > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks,
> so
> > > little time"!
> > >
> > > Mike
> > >
> > > A
> > >
> > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Martin!
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation"
> is
> > > > coming closer!
> > > >
> > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory
> of
> > > > affordances.
> > > >
> > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article.
> But
> > I
> > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
> > important
> > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
> > > >
> > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
> grenade
> > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list.
> If
> > > you
> > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to
> > > your
> > > > reply, Martin.
> > > >
> > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at
> > UCSD
> > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences
> > your
> > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
> > community
> > > in
> > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
> > phrased
> > > > that way).
> > > >
> > > > Kind regards,
> > > >
> > > > Annalisa
> > > > ________________________________________
> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Martin
> > John
> > > > Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
> > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> > > >
> > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to
> > me
> > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used,
> even
> > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in
> the
> > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define
> the
> > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
> > > >
> > > > Martin
> > > >
> > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > <javascript:;>> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Larry, Annalisa:
> > > > >
> > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when
> we
> > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
> > anything
> > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
> > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
> > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
> > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
> > > > > non-image based mental representation.
> > > > >
> > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
> > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
> > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
> > Titchener
> > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
> > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
> > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
> anterior
> > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not
> have
> > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
> > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
> reading
> > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
> > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
> > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT
> read
> > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
> > > > >
> > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
> > > > >
> > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
> > > > > Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
> > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
> > experience
> > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then deliberately
> > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
> > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus.
> > > > >
> > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel
> fresco
> > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or
> she
> > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
> > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
> > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
> > > > >
> > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > >
> > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
> > > > <javascript:;>> wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Hi Larry and David,
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at
> the
> > > > root of all thinking.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based
> upon
> > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
> > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase
> I
> > > like
> > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by
> > the
> > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
> > Hackett
> > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you
> > > already
> > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing
> > to
> > > > take a look.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
> > controversial.
> > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says
> > > "this
> > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
> > observation.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever
> that
> > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand?
> > > Just a
> > > > thought.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
> > > > >>
> > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Kind regards,
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Annalisa
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> ________________________________________
> > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Larry
> > > Purss <
> > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
> > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
> > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
> > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
> > > > >>
> > > > >> David K
> > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My
> > reason
> > > > for
> > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a
> > > basic
> > > > >> question.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
> guiding
> > > > images
> > > > >> upon which thinking rests"
> > > > >>
> > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances
> > and
> > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological
> > > path
> > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
> > > > process
> > > > >> *metaphoricity*.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
> image-character
> > > of
> > > > the
> > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
> > > brackets -
> > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> AND
> > > > >>
> > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds
> the
> > > > >> meaning of its very self.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
> > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
> > > metaphor
> > > > can
> > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
> > > > >> *objectivity*
> > > > >>
> > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself
> > > *in*
> > > > the
> > > > >> mode [path] of the concept
> > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images
> > has
> > > > been
> > > > >> established.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
> > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived
> from
> > > the
> > > > >> image-character of the guiding image.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this
> > topic
> > > > may
> > > > >> become [again]
> > > > >>
> > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this
> basic
> > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images
> as
> > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
> > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental]
> > and
> > > > is
> > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It
> > seems
> > > to
> > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
> > > > writings
> > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
> > > > >> personally am following this path for now.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Larry
> > > > >>
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>
>